Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 1

  

Frederick W. Kagan, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko

March 1, 3:00 pm EST

Russian forces are completing the reinforcement and resupply of their troops north and west of Kyiv and launching an envelopment of the capital likely aimed at encircling and ultimately capturing it. This effort will likely accelerate in the next 24-48 hours. Russian operations against Kyiv are Moscow’s main effort. Russian troops are also undertaking three supporting efforts, one to seize Kharkiv, one to take Mariupol and secure the “land bridge” connecting Rostov-on-Don to Crimea, and one to secure Kherson and set conditions for a drive west toward Mykolayiv and Odesa. The three supporting operations are active, with the operation against Mariupol making the most progress in the last 24 hours.

The Russian attack on Kyiv likely consists of a main effort aimed at enveloping and ultimately encircling the city from the west and a supporting effort along the axes from Chernihiv and Sumy to encircle Kyiv from the east. The long Russian column of combat and logistics vehicles north of Kyiv is likely setting conditions for the envelopment to the west, although it could also support attacks directly into the city from the positions Russian forces maintain in Kyiv’s northwestern outskirts. Russian forces are more likely to pursue the envelopment/encirclement than a direct assault into the city.

The Russian military has continued using area-attack weapons in the city of Kharkiv, dramatically increasing the damage to civilian infrastructure and civilian casualties. Russian forces have not reportedly attempted large-scale ground operations against Kharkiv in the last 24 hours but are likely instead using air, missile, and artillery bombardment to set conditions for a renewed ground attack sometime in the next 24-48 hours. Russian ground forces appear likely to conduct another frontal assault on Kharkiv from the northeast rather than attempt to envelop or encircle the city.

Russian forces in the south appear to be holding their positions south of Zaprozhya, fighting to reduce Ukrainian positions in Kherson and seize that city, and encircling Mariupol to set conditions to seize it. Russian operations in the south do not appear to pose an imminent danger to Odesa within the next 24 hours. A Russian drive north through or near Zaprozhya to cut off Ukrainian forces fighting along the line of contact also appears very unlikely in the next 24-72 hours.

Russian troops claim to have encircled Mariupol and have reportedly entered the city of Kherson in the south.

Russian forces are receiving needed supplies and reinforcements that may facilitate much more rapid and effective operations in the coming 24-72 hours. The Russian effort around Kyiv remains poorly organized, however, with elements of many different battalions combined into what seem to be ad hoc groupings rather than operating under standing regiment or brigade headquarters. The initial errors in the Russian force composition and organization in Belarus and western Russia that ISW has previously reported on, which contributed to Russian logistical and operational failures around Kyiv, will be difficult to remedy quickly and will likely continue to cause friction and reduce the effectiveness of Russian operations even as supply issues are addressed and reinforcements come into the fight.[1] It remains too early to evaluate the likely effective combat power the added Russian troops will bring.

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces are setting conditions to envelop Kyiv from the west and attempting to open up a new axis of attack from the east that would let them encircle the capital. It is unclear if Russia has sufficient combat power to complete such an encirclement and hold it against Ukrainian counter-attacks.
• Russian forces will likely launch a renewed ground offensive to seize Kharkiv following the air/artillery/missile attack it has been conducting in the past 24 hours.
• Russian and Russian proxy forces will likely solidify the “land bridge” linking Rostov-on-Don with Crimea, allowing Russian forces to move more rapidly from Rostov to reinforce efforts further west.
• Russia’s successful seizure of Kherson city may allow Russian forces to resume their interrupted drive toward Mykolayiv and Odesa.
• Belarusian forces have likely entered the war on Russia’s side despite denials by the Belarusian president.

Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:

• Main effort—Kyiv;
• Supporting effort #1—Kharkiv;
• Supporting effort #2—Mariupol; and
• Supporting effort #3—Kherson and west.

