Iranian Proxies Increase Attacks on US Forces to Catalyze a US Withdrawal from Iraq

 By Katherine Lawlor and Nicholas Carl

Contributor: Camille Jablonski

Key takeaway: Iran’s Iraqi proxies have likely become more willing to kill Americans and may soon do so to catalyze the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq and Syria. These proxies are advancing an Iran-directed campaign that has increased in frequency, accuracy, and lethality since January 2021. This campaign is expanding to include not just Iraq but also Iraqi Kurdistan and Syria. Proxies have also begun using more lethal munitions and drones that can bypass US defenses. Attacks will continue until US forces withdraw from Iraq and Syria or reestablish deterrence with both Iran and its proxy network.

The Iran-directed escalation campaign to expel US forces from Iraq and Syria has changed in five ways since the Biden administration took office in January 2021:

1. Proxies are increasing the frequency of their attacks against US forces in Iraq. The militias have conducted 20 rocket attacks and 11 drone attacks on US personnel and facilities in Iraq and Syria since President Biden took office in January 2021.[1] Six of those attacks occurred in the first week of July alone. That is a dramatic increase in tempo compared to the five proxy rocket attacks conducted in the final three months of the Trump administration. Iran and its proxies remain demonstrably undeterred. [2]
2. Proxies are increasingly attacking US intelligence and military assets in the once-protected Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Iran’s proxies conducted their first known attack on US forces in the KRI under in September 2020, firing six rockets at Erbil International Airport from beyond the KRI borders. The small-caliber rockets caused no casualties. Proxies have attacked US facilities inside the KRI five times since then, including a 14-rocket barrage in February 2021.[3] Drone attacks targeted an alleged CIA hangar at Erbil International Airport in April, a presumed US Joint Special Operations Command headquarters at Harir airbase near the Iranian border in May, a civilian house in Erbil Province in June, and Erbil Airport again in July.[4] The June attack triggered US retaliatory airstrikes along the Iraq-Syria border.
3. Proxies are increasing the geographic scope of their escalation to include US basing in Syria. The US retaliatory strikes struck minor Iranian proxy facilities in Iraq’s Anbar Province and Syria’s Deir ez-Zor Province on June 28.[5] Proxies fired 34 122 mm rockets at US forces stationed at a counter-ISIS forward operating base in Deir ez-Zor known as Green Village hours after the US strikes.[6]  US air defenses at Green Village prevented injury—never a guarantee with such large salvos of high-caliber munitions. [7] Proxies conducted another drone attack against the same US base on July 7, likely demonstrating their intention to continue targeting forces in Syria as well as Iraq.[8]
4. Proxies appear increasingly willing to inflict US casualties. The June 28 attack on Green Village in Syria is one of the largest attacks against the United States in the Middle East since US forces withdrew from Iraq in 2011—second only to Iran’s ballistic missile attack on Ain al-Assad airbase after the killing of Qassem Soleimani in January 2020. The scale of the Green Village attack indicates that Iran and its militias intended to inflict casualties. The 122 mm rockets used are larger and more lethal than the usual 107 mm Katyushas that proxies use in harassing attacks throughout the region. Other attacks in 2021 have also demonstrated a readiness to inflict casualties, including the February 15 attack on Erbil International Airport that killed one and injured 14 and the July 7 rocket barrage on Ain al-Assad that injured two.[9]
5. Proxies are demonstrating increasingly advanced drone capabilities to bypass US defenses. Iran-backed Iraqi militants conducted their first drone attack targeting a presumed CIA hangar in Erbil on April 14, 2021. They have since conducted nine additional drone attacks in Iraq and Syria. The drones used are coded with their targets’ GPS coordinates, often evade the US air defense systems that regularly intercept rocket attacks, and have struck multiple sensitive US assets.[10]

Iran has likely calculated that causing US casualties will motivate a US withdrawal from Iraq and Syria. Iranian leadership holds that the United States is extremely casualty-averse.[11] Tehran and its proxies likely believe that even a small number of US casualties in Iraq and Syria could convince the Biden administration to withdraw forces from those theaters—a key Iranian strategic objective. Iran and its proxies are likely emboldened by the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and believe that a similar bleeding of the US political will to remain will achieve the same outcome in Iraq. The head of the Iran-backed militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Qais al-Khazali, announced in April that “dialogue and logic does not work … the Afghan method is the only way to expel [US forces from Iraq].”[12]

Iran will continue its campaign to expel US forces from Iraq and Syria regardless of the outcome of US-Iran negotiations to restore the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran’s leadership has seemingly assessed that the Biden team is prioritizing the JCPOA above all else. That calculation has also emboldened them. Tehran is likely concerned that a future American president will pursue another “maximum pressure” policy similar to that of the Trump administration. The regime will therefore try to prepare itself economically and militarily to better resist coercion upon the potential return of maximum pressure during or after the Biden administration. Proxy attacks will likely continue so long as Iranian leaders see little risk and the potential for a huge reward (the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq and Syria).[13]

Forecast: Iran’s proxies in Iraq and Syria will likely continue to escalate against US forces and facilities until the United States withdraws its forces or reestablishes deterrence. Escalations will likely include simultaneous rocket and drone attacks to better evade US defenses in Iraq and Syria, the use of larger, more lethal munitions like 122 mm rockets, and the continued targeting of alleged US intelligence assets in Iraqi Kurdistan. Proxies will increasingly aim to inflict US casualties to create a politically untenable situation for the Biden administration, thereby catalyzing a US withdrawal.

 

This analysis is co-published by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute.

 

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[1] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqs-drone-and-rocket-epidemic-numbers.

www dot alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A5%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA.

www dot alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9.

https://apnews.com/article/syria-iraq-middle-east-d28a8cf02234a8f6c2ff431118f27c51
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/rockets-land-in-baghdads-green-zone-near-us-embassy/2021/07/08/f24aa1aa-dfd6-11eb-a27f-8b294930e95b_story.html

www dot alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B0%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%87-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9.

https://twitter.com/OIRSpox/status/1406598211679272961.

