Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 29

Karolina Hird, Mason Clark, and George Barros

May 29, 5:30 pm ET

New reports confirmed that Ukrainian forces conducted a successful limited counterattack near the Kherson-Mykolaiv oblast border on May 28, forcing Russian forces onto the defensive. This Ukrainian counterattack is likely intended to disrupt Russian efforts to establish strong defensive positions along the Southern Axis. While the Ukrainian counterattack does not appear likely to retake substantial territory in the near term, it will likely disrupt Russian operations and potentially force Russia to deploy reinforcements to the Kherson region, which is predominantly held by sub-standard units. Ukrainian counterattacks may additionally slow Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of occupied southern Ukraine.[1]

Russian forces continued to assault Severodonetsk on May 29 but did not make any confirmed advances; Russian progress in intense urban combat will likely be slow. The Russian campaign in eastern Ukraine—which previously aimed to capture the entirety of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts—is now focused almost entirely on Severodonetsk. Russian troops are unlikely to be able to conduct multiple simultaneous operations and will likely further deprioritize advances southeast of Izyum and west of Lyman in favor of concentrating available forces on Severodonetsk in the coming days.

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces continued attempts to take full control of Severodonetsk.
• Russian forces continued offensives southeast of Izyum but did not make any confirmed advances toward Slovyansk.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations to cut Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) northeast of Bakhmut and appear unlikely to attempt to directly assault the city.
• The Ukrainian counteroffensive in northwestern Kherson Oblast has forced Russian troops to take up defensive positions and will likely disrupt Russian efforts to effectively dig in and consolidate control of occupied areas along the Southern Axis.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time. We have stopped coverage of Mariupol as a separate effort since the city’s fall. We had added a new section on activities in Russian-occupied areas:

• Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
• Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv City;
• Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Izyum toward Slovyansk but did not make any confirmed advances on May 29. Russian troops unsuccessfully attacked Bohorodychne, about 30 km southeast of Izyum.[2] Russian forces additionally shelled Ukrainian positions southwest of Izyum around Husarivka, Velyka Komyshuvakha, and Virnopillya, and to the southeast of Izyum around Dovehenke and Raihorodok.[3] Russian efforts south of Izyum have likely shifted from being a key effort to a subordinate action increasingly intended to support offensive operations around Lyman. Advances in both southeastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast are now subordinate to the dominant Russian effort in the Donbas, the encirclement of Severodonetsk.[4]

Russian forces continued ground assaults against Severodonetsk itself on May 29, though ISW cannot confirm any specific advances. The Ukrainian General Staff stated on May 29 that Russian troops intend to encircle Severodonetsk and Lysychansk and cut the main Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the area, as ISW has previously assessed.[5] Russian forces additionally attempted to advance northward toward Severodonetsk from Bobrove and Ustynivka.[6] Head of Luhansk Regional State Administration Serhiy Haidai emphasized that Ukrainian troops are still in control of Severodonetsk, denying Chechen Leader Ramzan Kadyrov’s false claims that Severodonetsk is under full Russian control as of May 28.[7] Haidai additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a limited counterattack and drove a Russian grouping out of Toshkivka, which may put pressure on Russian operations in the vicinity of Popasna.[8]

Russian forces continued offensive operations to push westward of the Luhansk Oblast administrative border and cut Ukrainian GLOCs northeast of Bakhmut, rather than advancing toward Bakhmut itself, on May 29. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian troops are fighting around Volodymyrivka, Vasylivka, Komyshuvakha, and Myronivka those troops likely intend to reach and block the Bakmut-Lysychansk T1302 highway.[9] Russian forces around Donetsk City continued unsuccessful assaults around Avdiivka.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian troops intensified air, mortar, artillery, and rocket strikes in western Donetsk Oblast around Kurakhove on May 29.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff has not reported any Russian offensive operations around Kurakhove since May 16, and this report may indicate Russian efforts to renew offensive operations in this sector to support stalled Russian operations towards Zaporizhia.[12]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)