Main Effort—Kyiv Axis: Russian forces continue to move into position and to resupply in preparation for a likely attempt to envelop Kyiv from the west.[2] Russian operations on this axis consist of a main effort aimed at enveloping and ultimately encircling the city from the west and supporting efforts along the Chernihiv and Sumy axes to encircle it from the northeast and east.

Subordinate main effort west of Kyiv along the west bank of the Dnipro

• The long column approaching Kyiv from the northwest (on the west bank of the Dnipro) reported by Maxar Technologies consists of numerous trucks and an indeterminate number of combat vehicles. Elements of the 104th Regiment of the 76th Airborne Division based around Pskov are likely accompanying the convoy along with artillery and engineering assets including bridging equipment. Additional combat elements are in defensive positions oriented toward Antonov Airfield in Holstomel according to imagery provided by Maxar Technologies, likely screening the convoy against possible Ukrainian attacks from near the airfield, control of which is contested. ISW is unable to assess the overall combat power in this convoy at publication time. Reports that the convoy’s length grew from 17 to 40 miles are likely inaccurate. A spokesperson from Maxar Technologies has clarified to ISW that Maxar obtained new imagery showing more of the convoy, not the convoy getting longer.
• Russian forces are present in the northwest outskirts of Kyiv. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense reported Russian forces looting in areas of Kyiv’s western suburbs in Bucha, Hostolmel, and Novy Basaniv on March 1.[3] Ukraine’s General Staff reports that Russian forces at unspecified locations near Kyiv have taken up and are fortifying defensive positions, activity consistent with preparations for an encirclement and subsequent siege of the capital.[4] A Maxar spokesperson noted to ISW that imagery shows a significant concentration of Russian forces at Zdvyzhivka, a village on the road between Antonov Airfield and the ring road leading south, along which the long convoy appeared to be driving. These forces could be positioned to attack or secure the airfield, to screen the convoy as it moves past, or both.
• Social media users report Russian tanks present in Makariv, a town on that ring road approximately 30 miles west of the center of Kyiv.[5] The presence of Russian mechanized forces at Makariv suggests that the Russians intend to conduct a relatively deep envelopment of Kyiv, possibly following roads south as far as Fastiv before turning east, although they could choose avenues of approach to the capital further east. A reported Russian airstrike in Fastiv District could support this assessment, although the airstrike was more likely aimed at an ammunition depot in that district.[6] An envelopment or encirclement so far from central Kyiv would require considerable Russian combat power to complete and to maintain against Ukrainian counterattacks. ISW is unable to assess whether Russia has concentrated enough combat power north of Kyiv to complete such an operation.
• Russian efforts within and in the immediate vicinity of Kyiv have reportedly relied on saboteurs and reconnaissance elements, often out of uniform or wearing Ukrainian uniforms, rather than on attacks by regular combat forces.[7]

 

Subordinate Supporting Effort #1—Chernihiv Axis

• Russian forces have conducted rocket and missile attacks in the Chernihiv region and appear to be concentrating forces in Belarus for a renewed attack on the city. Chernihiv is an important road junction on the Desna River, and Russian forces may be focusing on capturing rather than bypassing it to open up the arterial highway leading southwest toward Kyiv on the east bank of the Desna. They did not make much progress in the last 24 hours on this axis but appear to be concentrating reinforcements for renewed efforts in the next 24-48 hours.
• A column of Russian combat vehicles reportedly moved east from the Chernihiv group of forces toward Bobrovytsya (roughly 65 kilometers northeast of Kyiv) on March 1.[8] This movement is likely an effort to link up with Russian forces from the Sumy axis whose advance had stalled around Nizhyn (roughly 115 kilometers east of Kyiv) as of March 1.
• Russian Iskander missiles reportedly hit the Ukrainian Operational Command North Headquarters and destroyed Ukrainian forces and fuel storage in the Chernihiv Oblast on February 28.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian troops fired rockets at Chernihiv City on March 1 after failing to take it.[10]
• Ukrainian Territorial Defense authorities claimed on March 1 that Belarusian combat troops have entered Chernihiv Oblast in support of the Russian offensive.[11]
• Russian forces are continuing to concentrate in Belarus likely to support renewed operations along both the Chernihiv and western Kyiv axes. Satellite imagery showed at least 63 Russian helicopters at the V. D. Bolshoy Bokov Airfield near Mazyr in Gomel Oblast, Belarus, on February 28.[12] The helicopters appeared to be a mix of attack and transport craft that might be used either to conduct air assault operations or to provide rapid resupply of forward units, as well as direct air attack against Ukrainian positions.[13] Numerous social media reports indicate Russian fixed- and rotary-wing air operations at many locations throughout Belarus, including near Minsk, Baranovichi, Gomel, and Grodno.[14]

