Belarus Warning Update: Putin Will Increase Pressure on Lukashenko to Integrate Belarus in 2021

 December 18, 2020, 7:45 pm EDT

George Barros

Russian President Vladimir Putin has used the ongoing crisis in Belarus to increase his sway over self-declared Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who has long stonewalled Moscow’s persistent efforts to integrate Belarus into Russia. A sustained protest movement following Lukashenko’s overt manipulation of Belarus’ August 2020 presidential election has seriously degraded Lukashenko’s ability to resist Russian pressure to integrate Belarus into Russia – a key Kremlin campaign ISW’s Russia Team has analyzed extensively in over 70 published assessments in 2020.[1]

The Kremlin has achieved major milestones in its pressure campaign to subordinate Belarus’ military to Russia since August 2020. Russian military units have been deploying to Belarus on a near-monthly basis under the rubric of “joint exercises” since August 2020. These exercises could support a sustained Russian deployment to Belarus.[2] The Kremlin leveraged the crisis in Belarus to test integrating Russian and Belarusian combat units at the battalion level for the first time in September 2020.[3] Russia and Belarus adopted a common military doctrine, announced the completed formation of Russian-Belarusian “regional grouping of forces,” and began conducting negotiations for deeper cooperation between the countries’ security services in October 2020.[4] Putin is also likely pressuring Lukashenko to create a unified advanced air defense system under Moscow’s control, among other concessions.[5]

Putin continued prioritizing Russo-Belarusian military integration in December 2020. The Commonwealth of Independence States (CIS)—a known vehicle for expanding Kremlin control over former Soviet republics—approved a draft concept on closer military cooperation until 2025 on December 10.[6] Lukashenko approved a plan for the use of the new joint Russo-Belarusian “regional grouping of forces” on December 10.[7] Belarusian defense officials said the Russian General Staff participated in producing this plan. The Union State—a supranational structure that the Kremlin is using to subvert Belarus’ sovereignty—must ratify this plan before it takes effect, and likely seeks to do so at a planned meeting in late December. Lukashenko may cancel Belarus’ participation in this meeting to delay making such concessions.

Putin made more progress to integrate Belarus’ government and economy into Russia’s in December 2020. Lukashenko enacted a law on Russian-Belarusian visa recognition reciprocity on December 7.[8] Russia’s and Belarus’ education ministers expressed interest in creating a “unified educational space.”[9] Russia’s and Belarus’ prime ministers discussed strengthening integration in the Union State framework and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)—the Kremlin-dominated customs union designed to integrate former Soviet states’ economies—on December 8.[10] Lukashenko attended an EAEU meeting on December 11 in which the body discussed plans to create an integrated gas market and harmonize member states’ oil market regulations.[11] The Kremlin has exploited Belarus’ economic structural dependency on Russian oil subsidies to pressure Lukashenko for Union State integration for years and will likely continue to do so.[12]

Forecast for 2021

Most likely course of action (MLCOA): Lukashenko will remain in power, protests continue to lose momentum, and Belarus remains de facto sovereign—despite mounting Russian pressure to surrender to integration—by the end of 2021.

Street protests will likely not succeed in overthrowing Lukashenko in 2021. Belarusian protesters have demonstrated great bravery and moral courage in their sustained protests against Lukashenko’s despotism, but Lukashenko, with Kremlin backing, has successfully mitigated the risk of protests deposing him. Lukashenko’s regime has recovered stability from its lowest point on August 18, when regional security forces in western Belarus likely defected from Minsk—the key event that triggered the Kremlin’s intervention to support Lukashenko.[13] The protests’ size and momentum has significantly diminished since their peak turnout in September. Lukashenko’s security forces demonstrated proficiency in managing the September protests that were significantly larger and more forceful than current December protests. Lukashenko has arrested or expelled the opposition’s main leaders, systematically harassed the opposition’s secondary and tertiary tiers of leadership, and has cracked down on factory strike participants. Protests have consistently grown smaller since November and Lukashenko has increasingly driven the opposition underground.  

Protests will likely continue in 2021.  Lukashenko’s efforts to end the protests with economic incentives and constitutional amendments in 2021 will likely fail. Lukashenko instructed his cabinet and national bank to enact price controls and attend “to the needs of the people” on December 7.[14] Lukashenko reiterated his intention to redistribute powers to democratize Belarus—likely via constitutional amendments to be introduced in early 2021—on December 7.[15] Enough protesters will likely reject these measures so that the crisis continues, though at a lower level of intensity.

Protesters in Minsk will likely develop decentralized local organizational leadership at the neighborhood level in 2021. The Poland-based NEXTA Telegram channel—the main driver of organized protests in Belarus—assumed a leadership role in organizing protest activities in the crisis. NEXTA likely launched a new campaign to spur the development of local opposition leadership in Belarus on November 20, to counteract Lukashenko’s efforts to partition the opposition.[16] This campaign is likely succeeding. Protesters in Minsk spontaneously gathered for organized protest on December 12 without directions from NEXTA. The development of local leadership has not changed the protesters’ tactics, which remain peaceful as of this writing. Growth in sporadic organized protests in the absence of public calls to action from NEXTA would indicate the protesters in Minsk have developed local organization.

Lukashenko may succeed in undermining Lithuania-based opposition leader and former Belarusian presidential candidate Svitlana Tikhanouskaya’s credibility inside Belarus. Tikhanouskaya is planning the opposition’s largest protest yet for December 20 and likely hopes that this protest will exceed 200,000 participants.[17] It is unclear whether protester attendance will exceed Tikhanouskaya’s expectations given that her previous attempts to marshal protesters have been ineffective.[18] Belarusian citizens will be increasingly unlikely to continue following Tikhanouskaya’s leadership if her track record in marshalling protesters continues to worsen.  

