Warning: Lukashenko Expels Opposition Leaders to Support Kremlin Information Operation

September 8, 2020, 7:20 pm EDT

By George Barros and Mason Clark 

Belarusian authorities are holding Belarusian opposition leader Kolesnikova after a failed attempt to expel her to Ukraine following her abduction on September 7. Ukrainian officials confirmed Belarusian authorities “forcibly expelled” Ivan Kravtsov and Anton Rodnenkov – two of Kolesnikova’s staffers – to Ukraine on September 8.[1] Belarusian security personnel in civilian clothes abducted Kolesnikova, Rodnenkov, and Kravtsov in downtown Minsk on September 7.[2] Rodnenkov claimed Belarusian authorities decided to expel him and Kravtsov to Ukraine, rather than Poland or Lithuania, because they did not have passports with EU visas.[3] Kravtsov and Rodnenkov confirmed at a press conference in Kyiv on September 8 that they witnessed Kolesnikova destroy her passport while in Belarusian detention to avoid expulsion.[4]

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko falsely claimed on September 8 Belarusian authorities detained Maria Kolesnikova at the Belarusian-Ukrainian border – not in Minsk – after she attempted to flee to Ukraine to meet her sister there.[5] Belarusian authorities falsely claimed Kolesnikova, Rodnenkov, and Kravtsov attempted to drive to Ukraine – where Belarusian authorities claim Rodnenkov and Kravtsov have Ukrainian residence permits – and that Rodnenkov and Kravtsov kicked Kolesnikova out of the car at the Belarusian border checkpoint.[6] Ukrainian authorities confirmed Kolesnikova did not arrive at the Ukrainian border checkpoint with Kravtsov and Rodenenkov.[7]

Lukashenko previously expelled Olga Kovalkova – a member of Lithuania-based opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanouskaya’s Coordination Council – to Poland on September 5. Kovalkova claimed Belarusian authorities expelled her to Poland on September 5 after threating her with indefinite detention if she remained in Belarus.[8] Belarusian authorities arrested Kovalkova on August 25 and extended her first 10-day arrest by an additional 15 days on September 3.[9]

Lukashenko likely continued his campaign to detain opposition organizers still active in Belarus on September 8. Tikhanouskaya’s headquarters announced that Tikhanouskaya staffer Antonina Kanovalova disappeared on September 8.[10] Kanovalova’s whereabouts are unknown as of this writing. Belarusian authorities may expel Kanovalova to Ukraine, Poland, or Lithuania, as they did Kovalkova, Kravtsov, and Rodnenkov.

Lukashenko is likely expelling Belarusian opposition leaders to disrupt opposition coordination and support the Kremlin’s information operation that NATO is waging a hybrid war against Belarus. Lukashenko may intend to disrupt the opposition’s ability to sustain large-scale protests by arresting or expelling all organizers still active in Belarus. However, Telegram channel NEXTA has largely organized mass protests without any presence in Belarus, and protests will likely continue. Lukashenko may have alternatively intended to intimidate the opposition through targeted expulsions, but likely could have done this more effectively by indefinitely detaining opposition leaders. Lukashenko may finally intend to amplify his framing of Western backing for a hybrid war to overthrow him by sending opposition leaders to European states. Rodnenkov’s claim Belarus only expelled him and Kravtsov to Ukraine because they lacked EU visas supports this framing.

Kolesnikova’s ostentatious decision to foil Lukashenko’s attempt to expel her was an act of courage and potentially based on confidence in receiving external support. Kolesnikova posed special risks to Lukashenko because she was the last prominent opposition leader active in Belarus and has demonstrated her effectiveness at organizing the opposition. She also has the clearest and strongest connections to Kremlin-amenable actors among prominent opposition leaders. Lukashenko may have attempted to expel her to disrupt any Kremlin efforts through her to negotiate a transition government or pursue constitutional changes. Kolesnikova’s resistance to her expulsion – unlike her staffers or Kovalkova – additionally singles her out. Kolesnikova has repeatedly demonstrated her courage and willingness to risk detention or harm by continuing to operate in Belarus after other opposition leaders fled or were detained. Her decision to destroy her passport disrupted Lukashenko’s desired framing that opposition leaders left Belarus by choice, making it clear she is being held by Lukashenko against her will and does not desire to leave the country. Kolesnikova may have taken the brave choice to act as a symbol for the opposition by risking indefinite detention – since Lukashenko cannot readily force her to leave Belarus without openly abandoning his framing of legality, which is an important component of Russian and Belarusian information and hybrid operations. Kolesnikova may alternatively have confidence – rightly or wrongly – that she will not be detained indefinitely or harmed too badly due to her prominence among the opposition or because she trusts that an external authority such as Putin will protect her and ensure her release.

Security personnel in green uniforms without insignia began to operate with regular marked Belarusian riot police in Minsk on September 8. Security personnel wearing unmarked green uniforms – initially reported as Belarusian riot police (OMON) in new uniforms – first appeared in Minsk on September 5.[11] The unidentified personnel may not be Belarusian OMON as initially reported. These personnel operated with OMON who wore their regular black uniforms with identifying insignia on September 8.[12] It remains unclear why Belarusian OMON would have changed their uniforms and removed identifying markings or why possible Belarusian OMON personnel are now sporting two different uniforms. The unidentified personnel are likely setting conditions for the appearance of Russian security personnel in similar unmarked uniforms, or may themselves be Russian personnel.

Lukashenko gave a prominent interview to four senior Kremlin propagandists in Minsk on September 8. RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan, Pervy Kanal anchor Anton Vernitsky, Russia 1 anchor Yevgeny Rozhkov, and Moscow Speaks Editor-in-Chief Roman Babayan met Lukashenko for an interview on September 8.[13] Lukashenko said he does not rule out the possibility of early presidential elections but that elections are only possible after constitutional reforms.[14] Lukashenko said he would not resign from office because his supporters would be killed and only he is capable of protecting Belarus – a reiteration of Lukashenko’s unsubstantiated claims of a Western hybrid war against Belarus.[15] Lukashenko also claimed Russia will fall if Belarus does and that it is “impossible” to block Telegram channels that organize protests – a tactic Lukashenko accused US-backed centers in Poland and the Czech Republic of using to organizing protests against him.[16]

The Kremlin likely organized this interview to humanize Lukashenko and reaffirm the Kremlin’s framing of the protests as a Western hybrid war that targets Russia. Lukashenko claimed his police response, though heavy-handed at times, was necessary given the severity of the threat to Belarus.[17] Simonyan in particular praised Lukashenko’s successful efforts to extinguish a color revolution, advancing the Kremlin’s framing of the Belarus protests as a Western hybrid war eventually targeting Russia.[18]

The Kremlin denies it had or will have contact with the Belarusian Coordination Council on September 8. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the Kremlin has had no contact with the Coordination Council and will not contact the Coordination Council on September 8.[19] The Kremlin likely has conducted some form of backchannel contact with Kolesnikova given her association with the Kremlin-linked Viktor Babariko. Babariko served as the chairman of Belgazprombank – the Belarusian branch of a bank owned by Russian gas giant Gazprom - from 2000 to May 2020.[20] The Kremlin will likely continue to downplay overt communication with the Belarusian opposition while leaving open the possibility of supporting an alternative to Lukashenko.