Russian forces focused on maintaining their positions north of Kharkiv City and fired on surrounding settlements on May 29.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces fired on Cherkasy Tyshky, Ruski Tyshky, Petrivka, and Ternova to deter further Ukrainian advances toward the international border.[14] A Russian Telegram channel claimed that Ukrainian forces took heavy losses during fighting in Ternova and that Russian troops have subsequently stopped Ukrainian pushes toward the international border.[15]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

The ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive in northwestern Kherson Oblast did not make any confirmed advances on May 29, and Russian forces focused on maintaining their defensive positions and launching limited attacks to regain lost ground.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces took up defensive positions in Kostromka, a settlement in northwestern Kherson Oblast within 10 km of the Kherson-Mykolaiv oblast border.[17] Reporting by Russian and Ukrainian sources indicates that Ukrainian troops likely conducted a counter-offensive south of the village of Davydiv Brid and east of the Inhulets River on May 28.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces are attempting to recapture positions in Andriivka, Bilohirka, and Bila Krynytsia, indicating the Ukrainian counteroffensive south of Davydiv Brid recaptured these positions on the Kherson-Mykolaiv border on May 28.[19] Russian forces are reportedly fighting around Vysokopillya, Dobryanka, and Kochubeivka, all settlements in northern Kherson Oblast.[20] Russian forces conducted artillery strikes against Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts and a missile strike against Kryvyi Rih.[21]

Activity in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Russian forces continued to consolidate their administrative control of occupied regions on May 29. Russian occupation forces are reportedly shipping looted rolled steel and metal to Russia through the Port of Mariupol.[22] The Russian-backed head of Kherson’s civil-military administration, Kirill Stremousov, told Reuters that the decision for Kherson to join Russia will likely occur next year and walked back his previous statements that Kherson would join Russia automatically by stating there will be a “referendum.”[23] Stremousov said that the occupation administration is focusing on restoring order in Kherson before making decisions on a potential referendum to join the Russian Federation, indicating that Ukrainian partisan activities may be disrupting ongoing efforts to consolidate full Russian administrative control of Kherson Oblast.

 

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[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/pro-moscow-kherson-official-sees-decision-towards-next-year-joining-russia-2022-05-28/

[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327663802880038; https://t.me/swodki/105539

[3] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328041022842316; https://t.me/swodki/105539; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327663802880038

[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328041022842316; https://t.me/strelkovii/2618

[5] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328041022842316

[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327663802880038

[7] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3015; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/2215

[8] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3015

[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327663802880038; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328041022842316

[10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327663802880038; https://t.me/strelkovii/2618

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328041022842316; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327663802880038

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328041022842316; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327663802880038

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327663802880038

[15] https://t.me/swodki/105539

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328041022842316; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327663802880038; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=685558229176861

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327663802880038

[18] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oPUihI8mTus&ab_channel=%D0%A4%D0%95%D0%99%D0%93%D0%98%D0%9DLIVE; https://www.mk dot ru/politics/2022/05/28/stali-izvestny-detali-neudachnoy-kontrataki-vsu-v-nikolaevskoy-oblasti.html; https://t.me/rybar/33221; https://real-vin dot com/vsu-osvobodili-tri-naselennyh-punkta-v-hersonskoj-oblasti-2

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328041022842316

[20] https://www.facebook.com/100064555155257/posts/pfbid029noy2gyck2jNHjomzh4oVx7WpnydNeGbAUCfp51eTMsisgzajzHibAWtPPiQHe5l/?d=n

[21] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/8391; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/8390; https://t.me/stranaua/44583; https://t.me/stranaua/44537; https://t.me/milinfolive/84196; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1042; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/515; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/517; https://t.me/mod_russia/16265

[22] https://t.me/andriyshTime/1136

[23] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/pro-moscow-kherson-official-sees-decision-towards-next-year-joining-russia-2022-05-28/

