Russian Military Movements Unlikely Preparing for Imminent Offensive against Ukraine but Still Concerning

By Mason Clark and George Barros

Movements and activities of elements of Russia’s 41st Combined Arms Army (CAA) and 1st Guards Tank Army in late October are unlikely to be preparations for an offensive against Ukraine, but do pose longer-term challenges to Russia’s neighbors and NATO. The Washington Post reported on October 30 that a “buildup” of Russian troops near the Ukrainian border concerned US and European officials.[1] The report suggested that the Russian deployments are similar to those carried out on Ukraine’s border in March-April 2021. Open-source reporting does not support the assessment that Russia has moved any additional forces closer to the Ukrainian border or that a Russian offensive against Ukraine is imminent, however. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense stated on November 1 it has not observed any transfers of Russian units, weapons, or equipment to the Ukrainian border.[2] 

• Elements of Russia’s 41st CAA redeployed from temporary positions near Voronezh (northeast of Ukraine) to permanent basing facilities in Yelnya (east of Belarus) in late October. Open source satellite imagery confirmed that the elements of the 41st CAA had left Voronezh by October 27 and arrived at permanent Russian bases in Yelnya by October 31.[3] Four battalion tactical groups and combat support elements from the 41st CAA, the equivalent of a small division, deployed to Voronezh from their permanent base in Novosibirsk, in the Russian interior, in April 2021.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed at the time that this deployment would support Russia’s Zapad-2021 military exercise, though the 41st CAA did not participate in the main Zapad exercises from September 10-16.[5]
• An unidentified Iskander ballistic missile battalion, likely part of the 41st CAA’s assets that deployed to Voronezh, was spotted traveling through Bryansk.[6] Open-source imagery of Russian bases in Bryansk taken on November 1 did not show the Iskander battalion, and its final destination is currently unknown, though it is likely redeploying to Yelnya.
• Elements of the 1^st Guards Tank Army began major training exercises on October 27. The Russian Ministry of Defense announced on October 27 that about 25 “subdivisions” (подразделение [podrazdelenie], a Russian word indicating units at the battalion echelon or lower) of the 1st Guards Tank Army, based east of Moscow, began exercises to earn the honorary title of “shock” units.[7] 

 

The 41st CAA elements are likely redeploying from temporary positions in Voronezh to permanent basing facilities in Yelnya, from which they could support several operational directions. These units had been in field camps near Voronezh rather than in hard-stand permanent bases. The Russian military was never likely to leave units or equipment in such facilities through the winter, making the movement of these units unsurprising in itself. Their new position in Yelnya is co-located with permanent basing facilities occupied by the 59th Tank Regiment, therefore likely better suited to house troops and maintain equipment over the winter. The movement of these elements of the 41^st CAA to the base at Yelnya rather than back to their original home bases in Siberia, however, is noteworthy. It suggests that they will be permanently transferred to the Western Military District (WMD) and remain on the Ukrainian and/or Belarusian border for a time. Yelnya may not be their final destination within the WMD, however.

Reports that elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army deployed to the Ukrainian border are likely inaccurate. Several social media users have claimed without supporting evidence that videos circulating in the past week of Russian armor moving through Kursk depict the 4th Tank Division, part of the 1st Guards Tank Army, deploying to Ukraine.[8] The videos likely instead depict the 41st CAA redeploying from Voronezh to Yelnya. The Russian Ministry of Defense’s announcement that elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army are conducting exercises to earn the “shock” title is likely accurate. ISW has not observed any footage of the 1st Guards Tank Army departing its bases in the Moscow region or transiting any point between Moscow and the Ukrainian border. Exercises to earn the title “shock” have previously occurred in October and November.[9] 

The Washington Post article rightly noted important inflections in Moscow’s information operations over the course of 2021 and in recent days and weeks. These changes in tone and rhetoric could presage military operations against Ukraine, although likely on a much more limited scale and focused in eastern Ukraine rather than in the areas through which the elements of the 41^st CAA have moved. They are most likely related to Kremlin posturing in advance of the next Normandy Format meeting, however, especially since no open-source evidence of Russian military buildups near eastern Ukraine has emerged.

The Kremlin exploited two Ukrainian actions in late October to advance a false narrative of a potential Ukrainian offensive against occupied Donbas and claimed it will protect “Russian citizens” (rather than “ethnic Russians”) in Donbas for the first time.

• The Kremlin conducted a disinformation campaign to mischaracterize a Ukrainian humanitarian aid delivery to a frontline village in Donetsk on October 26 as a Ukrainian attack. Elements of a Ukrainian mechanized brigade escorted a humanitarian aid delivery to Staromaryivka village, located in no man’s land in Donetsk, on October 26 and departed on the same day.[10] The Russian-backed Donetsk People’s Republic, Russian Foreign Ministry, and Kremlin-run media conducted a coordinated disinformation campaign accusing Ukrainian forces of attacking and occupying Staromaryivka.[11] The Kremlin has previously used false claims of Ukrainian actions to support kinetic escalations in Donbas. This single disinformation event does not indicate an imminent Russian operation, but further Kremlin information operations claiming Ukraine is conducting offensive operations could support a Russian kinetic escalation against Ukraine in coming months.
• The Kremlin is additionally exploiting Ukraine’s first use of Turkish TB2 drones in combat to claim a Ukrainian escalation. Ukrainian forces used a Turkish-supplied TB2 drone to strike a Kremlin-proxy artillery position in Donetsk on October 26 in response to shelling that killed a Ukrainian serviceman.[12] Ukraine first purchased TB2 drones from Turkey in late 2019 and deployed them to frontline units in summer 2020, but has not previously used them in combat.[13] Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated the strike supported longstanding Russian claims that Turkish weapon sales to Ukraine could destabilize Donbas on October 26.[14] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused Ukraine of using the novelty of a TB2 strike to obscure its “gross” and “direct” violations of ceasefire agreements on November 1.[15] Ukraine’s use of the TB2 in Donbas is a step-change in its ability to respond to Russian proxy shelling, but the limited deployment of armed drones is unlikely to grant Ukraine new operational capabilities or deter Russian operations. The Kremlin will likely increasingly falsely present Ukraine’s acquisition of TB2 drones and other tactical weapon systems as evidence of Ukrainian preparations to conduct an offensive operation against Donbas.
• The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that Russia is prepared to protect “Russian citizens” in Donbas for the first time on October 29—a significant inflection in Kremlin rhetoric about its claimed responsibilities in Donbas. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated on October 29 that Russia “will do everything possible” to protect the rights of Russian citizens in Donbas.[16] This is the first time a Russian ministry has prominently stated readiness to protect “Russian citizens” (as opposed to ethnic Russians) in Donbas.[17] The MFA made this statement as part of the disinformation campaign claiming Ukraine recaptured Staromaryivka. The Kremlin’s campaign to distribute over 600,000 Russian passports to residents in occupied Ukraine over the past several years enabled this disinformation operation.[18] ISW previously forecasted that the Kremlin could leverage its campaign to distribute passports to residents of other states as a pretext for military operations under the justification of protecting “Russian citizens.”[19]

