Russia in Review: Russia Opens Permanent Training Center in Belarus and Sets Conditions for Permanent Military Basing

By George Barros

April 8, 2021

Key Takeaway: Joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises in March 2021 demonstrated several new Russian capabilities that could support a permanent Russian force presence in Belarus. Russia’s efforts to cement control of Belarusian forces and permanently deploy forces to Belarus increase Russia’s capacity to threaten NATO’s eastern flank. Russia and Belarus announced plans to open three permanent combined combat training centers in Russia and Belarus. The Kremlin is likely increasing Belarus’ military readiness and integration with Russian forces, augmenting the Kremlin’s capability to mobilize more units for longer durations and increasing Russia’s total force projection capability against NATO. Russian military pilots may begin operating out of Belarusian airbases in 2021. The Kremlin additionally used March 2021 exercises to prepare for Russia’s upcoming annual capstone strategic readiness exercise, Zapad 2021, in September, during which Russian units will likely deploy to Belarus on a significantly larger scale than ever before.

Russian combined military exercises with Belarus in March 2021 established new capabilities to support a permanent Russian military presence in Belarus. Russia and Belarus have held monthly combined military exercises since September 2020.[1] The March 2021 iteration of these exercises demonstrated several new Russian capabilities that advance the Kremlin’s campaign to create a permanent force presence in Belarus to threaten NATO’s eastern flank.

Russia and Belarus announced plans on March 5 to open three permanent combined combat training centers in Russia and Belarus at an unspecified future date. Russia and Belarus will open a ground forces training center in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia, a naval center in Kaliningrad, Russia, and an air force and air defense center in Grodno, Belarus.[2] Belarus, it should be noted, is landlocked and has no navy.  These centers will likely support the Kremlin’s campaign to integrate the Belarusian military into Kremlin-controlled command structures and doctrine. The establishment of a permanent Russian training center in Belarus—which will likely contain a small permanent force as well as regularly rotating combat units from Russia—will enable a near-permanent Russian deployment in Belarus.

Russian military pilots may begin operating out of Belarusian airbases in 2021. Belarusian and Russian Air Force officials conducted a combined training on March 18 to, in part, plan relocating Russian Air Force assets to Belarusian airfields.[3] Self-declared Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko previously proposed hosting Russian military aircraft in Belarusian airbases for joint use by Russian and Belarusian airmen—as opposed to opening a new Russian airbase in Belarus, which Lukashenko has previously rejected—on March 2.[4] Russian pilots’ access to Belarusian airfields, if achieved, would enhance Russian force projection capabilities against NATO’s eastern flank and constitute a significant threat to the West.

Russian forces conducted expanded Russian-Belarusian battalion-level unit exercises, advancing the Kremlin’s efforts to integrate Belarusian combat units into Russian command structures. The Kremlin continued efforts to integrate Russian and Belarusian units down to the battalion level during their March 2021 military exercises.[5] Russian and Belarusian forces conducted exercises as a single combined combat battalion for the first time in September 2020.[6]  Russian and Belarusian forces formed three combined battalions in March 2021. The Kremlin’s increasing capability to create integrated units with Belarus is likely intended to support a permanent Russian presence in Belarus and will allow the Kremlin to better employ Belarusian forces outside of Belarus in future operations. The Kremlin may also be preparing Russian forces to subsume elements of Belarusian combat units in the event of a Russian intervention against the will of the Belarusian government—an unlikely but dangerous course of action ISW has previously warned of.[7]

The Kremlin is likely prioritizing increasing interoperability between Russian airborne forces—Russia’s main rapid reaction force—and partner forces in Belarus and the rest of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Two of the three combined combat battalions Russia and Belarus formed in March 2021 involved airborne units. These battalions marked a significant advance in the Kremlin’s effort to develop airborne cooperation with Belarus. Airborne units are Russia’s principal rapid reaction force and would likely be among the first units used in the event of a sustained Russian deployment to Belarus or a hybrid operation against NATO’s eastern flank.[8] Moscow’s development of airborne forces in Belarus could support other assessed Kremlin efforts to project Russian military force in the FSU, including Belarus.[9] The Kremlin likely seeks to tie a multinational Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) force to its own command structures to use these forces for its own campaigns.[10] The Kremlin may deploy a Kremlin-controlled multinational CSTO force to Belarus to obfuscate Russian efforts to undermine Belarusian sovereignty, for example.[11]

The Kremlin is likely increasing Belarus’ military capability to mobilize more units for longer durations. Belarusian units exercised more intensively and for longer durations in March 2021 than they did in similar monthly exercises in fall 2020.[12] Five of Belarus’ six principal maneuver units exercised simultaneously in Russia and Belarus in March 2021; Belarus has not previously exercised elements of that many brigades in both Russia and Belarus simultaneously.[13] Belarusian logistical tasks’ complexity increased in March 2021 to support longer exercise deployments.[14] The Kremlin likely seeks to leverage an enhanced Belarusian capability to simultaneously mobilize multiple brigades—and multiple elements of the same brigade—for longer periods of time to augment the Kremlin’s total force projection capability against NATO’s eastern flank.

The Kremlin used units based far from Belarus’ borders in exercises for the first time, indicating a likely priority to distribute interoperability experience throughout the Russian military. Belarusian forces conducted combined training with Central Military District and Southern Military District elements for the first time since ISW began closely watching the Belarus crisis as it began in August 2020.[15] Russian units outside the Western Military District (WMD) have not participated in previous combined Russian-Belarusian exercises in this period.[16]

The Kremlin publicly leveraged military learning from Nagorno Karabakh for the first time. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense stated that combined air-defense training in March 2021 leveraged military learning from the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.[17] The Kremlin will likely increasingly prioritize electronic warfare, air defense, and UAV/counter-UAV operations from lessons learned in Nagorno Karabakh.

The Kremlin additionally used the March 2021 exercises to prepare for Russia’s upcoming annual capstone strategic readiness exercise, Zapad 2021. Belarusian forces conducted intensified joint communications and air defense exercises with the expressed goal of increasing Russian-Belarusian interoperability to prepare for Zapad 2021. Conventional Russian forces will likely deploy to Belarus in September 2021 for Zapad 2021 on a significantly larger scale than they did for the last annual Russian strategic readiness exercise in Belarus, Zapad 2017.[18] The Kremlin may not return Russian units to Russia after Zapad 2021 officially ends, opting instead to keep them in Belarus and postured against NATO.[19]

The following is a list of exercises and joint activities that Russian and Belarusian forces conducted in March 2021. This list includes nominally independent Belarusian activity that likely advanced Russian objectives given their consistency with previously observed patterns of joint Russian-Belarusian activity. Exercises are grouped by type, day, and location, as applicable.

Russian-Belarusian airborne (VDV) exercises at the Polivno Training Ground in Ulyanovsk, Russia (March 9-20)

March 9

• A battalion-sized element of the Russian 31^st Airborne Brigade based in Ulyanovsk and an unspecified company of the Belarusian 38^th Airborne Brigade formed a combined Russian-Belarusian reinforced airborne battalion and began exercises emphasizing airborne and peacekeeping operations.[20] 

March 11

• An airborne infantry element of the Belarusian 38^th Airborne Brigade conducted small arms live-fire exercises.[21]

March 15

• Russian and Belarusian airborne elements conducted exercises and deployed a mobile reserve with army aviation helicopters.[22]

March 18

• A Russian-Belarusian “consolidated peacekeeping unit” of the combined reinforced battalion conducted peacekeeping exercises to practice managing observation posts and checkpoints, escorting humanitarian convoys, patrolling designated areas with ground and air vehicles, facility protection, demining, defense operations, and maintaining peace between two warring parties.[23] This exercise could support a potential Belarusian deployment to Syria or Ukraine.[24]

March 20

• The company of the Belarusian 38^th Airborne Brigade returned to Belarus.[25]

Russian-Belarusian airborne exercises at the Osipovichsky training Ground in Mogilev, Belarus (March 15-27)

March 14

• A reinforced company of the Russian 234th Airborne Regiment of the Guards 76^th Airborne Division based in Pskov and the Belarusian 357^th Battalion of the 103^rd Airborne Brigade formed a combined Russian-Belarusian reinforced airborne battalion at the Osipovichsky training ground in Mogilev, Belarus.[26]

March 15 – 27

• The combined Russian-Belarusian reinforced battalion conducted parachute exercises, maneuvers, and ambush tactics to relieve an encircled friendly force.[27] 
• The combined Russian-Belarusian reinforced battalion conducted force protection exercises emphasizing convoy escorts and anti-ambush actions.[28]
• Belarusian engineers deployed a bridge to cross a water obstacle.[29]
• A combined Belarusian-Russian company-sized element of the combined reinforced battalion performed a parachute exercise; the company departed from the Machulishchi airfield and parachuted into the Osipovichsky Training Ground[30]

