Russia-Ukraine Warning Update: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 26

 Mason Clark, George Barros, and Katya Stepanenko

February 26, 3pm EST 

Russian forces’ main axes of advance in the last 24 hours focused on Kyiv, northeastern Ukraine, and southern Ukraine. Russian airborne and special forces troops are engaged in urban warfare in northwestern Kyiv, but Russian mechanized forces are not yet in the capital. Russian forces from Crimea have changed their primary axes of advance from a presumed drive toward Odesa to focus on pushing north toward Zaporizhie and the southeastern bend of the Dnipro River and east along the Azov Sea coast toward Mariupol. These advances risk cutting off the large concentrations of Ukrainian forces still defending the former line of contact between unoccupied Ukraine and occupied Donbas. Ukrainian leaders may soon face the painful decision of ordering the withdrawal of those forces and the ceding of more of eastern Ukraine or allowing much of Ukraine’s uncommitted conventional combat power to be encircled and destroyed. There are no indications as yet of whether the Ukrainian government is considering this decision point.

Ukrainian resistance remains remarkably effective and Russian operations especially on the Kyiv axis have been poorly coordinated and executed, leading to significant Russian failures on that axis and at Kharkiv. Russian forces remain much larger and more capable than Ukraine’s conventional military, however, and Russian advances in southern Ukraine may threaten to unhinge the defense of Kyiv and northeastern Ukraine if they continue unchecked.

Key Takeaways

• Russia has failed to encircle and isolate Kyiv with the combination of mechanized and airborne attacks as it had clearly planned to do. Russian forces are now engaging in more straightforward mechanized drives into the capital along a narrow front along the west bank of the Dnipro River and toward Kyiv from a broad front to the northeast.
• Russian forces have temporarily abandoned failed efforts to seize Chernihiv and Kharkiv to the northeast and east of Kyiv and are bypassing those cities to continue their drive on Kyiv.  Russian attacks against both cities appear to have been poorly designed and executed and to have encountered more determined and effective Ukrainian resistance than they expected.
• Russian movements in eastern Ukraine remain primarily focused on pinning the large concentration of Ukrainian conventional forces arrayed along the former line of contact in the east, likely to prevent them from interfering with Russian drives on Kyiv and to facilitate their encirclement and destruction.
• Russian forces coming north from Crimea halted their drive westward toward Odesa, and Ukrainian forces have retaken the critical city of Kherson. Some Russian troops remain west of the Dnipro River and are advancing on Mikolayiv, but the main axes of advance have shifted to the north and east toward Zaporizhie and Mariupol respectively.
• Russian forces have taken the critical city of Berdyansk from the west, threatening to encircle Mariupol even as Russian forces based in occupied Donbas attack Mariupol from the east, likely to pin defenders in the city as they are encircled.
• Russian successes in southern Ukraine are the most dangerous and threaten to unhinge Ukraine’s successful defenses and rearguard actions to the north and northeast.
• Russian troops are facing growing morale and logistics issues, predictable consequences of the poor planning, coordination, and execution of attacks along Ukraine’s northern border.

Russia has surprisingly failed to gain air superiority or ground the Ukrainian air force after three days of fighting. The Ukrainian General Staff reported at 11am local time that Ukrainian aircraft conducted 34 sorties in the past 24 hours.[1] Ukrainian air defenses remained active as of 6am local time, with the Ukrainian General Staff stating a S-300 downed a Russian Su-25 fighter and an unspecified helicopter over Donbas early on February 26.[2] Ukrainian forces likely shot down a Russian Il-76 transport aircraft over Kyiv the night of February 25.[3] Russian airstrikes concentrated on northern Kyiv, Mariupol, and unspecified Ukrainian airports on February 26.[4] Russian forces continue to refrain from using the full array of air and missile capabilities available to them. Moscow may seek to limit the informational and diplomatic effects of causing heavy Ukrainian civilian casualties, and may also seek to avoid creating rubble and other obstacles to movement into and through Ukrainian cities. Russian forces will likely increase their use of fires in coming days to overcome heavier-than-anticipated Ukrainian resistance, however.

Russian forces in northeast Ukraine face growing morale and supply issues, likely due to poor planning and ad hoc command structures, as ISW previously forecasted.[5] Several reports emerged on Ukrainian social media February 25-26 of Russian forces lost and running low on fuel in northeastern Ukraine.[6] A Russian riot police reportedly conducted an unsupported attack on eastern Kyiv and suffered heavy casualties late on February 25, likely symptomatic of wider Russian coordination issues.[7] Several US and European intelligence sources reportedly assess the Kremlin has had to adjust plans and commit more capabilities than anticipated at this point in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[8]

Russian ground forces are advancing on four primary axes, discussed in turn below:

1. 1. Kyiv (NOTE: This is an alteration to our previous description of this axis, as we are now discussing Russian operations in Kyiv as a single line of effort);
2. Northeast front (NOTE: Russian forces have now advanced on a broad axis between Chernihiv and Kharkiv, and this section will discuss the entire northeastern Russian advance);
3. Donbas; and
4. Crimea-Kherson.

1)     Kyiv axis: Russia’s likely main effort to rapidly isolate Kyiv and force the Ukrainian government to capitulate has failed as of February 26. Russian forces entered downtown Kyiv along the western bank of the Dnipro River the night of February 25, but Russian forces have so far failed to enter the city from the east. Russian troops have not yet committed heavy armor and artillery forces to fighting in Kyiv and will likely need to do so to take the city. Ukrainian forces are unlikely to capitulate.

• The Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate. The Ukrainian General Staff reported at 11am local time February 26 that Ukrainian forces halted 14 Russian BTGs northeast of Kyiv and that Russia has committed its northern reserves – an additional 17 BTGs – along this operational direction.[9]
• If the Russians have abandoned for now the attempt to encircle Kyiv and committed to frontal assaults from the northwest and east/northeast, then the Ukrainians would be in close to the optimal scenario for defending their capital. The Russians could change that situation either by getting forces from the northeast axis across the river south of Kyiv and encircling in that way, by using forces from Crimea to drive all the way to Kyiv from the south, or by re-attempting and finally succeeding in airlanding airborne troops to the southeast of the capital.  Russia’s surprising failure to accomplish its initial planned objectives around Kyiv has given the Ukrainians an opportunity.
• Russian forces entered downtown Kyiv on the west bank of the Dnipro River the night of February 25. Urban combat continued the night of February 25-26.[10] Only lighter Russian units – VDV (Airborne) and Special Forces – have entered Kyiv as of 7pm local time on February 26.[11] Russian forces have not yet committed heavy armor and artillery to urban fighting in Kyiv.
• Russian forces have likely only entered Kyiv on a narrow band along the west bank of the Dnipro River. Russian forces have not completely isolated Kyiv and Ukrainian forces retain defensive positions in western Kyiv Oblast.[12] Ukrainian forces reported halted Russian armored advances on Kyiv at Borodyanka, Bucha, and Vyshhorod at 11am local time February 26.[13]
• The Ukrainian military claimed to shoot down two Russian Il-76 transport planes (Russia’s equivalent of the US C-17) over Kyiv late on February 25.[14] These claims have not yet been confirmed by other sources.[15] If true, they may indicate Ukrainian troops have inflicted losses on a Russian airborne operation around Kyiv.
• ISW cannot currently confirm the location or effectiveness of Russian sabotage groups reportedly active in downtown Kyiv as of February 25.[16]
• Ukrainian forces and civilians continued preparations to fight for Kyiv block-by-block on February 25-26. Territorial defense units and armed civilians began establishing roadblocks and defensive positions throughout Kyiv overnight.[17] The Ukrainian government is distributing small arms and instructions to make Molotov Cocktails to civilians.[18]

2)     Northeast axis: Russian forces advanced on a broad front between Chernihiv and Kharkiv on February 26 after Ukrainian forces halted direct Russian advances through both cities on February 24-25. Ukrainian forces continue to delay and inflict losses on the Russian advance but will likely not be able to halt further advances if the Kremlin commits additional reserves.