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 28

Frederick W. Kagan, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros

May 28, 7:30pm ET

Russian President Vladimir Putin is inflicting unspeakable suffering on Ukrainians and demanding horrible sacrifices of his own people in an effort to seize a city that does not merit the cost, even for him.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine that aimed to seize and occupy the entire country has become a desperate and bloody offensive to capture a single city in the east while defending important but limited gains in the south and east. Ukraine has twice forced Putin to define down his military objectives. Ukraine defeated Russia in the Battle of Kyiv, forcing Putin to reduce his subsequent military objectives to seizing Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine stopped him from achieving that aim as well, forcing him to focus on completing the seizure of Luhansk Oblast alone. Putin is now hurling men and munitions at the last remaining major population center in that oblast, Severodonetsk, as if taking it would win the war for the Kremlin. He is wrong. When the Battle of Severodonetsk ends, regardless of which side holds the city, the Russian offensive at the operational and strategic levels will likely have culminated, giving Ukraine the chance to restart its operational-level counteroffensives to push Russian forces back.

Russian forces are assaulting Severdonetsk even though they have not yet encircled it. They are making territorial gains and may succeed in taking the city and areas further west. The Ukrainian military is facing the most serious challenge it has encountered since the isolation of the Azovstal Plant in Mariupol and may well suffer a significant tactical defeat in the coming days if Severodonetsk falls, although such an outcome is by no means certain, and the Russian attacks may well stall again.

The Russians are paying a price for their current tactical success that is out of proportion to any real operational or strategic benefit they can hope to receive. Severodonetsk itself is important at this stage in the war primarily because it is the last significant population center in Luhansk Oblast that the Russians do not control. Seizing it will let Moscow declare that it has secured Luhansk Oblast fully but will give Russia no other significant military or economic benefit. This is especially true because Russian forces are destroying the city as they assault it and will control its rubble if they capture it. Taking Severodonetsk can open a Russian ground line of communication (GLOC) to support operations to the west, but the Russians have failed to secure much more advantageous GLOCs from Izyum partly because they have concentrated so much on Severodonetsk.

The Russians continue to make extremely limited progress in their efforts to gain control of the unoccupied areas of Donetsk Oblast, meanwhile. Russian troops have struggled to penetrate the pre-February 24 line of contact for weeks, while Russian offensive operations from Izyum to the south remain largely stalled. The seizure of Severodonetsk could only assist in the conquest of the rest of Donetsk Oblast if it gave the Russians momentum on which to build successive operations, but the Battle of Severdonetsk will most likely preclude continued large-scale Russian offensive operations.

Russian progress around Severdonetsk results largely from the fact that Moscow has concentrated forces, equipment, and materiel drawn from all other axes on this one objective. Russian troops have been unable to make progress on any other axes for weeks and have largely not even tried to do so. Ukrainian defenders have inflicted fearful casualties on the Russian attackers around Severodonetsk even so. Moscow will not be able to recoup large amounts of effective combat power even if it seizes Severdonetsk, because it is expending that combat power frivolously on taking the city.

Ukrainian forces are also suffering serious losses in the Battle of Severodonetsk, as are Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure. The Russians have concentrated a much higher proportion of their available offensive combat power to take Severodonetsk than the Ukrainians, however, shaping the attrition gradient generally in Kyiv’s favor. The Ukrainians continue to receive supplies and materiel from their allies as well, however slow and limited that flow may be. The Russians, in contrast, continue to manifest clear signs that they are burning through their available reserves of manpower and materiel with no reason to expect relief in the coming months.