The Kremlin’s disinformation is likely intended to pressure Ukraine ahead of a Normandy Format meeting in the next six months. The Kremlin reiterated its intention to hold a Normandy Format (a quadrilateral discussion group including Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany last held in December 2019) meeting on October 31.[20] Lavrov stated the Kremlin sent France and Germany proposals on the conditions necessary to hold a Normandy Format summit and is waiting for their answer. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Emmanuel Macron, and President Vladimir Putin agreed to determine prerequisites for holding a Normandy Format summit on October 11.[21] ISW forecasted in mid-October that Germany, France, and Ukraine likely seek to hold Normandy Format talks with Russia within the next six months.[22] The Kremlin historically intensifies military, diplomatic, information, political, and economic pressure against Ukraine ahead of Normandy Format meetings, including accusing Ukraine of offensive actions. ISW has previously published on the Kremlin’s escalations ahead of the December 2019 Normandy Format summit and April 2020 Normandy Format ministerial meeting.[23]

This recent series of Russian redeployments and rhetorical escalations is unlikely to be preparation for an imminent Russian offensive against Ukraine. It does, however, set conditions for increased pressure on Kyiv and also on Belarus and merits continued close but sober observation. The frequency of major Russian military exercises and redeployments increased in 2021. Several Russian actions throughout the year have sparked worries of major offensive actions that did not occur. This pattern of increasingly frequent Russian maneuvers and rhetorical escalations will likely continue, and it will be easy for the West to fall into one of two traps—overly alarmist warnings of imminent Russian offensives that are unlikely to occur, or complacency and inattention to Russian actions. The Kremlin likely intends to produce both these effects, allowing it to intimidate Ukraine and NATO and simultaneously establish a new normal of continuous Russian exercises, obscuring dangerous moves. The West should continue to monitor, publicly discuss, and evaluate Russian actions, even if they are not worst-case scenarios.

ISW will continue to monitor and report on Russian actions aimed at Ukraine. ISW does not currently forecast a Russian offensive against Ukraine is imminent, but is watching for the following indicators of preparations for a further escalation.

Indicators of a potential Russian military operation against Ukraine:

1. More Russian deployments, mobilizations, or snap exercises at scale (units at the brigade/regiment/multiple battalion tactical groups from maneuver elements of the 1st Tank Army, and the 20th, 8th, and 41st CAAs).
2. Mobilization of artillery elements at the regiment and brigade level.
3. Mobilization of Russia’s Airborne Forces (VDV) or Black Sea naval elements.
4. Mobilization of the DNR and LNR militias.
5. Sustained or intensified Kremlin information operations claiming Ukraine is attacking or preparing to attack Donbas.
6. An increase of Russian command and control (C2) elements inside Donbas or in southern or western Russia near the Russian-Ukrainian border.
7. Increased volume of video recordings capturing Russian hardware moving in western Russia towards Ukraine.
8. The Kremlin issues some form of political ultimatum to Kyiv or calls Zelensky in for senior talks.
9. Intensified Kremlin information operations claiming NATO is deploying forces into Ukraine or creating "NATO bases" inside Ukraine

Counterindicators indicating a Russian military maneuver against Ukraine is less likely:

1. Russian media relaxes or ends information operations about a Ukrainian offensive
2. Russian units observed in western and southern Russia redeploy east away from Ukraine

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[1] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russian-troop-movements-near-ukraine-border-prompt-concern-in-us-europe/2021/10/30/c122e57c-3983-11ec-9662-399cfa75efee_story.html.

[2] https://www.mil.gov dot ua/news/2021/11/01/fakti-naroshhuvannya-zbrojnih-sil-rf-na-ukrainskomu-napryamku-e-elementom-informaczijno-psihologichnih-dij-czentr-operativnogo-informuvannya/.

[3] https://rochan-consulting.com/russian-land-forces-movements-in-october/; https://twitter.com/The_Lookout_N/status/1455231057758982150?s=20.

[4] https://rochan-consulting.com/russian-land-forces-movements-in-october/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-russian-deployments-near-ukraine-likely-intended-pressure-zelensky-not.

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-zapad-2021-exercise; https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12358821@egNews; https://rochan-consulting.com/russian-land-forces-movements-in-october/.

[6] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1454052512932245504?s=20.

[7] https://structure.mil dot ru/structure/okruga/west/news/more.htm?id=12390789@egNews; The Soviet military historically employed “shock” units to spearhead offensives. Shock armies received high proportions of artillery, engineers, and other assets intended to break defensive positions, but lacked mobility and sustainability. The Russian military revived the “shock” designation in 2017 as an honorific reward for units that demonstrate high readiness and capabilities, without any changes in the equipment and doctrinal purpose of units designated “shock.” Elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army are carrying out unspecified tests to earn the shock designation. For more information on the past and present use of the “shock” designation, see: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russia-bringing-back-its-world-war-ii-shock-armies-20870.