• Ukrainian forces reported halting Russian advances on an axis roughly running through Nizhyn, Velyka Doroha, Obychiv, and Okhtyrka at 11am local time February 26.[19] Russian forces have likely penetrated northeastern Ukraine on a broad axis to the P67 highway, approximately 120km northeast of Kyiv.
• Russian forces likely bypassed Kharkiv early on February 26 and may have enveloped it but have not yet entered the city center. Russian tank and motor rifle units are reportedly continuing direct assaults on the city and shelling residential areas.[20] Russian forces entered Volokhov Yar, 70km southeast of Kharkiv, at 11am local time on February 26.[21] Ukrainian forces took prisoners from the Russian 2nd Tank Division and 138th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade at unspecified locations around Kharkiv on February 26.[22]
• Ukrainian forces confirmed that elements of Russia’s 1st Guards Tank Army and 20th Combined Arms Army comprise the main Russian force in northeast Ukraine.[23] Ukrainian forces additionally captured Russian troops from the 35th Motor Rifle Brigade of the 41st Combined Arms Army, including a battalion chief of staff, likely near Chernihiv.[24]
• The Ukrainian General Staff reported at 6am local time that Russian forces retain an uncommitted reserve from the 35th Combined Arms Army around Mazyr, in southeastern Belarus.[25]

3)     Donbas axis: Russian forces continued to deprioritize direct assaults in Donbas or an enveloping maneuver through Luhansk Oblast. Russian forces likely intend to pin Ukrainian forces in place on the line of contact to enable Russian forces breaking out of Crimea to isolate them. The Russians may be content to leave them there while concentrating on capturing Kyiv and imposing a new government on Ukraine. They may alternatively seek to encircle and destroy them or force them to surrender.

• Russian forces made limited advances on February 26 in Donetsk and Luhansk, reportedly capturing Stanysia Luuhanska, Volnovakha, and Starohnativka.[26] Ukrainian forces remain largely in place on the line of contact in Donbas.
• Russian forces attacking in northern Luhansk Oblast made little progress as of February 26. ISW’s initial assessment that Russian forces would likely attempt an envelopment through Luhansk Oblast was incorrect.[27] Russian forces likely seek to achieve a larger envelopment using forces breaking out from Crimea and currently advancing on Mariupol from the west.
• Russian forces are continuing assaults on Mariupol from the northeast but have yet to enter outskirts of the city. Russian proxies claimed to capture Pishchevik and Pavlopol, 25km northeast of Mariupol, the morning of February 26. Russian forces carried out airstrikes on suburbs of Mariupol at 3pm local time on February 26.[28]

⁴⁾     Crimea axis: Russian forces advancing north towards Zaprozhia and east towards Mariupol threaten to isolate Ukrainian forces on the line of contact in Donbas if they do not withdraw. Russian forces from the Southern Military District continue to make the greatest advances and demonstrate the highest capabilities of Russia’s multiple axes of advance. Ukrainian forces recaptured Kherson the night of February 25-26. However, Russian forces will likely counterattack within the next 24 hours and Russian forces remain west of the Dnipro River, threatening Mikolayiv.

• Russian forces in Crimea are advancing directly north towards Zaprozhia, entering Velyka Bilozerka and Tokmak – approximately 80km south of Zaprozhia – as of 3pm local time on February 26.[29] These forces will likely enter Zaprozhia within the next 48 hours at current rates of advance. They may then either continue north to Dnipro City, or pivot east to isolate Ukrainian forces in Donbas.
• Russian forces advancing east out of Crimea captured Berdyansk, 70km west of Mariupol, early on February 26.[30] Russian forces previously secured Melitopol late on February 25.[31] These Russian forces will likely encircle Mariupol within the next 48 hours. They may alternatively – or additionally – drive north, isolating Ukrainian forces on the line of contact in Donbas.
• Western sources have inaccurately reported the unopposed deployment of Russian Naval Infantry in Russian-controlled Azovskoye, just north of Crimea, as an amphibious landing.[32]  An anonymous US official told CNN on February 25 that “potentially thousands” of Russian troops conducted a landing west of Mariupol, which was inaccurately reported as an opposed landing.[33] These Naval Infantry forces will likely support Russian operations to isolate Mariupol. Russia has not yet conducted an opposed amphibious landing in southern Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recaptured Kherson as of 9am local time on February 26.[34] Ukrainian forces additionally retained control of Nova Kakhovka as of 9am local time following heavy fighting overnight.[35] Russian forces will likely attempt a second assault on the city in the next 24 hours.
• Russian forces entered the outskirts of Mikolaiyv early on February 26.[36] ISW cannot assess what strength of Russian forces have crossed the Dnipro River and their capability to threaten Odessa – or lack thereof – if cut off by the Ukrainian recapture of Kherson.
• Ukrainian forces reported up to 3 BTGs of Russian second echelon troops from the 58^th Combined Arms Army were committed to the advance on Tavriis'k, east of Kherson along the Dnipro River, early on February 26.[37]

Russian forces may additionally be preparing for an additional line of advance from Belarus into Western Ukraine. ISW previously reported a Russian armored column assembling in Stolin, Belarus on February 25 to support a possible advance into Rivne Oblast, in western Ukraine.[38] The Ukrainian Border Service reported cross-border shelling into Rivne Oblast from Belarus at 3pm local time on February 26.[39] Russian forces have not launched a ground attack as of publication. A Russian offensive in western Ukraine would likely seek to cut Ukraine off from ground shipments of Western aid through Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary.

Immediate items to watch

• Russian forces advancing north and east from Crimea threaten to cut off Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine if Kyiv des not withdraw them in the coming days.
• Russian forces face growing morale and supply issues but will likely be able to overcome these handicaps.
• Russian Naval Infantry have not yet conducted opposed amphibious landings but retain the capability to do so against the Odesa or the Azov Sea coasts or both.
• Russian forces continue to refrain from using their likely full spectrum of air and missile capabilities. The Ukrainian air force also remains active. Russian operations will likely steadily wear down Ukrainian air capabilities as well eventually taking the Ukrainian air force out of the fight.
• Russia has sufficient conventional military power to reinforce each of its current axes of advance and overpower conventional Ukrainian forces defending them.

 

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[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/259676363012116.

[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/259457293034023.

[3] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/259492119697207.

[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/259492119697207.

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20Invasion%20Forecast%20Series%20Part%202%20ISW%20CT%20December%202021.pdf.