Evidence of eroding military professionalism in the Russian officer corps is mounting. The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russian commanders are attempting to preserve military equipment by forbidding drivers from evacuating wounded servicemen or providing supplies to units that have advanced too far.[1] Refusing to risk equipment to evacuate wounded personnel on the battlefield—other than in extraordinary circumstances—is a remarkable violation of core principles of military professionalism. Such behavior can have serious impacts on morale and the willingness of soldiers to fight and risk getting injured beyond their own defensive lines. ISW cannot independently confirm the GUR’s report, but commentary by Russian milbloggers offers some circumstantial support for it. Russian milblogger Alexander Zhychkovskiy criticized the Russian military command’s disregard for reservists on the deprioritized Zaporizhia Oblast front. Zhychkovskiy reported that Russian commanders trapped lightly-equipped infantry units in areas of intense Ukrainian artillery fire without significant artillery support and did not rotate other units through those areas to relieve them.[2] Zhychkovskiy noted that Russian commanders are responsible for high losses and cases of insanity among servicemen. Another milblogger, Alexander Khodarkovsky, said that Russian commanders are not sending reinforcements in a timely matter, preventing Russian forces from resting between ground assaults.[3]

Waning professionalism among Russia’s officers could present Ukrainian forces with opportunities. Russian morale, already low, may drop further if such behavior is widespread and continues. If Russian troops stuck on secondary axes lose their will to fight as the Battle for Severdonetsk consumes much of the available Russian offensive combat power, Ukraine may have a chance to launch significant counteroffensives with good prospects for success. That prospect is uncertain, and Ukraine may not have the ability to take advantage of an opportunity even if it presents itself, but the current pattern of Russian operations is generating serious vulnerabilities that Kyiv will likely attempt to exploit.

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces pressed the ground assault on Severodonetsk and its environs, making limited gains.
• Russian forces in Kharkiv continue to focus efforts on preventing a Ukrainian counteroffensive from reaching the international border between Kharkiv and Belgorod.
• Ukrainian forces began a counteroffensive near the Kherson-Mykolaiv oblast border approximately 70 km to the northeast of Kherson City that may have crossed the Inhulets River.
• Russia’s use of stored T-62 tanks in the southern axis indicates Russia’s continued materiel and force generation problems.
• Ukrainian partisan activity continues to impose costs on Russian occupation forces in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time. We have stopped coverage of Mariupol as a separate effort since the city’s fall. We had added a new section on activities in Russian-occupied areas:

• Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
• Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
• Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City;
• Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis;
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted an offensive operation southeast of Izyum, likely in an effort to advance toward Slovyansk or Siversk. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces retreated after attempting to advance to Pasika, approximately 20 km southeast of Izyum.[4] Russian Telegram channels reported that Russian forces successfully seized Pasika on May 28, but ISW cannot independently confirm this claim.[5] Russian forces did not attempt to advance directly south of Izyum and are likely prioritizing an advance north of Lyman.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff also noted that Russian forces continued launching air and artillery strikes on settlements near Siversk, approximately 30 km west of Severodonetsk.[7] Russian forces from Izyum may join units in Lyman to conduct an offensive on Siversk or pursue a separate drive on Slovyansk. Russian forces are also reportedly transferring additional artillery and military equipment via Kupyansk, approximately 40 km west of the Russia-Kharkiv Oblast border.[8]

Russian forces continued ground assaults on Severodonetsk’s northern neighborhoods and have not fully encircled the city from the west. Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai reported that Russian forces seized a hotel and advanced to Severodonetsk’s bus terminal on May 27 and continued fighting with Ukrainian defenders in the area on May 28.[9] Haidai stressed that Russian forces have not isolated the city, despite damaging a bridge along the Lysychansk-Severodonetsk road.[10] Haidai indicated that Ukrainian forces may withdraw from the area to avoid getting surrounded.[11] Pro-Russian milblogger Alexander Sladkov (who has 850,000 followers) criticized Russian military commanders for beginning the Battle of Severodonetsk before fully encircling Ukrainian troops.[12] Sladkov also criticized the lack of coherent offensive tactics among Russian commanders, despite their successes around Lyman.