March 26

• The combined Russian-Belarusian reinforced battalion conducted combat exercises emphasizing holding a line, routing an enemy force into a prepared ambush, and destroying an enemy force with an airborne vertical envelopment.[31]

March 28

• The reinforced company of the Russian 234th airborne regiment returned to Russia.[32]

Russian-Belarusian mechanized battalion exercises at the Mulino Training Ground in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia (March 10-April 2)

March 9

• A company-sized element drawn from the Belarusian 6^th, 19^th, and 120^th mechanized brigades and a company-sized element of the Russian 1^st Tank Army based near Moscow formed a combined reinforced mechanized battalion at the Mulino Training Ground in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia.[33]

March 15-18

• The combined Russian-Belarusian reinforced mechanized battalion conducted exercises using drones to identify and destroy enemy firing positions with indirect fire.[34]
• The combined Russian-Belarusian reinforced mechanized battalion used drones to identify and destroy enemy firing positions with indirect fire and conducted an armored counterattack.[35]
• Likely Russian electronic weapons specialists of the 1^st Tank Army interfered with a simulated enemy force’s communications, and tank elements of the combined Russian-Belarusian reinforced mechanized battalion conducted live-fire exercises.[36]
• Russian and Belarusian motorized rifle and tank elements of the combined Russian-Belarusian reinforced mechanized battalion conducted exercises to practice an armored offensive under simulated enemy electronic weapons suppression and to practice countering an enemy air attack and enemy combat UAVs.[37]

March 22

• Belarus rotated its forces at the Mulino Training Ground, roughly doubling Russian and Belarusian participation in the exercise.[38]
• Scouts of the Russian 1^st Tank Army conducted exercises on psychological operations aimed to demoralize an enemy force and convince them to surrender with targeted text messages and propaganda leaflets.[39]

March 25

• A reinforced battalion-sized force with artillery, scouts, and signals elements of the Russian 1^st Tank Army practiced destroying ground targets with 120mm and rocket artillery using UAV reconnaissance.[40]

March 26

• The WMD transferred 20 Russian armored vehicles to Belarusian forces for combined battalion exercises.[41] 

March 29 – April 2

• The combined Russian-Belarusian reinforced mechanized battalion conducted armor exercises emphasizing cordoning a settlement and urban combat tactics.[42]
• A Russian chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense (CBRN) element, likely of the WMD, conducted exercises to protect Russian and Belarusian armored vehicles.[43]
• Tank and motorized rifle elements of the combined Russian-Belarusian reinforced battalion conducted exercises using drones to identify and destroy enemy firing positions with tank fire.[44]

Belarusian airborne exercises at the Brestsky Training Ground in Brest, Belarus

March 3

• An element of the Belarusian 38^th Airborne Brigade conducted parachute exercises.[45]

March 10

• A reinforced company of the Belarusian 38^th Airborne Brigade conducted live-fire exercises to neutralize an enemy force planning to conduct raids on critical infrastructure to destabilize Brest.[46]

March 18

• Elements, likely of the Belarusian 38^th Airborne Brigade, conducted live-fire exercises with 120mm artillery.[47]

March 25 – April 5

• Elements of the Belarusian 38^th Airborne Brigade conducted exercises emphasizing maneuvers, overcoming a water obstacle, and airborne parachute drops in multiple training grounds in Brest.[48]

Belarusian Signals Activity  

March 11

• Elements of the Belarusian 85^th Communications Brigade deployed to unspecified areas in Belarus to perform coordinated signals exercises, likely in coordination with other Belarusian signals units.[49]

March 15-19

• Elements of the Belarusian 127^th Communications Brigade conducted signals training at the Obuz-Lesnovsky and Domanovo Training Grounds in Brest, Belarus. [50] This exercise’s stated objective is to test Belarusian military communications readiness to support the Russian-Belarusian Regional Grouping of Forces (RGV)—a strategic formation of Russian and Belarusian units tasked with defending the Union State—and check the technical feasibility of transmitting communications from Belarus to Russia in preparation for Zapad 2021.[51]
• Elements of the Belarusian 83^rd Radiocommunications Center conducted exercises emphasizing deploying and camouflaging mobile communications equipment at the Obuz-Lesnovsky Training Ground in Brest, Belarus.[52]
• Elements of the Belarusian 742^nd Field Communications Center conducted exercises emphasizing deploying and camouflaging communications equipment to support the Belarusian 38^th Airborne Brigade and prepare for Zapad 2021.[53]
• Unspecified Russian signals “representatives” visited Belarus on March 16-18 to discuss coordinating field communication between Russian and Belarusian units, prepare for Zapad 2021, and attend the ongoing Belarusian signals exercises at the Obuz-Lesnovsky Training Ground.[54]
• Communications elements of the Belarusian 85th Communications Brigade completed training exercises in unspecified training grounds near Brest, Minsk, and Grodno on March 19. The stated objective of these exercises is to test a communication system similar to the one that will be deployed during Zapad 2021.[55]
• Communications elements of the Belarusian 86th Communications Brigade deployed to unspecified areas in Belarus to conduct exercises with the stated objective to prepare for Zapad 2021 on March 19.[56]

March 24

• A Belarusian military communications delegation met with their Russian counterparts in an unspecified location in Russia to discuss developing field communications systems between Russian and Belarusian forces and improving the RGV’s integrated communication system.[57]

Belarusian Air Defense Activity

March 10

• Elements of the Belarusian 377^th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment conducted exercises to practice deploying the unit to a new position and increasing unit cohesion in simulated combat conditions.[58]

March 18

• Unspecified Russian officials—likely senior officers—from Russia’s 6^th, 4^th, and 14^th Air Force and Air Defense (VVS-PVO) Armies completed a joint staff headquarters training with Belarusian air-defense forces that emphasized planning operations with the RGV, planning deployments of Russian Air Force assets to Belarusian airfields, and controlling subordinate units of Russia and Belarus’ unified regional air defense system.[59] The Belarusian Ministry of Defense stated that combat in Nagorno Karabakh and Syria informed this training. Belarus has troops in neither Syria nor Nagorno Karabakh.  
• A Belarusian anti-aircraft missile battalion of the Minsk-based 15^th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade conducted exercises emphasizing mobilizing and deploying equipment from stored positions.[60]

March 29

• An element, likely a battalion, of the Belarusian 115^th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade completed air-defense exercises at the Brestsky Training Ground to prepare for Zapad 2021.[61]
• A Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) delegation visited Belarus on March 29-April 2 to examine the Belarusian territories where Zapad 2021 will occur and discuss the formation of the joint Russian-Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Forces training center in Grodno.[62]

Belarusian Logistics Exercises

March 9

• A brigade-sized Belarusian element conducted readiness exercises emphasizing mobilizing equipment from storage bases in unspecified locations in Belarus.[63]

March 10-11

• Elements of the Belarusian 36^th Road and Bridge Brigade conducted exercises emphasizing countering enemy sabotage and reconnaissance and practiced deploying a field camp.[64]

March 16

• A battalion-sized Belarusian mechanized element practiced transferring ammunition and equipment from rear storage bases in an unspecified location in Belarus.[65]

March 19

• Elements of the Belarusian Vitebsk-based 19th and Slonim-based 11th Mechanized Brigades conducted combat readiness exercises to practice resupplying Belarusian units that conducted live fires in unspecified locations in Belarus.[66]

Miscellaneous Belarusian Exercises and Activity that Support Russian Lines of Effort

March 16

• A company of the Belarusian 103^rd Airborne Brigade held an exercise with Belarusian border guards at the Belarusian-Latvian border in Polotsk, Belarus.[67] This exercise’s stated objective is to foster interoperability between Belarusian airborne and border guard forces “in the event of the need to perform special operation forces tasks in border areas.”[68]

March 17

• The Belarusian Army activated approximately 1,000 reservists across Belarus and conducted mechanized brigade reserve officer training in Pechi, Minsk Oblast, Belarus, and likely other locations in Belarus.[69]
• Tank and artillery elements, likely of the Belarusian 6^th Mechanized Brigade, conducted live-fire exercises at the Gozhsky Training Ground in Grodno, Belarus.[70]  The Belarusian 6^th Mechanized Brigade continued exercising in Grodno until at least March 31.[71]

March 19

• Reserve officers of the Belarusian 19^th Mechanized Brigade received “special ideological, fire, and tactical” training.[72]

March 22

• The Belarusian North Western Operational Command (a Belarusian command structure roughly equivalent to a Russian military district) conducted operational planning staff training emphasizing the use of forces based on “an analysis of the results of modern wars and conflicts.”[73] This training’s stated goal is to prepare Belarusian forces for Zapad 2021.
• A reinforced battalion of the Belarusian 120^th Mechanized Brigade conducted live-fire and maneuver exercises at the 227^th combined arms training ground in Borisov, Belarus.[74]