The protest movement will likely not threaten Lukashenko in the short term. Lukashenko maintains control over his security forces despite some defections. Protest participation continues to steadily decrease as protester fatigue and weather in Minsk worsen. Lukashenko’s willingness to intensify political repression currently outweighs the protesters’ willingness to embrace more radical tactics that would pose threats to his regime.

The Belarusian government will likely further increase its control over the situation by banning Belarusians from leaving Belarus starting on December 20.[19] The ban will likely augment security forces’ policing capabilities by restricting Belarusian activist movement; hundreds of Belarusians have fled to Poland and Lithuania in search of political asylum since the crisis began in August.[20]

Belarus will likely remain a de facto sovereign state at the end of 2021 despite Putin’s intensified efforts to subsume Belarus’ military and governance structures via the Union State and other Kremlin-dominated international organizations. Lukashenko has demonstrated sophistication and skill in stonewalling major political concessions from Putin. The protests and Kremlin information operations have severely degraded but not destroyed Lukashenko’s maneuvering space to resist Putin. Lukashenko will likely continue stalling many—but not all—Kremlin demands in 2021.  

Lukashenko will likely resist Putin’s intensified efforts to establish a permanent conventional Russian military presence inside Belarus. Lukashenko has successfully pushed back against Putin’s multiple efforts to open a strategic Russian airbase in Belarus since at least 2015, for example.[21] Lukashenko likely could stall the ratification of the plan for the use of the Russo-Belarusian “regional grouping of forces” and other Kremlin integration initiatives.

Lukashenko will likely resist Putin’s overarching efforts to gain control over Belarus’ military in 2021. The Kremlin conducted an abnormally high number of exercises in and around Belarus in 2020.[22] The Kremlin will likely increase the size and frequency of its monthly military exercises with Belarus in 2021.[23] Russian influence will likely grow inside the Belarusian military, but Lukashenko will likely retain effective control over his armed forces. An increased rate of exercises between Belarusian and Russian units would indicate that the Kremlin is likely succeeding in its efforts to gain control over the Belarusian military. A reduction in Russian-Belarusian exercises’ scope and/or frequency would indicate the Kremlin is likely facing setbacks.

Lukashenko will likely fail to resist Russian military deployments to Belarus in 2021—a key component of the larger effort to gain control over Belarus’ military. Russia’s and Belarus’ defense ministers agreed to jointly conduct Russia’s next annual capstone strategic readiness exercise—Zapad 2021—and signed resolutions on conducting “joint special exercises” to prepare for this exercise.[24] Russia’s Western Military District (WMD) will likely conduct Zapad 2021 in western Russia and Belarus in September 2021.[25]

Conventional Russian forces likely will deploy to Belarus for Zapad 2021 on a significantly larger scale than they did for Zapad 2017. The Kremlin will likely use Zapad 2021 to deploy an unprecedented number of Russian military personnel into Belarus in September 2021. The Kremlin may choose to continue fielding Russian units in Belarus after the Zapad 2021 exercise officially ends. Moscow may also deploy forces to Belarus, possibly repeatedly, before the formal opening of Zapad on the pretext of making preparations for it or conducting rehearsals. The Kremlin will likely use the Zapad 2021 exercise to further integrate Russian and Belarusian military units at deep levels.

Putin may attempt to deploy Russian-controlled advanced air defense systems in Belarus in 2021. The Russian Defense Ministry claimed on December 11 a unified automated area defense control system will cover approximately 2,000 square kilometers of the WMD from St. Petersburg to Voronezh at an unspecified time in the future.[26] This network will receive targeting information on air and ground objects and coordinate WMD military responses in real-time. The Kremlin likely seeks to deploy Russian-controlled advanced air defense systems to Belarus and will likely attempt to integrate those systems into this automated WMD network.[27]

Putin will likely succeed in further integrating Belarus’ and Russia’s economies in 2021.

Putin will likely further integrate Belarus’ and Russia’s economies through Belarus’ upcoming 2021 chairmanship of the Commonwealth of Independence States (CIS). Lukashenko said strengthening integration among former Soviet states via the CIS and EAEU is an “inevitable necessity” when discussing his priorities for Belarus’ upcoming 2021 chairmanship of the CIS.[28] The country-chair of the CIS changes annually and Belarus will assume that chairmanship on January 1, 2021. Belarus last chaired the CIS in 2014 and 2012.[29]

The Kremlin will likely continue using energy pressure to coerce Belarus into making integration concessions. Russia and Belarus began negotiating natural gas contracts for 2021 in November 2020.[30] The Kremlin historically has used similar last-minute energy-supply deals to coerce political concessions from other states.[31]

The Kremlin will likely sabotage or co-opt Lukashenko’s upcoming constitutional amendments to prolong the crisis. The Belarusian government will likely hold the sixth All-Belarusian People’s Assembly—a national forum including members from all of Belarus’ social strata held every five years—on January 27-28, 2021.[32] Lukashenko suggested transferring some of his presidential powers to the assembly and stated he wants to elevate the assembly into a constitutional body.[33]

The Kremlin remains supportive of Lukashenko’s constitutional amendments for now. Russia’s ambassador to Belarus said Belarus’ constitutional reforms will democratize Belarus and strengthen its sovereignty on December 12.[34] Putin expressed reserved optimism about the planned amendments in his annual press conference on December 17.[35] The Kremlin will likely interfere in Belarusian political processes if Moscow perceives a risk Lukashenko’s amendments may end the crisis without further formalizing Belarus’ integration with Russia.[36] Any unplanned senior Kremlin officials’ visit to Minsk in close temporal proximity with Lukashenko’s introduction of constitutional amendments would indicate Kremlin interference to subvert or leverage those amendments.  

Lukashenko will likely remain in power by the end of 2021, albeit in a very vulnerable state. Lukashenko has no intention of abdicating before his term expires in 2025 and has the means to maintain his regime against the current state of the protests.   

Lukashenko will likely intensify crackdowns on protest leadership in 2021. New Belarusian laws permitting the regime to strip Belarusians of their citizenship for participating in protests will come into effect in June 2021.[37] Lukashenko will likely attempt to use this power to dismantle the growing local opposition leadership. 