[6] https://twitter.com/maxseddon/status/1497507453491105799; 25 ps://www.facebook.com/UkrainianLandForces/posts/291441756421156 https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1497317714058100737;

[7] https://twitter.com/CITeam_en/status/1497573785414901760?s=20&t=SvzDR8EOKtL6IQhUB0hBVQ.

[8] https://twitter.com/phildstewart/status/1497587654417797122; https://twitter.com/RihoTerras/status/1497537193346220038?s=20&t=QBQflksi-wtxg-7nqSH31Q 

[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/259676363012116.

[10] https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1497381035004383233?s=20&t=gt7CsSW4qZe8yDcfZq0WBA; https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1497378418173915141?s=20&t=jtRCRm_YAEjtP_qirPDwqA; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1497389437222805511?s=20&t=_uDOt69fWyGvvacceGvMyA; https://twitter.com/CourtenaySargon/status/1497392233586126854?s=20&t=_uDOt69fWyGvvacceGvMyA .

[11] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1497439935032434688.

[12] https://twitter.com/COUPSURE/status/1497590205074845698?s=20&t=j07FSgEJcc2Yd8ZEk4Fncw  .

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/259676363012116.

[14] https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFU/posts/255960156699477; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/259694853010267.

[15] https://twitter.com/JimLaPorta/status/1497428052988641281?s=20&t=e3u-COKR2To_0CqiV-ikEw.

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Operations%20Assessments%20February%2025%202022.pdf.

[17] https://twitter.com/UkraineLive24/status/1497599293712175115?s=20&t=2TDKmCGn1dvvlgUx07Hn4A; https://twitter.com/soleyman_1/status/1497454388088127490?s=20&t=2TDKmCGn1dvvlgUx07Hn4A; https://twitter.com/UkraineLive24/status/1497542270459039756?s=20&t=2TDKmCGn1dvvlgUx07Hn4A; https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1497311126845067268?s=20&t=KzJeNkogoonKHDSIKpuMYg.

[18] https://twitter.com/kiraincongress/status/1497264543428448260; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1497353864948891650; https://twitter.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1496785547594924032; https://twitter.com/IAPonomarenko/status/1497194377306902532?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1497194377306902532%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.businessinsider.com%2Fvideo-ukrainian-men-help-themselves-to-guns-in-kyiv-as-russia-attacks-2022-2.

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/259676363012116.

[20] https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1497566224687026176?s=20&t=jtRCRm_YAEjtP_qirPDwqA; https://twitter.com/loogunda/status/1497542551271837708?s=20&t=jtRCRm_YAEjtP_qirPDwqA  .

[21] https://twitter.com/ATS_company_/status/1497497710655594497?s=20&t=FrIZJ_S-6uLOULHnrd2sKA  .

[22] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1497604485270708224; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1497566927757135873.

[23] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/259676363012116.

[24] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1497601908487467010?s=20&t=1J63rn2SfXbQ2tuzpPEctw; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1497592611497992192?s=20&t=K1L_UKVT1R8KAibSTy_l1A

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/259492119697207.

[26] https://twitter.com/MarQs__/status/1497497572746924033?s=20&t=jtRCRm_YAEjtP_qirPDwqA; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1497490632826363909; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1497588541861289988; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1497585181309423620/photo/2.

[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-ukraine-warning-update-initial-russian-offensive-campaign-assessment.

[28] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/rus/news/2022/02/26/7326173/.

[29] https://twitter.com/The_Lookout_N/status/1497567359489519623?s=20&t=xliy-rYg0bKPtGB7ZouThQ; https://twitter.com/michaelh992/status/1497558206008147976?s=20&t=gZ4XwclqkmwzpsCncm5Xmg

[30] https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1497580097477480451?s=20&t=j07FSgEJcc2Yd8ZEk4Fncw; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1497536907223306240; https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1497579211841757185?s=20&t=j07FSgEJcc2Yd8ZEk4Fncw; https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1497609195675426821?s=20&t=gZ4XwclqkmwzpsCncm5Xmg.

[31] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/26/02/2022/6219c7129a7947ffad59c1c1; https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1497415742.

[32] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/26/02/2022/621946229a7947df69ff6654

[33] https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-25-22/h_622a8b21dd1cf52845090a96c9c6513b.

[34] https://twitter.com/mattia_n/status/1497468686461980672?s=20&t=XyWRq6cXMJxUgdROecWeNA; https://24tv dot ua/ru/ukrainskie-zashhitniki-razrushili-bronetehniku-vraga-hersone_n1879777.

[35] https://tsn.ua/ru/ukrayina/okkupanty-pokinuli-novuyu-kahovku-gorodskoy-golova-1989013.html; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1497399790988152834?s=20&t=_uDOt69fWyGvvacceGvMyA.

[36] https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1497580782415753220?s=20&t=j07FSgEJcc2Yd8ZEk4Fncw; https://twitter.com/poppoppopkt/status/1497589917605666826?s=20&t=lpfSfqlAGbHTf22x2R6_7Q  .

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/259676363012116.

[38] https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1497115295512776711; https://twitter.com/MotolkoHelp/status/1497108720953835543.

[39] https://www.facebook.com/DPSUkraine/posts/284968323742045.

 

Turkey Juggles Relationships after Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

 By Ezgi Yazici and Fatih Cungurlu

Contributors: Kevin Chen and Krista Schaefer

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is calling for a decisive NATO response against Russia after the Kremlin began a large-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24. Turkey has been prioritizing its bourgeoning defense and diplomatic partnership with Ukraine in recent years—an action that the Kremlin perceives as a challenge to its sphere of influence. Ukraine is not the first theater of conflict where Turkey and Russia have opposing interests, which they often have been able to compartmentalize. Turkey has challenged Russia’s sphere of influence in various theaters—including Libya, Central Asia, Syria, and the Caucasus—while maintaining its close coordination with Russia in its efforts to diversify its relations toward non-NATO states. However, Ukraine is likely the most significant challenge to date to Turkey’s bid to balance its NATO membership with its fragile partnership with Russia. Turkey has become increasingly reliant on Russian cooperation in various conflicts and key industries like energy and tourism.

Ankara long sought to avoid a Ukraine-Russia conflict that could upend its diplomatic balance. Throughout the Russian military buildup in early 2022, the Turkish government called for rapid de-escalation between Ukraine and Russia, made an offer to mediate direct talks between two states in Turkey, and downplayed NATO’s involvement in order to not exacerbate tensions. With the Russian invasion moving forward, Turkish officials are now trying to identify the lowest-cost policy options between standing with NATO, supporting Ukraine, and minimizing the risks of retaliation from Russia. Ankara remains supportive of Ukraine—including through past military aid and sales—but initial Turkish government statements suggest that Turkey’s unilateral support has limits: Ankara seeks to avoid a retaliatory response from Russia and the spillover financial impact of sanctions targeting Russia. Turkish officials have emphasized the need for decisive NATO action as a requirement for deterrence and support for Ukraine without providing details. Turkey’s financial and defense ties with Russia will likely limit its lobbying efforts within the alliance.