March 29

• Elements of the Belarusian 51^st Artillery Brigade conducted artillery live-fire exercises at the Osipovichi Training Ground in Mogilev, Belarus.[75]

March 30-31

• A reinforced battalion of the Belarusian 6^th Mechanized Brigade and elements of the Belarusian 557th Engineering Brigade conducted mechanized combat exercises to practice defensive operations, launching counterattacks, repelling air attacks, and overcoming water obstacles at the Gozhsky Training Ground in Grodno, Belarus on March 30.[76]
• Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov and Chief of the Belarusian General Staff Major General Viktor Gulevich discussed military cooperation on the RGV, Zapad 2021, CSTO, and the terms of the three new combined combat training centers in Moscow, Russia on March 30-31.[77]
• A battalion-sized reservist element of the Belarusian 19^th Mechanized Brigade conducted basic combat training exercises in Zaslonovo, Belarus, on March 31.[78] 
• A reinforced battalion of the Belarusian 120^th Mechanized Brigade began battalion tactical exercises at the 227^th Combined Arms Training Ground in Borisov, Belarus on March 31.[79]

 

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[1] Mason Clark, “Belarus Warming Update: Lukashenko Softens His Opposition to Protests, Seeking Leverage Against Increased Russian Pressure,” Institute for the Study of War, September 14, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-lukashenko-softens-his-opposition-protests-seeking-leverage.

[2] [“Results of Talks Between the Ministers of Defense of Belarus and Russia,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 16, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111189/; [“Talks Between the Heads of the Defense Ministries of Belarus and Russia,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 5, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/110984/; “Defence Ministers of Russia and Belarus Discussed Joint Activities for 2021,” Russian Ministry of Defense, March 5, 2021, https://eng.mil dot ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12347433@egNews; Belarusian Ministry of Defense, Telegram, March 16, 2021, https://t dot me/modmilby/3992.

[3] [“Joint Headquarters Training Completed in the Air Force and Air Defense Forces,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 18, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111272/.

[4] [“Lukashenko Spoke About the Details of Negotiations with Putin and Reacted to Speculation,”] Belta, March 2, 2021, https://www.belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-rasskazal-o-podrobnostjah-peregovorov-s-putinym-i-otreagiroval-na-domysly-430898-2021/; Maria Leyva, [“Lukashenko Refused to Create a Russian Military Base in Belarus,”] RBK, October 6, 2015, https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/06/10/2015/5613ebe59a794769839c9e3f.

[5] Elements of the Russian 234th airborne regiment formed a brigade-sized unified combat formation with Belarusian forces in March 2021 similarly to how a 234th Brigade Tactical Group (BTG) did with Belarusian airborne units in September 2020. George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: NEXTA Actively Encourages Belarusian Security Service Defections,” Institute for the Study of War, September 20, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-nexta-actively-encourages-belarusian-security-service-defections.

[6] George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: NEXTA Actively Encourages Belarusian Security Service Defections,” Institute for the Study of War, September 20, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-nexta-actively-encourages-belarusian-security-service-defections.

[7] George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: NEXTA Actively Encourages Belarusian Security Service Defections,” Institute for the Study of War, September 20, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-nexta-actively-encourages-belarusian-security-service-defections.

[8] The majority of Russian units that have deployed to Belarus since the crisis began have overwhelmingly been airborne units. George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: Upcoming CSTO Exercise Could Support Russian Military Deployment to Belarus,” Institute for the Study of War, November 6, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-upcoming-csto-exercise-could-support-russian-military-deployment.

[9] The Kremlin likely seeks to leverage Russian airborne units to create a new capability to rapidly deploy Russian-controlled Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) forces in the FSU. Russian and Belarusian forces conducted joint exercises in November 2020 testing the use of a Russian airborne command post as the command and control basis of the CSTO’s Rapid Reaction Force – a strategic force of approximately 18,000 personnel designed to rapidly respond to military crises in the FSU. Joint Russian-Belarusian airborne capabilities development could support this effort. George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: Upcoming CSTO Exercise Could Support Russian Military Deployment to Belarus,” Institute for the Study of War, November 6, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-upcoming-csto-exercise-could-support-russian-military-deployment.

[10] George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: Upcoming CSTO Exercise Could Support Russian Military Deployment to Belarus,” Institute for the Study of War, November 6, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-upcoming-csto-exercise-could-support-russian-military-deployment.

[11] George Barros, “Russia in Review: Putin’s ‘Peacekeepers’ Will Support Russian Wars,” Institute for the Study of War,  November 16, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-putins-%E2%80%9Cpeacekeepers%E2%80%9D-will-support-russian-wars; George Barros and Mason Clark, “Belarus Warning Update,” Institute for the Study of War, October 8, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-kremlin-will-likely-use-october-military-exercises-advance-its.

[12] George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: Russia Deploys a Third Battalion Tactical Group to Belarus,” Institute for the Study of War, September 22, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-russia-deploys-third-battalion-tactical-group-belarus; George Barros, “Warning: The Kremlin Deploys a Brigade-Sized Force to Belarus Near Polish Border,” Institute for the Study of War, September 21, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-kremlin-deploys-brigade-sized-force-belarus-near-polish-border; George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: Multiple Russian Military Exercises Occurring in the Western Military District, Belarus, and Moldova,” Institute for the Study of War, September 19, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-multiple-russian-military-exercises-occurring-western-military; George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: Upcoming CSTO Exercise Could Support Russian Military Deployment to Belarus,” Institute for the Study of War, November 6, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-upcoming-csto-exercise-could-support-russian-military-deployment; George Barros and Mason Clark, “Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin Will Likely Use October Military Exercises to Advance its Hybrid War in Belarus,” Institute for the Study of War, October 8, 2020, http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/10/belarus-warning-update-kremlin-will.html.

[13] Elements of the Belarusian 6th, 19th, and 120th, mechanized brigades and the 38th and 103rd VDV brigades, exercised in both Russia and Belarus in March 2021.

[14] Belarus rotated forces for a month-long exercise – a logistical task more sophisticated that what Belarusian forces have done before in monthly exercises – for the first time since the crisis in Belarus began in August 2020. [“Goodbye, Mulino!”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 22, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111361/; [“Servicemen of the Republic of Belarus Arrived in the Nizhny Novgorod Region to Participate in a Joint Exercise with Servicemen of the Western Military District,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 23, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12350389@egNews; [“Joint Battalion Tactical Exercises with Units of the Ground Forces of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 23, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111420/.

[15] The 31st airborne brigade and 14th Air Force and Air Defense (VVS-PVO) Army are subordinate to the Central Military District. The 4th VVS-PVO Army is subordinate to the Southern Military District. George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin May Have Used Kavkaz 2020 Exercises in Part to Prepare for a Conventional Russian Military Deployment to Belarus,” Institute for the Study of War, September 26, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-kremlin-may-have-used-kavkaz-2020-exercises-part-prepare; Mason Clark and George Barros, “Russia’s Unprecedentedly Expansive Military Exercises in Fall 2020 Seek to Recreate Soviet-Style Multinational Army,” Institute for the Study of War, October 20, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-unprecedentedly-expansive-military-exercises-fall-2020-seek-recreate-soviet.

[16] Russian Southern Military District and Belarusian units exercised together in the Kavkaz 2020 exercises in September 2020. However, Kavkaz 2020 – Russia’s annual strategic readiness capstone exercise for 2020 – included many international partners and was not part of the new monthly Russian-Belarusian exercises that began in Fall 2020. Mason Clark and George Barros, “Russia’s Unprecedentedly Expansive Military Exercises in Fall 2020 Seek to Recreate Soviet-Style Multinational Army,” Institute for the Study of War, October 20, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-unprecedentedly-expansive-military-exercises-fall-2020-seek-recreate-soviet.

[17] [“Joint Headquarters Training Completed in the Air Force and Air Defense Forces,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 18, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111272/; Belarusian Ministry of Defense, Telegram, March 18, 2021, https://t dot me/modmilby/4023; [“From March 16 to 18, the Air Force and Air Defense Forces Will Host a Joint Staff Training,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 15, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111153/.

[18] George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: Putin Intensifies Russian-Belarusian Military Integration,” Institute for the Study of War, October 27, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-putin-intensifies-russian-belarusian-military-integration.

[19] George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: Putin Will Increase Pressure on Lukashenko to Integrate Belarus in 2021,” Institute for the Study of War, December 18, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-putin-will-increase-pressure-lukashenko-integrate-belarus-2021.