The Kremlin may start grooming a Kremlin-preferable successor to replace Lukashenko. Lukashenko has said he does not intend to seek reelection after his current term expires in 2025.[38] Tikhanouskaya stated if she becomes president of Belarus, she intends to immediately conduct new, clean Belarusian presidential elections but not run in them herself, as she is not qualified to run the state.[39] The Kremlin will likely seek to ensure Lukashenko’s eventual successor will support Belarus’ integration with Russia. The Kremlin may support popular Kremlin-linked Belarusian opposition leaders who have spoken positively about reaching out to the Kremlin for mediation, such as Maria Kolesnikova, to become the next president.[40]

Most dangerous course of action (MDCOA): Putin succeeds in establishing a conventional Russian military presence inside Belarus permanently, with or without Lukashenko, de facto ending Belarusian sovereignty. Putin likely seeks to sustain a continuous Russian conventional military presence inside Belarus. Lukashenko’s continued support for the Russian information operation framing the protests as an existential NATO-backed hybrid war against the Union State would indicate this MDCOA is more likely. An increased rate of WMD exercises in 2021 focusing on command and control, logistics, and signals activity would indicate this MDCOA is more likely.[41]

The Kremlin will likely seek to avoid an overt military intervention into Belarus but will do so if Putin deems it necessary. The Kremlin will likely intervene in Belarus under the pretext of defending the Union State if it perceives that protests might weaken Lukashenko enough to put his continued control at risk. This is an unlikely and extreme scenario that will be costly for Putin. The Kremlin likely seeks to avoid having to intervene in Belarus but will do so if Lukashenko appears likely to lose control over his security services. Increased defections from Belarusian security services or a fundamental shift in protester’s tactics that threaten Lukashenko’s current control over the situation would indicate the MDCOA is more likely. A reframing from Lukashenko characterizing Russia’s growing influence as unwelcome or subversive would indicate this MDCOA is less likely.

Putin’s success in Belarus would pose significant security risks to the West. Putin’s successful integration of Belarus into Russia would increase the Kremlin’s strategic projection capabilities against NATO and Ukraine. Russia’s total freedom of movement in Belarus would enhance Russian forces’ ability to threaten the Suwalki Gap to geographically isolate NATO members Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia from the rest of the alliance.[42] Russia’s total freedom of movement in Belarus would also open new avenues of attack for the Kremlin to employ against Ukraine. Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv, is only 95 kilometers from the Ukrainian-Belarusian border, and Ukraine’s defense posture is unprepared for a threat from its northern border.[43] If Putin gains even partial freedom of movement and operations in Belarus, he can significantly increase the risk to NATO and Ukraine. The West should support Belarus’s full independence as a sovereign state and should not recognize any agreements subverting that sovereignty that Putin may coerce Lukashenko into. It must also couple full-throated support for complete Belarusian sovereignty with its already-articulated support for the protest movement.

ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.

 

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[1] See understandingwar.org.

[2] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-putin-setting-conditions-long-term-continuous-russian-military; http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-russia-and-belarus-prepare-october-exercises-belarus; http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-russia%E2%80%99s-western-military-district-prepares-october-exercises; http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-russia-likely-began-preparing-logistics-supply-lines-belarus

[3] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-nexta-actively-encourages-belarusian-security-service-defections

[4] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-putin-intensifies-russian-belarusian-military-integration; http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-kremlin-will-likely-use-october-military-exercises-advance-its

[5] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-putin-intensifies-russian-belarusian-military-integration

[6] https://rus.azattyq.org/a/30994230.html; http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin%27s%20Offset%20The%20Kremlin%27s%20Geopolitical%20Adaptations%20Since%202014.pdf

[7] https://www.belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-odobril-plan-primenenija-regionalnoj-gruppirovki-vojsk-belarusi-i-rossii-419514-2020/; https://iz dot ru/1098125/2020-12-10/lukashenko-odobril-plan-primeneniia-regionalnoi-gruppirovki-voisk-belorussii-i-rf; https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/108509/; https://www.belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-predstavili-pererabotannyj-plan-primenenija-sovmestnoj-gruppirovki-vojsk-belarusi-i-rossii-419498-2020

[8] https://pravo dot by/document/?guid=12551&p0=H12000057&p1=1&p5=0

[9] https://www.belta dot by/society/view/belarus-i-rossija-zainteresovany-v-edinom-obrazovatelnom-prostranstve-karpenko-420241-2020/; https://www.belta dot by/society/view/zasedanie-kollegij-ministerstv-obrazovanija-belarusi-i-rossii-prohodit-v-minske-420225-2020/

[10] https://www.belta dot by/economics/view/golovchenko-i-mishustin-obsudili-naraschivanie-sotrudnichestva-v-energetike-transporte-i-419200-2020

[11] https://www.belta dot by/president/view/etot-god-stal-nastojaschim-ispytaniem-na-prochnost-glavnoe-iz-vystuplenija-lukashenko-na-sammite-eaes-419749-2020; http://president.gov dot by/ru/news_ru/view/uchastie-v-zasedanii-vysshego-evrazijskogo-ekonomicheskogo-soveta-25042/; http://www.eurasiancommission dot org/ru/nae/news/Pages/10-12-2020-2.aspx

[12] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-belarus-update-lukashenko-uses-oil-tariffs-delay-integration-russia

[13] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-kremlin-begins-security-forces-support-lukashenko-following

[14] https://www.interfax dot ru/world/740221

[15] http://president.gov dot by/ru/news_ru/view/soveschanie-o-rabote-ekonomiki-v-2020-godu-i-proektax-prognoza-razvitija-strany-na-2021-j-25003/; http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-putin-pressures-lukashenko-implement-his-previous-integration; http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-putin-likely-disrupts-lukashenko%E2%80%99s-plan-defusing-protests