The update below provides an overview of Turkey’s goals and constraints in its approach to Ukraine, Russia, and NATO. Specifically:

1) Turkey’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on and after February 24 

2) Turkey’s efforts to mediate and de-escalate prior to the invasion

AFTER RUSSIA BEGAN ITS INVASION OF UKRAINE

Turkey calls for a more active and decisive NATO after Russia began its large-scale invasion of Ukraine. Turkey remains wary of pursuing sanctions against Russia, however.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called for more decisive NATO action and signaled a renewed commitment to work with NATO allies in support of Ukraine, despite strong ties with and risk of retaliation from Russia.[1] The Turkish Foreign Ministry and President Erdogan denounced Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24 for violating international law and posing a threat to regional and global security.[2] President Erdogan convened a national security summit with top Turkish government officials on February 24 to discuss developments in Ukraine.[3] Erdogan called on NATO and the European Union, to pursue more decisive actions beyond “issuing condemnations to Russia and offering advice to Ukraine” ahead of the virtual NATO Heads of State Summit on February 25.[4] Erdogan also underlined Turkey’s historical ties with and role in Europe—likely signaling his renewed commitment to work with NATO allies in support of Ukraine. 

Ukraine asked Turkey to deny Russian vessels access to the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits, though Turkey is unlikely to do so.[5] The Ukrainian government requested Turkey deny Russian vessels access to the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits under the 1936 Montreux Convention. The Montreux Convention grants Turkey the right to control and regulate the passage of naval vessels through Turkey’s two straits. Turkey can choose to close straits to all foreign warships in “wartime” or when it is threatened by aggression.[6] Turkish officials responded by saying that Ankara is prepared for all scenarios and will continue to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity and abide by the Montreux Convention.[7] However, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu underlined that the convention’s wartime clause still allows Black Sea littoral states to return their ships to their bases—allowing Russian vessels to enter the Black Sea regardless. The Convention also regulates the tonnage and time-of-stay of non-Black Sea states’ vessels, which would limit a possible NATO deployment into the Black Sea.[8]

Turkey offered humanitarian aid to Ukraine alongside its existing military support.[9] Erdogan spoke with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky over the phone and reiterated support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity on February 24.[10] Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar discussed Turkish humanitarian aid to Ukraine with his Ukrainian counterpart, Oleksiy Reznikov, on February 25.[11] Akar and Reznkiov previously had a phone call on February 24.[12] Ankara has also provided its Bayraktar TB2 armed drones to Ukraine since 2019, signed several defense cooperation agreements since 2020, provided military aid, and agreed on future joint defense productions.

Turkish officials increased coordination with NATO allies on February 24, marking a shift from Ankara’s earlier hesitant approach. President Erdogan discussed developments in Ukraine with French President Emmanuel Macron on February 24.[13] Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu called EU Foreign Affairs and Security Policy High Representative Josep Borrell.[14] Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar communicated with US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov.[15] Prior to Russia’s invasion, Turkish officials refrained from frequent coordination with NATO and criticized NATO states’ statements for exacerbating tensions. Instead, Ankara maintained its unilateral offer to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, which Russian President Vladimir Putin has so far refused. Turkey will likely maintain its symbolic mediation offer, but will also increase coordination with NATO allies.

The Turkish Foreign Ministry failed to urge its citizens to leave Ukraine prior to the invasion. The Turkish Foreign Ministry recommended its citizens leave eastern Ukraine on February 22, but did not issue guidance on the rest of the country before the airspace closure over Ukraine.[16] The Turkish government has not been able to evacuate most of its citizens as of February 25 but is collecting contact and location information for a possible evacuation operation.[17] Separately, Turkey sent two military transport aircraft to Kyiv, Ukraine, hours prior to Russia’s invasion announcement on February 23, and the aircraft likely remain in Ukraine.[18] Turkey also sent another military transport aircraft to Rzeszow, Poland, on the Polish-Ukrainian border on February 25.[19]  Ankara may have attempted to evacuate Turkish citizens or embassy staff or deliver military assistance to Ukraine.[20] Poland has provided ammunition support to Ukraine since the beginning of Russia’s invasion.[21]

A likely Russian air assault damaged a Turkish cargo ship off the coast of Odesa, Ukraine on February 24.[22] The Turkish Maritime General Directorate announced that a bomb hit a Turkish-owned ship en route to Romania. The incident resulted in no casualties and was likely an accident. The Directorate did not attribute the attack to Russia, and Turkish officials did not comment on the event. Russia’s ongoing attack on Ukraine may lead to similar accidental spillover violence in NATO member states and will likely disrupt critical trade routes through the Black Sea.

PRIOR TO RUSSIA’S INVASION OF UKRAINE:

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Turkey cannot abandon ties with Russia nor Ukraine.[23] Turkey condemned DNR and LNR recognition but is hesitant about imposing sanctions against Russia.

Erdogan had last-ditch phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on February 22-23 to condemn Russia’s recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR).[24] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had a phone call on February 22.[25] Erdogan emphasized that Russia’s recognition of the DNR and LNR is unacceptable and stressed the need for diplomacy in a statement after the call.[26]  The Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a similar statement on February 21 that classified Russia’s actions as a clear violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity.[27] President Zelensky suggested including Turkey, Ukraine, and Germany in a summit with the United Nations Security Council’s permanent members.[28] Erdogan reiterated his condemnation of Russia’s recognition of the DNR and LNR, called for a return to the Minsk II Accords, and stated that Turkey follows a “constructive approach” within NATO over a phone call with Putin as well on February 23.  [29] Erdogan later criticized Western leaders’ previous ineffective diplomatic efforts with the Kremlin.

Russian jets conducted flights over Turkish-controlled al-Bab, Aleppo Governorate, Syria, on February 23.[30] Local social media accounts reported that Russian warplanes dropped flare bombs over al-Bab in Turkish-controlled Syria on February 23. The Syria Civil Defense found evidence of shrapnel but no traces of airstrikes in the city. Other social media accounts also suggested that the jets were conducting an air exercise over the city—likely as a warning to Turkey about its support for Ukraine. The incident occurred after Ukrainian Ambassador to Turkey Vasyl Bodnar requested that Turkey deny Russia access to Turkish straits earlier on February 23. 

Turkish officials urged against sanctions on Russia in several statements on February 19-20.[31] Turkish Presidential Spokesperson Ibrahim Kalin stated that additional sanctions against Russia would undermine or delay a diplomatic solution in an interview with German newspaper Die Welt on February 19. Kalin criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin for seeking to redraw Russia‘s borders but urged states to listen to Russia and pursue mutual diplomacy, even if they do not fulfill Russian demands. Kalin also criticized Western and Russian statements for exacerbating tensions and recommended a flexible diplomatic approach—citing Turkey’s existing relations with Russia despite disagreements about Crimea and Libya. Kalin reiterated Turkey’s commitment to mediate between Russia and Ukraine both through NATO channels and bilaterally.

Turkish officials met with NATO leaders between February 18-23. Turkish General Staff Chief Yasar Guler and Hungarian General Staff Chief General Romulusz Ruszin-Szendi discussed current developments on February 23.[32] Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar also attended the Munich Security Conference in Munich, Germany on February 18-19.[33] Akar prioritized meetings with Iraqi Kurdish leaders but also met with his German counterpart, Christine Lambrecht, to discuss “regional developments” on February 19. Akar later urged caution against possible escalations due to disinformation campaigns and underlined the need for stability in the Black Sea region. Separately, Turkish Chief of the General Staff Yasar Guler and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe Tod Wolters discussed recent developments in NATO over the phone on February 20. Turkish readouts did not refer to Ukraine during these meetings.