[20] [“Two Joint Russian-Belarusian Tactical Exercises of the Airborne Forces of Russia and the Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus Will Be Held in March This Year,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 7, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12347675@egNews; [“On Holding a Joint Battalion Tactical Exercise,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 9, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111022/; [“The Exercise is Completed,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 19, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111331/; [“Skillfully! Well-Coordinated! Together!”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 18, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111296/; [“A Combined Peacekeeping Unit Repelled an Attack on the Observation Post of the Peacekeeping Forces of a Conditional Illegal Armed Group at the Stage of Live Firing as Part of the Russian-Belarusian Tactical Exercises,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 18, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12349542@egNews; [“Paratroopers of the Russian Federation and Belarus Worked Out Actions at a Conditional Checkpoint Near Ulyanovsk,”] TASS, March 18, 2021, https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/10938849; [“A Belarusian-Russian Group Conducted A Peacekeeping Mission – Video,”] Sputnik, March 19, 2021, https://sputnik dot by/video/20210319/1047177205/Belorussko-rossiyskaya-gruppirovka-otrabotala-mirotvorcheskuyu-missiyu--video.html; [“A Unit of a Separate Airborne Assault Unit of the Special Operations Forces of Belarus Arrived in Ulyanovsk to Participate in a Joint Russian-Belarusian Exercise,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 9, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12348049@egNews.

[21] [“Peacekeepers Are Being Trained for a Joint Russian-Belarusian Tactical Exercise in Ulyanovsk,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 11, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111103/.

[22] [“In One language,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 15, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111166/.

[23] [“A Combined Peacekeeping Unit Repelled an Attack on the Observation Post of the Peacekeeping Forces of a Conditional Illegal Armed Group at the Stage of Live Firing as Part of the Russian-Belarusian Tactical Exercises,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 18, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12349542@egNews; [“Skillfully! Well-Coordinated! Together!”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 18, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111296/; [“Paratroopers of the Russian Federation and Belarus Worked Out Actions at a Conditional Checkpoint Near Ulyanovsk,”] TASS, March 18, 2021, https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/10938849; [“A Belarusian-Russian Group Conducted A Peacekeeping Mission – Video,”] Sputnik, March 19, 2021, https://sputnik dot by/video/20210319/1047177205/Belorussko-rossiyskaya-gruppirovka-otrabotala-mirotvorcheskuyu-missiyu--video.html.

[24] George Barros with Jennifer Carafella, “Belarus Warning Update: Belarusian Forces may Deploy to Syria in Late 2021,” Institute for the Study of War, February 4, 2021, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-belarusian-forces-may-deploy-syria-late-2021.

[25] [“To Home - With Peacekeeping Experience,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 21, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111341/.

[26] https://t dot me/modmilby/3970; [“We are glad to welcome you on Belarusian soil (video)”] https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111141/; [“On Conducting a Battalion Tactical Exercise with Personnel of 103rd Airborne Brigade,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 12, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111130/.

[27] [“The Active Phase of the Joint Exercise of the Special Operations Forces of the Republic of Belarus and the Airborne Forces of Russia Opened at the Training Ground Near Mogilev,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 22, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12350330@egNews; Viktoria Ivashechkina, [“Airborne Forces and Special Forces: The Active Phase of the Exercises of Russia and Belarus Started Near Mogilev,”] Tv Zvezda, Mach 23, 2021, https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/2021323120-USc1f.html; “Belarusian, Russian Paratroopers in Joint Army Exercise,” Belta, March 22, 2021, https://eng.belta dot by/society/view/belarusian-russian-paratroopers-in-joint-army-exercise-138398-2021/; [“Joint Airborne Double Strike,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 24, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111451/.

[28] Russian Ministry of Defense, Facebook, March 24, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/1492252324350852/posts/2908892426020161/.

[29] [“Establishing a Bridge: Russian-Belarusian paratroopers led a convoy through a water barrier near Mogilev”] TV Zvezda, March 25, 2021, https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/20213251124-hEfhn.html.

[30] “Belarusian, Russian Paratroopers in Joint Army Exercise,” Belta, March 22, 2021, https://eng.belta dot by/society/view/belarusian-russian-paratroopers-in-joint-army-exercise-138398-2021/.

[31] [“Russian Paratroopers and Servicemen of the Special Forces of Belarus Blocked and Destroyed a Mock Enemy at a Joint Exercise Near Mogilev,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 26, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12351015@egNews; [“Not Instead, But Together,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 26, 2021 https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111543/.

[32] [“Personnel of the Reinforced Paratrooper Company of the Pskov-Guards Airborne Assault Force of the Airborne Forces Arrived From the Republic of Belarus to their Point of Permanent Deployment,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 28, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12351297@egNews.

[33] [“Preparation for the Exercise are in Full Swing,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 11, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111102/; [“Shoulder to Shoulder,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 15, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111155/; [“Servicemen of the Republic of Belarus Arrived in the Nizhny Novgorod Region to Participate in Joint Exercises with Servicemen of the Western Military District,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 10, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12348115@egNews; [“Servicemen of the Republic of Belarus Arrived in the Nizhny Novgorod Region to Participate in a Joint Exercise with Servicemen of the Western Military District”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 23, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12350389@egNews/; [“Shoulder to Shoulder,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 17, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111245/.

[34] [“Russian and Belarusian Servicemen have Practiced the Use of Drones During an Exercise in the Nizhny Novgorod Region,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 17, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12349331@egNews.

[35] [“In the Nizhny Novgorod Region, the Military Personnel of the Western Military District and the Republic of Belarus Jointly Stopped the Offensive of the Mock Enemy,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 19, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12349683@egNews.

[36] [“Officers of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus Gained Unique Experience in Managing Disparate Units During a Bilateral Exercise Near Nizhny Novgorod,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 19, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12349631@egNews.

[37] [“Allies Win,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 19, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111329/; [“Russian-Belarusian military exercises began in the Nizhny Novgorod region,”] Regnum, March 15, 2021, https://regnum dot ru/news/polit/3215627.html

[38] The rotation brought participation in the exercise from approximately 80 Belarusian personnel and 200 Russian personnel to 150 Belarusian personnel and 350 Russian personnel. [“Joint Battalion Tactical Exercises with Units of the Ground Forces of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 23, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111420/; [“Goodbye, Mulino!”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 22, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111361/; [“Servicemen of the Republic of Belarus Arrived in the Nizhny Novgorod Region to Participate in a Joint Exercise with Servicemen of the Western Military District,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 23, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12350389@egNews; [“A Company Tactical Exercise of Military Personnel of the Western Military District and the Republic of Belarus Started in the Nizhny Novgorod Region,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 15, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12349007@egNews; [“Shoulder to Shoulder,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 15, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111155/; [“Shoulder to Shoulder,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 17, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111245/; [“Allies Win,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 19, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111329/.

[39] Anton Valagin, [“The Military Captured the City by SMS,”] Rossiyskaya Gazeta, March 22, 2021, https://rg dot ru/2021/03/22/reg-pfo/voennye-zahvatili-gorod-po-sms.html; Anastasia Eremina, [“Nizhny Novgorod Servicemen Worked Out the Capture of a City Using SMS-Messages,”] Kommersant, March 22, 2021, https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/4740895.

[40] [“Artillerymen of the Western Military District, as Part of an Exercise Near Nizhny Novgorod, Destroyed More Than 50 Targets of a Simulated Enemy,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 25, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12350804@egNews.

[41] [“Servicemen of the Republic of Belarus Received Military Equipment to Participate in Joint Tactical Exercises,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 26, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12350999@egNews.

[42] [“Russian-Belarusian Battalion Tactical Exercise Started in the Nizhny Novgorod Region,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 29, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12351408@egNews.

[43] [“In the Nizhny Novgorod Region, the Military Personnel of the Western Military District Carried Out a Special Treatment of Armored Vehicles Involved in a Joint Russian-Belarusian Exercise,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 29, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12351399@egNews

[44] [“In the Nizhny Novgorod Region, Units of the Western Military District and the Republic of Belarus Held Joint Exercises,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, April 1, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12352044@egNews.

[45] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 3, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/110881/.

[46] [“The Landing Force Storms the Skies,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 3, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111051/.

[47] [“With a Female Name ‘NONA,’”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 18, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111284/.

[48] [“Tactical Exercise With the 38th Brest Separate Guards Airborne Assault Brigade,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 27, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111569/; [“Barriers Do Not Exist for Special Forces,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 31, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111665/; [“Barriers Do Not Exist for Special Forces,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, April 5, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111790/.

[49] [“Exam for Signalmen,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 11, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111099/.

[50] [“Readiness to Complete Tasks,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 16, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111188/; https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111254/; [“127th Guards Communications Brigade Participates in Control Exercises on Tactical and Special Training,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 19, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111316/; [“They Are Always Connected,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 23, 2021 https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111414/.

[51] [“Readiness to Complete Tasks,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 16, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111188/; [“127th Guards Communications Brigade Participates in Control Exercises on Tactical and Special Training,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 19, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111316/.

