Friday, February 11, 2022

Turkey in Review: January 19 – February 7, 2022

Turkey Deploys Sustained and Coordinated Strikes against Kurdish Forces in Iraq and Syria

By Ezgi Yazici and Fatih Cungurlu

Key Takeaway: Turkey conducted its first simultaneous multi-theater counterterrorism operation against the PKK in Iraq and its Syrian offshoot, the YPG, on February 2, 2022. The simultaneity of this operation is the most recent demonstration of Turkey’s fundamental shift in northern Syria and Iraq from full-scale ground incursions to a strategy of sustained counterterrorism pressure. Turkey’s ability to maintain a high tempo against the PKK and the YPG outside major incursions and its emphasis on airpower—including drone strikes—allow Ankara to circumvent the international political costs of its past capture-and-hold campaigns in Syria. Separately, Turkey is approaching Baghdad for counterterrorism and defense cooperation against the PKK. Turkey’s two-pronged diplomatic and military strategy may precipitate new PKK and Iranian proxy attacks to disrupt or retaliate against the Turkish military presence in both Syria and Iraq.

Turkey’s first-ever simultaneous cross-theater air campaign is a product of its combined counterterrorism approach to Syria and Iraq. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) conducted its first simultaneous air campaign in Syria and Iraq against People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) positions on February 2.[1] Turkish airstrikes hit YPG and PKK positions as well as some civilian areas in Malikiyah in Syria’s Hasaka Governorate and Iraq’s Sinjar District and Makhmur Refugee Camp on February 2.[2] The TSK used at least 60 aircraft, including armed drones and F-16 fighter jets in the campaign dubbed “Winter Claw.”[3] Turkey’s coordinated campaign across Iraqi and Syrian positions reflects its longstanding treatment of northern Syria and northern Iraq as two halves of a single counterterrorism theater.

Turkey and Turkish-backed forces are fighting across a wider frontline with the YPG in Syria. After the Turkish airstrikes, Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) initiated clashes with the YPG on February 2 onwards in at least eight different towns, including Tel Rifat, Aleppo Governorate; Tel Tamr, Ain Diwar Village, Tel Abu Rasin, and Darbasiyah in Hasaka Governorate; and Tel Abyad and Ain Issa, Raqqa Governorate.[4] The TSK did not attribute the ground fighting to Operation Winter Claw. However, the TSK likely timed these simultaneous ground and air campaigns to reinforce each other in pressuring the Kurdish YPG and PKK groups. Turkey and Turkish-backed Syrian forces have expanded the area in which they have launched or had planned to launch simultaneous attacks against the YPG forces, overstretching the YPG.[5]

Ankara is successfully keeping its high-tempo military activities below the “incursion threshold” to minimize domestic and international political costs. Turkey is now able to maintain a continuous pace of targeted drone strikes against top PKK commanders, almost-daily clashes with the YPG in Syria, and tight aerial surveillance over the PKK in northern Iraq—all without declaring a new cross-border campaign.[6] This strategy of sustained pressure is a major shift from Turkey’s past incursion approach in Syria or Iraq, which was confined to conventional, deadline-driven ground campaigns with political, resource, and weather restrictions. Introduced in late 2020, the new approach aims to disrupt command structures and paralyze PKK and affiliate groups’ movements between Syria, Iraq, and Turkey without depending on incursions. Its counterterrorism emphasis also circumvents the international diplomatic costs that plagued Turkey’s past cross-border incursions. Most recently, Ankara received significant pressure from the United States and Russia against a potential new cross-border incursion in October 2021.[7]

Turkey’s emphasis on drones and surveillance technologies has allowed Ankara to impose sustained pressure on areas with YPG and PKK presence. The wide geographic range of the TSK’s targets on February 2-3 reflects Turkey’s growing ability to sustain simultaneous or consecutive campaigns on multiple fronts across countries. Turkey’s investments in domestic defense production have been critical in developing this capability. Its emphasis on airpower (manned and unmanned) played a key role in evolving previously seasonal anti-PKK campaigns into the continuous ones Turkey maintains today. Turkey has used drones for surveillance and targeted attacks in its push to paralyze PKK supply lines and kill PKK leadership. This strategy has proved successful in cutting off PKK’s access to Iraq, minimizing casualties inside Turkey, and confining fatalities to northern Iraq, as well.[8]

Turkey’s sustained high-tempo military activity is drawing frequent retaliations from Kurdish groups and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. On February 2-3, Syrian Kurdish YPG forces conducted a cross-border rocket attack against a TSK border command post, killing a Turkish soldier in Cizre, Sirnak Province, Turkey.[9] YPG forces also targeted a civilian center in al-Bab, Aleppo Governorate, Syria with a rocket attack on February 2, killing nine.[10] These attacks are consistent with the likely YPG effort to disrupt and counter Turkish stabilization efforts in Turkish-controlled Syria. Iranian proxies in Iraq have also increasingly criticized Turkish airstrikes and military presence in Iraq in recent months. Most significantly, a new, likely Iran-backed Sinjar-based group “Ahrar Sinjar” fired at least 18 rockets at a TSK base in Bashiqa, Ninewa Province, Iraq, on February 3.[11] Prior to February 3, likely Iranian proxies targeted the TSK base in Bashiqa on December 27, January 2, January 15, and January 26. [12] Ahrar Sinjar claims to be comprised of Yezidi fighters from Sinjar—where the PKK has substantial presence and influence within Kurdish and Yezidi communities.[13] Ahrar Sinjar’s alleged ability to launch rockets from Iranian proxy-controlled areas far from Sinjar indicates growing coordination between Iraq-based Iranian proxy militant groups and the PKK.

Ankara couples its military campaigns against the PKK with political and defense outreach—particularly in Iraq. Turkish officials, from President Erdogan to Turkey’s Ambassador to Iraq, have focused on cultivating ties with key Iraqi Sunni officials since October 2021—likely to build a pro-Turkey Iraqi Sunni political alliance with which Ankara’s Iraqi Kurdish and Turkmen partners could align.[14] Turkey likely perceives military and political support from the Iraqi Government and the Kurdistan Regional Government as necessary to remove the PKK from parts of northern Iraq. Turkey even offered drone sales to Baghdad and military exercises with the Iraqi government to incentivize greater defense cooperation, though no agreements have been signed yet.[15] However, Turkey’s political interference in Iraq is likely a key motivator for the Iran-backed attacks against the Turkish base in Bashiqa.

Turkish officials likely view the transformation of Ankara’s counterterrorism approach in Syria and Iraq as a successful strategy. The TSK will likely continue forcing the Syrian Kurdish group to overstretch across a wide frontline. Turkey’s sustained campaign of surveillance and drone strikes is increasingly capable of cutting the PKK’s access from Iraq to Turkey and disrupting its Syria-Iraq networks.