[8] https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/1453752459210407951?s=20; https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/1453853398495899657?s=20.

[9] https://rochan-consulting.com/russian-land-forces-movements-in-october/.

[10] https://www.facebook.com/93OMBr/posts/1703030636560386; https://novosti.dn dot ua/news/316996-selo-staromarevka-ne-zahvatyvali-ukrainskaya-storona-zaprosila-tishinu-dlya-dostavki-uglya; https://www.facebook.com/364683177357638/posts/1226957351130212/?d=n%3B; https://www.facebook.com/93OMBr/posts/1703030636560386; https://ria dot ru/20211026/staromarevka-1756363335.html; https://www.osce.org/files/2021-10-30%20SMM%20Daily%20Report.pdf?itok=16279; https://www.osce.org/files/2021-10-29%20Daily%20Report_ENG.pdf?itok=25745; https://www.osce.org/files/2021-10-28%20Daily%20Report_ENG.pdf?itok=51748; https://www.osce.org/files/2021-10-27%20Daily%20Report_ENG.pdf?itok=59674; https://www.osce.org/files/2021-10-26%20Daily%20Report_ENG.pdf?itok=77572.

[11] https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2021/10/26/n_16754167.shtml; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6aQ1KTztXS8; https://news dot ru/world/glava-dnr-rasskazal-o-situacii-v-sele-staromarevka-zahvachennom-vsu/; https://aif dot ru/politics/world/ukrainskie_voennye_zanyali_selo_staromarevka_v_donbasse_-_smi; https://www.mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4920669; https://www.mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4919845#11; https://thegoaspotlight dot com/2021/10/26/media-ukrainian-military-took-control-of-staromaryevka-village-in-donbass/; https://www.facebook.com/364683177357638/posts/1226957351130212/?d=n; https://www.pravda dot com ua/rus/news/2021/10/26/7311750/; https://www.ostro dot org/general/society/news/621390/; https://focus dot ua/voennye-novosti/496319-smi-soobshchili-ob-osvobozhdenii-vsu-sela-staromarevka-shtab-oos-nazval-eto-feykom-foto-video.

[12] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=467614907881638

[13] https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/04/09/ukraine-might-field-a-drone-strike-force-and-it-could-knock-out-russian-tanks/?sh=30ddaf3b6ca1.

[14] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/5051611.

[15] https://www.mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4921162.

[16] https://www.mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4920669.

[17] https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-57087885; https://lenta dot ru/news/2021/03/07/deputat/; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/760395.

[18] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/society/news/2021/09/29/888934-v-etom-godu-rossiiskoe-grazhdanstvo-poluchili-500-000-inostrantsev

[19] A former representative of the Luhansk People’s Republic militia accused Ukraine of preparing for either a full-scale military operation or an escalation on the front line and accused Russia of not protecting Donbas on October 31. The Kremlin media apparatus has not adopted this narrative as of this writing. The Kremlin can fabricate information conditions to attack Ukraine if the Kremlin decides to. https://www.mk dot ru/politics/2021/10/31/veteran-lnr-o-zadache-korpusov-v-sluchae-voyny-proderzhatsya-tri-dnya.html; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-september-1-%E2%80%93-september-21-2021.

[20] https://tass dot ru/politika/12813285; https://tass dot ru/politika/12816739; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/12817881.

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-october-6-19-2021.

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-october-6-19-2021.

[23] https://www.iswresearch.org/2019/12/the-perils-of-talks-on-russias-war-in.html; https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/01/europe-cedes-opportunity-in-russia.html; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-kremlin-misdirection-continues-amid-covid-and-peace-processes; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-kremlins-fake-de-escalation-donbas; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-putin-accelerates-ukraine-campaign-amid-converging-crises; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/viral-disinformation-kremlin%e2%80%99s-coronavirus-information-operation-ukraine.

 

Turkey in Review October 13-28, 2021

Turkey’s Defense Industry Transforms Its Outreach to Africa and Beyond

By Ezgi Yazici

The Turkish government has consistently expanded its Africa outreach as a component of enlarging and diversifying Turkey's global footprint since President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s election in 2003. Ankara more recently began using defense ties to strengthen the diplomatic foundations of its outreach to African states. Growing international interest in Turkey’s domestic defense industry is speeding up this shift toward a defense-oriented approach in bilateral relations, particularly since Azerbaijan’s Turkey-enabled victory in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020.

Turkey is increasingly securitizing its foreign policy by leveraging its growing defense industry. Ankara is presenting its military industries and NATO-level capacity-building training programs to numerous developing countries in exchange for investment, energy deals, and construction projects that benefit the Turkish economy and Ankara’s influence abroad. Turkish drones serve as a relatively low-cost defense option for countries like Azerbaijan, Morocco, and Ukraine.[1] The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) offer training to foreign armed forces including those of Somalia, Azerbaijan, and Libya.[2] The role of Turkish armed drones and TSK military training programs in aiding Azerbaijan’s victory in Nagorno-Karabakh likely boosted global interest in Turkish defense assistance offerings.[3] Ankara is increasingly leveraging this demand and its growing domestic defense production to include military defense deals and sales to its bilateral agreements -- most significantly in Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Central Asian Turkic states.[4]

Defense sales and cooperation are playing a growing role in Turkish outreach to African countries that Erdogan has long prioritized. Turkish outreach to Africa in the early 2000s centered on expanding Turkey’s presence in diplomatic-humanitarian terms. Since Erdogan’s election, Turkey has increased its exports to sub-Saharan Africa tenfold, diversified its energy imports to include more African countries, quadrupled its number of embassies in the continent, and completed hundreds of construction and infrastructure projects with its companies in Africa.[5] More recently, however, Ankara began to build upon that two-decade-old foundation with more targeted outreach in the defense. Turkey now sells its Bayraktar TB2 combat drones to Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya and is exploring new sales to Nigeria and potentially Ethiopia.[6] Turkey sells other arms to Kenya, Uganda, and Tunisia; and offers TSK training programs to Somalian and Libyan forces.[7] Turkey also promotes itself as a security partner on the ground, working with various states in the Sahel and Horn of Africa in security, counterterrorism, and military initiatives.[8] The number of African countries engaging with Turkey’s defense industry through drone sales, arms sales, and training programs is growing steadily.