[52] [“Signalmen Hhave a Crunch Time,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 17, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111261/.

[53] [“To Keep the Connection Reliable,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 17, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111260/.

[54] [“Visit of the Russian Delegation of Signalmen to the Republic of Belarus,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 17, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111254/.

[55] [“They Are Always Connected,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 23, 2021 https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111414/.

[56] [“Preparation for the Main Exam of the Year,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 19, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111317/.

[57] [“Visit of the Belarusian Delegation of Signalmen to the Russian Federation,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 24, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111459/.

[58] [“Strength Test,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 10, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111066/.

[59] [“Joint Headquarters Training Completed in the Air Force and Air Defense Forces,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 18, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111272/; Belarusian Ministry of Defense, Telegram, March 18, 2021, https://t dot me/modmilby/4023; [“From March 16 to 18, the Air Force and Air Defense Forces Will Host a Joint Staff Training,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 15, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111153/.

[60] [“They Checked Combat Readiness,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 18, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111297/; [“Military Unit 30151,”] Fanipol Online, Accessed, April 5, 2021, http://fanipol dot net/business/business.php?id=30; [“Young Servicemen of Military Unit 30151 Swore Allegiance to the Motherland,”] DZR, June 16, 2020, https://dzr dot by/novobranczy-v-ch-30151-prisyagnuli-na-vernost-rodine/.

[61] [“Combat Readiness is the Priority,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 29, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111609/.

[62] [“Visit of the Delegation of the Aerospace Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 29, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111602/; [“Delegation of the Aerospace Forces of the Russian Armed Forces Visits Belarus,] Belta, March 29, 2021, https://www.belta dot by/society/view/delegatsija-vozdushno-kosmicheskih-sil-vs-rossii-poseschaet-belarus-434813-2021/; [“A Delegation of the Russian Aerospace Forces Has Arrived in Belarus to Prepare the Zapad-2021 Exercises,”] TASS, March 29, 2021, https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/11019551.

[63] [“The Armed Forces Began the Second Stage of a Comprehensive Check of Troops,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 9, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111021/.

[64] [“Special Tactical Exercise,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 15, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111164/.

[65] [“A Complex Check Continues,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 16, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111190/.

[66] [“A Comprehensive Check Continues in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 19, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111323/.

[67] [“Airborne Shield at the Borders of the Fatherland,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 16, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111219/.

[68] [“Airborne Shield at the Borders of the Fatherland,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 16, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111219/.

[69] [“A Complex Check Continues,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 17, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111264/.

[70] [“The Power of the ‘Staff,’”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 17, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111262/.

[71] [“Exercise Is the Best School and Baptism by Fire,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 31, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111666/.

[72] [“The Mood is a Fighting One,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 23, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111432/.

[73] [“Joint staff training is being held at the North Western Operational Command,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 22, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111388/.

[74] [“Battalion Tactical Exercise of the 120th Separate Guards Mechanized Brigade,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 22, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111390/.

[75] [“Everyone Knows Their Maneuver,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 29, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111591/.

[76] [“A Large-Scale Exercise at the Gozhsky Training Ground,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 30, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111642/.

[77] [“Within the Framework of Bilateral Military Cooperation”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 30, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111635/; [“Issues of Military Cooperation Between Belarus and Russia Discussed in Moscow,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 31, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111674/; [“Chiefs of General Staffs of Russia and Belarus Discussed Issues of Joint Defense Policy in Moscow”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 31, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12351838@egNews.

[78] [“Margin of Safety,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 31, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111667/.

[79] ["Our Armor is Strong and Our Tanks Are Fast,"] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 31, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111683/.

  

Russia in Review: Russian Deployments Near Ukraine Likely Intended to Pressure Zelensky, not Biden

 April 1, 2021

By Mason Clark

Ongoing reports of increased Russian troop movements on Ukraine’s borders and violations of the July 2020 ceasefire have drawn widespread attention and alarm but do not likely presage imminent Russian military action against Ukraine.

What we know so far:

• The New York Times reported on March 31 that the US military’s European Command (EUCOM) raised its watch level to the highest level in the last week of March 2021.[1] A Pentagon spokesperson stated EUCOM is “monitoring the situation.”[2]
• Russia’s proxies in eastern Ukraine escalated attacks on Ukrainian positions throughout March 2021. Neither Russia nor Ukraine has formally revoked the standing July 2020 ceasefire in Donbas, and ceasefire monitors remain in place, but Russia declined a Ukrainian offer to issue a joint reaffirmation of the ceasefire on March 31.[3]
• US and Ukrainian statements about the scale of Russian force deployments vary considerably. A US official told the New York Times that Russia recently deployed 4,000 additional troops to the Ukrainian border.[4] Ukrainian Chief of Staff Ruslan Komchak claimed on March 30 that Russia is deploying 25 additional Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs), which would consist of considerably more than 4,000 troops, to Ukraine’s borders beyond the 28 currently deployed BTGs, but did not specify a timeframe for these projected deployments.[5]
• Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley called his Ukrainian and Russian counterparts on March 31 to discuss the Russian deployments.[6]
• Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin spoke with his Ukrainian counterpart on April 1.[7]
• Ukraine invited NATO to organize joint military exercises and air patrols to “stabilize the situation” on April 1. NATO has not yet responded.[8]

Several independent sources reported video of Russian units deploying toward Ukraine from March 30 to April 1, including:

• The 56^th Air Assault Brigade deployed to Crimea on March 30 following an announcement by Russian Defense Minister Shoigu on March 25 that the brigade would permanently redeploy to Crimea by the end of 2021.[9]
• An unidentified Russian engineering unit was observed 25 kilometers east of Luhansk, Ukraine, on March 30.[10]
• An unidentified artillery unit, which could be part of the 56^th Air Assault Brigade, deployed to Crimea by rail on March 31.[11]
• A Russian logistical convoy moved from Rostov to eastern Ukraine on March 31.[12]
• Russian trucks were seen driving through occupied Luhansk, Ukraine, on April 1.[13]

The Kremlin claims all ongoing military deployments are part of a preplanned readiness check. Russia’s Southern Military District (SMD) is conducting an annual readiness check from March 29 to the end of April, including over 50 component exercises across southern Russia and occupied Crimea.[14] The Russian Ministry of Defense is not individually announcing the component exercises, which are predominantly at the company and battalion level.[15] The SMD borders eastern Ukraine and is responsible for the command and control of Russia’s proxy forces in Donbas. Putin’s spokesperson, Dmitri Peskov, and SMD spokesperson Vadim Astafiev claimed all current Russian movements are components of the ongoing readiness check on April 1.[16] The SMD holds annual readiness checks every April. However, it is unclear from available information what Russian deployments are and are not part of prescheduled exercises. The deployment of the 56^th Air Assault Brigade is not likely part of a normal readiness check given the MoD’s announcement that it is permanently moving to Crimea.

The purpose of these attention-grabbing Russian deployments is unclear. Most Western reporting and analysis of the Russian deployments do not identify a likely Russian course of action they would support. Many frame the Russian activities as a test of the Biden administration.[17] The Kremlin’s movements may be intended to support one of several possible courses of action.  

The most likely objective of these activities is to coerce Ukrainian President Zelensky to make concessions in the ongoing peace process. The Kremlin routinely escalates its aggression in eastern Ukraine to pressure Ukraine during negotiations.[18] Russian deployments may be intended to complement Putin’s discussion with French President Macron and German Chancellor Merkel on March 30, which the Kremlin exploited to suggest Russia may continue the Ukrainian peace process without Ukrainian participation.[19] President Zelensky’s government continues to focus on negotiations despite ongoing Russian aggression. Zelensky issued a statement on April 1 decrying Russian threats, calling for further negotiations on a ceasefire, and reaffirming his commitment to “negotiate a truce as the fastest tactical step.”[20] The Kremlin likely seeks to intimidate Zelensky into unfavorable negotiations that exploit his stated desire to reach a settlement and extract concessions such as direct recognition of Russian proxies or the resumption of water supplies to occupied Crimea. 

The Kremlin may intend to create a pretext to deploy “peacekeepers” in Donbas by creating the impression of a Ukrainian provocation. The Kremlin falsely frames itself as a neutral party in the Donbas conflict and has previously proposed creating a supposedly neutral peacekeeping force, potentially including Belarusian forces.[21] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin has conducted a disinformation campaign claiming Ukraine will launch an offensive against Russia’s proxies in eastern Ukraine since early March.[22] Russian deployments may be intended to provoke Ukrainian forces into an attack on Russian proxies in violation of ceasefire agreements or to set conditions in which a false-flag attack by proxies on themselves could be more readily blamed on Kyiv. The Kremlin could then exploit Ukrainian “aggression” to call for the deployment of a peacekeeping force involving Russian or Belarusian troops.  A Kremlin-backed peacekeeping force in Donbas would legitimize the Kremlin’s desired framing of Russia as a neutral arbiter in a Ukrainian civil conflict and grant Russia a permanent lever of influence against Ukraine.