 

 

 

 

---

[1] https://bianet.org/5/113/258308-erdogan-nato-eu-should-have-been-more-determined-against-russia

[2] https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/135776/-rusya-nin-ukrayna-ya-baslattigi-asker-harek-t-kabul-edilemez-

[3] https://twitter.com/tcbestepe/status/1496808376516362240

[4] https://www.sabah.com.tr/dunya/son-dakika-baskan-erdogandan-rusya-ukrayna-savasi-aciklamasi-natonun-kararli-bir-adim-atmasi-gerekir-5885229

[5] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/24/ukraine-asked-turkey-to-close-black-sea-waterways-to-russia

[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/pact-gives-turkey-oversight-warship-transit-russia-ukraine-2022-02-22/

[7] https://www.birgun.net/haber/akp-sozcusu-celik-bu-isgali-butunuyle-reddediyoruz-378409

[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-cannot-stop-russian-warships-accessing-black-sea-says-foreign-minister-2022-02-25/

[9] https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/turkish-red-crescent-to-send-first-relief-convoy-to-ukraine/news

[10] https://twitter.com/iletisim/status/1496811376555216898

[11] https://www.msb.gov.tr/SlaytHaber/2522022-36536

[12] https://t.co/pKK8UmCfO4

[13] https://twitter.com/tcbestepe/status/1496890706572595204

[14] https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkish-foreign-minister-discusses-ukraine-with-eu-official/2513012

[15] https://www.msb.gov.tr/SlaytHaber/2422022-74087

https://twitter.com/tcsavunma/status/1496896694683852800

[16] https://www.mfa.gov.tr/ukrayna-ya-iliskin-seyahat-uyarisi_22-02-2022-.en.mfa

[17] https://twitter.com/yavuzselimkiran/status/1496771983798726661?s=20&t=gKAQMoQDufIjbWxv70M43w

https://twitter.com/yavuzselimkiran/status/1496843165541748741?s=20&t=gKAQMoQDufIjbWxv70M43w

https://twitter.com/TC_Disisleri/status/1496952364858855428?s=20&t=gKAQMoQDufIjbWxv70M43w

[18] https://twitter.com/NotWoofers/status/1496638195307622400?s=20&t=pwJryWhlM6yqeQX4Dbobfg

https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/1496664865355747330?s=20&t=iTkVIORb2sVhyeWg77ZolA

[19] https://twitter.com/Danale/status/1497323558653026317?s=20&t=eyBQyWfYEkn7t4d9YbkuvQ

[20] https://twitter.com/Andy_Scollick/status/1496650104132063234?s=20&t=bEJ0BdyAusmFcCG_AuEiEg

[21] https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-25-22/h_b821ab5fc5308a00b02b90571718c54b

https://twitter.com/mblaszczak/status/1497258005955547143?s=20&t=Kb7j5q1XfBml1sTpfjVjog

[22] https://www.dailysabah.com/world/europe/bomb-hits-turkish-owned-ship-off-ukraines-odessa

[23] https://twitter.com/iletisim/status/1496440200972718084

[24] https://twitter.com/tcbestepe/status/1496485282400641029

[25] https://twitter.com/iletisim/status/1496123163503124483

https://twitter.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1496112679685177349?s=20&t=Fa97c2iIPJ70sc61JQ3gpw

[26] https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/haberler/detay/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-rusyanin-sozde-donetsk-ve-luhansk-cumhuriyetlerini-tanima-karari-kabul-edilemez

[27] https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-57_-rf-nin-sozde-donetsk-ve-luhansk-cumhuriyetleri-ni-tanima-karari-hk.en.mfa

[28] https://twitter.com/iletisim/status/1496063324806656007

https://www.voanews.com/a/ukraine-s-president-wants-new-security-guarantees-at-munich-conference/6450602.html

[29] https://twitter.com/iletisim/status/1496481053485248514

https://twitter.com/anadoluagency/status/1496495023147388931

[30] https://twitter.com/NotWoofers/status/1496582030133534726

https://twitter.com/NotWoofers/status/1496585080797597701

https://twitter.com/Tareek2011T/status/1496881787422838786

https://hibrpress.com/v2/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%82%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%B6%D9%88%D8%A6%D9%8A/

https://altareek-media.com/public/ar/post/4483

[31] https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/turkish-official-warns-sanctions-useless-against-russia-over-ukraine-crisis-54964

[32] https://twitter.com/TSKGnkur/status/1496439145799069706

[33] https://www.msb.gov.tr/SlaytHaber/2122022-21183

 

 

Ukraine Conflict Update 8

 Institute for the Study of War, Russia Team  

ISW published its most recent Russian offensive campaign assessment on February 25 at 3:00 pm Eastern Time.

This daily synthetic product covers key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine.

Key Takeaways February 25

• Russian forces entered major Ukrainian cities—including Kyiv and Kherson —for the first time and carried out additional air and missile strikes on military and civilian targets.
• Russian forces entered the outskirts of Kyiv on the west bank of the Dnipro River as Russian sabotage groups in civilian clothing reportedly moved into downtown Kyiv.
• Ukrainian forces have successfully slowed Russian troops on the east bank of the Dnipro, forcing them to bypass the city of Chernihiv after stout resistance. Russian airborne forces have concentrated in southeastern Belarus, likely for use along the Chernihiv-bypass axis toward Kyiv in the next 24 hours.
• Russian forces will likely envelop Kharkhiv in the next 24 hours after failing to enter the city through frontal assaults on February 24-25.
• Russian forces have achieved little success through frontal assaults or envelopments against Ukrainian forces in Donbas but may not have intended to do more than pin Ukrainian forces in the east. 
• North of Crimea, Russian forces fully captured Kherson and are likely on the verge of seizing Melitopol in the east. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Russian forces bypassed Kherson earlier and headed directly for Mykolaiv and Odessa.
• Russian forces may be assembling in Stolin, Belarus, to open a new line of advance against Rivne in western Ukraine.
• Western intelligence officials told CNN on February 25 that Russian President Vladimir Putin intends to invade all of Ukraine and could install a pro-Kremlin regime within days.
• Russian opposition groups and citizens opposing the Russian war in Ukraine may be laying the foundations of a coordinated anti-war movement that will be unlikely to alter Putin’s decision making but will likely provoke harsher domestic crackdowns, further eroding Putin’s domestic popularity.
• The United States, United Kingdom, and European Union expanded their sanctions on Russia to target Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on February 25, but sanctions to sever Russia from SWIFT remain unlikely.
• NATO activated its 40,000-troop Response Force for the first time ever on February 25 to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
• The International Criminal Court (ICC) announced possible investigations into alleged Russian war crimes amid Russian denials.