[16] https://twitter.com/franakviacorka/status/1337780012573974530; https://twitter.com/HannaLiubakova/status/1337776172223115264

[17] https://t dot me/tsikhanouskaya/421

[18] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-police-detain-demonstrators-protests-escalate; http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/11/belarus-warning-update-belarusian.html

[19] https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus--close-land-borders-covid--19-opposition-activists-movement-limited/30993827.html

[20] https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-54209579

[21] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-putin-sends-airborne-troops-belarus-exercise%E2%80%94and-message; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/06/10/2015/5613ebe59a794769839c9e3f; https://www dot vesti dot ru/article/1501418; https://www.gazeta dot ru/army/2019/11/14/12811502.shtml

[22] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-unprecedentedly-expansive-military-exercises-fall-2020-seek-recreate-soviet

[23] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/belarus-warning-update-multiple-russian.html; https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/10/russias-unprecedentedly-expansive.html

[24] https://reform dot by/175035-hrenin-nazval-uchenija-zapad-2021-glavnym-meroprijatiem-sledujushhego-goda

[25] Russia’s annual strategic joint-staff exercise usually occurs in September.

[26] https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12329701@egNews; https://iz dot ru/1098336/anton-lavrov-roman-kretcul/shchit-s-upravleniem-zapad-rossii-prikroet-avtomatizirovannaia-sistema?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop

[27] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-lukashenko-and-kremlin-vie-control-over-future-russian-weapons

[28] https://www.belta dot by/president/view/integratsija-neizbezhnaja-neobhodimost-lukashenko-ozvuchil-prioritety-predsedatelstva-belarusi-v-sng-420767-2020/

[29] http://www.cis.minsk dot by/reestr/ru/index.html#reestr/view/text?doc=4807; http://www.cis.minsk dot by/reestr/ru/index.html#reestr/view/text?doc=3617

[30] https://www.gazprom dot com/press/news/2020/november/article517803/

[31] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/01/europe-cedes-opportunity-in-russia.html

[32] https://www.dw dot com/ru/oppozicija-belarusi-zajavila-o-provedenii-v-janvare-vsebelorusskogo-narodnogo-sobranija/a-55621869

[33] https://www.interfax dot ru/world/740380

[34] https://sputnik dot by/politics/20201212/1046378756/Mezentsev-konstitutsionnaya-reforma-posposobstvuet-demokratizatsii-v-Belarusi.html

[35] https://eadaily dot com/ru/news/2020/12/17/putin-vyrazil-soglasie-s-lukashenko-po-situacii-v-belorussii; https://tass dot ru/politika/10283283

[36] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-putin-likely-disrupts-lukashenko%E2%80%99s-plan-defusing-protests

[37] https://newsbel dot by/12/17/v-belarusi-s-iyunya-2021-goda-nachnut-lishat-grazhdanstva-za-ekstremizm/; https://pravo dot by/document/?guid=12551&p0=H12000067&p1=1&p5=0

[38] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-putin-likely-disrupts-lukashenko%E2%80%99s-plan-defusing-protests

[39] https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-new-yorker-interview/sviatlana-tsikhanouskaya-is-overcoming-her-fears

[40] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-belarusian-opposition-reaches-out-kremlin

[41] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-russia-likely-began-preparing-logistics-supply-lines-belarus

[42] https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2020/08/why-future-belarus-matters-united-states/167627/

[43] Ukraine’s armed forces have built up Ukraine’s defenses against Russian forces in eastern and southern Ukraine.

 

Syria Situation Report: December 2 - 15, 2020

By Andrew Greco

Key Takeaway: The Turkish military and its proxy forces are likely preparing an offensive against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to capture Ayn Issa. Turkey likely capitalized on the Russian withdrawal from Ayn Issa to increase its bombardment of SDF positions ahead of an intended ground assault. Escalations have continued despite the redeployment of Russian forces to Ayn Issa. Turkey appears to want to avoid direct confrontation with Russia and will likely attempt to attack SDF positions and take control of the city without firing upon nearby Russian forces. The capture of Ayn Issa would grant Turkey control of a portion of the M4 highway, interrupting SDF ground lines of communication from the areas it governs in western Syria to those in eastern Syria.

New Moldovan President Presents Opportunity to Limit Kremlin Suzerainty in Moldova

 December 10, 2020

Savannah Modesitt and Paisley Turner

Key Takeaway: Pro-Western Moldovan politician Maia Sandu won the Moldovan presidential election by defeating pro-Kremlin incumbent President Igor Dodon on November 15, 2020. Sandu’s election limits the Kremlin’s opportunity to expand its influence toward the eastern Balkans and presents the United States with an opportunity to reverse the Kremlin’s recent gains. However, the Kremlin will likely exploit its control in the Moldovan Parliament to contest Sandu’s electoral mandate. The United States and its allies should support Sandu’s efforts to expand, strengthen, and intensify cooperation agreements with Western countries as well as Sandu’s stated objective to end Russia’s military presence in the breakaway region of Transnistria to limit a dangerous Kremlin position in the eastern Balkans and on Ukraine’s western border.

Pro-Western Moldovan politician Maia Sandu defeated pro-Kremlin incumbent Igor Dodon in Moldova’s presidential election on November 15, 2020, presenting an opportunity to reverse the Kremlin’s influence in this key state between Ukraine and the eastern Balkans.[1] Sandu leads the European-focused Action and Solidarity Party (PAS). She lost the 2016 presidential race to Dodon, but then became Moldova’s prime minister in 2019. Dodon’s pro-Kremlin Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM) ousted her in a no-confidence vote later in 2019.[2] Sandu won in 2020 with a platform focused on Moldova’s economic crisis, anti-corruption judicial reforms, and Dodon’s poor response to the COVID-19 pandemic.[3] Sandu promises to integrate Moldova with the West and increase diplomatic and economic relations with Romania and Ukraine.[4] Dodon pushed for closer integration with the Kremlin and with Transnistria, the Kremlin-occupied breakaway region in Moldova.[5]Sandu’s focus on anti-corruption reform rather than Western versus Kremlin rhetoric likely won her the election.