However, Ankara’s new strategy comes with costs and risks. Turkey’s sustained bombing campaign is destabilizing Kurdish-populated zones in both Syria and Iraq. Ankara’s approach may also precipitate transnational responses from Iranian proxy or PKK-aligned groups against TSK positions in Syria and Iraq. Turkey’s strategy relies heavily on the sustained use of its F-16 fleet. While not an immediate problem, that fleet is rapidly aging. If Ankara wants to sustain an airpower-heavy strategy, it will need to secure replacements or upgrades for its fighters. Turkey was expelled from the F-35 fighter program in 2019 and has been lobbying the United States for re-inclusion or other access to fighter technology.

January 21: Iran halts natural gas exports to Turkey, amplifying energy shortages and high prices in Syria and Turkey. Iran halted gas exports to Turkey for ten days, citing technical problems, on January 21.[16] The Turkish government imposed power cuts on industrial users and manufacturers for at least three days on January 24.[17] Iran provides 10 percent of Turkey’s natural gas, and its ten-day cut put significant strain on Turkish manufacturers and the government alike. Energy prices have skyrocketed in Turkey in recent months due to the weakening Turkish lira. A Turkish delegation traveling to Iran claimed Iran halted natural gas exports to Turkey due to increased Iranian domestic energy use, not a technical failure, on January 26.[18] Azerbaijan agreed to increase its natural gas supply to Turkey through February to compensate for Iran’s supply suspension.[19] Iran’s export halt exacerbated anxieties over rising energy prices in Turkey; electricity and natural gas bills for households in Turkey have doubled since December 2021. Turkish citizens organized local protests in several provinces.[20] In Syria, demonstrators broke into a Turkish electricity company to protest price hikes in Turkish-controlled Syria.[21] Turkish President Erdogan announced a limited adjustment to electricity bills to alleviate public pressure on February 1.[22] In Turkey, the energy shortage and production disruptions could threaten Erdogan’s efforts to put exports at the center of his economic model. Growing displeasure about price hikes and power cuts also undermines Turkey’s bid to stabilize and govern Turkish-controlled Syria. Turkey may further reduce electricity supplies to northern Syria to alleviate domestic shortages. Iran restarted limited exports on January 31.
February 3: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan traveled to Kyiv, Ukraine, to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Erdogan and Zelensky discussed Russia-Ukraine tensions as part of Turkey’s bid to mediate the crisis while establishing its firm support for Ukraine.[23] Erdogan and Zelensky signed a free trade agreement between Turkey and Ukraine to boost bilateral trade from $7 billion to $10 billion over the next five years.[24] Erdogan and Zelensky also agreed to produce Turkish Bayraktar TB-2 combat drones in Ukraine, use Ukrainian Motor Sich engines in the next generation Bayraktar drones, and establish a Bayraktar TB-2 training center in Ukraine.[25] Russia previously criticized Ukraine for using Turkish drones to escalate fighting in the Donbas region. Erdogan reiterated Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and criticized Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Turkey’s fragile mediation efforts are likely out of necessity to maintain its position as a state with significant dependencies on NATO and Russia alike. However, Erdogan is also aiming to leverage the escalations to establish Turkey as a dependable partner and to solidify long-term Turkish-Ukrainian defense ties.
February 1: Turkish President Erdogan hosted a Lebanese delegation led by Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati in Ankara, Turkey. Prime Minister Mikati’s delegation met with Turkish officials on February 1.[26] Mikati and Erdogan discussed a wide range of subjects, including trade and tourism cooperation, Turkish aid to Lebanon, and energy investments, during a one-on-one meeting.[27] Erdogan offered Turkish companies’ support for Lebanese infrastructure projects, particularly for reconstructing the Beirut Port.[28] Erdogan also indicated Turkey would support Lebanon’s government reform efforts. Turkish Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu met with Lebanese Economy and Trade Minister Amin Salam on February 1, after which Turkey removed its ban on scrap metal imports from Lebanon—an estimated $100 million export income to Beirut.[29] Turkey’s outreach to Lebanon is likely connected to Ankara’s desire to expand energy cooperation in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey also likely seeks to establish itself as a main supporter of Lebanon in the latter’s attempt to recover from economic collapse.
January 27: Turkey and Qatar continued negotiations with the Taliban to run the Kabul International Airport alongside other Turkish outreach in Afghanistan. Turkish, Qatari, and Taliban delegations met in Doha, Qatar, on January 27 to discuss the Turkish-Qatari proposal to operate and secure the Kabul Airport.[30] The delegations agreed on “key issues” on how to manage and operate the airport, according to the Qatari Foreign Ministry readout.[31] The Taliban asked for Turkey’s support to operate the Kabul Airport in September 2021, but the discussions paused after Turkey sought to bring in its personnel for airport security. Separately, the Turkish ambassador to Afghanistan, Cihad Erginay, met with key Afghan officials, including Taliban Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Salam Hanafi and former Afghan President Hamid Karzai.[32] Turkey continues its humanitarian aid and infrastructure projects as part of its bid to maintain its unique stabilizer and gateway position between the Taliban and the rest of the world [33]
January 30: Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu visited Bahrain as part of Turkey’s Gulf outreach. Cavusoglu's visit marks the first high-level Turkish delegation visit to Bahrain since Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit in February 2017. Cavusoglu met with Bahraini Prime Minister Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa and Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani in Manama, Bahrain, on January 31.[34] Cavusoglu underlined that Turkey aims to increase its cooperation with Bahrain in the health and defense industries.[35] Cavusoglu's visit is likely part of Turkey's efforts to mend ties with the Persian Gulf countries by offering defense cooperation deals while seeking cash injections to recover its economy. Erdogan is scheduled to visit the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in February for the first time since the Gulf diplomatic crisis in 2017.[36]

Contributors: Fatih Cungurlu, Kevin Chen, Krista Schaefer

[1] https://twitter.com/AlArabiya_Brk/status/1488837107774803968

https://twitter.com/HoshangHesen/status/1488912418818379776

https://twitter.com/zidan_yezidi/status/1488822638696968199

https://www.msb.gov.tr/SlaytHaber/122022-85544

[2] Sinjar: https://twitter.com/zidan_yezidi/status/1488822638696968199

https://twitter.com/metesohtaoglu/status/1488924944771825675

Makhmur: https://twitter.com/baxtiyargoran/status/1488622978397085697

https://twitter.com/SVErguven/status/1488901262091251717

Malikiyah: https://twitter.com/NassanIdriss/status/1488638621158621195

https://twitter.com/kkpkurdistan/status/1488932252008472582

[3] https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/turkiye/kis-kartali-harekatinin-ayrintilari-belli-oldu-1904719