Key Events February 24, 4:00 pm EST – February 25, 4:00 pm EST

Military Events:

Russian forces entered major Ukrainian cities—including Kyiv and Kherson – for the first time on February 25. Russian forces’ main axes of advance focused on Kyiv, successfully isolating the city on both banks of the Dnipro River. Poorly planned and organized Russian military operations along Ukraine’s northern border have been less successful than those emanating from Crimea so far. Determined and well-organized Ukrainian resistance around Kyiv and Kharkiv has also played an important role in preventing the Russian military from advancing with the speed and success for which it had reportedly planned.The Russian military has deployed forces beyond those it likely planned to use against Ukraine to offset these challenges. However, Russian forces remain much larger and more capable than Ukraine’s conventional military. Russia will likely defeat Ukrainian regular military forces and secure their territorial objectives at some point in the coming days or weeks if Putin is determined to do so and willing to pay the cost in blood and treasure.

Russian forces carried out additional air and missile strikes on Kyiv and other major cities around 3:00 am local time on February 25. ISW cannot confirm the frequency and targets of overnight Russian strikes at this time. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are increasingly targeting civil infrastructure and residential buildings “to intimidate the population of Ukraine.” Russian forces continue to refrain from using the likely full scale of Russian air and missile capabilities, likely seeking to limit the negative imagery of heavy Ukrainian civilian casualties. However, Russian forces will likely increase their use of bombardment in the coming days to overcome heavier-than-anticipated Ukrainian resistance.

Russian ground forces are advancing on four primary axes:

1. Kyiv Axis: Russian forces entered the outskirts of Kyiv on the west bank of the Dnipro on February 25. Russian forces have so far failed to enter Kyiv’s eastern outskirts. They have abandoned for now the failed attempt to take the city of Chernihiv and are instead bypassing it. Elements of the 76th VDV (Airborne) division have concentrated in southeastern Belarus likely for use along the Chernihiv-bypass axis toward Kyiv in the next 24 hours.
2. Kharkiv Axis: Russian forces will likely envelop Kharkhiv in the next 24 hours after failing to enter the city through frontal assaults on February 24. Russian forces are now advancing on a broad front along the northeastern Ukrainian border as of February 25.
3. Donbas Axis: Russian forces may not have intended to do more than pin Ukrainian forces in the east. The Russians have not weighted their ground offensive efforts toward breaking through Ukrainian defensive positions on the line of contact, taking Mariupol from the east, or driving rapidly through Luhansk Oblast to the north. Ukrainian forces remain largely static on the line of contact.
4. Crimea Axis: Russian forces fully captured Kherson and are likely on the verge of seizing Melitopol in the east. Unconfirmed reports indicated that Russian forces had bypassed Kherson earlier and headed directly for Mykolaiv and Odessa.

Russian Activity

Kremlin officials and Russian government media advanced the dual narratives that Ukrainian “nationalists” are the only Ukrainians fighting and that Russian forces are easily succeeding in Ukraine throughout coverage on February 25 to counteract the growing unpopularity of the war in Russia. TASS falsely claimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) forces are advancing toward the administrative borders of Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast late on February 25.[1] Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova falsely claimed Russian forces are only striking Ukrainian military infrastructure, not Ukrainian cities or civilians. Zakharova also claimed that Ukrainian “nationalists” threaten ethnic Russians with “direct reprisals” in Ukraine.[2] Russian domestic media additionally amplified a Russian Defense Ministry announcement claiming Ukrainian nationalist battalions are destroying bridges and civilian infrastructure to prevent other Ukrainians from surrendering.[3] Russian TV channels reported that the West and Ukraine are artificially insinuating panic across all Ukrainian cities to amplify mobilization and mass nationalist revolts by supplying Ukrainian civilians with weapons.[4] Russian Defense Ministry Spokesperson Major General Igor Konashenkov claimed that Russian forces neutralized 11 Ukrainian military aircraft, 18 tanks and armored vehicles, and 211 military infrastructure facilities but did not mention Russian losses.[5] Konashenkov also claimed that Russia’s seizure of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant prevented “Ukrainian nationalists” from using the power plant to conduct a “nuclear provocation.”[6] Kremlin media amplified false Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) claims that the Ukrainian 36th and 53rd Brigades “laid down their arms.”[7] 

Russian President Vladimir Putin called on Ukrainian soldiers to stage a military coup during a Russian Security Council meeting on February 25, indicating continued Kremlin misunderstanding of the scale of Ukrainian resistance. Putin updated the Russian Security Council on the progress of the operation in Ukraine and claimed that Russian forces are primarily clashing with “Ukrainian nationalists,” not Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel.[8] Putin told Ukrainian forces to prevent Ukrainian “nationalists” from using civilians as “human shields,” likely aimed at bolstering the false Kremlin claim of a genocide of ethnic Russians in Ukraine.[9] The Kremlin’s continued calls for Ukrainians to reject ”nationalists” and that Russia's operations are only directed at the government in Kyiv may indicate the Kremlin falsely expected the Ukrainian military to collapse quickly or for Russian troops to be greeted as “liberators,” as Putin has claimed. 

Russian opposition groups and citizens opposing the Russian war in Ukraine may be laying the foundations of a coordinated anti-war movement that will be unlikely to alter Putin’s decision making but will likely provoke harsher domestic crackdowns, further eroding Putin’s popularity.[10] Russian police detained 1,012 anti-war demonstrators in Moscow, 458 in St Petersburg, and more than 300 in other Russian cities in total as of February 25 according to rights group OVD-Info.[11] Russian independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta condemned the Kremlin’s war on Ukraine on February 25 and emphasized that “only the antiwar movement of Russians” can help peacefully resolve the situation.[12] The Yeltsin Center and more than 180 Russian academics from the Russian Academy of Sciences called for an immediate end to the war in Ukraine.[13] Separately, a Russian human rights group, the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, condemned the Russian military for sending conscripts to the frontlines with less than four months of training, laying the potential groundwork for an influential anti-war bloc even among Putin’s grassroots supporters.[14] Russians withdrew more than $1.3 billion in cash on the first day of the war with Ukraine as Russia‘s financial markets plummeted, demonstrating public unease with the Russian government’s ability to handle the economic consequences of the invasion.[15] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov condemned Russian protests against the war and warned Russian citizens they will face consequences if they continue violating the law by protesting.[16] Russia enacted a “partial restriction” of Facebook following accusations that Facebook blocked several Russian media outlets on the website on February 25.[17] Protests are highly unlikely to affect Putin’s decision making on the war, but will require the Kremlin to expend further resources on domestic crackdowns and will likely accelerate Putin’s declining popularity.