Russian force movements may be intended to distract from another Kremlin line of effort, such as ongoing military pressure in Belarus. The Kremlin’s force deployments in Crimea and on Ukraine’s eastern borders—and Western reactions to them—have drawn widespread attention in the US government, mainstream media, and analytical community. Russian exercises around Ukraine may be intended to draw US attention, or political capital for a response, away from other Kremlin lines of effort. The Kremlin is rapidly advancing its ongoing campaign to integrate the Belarusian military into Kremlin-dominated structures, including establishing a new joint training center and deploying additional Russian forces to the Kaliningrad exclave to threaten NATO’s eastern flank.[23] The Kremlin could additionally seek to distract from escalating repressive measures inside Russia or another international effort. Analysts should keep a watchful eye on other aspects of the Kremlin’s malign global campaigns during these attention-grabbing actions near Ukraine.

Russia is unlikely to be preparing for either a major or localized offensive against Ukraine at this time. Large-scale Russian force deployments, a logistical buildup, and a likely NATO response would be indicators of looming large-scale offensive operations against Ukraine. Russia’s frontline conventional units have not deployed at the brigade level or above during ongoing readiness checks in the SMD. Russia’s Western Military District (WMD) has likewise not mobilized key regiments and divisions that would likely be necessary to support an offensive against Ukraine. ISW has not observed or captured reports of the buildup of logistical supplies—including fuel, ammunition, and medical supplies—which would be necessary to support a major offensive. The United States, Ukraine, and NATO would almost certainly observe the preparations for a major offensive and issue far more strident statements than they have so far made.

Russian deployments do not indicate preparations for an imminent, more-localized conventional escalation either. If Putin intended to conduct a sudden operation—such as a surprise air assault to secure the Crimean canal, or a mechanized offensive using forces permanently stationed on the Ukrainian border—the Russian military would not have openly telegraphed ongoing deployments. The Kremlin has additionally not set conditions in the information space for major operations. Russia’s campaign to regain dominant influence over Ukraine is concentrated on the information space, and the Kremlin has not taken rhetorical steps to justify a major offensive. The Kremlin’s ongoing disinformation campaign claiming Ukraine will attack occupied Donbas would not likely support an overt Russian conventional attack into Ukraine on any scale without further conditions-setting. The Kremlin is therefore unlikely to be preparing for offensive action at this time.

The Kremlin is unlikely to be redeploying forces and making provocative statements solely to test the Biden administration. Many current reports argue the Kremlin is deploying troops near Ukraine to test the Biden administration. It is unclear what Putin could intend such a “test” to demonstrate.  

The United States could respond to Russian posturing with statements, sanctions, additional aid to Ukraine, or troop deployments of its own to either Ukraine or Ukraine’s NATO neighbors. Putin has shown little interest historically in US rhetoric and is unlikely to have ordered this movement of military assets simply to prompt a response from the White House. The United States is unlikely to impose further sanctions in response to Russian military deployments occurring exclusively within Russia’s borders and illegally occupied Crimea. The United States could conceivably increase its military aid to Ukraine. Finally, the United States is highly unlikely to deploy conventional forces to Ukraine in response to Russian deployments of this variety. 

Both an increase in military aid to Ukraine and the deployment of American or NATO troops further east would be major setbacks for Putin’s campaign to regain dominance over Ukraine. He is therefore highly unlikely to have taken actions that he thought might provoke such responses. Furthermore, the US response to these recent Russian military movements is unlikely to provide Putin with any useful indication of how the United States might respond to a more dramatic Russian escalation in the future. The Kremlin thus is far more likely to be posturing in support of a Ukraine-focused outcome than orienting on Washington’s response to its actions.

Russian deployments around Ukraine must be assessed in the context of Putin’s broader objectives against Ukraine. The Kremlin’s primary objective against Ukraine is to regain dominant influence over the government in Kyiv and prevent Ukraine from joining NATO or the EU. Putin’s campaign against Ukraine is centered on an information campaign to normalize truncated Ukrainian sovereignty. Russia’s proxy forces in eastern Ukraine are a means to the end of securing leverage over Ukraine, not an end themselves. Putin has successfully ensured Ukraine is unlikely to join NATO or the EU by occupying Ukrainian territory. The Kremlin continues to prioritize shaping peace talks with Zelensky to achieve a Kremlin-favorable outcome. Putin is highly unlikely to resort to major offensive operations—which would almost certainly result in further painful sanctions if not a US or NATO military response—unless he assesses direct conquest is the only way to regain dominance over Ukraine. Ukraine, the United States, and its allies must therefore assess Russian actions in the context of Russian objectives and potential courses of action; these actions currently point to an escalation of the ongoing Russian pressure campaign against Ukrainian President Zelensky, not an imminent offensive.

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[1] Andrew E. Kramer, “Fighting Escalates in Eastern Ukraine, Signaling the End to Another Cease-Fire,” New York Times, March 30, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/30/world/europe/ukraine-russia-fighting.html.

[2] Max Seddon and Roman Olearchyk, “Tensions Flare Between Russia and Ukraine,” Financial Times, March 31, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/6a3d49e4-ffc8-4fd2-90c8-8516c2c89c8f.

[3] “TCG Talks: Russia Turns Down Offer to Secure Truce in Donbas from April 1,” UNIAN, March 31, 2021, https://www.unian dot info/war/donbas-russia-turns-down-ukraine-s-offer-to-secure-truce-in-donbas-from-april-1-11373031.html; Ukrainian Delegation to the Trilateral Contact Group, Facebook March 31, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/UkrdelegationTCG/posts/239600531283698.

[4] Andrew E. Kramer, “Fighting Escalates in Eastern Ukraine, Signaling the End to Another Cease-Fire,” New York Times, March 30, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/30/world/europe/ukraine-russia-fighting.html.

[5] Battalion Tactical Groups are motorized rifle or tank battalions with attached ATGM, artillery, reconnaissance, engineer, and rear support units, intended to be self-sufficient ground combat units. BTGs range in size from 700-900 personnel, and each Russian brigade or regiment fields two BTGs. [“The Quantity of Battalion Groups Consisting of Contract Soldiers in the Russian Army Will Reach 125 in Two Years - Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,”] Interfax, September 14, 2016, https://www.militarynews dot ru/story.asp?rid=1&nid=425709&lang=RU; “Contractees in BTGs,” Russian Defense Policy, September 17, 2016, https://russiandefpolicy.com/2016/09/17/contractees-in-btgs/; [“Russia Draws Troops to the Border with Ukraine, the Armed Forces of Ukraine Are Preparing to Replenish Forces With Reservists If Necessary - Ruslan Khomchak,”] Radio Svoboda, March 30, 2021, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/zsu-heneral-khomchak-pro-diyi-rosiyi/31178741.html.

[6] [“Head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Valery Gerasimov Had a Telephone Conversation With the Chairman of the Committee of Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces Mark Milley,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 31, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12351887@egNews; “Readout of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley’s Phone Call with Russian Chief of the General Staff Gen. Gerasimov,” Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Public Affairs, March 31, 2021, https://www.jcs.mil/Media/News/News-Display/Article/2557092/readout-of-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen-milleys-phone-call-with-ru/; “Russian and U.S. military Chiefs of Staff Hold Phone Call,” Reuters, March 31, 2021, https://news.trust.org/item/20210331170618-yrxzk/.

[7] US Secretary of Defense, Twitter, April 1, 2021, https://twitter.com/SecDef/status/1377693917689344001?s=20.

[8] “Deputy Head of the Office of the President Roman Mashovets and Head of the NATO Representation to Ukraine Alexander Vinnikov Discussed the Security Situation in Donbas and Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration,” Office of the President of Ukraine, April 1, 2021, https://www.president.gov dot ua/en/news/zastupnik-kerivnika-ofisu-prezidenta-roman-mashovec-obgovori-67749.

[9] [“Shoigu Announced the Formation of a New Airborne Regiment in Crimea,”] Izvestia, March 25, 2021, https://iz dot ru/1142141/2021-03-25/shoigu-soobshchil-o-sozdanii-novogo-polka-vdv-v-krymu; Igor Girkin, Twitter, March 30, https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1376953240915476489?s=20; Igor Girkin, Twitter, March 31, https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1377266153207250944?s=20.

[10] Petri Makela, Twitter, March 31, 2021, https://twitter.com/pmakela1/status/1377332457209393152?s=20.

[11] Herooftheday10, Twitter, March 31, 2021, https://twitter.com/herooftheday10/status/1377164096987000832?s=20.