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/rockets-hit-iraqi-base-housing-us-forces-no-casualties-us-coalition-2021-07-05/.

https://twitter.com/OIRSpox/status/1412720373691469825.

[2] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/deterring-militias-iraq-what-works-and-what-doesnt

[3] https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2021/02/27/why-werent-us-air-defenses-in-erbil-airport-activated-during-recent-rocket-strike/?sh=2e514f4a2178

[4] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/04/world/middleeast/iran-drones-iraq.html

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraq-militia-drones-threat/2021/05/28/864e44d0-bc8f-11eb-922a-c40c9774bc48_story.html

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/explosive-laden-drone-hit-erbil-airport-iraq-aimed-us-base-security-sources-2021-07-06/

www dot rudaw dot net/english/kurdistan/26062021

[5] https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2672875/statement-by-the-department-of-defense/

[6] https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2021-03-12/us-troops-syria-civil-war-biden

https://twitter.com/OIRSpox/status/1409976895425417219?s=20

[7] https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2676421/pentagon-press-secretary-john-f-kirby-holds-a-press-briefing/

[8] https://apnews.com/article/syria-iraq-middle-east-d28a8cf02234a8f6c2ff431118f27c51

[9] https://apnews.com/article/syria-iraq-middle-east-d28a8cf02234a8f6c2ff431118f27c51

[10] https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/28/politics/us-airstrikes-new-iran-drone-attacks-avoid-surveillance/index.html

[11] https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/irans-military-doctrine

[12] https://t dot me/Tura313/13542

[13] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/iran-file/iranian-presidential-election-tracker-the-coronation-of-ebrahim-raisi

 

 

 

 

Russia in Review: June 23 – July 6

  By Mason Clark

July 8, 2021

ISW has revamped its Russia in Review product to provide more-complete snapshots of Russian activity around the globe.

Russian Navy Increases Number of Aggressive Actions to Counter NATO Exercises and Freedom of Maneuver Operations in the Black Sea

NATO is currently conducting its largest-ever Black Sea naval exercises to strengthen maritime collective defense and resist Russian efforts to limit international access to the Black Sea. Sea Breeze 2021 is the largest iteration yet of NATO’s annual Sea Breeze exercises, held in the Black Sea since 1997 to strengthen interoperability between NATO and partner navies. The United States and Ukraine are cohosting the ongoing Sea Breeze 2021 exercise, which runs from June 28 to July 10, in the Black Sea.[1] NATO explicitly intends Sea Breeze 2021 to “demonstrate presence and assure allies of [NATO’s] maritime commitment to collective defense.” The exercises involve 32 states, 5,000 personnel, 32 ships, and 40 aircraft.[2] Participating warships and personnel will practice multiple types of operations, including amphibious warfare, maritime interdiction, air defense, and anti-submarine warfare.[3]

The Kremlin decries Sea Breeze 2021 as a NATO provocation and violation of Russian waters and is conducting several naval exercises in response. Five Russian warships in Russia’s Mediterranean Taskforce, including the missile cruiser and Black Sea Fleet flagship Moskva, the frigates Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov, and two submarines began exercises in the Mediterranean Sea on June 25.[4] The exercises practiced repelling simulated air attacks and defending Russia’s naval base in Tartus, Syria. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, based in Crimea, began conducting air defense training checks on June 29 (the day after the start of Sea Breeze 2021) including several S-400 and Pantsir air defense systems and 20 aircraft.[5] The Moskva and Admiral Essen redeployed from the Mediterranean to Crimea on June 5 to replenish supplies and join these ongoing Black Sea Fleet training checks.[6] The Russian Black Sea Fleet and Mediterranean Task Force will likely continue to hold exercises parallel to Sea Breeze 2021 to demonstrate Russian capabilities and imply limits on NATO freedom of action in the Black Sea.

The Kremlin increased its aggressive responses to NATO and Ukrainian actions in international waters in June prior to Sea Breeze 2021. The Kremlin claimed its forces fired warning shots and dropped bombs near the Royal Navy’s HMS Defender while it conducted a freedom of navigation operation off the shore of occupied Crimea on June 23.[7] The United Kingdom denied Russian claims of bombing the HMS Defender and asserted the United Kingdom’s freedom of navigation rights near Crimea.[8] Russian aircraft have shadowed NATO warships in the Black Sea throughout June, and the Kremlin likely used electronic warfare to falsify the locations of several NATO warships in late June, making them appear to be violating Russia’s claimed territorial waters.[9]

Expanded NATO exercises and freedom of maneuver missions are necessary to support US partners in the Black Sea region and counter the Kremlin’s illegal efforts to limit international access to the Black Sea. The Kremlin seeks to limit Ukraine and NATO’s freedom of action in the Black Sea to cement Russian dominance over this region and pressure US allies including Ukraine, Georgia, and Turkey. The Russian Navy has expanded its aggressive actions in the Black Sea in 2021 and intends to normalize Russian dominance over international waters in violation of international law.