The Kremlin reiterated its desire for Belarusian constitutional reforms after Lukashenko detained Kolesnikova – who has voiced support for constitutional reforms. Peskov reiterated the Kremlin’s desire to begin a dialogue to discuss Belarusian constitutional reforms on September 8 – a policy the Kremlin has advocated since August 31.[21] Kolesnikova previously stated her openness to working with the Kremlin and expressed support for constitutional reforms.[22] ISW warned Belarusian constitutional reforms could present opportunities for the Kremlin to secure provisions granting Russia additional strategic basing rights in Belarus and provisions further institutionalizing the Union State.[23] Lukashenko may have detained Kolesnikova in order to disrupt Kremlin efforts to undermine Belarus’ sovereignty via constitutional amendments.

An unknown number of Russian and Serbian troops will arrive in Belarus on September 10 for prescheduled annual tactical joint exercises. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed on September 8 the “Slavic Brotherhood 2020” counterterror exercises will be held in Brest on September 10-15.[24] The MoD stated up to 1,500 troops from Belarus, Serbia, and Russia will participate in the exercises.[25] Units from Belarus’ 38th Guards Air Assault Brigade are garrisoned in Brest and will likely participate in the exercise. Planning for these exercises have been underway since at least December 2019.[26]

Slavic Brotherhood 2020 is at least twice as large as the previous two iterations of the exercises in 2018 and 2019. Approximately 600 Russian, Belarusian, and Serbian troops participated in the Slavic Brotherhood 2019 exercises in Pancevo, Serbia, in June 2019 and approximately 700 Belarusian, Russian, and Serbian troops participated in Slavic Brother 2018 in Krasnodar, Russia, in June 2018.[27] The 2020 exercises may be larger due to a higher number of Belarusian troops’ participation given the Belarusian military’s mobilization to full combat readiness since August 18.[28]

ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.

[1] https://www.facebook.com/anton.gerashchenko.7/posts/3273700299383461; https://mvs.gov(.)ua/ua/news/33830_SHCHodo_peretinu_ukrainskogo_kordonu_gromadyanami_Respubliki_Bilorus.htm; https://dpsu.gov(.)ua/ua/news/SHCHodo-peretinu-ukrainskogo-kordonu-gromadyanami-Respubliki-Bilorus/?fbclid=IwAR3tP2QvZCfkik4ufGEJbQcxVzvAnQNRO2-RUBCtDINanjA__3ONFfjkHKM.

[2] https://news.tut((.))by/economics/699502.html.

[3] https://gordonua(.)com/news/worldnews/belorusskie-oppozicionery-rodnenkov-i-kravcov-ne-planiruyut-poluchat-politicheskoe-ubezhishche-v-ukraine-1517418.html.

[4] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VG3Rzg3M7jc&ab_channel=WorldLiveNews.

[5] https://strana(.)ua/news/288519-lukashenko-zajavil-chto-oppozitsionerka-kolesnikova-planirovala-pobeh-v-ukrainu-k-sestre-smi.html.

[6] https://t(.)me/gpkgovby/216.

[7] https://www.facebook.com/anton.gerashchenko.7/posts/3273700299383461; https://mvs.gov(.)ua/ua/news/33830_SHCHodo_peretinu_ukrainskogo_kordonu_gromadyanami_Respubliki_Bilorus.htm; https://dpsu.gov(.)ua/ua/news/SHCHodo-peretinu-ukrainskogo-kordonu-gromadyanami-Respubliki-Bilorus/?fbclid=IwAR3tP2QvZCfkik4ufGEJbQcxVzvAnQNRO2-RUBCtDINanjA__3ONFfjkHKM.

[8] https://www.voanews.com/europe/belarusian-opposition-activist-kovalkova-leaves-country-after-arrest.

[9] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-belarusian-opposition-begins.html.

[10] https://www.interfax(.)ru/world/725075; https://www.mk(.)ru/politics/2020/09/08/propala-doverennoe-lico-svetlany-tikhanovskoy-antonina-konovalova.html; https://www.fontanka.ru/2020/09/08/69460271/.

[11] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-security-personnel-in-green.html.

[12] https://twitter.com/Den_2042/status/1303385448723734529/photo/1.

[13] http://president.gov(.)by/ru/news_ru/view/intervjju-predstaviteljam-veduschix-rossijskix-smi-24489/; https://eng.belta(.)by/politics/view/russian-journalist-there-are-always-people-who-seek-to-utilize-protests-133266-2020/.

[14] https://www.themoscowtime(.)com/2020/09/08/belarus-leader-admits-to-staying-too-long-in-power-in-rt-interview-a71381; http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-security-personnel-in-green.html; https://meduza(.)io/en/news/2020/09/08/lukashenko-reportedly-admits-to-russian-tv-journalist-that-maybe-he-s-overstayed-his-welcome-as-belarusian-president; http://president.gov(.)by/ru/news_ru/view/intervjju-predstaviteljam-veduschix-rossijskix-smi-24489/; https://belsat(.)eu/en/news/too-long-in-office-but-still-irreplaceable-lukashenka-interviewed-by-russian-media/; https://tass(.)com/world/1198533.

[15] https://www.themoscowtime(.)com/2020/09/08/belarus-leader-admits-to-staying-too-long-in-power-in-rt-interview-a71381; http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-security-personnel-in-green.html; https://meduza(.)io/en/news/2020/09/08/lukashenko-reportedly-admits-to-russian-tv-journalist-that-maybe-he-s-overstayed-his-welcome-as-belarusian-president; http://president.gov(.)by/ru/news_ru/view/intervjju-predstaviteljam-veduschix-rossijskix-smi-24489/; https://belsat(.)eu/en/news/too-long-in-office-but-still-irreplaceable-lukashenka-interviewed-by-russian-media/; https://tass(.)com/world/1198533.