[4] Afrin: https://twitter.com/NPA_English/status/1488821225371676673

Tal Rifat: https://twitter.com/MustafaB49/status/1488923792386797571

Tal Tamr: https://twitter.com/NPA_English/status/1488871355193909249

https://t.me/gizliservis06/3497, https://twitter.com/RojavaIC/status/1488904542448234497

https://twitter.com/BirDertli42/status/1489171198743359492

Abu Rasin: https://twitter.com/syriahr/status/1488884040845434883

Ain Diwar: https://twitter.com/spriter99880/status/1488884415006662657

Darbasiyah: https://www.syriahr.com/en/237775/

https://twitter.com/welcomeToTRT/status/1489170381307101187?s=20&t=MUT3uCPTGJdaa4qHTBV_eQ

https://twitter.com/NPA_English/status/1489161658744418304

Tal Abyad and Ain Isa:

https://twitter.com/NPA_English/status/1488888239347875844

https://twitter.com/RojavaIC/status/1488904499699888137

[5] In October 2021, Turkish Armed Forces deployed troops and equipment toward the border in preparation for a possible Turkish incursion. The preparation never materialized to an actual military campaign, however the deployments also indicated an expansion of the area that Turkish and Turkish-backed forces were planning to target the YPG from.

[6] Turkey also killed senior YBS leaders with drone strikes in Sinjar August and December 2021. Shingal Resistance Units (YBS) was formed of local Yazidi fighters in 2014 to fight ISIS. Turkey considers the YBS to be an offshoot of the PKK

https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/12/turkey-strikes-yazidi-militia-iraq

https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/071220212

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/turkey-review-october-29-%E2%80%93-november-17-2021

[8] https://twitter.com/abdullahawez/status/1491383474540126209?s=20&t=TPNW8NZakW4N6PZhEOh0uQ

[9] https://twitter.com/Axpin72/status/1488932252033724416

https://twitter.com/botanistan/status/1488892464794644486

https://twitter.com/boluakgenclik14/status/1488933182904930308

[10] Cizre: https://twitter.com/Axpin72/status/1488932252033724416

https://twitter.com/botanistan/status/1488892464794644486

https://twitter.com/boluakgenclik14/status/1488933182904930308

Al Bab: https://twitter.com/AsaadHannaa/status/1488918808790290438

https://twitter.com/SyriaCivilDefe/status/1488864627224158209

https://twitter.com/RojavaIC/status/1488904544830504960

[11] https://twitter.com/AliBaroodi/status/1489112061372256256

https://twitter.com/Natsecjeff/status/1489218034506113031

https://t.me/sabreenS1/40150

[12] No group has claimed the attacks, however ISW assesses that Iran-backed Iraqi proxies might have conducted most if not all of the attacks due to the immediate proxy criticism of Turkish military presence in Iraq after each attack.

27 Dec: https://www.shafaq.com/en/Iraq-News/A-rocket-attack-targets-Turkish-Base-in-Iraq

https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/26720-Rocket-attack-targets-Turkish-military-camp-near-Iraq%27s-Mosul

RUMINT 30 DEC: https://twitter.com/Suribelle1/status/1477025054084980736?t=xrR3O29lrX1LUismXoTvxQ&s=19

https://twitter.com/Asbghostyeni4/status/1477036488542072837

2 JAN: https://shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82

https://t.me/sabreenS1/38077

https://t.me/sabreenS1/38075

JAN 15: “In the Second Attack of its Kind a Missile Attacks Targets the Zlikan Base,” Shafaq, January 15, 2022. shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B9%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%B2%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AF; “At least 3 missiles targeted the Turkish Zlikan base in Bashiqa, Mosul Governorate,” Sabereen News Telegram, January 15, 2022. t dot me/sabreenS1/39133

“A Second Burst of 4 Missiles Target the Turkish Base Responding to the Artillery of the Turkish Occupation,” Sabereen News Telegram, January 16, 2022. t dot me/sabreenS1/39135

JAN 26: https://t.me/sabreenS1/38077

https://twitter.com/remilitari/status/1477939406350733313

[13] https://t.me/sabreenS1/40150

[14] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan summoned Iraqi Parliamentary Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi and US-sanctioned businessman Khamis al-Khanjar, the leaders of Iraq’s two largest Sunni blocs, to Ankara in October and reportedly encouraged them to form a unified Sunni political alliance. They formed that alliance in January and aligned with Iraqi nationalist Shi’a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and the Turkey-backed Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) to attempt to form an Iraqi government with limited Iranian influence. The Sadr-led coalition is attempting to reinstate current Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who is close to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey and has written extensively about the importance of counterbalancing Iranian influence in Iraq with Gulf state relations.

[15] 2021-12-03 RUMINT The Iraqi government approves a $100 million budget to buy Turkish Bayraktar TB2 Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV) on December 2. https://www.defenceturk.net/irak-tan-bayraktar-tb2-siha-alimi-icin-100-milyon-dolarlik-butce

2021-12-01: Turkish Chief of the General Staff Yasar Guler and Iraqi Chief of the General Staff Abdul-Amir Rashid Yarallah discuss recent developments, potential Turkish-Iraqi military exercises over the phone on December 1. https://twitter.com/TSKGnkur/status/1466034776792514569 ) https://twitter.com/IraqiSpoxMOD/status/1466098896208375822?s=20&t=6vL848G4tE2MkuFnyQmPnw

[16] Tasnim News Agency https://tn.ai/2648222

[17] https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/iran-fails-to-meet-conditions-in-natural-gas-contract-turkey-170995

[18] https://www.dailysabah.com/business/energy/local-use-not-technical-fault-reportedly-behind-irans-gas-halt-to-turkey

[19] SOCAR SPOX https://twitter.com/Qizilbasch/status/1486332157144481797 DNGTS: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/azerbaycan-turkiyeye-gaz-ihracatini-artiracak/2486186

[20] 31 JAN: Hundreds of Turkish protesters demonstrate against electricity price hikes in Bodrum, Mugla Province and Rize Province, Turkey. (https://twitter.com/gercekgundem/status/1488117714606510082?s=20&t=nJbLIc5f81W3EmwS6j5sKg, https://twitter.com/724_bodrum/status/1488180464871514112, DNGTS https://www.turkishminute.com/2022/01/31/high-energy-bills-in-turkey-spark-protests-in-the-street-and-on-social-media/)

[21] https://www.syriahr.com/en/237166/, https://twitter.com/ali_avissta/status/1488593010610876418, https://twitter.com/waledALedlbe/status/1488467777816076289 The protesters burned tires outside the building and removed the Turkish flag from the Turkish electricity company’s offices. The company, AK Enerji, announced reducing electricity supplies to 12 hours a day, prompting protests, according to local sources. Civilians held similar protests against AK Enerji in al-Bab on January 4 due to harsh winter weather and rising electricity prices.