1. The European Union (EU) rejected a Franco-German proposal to hold a summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin. France and Germany submitted a proposal to the European Council on June 23, 2021, without advance notice, calling for a summit between EU leadership and Putin to develop closer EU-Russia engagement.[10]  The European Council rejected this proposal during a private meeting on June 25, instead issuing a joint statement calling on Russia to “demonstrate a more constructive engagement” as a condition of further EU outreach.[11]  Central and Eastern European states—particularly Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania—publicly decried France and Germany’s call for closer relations with Russia as a dangerous concession in the absence of changes to Russia’s malign actions in Europe.[12]  French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel reiterated their intent to meet with Putin independently of the EU following the June 25 European Council summit.[13]  Macron directly called for a “structured dialogue” with Russia during a call with Putin on July 2.[14]  Direct engagement with the Kremlin by EU members without substantial changes in Russian malign behavior will undermine collective European policies and further embolden Putin to act without fear of repercussions.
2. Belarus withdrew from the EU's Eastern Partnership cooperation initiative after the EU levied sectoral sanctions against Belarus. The EU approved sectoral sanctions against the Belarusian economy on June 24 in response to Belarus' grounding of Ryanair flight 4978 on May 23.[15]  Belarus suspended its participation in the EU’s Eastern Partnership Initiative—an EU framework to promote trade, travel agreements, and democracy between Western Europe and former Soviet states, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—in response on June 28.[16]  EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell stated the EU is ready to continue working with the “Belarusian people” despite the Belarusian government’s withdrawal from the Eastern Partnership, likely through communication with exiled Belarusian opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya.[17]  The Kremlin will likely take advantage of Belarus’ increasing isolation from non-Russian partners to further isolate Belarus and integrate it into Russian-controlled structures.[18]
3. Russia and China signed a five-year extension to the Sino-Russian friendship treaty. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a five-year extension of the Sino-Russian Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation (signed in 2001) on June 28.[19]  Putin praised the agreement for reaffirming mutual support for protecting “state unity and territorial integrity,” (referencing Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea) and the rejection of the first use of nuclear weapons. Putin claimed that joint Sino-Russian economic projects and Sino-Russian cooperation have a stabilizing role in world affairs, highlighting the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, and Sino-Russian cooperation in the Korean Peninsula, Syria, Afghanistan, and Iran. President Xi Jinping praised Sino-Russian efforts to build a multipolar world order and said he appreciated that Russia and China support each other's interests on the international stage. The Kremlin continues to be threatened by rising Chinese power but will increasingly seek to selectively leverage China against US efforts to counter Russia’s aggressive foreign policy.
4. The Russian Pacific Fleet was highly active during June 2021. The Russian Pacific Fleet conducted its largest naval exercises since the Cold War in the central Pacific Ocean and near Hawaii from June 14 to 30, practicing the simulated destruction of an enemy carrier strike group and strikes against shore facilities.[20]  Approximately 20 warships participated, including the missile cruiser Varyag (the Pacific Fleet’s flagship), two destroyers, three corvettes, a missile-tracking ship, an unspecified number of submarines and support vessels, and at least 20 aircraft. A US Navy Indo-Pacific Command spokesperson said some of the Russian vessels operated 20 to 30 nautical miles off the coast of Hawaii.[21]  The US scrambled F-22 fighters in Hawaii on June 14, likely in response to this Russian activity.[22]  The Russian MoD additionally announced on June 29 that the Russian Pacific Fleet will expand the infrastructure at its Kamchatka submarine base by the end of 2021.[23]  The Russian Navy is increasing its power projection capabilities in the Pacific to support the Kremlin’s campaign to expand its global military footprint.
5. The Kremlin likely continued to pressure Belarus for additional concessions on Russo-Belarusian government integration. Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikita Patrushev—a senior Kremlin security official close to Vladimir Putin—and self-declared Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko discussed Russo-Belarusian security cooperation issues “not subject to public disclosure” in Minsk on June 29.[24]  Lukashenko atypically declined to make any public statement on the meeting. The unusually sensitive nature of their conversation indicates they likely discussed Russo-Belarusian security and military integration. Senior Russian-Belarusian meetings at this level have historically precipitated significant Belarusian security integration concessions and new deals for the Kremlin.[25]  Russian President Vladimir Putin and Lukashenko held another call on July 1, discussing further security and economic cooperation.[26]  The Kremlin is continuing to advance its campaign to establish a permanent military presence in Belarus postured against NATO and Ukraine.[27] 
6. Russian President Vladimir Putin approved an increasingly combative National Security Strategy (NSS) that removed all mention of cooperation with the West. Putin approved the new NSS on July 3, replacing the existing NSS written in 2015.[28]  The new NSS paints an increasingly alarmed picture of perceived Western threats. The NSS increases formal emphasis on protecting Russia’s “cultural sovereignty” and traditional values against perceived Western pressure, policy changes the Kremlin has prioritized since 2015. The NSS removes all references to cooperation with the United States and NATO, as well as specific arms control and nuclear non-proliferation objectives previously included in the 2015 strategy. Much of the strategy remains the same from 2015, and the Kremlin has already enacted many of the policy changes and adaptations formalized in this document.[29]  The Kremlin’s formalization of its defensive worldview and removal of all mentions of cooperation with the West indicate an increasingly combative mindset that is unlikely to respond to Western outreach or strategic dialogue in good faith.
7. Tajikistan will mobilize military reservists to the Afghan border with Kremlin promises of support. Tajik President Emomali Ramhmon ordered the mobilization of 20,000 reservists to support ongoing military deployments to Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan on July 5 in response to Taliban advances in Afghanistan.[30]  Putin promised his counterparts from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan support from the Russian military both bilaterally and through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) on July 6.[31]  The Russian Foreign Ministry further stated Russia’s 201st military base in Tajikistan— Russia’s only formal international military base—is equipped with “everything necessary” to support Tajikistan if required.[32]  The Kremlin will likely increase its military presence in Central Asia to counter the potential threat of a jihadist resurgence in Afghanistan. The Kremlin will also prioritize maintaining its dominant influence in Central Asia and advancing its unitary security interests; its deployments to the area are unlikely to effectively replace NATO security operations in Afghanistan.

 

 

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[1] “U.S. Sixth Fleet Announces Sea Breeze 2021 Participation,” US Navy, June 21, 2021, https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2664699/us-sixth-fleet-announces-sea-breeze-2021-participation/.

[2] The states participating in Sea Breeze 2021 include Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, France, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Morocco, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Spain, South Korea, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the United States.

[3] “NATO Allies and Partners Ready for Exercise Sea Breeze 2021,” Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, June 25, 2021, https://shape.nato.int/news-archive/2021/nato-allies-and-partners-ready-for-exercise-sea-breeze-21.

[4] [“Ships of the Russian Navy repelled an Attack of a Mock Enemy During Exercises in the Mediterranean Sea,”] TASS, June 27, 2021, https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/11765763.

[5] [“Pilots of the Naval Aviation of the Black Sea Fleet and Aviation of the Southern Military District Checked the Air Defense System of Crimea,”] Russian MoD, June 29, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12369232@egNews.

[6] [“Guards Missile Cruiser ‘Moskva’ and frigate ‘Admiral Essen’ of the Black Sea Fleet are Returning from the Mediterranean Sea,”] Russian MoD, July 5, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12370157@egNews.