[16] https://www.themoscowtime(.)com/2020/09/08/belarus-leader-admits-to-staying-too-long-in-power-in-rt-interview-a71381; http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-security-personnel-in-green.html; https://meduza(.)io/en/news/2020/09/08/lukashenko-reportedly-admits-to-russian-tv-journalist-that-maybe-he-s-overstayed-his-welcome-as-belarusian-president; http://president.gov(.)by/ru/news_ru/view/intervjju-predstaviteljam-veduschix-rossijskix-smi-24489/; https://belsat(.)eu/en/news/too-long-in-office-but-still-irreplaceable-lukashenka-interviewed-by-russian-media/; https://tass(.)com/world/1198533.

[17] https://www.themoscowtime(.)com/2020/09/08/belarus-leader-admits-to-staying-too-long-in-power-in-rt-interview-a71381; http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-security-personnel-in-green.html; https://meduza(.)io/en/news/2020/09/08/lukashenko-reportedly-admits-to-russian-tv-journalist-that-maybe-he-s-overstayed-his-welcome-as-belarusian-president; http://president.gov(.)by/ru/news_ru/view/intervjju-predstaviteljam-veduschix-rossijskix-smi-24489/; https://belsat(.)eu/en/news/too-long-in-office-but-still-irreplaceable-lukashenka-interviewed-by-russian-media/.

[18] https://eng.belta(.)by/society/view/russia-today-chief-describes-interview-with-lukashenko-as-sincere-personal-133263-2020/.

[19] https://rg(.)ru/2020/09/08/peskov-zaiavil-ob-otsutstvii-kontaktov-moskvy-i-koordinacionnogo-soveta-belarusi.html.

[20] https://belsat(.)eu/en/news/banker-and-philanthropist-babaryka-may-stand-in-2020-presidential-election/; https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-belarussian-opposition-reaches.html.

[21] https://rg(.)ru/2020/09/08/peskov-zaiavil-ob-otsutstvii-kontaktov-moskvy-i-koordinacionnogo-soveta-belarusi.html; https://tass.ru/politika/9329937.

[22] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-belarussian-opposition-reaches.html; https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-kremlin-linked-belarusian.html; http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-kremlin-information-operations.html; https://tass.ru/politika/9329937.

[23] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-kremlin-information-operations.html.

[24] https://eng.belta(.)by/society/view/slavic-brotherhood-2020-exercise-to-be-held-at-brestsky-training-range-in-belarus-133255-2020/; https://www.mil(.)by/ru/news/105823/.

[25] https://www.mil(.)by/ru/news/105823/.

[26] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12264631@egNews; https://regnum(.)ru/news/polit/2837915.html; http://www.vs(.)rs/en/news/1472F895256C11EABEE30050568F5424/discussions-on-military-cooperation-between-serbia-and-belarus.

[27] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12238560@egNews; https://ria(.)ru/20180628/1523582020.html.

[28] https://hromadske(.)ua/ru/posts/lukashenko-privel-armiyu-v-boevuyu-gotovnost-na-granice-s-es-v-nato-govoryat-chto-sily-ne-narashivayut-i-nikakoj-ugrozy-net; https://www.interfax(.)ru/world/722395.

Warning: Belarusian Security Forces Likely Kidnap Opposition Leader Kolesnikova

September 7 5:00pm EDT Belarus Update

By: Mason Clark 

Unidentified men abducted opposition leader Maria Kolesnikova and two of her staffers in Minsk on September 7. An unidentified group of masked men in civilian clothes abducted Kolesnikova and two of her staffers, Anton Rodnenkov and Ivan Kravtsov, using an unmarked van in downtown Minsk the morning of September 7.[1] The whereabouts of Kolesnikova and her staffers is currently unknown. Kolesnikova is a key member of the opposition Coordination Council and the last remaining Belarusian opposition leader active in-country.[2]

Lukashenko likely kidnapped Kolesnikova – rather than detaining her – to intimidate the opposition. Belarusian state media outlets are not reporting on Kolesnikova’s disappearance. The Belarusian Interior Ministry denied its involvement to international and Russian media and claimed to begin an investigation the evening of September 7.[3] Kremlin-run media outlets alternatively describe the incident as a “disappearance” or “kidnapping.”[4] Opposition leader Svetlana Tikanouskaya accused Belarusian authorities of kidnapping Kolesnikova to disrupt opposition planning.[5] ISW cannot independently verify the identity of Kolesnikova’s assailants. However, the unmarked men were likely Belarusian Interior Ministry personnel. Belarusian Interior Ministry personnel without insignia beat and detained protesters on September 6, and Belarusian police have previously formally detained opposition leaders.[6] Lukashenko’s likely decision to abduct Kolesnikova rather than formally detaining her, which would have equally disrupted her ability to coordinate the opposition, is likely an intimidation tactic against the opposition among other things. Opposition figures recently began publicly stating that they can expect to be arrested and held for a few days, suggesting that threats of arrest have lost their force.[7] Abduction and disappearance may re-introduce an element of terror-based deterrence that Lukashenko apparently seeks.

Lukashenko likely additionally targeted Kolesnikova to disrupt the Kremlin’s outreach to the opposition. Kolesnikova represents Viktor Babariko, a Russia-amenable presidential candidate detained by Lukashenko since June.[8] Kolesnikova has previously expressed a willingness to work with the Kremlin on a power transition in Belarus and has attempted to moderate protests. ISW has previously forecasted the Kremlin may attempt to dominate Belarus by supporting a transition leader – such as Babariko – it can control.[9] Lukashenko is scheduled to travel to Moscow for a meeting with Putin sometime this week. Lukashenko may have kidnapped Kolesnikova to send a message to Putin and disrupt Kremlin efforts to support an alternative to Lukashenko. Assuming Lukashenko was behind the abduction he might hope to regain some leverage with Putin through the threat of what he might compel Kolesnikova to say about Moscow’s role and plans in Belarus. Putin could decide to delay the announced meeting given this development, which might benefit Lukashenko by buying him more time to suppress the protests and delay Kremlin efforts to absorb Belarus. Such speculations must be tentative at this time given the paucity of available information. ISW will continue to update this assessment when and as more data become accessible.

---

[1] https://news.tut((.))by/economics/699502.html.

[2] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/11/belarus-opposition-candidate-lithuania-protests-svetlana-tikhanouskaya; https://www.voanews.com/europe/belarusian-opposition-activist-kovalkova-leaves-country-after-arrest.

[3] https://www.euronews.com/2020/09/07/belarusian-opposition-figure-maria-kolesnikova-missing-after-bystander-reports-abduction; https://tass((.))ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/9390183; https://tass((.))ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/9393927.

[4] https://ria((.))ru/20200907/kolesnikova-1576896902.html; https://tass((.))ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/9391445.

[5] https://tass((.))ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/9389843.

[6] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-belarusian-security-forces-escalate-violence-against-protesters-large-protests.