[22] https://ahval.io/turkey-economy/erdogan-announces-electricity-price-adjustment-turks-protest-hikes

[23] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/erdogan-visits-ukraine-hoping-play-mediator-with-russia-2022-02-03/

[24] https://www.wsj.com/articles/turkey-ukraine-sign-free-trade-drone-deals-as-erdogan-visits-kyiv-11643911532

[25] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/erdogan-visits-ukraine-hoping-play-mediator-with-russia-2022-02-03/

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-deepens-defense-ties-ukraine-drone-trade

[26] https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/speeches-statements/558/135538/pm-mikati-of-lebanon-to-visit-turkiye

[27] https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/135564/-we-want-to-strengthen-our-solidarity-with-our-lebanese-brothers-and-sisters-

[28] https://www.dailysabah.com/business/economy/turkey-ready-to-undertake-reconstruction-of-beirut-port

[29] https://twitter.com/TC_icisleri/status/1488557165342339077

https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2022/ekonomi/turkiye-lubnandan-hurda-metal-ithalatina-uygulanan-yasagi-kaldirdi-6936875/

[30] DNGTS https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/qatar-turkiye-taliban-led-gov-t-agree-on-several-key-issues-to-run-kabul-airport/2487641

[31] https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/qatar-turkey-taliban-agree-on-key-issues-to-run-kabul-airport

[32] (https://twitter.com/Reporterlyaf/status/1487750290300416002, https://twitter.com/HabibiSamangani/status/1487745857613189123

https://twitter.com/AfghanistanTime/status/1488576618918514691

[33] 27 JAN: Representatives from Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, and an Erdogan-ally Turkish company Calik Holding sign an agreement to support Afghanistan’s electrical infrastructure IVO Kabul, Afghanistan. https://twitter.com/DABS_Official/status/1486699499657609216

https://twitter.com/BakhtarNA/status/1486698500272365569; DNGTS: http://main.dabs.af/News/NewsDetail/4591)

27 JAN: Turkish disaster relief agency AFAD sent 748 tons of humanitarian aid materials to Afghanistan over train on January 27. (DNGTS: http://dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkish-kindness-train-departs-for-afghanistan-with-748-tons-of-aid)

[34] https://twitter.com/MevlutCavusoglu/status/1487847598182514692

[35] https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkey-bahrain-share-united-stable-gulf-region-vision-fm-cavusoglu

[36] https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/erdogan-to-visit-saudi-arabia-in-february

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/recep-tayyip-erdogan-turkey-uae-ankara-abu-dhabi-b1966041.html

Monday, January 31, 2022

Taliban Government Responds to Uzbek Taliban Revolt in Faryab Province

Afghanistan in Review January 3 – January 25, 2022

By Peter Mills

Key Takeaway: Uzbek Taliban units revolted, forcibly disarmed local Pashtun Taliban units, and briefly seized control of Maimana, the provincial capital of Faryab Province on January 13.[1] Local Taliban leadership, including the governor and police chief, fled the city while locals reported some shots fired.[2] The revolt occurred shortly after Taliban Deputy Defense Minister Mullah Fazel Mazloom arrested a senior Uzbek Taliban commander, Makhdoom Alem, in Mazar-i-Sharif on January 12.[3] The Taliban central leadership responded quickly to the revolt in Faryab Province by deploying additional reinforcements January 14-16, which appears to have ended the revolt. Makhdoom Alem remains in custody in Kabul. If the Taliban exclude local elites from ethnic minority groups from power, it risks increasing inter-ethnic tensions in Afghanistan, and it may not have enough forces to forcibly stop every revolt.

Makhdoom Alem is the former head of the Taliban Military Commission for Faryab Province and commanded Taliban forces in Faryab, Jowzjan, and Sar-e-Pul Provinces.[4] One of Makhdoom Alem’s aides, Turkoglu, reportedly threatened the Taliban government, saying if Makhdoom Alem is not released, then his forces will “permanently lower the Taliban flag in Faryab Province.”[5] The Taliban governors of Faryab, Jowzjan, Sar-e-Pul, Samangan provinces, as well as the commander of the Taliban 209^th Corps, Attaullah Omari, reportedly went to Balkh to deliberate over the revolt.[6] During this crisis, Taliban officials also reportedly arrested Qari Wakil, the senior-most Tajik Taliban military commander in Faryab Province, in Mazar-i-Sharif after he traveled there to negotiate the release of Makhdoom Alem on January 14.[7] Omari reportedly told supporters of Qari Wakil and Makhdoom Alem that the two men will remain in Taliban custody and that the people who protest this will be repressed.[8] Armed clashes between Pashtun and Uzbek Taliban units took place the following day and reportedly killed a local Taliban commander and wounded several other fighters.[9]

Shortly after the arrest of Qari Wakil, local Tajik Taliban commanders in Badghis Province—Noor Agha in Ab Kamari and Saleh Mohammad Pardel in Qadis District—reportedly both revolted and said they would no longer obey the Taliban provincial leadership.[10] The Taliban response to their actions remains unclear, but the revolt indicates the difficulties the Taliban face in trying to preserve unity while simultaneously instituting more centralized command and control. If the Taliban fail to preserve unity within the movement and these inter-ethnic tensions worsen, the combined effect could seriously undermine Taliban governance in large parts of Afghanistan over time.

The Taliban central leadership responded quickly to the revolt in Faryab Province by deploying additional reinforcements, which appears to have calmed the situation. The convoy of reinforcements arrived in Maimana city on January 14 despite Uzbek Taliban units reportedly attempting to block Taliban reinforcements from Balkh Province.[11] Taliban-state media announced on January 17 that 110 Taliban soldiers had graduated from training and joined the 1^st Brigade, 209^th Corps, in Maimana city. It is unclear whether these were fresh troops or if they were part of additional reinforcements sent to Maimana on January 16.[12] Those troops, reportedly from the Taliban’s “Martyrdom Units,” marched in a military parade and engaged in a show of force when they arrived, the day prior to this reported graduation.[13] ISW did not observe disturbances in Sar-e-Pul Province, but the Taliban 209^th Corps deployed 2,500 troops there as well to increase security in the area.[14] This deployment may have been because Makhdoom Alem was briefly deputy governor of Sar-e-Pul Province after the fall of the Afghan government and therefore may still have supporters and fighters loyal to him in Sar-e-Pul.[15]

Makhdoom Alem’s detention may be related to internal Taliban factional politics. Taliban Deputy Foreign Minister Fazl Mazloom reportedly holds a special grudge against Uzbeks due to his experience as a captive of prominent Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum in 2001.[16] It is also possible that Alem’s detention is related to prior conflicts between Uzbek Taliban units under Alem’s command and Taliban fighters, possibly affiliated with the Haqqani network. In early December 2021, Taliban fighters, likely from the Haqqani-affiliated Badri 313 unit, disarmed 70 Uzbek Taliban fighters under Alem’s command on charges of collaborating with Islamic State – Khorasan Province (IS-KP).[17] A few days later, some Uzbek Taliban members did defect to IS-KP and engaged in clashes with Haqqani Network units and Taliban Uzbek commander Qari Salahuddin Ayoubi.[18] These prior incidents underscore that there is likely pre-existing tension between Taliban Uzbek commanders Qari Salahuddin Ayoubi and Makhdoom Alem. There is a real risk that inter-Taliban splits could contribute or directly lead to more Taliban defections to IS-KP.