[7] “Russian Border Guards to Continue Thwarting Provocations in the Black Sea – Kremlin,” TASS, June 24, 2021, https://tass dot com/politics/1306799; “Any Actions Possible in Response to Provocations Violating Russian Borders, Says Kremlin,” TASS, June 24, 2021, https://tass dot com/politics/1306821.

[8] Ben Wallace, “Exercises In the Black Sea,” UK Parliament, June 24, 2021, https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2021-06-24/hcws122.

[9] “Black Sea Fleet Monitor US Destroyer Entering Black Sea – Russian Defense Ministry,” TASS, June 26, 2021, https://tass dot com/defense/1307593; H I Sutton, “Positions of Two NATO Ships Were Falsified Near Russian Black Sea Naval Base,” USNI News, June 21, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/06/21/positions-of-two-nato-ships-were-falsified-near-russian-black-sea-naval-base.

[10] Sam Fleming, Valentina Pop, Mehreen Khan, Michael Peel, Henry Foy, and Victor Mallet, “Berlin and Paris Propose Reset for EU Relations with Moscow,” Financial Times, June 23, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/03528026-8fa1-4910-ab26-41cd26404439.

[11] European Council Conclusions on External Relations, 24 June 2021,” European Council of the European Union,  June 24, 2021, https://www.consilium.europa dot eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/06/25/european-council-conclusions-on-external-relations-24-june-2021/.

[12] “European Council Conclusions on External Relations, 24 June 2021,” European Council of the European Union,  June 24, 2021, https://www.consilium.europa dot eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/06/25/european-council-conclusions-on-external-relations-24-june-2021/; Sabine Siebold, Robin Emmott, and Gabriela Baczynska, “France and Germany Drop Russia Summit Plan after EU's East Objects,” Reuters, June 25, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/france-germany-drop-plans-russia-summit-after-eu-outcry-2021-06-25/; “Kremlin 'Regrets' EU Rejection Of Proposed Summit With Putin,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, June 25, 2021 https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-summit-brussels-putin-russia-france-germany-lithuania/31325264.html.

[13] David Herszenhorn, “Summit Exposes Stark Clash of EU Views on Russia,” Politico, June 25, 2021, https://www.politico dot eu/article/emmanuel-macron-russia-vladimir-putin-european-union/.

[14] [“Telephone Exchanges with Mr Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation,”] French Presidency, July 2, 2021, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2021/07/02/echange-telephonique-avec-m-vladimir-poutine-president-de-la-federation-de-russie; [“Telephone Covnersation with French President Emmanuel Macron, Kremlin, July 2, 2021, http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/66055.

[15] “EU Imposes Sanctions on Belarusian Economy,” European Council of the European Union, June 24, 2021, https://www.consilium.europa dot eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/06/24/eu-imposes-sanctions-on-belarusian-economy/.

[16] Olga Demidova, [“Belarus Suspends Participation in Eastern Partnership,”] Deutsche Welle, June 28, 2021, https://www.dw dot com/ru/belarus-priostanovila-uchastie-v-vostochnom-partnerstve/a-58080349.

[17] Tweet. Josep Borrell Twitter Account, June 28, 2021, https://twitter.com/JosepBorrellF/status/1409594465296306179.

[18] George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: Forced Integration with Russia – Not the Protest Movement – is Lukashenko’s Biggest Threat,” Institute for the Study of War, February 19, 2021, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-forced-integration-russia%E2%80%94not-protest-movement%E2%80%94-lukashenko%E2%80%99s.

[19]  [“Conversation with President of the People's Republic of China Xi Jinping,”] Kremlin, June 28, 2021, http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/65940; [“Joint statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Signing of the Cooperation Agreement on Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China,”] Kremlin, June 28, 2021, http://static.kremlin dot ru/media/events/files/ru/hkwONx0FSpUGgXPaRU3xUHRmkRneSXIR.pdf.

[20] The Russian Ministry of Defense reported the “main part” of the exercises concluded on June 24. The final reported exercises concluded on June 30. Anna Berestovaya, Denis Ivlev, [“In the Central Part of the Pacific Ocean, the main Part of the Operational Exercises of the Pacific Fleet has been Completed,”] TVZvezda, June 24, 2021, https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/2021624254-pGRxa.html; [“The Crews of the Ships of the Pacific Fleet During the Exercise in the Far Sea Zone Worked out the Tasks of Destroying the Aircraft Carrier Strike Group of the Mock Enemy,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, June 21, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12367884@egNews; [“In the Central Part of the Pacific Ocean, an Operational Exercise of the Diverse Forces of the Pacific Fleet is Being Conducted,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, June 10, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12366072@egNews; [“A Squadron of Ships of the Pacific Fleet Conducted Rocket and Artillery Fires in the Pacific Ocean,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, June 30, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12369401@egNews; [“A Squadron of Ships of the Pacific Fleet Conducted Rocket and Artillery Fires in the Pacific Ocean,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, June 30, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12369401@egNews.

[21] William Cole, “Russian Naval Exercise Ends as Spy Ship Remains in Hawaii area,” Honolulu Star-Advertiser, June 21, 2021, https://www.staradvertiser.com/2021/06/21/breaking-news/navy-conducts-drills-near-hawaii-as-russian-spy-ship-cruises-north-of-oahu/; Brendan Cole, “Russian Navy Warships Come Within Two Dozen Miles of Hawaii,” Newsweek, June 23, 2021, https://www.newsweek.com/hawaii-pacific-fleet-russian-navy-uss-vinson-coast-close-1603292.

[22] Tyler Rogoway, “Hawaii-Based F-22s Scrambled on FAA's Request But Nobody Will Say Why (Updated),” The Drive, June 14, 2021 https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/41089/hawaii-based-f-22s-scrambled-on-faas-request-but-nobody-will-say-why.

[23] Timur Sherzad, [“Kamchatka Submariners Will Receive Three Dozen New Structures by the End of the Year,”] Tv Zvezda, June 29, 2021, https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/20216291239-oEvxv.html.