[7] https://www.voanews.com/europe/belarusian-opposition-activist-kovalkova-leaves-country-after-arrest.

[8] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-kremlin-linked-belarusian-opposition-leadership-threaten-further-fragment.

[9] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-belarusian-opposition-reaches-out-kremlin.

Warning: Belarusian Security Forces Escalate Violence against Protesters but Large Protests Continue

September 6, 2020, 5:00 pm EDT

By Mason Clark

Belarusian Interior Ministry personnel without insignia, possibly including Russians, seriously beat and detained protesters in Minsk on September 6. Around 15 men in civilian clothes carrying batons and body armor beat and detained protesters in Minsk at approximately 7:00 pm local time, after most protesters had begun to disperse.[1] The men, who bore no insignia, pursued protesters into a nearby café, later bringing the detained protesters to liveried police vehicles.[2] The men used significantly more violence than Belarusian security forces have since the first week of the protests, continuing to beat already unconscious protesters.

Belarusian media identified the leader of the group as Police Colonel Nikolai Karpenkov, the head of the Belarusian Interior Ministry’s office for Combating Organized Crime.[3] Belarusian media additionally identified one of the men as Andrey Karpov, who listed his home city as Saint Petersburg on Russian social media platform VK but resides in Vitebsk, Belarus.[4] Karpov’s VK account was deleted as of 9:30 pm Belarus time. The NEXTA Telegram channel published the Belarusian address and personal information of Karpenkov and Karpov.[5] ISW cannot independently verify the identities of the rest of the men and the scale of Russian involvement in this group. The evidence so far presented is too tenuous to support the assessment that Russian security personnel are taking direct part in violence against protesters.

Belarusian security forces in Minsk escalated their use of force against protesters compared with previous Sunday protests. Uniformed Belarusian security forces additionally dispersed and detained isolated groups of protesters throughout the day.[6] OMON riot police repeatedly pepper-sprayed protesters who attempted to approach the security cordon around the Presidential Palace in Minsk for the first time since protesters began focusing on the Presidential Palace on August 16th. [7] Security forces in Minsk did not directly confront large groups of protesters. The Belarusian interior ministry announced it detained “hundreds of protesters,” and independent organizations estimated security forces detained around 200 protesters on September 6.[8] Belarusian security forces have yet to equal the scale of violent force used against protesters in the first week after the August 9 Presidential election, however.

Tens of thousands of protesters marched in Minsk and around the country amid increased intimidation by security forces. The Belarusian Interior Ministry warned protesters “the number of squads and servicemen has been increased” and “special equipment” would be used to suppress protests the morning of September 6.[9] Belarusian police and interior ministry troops, using armored military vehicles for the second week in a row, deployed around Minsk’s Independence Square, Victory Park, and Presidential Palace – previous destinations of Sunday protests.[10] Belarusian authorities closed several metro stations in Minsk for the first time in a likely attempt to channel protester movement. [11] Protesters marched in several directions and did not concentrate in a single location en masse – though tens of thousands approached the Presidential Palace in the late afternoon. [12] Protests continued in every region of Belarus despite the increased security presence. [13]

Belarusian security forces continue to use escalated levels of force against protests in the strategic western city of Grodno. Belarusian security forces dispersed thousands of protesters in Grodno on September 6.[14] Belarusian security forces used more force, and challenged larger groups of protesters, in Grodno compared to the rest of the country on September 6.[15] Belarusian security forces and military deployments have focused on Grodno since mid-August. Grodno borders Lithuania and Poland, and was the site of the only major defection among local authorities to support protesters to date.[16] Lukashenko and the Kremlin likely prioritize maintaining security over Grodno due to its strategic location on the border of Poland and Lithuania – which Lukashenko and the Kremlin continue to claim are behind the protest movement. The Kremlin and Lukashenko will likely use Grodno as one of the coordinating points for any potential hybrid actions against Poland and Lithuania, and the deployment of Russian forces to Grodno would pose a major threat to NATO’s ability to defend the Baltic States.

Direct Russian intervention in Belarus is turning protesters against the Kremlin. Protesters in at least Minsk and Grodno displayed anti-Russian sentiment and signs on September 6.[17] Independent Belarusian media widely reported example signs, including “no Kremlin absorption of Belarus,” “the Kremlin betrayed Belarus,” and “down with Putashenko,” an amalgamation of Putin and Lukashenko’s names. The protests remain overwhelmingly focused on Lukashenko but are likely to increasingly focus on Russia as Kremlin involvement increases. ISW previously forecasted increasing Russian involvement in Belarus risked refocusing the protests on the Kremlin and disrupting the Kremlin’s efforts to consolidate control over Belarus.[18] Belarusian protests showed no anti-Russian sentiment until the Kremlin overtly pressured Lukashenko to integrate Belarus under Russian structures on September 3.[19]



[1] https://news.tut((.))by/economics/699444.html.

[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TZGgW6Oaepk&feature=youtu.be.

[3] https://news.tut((.))by/society/699459.html.

[4] https://t((.))me/nexta_live/10941.

[5] https://t((.))me/nexta_live/10946; https://t((.))me/nexta_live/10941.

[6] https://news.tut((.))by/economics/699444.html.

[7] https://news.tut((.))by/economics/699444.html.

[8] https://news.tut((.))by/society/699457.html.

[9] https://news.tut((.))by/economics/699444.html.

[10] https://news.tut((.))by/economics/699444.html.

[11] https://news.tut((.))by/economics/699444.html.

[12] https://news.tut((.))by/economics/699444.html.

[13] https://news.tut((.))by/economics/699444.html; https://tass((.))ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/9383941.

[14] https://news.tut((.))by/economics/699444.html.

[15] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FERKhfdAmrY&feature=youtu.be; https://news.tut((.))by/economics/699444.html.

[16] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-kremlin-begins-security-forces-support-lukashenko-following-regional-security.

[17] https://news.tut((.))by/economics/699444.html; https://twitter.com/franakviacorka/status/1302578919476989952?s=20.

[18] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-moscow-claims-poland-lead-sponsor-belarusian-protests-minsk-calls-protests-.

[19] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-belarusian-opposition-begins-first-anti-kremlin-shift-after-lukashenko-promises.

Warning: Security Personnel in Green Uniforms without Insignia Appear in Minsk

September 5, 2020, 6:15 EDT

By George Barros

Security personnel wearing unmarked green uniforms appeared in Minsk for the first time on September 5. The personnel are reportedly Belarusian riot police (OMON) in new uniforms.[1] These personnel wear Russian-made Dozor body cameras – a model of cameras Russian police and interior forces as well as Belarusian OMON personnel use.[2] Belarusian OMON previously wore all black uniforms with identifying markings.[3] It is unclear why Belarusian OMON would have changed their uniforms and removed identifying markings. They could be setting conditions for the appearance of Russian security personnel in similar unmarked uniforms.