Expanding Turkey’s influence in Africa has been key to President Erdogan’s foreign policy objectives and self-perception. Since the early 2000s, Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) has perceived Africa as an untapped opportunity that could diversify Turkey’s diplomatic outreach beyond Europe and the United States while offering new markets to its companies. Successful Africa outreach also elevates Erdogan’s self-perception as a leader of both the Muslim and of the “Global South” and larger developing world.[9]

Erdogan’s recent four-day trip to Africa aimed to secure key defense and energy deals. President Erdogan and top Turkish officials, including Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and Defense Minister Hulusi Akar, visited Angola, Togo, and Nigeria between October 17 and 20, 2021.[10] Angolan and Turkish officials discussed Turkish drone and armored vehicle sales, bilateral trade agreements, and Turkish powerplant projects.[11] Turkey and Togo agreed to advance trade and military cooperation in the first presidential-level state visit Turkey has made to the country.[12] Turkey also signed numerous trade agreements with mutual promises to strengthen military defense and cooperation with Nigeria—likely in line with Nigeria’s desire to purchase Turkish Bayraktar TB2 combat drones.[13] 

Turkey’s Africa outreach—specifically to Nigeria and Angola—is critical for at least two Turkish strategic objectives.

• Turkey seeks to expand access to and diversify its imports of energy resources away from Russia and Iran and toward Africa and the Caucasus. Nigeria and Angola are two of the top African oil producers and exporters to Turkey.[14] Nigeria is also Turkey’s top sub-Saharan trading partner and has a natural gas agreement with Turkey that was set to expire at the end of October.[15] Turkey also faces other expiring natural gas agreements with Russia at the end of 2021 just as Turkey is likely to see an increase in demand during the winter months.[16]
• Turkey seeks to build and expand a unique global footprint where it can coexist or compete with global actors. Turkey under Erdogan has pursued opportunities to create low-cost, asymmetrical, competitive advantages that increase its leverage over larger countries despite Turkey’s faltering economy and limited global experience. In Africa, Ankara is combining its willingness to offer arms deals and military training with effective rhetoric. Erdogan often capitalizes on the lack of an Ottoman-Turkish colonial history in sub-Saharan Africa to position Turkey as a benevolent ally that promotes “African solutions for African problems” —an implicit criticism of external European involvement in the continent. [17] Ankara is likely observing and learning from China and Russia’s activity in Africa in order to coexist or compete with their investments.  

Turkey’s young defense industry will continue to shape the country’s outreach abroad as it refines and expands its defense production at home. Ankara is likely to sharpen the defense component of its outreach, to observe and learn from larger external actors in the region, and to capitalize on its advantages over them to carve out a greater role for itself in the continent. Its lower-cost drones are one of those key advantages. However, Ankara may face diplomatic consequences for exporting combat drones to a growing number of countries and may face production obstacles and an increasingly competitive market for drones as it pursues this path. Ankara’s unique defense assistance and military outreach will increasingly sharpen and spearhead its foreign relations as it seeks to insert itself into regions already crowded with many external players with greater capital and resources than those of Turkey.