Belarusian Activity

N/A

Ukrainian Activity

The Kremlin and Ukrainian Presidential Office confirmed on February 25 that Ukraine and Russia are negotiating a time and location for talks, during which the Kremlin will likely seek to impose maximalist surrender demands. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky offered to “sit at the negotiation table to stop deaths of people” with Putin on February 25.[18] Zelensky vaguely stated that Ukraine “is not afraid to discuss neutral status” with Russia due to its current lack of NATO membership, but his advisors clarified that media misrepresented Zelensky’s statements.[19] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed that Putin is ready to send a presidential, Defense and Foreign Ministry delegation to Minsk after discussing Zelensky’s offer with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. Peskov later claimed that Ukraine counteroffered to hold meetings in Warsaw before breaking off negotiations, which Ukrainian officials denied.[20] Peskov and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov issued incongruous statements on Russian-Ukrainian dialogue terms. Peskov said that the Kremlin “positively” welcomes Zelensky’s consideration of neutrality status and officially recognizes his presidency.[21] Lavrov, however, claimed that he does not believe that Zelensky wants to negotiate and stated that Ukrainian Armed Forces must surrender before the dialogue.[22]

US Activity

Western intelligence officials told CNN on February 25 that Russian President Vladimir Putin intends to invade all of Ukraine and could install a pro-Kremlin regime within days, refuting Russia’s claims that it is conducting a “limited operation.”[23] UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace stressed that intelligence suggests Russia’s ultimate objective remains a full invasion of Ukraine but that Russian troops have failed to achieve their major military objectives as of February 25. Unnamed American intelligence officials told CNN that Russian troops may take Kyiv by March 1 and that Russia will install a “Russia-friendly proxy government.”[24] US intelligence sources told CNN that it is unclear if Russia will continue to hold Ukrainian territory after installing a proxy government. Notably, the Pentagon reported that the Russian offensive has lost momentum and has been unable to seize control of Ukrainian airspace.[25] US Senate Intelligence Committee Chair Senator Mark Warner added that Russian cyber-attacks in support of the invasion have been more muted than anticipated, likely due to deliberate restraint rather than diminished cyber capacity.[26]

The European Union (EU), United States, and United Kingdom expanded their sanctions on Russia to target Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov on February 25, but sanctions to sever Russia from SWIFT remain unlikely.[27] The EU approved an additional sanctions package on February 25 largely targeting Russia’s financial sector in conjunction with US and UK sanctions packages.[28] EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borell denied that a third EU sanctions package is under preparation but affirmed the EU is ready to supplement existing sanctions based on Russian activity and EU consensus.[29] The EU asked the European Commission and European Central Bank (ECB) to assess the ramifications of further cutting off Russian institutions‘ access to the EU financial system, including Russian access to the SWIFT high-security payment network. The European Council emphasized that “all options are on the table.”[30] French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire said cutting Russia from SWIFT is an option of ”last resort” on February 25.[31] UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson urged NATO and EU leaders to immediately remove Russia from SWIFT and announced new UK sanctions suspending export credit and investment guarantees for Russia.[32] Bloomberg Wealth reported that international sanctions cost Russia’s wealthiest citizens a cumulative 39 billion USD within 24 hours of Russia’s invasion.[33] Taiwan announced that it will join international economic sanctions against Russia on February 25.[34]  Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov warned on February 25 that Russia will retaliate against international sanctions.[35] Russia’s Federal Air Transport Agency, Rosaviatsiya, banned all UK-based airlines from landing in Russia and crossing Russian airspace on February 25 after the United Kingdom banned Russian airline Aeroflot on February 24.[36]

NATO and EU Activity

NATO activated its 40,000-troop Response Force on February 25 in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[37] Elements of the NATO Response Force will remain on standby to help support NATO countries in Eastern Europe should Russia threaten their territorial integrity.[38] NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated that elements of the Response Force, including the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, a land brigade of approximately 5,000 troops, can deploy rapidly where needed to bolster eastern flank security.[39]  NATO heads of state, along with those of Finland, Sweden, and the European Union, reinforced their commitment to NATO’s Article 5 and their support for Ukrainian sovereignty during a call on February 25.[40] Stoltenberg emphasized that Russia and Belarus will be held economically and politically accountable for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.[41] Separately, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said on February 25 that Ukraine requested military, financial, and humanitarian aid from European leaders and that France was ready to help “if necessary.”[42] French President Emmanuel Macron stated that France will provide Ukraine with military defense equipment and an additional 300 million euros in budgetary assistance.[43]

Other International Organization Activity

The International Criminal Court (ICC) announced possible investigations into alleged Russian war crimes amid Russian denials, and several states and international organizations began preparing humanitarian aid packages on February 25. ICC prosecutor Karim Kahn said on February 25 that the ICC may investigate possible war crimes in Ukraine and urged all sides to respect international humanitarian law.[44] US officials reported that about 200 Russian missiles have hit residential areas in Ukraine as of February 25.[45] The Russian Defense Ministry denied claims that Russia is indiscriminately targeting civilian and military targets and said Russia would not endanger civilians by attacking cities.[46] Russian Presidential Spokesman Dmitry Peskov declined to state if the Kremlin had data on civilian deaths.

The Kremlin denied UN reports of at least 127 civilian deaths and a UN assessment that the invasion could cause up to five million Ukrainian refugees to flee abroad.[47] Polish border officials reported that about 29,000 Ukrainian refugees entered Poland on February 24.[48] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi estimated that about 100,000 Ukrainians were displaced from February 24-25.[49] United Nations Aid Chief Martin Grifiths reported that aid operations in Ukraine will require about 1 billion USD over the next three months to provide humanitarian aid to fleeing Ukrainians. US Chairman of the State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee Senator Chris Coons announced his support for a minimum $10 billion US aid package to support Eastern European and NATO countries taking in Ukrainian refugees.[50]

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Special Monitoring Mission (OSCE SMM) announced on February 25 that it could not safely run ground patrols due to heavy fighting and that it would continue monitoring the conflict from limited listening posts and with a reduced posture.[51] Doctors Without Borders also suspended its operations in Eastern Ukraine due to the conflict on February 25 but announced plans to station medical teams in neighboring countries.[52]

Individual Western Allies’ Activity

N/A

Other International Activity

China has not cohered a consistent public approach to the Russian war against Ukraine; The Chinese government is beginning to comply with US sanctions on Russia while calling for negotiations and declining to fully denounce Russian aggression. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed Ukraine on February 25. Xi called for rejecting Cold War mindsets and reaching a balanced, effective, and sustainable European security mechanism through negotiations. Xi emphasized China’s claimed respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and said that China will work with the international community to safeguard the UN-based international order.[53] Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin reiterated that China seeks to resolve Ukraine issues in line with UN principles and that sanctions are an ineffective tool during a February 25 press conference.[54] Two of China’s largest state banks, the Industrial and Commerical Bank of China (ICBC) and Bank of China (BOC), also began complying with US sanctions and started restricting financing for Russian commodities on February 25. The ICBC is still offering limited Chinese Yuan-based lines of credit to select Russian clients, pending senior approval.[55] Chinese banks have largely complied with US financial sanctions against Iran and North Korea in the past to retain access to US dollar markets.

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[1] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/13868561.

[2] https://tass dot ru/politika/13862543.

[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cc5ItdYhx0M.

[4] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iCb9knoSYLk.

[5] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/13854541; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/13866981.

[6] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/13854375.

[7] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/13854525.

[8] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/824597.

[9] https://tvrain dot ru/news/putin_zajavil_o_shajke_narkomanov_v_kieve_i_prizval_ukrainskih_voennyh_brat_vlast_v_svoi_ruki-548652/?from=rss.