Belarusian authorities did not try to disperse the second consecutive Saturday Women’s march in Minsk on September 5. Approximately 10,000 women marched in Minsk and gathered on Independence Square on September 5.[4] The personnel in unmarked green uniforms and other Belarusian security forces deployed to Independence Square likely to intimidate the protesters but did not disperse or detain them.[5] Security forces had not detained any women protesters during the August 29 women’s march either.[6] Belarusian security forces detained at least two journalists covering protests in Minsk on September 5, however.[7] Belarusian women will likely continue to hold weekly Saturday marches.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to target student protests. The personnel in unmarked green uniforms detained student protesters in Minsk on September 5.[8] Belarusian security forces have been detaining student protesters in Minsk since September 1.[9] Lukashenko will likely intensify targeted detentions of student protests.

Women protesters confronted Belarusian security forces. Women protesters surrounded unmarked police detention vans and shouted at them on September 5.[10] ISW observed that protesters began using swarm tactics against security forces to resist detentions on August 30.[11] Confrontations between protesters and security forces may escalate further – a risk ISW forecasted.[12]

Belarusian protesters began displaying foreign flags prominently for the first time. Women’s march participants displayed the flags of Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Germany, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Israel, Ireland, and Jamaica on September 5.[13] The prominent display of foreign flags by protesters is a new phenomenon, but the red and white Belarusian flag continues to dominate the demonstrations. Lukashenko and the Kremlin will likely use the presence of foreign flags in the protests in its information operation claiming that the protests are a Western color revolution and hybrid war against Belarus.[14]

A factory suffered an explosion in Zhlobin, Belarus. A fire caused an explosion at an art factory in Zhlobin on September 5.[15] It is unclear whether the fire was accidental or arson. Regional Belarusian authorities reported no casualties but have not provided information on the fire’s causes .[16] The Kremlin and/or Lukashenko may use this or similar incidents to justify a Russian intervention to “restore order” in Belarus.[17] The Kremlin confirmed on August 27 the existence of a Russian law enforcement officer reserve prepared to intervene in Belarus if the situation “gets out of control.”[18] Russian or Belarusian framing of this explosion as an act of terrorism would indicate an increased likelihood of Russian intervention.

Opposition leader Svitlana Tikhanouskaya backed the NEXTA Telegram channel’s call for large protests on September 6. Tikhanouskaya released a video on September 5 calling on Belarusians to participate in the planned September 6 unity march.[19] NEXTA first directed Belarusians to hold this march in a September 3 post.[20] Protesters will likely hold large protests near Independence Square and Independence Avenue in Minsk at 2:00 pm local time on September 6. Lukashenko militarized his response to the last large Sunday protest on August 30 with armored vehicles and will likely do so again.[21]

 

ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.

---

[1] https://twitter.com/HannaLiubakova/status/1302260831619624965; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xy1A-LtmgBA&ab_channel=TUT.BY.%D0%9F%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0; https://t(.)me/nexta_live/10704; https://twitter.com/vottak_tv/status/1302276885519499272

[2] https://twitter.com/MarQs__/status/1302199713240961027; https://sputniknews(.)com/russia/201503051019109855/; https://t(.)me/nexta_live/10704; https://twitter.com/Dodeskaden2/status/1299752096477126656/photo/4

[3] https://twitter.com/Dodeskaden2/status/1299752096477126656/photo/4; https://42.tut(.)by/696542

[4] https://news.tutby(.)news/society/699392.html; https://meduza(.)io/short/2020/09/05/v-minske-proshel-mnogotysyachnyy-zhenskiy-marsh-fotografiya; https://meduza(.)io/feature/2020/08/29/desyat-tysyach-zhenschin-proshli-marshem-po-tsentru-minska-omon-pytalsya-im-pomeshat-no-ne-smog

[5] https://twitter.com/tutby/status/1302259451324489728; https://www.interfax(.)ru/world/724731

[6] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-lukashenko-and-kremlin.html

[7] https://twitter.com/tutby/status/1302240623966257153

[8] https://twitter.com/HannaLiubakova/status/1302176936408625153; https://twitter.com/HannaLiubakova/status/1302194994774716416; https://twitter.com/franakviacorka/status/1302193212765937664; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xy1A-LtmgBA&ab_channel=TUT.BY.%D0%9F%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0

[9] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-kremlin-linked-belarusian.html; http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-moscow-claims-poland-is-lead.html

[10] https://twitter.com/HannaLiubakova/status/1302248827165048832

[11] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-militarization-of-lukashenkos.html; https://twitter.com/BFreeTheatre/status/1302309923301339136

[12] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-militarization-of-lukashenkos.html

[13] https://twitter.com/franakviacorka/status/1302230796724514816; https://twitter.com/izvestia_ru/status/1302255213466791936/photo/1; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8pT6YSfYPbI&ab_channel=TUT.BY.%D0%9F%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0; https://twitter.com/tutby/status/1302233931169910784; https://twitter.com/PolScorr/status/1302232401591103490; https://twitter.com/PolScorr/status/1302237861236879362; https://twitter.com/franakviacorka/status/1302230796724514816; https://twitter.com/vottak_tv/status/1302245702618222597; https://twitter.com/izvestia_ru/status/1302255213466791936; https://twitter.com/tutby/status/1302233931169910784; https://twitter.com/tutby/status/1302258954945339393/photo/2;

[14] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-moscow-claims-poland-is-lead.html

[15] https://www.rbc(.)ua/rus/news/belarusi-proizoshel-vzryv-fabrike-1599311327.html

[16] https://newsgomel(.)by/news/incidents/masshtabnyy-pozhar-edva-ne-unichtozhil-fabriku-v-zhlobine_53467.html; https://sputnik(.)by/incidents/20200905/1045624803.html

[17] http://kremlin((.))ru/events/president/news/63951 ; https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-kremlin-announces-reserve-force.html

[18] http://kremlin((.))ru/events/president/news/63951; https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-kremlin-announces-reserve-force.html

[19] https://twitter.com/franakviacorka/status/1302289305788772352

[20] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-belarusian-opposition-begins.html

[21] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-militarization-of-lukashenkos.html

Warning: Moscow Claims Poland Is the Lead Sponsor of Belarusian Protests; Minsk Calls Protests a “Color Revolution”