[24] [“Lukashenko Discussed Issues with the Secretary of the Russian Security Council,”] Izvestia, June 29, 2021, https://iz dot ru/1185699/2021-06-29/lukashenko-obsudil-s-sekretarem-sovbeza-rossii-voprosy-bezopasnosti-stran.

[25] George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: Belarus Confirms Plans to PurchaseAdvanced Air Defense Systems from Russia,” Institute for the Study of War, January 14, 2021, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-belarus-confirms-plans-purchase-advanced-air-defense-systems; George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: Putin Intensifies Russian-Belarusian Military Integration,” Institute for the Study of War, October 27, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-putin-intensifies-russian-belarusian-military-integration.

[26] [“VIII Forum of the Regions of Russia and Belarus,”] Kremlin, July 1, 2021, http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/65982.

[27] George Barros, “Russia in Review: Russia Opens Permanent Training Center in Belarus and Sets Conditions for Permanent Military Basing,” Institute for the Study of War, April 8, 2021, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-russia-opens-permanent-training-center-belarus-and-sets-conditions.

[28] [“On the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation,”] Kremlin, July 3, 2021, http://static.kremlin dot ru/media/events/files/ru/QZw6hSk5z9gWq0plD1ZzmR5cER0g5tZC.pdf; [“On the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation,”] Kremlin, December 31, 2015, http://static.kremlin dot ru/media/acts/files/0001201512310038.pdf. 

[29] Nataliya Bugayova, “Putin’s Offset: The Kremlin’s Geopolitical Adaptations Since 2014,” Institute for the Study of War, September 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/report/putins-offset-kremlin%E2%80%99s-geopolitical-adaptations-2014.

[30] [“Tajikistan Mobilizes 20,000 Personnel amid Taliban Offensive,”] RBC, July 5, 2021, https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/05/07/2021/60e3266e9a794748f0fb74fd; [“Meeting of the Security Council of the Republic of Tajikistan,”] President of the Republic of Tajikistan, July 5, 2021, http://president dot tj/ru/node/26124.

[31] [“Telephone Conversation with President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon,”] Kremlin, July 5, 2021, http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/66143; [“Telephone Conversation with President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev,”] Kremlin, July 5, 2021, http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/66144.

[32]  [“The Russian Foreign Ministry Said that the 201st Military Base is Equipped to Provide Assistance Near the Border with Afghanistan,”] TASS, July 6, 2021, https://tass dot ru/politika/11833209.

 

Belarus Warning Update: Russia Expands Unit Integration with Belarusian and Serbian Militaries in June Slavic Brotherhood Exercises

By George Barros

Key Takeaway: The joint Russian-Belarusian-Serbian military exercise Slavic Brotherhood 2021 advanced Russian efforts to gain control over the Belarusian military and cultivate partner forces that the Kremlin can use in future Russian deployments. Russia and Belarus operated integrated combat units at the company level for the first time, building on previous exercises fielding combined battalions. The Kremlin practiced integrating non-Belarusian troops into Russian-controlled companies and platoons for the first time—a dangerous development that will expand Russian control over the militaries of sovereign states, enhance Russian force generation capabilities, and help the Kremlin obfuscate its military activity by framing Russian activities as multilateral. The Kremlin will develop these capabilities further in future exercises, including the upcoming annual capstone strategic readiness exercise, Zapad 2021, in September.

Joint military exercises among Russian, Belarusian, and Serbian forces from June 8 to 18, 2021, advanced ongoing Kremlin efforts to subordinate the Belarusian military to Russian-controlled structures and cultivate partner forces that the Kremlin can use in Russia’s future force deployments. The exercise was the sixth iteration of the annual Slavic Brotherhood exercises and involved almost 1,000 Russian, Belarusian, and Serbian troops in the Raevsky Training Ground in Novorossiysk, Russia.

Map: A battalion-sized Belarusian element (over 350 personnel) of the Vitebsk-based 103rd airborne brigade, a Russian-reinforced battalion (over 500 personnel) of the Novorossiysk-based 108th airborne regiment, and a roughly company-sized Serbian element (approximately 100 personnel) of the 63rd airborne and 72nd special operation brigades participated in Slavic Brotherhood 2021 at the Raevsky Training Ground in Novorossiysk, Russia, from June 8 to 18.[1]

Russian and Belarusian forces likely operated as a combined battalion, advancing the Kremlin’s efforts to integrate Belarusian combat units into Russian command structures. Russian and Belarusian forces formed an unspecified “consolidated unit” that served as Slavic Brotherhood 2021’s main operational group.[2] This force was likely comprised of one or more combined Belarusian-Russian battalions, though official sources did not confirm the exact unit structure unlike in previous exercises. Slavic Brotherhood 2021 had strong similarities with previous exerxises in which Russian and Belarusian forces formed combined battalions. Russian and Belarusian forces conducted exercises as a single combined combat battalion for the first time in September 2020 and formed three combined battalions in March 2021.[3]

Russia and Belarus operated integrated combat units at the company level for the first time—a development that could support a permanent Russian military presence in Belarus. The Russian Ministry of Defense stated that Belarusian forces operated “as part of an airborne company,” suggesting a Belarusian element was part of a larger combined Russo-Belarusian company.[4] Observed Russo-Belarusian unit integration previously has not occurred below the battalion level.[5] Combined Russo-Belarusian companies would be the next logical step in increased unit integration and would indicate progress in Kremlin efforts to control Belarusian tactical formations.

The Kremlin’s increasing capability to create integrated units with Belarus is likely intended to support a permanent Russian presence in Belarus. The Kremlin may also be preparing Russian forces to subsume elements of Belarusian combat units in the event of a Russian intervention against the will of the Belarusian government—an unlikely but dangerous course of action ISW has previously warned of.[6]

The Kremlin practiced integrating non-Belarusian troops into combined Russian-controlled companies and platoons for the first time—a significant Russian achievement that will enhance Russian force projection capabilities. Such unit integration will expand Russian control over the militaries of sovereign states, enhance Russian force generation capabilities, and help the Kremlin obfuscate its military activity by framing Russian activities as multilateral. The Kremlin likely seeks to replicate the combined combat unit integration it has achieved with Belarus and now Serbia (on a smaller scale) with other Russia-amenable states. The West must scrutanize Russian efforts to enlist non-Russian forces within Russian-controlled tactical formations. During the Slavic Brotherhood exercises, Serbian elements operated both as discrete country units and in combined companies and platoons.[7] Russian, Belarusian, and Serbian forces also conducted their first-ever joint parachute landing.[8] The Kremlin likely seeks to expand military unit integration with its partner forces below the battalion level.