[12] Herooftheday10, Twitter, March 31, 2021, https://twitter.com/herooftheday10/status/1377280560406597634?s=20.

[13] Marqs, Twitter, April 1, 2021, https://twitter.com/MarQs__/status/1377620873457373185?s=20.

[14] [“Formations and Units of the Southern Military District Began to Pass the Control Check for the Winter Training Period,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 29, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12351446@egNews; [“The Control Check of the Southern Military District Troops will Take Place in the Format of Bilateral Tactical Exercises,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 31, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12351798@egNews.

[15] The Russian Ministry of Defense issued announcements of broad components of the readiness check, including the participation of engineering troops in all exercises and tank exercises in Chechnya, but has not issued readouts of the participating units and locations of individual exercises. [“Engineering Units Will Provide Ferries for Motorized Riflemen of the Southern Military District During Exercises During a Control Check,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 31, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12351801@egNews; [“In Chechnya, the Tankers of the Southern Military District Began to Pass the Control Check During the Winter Training Period,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, April 1, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12351994@egNews; [“Servicemen of the Southern Military District in the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia Began to Pass the Check During the Winter Training Period,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, April 1, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12352006@egNews.

[16] [“Military Equipment is Move to Crimea as Part of Planned Training Activities,”] TASS, April 1, 2021, https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/11049629; [“Peskov Said that the Movement of Russian Troops Across the Russian Federation Should Not Bother Other Countries,”] TASS, April 1, 2021, https://tass dot ru/politika/11048035.

[17] Thomas Grove and Alan Cullison, “Russian Troop Movements on Ukraine Border Test Biden Administration,” Wall Street Journal, March 31, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-troop-movements-on-ukraine-border-test-biden-administration-11617230084; Andrew E. Kramer, “Fighting Escalates in Eastern Ukraine, Signaling the End to Another Cease-Fire,” New York Times, March 30, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/30/world/europe/ukraine-russia-fighting.html; David MArtin and Eleanor Watson, “U.S. Watching ‘Escalation of Armed Confrontation’ Near Ukraine’s Border with Russia,” CBS News, March 31, 2021, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-troops-ukraine-border-concerning-united-states/.

[18] George Barros and Nataliya Bugayova with Mason Clark, “Russia in Review: Kremlin Escalates in Ukraine while Playing Peacemaker,” Institute for the Study of War, June 1, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-kremlin-escalates-ukraine-while-playing-peacemaker.

[19] “Macron, Merkel Call on Russia to Stabilize Ceasefire in Donbas,” Unian, March 30, 2021, https://www.unian dot info/politics/donbas-macron-merkel-call-on-russia-to-stabilize-ceasefire-11371897.html; Gleb Ivanov, [“Dmitri Peskov: Russia has Many More Friends than Enemies,”] Arguments and Facts, March 31, 2021, https://aif dot ru/politics/russia/dmitriy_peskov_druzey_u_rossii_gorazdo_bolshe_chem_nedrugov.

[20] Volodomyr Zelensky, Facebook, April 1, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/zelenskiy95/posts/2784857348431290.

[21] Mason Clark, “Russia in Review: Russian Offensive in Ukraine Unlikely, but Russian Disinformation Campaign Pressures Ukraine to Make Concessions,” Institute for the Study of War, March 18, 2021, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-russian-offensive-ukraine-unlikely-russian-disinformation-operation.

[22] Mason Clark, “Russia in Review: Russian Offensive in Ukraine Unlikely, but Russian Disinformation Campaign Pressures Ukraine to Make Concessions,” Institute for the Study of War, March 18, 2021, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-russian-offensive-ukraine-unlikely-russian-disinformation-operation.

[23] ISW will publish an assessment of March 2021 joint Russian/Belarusian military exercises in early April.

 

Syria Situation Report: February 19 - March 22, 2021

By Eva Kahan and Ezgi Yazici

Key Takeaway: The United States and Russia are exerting pressure to limit Iran’s military and diplomatic leverage in Syria. The United States conducted several airstrikes targeting Iranian proxies in Albu Kamal, Deir ez-Zour Province, on February 25, 2021, in response to a series of proxy rocket attacks in Iraq in mid-February. Meanwhile, Russia began several new diplomatic initiatives on the behalf of the Assad regime that could diminish Iran’s potential economic and political leverage in Syria. Russia facilitated a deal to renew oil trade between the Assad regime and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), possibly reducing the Assad regime’s reliance on Iranian oil. Russia additionally brokered a prisoner exchange between Israel and Syria in which Israel also agreed to finance the purchase of Russia’s Sputnik V Covid-19 vaccine for the Syrian government. Russia led trilateral talks with Turkey and Qatar that could be aimed at cutting Iran out of the peace process. 

Click the image below to enlarge.

Russia in Review: Russian Offensive in Ukraine Unlikely, but Russian Disinformation Operation Pressures Kyiv To Make Concessions

By Mason Clark

Key Takeaway: The Kremlin launched a disinformation campaign against Ukraine in early March that could support renewed Russian offensive conventional operations in 2021, but Russia is unlikely to launch offensive operations in the coming weeks. Russian proxies in eastern Ukraine deployed to full combat readiness on March 16. Despite that potential indicator of a possible operation, the Russian military is not postured to support an imminent offensive. The Kremlin’s disinformation campaign may be intended to pressure Ukraine into engaging in negotiations on unfavorable terms or to set conditions for a Russian escalation in late spring 2021 or both. ISW will continue to assess indicators of a potential Russian escalation and monitor the Kremlin’s ongoing disinformation campaign.

Russia’s proxy forces in eastern Ukraine deployed to full combat readiness on March 16, 2021. Ukrainian intelligence reported Russia’s proxy forces in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk deployed to the highest degree of combat readiness, withdrew personnel from vacations early, and replenished ammunition for front line units on March 16.[1] Russian proxies have increased their pace of readiness drills since early March.[2] Ukrainian intelligence and independent reporting confirm that Russia’s proxies are currently improving their defensive positions.[3]

The Russian military has not set the conditions necessary to support offensive operations and an imminent escalation is unlikely. Russia is conducting an annual Russian Airborne (VDV) exercise in Crimea from March 16-19, 2021, involving 2,000 troops, but this exercise is likely preplanned and has occurred in mid-March every year since 2017.[4] ISW has not observed reporting of any other Russian forces redeploying or conducting snap exercises near Ukraine in recent weeks. Russia has not deployed additional combat assets into Donbas, such as artillery and armor units, to support an escalation. The weather in eastern Ukraine is currently poor and unsuited to offensive operations.[5] Ukrainian intelligence characterizes ongoing Russian proxy activity as preparations for “provoking tension” and “provocative action,” not a new offensive.[6] Increased readiness drills and improved defensive positions in the absence of necessary preparations for offensive action indicate an imminent escalation is unlikely. Proxy leaders may have taken defensive measures around the anniversary of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea on March 18, 2014, amid annual intense rhetoric from Ukraine and Russia. Russian proxies are likely additionally supporting an ongoing Kremlin information campaign against Ukraine.

The Kremlin began a disinformation campaign in early March claiming Ukraine is preparing to launch an offensive against Donbas later in spring 2021. The Kremlin-funded Federal News Agency likely originated this false narrative on March 1, 2021, by distorting a Ukrainian military analyst’s discussion of “Western instructors” assisting new Ukrainian urban warfare training centers. The Federal News Agency claimed these new centers indicated an imminent Ukrainian offensive against occupied Donbas in spring 2021.[7] Retired Russian Colonel Viktor Baranets stated on March 3 that Ukraine is likely preparing for an offensive in mid-May and after the spring thaw at the earliest.[8] Baranets is an unofficial mouthpiece for the Russian military and often acts as a leading indicator for Russian intent.[9] Russia’s proxies in Donetsk issued statements warning of a possible “new cycle of escalation” by Ukraine in spring 2021 on March 4 and 16.[10]

The Kremlin boosted this narrative on March 4. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated Russia is concerned about a potential Ukrainian escalation and renewed force deployments.[11] Russian representative to the OSCE Alexander Lukashevich claimed the Ukrainian military is deploying additional forces to Donbas and training for offensive operations—misquoting the same Ukrainian analyst cited by the Federal News Agency—and accused Ukraine of stalling negotiations with Russia to buy time to prepare for offensive action.[12] Kremlin representatives and state-run media have continued to amplify this narrative throughout March 2021. Director Andrei Kortunov of the Russian International Affairs Council, a key Kremlin-run think tank, forecasted Ukraine will escalate the Donbas conflict “in the near future” on March 14.[13] Russian envoy to Ukraine Boris Gryzlov claimed Ukraine continues to deploy additional troops to Donbas and seeks a pretext for escalation on March 17.[14]