September 4, 2020, 5:15 EDT

By George Barros

The Kremlin framed Poland as a leader in sponsoring Belarusian protests for the first time and Belarus claimed the ongoing protests are part of a Western-sponsored “color revolution.” The Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) dedicated a segment of its September 3 briefing to accusing Warsaw of providing direct financial, NGO, and influence operation support to the Belarusian opposition and said Poland is “at the forefront of the EU's unfriendly policy.”[1] The Kremlin has not previously framed Poland as the leader of Western inference in Belarus, but rather as a coconspirator along with Lithuania, Germany, the Czech Republic, the United States, Ukraine, and Canada.[2] The Kremlin may be setting information conditions to conduct hybrid operations against Poland.[3]

The Kremlin and Lukashenko reiterated false claims that the protests are an attempt at a color revolution. Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin participated in a prescheduled defense ministerial along with member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Moscow on September 4.[4] Khrenin said “color revolutions” are a major international security threat for the Kremlin-aligned block and used the current protests in Belarus as an example of an attempted but unsuccessful color revolution.[5] ISW assessed the Kremlin will likely deepen its military footprint in Belarus by exploiting the false narrative of external threats to the Union State.[6]

Belarusian security forces forcefully entered a university building to detain student protesters for the first time on September 4. Security forces detained students demonstrating in solidarity with students whom Belarusian security forces had previously detained in street protests on September 1.[7] Belarusian university administrators are cooperating with Belarusian security forces.[8] Student demonstrations are not displaying anti-Kremlin symbols.[9]

Protests in Minsk on September 4 were larger than usual weekday protests. A few hundred women formed an impromptu march in Minsk to protest student detentions in the evening of September 4.[10] Minsk residents demonstrated in a number of neighborhoods around the city as well.[11] These protests were larger than the usual weekday protest pattern. ISW did not observe anti-Kremlin symbols in posted media of these protests.

The Kremlin continues preparations for President Alexander Lukashenko’s upcoming summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. The Kremlin said on September 4 that Lukashenko and Putin will discuss reopening the Russian-Belarusian border during their upcoming meeting in Moscow.[12] The Kremlin has not yet confirmed the date of their meeting but it will reportedly be around September 10.[13] ISW forecasted that Lukashenko may cede more of Belarus’ remaining sovereignty to Russia at this summit.[14]

The Kremlin’s decision to open the Russian-Belarusian border may enhance Moscow’s capabilities to infiltrate personnel into Belarus. The Kremlin closed Russia’s borders with Belarus as a COVID-19 precaution in March 2020.[15] Resumption of regular traffic between Russia and Belarus may provide the Kremlin cover to infiltrate personnel into Belarus. The Kremlin reportedly deployed at least 600 Russian riot control personnel to Pskov – 200 kilometers away from Belarus – on September 2.[16] The Kremlin confirmed on August 27 the existence of a Russian law enforcement officer reserve prepared to intervene in Belarus if the situation “gets out of control.”[17] ISW assessed unmarked vehicles may already be transporting Russian riot control personnel to Belarus on August 30.[18]

The Kremlin likely seeks to prevent the tone of the protests from becoming anti-Russian. Anti-Kremlin backlash from the Belarusian population would disrupt the Kremlin’s efforts to consolidate control over Belarus in the guise of voluntary Belarusian accession to the Union State mechanism. The Kremlin’s overt support for Lukashenko began pushing elements of the Belarusian opposition into an anti-Russian direction for the first time on September 3.[19] Belarusian protests remain overwhelming neutral on Russia as of this writing.

ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates

[1] https://www.mid(.)ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4309873

[2] https://www.mid(.)ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4307068; https://ria(.)ru/20200901/belorussiya-1576566492.html

[3] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-moscow-sets-conditions-for.html

[4] https://www.mil(.)by/ru/news/105607/

[5] https://www.mil(.)by/ru/news/105607/

[6] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-kremlin-prepares-to-further.html

[7] https://twitter.com/HannaLiubakova/status/1301826859701800961; https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1301838518415773696; https://twitter.com/BFreeTheatre/status/1301856224959434752; https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1301872244709261318; https://twitter.com/BFreeTheatre/status/1301837953078091776; https://twitter.com/HannaLiubakova/status/1301855697324437504; https://twitter.com/VoicesBelarus/status/1301825461920694272;

http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-belarusian-opposition-begins.html

[8] https://twitter.com/HannaLiubakova/status/1301855697324437504; https://twitter.com/HannaLiubakova/status/1301835757083131904; https://twitter.com/BFreeTheatre/status/1301864294641020928

[9] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-belarusian-opposition-begins.html

[10] https://twitter.com/BFreeTheatre/status/1301931199514972160

[11] https://t(.)me/nexta_live/10573; https://t(.)me/nexta_live/10567; https://t(.)me/nexta_live/10576; https://t(.)me/nexta_live/10582; https://t(.)me/nexta_live/10578; https://t.me/nexta_live/10575

[12] https://riafan(.)ru/1308357-rossiya-gotova-otkryt-granicu-s-belorussiei

[13] https://www.newsru(.)com/blog/02sep2020/mos_luk.html; https://dni(.)ru/polit/2020/9/2/458507.html; https://udf(.)by/news/main_news/217768-10-sentjabrja-belorusskij-prezident-priedet-v-moskvu-tam-budut-proishodit-jeti-samye-rokovye-peregovory.html

[14] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-kremlin-prepares-to-further.html

[15] https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-51904909; https://rg(.)ru/2020/03/18/reg-cfo/rossiia-vremenno-zakryla-granicu-s-belorussiej.html

[16] https://twitter.com/ErlikhmanK/status/1301208662774554625; http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-belarusian-opposition-begins.html

[17] http://kremlin((.))ru/events/president/news/63951 ; https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-kremlin-announces-reserve-force.html

[18] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-militarization-of-lukashenkos.html

[19] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-belarusian-opposition-begins.html

Syria Situation Report: August 19-September 1, 2020

 By John Dunford and Will Cristou (Syria Direct)

Key Takeaway: The pro-regime coalition is increasing pressure on the US presence in northeast Syria through kinetic activity targeting US forces. A Russian military police (MP) vehicle collided with a US military vehicle in northern Hasakah Province on August 25. Russia seeks to disrupt the US ground supply lines in northern Hasakah that connect US forces in Iraq and Syria. Pro-regime militias conducted two rocket and mortar attacks near a US base in eastern Deir e-Zor on August 18 and 29. The pro-regime coalition seeks to exploit security tensions in Deir e-Zor to undermine the US and its local partner’s presence along the Euphrates River.

Click the image below to enlarge. Click here to download the PDF.