Sandu was not the Kremlin’s preferred candidate, but Russian President Vladimir Putin accepted the results of the election and expressed willingness to cooperate with Sandu.[6] The Kremlin did not contest the election results despite running a previous information campaign claiming the West was preparing a color revolution in Moldova, a common Kremlin narrative in the post-Soviet space.[7] Dodon’s re-election would have allowed the Kremlin to further its campaign to gain suzerainty over Moldova and further embed its military presence without serious contestation in Transnistria^.[8]

Sandu’s election challenges the Kremlin’s efforts to use Moldova as a base for increased Russian military pressure against western Ukraine and influence in the eastern Balkans. The Kremlin uses Moldova’s breakaway region of Transnistria as a military stronghold on Ukraine’s western border and to prevent Moldova from increasingly aligning with NATO and other Western structures.[9] The 1500 Russian troops in Transnistria do not directly militarily threaten the rest of the Balkans but could support the deployment of advanced air defenses or other systems that could pressure NATO member Romania. Russia can use the base to support other subversive actions in western Ukraine and the Balkans and more broadly act as a symbol of Russian military power in the western former Soviet Union.[10]

Sandu will challenge the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria and the Kremlin’s effort to secure concrete guarantees of Moldova’s status as a neutral state. The Kremlin seeks to legitimize the enduring Russian military presence in Transnistria and prevent Moldova from aligning with Western organizations. Despite the presence of Russian troops, Moldova's constitution states Moldova is “permanently neutral;” does not accept the stationing of foreign troops on its territory; and cannot join military, political, or economic alliances aimed at war preparations.[11]The Kremlin is pushing for Moldova and Western actors such as NATO and the EU to make statements that guarantee Moldovan “neutrality.” The Kremlin seeks to ensure that Moldova will not join any Western structures. Russian leaders have evinced concern that further Moldovan integration with Western structures could allow the West to contest both Russia’s military presence in Transnistria and pro-Kremlin policies promoted by Dodon’s PSRM party.[12]

The Kremlin has set concrete guarantees of neutrality as a precondition for any discussion of the status of its forces in Transnistria. Dodon made efforts toward these concrete guarantees, seeking pledges from the EU and NATO in 2019 and stating that he wanted "international recognition of Moldovan permanent neutrality.”[13] Dodon made this request after multiple visits to the Kremlin and likely sought favor with the Kremlin in exchange for discounted natural gas.[14] This effort to obtain Western guarantees that Moldova would not integrate with Western structures was never likely to succeed—neither NATO nor the EU has a strong enough reason to make any such pledges.[15] Sandu will likely contest Kremlin-instigated guarantees of neutrality as she has pledged to increase outreach to the West and seeks to end Russia’s peacekeeping presence in Transnistria.[16]She has already stated her plans as president-elect to require Russia to withdraw its troops in favor of a civilian mission under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).[17]

Sandu’s presidency exacerbates the Kremlin’s losses in Moldova earlier in 2020. The Kremlin has steadily lost ground since its successful ousting of Sandu as prime minister in November 2019. Russia effectively used preferential economic measures in multiple sectors to co-opt the Moldovan government after supporting the no-confidence vote against then-Prime Minister Sandu in November 2019.[18] Dodon’s pro-Kremlin government made several deals with Russia, including an infrastructure loan and a major gas deal.[19] The Kremlin additionally secured several bilateral agreements to draw Moldova closer into Kremlin-dominated structures like the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and away from Western institutions.[20] The Kremlin faced setbacks to its influence of the Moldovan government in 2020, after PSRM’s coalition eroded.[21] The Kremlin lost a comfortable Kremlin-amenable majority in Parliament and the Moldovan Constitutional Court blocked a Kremlin-backed loan which it ruled would have influenced Moldovan politicians to advance Kremlin political interests in April 2020.[22] The Kremlin seemingly abandoned Dodon during his re-election campaign and de-prioritized Moldova after these losses. The Kremlin may turn to other, more reliable Moldovan actors to advance its campaigns, particularly those aimed at further integrating Transnistria with Russia. Current Speaker of Parliament and PSRM party leader Zinaida Greceanii is a strong candidate for Kremlin influence due to her strong pro-Russian rhetoric and Kremlin ties.[23]

The Kremlin will contest Sandu’s election through the pro-Kremlin PSRM party while still ostensibly cooperating with her. The majority of Moldova’s Parliament opposes many of Sandu’s proposed policies, and Dodon’s PSRM faction is attempting to create a new coalition that would effectively limit Sandu’s domestic actions.[24] The PSRM party pushed a bill through Parliament to effectively take the security services out of the president’s control; Sandu derided the bill as an attempt to seize power on December 3.[25] It is unclear if the Kremlin influenced this move, but it is still a milestone for the Kremlin’s in its efforts to undermine Sandu’s power over Moldova’s domestic affairs. Sandu has pledged to call snap elections in early 2021 and will likely secure enough seats to ensure the PSRM’s coalition cannot completely block her actions.[26] However, the elections present the Kremlin another chance to contest Sandu and the PSRM is clearly preparing to shift its efforts to Parliament after losing the presidency. The party will likely attempt to handicap Sandu's powers using means beyond limiting security service control. Sandu is pro-European but not explicitly anti-Kremlin. She has voiced her willingness to cooperate with the Kremlin so long as that cooperation does not lead to corruption or political manipulation.[27]

Sandu’s election presents the United States with new and unexpected opportunities in Moldova to develop democratic institutions, assist the country’s integration with Europe, and push back against Russian influence in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Sandu intends to strengthen Moldova’s economy by enhancing working relationships with the United States and forming new relationships with Ukraine and Romania.[28] Moldova is one of the top three recipients of the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) economic aid in Europe.[29] Sandu intends to build on Moldova's existing status as a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and seeks to join the EU.[30] While Moldova will not be joining NATO anytime soon, Sandu can take steps to increase the Moldovan military’s alignment with NATO standards to increase cooperation. The United States should politically support Sandu in these efforts and increase aid for projects aimed at economic growth, poverty reduction, and anti-corruption reforms to seize the opportunity Sandu presents to reverse the Kremlin’s dangerous gains in 2019 and to balance against the Kremlin’s efforts to influence Moldova through the pro-Kremlin faction in Parliament.