Russian forces launched ground assaults west and east of Popasna but did not gain access to the Lysychansk-Bakhmut nor the Lysychansk-Hirske highway. Russian Telegram channels reported that fighting continued over Komyushuvakha, approximately 8 km east of Popasna, with the aim of allowing the Russians to launch an offensive on Zolote and secure the T1303 highway to Lysychansk.[13] Haidai reported that Ukrainian forces secured positions in a settlement along the T1303 highway, likely to hinder the Russian drive on Severodonetsk.[14] Haidai also noted that Russian forces have yet to seize the T1302 highway from Bakhmut to Lysychansk despite repeated attempts to secure the road from positions northeast of Popasna.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attempted to advance toward Bakhmut from settlements approximately 25 km southwest of Popasna.[16] Russian forces will likely continue offensive operations on Bakhmut as well as the T1302 and T1303 highways to isolate Ukrainian forces in the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area.

Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast on May 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued shelling near Avdiivka.[17] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) claimed to have advanced by 1.5 km in the Avdiivka area, but ISW cannot independently confirm this claim.[18]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)

Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations north of Kharkiv City but continued to maintain their positions along the Ukrainian-Russian border on May 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian engineering elements improved their positions near Kozacha Lopan, approximately 36 km northwest of Kharkiv City.[19] Russian forces continued to shell Kharkiv City and settlements to its north.[20] Russian forces are likely maintaining their positions in the area to defend Belgorod City from Ukrainian artillery. Russian milblogger and former Russian proxy commander Igor Girkin (also known as Igor Strelkov) noted that Russian forces rely on "old-fashioned methods” such as artillery to defend the Ukrainian-Russian border instead of more-effective drones.[21]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporozhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Ukrainian forces reportedly launched a counteroffensive in northern Kherson Oblast on May 28. The Ukrainian General Staff issued a vague report that Ukrainian defenders pushed Russian forces to “unfavorable borders” in three settlements along the Mykolaiv-Kherson Oblast border, approximately 70 km northeast of Kherson City.[22] Ukrainian military sources did not specify if Ukrainian forces liberated any occupied settlements. The Ukrainian General Staff’s report may support unconfirmed social media reports that Ukrainian forces crossed the Inhulets River on May 27, as the three villages are located on the eastern bank of the river.[23]

Russian forces continued to fortify and equip their positions throughout southern Ukraine in an effort to retain permanent control over the territory. Zaporizhia Oblast Administration Head Oleksandr Starukh reported that Russian forces have accumulated a large number of old T-62 tanks in Melitopol since withdrawing them from storage on May 25.[24] Starukh noted that Russian forces will commit the tanks to stationary firing points in Zaporizhia Oblast, rather than committing the obsolescent tanks to combat in the oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces are replenishing equipment losses with T-62s in northern Kherson Oblast, however, despite the tank’s vulnerabilities in modern warfare.[25] Russian forces continued to increase air defense systems in southern Ukraine.[26]

Activity in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

The Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration reported that Russian forces converted a Melitopol police station into an office of “People’s Militia” with 35 collaborators.[27] The Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration also reported that fully-armed Russian servicemen broke into two universities in Melitopol and demanded that professors reapply for their positions under the occupation regime or resign.[28] Russian forces are likely aware of their lack of control over occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts and fear Ukrainian civil resistance. Russian forces closed all Kherson Oblast borders near Ukrainian-controlled territories on May 28, possibly in anticipation of Ukrainian counterattacks or partisan activity.[29] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that a new Russian collaborationist and mayor of Enerhodar, Ruslan Kirpichev, fortified the entrance to his apartment due to rising partisan activity. The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russian commanders stationed their personnel in a penal colony in Kherson Oblast.[30]

Russian forces likely intend to loot occupied industrial sectors in Mariupol and Zaporizhia Oblast. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin reported that occupation forces will not repair Azovstal Steel Plant for ecological reasons on May 28.[31] Russian forces began exporting metal from Mariupol Port to Russia.[32] Pushilin noted that the Azovmash machine-building plant will resume its operations, even though the plant has faced severe financial problems for over ten years and is unlikely to generate profit. The Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration reported that Russian forces just began to operate the spare tractor parts plant in Melitopol after confiscating it from the rightful owner.[33]