1. October 26: Turkey prepared for a potential cross-border military campaign into northern Syria. Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) sent at least ten military convoys to reinforce its military positions across northern Syria.[18] The largest convoys—with tanks, heavy weaponry, cement blocks, armored personnel carriers, and likely other equipment—reached Tal Abyad in Raqqa Province and Jabal Zawiyah in Idlib Province between October 26-28.[19] Local sources estimate up to 400 vehicles are in Idlib, and a few hundred are in Tal Abyad as of October 28.[20] Local sources also reported additional reinforcements to Ras al Ayn, Hasakah Province, on October 28. The Turkish government has not confirmed any deployments, but a Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) spokesperson confirmed that SNA deployments have occurred in preparation for a Turkish incursion.[21] The reported TSK and SNA reinforcements span a long frontline from Idlib to Raqqa Governorate that could challenge the Turkish military and resource bandwidth more than previous incursions.[22] Turkey will likely need to prioritize a specific area between the Euphrates River and the Turkish-controlled “Peace Spring Zone” in northeast Syria, most likely Ayn Issa or Ayn al Arab, as a result. Pro-regime forces and Iranian militias sent military reinforcements toward Tal Rifat in anticipation of a potential Turkish military offensive.[23]
2. October 26-27: Turkey extended troop deployment in Iraq and Syria until October 2023 despite opposition disapproval. The Turkish Parliament ratified a motion to extend Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) deployments to Syria and Iraq for two years on October 26—likely until after the upcoming general elections in 2023.[24] Erdogan recommended a two-year extension for the first time ahead of the current motion’s expiration on October 31.[25] Further Turkish military incursions into Iraq and Syria require Parliament’s approval, as does the potential military campaign against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in northern Syria that Erdogan and other government officials signaled in recent weeks. Erdogan’s coalition holds the majority of parliamentary seats. Turkey’s main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) voted against the motion for the first time, accusing the government of mismanaging Turkish forces in Syria.[26] The CHP likely seeks to retain the support of Turkey’s large Kurdish electorate, who mostly oppose actions against the YPG, ahead of a potential run-off election between Erdogan and CHP’s presidential candidate in 2023.
3. October 18-28:  Turkish officials proposed purchasing Russian fighter jets to pressure the United States for F-16 sales. Turkish officials likely prefer US aircraft, which are easier to integrate with Turkey’s existing systems, to their Russian counterparts. Turkish officials are therefore likely trying to coerce the United States, rather than truly changing their acquisition priorities. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu stated on October 28 that Turkey will consider buying Russian-made SU-35 and SU-57 fighter jets if the United States “does not resolve issues over F-35 jets.”[27] Turkish Defense Industries President Ismail Demir also said that Turkey will turn to Russia for new aircraft if US-Turkish talks on the F-16 fighter jets fail.[28] Turkey requested 40 F-16s and 80 modernization kits for its existing jets to upgrade its air force fleet after its 2019 removal from the F-35 fighter jet program.[29] Turkish officials argue that Washington needs to provide Turkey with F-16 fighter jets to compensate for Turkey’s $1.4 billion payment into the F-35 program.[30] US leaders have said that US defense sales to Turkey cannot resume until Turkey gives up its already-purchased Russian S-400 missile systems and commits to not acquiring the system in the future.[31]  
4. October 14: Turkey hosted Taliban leaders in Ankara: Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu hosted a Taliban delegation led by Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Ankara on October 14.[32] The two parties discussed bilateral relations, trade, humanitarian aid, migration, and air transport issues.[33] The Taliban held a series of meetings with Western countries in Qatar earlier that week.  Muttaqi encouraged Turkey to provide renovation and reconstruction projects in Afghanistan.[34] Separately, a group of former Afghan government officials announced the formation of the “National Resistance Council” on October 22.[35] Local sources have reported some former Afghan government officials, including Abdul Rashid Dostum, Atta Noor, and Masoom Stanekzai, have been in Turkey in recent months.[36] Various social media accounts speculated that the Council may be based in Istanbul, Turkey, but these claims are unverified.
5. October 18-25: President Erdogan threatened to expel ten foreign ambassadors for supporting jailed Turkish philanthropist. Erdogan demanded the Turkish Foreign Ministry declare US Ambassador to Turkey David Satterfield and nine other ambassadors to be “persona non grata” and threatened to remove them from Turkey on October 21. The ambassadors called for the release of imprisoned philanthropist and businessperson Osman Kavala in a joint statement on October 18.[37]  Erdogan stepped back from his initial threat after a cabinet meeting with his ministers on October 25. Turkish officials, including Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, likely sought to soften Erdogan’s reaction to avert a diplomatic crisis with multiple countries. The ambassadors of the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, and New Zealand joined the October 18 statement. Erdogan’s mercurial position on this diplomatic confrontation also led to significant fluctuations of the Turkish lira as part of a longer-running free fall of the currency’s value.

Contributors: Fem Koymen, Fatih Cungurlu, Ezgi Yazici

 

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[1] https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/uav-magnate-baykar-to-build-centers-for-turkish-drones-in-ukraine

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/morocco-receives-turkey-armed-drones-report

https://www.wsj.com/articles/armed-low-cost-drones-made-by-turkey-reshape-battlefields-and-geopolitics-11622727370

[2] https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/1-of-3-somalian-troops-to-be-trained-by-turkey-envoy/1931275

https://www.gmfus.org/news/turkeys-overlooked-role-second-nagorno-karabakh-war

https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkish-soldiers-continue-to-provide-military-training-consultancy-for-libyan-army

[3] https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210319-after-big-wins-interest-in-turkish-combat-drones-soars

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/turkey%E2%80%99s-drones-and-proxies-are-turning-tide-war-194576

[4] The host countries often welcome Turkish investments and interest as a means to diversify often energy-dependent economies, improve militaries, bring in industry expertise from Turkish companies, and forge partnerships with a new actor on the continent. In return, Ankara receives favorable energy and investment deals to expand and diversify Turkey’s access to various energy and mining resources. It pragmatically prioritizes resource allocations to regions with geopolitical or energy assets that are important to Turkey.

[5] https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/-number-of-turkish-embassies-in-africa-rises-from-12-to-42/1619429

https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa

https://african.business/2021/03/trade-investment/erdogans-ambition-drives-turkeys-africa-surge/

[6] https://www.africaintelligence.com/north-africa_business/2021/10/08/tunis-takes-delivery-of-its-first-turkish-armed-drones,109697033-bre

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-expands-armed-drone-sales-ethiopia-morocco-sources-2021-10-14/

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-aims-to-boost-cooperation-in-defense-industry-with-nigeria/2396812

https://www.facebook.com/farmarocofficielle/posts/2987561524802147 

https://www.arabnews.com/node/1935236/middle-east 

https://www.airrecognition.com/index.php/news/defense-aviation-news/2021/september/7667-morocco-receives-first-turkish-bayraktar-tb2-unmanned-aerial-vehicle.html 

 

[7] https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/turkey-joins-scramble-africa-arms-sales-krldt8wlb

[8] https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkeys-sahel-strategy

[9] https://www.insightturkey.com/commentaries/a-post-2014-vision-for-turkey-africa-relations

https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/apr/10/turkey-development-partner-africa

[10] Turkish Foreign, Defense, and Energy ministers joined Erdogan for the tour

The high-level Turkish delegation left Turkey at a time of and despite a heightened possibility for a new Turkish incursion in northern Syria. Ankara’s prioritization to put Syria decision-making on hold and travel to three African states highlights Turkey’s Africa outreach as a key priority for the leadership.

[11] https://www.aa.com.tr/en/live/turkish-president-arrives-in-southern-african-nation-of-angola/2395075   

[12] https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkish-president-appreciates-togo-s-support-in-fight-against-feto-terror-group/2396879

[13]  https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkey-nigeria-determined-to-deepen-cooperation-erdogan

Turkey and Nigeria likely extended the expiring natural gas deal. Neither delegation confirmed the extension, however.

[14] https://www.trade.gov/energy-resource-guide-turkey-oil-and-gas

[15] Turkish and Nigerian officials signed an energy cooperation deal. However, neither country formally recognized the extension of the natural gas deal. Turkey’s original natural gas deal with Nigera dates back to 1995.