 

 

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[1] Corneliu Rusnac, “Pro-Western candidate wins Moldovan presidential election,” AP News, November 16, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-eastern-europe-referendums-maia-sandu-2e1d04e167be69101a1f7fefecd95761; Sandu won in the second round of elections, after leading in the first round. 

[2] Nataliya Bugayova, “Russia in Review: Putin Advances in Ukraine and Its Neighboring States,” Institute for the Study of War, October 15, 2019, http://www.iswresearch.org/2019/10/russia-in-review-putin-advances-in.html; Alexander Tanas, “Moldova's fledgling government felled by no-confidence vote,” Reuters, November 12, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-moldova-politics/moldovas-fledgling-government-felled-by-no-confidence-vote-idUSKBN1XM1G4.

[3] [“Maia Sandu – Program and National Objectives as President (Romanian and Russian,”] Maia Sandu President, 2020, https://maiasandu2020 dot md/program/; Denis Cenusa, “Moldova heads to an electoral run-off as “apocalyptic” discourse gains ground,” New Eastern Europe, November 4, 2020, https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/11/04/moldova-heads-to-an-electoral-run-off-as-apocalyptic-discourse-gains-ground/; Denis Cenusa, “What Will Change for Moldova?” Visegrad Insight, November 17, 2020, https://visegradinsight.eu/what-will-change-for-moldova/; [“Public debate Maia Sandu vs Igor Dodon. Maia Sandu: "Today we wanted to have a debate on economic issues, because a strong economy means well-paid jobs at home, higher pensions and honest successful businesses,”] Maia Sandu President, 2020, https://maiasandu2020 dot md/dezbatere-publica-maia-sandu-vs-igor-dodon-maia-sandu-astazi-am-vrut-sa-avem-o-dezbatere-pe-teme-economice-pentru-ca-o-economie-puternica-inseamna-locuri-de-munca-bine-platite-acasa-pensi/; Madalin Necsutu, “Belarus should be a warning for Moldova ahead of election, says presidential hopeful Maia Sandu,” Euronews, September 28, 2020, https://www.euronews.com/2020/09/25/belarus-should-be-a-warning-for-moldova-ahead-of-election-says-presidential-hopeful-maia-s. 

[4] Steve Rosenberg, “Moldova election: Pro-EU candidate Maia Sandu wins presidency,” BBC, November 16, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54942847.

[5] [“The Candidate’s electoral platform to the position of President of the Republic of Moldova,”] Igor Dodon, 2020, https://dodon dot md/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/2p_platforma_electorala_ind_md_final.pdf. 

[6] “Russia looks forward to mutually beneficial relations with new Moldovan leader — Kremlin,” Tass, November 16, 2020, https://tass.com/politics/1224077; “[Congratulations to Maia Sandu on winning the presidential elections in Moldova,]” Kremlin, November 16, 2020, http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/64423.

[7] “[SVR claimed the US is preparing a “revolutionary” scenario in Moldova,]” Interfax, October 20, 2020, https://www dot interfax dot ru/world/732339; “[Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO Member States,]” Kremlin, November 10, 2020, http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/64385; “[Commentary by the Information and Press Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry on the preparation of the second round of the presidential elections in the Republic of Moldova,]” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, November 11, 2020, https://www dot mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4420073; “[Meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club,]” Kremlin, October 22, 2020, http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/64261; “[Sergey Lavrov's lengthy interview with three radio stations: full transcript,]” Komsolskaya Pravda, October 14, 2020, https://www dot kp dot ru/daily/217195/4303719/?utm_campaign=external&utm_medium=main_top&utm_source=quote_preview&utm_term=0; Madalin Necsutu, “Russian Advisers ‘Working for Moldovan President’s Re-Election Campaign’,” Balkan Insight, October 20, 2020, https://balkaninsight.com/2020/10/20/russian-advisers-working-for-moldovan-presidents-re-election-campaign/.

[8] Vladimir Socor, “Russia’s Current Political Objectives in Moldova,” Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 16, No. 16 (February 7, 2019), https://jamestown.org/program/russias-current-political-objectives-in-moldova/. 

[9] Vladimir Socor, “Russia’s Current Political Objectives in Moldova,” Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 16, No. 16 (February 7, 2019), https://jamestown.org/program/russias-current-political-objectives-in-moldova/. 

[10] Madalin Necsutu, “NATO Urges Russia to Withdraw Troops from Moldova,” Balkan Insight, July 12, 2018, https://balkaninsight.com/2018/07/12/nato-urges-russia-to-redraw-its-troops-from-moldova-07-12-2018/.

[11] Vladimir Socor ^“President Dodon Introduces Nuances to Moldova’s Neutrality,” Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 16, No. 134 (October 1, 2019), https://jamestown.org/program/president-dodon-introduces-nuances-to-moldovas-neutrality/.

[12] Vladimir Socor ^“President Dodon Introduces Nuances to Moldova’s Neutrality,” Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 16, No. 134 (October 1, 2019), https://jamestown.org/program/president-dodon-introduces-nuances-to-moldovas-neutrality/.

[13] Dumitru Minzarari, “Diplomacy Through Proxies: Moldova as a Testbed for Russia’s New Foreign Policy Tool,” Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 16, No. 123 (September 11, 2019), https://jamestown.org/program/diplomacy-through-proxies-moldova-as-a-testbed-for-russias-new-foreign-policy-tool/. 