 

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[1] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rosii-ne-vdaietsia-vyrishyty-problemy-zabezpechennia-okupatsiinykh-pidrozdiliv.html

[2] https://vk.com/wall-5158073_2571815; https://t.me/strelkovii/2613

[3] https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/2223

[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327247112921707

[5] https://t.me/epoddubny/10945

[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327247112921707

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/326823172964101

[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327247112921707

[9] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2972

[10] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2972

[11] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2972

[12] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/5566

[13] https://t.me/swodki/105305

[14] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2984

[15] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2972

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327247112921707; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/326823172964101

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/326823172964101

[18] https://t.me/swodki/105322

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327247112921707

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/326823172964101; https://t.me/synegubov/3306; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/326823172964101

[21] https://t.me/strelkovii/2612

[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327247112921707; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=414187113903942

[23] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1530157317219569665; https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1530266392292954118; https://twitter.com/mhmck/status/1530543908161200128; https://twitter.com/WarMonitor3/status/1530618951293706249

[24] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/8373; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/8359

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/326823172964101

[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327247112921707; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/326823172964101

[27] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/8359

[28] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/8359

[29] https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/posts/2067135176791058; https://t.me/epoddubny/10938

[30] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/okupanty-rozmishchuiut-svii-osobovyi-sklad-v-ukrainskii-vypravnii-kolonii.html

[31] https://t.me/andriyshTime/1103

[32] https://t.me/andriyshTime/1125; https://t.me/mariupolnow/11874

[33] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/8359

 

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 27

Kateryna Stepanenko and Mason Clark

May 27, 7:30pm ET

Russian forces began direct assaults on Severodonetsk on May 27 despite not yet having fully encircled the town. Russian forces have performed poorly in operations in built-up urban terrain throughout the war to date and are unlikely to be able to advance rapidly in Severodonetsk itself. Russian forces continue to make steady and incremental gains around the city but have not yet encircled the Ukrainian defenders. Ukrainian forces continue to maintain defenses across eastern Ukraine and have slowed most Russian lines of advance. Russian forces will likely continue to make incremental advances and may succeed in encircling Severodonetsk in the coming days, but Russian operations around Izyum remain stalled and Russian forces will likely be unable to increase the pace of their advances.

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces began direct assaults on built-up areas of Severodonetsk without having fully encircled the city and will likely struggle to take ground in the city itself.
• Russian forces in Lyman appear to be dividing their efforts—attacking both southwest to support stalled forces in Izyum and southeast to advance on Siversk; they will likely struggle to accomplish either objective in the coming days.
• Russian forces in Popasna seek to advance north to support the encirclement of Severodonestk rather than advancing west toward Bakhmut.
• Positions northeast of Kharkiv City remain largely static, with no major attacks by either Russian or Ukrainian forces.
• Russian forces continue to fortify their defensive positions along the southern axis and advance efforts to integrate the Kherson region into Russian economic and political structures.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time.  We have stopped coverage of Mariupol as a separate effort since the city’s fall.  We had added a new section on activities in Russian-occupied areas:

• Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
• Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv City;
• Supporting effort 2—Southern Axis;
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces began direct assaults on built-up areas of Severodonetsk on May 27 without having fully encircled the city and cut off the Ukrainian defenders. Geolocated videos confirmed that Chechen units seized a hotel located in the northern part of Severodonetsk on May 27. Severodonetsk Military-Civil Administration Head Oleksiy Stryuk reported that Ukrainian forces previously repelled Russian attacks on the hotel on May 26, but Russian forces captured the position sometime on May 27.[1] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai said that Russian forces also conducted offensive operations just southeast of Rubizhne toward Severodonetsk.[2] Russian forces also continued to push on Severodonetsk via Ustynka and Borisvske just 9km and 14km southeast of the city, respectively.[3] The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) falsely claimed that Russian forces cut off all routes and surrounded Severodonetsk, trapping Ukrainian units in the Severodonetsk cauldron, though this is untrue and Russian forces have not yet fully encircled Ukrainian defenders.[4] Ukrainian sources differed on the extent of Russian advances, with Stryuk estimating that Russian forces have encircled approximately two-thirds of Severodonetsk’s perimeter and Haidai stating Russian forces have only reached the city’s outskirts.[5]