Subordinate Supporting Effort #2—Sumy Axis (approximately 115 kilometers from Kyiv)

• Russian forces on the Sumy axis appear to have concentrated on reducing pockets of Ukrainian resistance in the last 24 hours. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops have encircled Sumy, Lebedyn, and Okhtyrka and have been shelling Okhtyrka heavily.[15] Russian forces do not appear to have made much forward progress on this axis in the last 24 hours.

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv: Russian forces remain unable to seize the city and have apparently concentrated on an air, missile, and artillery bombardment likely intended in part to enable a subsequent renewed ground offensive. Russian forces have used bombers, tube artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS), and reportedly thermobaric weapons against Kharkiv.[16] Russian ground forces remain positioned near the city and may commence renewed offensive operations within the next 24-72 hours. The Russian air, artillery, and missile barrage may also be intended to generate panic and reduce the morale of Ukrainian defenders in Kharkiv and elsewhere. It is unlikely to achieve that effect. It is too early to evaluate the likelihood that a renewed Russian ground offensive will succeed in taking the city.

Supporting Effort #2—Mariupol: Russian forces claim to have completed the encirclement of Mariupol by land and sea on March 1.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of Russia’s 8th Combined Arms Army and proxy forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic tried and failed to take Mariupol on March 1.[18] Multiple sources report heavy fighting around the city, but ISW has been unable to verify Russian claims of having encircled it nor identify the forward trace of Russian and proxy positions near it.[19] ISW assesses with low confidence that Russian forces have completed the encirclement of Mariupol and will seek to compel the Ukrainian defenders to surrender or attack to seize it within the coming 24 hours.

Supporting Effort #3—Kherson and West: Russian forces have likely secured control of Kherson city and are consolidating there before continuing their advance to the west. Multiple sources reported elements likely of the 7th Airborne Division and SPETSNAZ units throughout Kherson City on March 1, and Ukrainian forces will likely lose control of the city within the next 24-48 hours.[20]

Immediate items to watch

• Russian forces maneuvering to the west and southwest of Kyiv to envelop and then encircle it
• Russian forces securing the crossings over the Desna near Chernihiv and/or linking up with forces advancing from the Sumy axis to open a new front against Kyiv from the east
• Belarusian ground forces beginning active participation in the Russian offensive campaign
• Russian ground forces launching an offensive against Kharkiv following the air/missile/artillery attacks
• Russian forces around Kherson resuming their advance toward Mykolayiv and Odesa
• Russian and proxy forces commencing an offensive to take Mariupol

 

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[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin%27s%20Likely%20Course%20of%20Action%20in%20Ukraine%20Updated%20Course%20of%20Action%20Assessment%20ISW%20CTP%20%282%29.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20Invasion%20Forecast%20Series%20Part%202%20ISW%20CT%20December%202021.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20Invasion%20Forecast%20Series%20Part%201%20ISW%20CT%20December%202021.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2022.

[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/262194402760312.

[3] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261976762782076.

[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/262434586069627.

[5] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1498664725978173446; https://twitter.com/aldin_ww/status/1498665167210569731?cxt=HHwWhoCzjfCBqswpAAAA.

[6] https://twitter.com/MVS_UA/status/1498640307713454082.

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261976762782076;

 https://www.facebook.com/DPSUkraine/posts/28645108026043; https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFU/posts/258048646490628.