[14] Dumitru Minzarari, “Diplomacy Through Proxies: Moldova as a Testbed for Russia’s New Foreign Policy Tool,” Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 16, No. 123 (September 11, 2019), https://jamestown.org/program/diplomacy-through-proxies-moldova-as-a-testbed-for-russias-new-foreign-policy-tool/. 

[15] Vladimir Socor, “Russia’s Current Political Objectives in Moldova,” Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 16, No. 16 (February 7, 2019), https://jamestown.org/program/russias-current-political-objectives-in-moldova/. 

[16]Andrew Kramer, “Pro-E.U. Candidate Wins Moldova Election Over Putin-Backed Rival,” The New York Times, November 16, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/16/world/europe/moldova-election-president-sandu.html.

[17] “[The Kremlin reacted to Sandu's desire to withdraw Russian troops from Transnistria,]” European Truth, November 30, 2020, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/rus/news/2020/11/30/7117118/.

[18] Yana Zakharova, “[New Prime Minister of Moldova makes first visit to Moscow: agenda and plans,]” Sputnik, November 20, 2019, https://ru dot sputnik dot md/politics/20191120/28270943/pervyy-vizit-novyy-premer-moldova-sovershaet-moscow.html; “Moldova’s new cabinet sets course for mending strategic relations with Russia — president,” Tass, November 20, 2019, https://tass.com/politics/1091311; Nicoleta Banila, “Moldova seeking $300 mln loan from Russia for infrastructure projects – Dodon,” SeeNews, December 23, 2019, https://seenews.com/news/moldova-seeking-300-mln-loan-from-russia-for-infrastructure-projects-dodon-681217.

[19] “Gazprom cut gas price for Moldova by 26%,” Novoye Vremya, November 21, 2019, https://nv dot ua/biz/markets/cena-gaza-rossiya-snizila-cenu-na-gaz-dlya-moldovy-novosti-mira-50054804.html; “Moldova’s new cabinet sets course for mending strategic relations with Russia — president,” Tass, November 20, 2019, https://tass.com/politics/1091311.

[20] Dumitru Minzari, “Amid Economic Pressure, Moldova’s Pro-Russian Government Looks for Alternatives,” Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 13, 2020), https://jamestown.org/program/amid-economic-pressure-moldovas-pro-russian-government-looks-for-alternatives/.

[21] Nataliya Bugayova, Mason Clark, and Andre Briere, “Russia in Review: The Kremlin Reverses Setbacks in Moldova,” Institute for the Study of War, December 6, 2019, http://www.iswresearch.org/2019/12/russia-in-review-kremlin-reverses.html.

[22] Maria Procopciuc, [“IDIS "Viitorul" opinion on the notifications regarding the control of the constitutionality of some provisions of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Moldova and the Government of the Russian Federation,”] Institute for Development and Social Initiatives "The Future," April 30, 2020, http://viitorul.org/ro/content/opinia-idis-%E2%80%9Dviitorul%E2%80%9D-asupra-sesiz%C4%83rilor-referitoare-la-controlul-constitu%C8%9Bionalit%C4%83%C8%9Bii-unor; Sergiu Praporșcic, [“Prime Minister Ion Chicu. ArchiveIon Chicu, about the CC decision in the case of the Russian loan: It is mandatory for execution,”] Sputnik, May 8, 2020 https://sputnik dot md/politics/20200508/30172905/Ion-Chicu-despre-decizia-CC-n-cazul-mprumutului-rusesc-E-obligatorie-spre-executare-.html. 

 

[23] “Dmitry Medvedev meets with Zinaida Greceanii, Chair of the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova,” Government of the Russian Federation, February 13, 2017, http://government.ru/en/news/26427/.

[24] Denis Cenusa, “Moldovans elected an anti-corruption president, avoiding a ‘colour revolution,’” New Eastern Europe, November 18, 2020, https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/11/18/moldovans-elected-an-anti-corruption-president-avoiding-a-colour-revolution/.

[25] “[Sandu called people to the streets after resonant parliamentary decisions,]” European Truth, December 3, 2020, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/rus/news/2020/12/3/7117271/; Madalin Necsutu, “Moldovans Protest Removal of Secret Services from Presidential Control,” Balkan Insight, December 3, 2020, https://balkaninsight.com/2020/12/03/moldovans-protest-removal-of-secret-services-from-presidential-control/.

[26] Orlando Crowcroft and Alice Tidey, ^“'The people want snap parliamentary elections,' Moldovan president-elect tells Euronews,” Euronews, November 16, 2020, https://www.euronews.com/2020/11/15/maia-sandu-on-track-to-become-moldova-s-new-president.

[27] Denis Cenusa, “Moldova heads to an electoral run-off as “apocalyptic” discourse gains ground,” New Eastern Europe, November 4, 2020, https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/11/04/moldova-heads-to-an-electoral-run-off-as-apocalyptic-discourse-gains-ground/.

[28] Maia Sandu, interview by Steve Rosenberg, Chisinau, Moldova, November 16, 2020, 

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54942847.

[29] USAID, US Foreign Aid by Country: Moldova, 2020, https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/MDA?fiscal_year=2020&measure=Obligations&implementing_agency_id=1; “U.S. relations with Moldova,” US Department of State, January 7, 2020, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-moldova/.

[30] Maia Sandu, interview by Steve Rosenberg, Chisinau, Moldova, November 16, 2020, 

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54942847.

 

 

Syria Situation Report: November 11-December 1, 2020

 By: Andrew Greco 

Key Takeaway: ISIS is reconstituting and expanding attack zones in northern and central Syria. ISIS militants may have carried out three explosive attacks in Turkish-controlled Aleppo Province and separately attacked a pro-regime outpost and oil facility in central Syria.  The increasing severity and geographic area of ISIS attacks likely indicates the organization is successfully expanding its freedom of action in Syria. Continued releases of ISIS militants and family members by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) will likely provide ISIS with veteran fighters and enable it to further expand its operations.