Russian forces likely seek to advance toward Slovyansk from Lyman to the north due to stalled operations south of Izyum.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces shelled two settlements approximately 30km and 35km southeast of Izyum and conducted limited attacks south from Lyman.[7] Russian forces have been unable to advance south from Izyum on the E40 highway due to Ukrainian resistance along the road and may now be changing their approach to attack toward Slovyansk from the northeast. The Ukrainian General Staff also noted that Russian forces in Kharkiv Oblast are training personnel to replenish infantry, tank, and artillery units, and deployed the 29th Separate Railway Brigade from Smolensk to Kharkiv Oblast, likely to generate new forces and restore logistics to attempt to resume stalled offensive operations southeast of Izyum.[8]

Russian forces in Lyman are additionally attacking southeast toward Siversk as part of ongoing efforts to encircle Ukrainian defenders in the town.[9] Russian forces will likely attempt to seize the roads leading to Severodonetsk from the northwest to sever Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Luhansk Oblast.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces fired mortars and rocket-propelled grenades on settlements within a 20km range of northwestern Siversk and launched an airstrike on Siversk on May 27.[11] Russian forces in Lyman appear to be dividing their efforts—attacking both southwest to support stalled forces in Izyum and southeast to advance on Siversk; they will likely struggle to accomplish either objective in the coming days based on past Russian performance.

Russian forces attempted to seize access to two highways east and northeast of Popasna on May 27 in a continued effort to partially disrupt Ukrainian GLOCs to Severodonetsk. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued assaults against villages adjacent to the T1302 highway from Bakhmut to Lysychansk, just northeast of Popasna.[12] Russian forces also attacked east of Popasna to secure access to the T1303 highway to Lysychansk.[13] Russian forces are likely prioritizing the Lysychansk direction, rather than advancing toward Bakhmut, to support Russia’s main effort operations in Severodonetsk.

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)

Russian forces did not launch any ground assaults against Ukrainian defenders north of Kharkiv City on May 27. Russian forces continued systematic shelling of Ukrainian-liberated villages to preserve their defensive positions near the Ukrainian-Russian state border.[14] Ukraine’s Security Service reported that entire Russian units rioted and refused to conduct an offensive operation on Kharkiv City, though ISW cannot independently confirm this claim.[15]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces continued to fortify their positions along the southern axis.[16] Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Vadym Skibitsky reported that Russian forces are currently building a third line of defense in Kherson Oblast and are consolidating their control over railroads, airfields, and ports.[17] The Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration also said that Russian forces transferred land, air, and sea military equipment from Crimea on May 26, including 24 "Grad” MLRS systems.[18] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces also continued to deploy reservists from Crimea.[19] The UK Defense Ministry noted that Russian forces deployed 50-year-old T-62 tanks from storage to the southern axis.[20]

Russian forces launched an unsuccessful ground attack near the Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast border and continued artillery and airstrikes throughout southern Ukraine, the first attack near Kherson for several weeks.[21] This attack is unlikely to be part of a wider offensive operation. Russian forces also launched a missile strike on the Motor Sich Plant in Zaporizhia City on May 26 but missed the target and damaged residential infrastructure nearby.[22]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Russian forces continued to set conditions for the long-term occupation of Ukraine’s southern regions. Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Vadym Skibitsky reported that Russian occupation forces are likely preparing for referendums on the occupied territories in September or October.[23] Russian occupation authorities began transitioning Zaporizhia Oblast to the Russian time zone and introducing Russian license plates; they also promised to establish new subsidy and tax systems in the near future.[24] Russian occupation officials are additionally reportedly attempting to create an Internal Ministry subordinate to the Kherson Oblast Civil-Military Administration to support occupation administration and possibly support integration with Russia’s own Internal Ministry.[25] The Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration reported that Russian authorities continued to hand out Russian passports to Melitopol residents, which will allow the Kremlin to mobilize and control the movements of inhabitants of the occupied territories and conscript them for military service. These efforts will also allow the Kremlin to claim it is protecting Russian citizens, as it did in the DNR and LNR prior to February 24.[26]