[8] https://twitter.com/HN_Schlottman/status/1498716945121742852; https://twitter.com/antiputler_news/status/1498672846838583304 https://www.unian dot net/war/na-chernigovshchine-zasnyali-peredvizhenie-tehniki-okkupantov-video-novosti-donbassa-11723554.html.

[9] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498580468895293440.

[10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/262194402760312; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261976762782076.

[11] https://t dot me/suspilnechernihiv/6484, https://gur.gov dot ua/content/spysky-kerivnoho-skladu-viiskovykh-chastyn-viiskovo-povitrianykh-syl-respubliky-belarus.html; https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/261783329466428

[12] https://twitter.com/trbrtc/status/1498626050233933828?cxt=HHwWiIC59fucmMwpAAAA; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498632085308850180?cxt=HHwWiICy3aD8mswpAAAA.

[13] https://twitter.com/trbrtc/status/1498626050233933828?cxt=HHwWiIC59fucmMwpAAAA; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498632085308850180?cxt=HHwWiICy3aD8mswpAAAA

[14] https://twitter.com/MotolkoHelp/status/1498616685137383425?cxt=HHwWgsCywez7k8wpAAAA, https://twitter.com/MotolkoHelp/status/1498616685137383425?cxt=HHwWgsCywez7k8wpAAAA, https://twitter.com/MotolkoHelp/status/1498619422818377728?cxt=HHwWgIC56ZmblcwpAAAA, https://twitter.com/MotolkoHelp/status/1498636603719360513, https://twitter.com/MotolkoHelp/status/1498408815183683587?cxt=HHwWhoCz1Zy4tcspAAAA, https://twitter.com/MotolkoHelp/status/1498309916662059012?cxt=HHwWiMCyocm7iMspAAAA, https://twitter.com/MotolkoHelp/status/1498347169975312391, https://twitter.com/MotolkoHelp/status/1498643726356426756?cxt=HHwWiMC9pe2hoMwpAAAA

[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/262194402760312; https://twitter.com/HN_Schlottman/status/1498318643574226952?cxt=HHwWkICy6cW3jMspAAAA, https://twitter.com/verkhovna_rada/status/1498531224096288770; https://twitter.com/michaelh992/status/1498515281165135872?cxt=HHwWgMC9ha7t5cspAAAA.

[16] https://twitter.com/The_Lookout_N/status/1498580924363116546?cxt=HHwWhMC4_aXag8wpAAAA; https://t.me/suspilnekharkiv/8404; https://twitter.com/Liveuamap/status/1498658969828704257?cxt=HHwWgoC-gZKZp8wpAAAA, https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/262194402760312; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498548329571143684, https://twitter.com/perfiliev/status/1498330650021093380; https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1498343939925020674; https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1498674395820216329?cxt=HHwWksCyzYabrswpAAAA.

[17] https://twitter.com/rianru/status/1498638111156457480; https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1498670083249512457?cxt=HHwWkoC9uYOgrMwpAAAA; https://www.interfax dot ru/world/825475.

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/262194402760312.

[19] https://twitter.com/YWNReporter/status/1498469970648387588, https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1498684370885959683, https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498715147057213440.

[20] https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1498650588497813510, https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498618283309867008; https://twitter.com/The_Lookout_N/status/1498618847124992005?cxt=HHwWisC5ydj5lMwpAAAA, https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498599593872965632?cxt=HHwWgIC-1YCZjMwpAAAA; https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1498672553631621128?cxt=HHwWkIC5nemvrcwpAAAA; https://twitter.com/NotWoofers/status/1498670343984238594?cxt=HHwWhMC-iZqvrMwpAAAA; https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1498670436753752071?cxt=HHwWjoCyoc20rMwpAAAA, https://twitter.com/OmerOzkizilcik/status/1498676360570712064?cxt=HHwWgMC9kbWNr8wpAAAA, https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1498546527832317957; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498626226667282433?cxt=HHwWgoCzuZ6nmMwpAAAA; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498626127790850048?cxt=HHwWgIC-4b2hmMwpAAAA; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498625804426792962?cxt=HHwWhMC-wdSOmMwpAAAA; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498714618558136321.