Click the image below to enlarge it. Click here to download the PDF. 

Prisoner Releases will Empower Extremist Insurgencies

 By Eva Kahan and Rahma Bayrakdar

Contributors: Omer Niazi

Key Takeaway: Large-scale prisoner releases and escapes will invigorate the global Salafi-jihadi movement at a time when it has ample opportunity to expand. Recent prisoner exchanges, escapes, and mass releases are returning thousands of insurgents to battlefields in West Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia and will accelerate the growth of several insurgencies.

What’s happening:

Global counterterrorism efforts are receding. The US is planning drawdowns from Afghanistan under the US-Taliban deal and from the counter–Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) mission in Iraq. The US footprint in the Sahel, which enables a French-led counterterrorism mission, may be removed.

The COVID-19 pandemic has also challenged extant counterterrorism missions. The downsizing of counterterrorism missions is pulling already limited support from local forces and governments that are responsible for detainees and lack sufficient long-term detention infrastructure and effective de-radicalization programs.

The US-Taliban deal set conditions for several thousand Taliban fighters to return to the battlefield. In February 2020, the US and Taliban signed an agreement setting conditions for ending the war in Afghanistan and guaranteeing a US drawdown by May 2021. The Afghan government agreed to release 5,000 Taliban members in Afghanistan in exchange for 1,000 government-affiliated detainees during the US-Afghan peace negotiations. The Afghan government released most of the promised Taliban-affiliated detainees, including 400 convicted of serious violent crimes, by August 2020. The Taliban guaranteed that released detainees will abide by the terms of the US-Taliban agreement and support an intra-Afghan cease-fire, but there is no mechanism for the US or the Afghan government to enforce that guarantee. The drawdown of US forces in Afghanistan creates an opportunity for the Taliban to expand and cement its political power just as these experienced fighters return to the battlefield.

The postcoup Malian government released prisoners to an al Qaeda–linked group in exchange for hostages. The Malian government released 180 prisoners to Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) on October 8 in exchange for four high-profile hostages. The prisoners released were not exclusively JNIM militants and included other combatants in Mali’s complicated insurgency.

JNIM’s strategy includes forging alliances with nonideologically aligned groups to achieve its ends; securing the release of such groups’ members will raise JNIM’s profile and increase the likelihood of cooperation. Creating alliances with these groups will provide protection and safe havens for JNIM militants. The release of JNIM militants will also strengthen the group directly.

The US-Taliban deal has influenced the handling of the Salafi-jihadi threat in Mali. Ousted Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita directly cited the US-Taliban deal in Afghanistan as a justification for negotiating with JNIM. Other international arbitrators, including UN Secretary-General António Guterres and an African Union commissioner, encouraged negotiations with Salafi-jihadi groups in the Sahel region after the JNIM prisoner exchange, citing the Afghan deal as a successful precedent.

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) accelerated releases of former ISIS fighters and their families without de-radicalization and reintegration. ISIS has exploited the poor conditions of Northeast Syria’s overcrowded internally displaced person (IDP) camps and detention centers, encouraging *attacks and riots since the fall of ISIS’s territorial caliphate in Syria in March 2019. On October 4, the US-backed SDF announced it would release all 25,000 Syrian IDPs from the al Hol camp upon the IDPs’ request, rather than under previous tribal guarantees to prevent ISIS recidivism. The SDF announced a general amnesty for petty criminals and ”low-level” *ISIS affiliates on October 14 and released more than 600 detainees on October 15 and *another 515 IDPs on November 16, explicitly outside the framework of tribal guarantees.

ISIS will pressure released fighters and families to rejoin ISIS's anti-SDF insurgency. The SDF does not have the capacity to de-radicalize and reintegrate detainees or IDPs while combating a mounting ISIS insurgency. The SDF may instead shift its focus to protecting communities without ISIS presence, rendering communities with returnees more isolated and vulnerable to ISIS and pro-regime intimidation.

The Islamic State has focused on freeing fighters from detention facilities around the world through bargains, bribes, and prison breaks concurrent with recent detainee releases. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) attacked the Nangarhar central prison in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, on August 2, freeing over 50 detainees and providing a propaganda coup. Islamic State spokesperson Abu Hamza al Quraishi called for fighters to “break the walls” of detention centers to free fellow Islamic State members in an October 18 speech that referenced the Jalalabad prison break. The Islamic State conducted a major raid on the Kangbayi prison in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on October 20, freeing 900 detainees, in response to Quraishi’s “call.”

The Islamic State also released an editorial announcement in its weekly Naba magazine on August 6 encouraging Islamic State members to bribe or bargain with local governments to escape detention centers, prioritizing escape despite the organization’s aversion to working with local governments. The Islamic State will likely continue encouraging prison breaks and smaller-scale escapes on detention facilities in the coming months.

Why it matters:

Experienced Salafi-jihadi fighters returning to the battlefield will reinvigorate insurgent organizations poised for breakout. Al Qaeda in Iraq, later ISIS, set the precedent for this style of resurgence in its “Breaking the Walls” prison breaks campaign in 2012 and 2013, following the American withdrawal from Iraq. The breaking the walls campaign freed approximately 600 veteran ISIS fighters over nine months; recent releases in Afghanistan and Syria have greatly exceeded that campaign in scale and pace. Released fighters were radicalized while in prison and used their battlefield expertise to bolster their organization’s command and control networks.

Fighters released in the Taliban and JNIM prisoner exchanges are likewise battle-hardened veterans. Onetime Taliban-affiliated fighters may have been recruited to Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda and ISKP, while in prison. Malian prisons similarly serve as hotbeds for radicalization. In Syria, returning ISIS-affiliated families may also carry forward the group’s governance vision by replicating the religious law enforcement they maintained in IDP camps in their home communities. Detainee releases and escapes will exacerbate the effects of current drawdowns in counterterrorism missions to empower surging extremist groups globally.