The Kremlin’s disinformation campaign may be intended to pressure Ukrainian President Zelensky into renewed unfavorable negotiations with the Kremlin or direct engagement with Russian proxies. Kremlin representatives and media outlets have accused Ukrainian President Zelensky of preparing for an offensive due to his unwillingness to continue negotiations with Russia. Ukraine has refrained from direct engagement with Russia’s proxies in Donbas to avoid legitimizing them as independent actors through direct engagement.[15] Russian envoy Gryzlov accused Ukraine of preparing an escalation to break the “impasse” on negotiations and claimed Ukraine’s only alternative to a military escalation is direct talks with Russian proxies.[16] Lukashevich similarly accused Ukraine of preparing an escalation to avoid what the Kremlin frames as Kyiv’s “commitment” to begin direct engagement with Russian proxies in Donbas.[17] Russia’s proxy authorities in Donetsk accused Ukraine of seeking a forceful end to the conflict instead of negotiations on March 17.[18] The Kremlin previously failed to coerce Ukraine into direct talks with Russian proxies in May 2020 through an information campaign and increased military pressure—including raising its proxies to full combat readiness on May 19, 2020.[19] The Kremlin may seek to use Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s 2019 election promise to end the war in Donbas to pressure him into entering further Kremlin-favorable negotiations.[20]

The Kremlin’s disinformation campaign may be setting conditions for its own kinetic escalation in spring 2021. The Kremlin routinely accuses Ukraine of refusing to consider Russia-favorable negotiations and of perpetuating the conflict in eastern Ukraine. However, claims emanating directly from the Kremlin overtly accusing Ukraine of preparing for an offensive are unusual. Russian claims of a Ukrainian offensive in May might indicate that Russian leaders intend to conduct a kinetic escalation in late spring 2021. The Kremlin likely intends to build its disinformation campaign over several months and may seek to provoke Ukrainian forces into action Russia that can frame as a justification for a renewed offensive against Ukraine.

ISW will continue to monitor the situation and assess indicators of a potential Russian escalation. Russia has not deployed the forces necessary for a kinetic escalation as of late March but may do so in the coming weeks. ISW will monitor and report on indicators—including Russian military exercises, command changes, deployment of additional assets to Donbas, and heightened rhetoric—of a Russian escalation. ISW will additionally continue to monitor the Kremlin’s disinformation campaign against Ukraine, including its likely triggers and objectives.

 

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[1] [“Summary of the Press Service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine on the Situation in the Area of the Joint Forces Operation,”] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, March 16, 2021, https://www.mil.gov dot ua/news/2021/03/16/zvedennya-pressluzhbi-minoboroni-ukraini-shhodo-obstanovki-v-rajoni-provedennya-operaczii-obednanih-sil/.

[2] Eastern Human Rights Group, Facebook, March 8, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/east.hr.group/posts/2944279412497906; [“DNR Allowed to Open Pre-emptive Fire on Ukrainian Positions in Donbas,”] RBC, March 3, 2021, https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/603f4c2a9a7947a584cd466d; [“The Armed Formations of Ukraine Continue to Violate the Complex of Additional Measures to Control Compliance with the Armistice, During the Meeting of the Contact Groups,”] DNR Army, March 3, 2021, http://armiyadnr dot su/news/ekstrennoe-zayavlenie-oficialnogo-predstavitelya-nm-dnr-257.

[3] Joint Forces Operation, Facebook, March 16, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/pressjfo.news/posts/1079885725837376; Alexander Demchenko, [“Russian Journalist Showed Strengthening of Fighters near Donetsk,”] Radio Svoboda, March 16, 2021, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/sladkov-staromykhaylivka-donetsk/31154191.html.

[4] [“As Part of the Command Post of the Novorossiysk Airborne Unit, the Paratroopers Began to Plan Military Operations,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 16, 2021, https://structure.mil dot ru/structure/okruga/south/news/more.htm?id=12349219@egNews; [“Command and Staff Exercises of the Airborne Forces with the Landing of Air and Sea Assault Forces will be Held in Crimea and the Volgograd Region,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 26, 2020, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12282420@egNews; [“A Large-Scale Exercise of the Airborne Forces Began in Crimea,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 25, 2019, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12222966@egNews; [“In Crimea, a Tactical Exercise Began with an Airborne Assault Battalion of the Novorossiysk Airborne Unit,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 13, 2018, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12166534@egNews; [“For the First Time in Crimea, a Large-Scale Command-Staff Exercise with Command and Control Bodies and Subunits of Three Airborne Units is Being Held,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 20, 2017, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12115116@egNews.

[5] “Donetsk, Ukraine Weather Forecast,” Weather.com, March 18, 2021, https://weather.com/weather/tenday/l/Donetsk+Donetsk+Ukraine?canonicalCityId=75d657e7bfd13bef4b16d01854b11965bc0dde14d1d358d24fecdf1a67103fdd; “Luhansk, Ukraine Weather Forecast,” Weather.com March 18, 2021, https://weather.com/weather/tenday/l/Luhansk+Luhansk+Ukraine?canonicalCityId=6ea53f313788daf1a7d37662995d12883da507e424586f745297c60a34f93ac1.

[6] [“Summary of the Press Service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine on the Situation in the Area of the Joint Forces Operation,”] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, March 16, 2021, https://www.mil.gov dot ua/news/2021/03/16/zvedennya-pressluzhbi-minoboroni-ukraini-shhodo-obstanovki-v-rajoni-provedennya-operaczii-obednanih-sil/; Joint Forces Operation, Facebook, March 16, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/pressjfo.news/posts/1079885725837376.

[7] [“Kyiv Trains Soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the "Spring" Offensive in Donbas,”] Federal News Agency, March 1, 2021, https://riafan dot ru/1396403-kiev-nataskivaet-boicov-vsu-dlya-vesennego-nastupleniya-na-donbass; Vladislav Krasinsky, [“On the Edge of the World: What is Happening in Donbas and is Ukraine Ready for ‘Putin's Response,’”] RBK Ukraine, March 1, 2021, https://daily.rbc dot ua/rus/show/grani-mira-proishodit-donbasse-gotova-ukraina-1614536137.html.

[8] Viktor Baranets, [“When Will the War Start in Donbas and How Will it End,”] Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 3, 2021, https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27248/4377008/.

[9] For example, Baranets discussed impending Russian military exercises in Belarus before their official announcement in late 2020. George Barros and Mason Clark, “Belarus Warning Update: he Kremlin will Likely Use october Military Exercises to Advance its Hybrid War in Belarus,”] Institute for the Study of War, October 8, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-kremlin-will-likely-use-october-military-exercises-advance-its.

[10] DNR Foreign Ministry, Telegram, March 4, 2021, https://t dot me/mid_dnr/1281; [“The DNR Reports on the Aggravation of the Situation Along the Entire Line of Contact in Donbas,”] TASS, March 16, 2021, https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/10918875.

[11] [“The Rise of Tensions in Donbas Worries the Kremlin,”] Interfax, March 4, 2021, https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/754516.

[12] [“Speech by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the OSCE A.K. Lukashevich at the Online Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, 4 March 2021,”] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 4, 2021, https://www.mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4607224.

[13] [“The Expert did not Rule Out Escalation in Donbas in the Near Future,”] TASS, March 14, 2021, https://tass dot ru/politika/10900609.

[14] [“Gryzlov: Ukraine is Deploying New Forces and Means to the Contact Line in Donbas,”] TASS, March 17, 2021, https://tass dot ru/politika/10929895.

[15] George Barros and Nataliya Bugayova with Mason Clark, “Russia in Review: Kremlin Escalates in Ukraine while Playing Peacemaker,” Institute for the Study of War, June 1, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-kremlin-escalates-ukraine-while-playing-peacemaker.

[16] [“Gryzlov: Ukraine is Deploying New Forces and Means to the Contact Line in Donbas,”] TASS, March 17, 2021, https://tass dot ru/politika/10929895.

[17] [“Speech by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the OSCE A.K. Lukashevich at the Online Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, 4 March 2021,”] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 4, 2021, https://www.mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4607224.

[18] [“Kyiv Aims at War Instead of Peaceful Solution to the Conflict in Donbas - DPR Delegation in KG,”] Donetsk News Agency, March 17, 2021, https://dan-news dot info/politics/kiev-nacelen-vojnu-vmesto-mirnogo-reshenija-konflikta-v-donbasse-delegacija-dnr-v-kg.html.

[19] George Barros and Nataliya Bugayova with Mason Clark, “Russia in Review: Kremlin Escalates in Ukraine while Playing Peacemaker,” Institute for the Study of War, June 1, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-kremlin-escalates-ukraine-while-playing-peacemaker.

[20] Nataliya Bugayova, “Ukraine’s New President: The Stakes for Ukraine and the West,” Institute for the Study of War, April 22, 2019, http://www.iswresearch.org/2019/04/ukraines-new-president-stakes-for.html.