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 28, 2022

  

Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko

February 28, 3:30pm EST

The Russian military is reorganizing its military efforts in an attempt to remedy poor planning and execution based on erroneous assumptions about Ukrainians’ will and ability to resist.  Russian operations around Kyiv remain limited as logistics and reinforcements arrive but will likely resume in greater strength in the next 24 hours. Ukrainian military leaders say that they have used the pause to strengthen Kyiv’s defenses and prepare to defend their capital in depth. The Ukrainian military likely cannot prevent Russian forces from enveloping or encircling Kyiv if the Russians send enough combat power to do so, but likely can make Russian efforts to gain control of the city itself extremely costly and possibly unsuccessful.

The Russian military has begun using area-attack weapons in the city of Kharkiv, dramatically increasing the damage to civilian infrastructure and the number of civilian casualties it is causing. It is using tube- and rocket artillery against Kharkiv, and unconfirmed reports indicate that it is also using thermobaric weapons, which can have devastating effects, especially on civilian targets. Ukrainian resistance in and around Kharkiv remains determined, but it is unclear how long Ukrainian defenders can hold if Russia sustains or increases attacks of this variety coupled with ground attacks supported by arriving Russian reinforcements.

Russian advances in southern Ukraine remain slower than they had been in the initial days of the war, possibly due to Russian efforts to concentrate sufficient combat power to conduct decisive operations against Mariupol and, possibly, Zaporizhia. 

The next major phase of Russian offensive operations will likely begin within the next 24 hours and play out over the ensuing 48-72 hours.

Ukrainian resistance remains remarkably effective and Russian operations, especially on the Kyiv axis, have been poorly coordinated and executed, leading to significant Russian failures on that axis and at Kharkiv. Russian forces remain much larger and more capable than Ukraine’s conventional military, however, and Russian advances in southern Ukraine threaten to unhinge the defense of Kyiv and northeastern Ukraine if they continue unchecked.

Key Takeaways

• Russia deployed additional heavy forces and artillery that it has so far failed to employ in assaults on Kyiv to the city’s western approach on February 27-28. Russian forces will likely launch a renewed assault on western Kyiv on March 1.
• Russian forces began using heavy artillery against central Kharkiv on February 28, indicating a dangerous inflection in Russian operations as the Kremlin chooses to use air and artillery assets it has held in reserve to date.
• Russian forces resumed limited advances in northeastern Ukraine on February 28 after an operational pause on February 26-27.
• Russian and proxy forces resumed assaults on Ukrainian forces defending Mariupol from the east and deployed additional artillery and anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) assets to the Mariupol front line on February 28. Russian forces may attempt a renewed assault on Mariupol in the coming days.
• Russian forces increasingly targeted Ukrainian airfields and logistics centers on February 28, particularly in western Ukraine. Russia likely seeks to ground the Ukrainian air force and interdict the ability of Western states to resupply the Ukrainian military.
• Russian and Belarusian forces may be preparing for an additional line of advance from Belarus into western Ukraine.
• Russian successes in southern Ukraine are the most dangerous and threaten to unhinge Ukraine’s successful defenses and rearguard actions to the north and northeast.
• Russian troops are facing growing morale and logistics issues, predictable consequences of the poor planning, coordination, and execution of attacks along Ukraine’s northern border.