The Kremlin used Slavic Brotherhood 2021 to develop Belarus’ ability to deploy forces long distances—supporting Russian capabilities to leverage Belarusian forces in future deployments.[9] The Kremlin likely seeks to develop Belarus’ ability to deploy forces long distances to support assessed Kremlin efforts to cultivate partner forces that the Kremlin can use to augment Russia’s own force deployments.[10] Belarus deployed armored vehicles and a battalion of airborne infantry from Vitebsk, Belarus, to Novorossiysk, Russia—a challenging logistical undertaking for Belarusian forces that typically do not deploy outside Belarus at that scale.[11] ISW forecasted in January 2021 that the Kremlin would likely leverage non-Russian forces in future expeditionary operations in and that the Kremlin may deploy Belarusian forces to Syria in September 2021.[12]

The Kremlin is progressing its effort to expand Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) interaction with non-CSTO states and to turn the CSTO Rapid Reaction Force (RRF)—a theoretically multinational rapid reaction force—into a Moscow-controlled force. The Kremlin likely used Slavic Brotherhood 2021 to practice Russo-Belarusian cooperation in the RRF. The RRF is a multinational CSTO contingent tasked with quickly responding to threats against CSTO member states. A Russian officer with senior RRF responsibilities and Belarus’ 103rd brigade—which contributes 2,000 personnel to the RRF—participated in Slavic Brotherhood 2021.[13] Serbia’s likely interaction with elements of the RRF in Slavic Brotherhood 2021 indicates the Kremlin is successfully expanding interaction between the CSTO and non-CSTO members. ISW has warned that the Kremlin may frame Russian expeditionary deployments as CSTO “peacekeeping missions” to obfuscate Russian actions.[14]

The Kremlin used Slavic Brotherhood 2021 to prepare for Russia’s upcoming annual capstone strategic readiness exercise, Zapad 2021. The Russian military’s primary stated objective for Slavic Brotherhood 2021 was to improve cohesion between the staff headquarters and combat units of participating states—a focus likely intended to support joint operations between Russian and Belarusian command staffs in Zapad 2021.[15] Slavic Brotherhood 2021 participants additionally conducted tactical tasks that Russian and Belarusian Zapad 2021 participants will likely repeat.[16] Russia and Belarus will likely intensify their unit and headquarters integration efforts in the buildup to Zapad, which will occur in September 2021.

ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.

[1] Belarusian participants returned to Vitebsk on June 19. [“Slavic Brotherhood 2021 Exercises,”] Serbian Ministry of Defense, June 9, 2021, http://www.vs dot rs/sr_cyr/vesti/C19D09D2C92E11EB8D050050568F5424/vezba-slovensko-bratstvo-2021; [“The Active Phase of the Russian-Belarusian-Serbian Tactical Exercise "Slavic Brotherhood-2021" Has Ended at the Raevsky Training Ground,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, June 18, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12367538@egNews; [“Units of the Vitebsk Airborne Formation of the Belarusian Special Forces Arrives in Novorossiysk for Joint ‘Slavic Brotherhood-2021’ Exercises,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, June 8, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12365830@egNews; [“Home With Victory!,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, June 19, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/114031/.

[2] [“The Active Phase of the Russian-Belarusian-Serbian Tactical Exercise "Slavic Brotherhood-2021" Has Ended at the Raevsky Training Ground,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, June 18, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12367538@egNews; [‘Slavic Brotherhood-2021’ Exercise Participants Blocked and Destroyed the Illegal Armed Group Training Camp at the Training Ground in the Krasnodar Territory,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, June 18, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12367285@egNews.

[3] George Barros, “Russia in Review: Russia Opens Permanent Training Center in Belarus and Sets Conditions for Permanent Military Basing,” Institute for the Study of War, April 8, 2021, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-russia-opens-permanent-training-center-belarus-and-sets-conditions; George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: NEXTA Actively Encourages Belarusian Security Service Defections,” Institute for the Study of War, September 20, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-nexta-actively-encourages-belarusian-security-service-defections.

[4] [‘Slavic Brotherhood-2021’ Exercise Participants Blocked and Destroyed the Illegal Armed Group Training Camp at the Training Ground in the Krasnodar Territory,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, June 18, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12367285@egNews.

[5] George Barros, “Russia in Review: Russia Opens Permanent Training Center in Belarus and Sets Conditions for Permanent Military Basing,” Institute for the Study of War, April 8, 2021, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-russia-opens-permanent-training-center-belarus-and-sets-conditions.

[6] George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: NEXTA Actively Encourages Belarusian Security Service Defections,” Institute for the Study of War, September 20, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-nexta-actively-encourages-belarusian-security-service-defections.

[7] [“A Slavic Landing Fights Together,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, June 16, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/113964/.

[8] [“‘Slavic Brotherhood-2021’: How the Exercises Are Conducted at a Training Ground that Has No Analogues in the World”] Sputnik Uzbekistan, June 18, 2021, https://uz.sputniknews dot ru/20210618/slavyanskoe-bratstvo-2021-kak-proxodyat-ucheniya-na-poligone-ne-imeyuschem-analogov-v-mire-19297969.html.

[9] [“During the Russian-Belarusian-Serbian Tactical Exercise ‘Slavic Brotherhood – 2021’ the Issues of Deployment of Troops Over Long Distances Were Worked Out,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, June 17, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12367095@egNews.

[10] Mason Clark, “The Russian Military’s Lessons Learned in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2021, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Russian%20Military%E2%80%99s%20Lessons%20Learned%20in%20Syria_0.pdf.