Qari Salahuddin Ayoubi continues to support the government and joined Taliban deputy spokesperson Inamullah Samangani, a Tajik Taliban member, in blaming inter-ethnic tensions on democracy and corrupt supporters of the former Afghan government.[19] Inamullah Samangani claimed on January 16 that the situation in Faryab Province is stable and emphasized that the Taliban government reserves the right to investigate anyone, regardless of ethnic affiliation or background.[20]

This revolt is the most serious incident so far in an escalating pattern of intra-Taliban conflict. Although the situation in Faryab appears stable for now, tensions likely continue beneath the surface. If the Taliban excludes local elites from minority ethnic groups from power, inter-ethnic tensions within Afghanistan will escalate. Nizamuddin Qaisari, a former Uzbek Afghan warlord, threatened the Taliban on January 15 saying if Makhdoom Alem was not released then there would be a national uprising in northern Afghanistan.[21] The Taliban may find they do not have enough forces to deal with every crisis or revolt if these inter-ethnic tensions spread across northern Afghanistan. The two primary armed groups opposing the Taliban, the National Resistance Front and IS-KP, will likely try to exploit splits within the Taliban movement and inter-ethnic tensions within Afghanistan.

1. The Taliban government is refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Durand Line border with Pakistan. Local Afghan Taliban forces tore down sections of fencing put up by Pakistan along the Durand Line, which forms the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, in a series of border incidents starting in December. Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi acknowledged these incidents on January 4 but stated this was due to “certain miscreants” and that the matter was being discussed diplomatically with the Afghan Taliban government.[22] That same day, Taliban forces allegedly prevented Pakistani forces from building a fence along the border near Khost Province, Afghanistan.[23] Taliban Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Abdul Qahar Balkhi admitted there had been recent incidents along the border, while a Taliban border commander in eastern Afghanistan, Mawlawi Sanaullah Sangin, stated explicitly that the Taliban will not allow Pakistan to put up fencing along the Durand Line. Taliban Deputy Foreign Minister, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai, denied negotiations were taking place over the Durand Line and stated on January 6 that no Afghan government had the authority to decide on this issue, as it was up to the Afghan people.[24] The following day saw an escalation in tensions when Taliban border troops arrested seven Pakistani paramilitary soldiers who were accused of crossing the border into Gomal District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan.[25] While these Pakistani paramilitary troops were released shortly afterward, the Taliban has not compromised on its rhetoric toward the Durand Line. On January 10, Mawlawi Sangin reiterated the need to prevent the border from being fenced, this time at a ceremony with Taliban 201^st Corps commander Abdul Sabour Abu Dojana.[26] On January 14, Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan Sardar Ahmad Khan Shakib echoed Taliban Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Stanekzai’s prior comments, stressing that the Durand Line issue is a national issue that can only be solved by the Afghan nation, not by the Taliban government alone.[27]

The escalating Pakistani Taliban campaign inside Pakistan will likely push the Pakistani military to continue cross-border operations into Afghanistan, where the Pakistani Taliban maintains havens. The Taliban’s ability to prevent Pakistan from fencing the Durand Line is limited. However, this rhetoric and continuing cross-border operations by Pakistan indicate these border tensions may become worse over time.

2. The National Resistance Front stated that it is actively preparing to launch an offensive at the end of winter against the Taliban government. Head of Foreign Relations for the National Resistance Front (NRF) Ali Nazary stated on January 10 and 20 that the NRF is gathering supplies and preparing for a spring offensive that will take place once the snows melt.[28] NRF militants have recently been spotted with newer weapons, possibly Russian-made PG-7VR’s and SVDS DMRs, which could indicate external support.[29] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly denied that these weapons had come from Russia.[30] There were also reports that Uzbek Afghan warlord, Abdul Rashid Dostum, told his commanders that he will launch a spring offensive against the Taliban.[31] It is unclear what capabilities Dostum can deploy inside Afghanistan and to what extent he will work with the NRF. The NRF engaged in skirmishes with the Taliban in Kapisa Province on January 16, Panjshir Province on January 18, and Balkh Province on January 21.[32] There are reports of ongoing battles between the NRF and the Taliban in Khost wa Fereng District, Baghlan Province.[33] These battles resulted in mostly minor casualties, but they indicate that the NRF maintains the ability to carry out insurgent attacks and that they may be expanding this capability to other parts of Afghanistan.

3. The Taliban government is seeking to build diplomatic and trade ties with Turkmenistan. Turkmenistani Deputy Foreign Minister Wafa Hajiyev met separately with the Taliban Deputy Foreign Minister Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai and Taliban Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Salam Hanafi to discuss bilateral relations and cooperating on economic projects including the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline (TAPI).[34] Shortly after these meetings, the Haqqani-run Taliban Ministry of Interior Affairs announced the creation of a special unit of 3,000 soldiers to provide security for TAPI projects in Afghanistan.[35] Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi met with Turkmenistan’s Foreign Minister Rashid Muradov in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, to further discuss TAPI projects on January 16.[36] They also reportedly discussed plans to build railways to Aqina and Torghundi, both border crossings into Afghanistan. The Taliban claim construction on these projects will start in March 2023.[37] This is likely overly optimistic and it is still unclear who will pay for these projects. Nevertheless, these meetings indicate that Turkmenistan plans to expand relations with the Taliban government.