Russian forces increasingly targeted Ukrainian airfields and logistics centers on February 28, particularly in western Ukraine. Russia likely seeks to ground the Ukrainian air force and interdict the ability of Western states to resupply the Ukrainian military. The Ukrainian General staff reported that Russian airstrikes increasingly concentrated on military and civilian airfields and air-defense assets on February 28.[1] Russian forces conducted thirty missile strikes and four airstrikes from 11:00 am local time February 27 to 11:00 am February 28.[2] US intelligence officials reported that Russia has fired 380 missiles, predominantly short-range ballistic missiles, since February 24.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian air assets are increasingly targeting Ukraine from Belarusian airspace, though no Belarusian assets have launched operations as of now.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense falsely claimed to have secured air supremacy over Ukraine on February 28.[5] Russian forces have still not secured air superiority five days into the invasion but likely seek to do so in coming days through increased strikes on Ukrainian air assets.[6] Western military aid to the Ukrainian air force, including EU plans announced on February 27 to send fighter jets to Ukraine, will be crucial in preventing Russian forces from achieving air superiority.[7] Russian forces likely seek to interdict US and European aid shipments through western Ukraine.

Russian ground forces are advancing on four primary axes, discussed in turn below:

1. Kyiv;
2. Northeast front;
3. Donbas and Mariupol; and
4. Crimea-Kherson.

1)      Kyiv axis: Russia deployed additional heavy forces and artillery it has so far failed to employ in assaults on the city to the western approach to Kyiv on February 27-28. Russian forces will likely launch a renewed assault on western Kyiv on March 1. Attacks by Russian light forces on the outskirts of the city failed to make progress on February 28. Ukrainian forces are unlikely to capitulate.

• Russia deployed substantial additional forces to its offensive along the western bank of the Dnipro River on February 27-28. Maxar Technologies satellite imagery (see Appendix A below) captured an 11-mile-long Russian convoy approaching Antonov airport, about 17 miles from downtown Kyiv, at 11:00 am local time on February 28. Social media users observed additional Russian forces moving through southern Belarus on February 28.[8] Russian logistics columns were additionally spotted in southeastern Belarus, likely to support Russian attacks on eastern Kyiv.[9] Russian forces will likely attempt a renewed assault on western Kyiv with supporting artillery on March 1.
• Russian light forces continued unsuccessful attacks on Kyiv the night of February 27-28.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff reported Ukrainian forces have established a  “dense and multilevel system of defense of the capital” on February 28.[11] Ukrainian forces likely successfully took advantage of the time granted by Russia’s operational pause February 26-27 to reinforce defenses in the city.
• Russian forces are likely continuing attempts to infiltrate the city. Ukrainian forces reported Russian troops attempted to use three captured ambulances to infiltrate Ukrainian lines in Kyiv on February 27.[12] UK media outlet the Times reported on February 28 that more than 400 Russian mercenaries are currently operating in Kyiv under orders to kill Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, prompting Ukrainian forces to implement a strict curfew on February 26.[13] ISW cannot confirm this report, though it would track with Russia’s likely efforts to decapitate the Ukrainian government.
• Ukrainian forces continue to successfully defend against Russian efforts to encircle Kyiv west of the city, repulsing an attack on Irpin the night of February 27 and possibly temporarily recapturing Hostomel airport from Russian forces.[14]

2)      Northeast axis: Russian forces began using heavy artillery against central Kharkiv on February 28, indicating a dangerous inflection in Russian operations as the Kremlin chooses to use fire assets it has held in reserve to date. Russian forces additionally resumed limited advances in northeastern Ukraine on February 28 after an operational pause on February 26-27. Ukrainian forces continue to delay and inflict losses on the Russian advance but will likely not be able to halt further advances if the Kremlin commits additional reserves.