[16] https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-energy-import-bill-up-65-7-pct-in-sept-168942

[17] https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/erdogan-calls-for-a-fairer-world-urges-africa-to-act-together

[18] https://twitter.com/Realistqx/status/1453087987764453379

https://twitter.com/LindseySnell/status/1452906971317800964

[19] https://twitter.com/L_Team10/status/1453372861649981450

https://twitter.com/StanteaR_/status/1453111188343173122

https://twitter.com/OGNreports/status/1453080037834514442

[20] https://twitter.com/bifikirver/status/1453234546347024387

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-10-27/turkey-reinforces-syria-troops-for-possible-attack-on-u-s-ally

[21] The SNA spokesperson statement https://arabi21.com/story/1393967/%D8%AD%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A..-%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%83%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A1-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF

[22] Turkey increased its reconnaissance activities across northern Syria including Tal Rifat, Idlib Governorate, and Ayn al Arab.

https://twitter.com/GDarkconrad/status/1452559922986725376

https://twitter.com/GDarkconrad/status/1452999845984227334

https://twitter.com/GDarkconrad/status/1451833013868929028

https://twitter.com/GDarkconrad/status/1451100616336494593

[23] Turkish-backed and pro-regime forces also both dropped leaflets to the Tal Rifat area warning of a possible Turkish incursion in early October.

https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/10/syrian-government-forces-deploy-response-turkish-threat

https://twitter.com/Magedabdelnour1/status/1451967816622657541

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nalxwjqLHcI

https://www.zaitunagency.net/63922/

[24] https://www.dw.com/tr/irak-suriye-tezkeresi-tbmmden-ge%C3%A7ti/a-59632314

[25] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-erdogan-troops-syria-iraq-extension-request

[26] https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/legislation/chp-to-oppose-extending-troop-mandate-for-cross-border-ops

https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/chp-tezkereye-hayir-diyecek-3708775

[27] https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/us-should-deliver-f-35s-ankara-paid-for-or-return-money-turkey/2405426

[28] https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/russian-fighter-jets-still-in-the-game-if-turkey-us-f-16s-talks-fail

[29] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-seeks-40-f-16-jets-upgrade-air-force-sources-2021-10-07/

[30] https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-us/ankara-talks-washington-purchase-f-16-fighter-jets-erdogan

[31] https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/not-a-divorce-but-a-defense-decoupling-whats-next-for-the-u-s-turkish-alliance/; https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1790/text

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-lawmakers-express-concern-over-reports-potential-turkey-f-16-purchase-2021-10-26/

[32] The delegation included Information and Culture Minister Mullah Khairullah Khairkhwa, Intelligence head Abdul Haq Wasiq, Deputy Interior Minister Noor Jalal Jalali,  Shahabuddin Delawar, Suhail Shaheen, Mohammad Ibrahim, and Abdul Qahar Balkhi.

https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/taliban-delegation-to-visit-ankara-to-discuss-turkey-afghanistan-ties

[33] https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/talibandan-turkiyeye-ust-duzey-ziyaret-3706851

[34] https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/ankara-ziyareti-sonrasi-talibandan-aciklama,fv4hbCHY40WstTJISbx9Dw

https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/taliban-delegation-to-visit-ankara-to-discuss-turkey-afghanistan-ties

[35] https://twitter.com/ShorayNezarAAES/status/1450289438089691144

https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-175143

Abdul Rab al-Rasul Sayyaf, Mohammad Mohaqiq, Younus Qanuni, Salahuddin Rabbani, Atta Mohammad Noor, and Abdul Rashid Dostum members of the council according to anonymous reporting  

[36] Claims that the NRC is based in Istanbul, Turkey are unconfirmed and are disputed.

An Ankara-based account shared the video of Masoom Stanekzai visiting an immigration office in Ankara on October 14. https://twitter.com/AhmadQasani/status/1448635736664776708

Another account reports that Ankara asked Atta Noor to leave Turkey after Cavusoglu met with Muttaqi https://twitter.com/AhmadQasani/status/1450494667712249865?cn=ZmxleGlibGVfcmVjcw%3D%3D&refsrc=email

Abdul Rashid Dostum fled to Turkey in 2017 and was receiving medical treatment in Turkey earlier in 2021. He likely returned to Afghanistan in August. His current location is unknown.

https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210805-notorious-afghan-warlord-returns-to-fight-for-besieged-home

[37] https://tr.usembassy.gov/statement-on-four-years-of-osman-kavalas-detention/

 

Afghanistan Warning Update: IS-KP in Afghanistan is Expanding Faster than Anticipated

Key Takeaway:

Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-KP) is expanding its support zones and attack zones across Afghanistan as part of a campaign to undermine and replace the Taliban government. Most IS-KP attacks target Taliban fighters and officials in Nangarhar and Kunar Provinces. The presence of IS-KP propaganda materials indicates that IS-KP is expanding in northern and southern Afghanistan. Bombings at major Shi’a mosques in Kunduz on October 8 and Kandahar on October 15 indicate that IS-KP is attempting to incite sectarian conflict in Afghanistan.[1] Taliban land expropriations from largely Shi’a communities to Sunni Taliban fighters are also increasing sectarian tensions. The contradictory efforts to protect these communities while redistributing their land will complicate the Taliban’s efforts to pose as a defender of Afghanistan’s Shi’a. If IS-KP continues to expand and strengthen, it could develop havens that enable it to conduct attacks outside Afghanistan.

IS-KP Efforts to Undermine the Taliban Government

IS-KP rejects the legitimacy of the Taliban government and is attempting to prevent the Taliban from gaining legitimacy in the eyes of Sunni Afghans.[2] IS-KP is attempting to achieve this goal through frequent kinetic attacks that undermine the Taliban’s ability to govern, guarantee security, and respond to the ongoing catastrophic economic crisis.