4. The Taliban is actively working to maintain its air force and is seeking the return of former-Afghan Air Force aircraft from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Latifullah Hakimi, director of the commission that controls airports, stated that the Taliban Air Force has 41 working aircraft and 81 aircraft total as of January 5.[38] It is unclear how the Taliban Air Force will continue to maintain its aircraft; according to former Afghan National Army Lieutenant General Yassin Zia, the former Afghan Air Force was spending more than $12 million per day on maintenance and most Taliban aircraft will likely cease working within 6 months.[39] Up to two Taliban helicopters crashed during rescue operations responding to serious flooding in Kandahar and Helmand on January 4.[40] Taliban Defense Minister Mullah Yaqub underscored the importance of the Taliban Air Force to the Taliban government during a speech on January 11 when he threatened to take action against Tajikistan and Uzbekistan if they did not return former Afghan Air Force aircraft currently being held by those countries.[41]

5. The Taliban Clearing of Ranks Commission is slowly expanding its operations but faces violent pushback. The Taliban Commission for the Clearing of Ranks began operations in Badakhshan Province on January 5.[42] Armed clashes took place the following day between groups of Taliban fighters loyal to Safauddin, the local head of criminal investigations, and Salahuddin, the police chief for Maimay District, Badakhshan Province. This clash reportedly occurred because the Clearing of Ranks Commission wanted to remove the local Taliban intelligence official for disobeying orders.[43] The clash left two Taliban fighters and a civilian dead with several more Taliban fighters and civilians injured. Latifullah Hakimi, the head of the Clearing of Ranks Commission said the commission has removed more than 2,840 Taliban members from the Taliban’s ranks across 14 provinces as of January 16.[44] Those fighters were removed due to links to IS-KP, involvement in drug smuggling, and violating people’s privacy. Hakimi’s statement indicates that the commission is not yet operating across all of Afghanistan and is likely being slowly rolled out across the country. It is also a rare acknowledgment from the Taliban that some of its fighters are defecting to IS-KP.

6. Taliban Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Salam Hanafi appears to be taking the lead on economic policy within the Taliban government. Hanafi chaired meetings of the Economic Commission on January 6 and January 17. The meeting on January 6 included Taliban Minister of Commerce Nooruddin Azizi and discussed oil, gas, and food imports; increasing trade ties with Iran; and cooperating on a project by Uzbekistan to build a railway from Termez, Uzbekistan, to Torkham on the border with Pakistan.[45] The meeting on January 17reportedly focused on increasing electricity in Kandahar Province and responding to significant bankruptcies among Afghan banks.[46] Deputy Prime Minister Hanafi also gave a prominent speech on January 19 at a major Taliban economic conference. During this speech, Hanafi blamed the country’s problems on sanctions and said the Taliban would never sacrifice the independence of Afghanistan’s economy to satisfy donor conditions.[47]

7. Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi led a delegation to Iran and met with Afghan warlord-in-exile Ismail Khan on January 9. Inamullah Samangani, a Taliban deputy spokesperson, claimed Ahmad Massoud was present for the talks and that the Taliban offered him safe passage to return home to Afghanistan.[48] Other journalists reported that the National Resistance Front (NRF) denied Massoud was present at the talks. However, these same accounts confirmed that Ismail Khan and other NRF leaders met with Muttaqi.[49] The Taliban reportedly tried to convince Massoud and the NRF to give up their rebellion and return home to Afghanistan. Sibghatullah Ahmadi, the spokesperson for the NRF, said the Haqqani Network is opposed to any talks with the NRF.[50] Taliban Minister of Commerce Nooruddin Azizi, an ethnic Tajik who is originally from the Panjshir Valley, was also present. He was likely attempting to demonstrate that Panjshiris will be represented within the Taliban government and can live in Afghanistan without being persecuted. During this visit, Muttaqi also appointed Qayyum Soleimani, reportedly Ismail Khan’s nephew, as head of the Afghanistan embassy in Iran.[51] It is unclear whether Iran has formally accepted Soleimani as the new ambassador to Iran. However, Soleimani did comment on the talks with the NRF and said they were proceeding smoothly.[52]

8. The Taliban Ministry of Defense is becoming increasingly involved in the distribution of humanitarian aid and food. The Taliban Ministry of Agriculture announced on January 12 that the Ministry of Defense will distribute 21,559 tons of wheat to various unnamed provinces across Afghanistan.[53] The Taliban commander of the National Transport and Mobility Brigade, Mawlawi Bismillah, later stated on January 17 that his unit had distributed wheat to two provinces and planned to deliver wheat to more provinces in the near future.[54] The following day Taliban officials from the 203^rd Mansoori Corps distributed food items to poor families in Paktia Province.[55] These events indicate that international aid organizations may need to work with the Taliban military in order to distribute humanitarian relief in the future.

9. IS-KP continues to carry out regular attacks targeting the Taliban government and Shi’a civilians, predominantly in Kabul. IS-KP carried out at least eight attacks in Kabul, mostly targeting Taliban soldiers, though at least one targeted a bus carrying Shi’a civilians. IS-KP also attacked local Taliban officials in several districts in Nangarhar and Kunar Province in eastern Afghanistan. In Kunar Province, likely IS-KP militants attacked the home of a local Taliban intelligence commander in Sawkay District on January 16. On January 19, likely IS-KP militants attacked and killed a local Taliban commander in neighboring Narang district.[56] The January 16 and 19 events came after a failed likely IS-KP assassination attempt on the Taliban district governor for Shegal District on January 14.[57] In Nangarhar Province on January 11, likely IS-KP militants killed the Taliban intelligence chief for Batikot District. On January 25, IS-KP claimed IED attacks targeting the local Taliban district governor and his bodyguards in neighboring Kama District.[58] These attacks on rural local Taliban leadership will likely undermine Taliban governance and open up more support and operational areas for IS-KP.

[1] https://twitter.com/Natsecjeff/status/1481627798473220098
https://twitter.com/Natsecjeff/status/1481636014451937281
https://twitter.com/bsarwary/status/1481626017139769344
https://twitter.com/AfghanAnalyst2/status/1481602847825440772

[2] https://twitter.com/TajudenSoroush/status/1481610672068870146

https://8am(dot)af/ps/uzbek-taliban-commander-arrested-uzbeks-protest-in-faryab/

[3] https://twitter.com/TajudenSoroush/status/1481565011776610305
https://www(dot)etilaatroz(dot)com/134757/faryab-residents-protest-arrest-of-talibans-senior-commander/
https://twitter.com/AfghanistanTime/status/1481591361883279366

[4] https://www(dot)etilaatroz(dot)com/134757/faryab-residents-protest-arrest-of-talibans-senior-commander/
https://8am(dot)af/ps/uzbek-taliban-commander-arrested-uzbeks-protest-in-faryab/

[5] https://twitter.com/aamajnews24/status/1481623758364422148
https://twitter.com/Natsecjeff/status/1481628156280905734

[6] https://8am(dot)af/eyewitnesses-in-faryab-pashtun-taliban-disarmed-in-maimana/

[7] https://twitter.com/TajudenSoroush/status/1481987378835341312

https://twitter.com/aamajnews24/status/1482006575690752006

[8] https://twitter.com/Reporterlyaf/status/1482286014710300677

[9] https://twitter.com/AfghanAnalyst2/status/1481924902475157504

https://twitter.com/aamajnews24/status/1481930552592764935

[10] https://twitter.com/TajudenSoroush/status/1482005591044366338

https://twitter.com/aamajnews24/status/1481961101487226883

[11] https://twitter.com/Natsecjeff/status/1481995853501972486 Video shows a company sized formation of Taliban fighters in a convoy consisting of at least; 5 MRAPs, 6-7 pickup trucks, and 7 armored humvees.