[10] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/02/25/petitsiya-s-trebovaniem-ostanovit-voynu-v-ukraine-nabrala-bolee-500-tysyach-podpisey;https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/25/ukraine-invasion-russia-news/#link-VHKLFFGG6ZAHTL633DPEFAH6FQ

[11] https://ovd dot news/news/2022/02/24/spiski-zaderzhannyh-v-svyazi-s-akciey-v-protiv-voyny-s-ukrainoy-24-fevralya-2022

[12] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/25/ukraine-invasion-russia-news/#link-VHKLFFGG6ZAHTL633DPEFAH6FQ

[13] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/02/25/eltsin-tsentr-prizval-nemedlenno-ostanovit-voynu-v-ukraine; https://tvrain dot ru/news/akademiki_ran_i_nauchnye_zhurnalisty_potrebovali_ostanovit_voennye_dejstvija_v_ukraine-548545/?from=rss

[14] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/25/ukraine-invasion-russia-news/#link-AL7FFRO36NBENP5HOJVMZ2ELMM

[15] https://tvrain dot ru/news/rossijane_v_pervyj_den_vojny_s_ukrainoj_snjali_bolee_110_milliardov_nalichnyh-548632/?from=rss

[16] https://tass dot ru/politika/13857905

[17] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/25/ukraine-invasion-russia-news/#link-55TH2KDNZFGWRAERNODOKH2RZ4.

[18] https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-60525339.

[19] https://nv dot ua/ukraine/politics/voyna-rossii-protiv-ukrainy-zelenskiy-zayavil-chto-ukraina-ne-boitsya-govorit-o-neytralnom-statuse-50219834.html; https://nv dot ua/ukraine/politics/vladimir-zelenskiy-gotov-obsuzhdat-neytralnyy-status-ukrainy-kommentariy-opu-novosti-ukrainy-50219958.html.

[20] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/13870215.

[21] https://tass dot ru/politika/13857863; https://tass dot ru/politika/13857501.

[22] https://tass dot ru/politika/13859405.

[23] https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-25-22/h_95af9a862ebf46ebc8fe1532c2a1e3f9 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-update-7

[24] https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-25-22/h_c8d43a5b5a9c4fde6c37ed905f033a0b

[25] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/25/ukraine-invasion-russia-news/#link-RCVQQO7CNFC33LEDYG2O3Q3JAE ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/25/ukraine-invasion-russia-news/#link-AZZQA2VO2ZHXZDAWXSTQ6PP65U

[26] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news/card/senate-intelligence-chief-says-russia-has-limited-its-cyberattacks-3hBKHsDz7Um29KtGz5Lz

[27] https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-25-22/h_21282cfae42e4553d6d767dd65f38460

https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-25-22/h_998f7b3745ed9468a46920569ac0aa13

https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/25/politics/us-putin-sanctions/index.html

[28] https://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-to-cut-70-of-russias-banking-system-off-from-global-markets-11645760548

[29] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-could-add-russia-sanctions-no-plan-new-package-borrell-2022-02-25/; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/25/ukraine-invasion-russia-news/#link-PJ2O4XP7VFCOTGT3R733IYVXYM; https://twitter.com/eucopresident/status/1497147202027802624?s=20&t=fybTWaitoOpt6pXO09rLsA

[30] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/25/ukraine-press-statement-from-the-eu-ministers-for-finance-european-commission-and-the-european-central-bank/; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2022/02/25/l; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/25/ukraine-invasion-russia-news/#link-Y76DNWUJZVHVHGAPSGXIWQAHGM

[31] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/25/ukraine-invasion-russia-news/#link-Y76DNWUJZVHVHGAPSGXIWQAHGM

[32] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news/card/germany-suspends-export-credit-and-investment-guarantees-for-russia-lF39k3IN0rPAvYyTaSxg

[33] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-24/russian-billionaires-lose-39-billion-in-a-day-on-ukraine-attack

[34] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/25/ukraine-invasion-russia-news/#link-TVHMKD6THFH2NGGKFKPTFKGQIE

[35] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/13857475

[36] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/25/ukraine-invasion-russia-news/#link-VTL4O4F3AFCHJCPQYYL7QCZ6PI

[37] https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-25-22/h_8a55abba53c54d8602839221dbe8d8b0^; https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-25-22/h_ea3c0368bdfbc09f1e1a63cf967dce06; https://nato.createsend1.com/t/ViewEmail/r/7C0D1AEDCEF16DA72540EF23F30FEDED/62D29E709F6D885EE89F0E32AAFB68BF?alternativeLink=False

[38] https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-25-22/h_8a55abba53c54d8602839221dbe8d8b0^; https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-25-22/h_ea3c0368bdfbc09f1e1a63cf967dce06 ^; https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_192489.htm?selectedLocale=en

[39] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/25/world/russia-ukraine-war/nato-to-deploy-more-troops-to-nations-that-make-up-eastern-border^; https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_192489.htm?selectedLocale=en

[40]https://nato.createsend1.com/t/ViewEmail/r/7C0D1AEDCEF16DA72540EF23F30FEDED/62D29E709F6D885EE89F0E32AAFB68BF?alternativeLink=False^; https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_192454.htm?selectedLocale=en

[41] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_192455.htm?selectedLocale=en

https://www.ft.com/content/875bd999-1feb-4e2d-9455-30653a63a071

[42] https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-25-22/h_d9ffeedf875d94c7364bc3c8a7eaf467

[43] https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-25-22/h_49b1e98e5d017deb2dd77ad572fbc7bd

[44] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/icc-says-may-investigate-possible-war-crimes-after-russian-invasion-ukraine-2022-02-25/ ; https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=20220225-prosecutor-statement-ukraine

[45] https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-25-22/h_438897dbe34aabf0df01f81efa4fb168

[46] https://tass dot ru/politika/13857603; https://tass dot ru/politika/13858015

[47] https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-europe-media-united-nations-kyiv-3500e852f1a812a23dc9ff492ca2af08 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/invasion-could-drive-5-million-ukrainians-flee-abroad-un-2022-02-25/

[48] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/24/world/russia-attacks-ukraine/thousands-of-ukrainians-are-crossing-the-border-into-eastern-poland

[49] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news/card/sen-chris-coons-calls-for-billions-in-emergency-aid-for-ukrainian-refugees-lxeSfFhZx0CumcGsPu9U

[50] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/un-aid-chief-says-more-than-1-bln-needed-ukraine-2022-02-25/

[51] https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/512989

[52] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/25/ukraine-invasion-russia-news/#link-WRVUOWSJCZHXRCZBOFL3MABFAQ

[53] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news/card/china-s-xi-jinping-spoke-with-putin-on-friday-chinese-state-media-says-mrOuJYBgLylU96Pa85Y8;
https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-25-22/h_309d5dd81a3fcbb3b27886f13b2e3c5e;
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/25/ukraine-invasion-russia-news/#link-PXQ2FL7QWFH3PBQRIX2LHM5S7Q;
https://tass dot ru/politika/13862527; https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202202/t20220225_10645701.html

[54] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/202202/t20220225_10645686.shtml;
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/25/ukraine-invasion-russia-news/#link-OGFTBKWU2BDNRMN5W4AIFJ2EWQ

[55] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-25/chinese-state-banks-restrict-financing-for-russian-commodities#:~:text=At%20least%20two%20of%20China%E2%80%99s%20largest%20state-owned%20banks,of%20sanctions%20by%20the%20U.S.%20and%20its%20allies.