IS-KP is prioritizing kinetic attacks against the Taliban government over its secondary campaign to stoke a sectarian conflict within Afghanistan. The majority of IS-KP’s attacks within Afghanistan are improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against isolated Taliban patrols and assassinations of officials. These attacks occur on a near-daily basis, mostly within Kabul, Nangarhar, and Kunar provinces. The Taliban responded to these attacks with retaliatory killings of individuals accused of being affiliated with IS-KP.[3] The Taliban committed these killings without following its own stated judicial procedures.[4] This approach to fighting IS-KP may fuel IS-KP recruiting rather than weaken the group.

IS-KP Operational Campaign in Afghanistan

IS-KP is expanding its attack zones and support zones across Afghanistan. IS-KP currently has attack and support zones within Nangarhar, Kunar, Kabul, and Parwan provinces. Recent attacks in Kunduz and Kandahar indicate that IS-KP is expanding attack zones to those provinces and likely has support zones in or near those provinces. [5]  IS-KP’s activity in Jowzjan, Uruzgan, Zabul, Khost, and Paktia Provinces indicates that it is attempting to expand support zones to those provinces. [6] Taliban splinter groups appear to be defecting to IS-KP, helping enable its expansion. Fighters previously affiliated with Mullah Manan Niazi’s Taliban splinter faction in Herat Province allegedly defected to IS-KP.[7] These defections may have prompted a firefight between Taliban forces and IS-KP in Herat City on October 24.[8] Expanding IS-KP support zones and attack zones will likely lead the Taliban to spread out its security forces, opening space for IS-KP to develop havens from which it could launch attacks beyond Afghanistan.

IS-KP is attacking economic infrastructure in Afghanistan to worsen the economic crisis and to undermine Taliban efforts to maintain Afghan government institutions. IS-KP repeatedly destroyed electricity pylons in Parwan Province in June and July 2021, threatening the supply of electricity to Kabul.[9] IS-KP carried out similar attacks near Jalalabad when it resumed its offensive against the Taliban on September 18 and was responsible for a blast on October 21 that shut off power to Kabul. [10]

IS-KP Efforts to Gain Strength

Younger fighters and mid-level commanders in the Taliban movement are consistently reported to be more radical than the Taliban leadership.[11] The Taliban government showed a certain willingness to compromise on its most hardline values by allowing high school-age girls to go back to school in certain parts of Afghanistan.[12] The Taliban also offered a general amnesty for Afghan government officials and encouraged many of them to return to their old positions.[13] The Taliban likely intend for these compromises to help it maintain government institutions and gain international support, but these actions also support IS-KP’s messaging campaign portraying the Taliban leadership as apostates and false jihadists. This dynamic could fuel increased defections by younger and more radical Taliban fighters to IS-KP. Such defections will increase internal turmoil within the Taliban movement, possibly worsening ongoing power struggles within the Taliban movement and increasing the likelihood of serious infighting.[14]

IS-KP aims to incite sectarian conflict within Afghanistan by repeatedly attacking Shi’a mosques. IS-KP group released a statement that it intended to strike Shi’a communities “from Baghdad to Khorasan” shortly after it carried out a suicide bombing at the Shi’a Fatima Mosque in Kandahar on October 15.[15] The statement also cast the Taliban as “allies of the Rafidha (Shi’as).” The Taliban government pledged on October 17 to increase security at Shi’a mosques.[16] In Helmand and Kandahar, local Taliban security officials met with Shi’a communities and pledged to protect their religious centers. [17] The Taliban explicitly taking a stance to defend Shi’a communities may further encourage radical Sunni elements within the Taliban to defect to IS-KP.

The Taliban rewards its fighters with land expropriated from Hazara (Shi’a) communities, undermining its efforts to pose as the defender of Afghanistan’s Shi’a against IS-KP. Local Taliban officials are rewarding their supporters by expropriating land from Hazaras and other peoples perceived to be opposed to the Taliban government. These expropriations started in September in Daikundi and Uruzgan provinces, where the Taliban and local Pashtuns evicted at least 2,800 Hazaras and seized their homes and crops.[18] Similar evictions are taking place in Kandahar, Helmand, and Mazar-e-Sharif.[19] The Taliban will need to expropriate land (although not necessarily from Shi’as) if it is to fulfill promises, such as those made by the Taliban’s interior minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani, to reward the families of suicide bombers with allotments of land and money.[20] The Taliban risks alienating members of its hardline base if it fails to fulfill these promises and prioritizes protecting Shi’a communities. If the Taliban continues to victimize Shi’a communities as IS-KP attacks them, however, it risks damaging its relations with Iran and causing Shi’a communities to mobilize to protect themselves.

IS-KP attacks are already encouraging Shi’a community mobilization. A new Hazara militia announced itself as “The Anonymous Soldiers of Hazaristan” on October 8.[21] This group declared that it saw no difference between the Taliban and IS-KP and would fight both groups.[22] Such mobilizations may encourage revenge attacks by Shi’as and consequently lead to Sunni Afghan communities arming themselves. If regional actors such as Iran become involved in protecting Shi’a communities, this dynamic may strengthen IS-KP’s rhetoric that Hazara groups will seek to dominate Sunni communities in the same manner as other Iranian proxies, such as Hezbollah.[23] A sectarian war within Afghanistan could open new areas of recruitment and support for IS-KP. This course of action would be a historical aberration in recent ethnic relations in Afghanistan and is a most dangerous rather than most likely scenario.

Possible Future Courses of Action

IS-KP could develop a haven in Afghanistan and begin planning attacks in Europe and the Middle East. US Department of Defense Undersecretary for Policy Colin Kahl stated on October 26 that IS-KP could generate the capability to conduct attacks abroad within six to 12 months.[24] A haven in Afghanistan could encourage Islamic State (IS) leadership across the globe to migrate to Afghanistan and make it the preeminent hub for organizing IS activity. The migration of skilled and experienced leaders and fighters would increase the capability of IS-KP forces within Afghanistan. Encouraging a regional sectarian war could be a way for IS-KP to disrupt its rivals and establish the havens needed to plan attacks abroad in the Middle East and Europe.