https://twitter.com/AfghanAnalyst2/status/1481882000000700416

https://twitter.com/aamajnews24/status/1481890636773089280

[12] https://twitter.com/BakhtarNA/status/1483059965149519875

https://twitter.com/aamajnews24/status/1482676170823020545

[13] https://twitter.com/aamajnews24/status/1482707374498627586

https://twitter.com/BakhtarNA/status/1483000063064428544

[14] https://www(dot)tolonews(dot)com/afghanistan-176347

[15] https://www(dot)etilaatroz(dot)com/134757/faryab-residents-protest-arrest-of-talibans-senior-commander/

[16] https://twitter.com/bsarwary/status/1481652952636944393

[17] https://twitter.com/TajudenSoroush/status/1468888698834014214

[18] https://twitter.com/AfghanAnalyst2/status/1470461624620310533

[19] https://twitter.com/HabibiSamangani/status/1481955803410178051

https://twitter.com/hamemafghan/status/1482052055749599232

https://twitter.com/RahimTareen123/status/1482047172346531844

[20] https://twitter.com/bbcpersian/status/1482428689870688256

[21] https://twitter.com/aamajnews24/status/1482351815157075968

[22] https://www(dot)dawn(dot)com/news/1667422/pak-afghan-border-fencing-issue-to-be-resolved-diplomatically-says-qureshi%20(0)

[23] https://twitter.com/Natsecjeff/status/1478261810692337669

[24] https://www(dot)khaama(dot)com/it-is-time-for-world-to-recognize-taliban-deputy-fm-786876/

[25] https://twitter.com/abdsayedd/status/1479423126962384896

https://twitter.com/MichaelKugelman/status/1479457191077818374

https://twitter.com/IftikharFirdous/status/1479440666199531520

[26] https://www(dot)tolonews(dot)com/afghanistan-176248

[27] https://www(dot)tolonews(dot)com/afghanistan-176291

[28] https://zetaluiss(dot)it/2022/01/07/panjshir-afghanistan-riconquista-talebani/

https://aamajnews24(dot)com/nrf-39/

[29] https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1481960191201615875

[30] https://twitter.com/Reporterlyaf/status/1483307746120380417

[31] https://twitter.com/Sarfaraz1201/status/1479540313979256833

[32] https://twitter.com/aamajnews24/status/1483323549108649987

https://twitter.com/aamajnews24/status/1482617344157523970

https://twitter.com/panjsher0021/status/1484591031098437632

https://twitter.com/TajudenSoroush/status/1484505926275309573

[33] https://www(dot)independentpersian(dot)com/node/210406/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%DB%8C/%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87%C2%A0%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%87%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C-%DA%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF

https://twitter.com/mujahidandarabi/status/1485535812041195520

https://twitter.com/AndarabRF/status/1485566376718835714

[34] https://twitter.com/HabibiSamangani/status/1479785530317541377
https://twitter.com/BakhtarNA/status/1479877136941187072

https://twitter.com/BakhtarNA/status/1479865326355554308

[35] https://twitter.com/MJalal313/status/1480519929568935940

[36] https://twitter.com/HabibiSamangani/status/1482605758298660866
https://twitter.com/BilalKarimi21/status/1482956040710852608

[37] https://twitter.com/HabibiSamangani/status/1482605765487702018

[38] https://www(dot)tolonews(dot)com/index.php/afghanistan-176177

[39] https://twitter.com/TajudenSoroush/status/1478655023156547584

[40] https://twitter.com/RahmatullahN/status/1478457843225440257

[41] https://twitter.com/panjsher0021/status/1480965988409507842
https://twitter.com/modafghanistan2/status/1480874651240865794

[42] https://twitter.com/BakhtarNA/status/1478753349558276097

[43] https://8am(dot)af/eng/clashes-among-taliban-members-leave-three-dead-and-four-wounded/?fbclid=IwAR32Mn1Ewfhs5xKM4RtXQFeMBEIR-T0hhKXai2VOZRZeaomC_kgDMa6Mw2I

[44] https://www(dot)khaama(dot)com/nearly-3000-taliban-affiliates-dismissed-so-far-officials-346346/

https://twitter.com/aamajnews24/status/1483354485581914115

[45] https://twitter.com/BakhtarNA/status/1478984241077575681

https://twitter.com/rtapashto/status/1478990503911870469

[46] https://twitter.com/ARG_1880/status/1482964086031888387

https://twitter.com/HabibiSamangani/status/1482788073519919106

[47] https://twitter.com/rtadari/status/1483676024634232834

[48] https://twitter.com/HabibiSamangani/status/1480468364132765698

[49] https://twitter.com/TajudenSoroush/status/1480137312529002497

https://twitter.com/altaaf_f/status/1480427964156289028

[50] https://twitter.com/DaudQarizadah/status/1480632859274665989

[51] https://twitter.com/TajudenSoroush/status/1480242340996567045

[52] https://twitter.com/TajudenSoroush/status/1481205954834219009

[53] https://twitter.com/rtadari/status/1481148009564024835

[54] https://mod(dot)gov(dot)af/ps/node/4562

[55] https://twitter.com/BakhtarNA/status/1483491501762035712

[56] https://twitter.com/bsarwary/status/1482941338387718146

https://twitter.com/Etilaatroz/status/1483788910610235395

[57] https://twitter.com/bsarwary/status/1481868938829090816

[58] https://twitter.com/AfghanAnalyst2/status/1480808181530042368

https://www(dot)etilaatroz(dot)com/135400/five-taliban-injured-in-mine-blast-in-kama-district-of-nangarhar/

Thursday, January 27, 2022

Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine: Updated Course of Action Assessment

By Frederick W. Kagan, Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko

Executive Summary:

Click here to read the full report.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is using the crisis he created by mobilizing a large military force around Ukraine to achieve two major objectives: first, advancing and possibly completing his efforts to regain effective control of Ukraine itself, and second, fragmenting and neutralizing the NATO alliance. Russian military preparations can support a massive invasion of Ukraine from the north, east, and south that could give Putin physical control of Kyiv and other major Ukrainian cities, allowing him to dictate terms that would accomplish the first objective. Such an invasion, however, might undermine his efforts to achieve the second objective because it could rally the NATO alliance around the need to respond to such a dramatic act of aggression. An invasion would also entail significant risks and definite high costs. A Russian military action centered around limited military operations in southern and southeastern Ukraine coupled with a brief but widespread and intense air and missile campaign could better position Putin to achieve both aims as well as reduce the likely costs and risks to Russia.