Assad and Russia Deliberately Exacerbate Crisis as COVID-19 Ravages Idlib

  By: Isabel Ivanescu

Key Takeaway: Mounting internal and external pressures threaten the stability and territorial integrity of opposition-held Idlib Province, where nearly 1 million internally displaced persons are concentrated without access to basic necessities. The Assad regime and Russia are deliberately exacerbating the mounting humanitarian crisis in Idlib and applying renewed military pressure as COVID-19 cases surge in the province. Rising tensions between jihadist groups in Idlib are driving further instability. These circumstances could enable pro-regime advances in the coming months by weakening anti-Assad forces.

Syria’s COVID-19 outbreak reached the opposition-held province of Idlib in July. A Turkish doctor working at the Bab al-Hawa hospital in northwest Idlib became the first confirmed COVID-19 patient in opposition-held greater Idlib on July 9. [1] The virus had likely been spreading at low levels for weeks or months prior. Since July 9, the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) – the Idlib governing body dominated by al Qaeda-linked Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS) – has reported 89 total cases spread across opposition-held areas of Idlib and Aleppo Provinces.[2] Each case likely indicates a cluster of infections and hundreds of infections likely remain undetected given the SSG’s limited testing capacity. Poor sanitation in the makeshift IDP camps and ruined towns that house most of Idlib’s population provides fertile ground for the spread of infectious diseases, including COVID-19. The Eid al-Adha holiday from July 30 to August 3 likely drove a further increase in infections, as the Turkish-Syrian border opened to allow Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees residing in Turkey to spend the holiday with family in Syria.[3] Turkey continues to face a serious COVID-19 outbreak; doctors in Gaziantep, just across Turkish the border from Aleppo City, observed particularly high rates of infection in August.[4]

Idlib’s surviving healthcare infrastructure cannot manage the area’s COVID-19 outbreak in the face of continued pro-regime attacks. Deliberate regime and Russian strikes on medical personnel have killed at least 900 since the start of the Syrian Civil War, contributing to an exodus of Syria’s medical professionals.[5] The NGO MedGlobal told al-Monitor in July that there are 1.4 physicians per 10,000 people in northwest Syria compared to roughly 25 physicians per 10,000 people in the US. Years of pro-regime airstrikes and shelling targeting hospitals and other healthcare facilities have produced an acute shortage of hospital beds and medical equipment. Pro-regime strikes, staff shortages, and supply shortages have forced the closure of 84 medical facilities in Idlib since December 1, 2019.[6] As of July, Idlib hospitals had a total of 3065 hospital beds – of which only a few hundred are in ICUs – and fewer than 100 ventilators for a population of over 3 million, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.[7] Hospitals also lack sufficient PCR machines to run COVID tests, oxygen compressors and cylinders, personal protective equipment for medical staff, and sanitizing products.[8]

 

A screenshot from one of the SSG propaganda videos.

 

The Assad Regime and Russia increased military pressure on anti-Assad forces. Pro-regime units maintained a substantial presence along the Idlib frontlines when a Russo-Turkish de-escalation agreement took effect on March 5 and have continued to deploy reinforcements to the area.[9] Pro-regime forces have also intensified shelling along the southern Idlib frontlines and conducted periodic small-scale attacks.[10] The operational tempo of Russian airstrikes in the area has increased, though Russia has not resumed the large-scale air campaign that typically immediately precedes a pro-regime offensive.[11] The increased frontline activity instead likely represents an effort to tax HTS’s attention and resources as the group navigates competing crises.

Russia forced the UN to further constrict cross-border humanitarian aid in July, exacerbating shortages of medical supplies and basic goods in Idlib. Cross-border aid into greater Idlib requires regular reauthorization by the United National Security Council (UNSC); recent resolutions have continued aid for six months at a time.[12] Russia compelled the UNSC to reduce authorized border crossings from two to one in order to prevent a Russian veto of the re-authorization as it came due in July.[13] The UNSC passed a modified resolution authorizing cross-border aid through only one crossing – the Bab al Hawa crossing in Idlib – on July 11.[14] This modification halves the aid the UN is able to deliver to Idlib. Russia employed a similar tactic to reduce the number of border crossings open to humanitarian aid from four to two during the previous round of re-authorization deliberations in December 2019.[15] Russia seeks to aggravate and exploit the unique pressures of COVID-19 to erode the will of greater Idlib’s population to resist “reconciliation” with the Assad regime while eroding the ability of anti-Assad forces to defend an increasingly unstable province. Russia and the Assad regime have previously pursued local surrender agreements couched as negotiated reconciliation with opposition actors.[16] A Russian attempt to broker such an agreement in Idlib failed in 2018.[17]

The HTS-dominated Syrian Salvation Government attempted to impose public health measures to contain the COVID-19 outbreak. The SSG announced some containment measures in early April, suspending or reducing the operation of schools, mosques, and markets and distributing information to the public before any cases had been identified.[18] The SSG later temporarily closed the Bab al-Hawa hospital, which it runs, after the first confirmed case occurred on July 9. HTS also closed roads between Idlib and Aleppo Provinces to civilian traffic on July 17, attempting to isolate Idlib.[19] On July 21, the SSG prohibited large group gatherings, canceled public events, and mandated the shuttering of dine-in restaurants throughout greater Idlib until further notice.[20] Both the SSG and HTS have disseminated propaganda to encourage public compliance with public health measures and to portray themselves as responsible actors. The propaganda depicts HTS members wearing masks, thoroughly sanitizing food production facilities and mosques, and conducting temperature tests and distributing hand sanitizer at the entrances and exits to public buildings.[21]

The crude protective measures HTS and the SSG can deploy are neither sustainable nor likely to stem the spread of COVID-19. The SSG maintains a fairly small police force, distinct from HTS’s hisba religious police and charged only with basic functions such as traffic stops. The SSG’s police force struggles to exert influence outside Idlib City.[22] HTS’s estimated 12,000-15,000 fighters are spread thin manning frontlines and checkpoints.[23] HTS has not allocated significant manpower to enforcing COVID-19 containment measures. COVID-19 containment measures have created another opportunity for graft. For example, the SSG agents that operate the Jisr al-Shughour courthouse are requiring Syrians to purchase face masks to enter the facility and surrender them upon exit, before reselling them – generating revenue.[24]

HTS faces backlash from other Salafi-jihadist groups and local religious figures for closing mosques. The smaller and more hardline al Qaeda-affiliate Hurras al-Din rejected the mosque closures and continued to hold religious services.[25] Two prominent Idlib clerics formerly affiliated with HTS, Abdullah al-Muhaysini and Abu Yaqazan al-Masri, urged locals to disobey mosque closures in late March and early April respectively.[26] One high-level HTS commander, Abu Malek al-Tali, threatened to defect in April in response to mosque closures. His subsequent defection to a Hurras al Din-led Operations Room in July triggered clashes between Hurras al-Din and HTS, creating a new spasm of instability within the Salafi-jihadist network in Idlib.[27] Mosque closures by HTS caused other Salafi-jihadist groups and similarly aligned locals to doubt the group’s commitment to Islam. This doubt generated defections from HTS and increased resistance to HTS dominance over greater Idlib.