A major sectarian conflict in Afghanistan could draw Iran into more active military engagement in Afghanistan. The official Iranian position on Afghanistan remains supportive of working with the Taliban and refraining from sending forces or fighters into the country.  Continued IS-KP attacks against Afghanistan’s Shi’a could cause elements of the Afghan Fatimiyoun forces that Iran has developed and used to fight for the Assad regime in Syria to return to Afghanistan to protect Shi’a Afghans.  These attacks could also raise pressure among Iran’s hardline factions to defend Shi’a communities under attack. IS-KP may be seeking to draw Iran or Iranian-backed forces into the fight in Afghanistan as a way of mobilizing Sunni support for its cause.

 

---

[1] https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/explosion-shiite-mosque-kunduz/31499426.html

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/15/explosion-hits-shia-mosque-in-afghanistans-kandahar

[2] https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2021/08/27/what-we-know-and-dont-know-isis-k/

[3] https://jamestown.org/program/the-talibans-persistent-war-on-salafists-in-afghanistan/

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/27/afghanistan-taliban-promises-to-eradicate-groups-seeking-chaos

[4] https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-islamic-state-khorasan/31507469.html

[5] https://apnews.com/article/world-news-asia-pacific-afghanistan-prayer-religion-2b9d9863da38661ba6fa186a72ac5352

https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/explosion-shiite-mosque-kunduz/31499426.html

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/15/explosion-hits-shia-mosque-in-afghanistans-kandahar

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58925863

 

[6] https://twitter.com/Natsecjeff/status/1449754640388591617

https://twitter.com/AfghanAnalyst2/status/1449774226160902145

IS-KP supporters claimed they raised IS flags over government buildings in Aqcha District in Jowzjan Province

https://twitter.com/ZDaryabi/status/1452184230537089029

Local sources stated that IS-KP raised their flag and distributed propaganda material in Deh Rawood District, Uruzgan Province. IS-KP promised 30,000 AFN to anyone who joined IS-KP.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/killings-of-islamic-state-militants-highlight-power-struggle-with-afghanistans-taliban-11632650997?st=9htlslq1i6okwyn&reflink=article_gmail_share

https://twitter.com/AfghanAnalyst2/status/1443488159992516615

https://twitter.com/kabulnewstv/status/1443518141007646723

There were reports of a firefight between IS-KP and Taliban forces in Arghandab District, Zabul Province, with 17 Taliban fighters and 4 IS-KP fighters killed in action.

https://twitter.com/MJalal313/status/1446465139817975811

https://twitter.com/haidari5555/status/1446457404305051667

It is possible this IS-KP cell carried out the October 6 grenade attack at a mosque in Khost which caused several Taliban casualties.

https://twitter.com/ArianaNews_/status/1447469693418283012

Taliban officials arrested 5 suspected IS-KP militants who were planning attacks in Paktia Province

[7] https://twitter.com/Natsecjeff/status/1452518769335668738

[8] https://twitter.com/Natsecjeff/status/1452290477240340490

https://twitter.com/TajudenSoroush/status/1452248697723625473

[9] https://www.khaama(dot)com/four-isis-associates-accused-of-demolishing-power-pylons-arrested/

[10] https://twitter.com/Natsecjeff/status/1439321308022689796

https://twitter.com/abdsayedd/status/1451663221962821637

https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20211021-blast-cuts-power-to-afghan-capital-kabul?ref=tw

[11] https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/08/31/will-the-taliban-regime-survive/

https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/05/qatar-diplomat-lolwah-rashid-al-khater/

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/23/how-deep-are-divisions-among-the-taliban

[12] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/18/taliban-says-afghan-girls-will-return-to-secondary-schools-soon

https://www.wsj.com/articles/taliban-allow-teenage-afghan-girls-back-in-some-provincial-schoolsbut-not-in-kabul-11634058143

[13] https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20210817-taliban-declare-amnesty-urge-women-to-join-government-according-to-shariah-law

https://www.wsj.com/articles/talibans-pledge-of-amnesty-for-security-officials-meets-widespread-distrust-11631611675

[14] https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/guterres-taliban-fight-for-power/31468944.html

[15] https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/is-expresses-bloodthirsty-pursuit-of-shi-ites-from-baghdad-to-khorasan-in-naba-308-editorial.html

SITE - Naba 308 Editorial

[16] https://ariananews(dot)af/iea-pledges-to-increase-security-at-shiite-mosques-after-2nd-deadly-bombing

[17] https://twitter.com/aip_news/status/1449794793723281408

Abdul Khalid, Taliban intelligence chief for Helmand Province, met with representatives of the Shi’a community and assured them the Taliban would protect their religious centers day and night.

[18] https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/22/afghanistan-taliban-forcibly-evict-minority-shia#

[19] https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/22/afghanistan-taliban-forcibly-evict-minority-shia#

[20] https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-kabul-taliban-f5a69b1c2676f9345b8dce490798d4ee

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taliban-praise-suicide-bombers-offer-families-cash-land-2021-10-20/

[21] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zbscva_g4Sc

https://twitter.com/aamajnews24/status/1448200028095455232?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1448200028095455232%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.redditmedia.com%2Fmediaembed%2Fq7miyi%3Fresponsive%3Dtrueis_nightmode%3Dfalse

[22] https://twitter.com/natiqmalikzada/status/1448356552113410048 

https://twitter.com/AamajN/status/1448200028095455232

[23] https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/is-expresses-bloodthirsty-pursuit-of-shi-ites-from-baghdad-to-khorasan-in-naba-308-editorial.html

SITE - Naba 308 Editorial

[24] https://twitter.com/jseldin/status/1452998476690821130