• Russian forces used close air support and heavy artillery, including unconfirmed reports of thermobaric artillery, in assaults on Kharkiv on February 28. Russian Su-34 fighter bombers conducted strikes in Kharkiv on February 28, and Russian forces will likely increase their use of close air support in the coming days.[15] Russian Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and traditional tube artillery began striking central Kharkiv on February 27-28, inflicting numerous civilian casualties.[16]
• The Russian use of heavy artillery against urban areas indicates a dangerous new phase in Russian operations. ISW previously warned that Russian forces would likely need to increase their use of air and artillery assets to overcome heavier-than-expected Ukrainian resistance but that Russia refrained from doing so to limit the informational and diplomatic effects of causing heavy Ukrainian civilian casualties and to avoid creating rubble and other obstacles-to-movement into and through Ukrainian cities. Russian forces will likely be able to overcome Ukrainian defenses in Kharkiv (and in Kyiv, if they choose to apply similar firepower there) while inflicting heavy civilian casualties and doing massive property damage.
• Russian forces resumed offensive operations in northeastern Ukraine, between Chernihiv and Sumy, on February 28.[17] Ukrainian forces claimed to halt attacks by Russian forces out of Khomutovka (in Kursk Oblast, Russia) towards Hlukhiv and Baturyn, west of Sumy.[18] Russian forces have not previously attacked this sector of northeastern Ukraine and likely seek alternate routes through to-date strong Ukrainian defenses. Elements of Russia’s 14th Army Corps of the Northern Fleet and 47th Tank Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army are operating along this axis.[19]
• Ukrainian forces also repulsed attacks on eastern Kyiv in Baturyn, from the direction of Chernihiv, on February 28.[20]

3)      Donbas axis: Russian and proxy forces resumed assaults on Ukrainian forces defending Mariupol from the east and deployed additional artillery and anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) assets to the Mariupol front line on February 28. Russian forces may attempt a renewed assault on Mariupol in the coming days. Russian forces likely intend to pin Ukrainian forces in place on the line of contact to enable Russian forces breaking out of Crimea to isolate them. The Russians may be content to leave them there while concentrating on capturing Kyiv and imposing a new government on Ukraine. They may alternatively seek to encircle and destroy them or force them to surrender.

• Russian forces advancing on Mariupol from the west continued assembling in Berdyansk on February 28 but did not make any major assaults.[21] Russia may be halting these forces to instead prioritize the other two Russian advances out of Crimea toward Zaporizhia and Mykolayiv. They may, on the other hand, be waiting until they have concentrated enough combat power in this region before launching a full attack.  Additionally, several videos of Ukrainian citizens in Berdyansk interdicting and harassing Russian forces circulated on Ukrainian social media on February 28.[22]
• Russian proxies in the 1st and 2nd Army Corps (the Ukrainian designations for the Russian-controlled military forces of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, respectively) conducted assaults along the line of contact in Donbas, supported by Russian artillery.[23] Proxy forces reportedly captured Hranitne, northeast of Mariupol, on February 28.[24] Ukrainian forces remain largely in place on the line of contact in Donbas. Russian forces likely seek to achieve a larger envelopment using forces breaking out from Crimea and currently advancing on Mariupol from the west.
• Ukrainian forces reported capturing a Russian sniper from the 102nd  Motor Rifle Regiment of the 150th Motor Rifle Division in Donbas on February 28.[25] If confirmed, this indicates at least elements of the previously uncommitted Russian 8^th Combined Arms Army are active in Donbas.
• Russian forces additionally deployed additional MLRS, thermobaric artillery, and ATGM assets toward Mariupol in Donetsk Oblast on February 28.[26] Russian forces may attempt an assault on Mariupol from the east in the coming days.

4)      Crimea axis: Russian forces continued limited advances on two axes out of Crimea—north toward Zaprozhia and west toward Mykolayiv, reaching the outskirts of Mykolayiv on February 28. Russia may struggle to fully supply both axes of advance and may be forced to choose which advance to prioritize.

• Russian forces continued to advance north toward Zaprozhia on February 28 but have not yet entered the city. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to capture the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant, approximately 50km southwest of the city, on February 28.[27] Russian forces in Melitopol likely deployed north to attack Zaporizhia on February 28.[28] ISW cannot confirm the extent of Russian advances toward Zaporizhia on February 28.
• The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops launched an assault on Mykolayiv at 11:00 am local time on February 28.[29] ISW cannot confirm the extent of Russian advances west of the Dnipro River, though Russian forces have likely encircled Kherson.