We therefore currently forecast that:

Russia will not conduct a full mechanized invasion to conquer all of Ukraine this winter (unchanged).
Russian mechanized forces will overtly deploy into occupied Donbas on a large scale by mid-February (increased likelihood).
Russia may launch an air and missile campaign throughout unoccupied Ukraine in conjunction with an overt deployment into occupied Donbas (newly identified course of action).
Russia may conduct limited ground incursions north and west from occupied Donbas and/or north from Crimea.

Our previous forecast that Russia would deploy mechanized forces to Belarus in early 2022 (which we first made in December 2020 and last updated in December 2021) has transpired.[1]

We have identified a new course of action since our previous examination of Russian options that Putin is preparing and may pursue in conjunction with an overt move into occupied Donbas: an air and missile campaign, possibly extensive, throughout unoccupied Ukraine. We have observed indicators that he is preparing this option. We assess that such an air campaign in unoccupied Ukraine is significantly more likely than an invasion intended to seize large areas of unoccupied Ukraine, including Kyiv and other major cities. Putin could initiate the air and missile campaign and/or limited ground incursions in southeastern and southern Ukraine before Russian forces have completed deployments to and preparations along the northern Ukrainian frontier and in Belarus. We are not yet ready as of January 27, 2022, to forecast that Putin will actually order the air and missile campaign in conjunction with the move into Donbas, but policymakers must be aware of the conditions the Kremlin is setting for that contingency—separate from preparations for a major ground offensive.

A Russian air and missile campaign that targets both occupied and unoccupied Ukraine could pose an even greater short-term challenge to the US and NATO than an invasion to occupy most of Ukraine in the same way that a live hostage situation creates more tension and complexity while in progress than a completed murder. Once Russian mechanized forces have seized Ukraine’s capital and major cities, Putin’s effective leverage on the West drops substantially, as he will have exercised the near-complete extent of his ability to damage Ukraine and left little for the West to try to deter by action or prevent by appeasement.

A partial attack that retains the visible capability to go further, however, increases the pressure on the West to meet some of Putin’s demands to dissuade him from further violence. Holding back from the conquest of Kyiv and major Ukrainian cities allows Putin to continue to demand concessions from the West that transcend Ukrainian issues, such as blanket commitments not to expand NATO further. Russia’s military conquest of Ukraine would seem to make such commitments irrelevant and reduce pressure on the West to make them.

An air and missile campaign that leaves the Ukrainian state nominally independent with a beleaguered and fearful government and people, however, allows Putin to protract the crisis. He can continue his efforts to maximize the tension and friction among Ukraine, the United States, and America’s European allies (especially the Germans, given their extreme vulnerability to Russia’s energy pressure) by using the threats of continuing air attacks, the economic devastation of Ukraine and Europe, or, finally, the invasion and occupation of Ukraine.

An air and missile campaign against unoccupied Ukraine would pose less cost and risk to Russia compared with an invasion and occupation of territory, although an air and missile campaign would incur more cost and risk than simply moving forces overtly into occupied Donbas without attacking beyond the current line of contact. The United States and NATO should prioritize developing a coherent response to this course of action in addition to their other efforts to deter and set conditions to respond to Russian threats.

The objectives of such a Russian air and missile campaign could include:

Expanding wedges in the Western alliance;
Increasing pressure on the West to make larger concessions regarding NATO expansion in general and the disposition of NATO forces in eastern Europe;
Forcing Ukraine to make further concessions to Russian demands regarding occupied Donbas;
Coercing Ukraine into accepting a new version of the Minsk Accords or an entirely different agreement making even more concessions that undermine Ukrainian sovereignty;
Forcing Ukraine to amend its constitution to rule out NATO membership;
Disrupting the Ukrainian government;
Creating a governance and stability crisis in Ukraine by forcing concessions that infuriate Ukrainian patriots;
Crippling the Ukrainian economy; and
Severely degrading the Ukrainian military to set conditions for further demands or Russian military activities if Putin is not able to secure his objectives through this more limited campaign.

An air and missile campaign would be far more likely to achieve these objectives than simply moving Russian forces overtly into occupied Donbas. It would also be more likely to achieve these aims at a cost acceptable to Putin than a mechanized drive along the northern Azov Sea coast would alone.

If the Kremlin can protract the crisis on its terms, it can raise the costs to the United States and NATO. The United States and NATO must prioritize preventing Putin from protracting the crisis by rapidly increasing the risks to his forces and the cost to the Russian economy as soon as he initiates the conflict either by moving forces overtly into occupied Donbas or by attacking unoccupied Ukraine.

The United States and NATO could best deter or disrupt such an attack by deploying and using ground- and sea-based air- and missile- defense systems and stealth fighters to shoot down Russian manned aircraft attacking targets in unoccupied Ukraine. The purpose of such Western military operations would be to impose high-enough costs on Russia to persuade Putin to avoid or terminate the operation.

Overt Russian deployments into Donbas with or without a Russian air campaign in unoccupied Ukraine should trigger the full array of US and European punitive sanctions on Russia. The United States and its allies should also define a threshold at which continued covert Russian deployments into occupied Donbas would trigger a response. But the Russian course of action considered in this essay, including the air and missile campaign, puts tremendous pressure on the US relationship with its reluctant partners, especially Germany, if it does not involve significant Russian forces invading unoccupied Ukraine. The United States and its more-committed allies must prepare now for this challenging contingency.

European responses to US attempts to rally the alliance to deter Putin thus far suggest that a more limited Russian attack is more likely to weaken and fragment NATO than the military conquest of most of Ukraine. A full Russian invasion and occupation of Ukraine including Kyiv and/or other major urban centers collapses the West’s decision-space and is the likeliest Russian course of action to trigger a strong, coherent set of Western reactions. Russian military aggression short of a full-scale invasion, even including an extensive air campaign, however, gives Putin the initiative and creates uncertainty about how Putin will ultimately resolve the crisis. Putin has used this approach to great effect in Syria and elsewhere. It opens room for much debate and disagreement about responses among the United States, its European allies, and Ukraine. Continuing Russian economic pressure on Europe, especially Germany, amidst such a crisis may seriously erode alliance cohesion.

The United States and its other NATO partners must nevertheless accept the risk of serious strain and even damage to the US-German and NATO-German relationship to respond decisively to this more-limited form of Russian aggression. Allowing Putin to coerce major concessions from Ukraine or the West through limited aggression poses a greater danger to the NATO alliance’s cohesion, credibility, and even survival than does antagonizing Germany and other recalcitrant NATO members by imposing tough economic penalties on Russia that hurt those allies economically. Repairing strains with Germany and other allies, especially those caused by bad decisions the German government has already made, is a more manageable problem in the long run.

[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-putin-will-increase-pressure-lukashenko-integrate-belarus-2021, https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20Invasion%20Forecast%20Series%20Part%201%20ISW%20CT%20December%202021.pdf.

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