Russian occupation officials are struggling to subdue Ukrainian partisan activity in the south. The GUR intercepted a call with a Melitopol resident who noted a rise in unspecified partisan activity in Kyrylivka, a coastal town just south of Melitopol.[27] GUR representative Skibitsky also claimed that Russian forces began avoiding bridges and roads, likely to avoid Ukrainian partisan attacks.[28]

Immediate items to watch

• Russian forces are likely reinforcing their grouping north of Kharkiv City to prevent further advances of the Ukrainian counteroffensive toward the Russian border. Russian forces may commit elements of the 1st Tank Army to northern Kharkiv in the near future. 
• Russian forces are unlikely to advance rapidly in direct assaults against Severodonetsk, but supporting operations to fully encircle the town will likely continue to secure incremental gains.
• Occupation forces in Mariupol will continue to strengthen administrative control of the city but are likely unsure of what the ultimate annexation policy will be.
• Russian forces are likely preparing for Ukrainian counteroffensives and settling in for protracted operations in southern Ukraine. 

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[1] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2934; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/36765

[2] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2935?single

[3] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/326425353003883; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2935?single; https://t.me/swodki/104473

[4] https://t.me/epoddubny/10929; https://t.me/readovkanews/35125

[5] https://hromadske dot ua/posts/gajdaj-syevyerodoneck-ne-otochenij-yak-zayavlyayut-u-rf-okupanti-zajshli-na-okolicyu-mista; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2962

[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/326425353003883; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/326063393040079

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/326425353003883

[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/326063393040079; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/326425353003883

[9] https://t.me/readovkanews/35099; https://t.me/swodki/104473

[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/326425353003883

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/326425353003883; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1530201934623383555; https://www.facebook.com/butusov.yuriy/posts/pfbid02i59nU6eUsK2S74Xk3F67Bvf1VxdkR5bP5ucwCPJnFGg5jc7gKq5N83gSwsPoww5Sl

[13] https://t.me/swodki/104473

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/326425353003883; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/326063393040079; https://t.me/synegubov/3297; https://t.me/synegubov/3297; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1530206502140751874; https://t.me/synegubov/3297; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/12851; https://t.me/synegubov/3297; https://t.me/swodki/104473

[15] https://t.me/SBUkr/4340

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/326425353003883; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1051716292134026

[17]  https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/viyna-tryvatyme-do-zymy-khersonshchyna/31870035.html?fbclid=IwAR0jMDeE6jybW08ePv5wGzNrh6HxEDY37Yfj0gpUz-GJWhbtFgb1Dw0ZjhE

[18] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/8288

[19] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1051716292134026

[20] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1530056331960385536; https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1530056431407353856

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/326425353003883; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/8288; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/8291; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1529934569591521289

[22] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1529934569591521289

[23] https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/viyna-tryvatyme-do-zymy-khersonshchyna/31870035.html?fbclid=IwAR0jMDeE6jybW08ePv5wGzNrh6HxEDY37Yfj0gpUz-GJWhbtFgb1Dw0ZjhE

[24] https://t.me/swodki/104400; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/8291

[25] https://t.me/swodki/104400; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/8291

[26] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/8288;

[27] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1044535432826520

[28] https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/viyna-tryvatyme-do-zymy-khersonshchyna/31870035.html?fbclid=IwAR0jMDeE6jybW08ePv5wGzNrh6HxEDY37Yfj0gpUz-GJWhbtFgb1Dw0ZjhE