Russian and Belarusian forces may be preparing for an additional line of advance from Belarus into Western Ukraine. The Belarusian 38th Air Assault Brigade deployed to Kobryn, near Brest in southwestern Belarus, on February 28.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 28 that there is a high likelihood of Belarusian forces joining Russian operations.[31] ISW previously reported a Russian armored column assembling in Stolin, Belarus, on February 25 to support a possible advance into Rivne Oblast in western Ukraine.[32] Russian forces have not launched a ground attack as of this publication. A Russian offensive in western Ukraine would likely seek to cut Ukraine off from ground shipments of Western aid through Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary. However, Belarusian airborne forces would likely face similar difficulties to previous, failed, Russian airborne operations against Kyiv if they attempted airdrops.

Immediate Items to Watch

• Russian forces advancing north and east from Crimea threaten to cut off Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine if Kyiv does not withdraw them in the coming days.
• Russian forces began using artillery against residential areas in Kharkiv on February 28, likely signaling a dangerous new phase of Russian operations.
• Russian forces face growing morale and supply issues but will likely be able to overcome these handicaps.
• Russian forces continue to refrain from using their likely full spectrum of air and missile capabilities. The Ukrainian air force also remains active. Russian operations will likely steadily wear down Ukrainian air capabilities and eventually take the Ukrainian air force out of the fight.
• Russia has sufficient conventional military power to reinforce each of its current axes of advance and overpower the conventional Ukrainian forces defending them.

Appendix A – Satelite Imagery

Satellite image ©2022 Maxar Technologies.

Satellite image ©2022 Maxar Technologies.

Satellite image ©2022 Maxar Technologies.

Satellite image ©2022 Maxar Technologies.

Satellite image ©2022 Maxar Technologies.

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[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261189039527515.

[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261400946172991.

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[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261400946172991.

[5] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XN24My3vFeg.

[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261400946172991.

[7] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-02-26/card/zjCJ5iME2keSkxfiaIpr; https://www.axios.com/eu-weapons-ukraine-russia-invasion-331bfcbc-5193-47b0-8afb-03f194d95619.html.

[8] https://twitter.com/gfusfus/status/1497989547203842051.

[9] https://twitter.com/MotolkoHelp/status/1498226217941671936; https://twitter.com/MotolkoHelp/status/1498270383262343171.

[10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261156522864100;

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261034776209608.

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/260936159552803.

[13] https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/volodymyr-zelensky-russian-mercenaries-ordered-to-kill-ukraine-president-cvcksh79d.

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261034776209608; https://twitter.com/defencehq/status/1498191541675958273?s=21.

[15] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498220414300045319; https://twitter.com/CITeam_en/status/1498284750850740228; https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1498304259447828481.

[16] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=672925393899103; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/26093615955280;  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261453089501110; https://twitter.com/olliecarroll/status/1498264116871507971; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498270787081547777.

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261400946172991.

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261400946172991.

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261400946172991; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1498181728921436163?cxt=HHwWhoC-lYiWzsopAAAA.

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261400946172991; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1498318233946161155.

[21] https://twitter.com/COUPSURE/status/1497989234476699655; https://twitter.com/nigroeneveld/status/1498072845607444484;

[22] https://twitter.com/ArmedForcesUkr/status/1498298228802007042?s=20&t=F3QRgHEoM9-x5TGbj6bwrw; https://twitter.com/PVB40/status/1498300930613207049?s=20&t=F3QRgHEoM9-x5TGbj6bwrw.

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[24] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1498298575339638784?s=20&t=F3QRgHEoM9-x5TGbj6bwrw.

[25] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1498256738562318337; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1498174702107381760.

[26] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498255416203087872; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498265765811834884; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1498219680242311171?cxt=HHwWhoC9xY-338opAAAA ; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498254707420241921

[27] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/13892671.

[28] https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1498301907202457600?cxt=HHwWgIC-ka7phMspAAAA.

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[30] https://twitter.com/COUPSURE/status/1498250818306420740.

[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261400946172991.

[32] https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1497115295512776711; https://twitter.com/MotolkoHelp/status/1497108720953835543.