Division between Salafi-jihadist groups over Turkey’s role in Idlib has generated further instability. HTS has defended the Russo-Turkish de-escalation agreement and broadly aligned itself with Turkey despite resistance from other jihadist groups, including Hurras al Din, which view Turkish forces in Idlib as “secular invaders.”[28] HTS has suffered defections as a result.[29] Hardline jihadist groups launched attacks against joint Russo-Turkish patrols in an effort to spoil the de-escalation agreement in July and August. A previously unknown al Qaeda-aligned group, the Khattab al-Shishani Brigades, carried out three attacks on the Russo-Turkish joint patrols mandated under the March 5 agreement. The group detonated a vehicle-borne IED near Ariha, south of Idlib City, on July 14, fired an RPG against a patrol on August 17, and struck a patrol vehicle with a grenade on August 25.[30] HTS raided two cells it accused of being aligned with ISIS and of planning further attacks on the joint patrols on July 14 and 15.[31]

The humanitarian and military situation in Idlib is unsustainable. Turkey lacks both the will and ability to stabilize Idlib and ameliorate the humanitarian crisis in the province. Hardline jihadist efforts to spoil the Russo-Turkish agreement undermine HTS’s effort to posture as a security guarantor in the province. This pressure from the Salafi-jihadist network applies a constraint on HTS’s alignment with Turkey, providing Russia and the Assad regime justification to resume large-scale military operations in Idlib in the future.

 

---

[1] https://www.syriahr.com/en/174037/

[2] https://jihadology.net/coronavirus-and-the-salvation-government-hayat-tahir-al-sham/ ; https://www.syriahr.com/en/176620/ ; https://www.syriahr.com/en/176646/

[3] “Weekly COVID-19 Update #16,” Syria in Context, 29 JUL

[4] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-turkey/doctors-say-turkish-covid-19-outbreak-worse-than-reported-as-hospitalisations-swell-idUSKCN251231

[5] https://phr.org/our-work/resources/medical-personnel-are-targeted-in-syria/ ;  https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/07/syria-idlib-coronavirus-doctors-bab-al-hawa-hospital-virus.amp.html?skipWem=1&__twitter_impression=true

[6] https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/health-care-brink-collapse-idlib-hospitals-lack-medicine-save-lives

[7] https://www.syriahr.com/en/174254/

[8] https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/07/syria-idlib-coronavirus-doctors-bab-al-hawa-hospital-virus.amp.html?skipWem=1&__twitter_impression=true ; https://www.syriahr.com/en/174254/

[9] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/pro-regime-forces-idlib-posture-resumption-offensive

[10] https://www.syriahr.com/en/174108/ ; https://www.syriahr.com/en/177429/ ; https://www.syriahr.com/en/177283/ ; https://www.syriahr.com/en/177223/ ; https://www.syriahr.com/en/177152/

[11] https://www.syriahr.com/en/177874/ ; https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/405544 ; https://halabtodaytv.net/archives/152585?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=%25d9%2582%25d8%25aa%25d9%2584%25d9%2589-%25d9%2588%25d8%25ac%25d8%25b1%25d8%25ad%25d9%2589-%25d9%2585%25d9%2586-%25d9%2582%25d9%2588%25d8%25a7%25d8%25aa-%25d8%25a7%25d9%2584%25d9%2586%25d8%25b8%25d8%25a7%25d9%2585-%25d8%25b9%25d9%2584%25d9%2589-%25d9%2585%25d8%25ad%25d9%2588%25d8%25b1-%25d8%25a7%25d9%2584%25d8%25ad%25d8%25af ; https://www.radioalkul.com/p332073/

 

[13] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-un/russia-fails-again-at-u-n-ahead-of-last-ditch-vote-on-syria-cross-border-aid-idUSKBN24A2S7

[14] https://www.npr.org/2020/07/11/890061563/at-the-u-n-russia-forces-reduced-access-for-aid-to-syrians

[15] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/russia-china-veto-extension-cross-border-aid-syria-200708070858597.html

[16] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Report%20-%20Russia%E2%80%99s%20Dead-End%20Diplomacy%20in%20Syria%20-%20November%202019.pdf

[17] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Report%20-%20Russia%E2%80%99s%20Dead-End%20Diplomacy%20in%20Syria%20-%20November%202019.pdf

[18] https://jihadology.net/coronavirus-and-the-salvation-government-hayat-tahir-al-sham/

[19] https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/401835 ; https://twitter.com/seerij80/status/1284094210409365504

[20] https://www.syriahr.com/en/176052/

[21] https://jihadology.net/coronavirus-and-the-salvation-government-hayat-tahir-al-sham/

[22] https://www.france24.com/en/20190628-syrias-idlib-enclave-how-does-it-work

[23] https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/terrorism-backgrounders/hayat-tahrir-al-sham-hts

[24] https://www.syriahr.com/en/176052/

[25] https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2020/04/coronavirus-and-sharia-law-divide-over-closure-of-mosques-and-ban-of-friday-prayers-in-idlib/ ; https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/aq-aligned-hurras-al-deen-holds-advocacy-proceedings-in-crowded-mosque-during-covid-19-pandemic.html

[26] https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/374738 ; http://www.shaam.org/news/syria-news/%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B0-%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%A3%D9%86-%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%A7.html ; https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Chatter/prominent-jihadi-cleric-directs-muslims-to-disobey-covid-19-mosque-closures.html

[27] https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2020/04/coronavirus-and-sharia-law-divide-over-closure-of-mosques-and-ban-of-friday-prayers-in-idlib/

[28] https://english.aawsat.com//home/article/2189971/hurras-al-din-attacks-turkish-forces-northwest-syria ; https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/powerful-islamist-group-intensifies-crackdown-jihadists-syrias-idlib

[29] https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/04/syria-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-al-qaeda-defections-tension.html ; http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syria%20SITREP%20Map%2010%20JUN%20-23%20JUN%202020.pdf

[30] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-russia/russia-says-joint-patrol-with-turkey-hit-by-bomb-attack-in-syria-idUSKCN24F0XB ; https://twitter.com/Dalatrm/status/1283027735661731841 ; https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/408898 ; https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/khattab-al-shishani-brigade-claims-2nd-attack-on-russian-turkish-patrol-on-m4-highway.html ; https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/411071

[31] https://www.syriahr.com/en/174916/ ; https://www.syriahr.com/en/174899/