[11] [“Units of the Vitebsk Airborne Formation of the Belarusian Special Forces Arrives in Novorossiysk for Joint ‘Slavic Brotherhood-2021’ Exercises,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, June 8, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12365830@egNews; [“The ‘Slavic Brotherhood – 2021’ Exercise Starts in Novorossiysk,”] Sputnik Belarus, June 8, 2021, https://sputnik dot by/defense_safety/20210608/1047828356/Uchenie-Slavyanskoe-bratstvo--2021-startuet-v-Novorossiyske.html.

[12] Mason Clark, “The Russian Military’s Lessons Learned in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2021, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Russian%20Military%E2%80%99s%20Lessons%20Learned%20in%20Syria_0.pdf; George Barros with Jennifer Cafarella, “Belarus Warning Update: Belarusian Forces May Deploy to Syria in Late 2021,” Institute for the Study of War, February 4, 2021, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-belarusian-forces-may-deploy-syria-late-2021.

[13] “Russia, Belarus, Serbia Kick Off Slavic Brotherhood Joint Counter-Terror Drills,” TASS, June 16, 2021, https://tass dot com/defense/1303171; Andrzej Wilk, “Russia’s Belarusian Army: The Pratcial Aspects of Belarus and Russia’s Militart Integration,” Centre for Eastern Studies, March 2021, https://www.osw.waw dot pl/sites/default/files/OSW-Report_Russia%E2%80%99s-Belarusian-army_net.pdf.

[14] George Barros, “Russia in Review: Putin’s ‘Peacekeepers’ Will Support Russian Wars,” Institute for the Study of War, November 16, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-putins-%E2%80%9Cpeacekeepers%E2%80%9D-will-support-russian-wars; George Barros with Jennifer Cafarella, “Belarus Warning Update: Belarusian Forces May Deploy to Syria in Late 2021,” Institute for the Study of War, February 4, 2021, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-belarusian-forces-may-deploy-syria-late-2021.

[15] [“The International Tactical Exercise "Slavic Brotherhood-2021" Began in the Krasnodar Territory,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, June 16, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12367029@egNews.

[16] Slavic Brotherhood 2021 participants conducted airborne infantry jumps, river-crossings, envelopment maneuvers, and conducted an airborne assault to support the arrival of a main force. Slavic Brotherhood also had a combined arms component; Russian Aerospace Forces aircraft supported Slavic Brotherhood’s ground units and an Il-76 transport airdropped cargo onto the training ground. [“In Preparation for the ‘Slavic Brotherhood-2021’ Tactical Exercise, the First Classes Were Held with Landings from MI-8 AMTSh ‘Terminator’ Helicopters,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, June 11, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12366192@egNews; [“The Armed Forces of Russia, Belarus and Serbia Are Preparing for the ‘Slavic Brotherhood – 2021’ exercises,”] EurAsia Daily, June 11, 2021, https://eadaily dot com/ru/news/2021/06/11/vs-rossii-belorussii-i-serbii-gotovyatsya-k-ucheniyam-slavyanskoe-bratstvo-2021; Anna Berestovaya, [“The Military Worked Out Parachute and Parachute-Free Landing Before the ‘Slavic Brotherhood-2021’ Exercises,”] TV Zvezda, June 11, 2021, https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/2021611218-5a0y7.html; “Russia, Belarus, Serbia Kick Off Slavic Brotherhood Joint Counter-Terror Drills,” TASS, June 16, 2021, https://tass dot com/defense/1303171; [“Shoulder to Shoulder at the Raevsky Training Ground,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, June 18, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/114017/; [“Servicemen of the Special Operations Forces of the Republic of Belarus Crossed a Water Barrier at the Raevsky Training Ground in Preparation for the ‘Slavic Brotherhood-2021’ Joint Exercise,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, June 15, 2021 https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12366752@egNews; [“The Active Phase of the Russian-Belarusian-Serbian Tactical Exercise "Slavic Brotherhood-2021" Has Ended at the Raevsky Training Ground,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, June 18, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12367538@egNews; [“The Closing Ceremony of the ‘Slavic Brotherhood-2021’ Joint Exercise Was Held at the Raevsky Training Ground,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, June 19, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12367549@egNews.

ISIS Ramadan 2021 Campaign Review

By Eva Kahan

Key Takeaway: ISIS escalated attacks during Ramadan 2021 despite sustained counterterrorism pressure. ISIS maintains its ability to recruit, conduct attacks, exploit gaps, and in some areas replace weakened governance systems. Local and international security forces are unlikely to fully defeat ISIS in its “core terrain” in Iraq and Syria in the short term due to competing priorities among counter-ISIS actors and decreasing international interest.

ISIS aims to expand insurgencies against the Iraqi government, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), pro-Assad regime forces, and Turkish-backed forces in Iraq and Syria to maintain ideological coherence and leadership security. In pursuit of expanding these insurgencies, ISIS seeks to increase control zones and deep support zones, reconstituting key capabilities, generating new revenue streams, maintaining external lines of support (to Turkey, possibly Jordan, and Iran), and demonstrating its ability to rival other jihadist groups active in Syria.

ISIS must maintain its insurgent activity in Iraq and Syria – its “core terrain” – to guarantee its legitimacy and leadership security. The ISIS affiliates in Africa carry out faster-paced and larger-scale attacks than their Iraqi and Syrian counterparts, providing useful propaganda and justifying the ISIS argument that they are a global organization. However, ISIS groups in Africa are less clearly ideologically orthodox due to their lasting connections with their pre-ISIS networks.[1] ISIS’s core terrain in Iraq and Syria presents a fallback option if affiliates further afield are defeated or diverge from central ISIS messaging. ISIS’s teleological ideology depends on the reclamation of a territorial caliphate in Iraq and Syria, which they claim will set conditions for the end of days.[2] ISIS leaders depend on known routes through the vast ungoverned areas of the Central Syrian Desert between Iraq’s Anbar Desert and Syria’s salafi jihadist-dominated Idlib Province. ISIS leadership in Iraq and Syria is likely vital to maintaining connections between the organization’s global cells. Were ISIS completely incapable of leading from Syria and Iraq, cells in Africa, southeast Asia, and elsewhere could be forced to decentralize similar to how al Qaeda has done in the past.

ISIS has sustained three coherent operational patterns across the Iraqi-Syrian theater. ISIS historically used its Ramadan campaigns to expand its area and scope of operations on the global stage.[3] ISIS’s Ramadan campaigns in 2020 and 2021 have instead demonstrated the viability of its post-caliphate insurgency within these operational patterns, given the consistently degraded security infrastructure of Syrian and Iraq.

1. ISIS exploits areas with weak governing bodies to aggravate popular discontent and reduce trust in local governance. ISIS targets tribal and civic leaders in northeast Syria, Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries, and the Baghdad Belts in order to delegitimize government security and replace it with ISIS. Likely ISIS militants attacked Iraqi Security Forces in Diyala and the northern Baghdad Belts to degrade their governing capacity and perceived legitimacy during Ramadan 2021.[4] ISIS similarly attacked symbols of SDF governance in order to diminish the SDF’s legitimacy and discourage local conscription. ISIS conducted fewer attacks on tribal leadership in northeast Syria during this time than in late 2020, and instead doubled down on attacking SDF infrastructure.[5]
2. ISIS houses key leadership in small zones of control within sparsely populated desert and mountain areas that are largely beyond government control, including the Central Syrian Desert and the Hamrin and Makhmour Mountains. Some ISIS cells based in Central Syrian Desert control zones additionally attack high-value resources and transit routes in order to deter clearing operations targeting those control zones and erode security force will and capacity in the desert.[6] ISIS conducted a string of attacks targeting regime-held oil and gas fields immediately prior to Ramadan 2021, leading Russian companies to abandon the project of rehabilitating those fields. Some ISIS cells in Iraq’s Hamrin Mountains aim to build complex vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) to launch from ungoverned areas towards urban areas or disputed areas of governance, but are unlikely to build a sustainable VBIED production pipeline unless the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are significantly degraded.[7] ISIS may also be attempting to build motorcycle-borne IED (MBIED) capacity in the deserts of northeast Syria, but have only conducted two parked, small-scale attacks since March 2021.[8]
3. ISIS maintains small cells in urban areas with the aim of conducting high-profile and spectacular attacks that undermine government legitimacy and increase ISIS’s long-term relevancy and viability. Spectacular attacks are aimed at feeding ISIS worldwide propaganda. ISIS exacerbates and benefits from security force competition in urban areas in order to blur responsibility for the attacks, sow doubt regarding rival security forces, and avoid capture.[9] ISIS conducted a VBIED attack in Sadr City, Baghdad, during Ramadan 2021, which was initially wrongly attributed to Iranian-backed militias, exacerbating intra-communal tensions in the city. Iranian-backed militias conduct intimidation IED attacks and rocket attacks throughout Baghdad. ISIS attacks in Aleppo and Dera’a are often misattributed to Syrian National Army (SNA) infighting and opposition remnants, respectively. ISIS activity in Dera’a and Aleppo provinces also supports smuggling routes to external support zones through Jordan and Turkey, respectively. ISIS conducted and claimed several attacks in Dera’a during Ramadan 2021, and has conducted and claimed intermittent attacks on Turkish-occupied areas north of Aleppo since June 2020.[10]

The Iraqi and Syrian security environments are too crowded and competitive to enable the conclusive defeat of the ISIS insurgency in the near term. ISIS is unlikely to significantly lose attack capabilities in the next year. However, the international coalition can take several measures to mitigate the degradation of Iraqi and Syrian partners’ security forces and contain ISIS.

The international coalition can mitigate degradation of Iraqi and Syrian partner forces and contain ISIS by:

• Providing consistent air support to ISF and SDF counter-ISIS operations and supporting counter-ISIS planning at the operational and strategic levels.
• Supporting the ISF in cooperating with the Kurdish Regional Government Peshmerga forces, including by building planned coordination centers in Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salah ad-Din, and Diyala Provinces.
• Supporting continued Iraqi Army presence in Iraqi cities to the detriment of the Popular Mobilization Forces, which aim to gain influence in cities rather than countering ISIS.

Additionally, these proactive steps can help prevent ISIS from potentially making major breakthroughs in its effort to reconstitute lost territory in Iraq and Syria

• Mediate between the SDF and partner nations, most importantly Iraq, that have yet to repatriate their citizens from al Hol. Facilitating those returns will protect the thousands of innocent displaced persons in the camp from ISIS-initiated violence and will slow the spread of ISIS’s ideology to the next generation.
• Support the SDF in decentralizing governance in Arab tribal communities and slow attacks by ISIS and pro-regime insurgents.
• Renew airstrikes that target ISIS-occupied and -claimed territory in the Central Syrian Desert. This campaign could prevent ISIS from abusing oil and gas resources in the Central Syrian Desert to generate revenue.
• Gain support from Turkish partners to openly face the ISIS threat in Turkish-held northwest Syria and slow ISIS smuggling routes between Turkey and Europe.

---

[1] https://ctc.usma.edu/outlasting-the-caliphate-the-evolution-of-the-islamic-state-threat-in-africa/

[2] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30083303

[3] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS Ramadan Chart.pdf

[4] http://www dot sotaliraq dot com/2021/04/26/وساطة-الحكومة-تفشل-بتخفيف-التوتر-في-دي/; http://pukmedia dot com/AR_Direje.aspx?Jimare=157835

[5] https://www dot syriahr dot com/%d9%85%d8%ac%d9%87%d9%88%d9%84%d9%88%d9%86-%d9%8a%d9%81%d8%ac%d8%b1%d9%88%d9%86-%d9%85%d9%82%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%8b-%d8%b3%d8%a7%d8%a8%d9%82%d8%a7%d9%8b-%d9%84%d9%82%d8%b3%d8%af-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d9%82%d8%b1/435025/

[6] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-poised-ramadan-surge-syria

[7] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-and-iranian-backed-militias-compete-control-baghdad-region

[8] https://www dot syriahr dot com/en/208831/

[9] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-and-iranian-backed-militias-compete-control-baghdad-region

[10] https://www.stitcher.com/show/overwatch-2/episode/e34-isis-escalates-violence-in-turkish-held-parts-of-northwest-syria-76964317