Russia in Review: Belarus Update: Lukashenko Uses Oil Tariffs to Delay Integration with Russia

Russia in Review is a weekly intelligence summary (INTSUM) produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This ISW INTSUM series sheds light on key trends and developments related to the Russian government’s objectives and its efforts to secure them. Receive future Russia in Review INTSUM products via-email by signing up for the ISW mailing list.

Key Takeaway: Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko is using energy policy in his latest efforts to resist growing Russian pressure to integrate into Russia-dominated structures. Lukashenko’s efforts to diversify Belarusian oil imports will likely provide him with sufficient leverage to secure higher payments from Russia on Russian oil transiting Belarus. However, Lukashenko lacks leverage on the issue of Russian gas subsidies to Belarus. Lukashenko will not, in the long run, be able to prevent further integration with Russia. However, through selective resistance with Western support, Lukashenko may be able to shape the nature of the Union State relationship to limit Russian President Vladimir Putin’s growing control over Belarus.

The Kremlin’s campaign achieve greater control over Belarus slowed in 2019 but has not stopped. In 1999, Belarus and Russia formed the Union State – a supranational agreement with the stated goal of the federal integration of the two states under a joint structure. The Kremlin intensified its political and economic pressure campaign to integrate Belarus through the Union State structure throughout 2019. [1] Lukashenko stepped up his balancing act in response – resisting Russian pressure while maintaining a strategic relationship with the Kremlin. Lukashenko successfully slowed the Russian campaign by the end of 2019. Putin left December 7 negotiations with Lukashenko without a joint press conference and without a Union State roadmap – a key Kremlin objective for 2019. [2] The Kremlin still intends to integrate Belarus.

Lukashenko’s leverage is limited, but he is attempting to use energy policy to counter the Kremlin’s pressure for greater integration. Lukashenko stated that unequal energy relations are his main problem with Russian demands prior to the December 7 meeting.[3] Lukashenko is currently countering Russia’s pressure on two major energy issues – Russian oil transit and Russian gas supply to Belarus. Lukashenko is likely using his limited advantage in the oil trade to resist Russian pressure on gas. Belarus derives income from tariffs on Russian crude oil transit through two Belarusian oil refineries, purchasing crude oil from Russia before selling the refined product to European consumers. Lukashenko holds slight leverage in oil politics through the threat of increasing tariffs and pursuing alternative suppliers of oil. In contrast to oil, which is a source of income for Belarus, Belarus is reliant on cheap Russian gas for its domestic use. Lukashenko has little leverage in his ongoing effort to retain low prices for Russian gas.

Lukashenko is attempting to make Russia pay a higher tariff rate on oil transit but is weakened by a reliance on Russian shipments. In 2019, Belarus demanded Russia pay a tariff increase of 16.6 percent starting in 2020.[4] Belarus argued even such increase would be a concession, as a 21-percent increase would be necessary to cover damage to Belarusian oil refineries caused by contaminated oil Russia shipped to Belarus earlier in 2019.[5] Russian state-owned oil company Transneft refused the increased tariff on December 17.[6] Russia’s Federal Antimonopoly Service stated Russia only forecasted a 3-6.8-percent increase in Belarusian tariffs for 2020. Negotiations stalled, and Russia halted all oil supplies to Belarus on January 1.[7] Belarus agreed January 4 to a reduced amount of Russian oil imports – 133,000 tons, roughly 9 percent of the average monthly shipment in 2019 – at current tariff rates for the month of January while negotiations continue.[8]

Lukashenko is using alternative oil sources to resist the Kremlin’s pressure. Lukashenko quickly adapted to the Russian shutoff by pursuing diversified oil imports. Belarusian state oil company Belneftkim reportedly began holding near-daily talks with potential oil suppliers, including Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic States, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan, on January 14.[9] Lukashenko said January 24 that Belarus will attempt to import American, Saudi, and Emirati oil to keep its refineries running.[10] Belneftkim stated Belarusian refineries have run on minimum loads in 2020 due to Russian cutoffs and required substitutions to remain functional. 

Belarus purchased 80,000 tons of crude oil – roughly equivalent to 6 percent of the pre-2020 monthly shipments to Belarus from Russia – from Norway on January 21. Norway will deliver the oil over two weeks beginning January 26.[11] Belarus also agreed to purchase an additional shipment from Kazakhstan, which Russia blocked on January 21. [12] Lukashenko denounced Russia for blocking oil deliveries between two of its own allies in response. Lukashenko continues to take escalating actions aimed at squeezing concessions from Russia. Lukashenko raised tariffs to 6 percent on February 1 to “adjust for inflation” despite ongoing negotiations with Russia and the apparent stability of the Belarusian ruble.[13]

Lukashenko is trying to resist the Kremlin’s efforts to use gas prices as a tool to pressure Belarus into integration with Russia. Belarus is fully dependent on Russia for gas. Lukashenko is trying to keep prices at their 2019 levels, which Russia frames as a subsidized price but Belarus frames as a fair market price. Russia openly uses gas prices as leverage to influence Belarus. The Kremlin links continuing gas subsidies to Belarusian concessions on integration, claiming it would be a “mistake” to retain low gas prices to Belarus for 2020 prior to a concrete Union State roadmap.[14] Lukashenko and Putin negotiated the prices of Russian gas subsidies to Belarus throughout December 2019. Belarus and Russia reached a last-minute deal on December 31 to freeze gas prices at 2019 levels for January and February 2020 pending further negotiations.[15] Lukashenko took an opposing stance on January 9, accusing Russia of price gouging and stating Belarus will not sign a deal to purchase gas without continued lower pricing.[16] Belarusian officials stated on January 16 that Belarus and Russia would resume talks on gas pricing by the end of January; it is unclear if these talks have occurred.[17]

Despite the conflict over energy, Lukashenko continues cooperate with Russian integration in other sectors and prioritize friendly ties with Russia. Lukashenko explicitly expressed his dissatisfaction with Russian policies on oil and gas on January 9 but emphasized that he seeks fair energy relations, not ending ties.[18] Lukashenko continued to describe Russia as “brotherly Russia” in January 2020 despite his strong criticism of Russian energy pressure. Lukashenko has focused his resistance on the energy sector while assenting to other Russian integration demands.[19] It is unclear if Lukashenko intends to broaden his resistance to Russian integration efforts to include other sectors.

The Kremlin will likely successfully pressure Belarus into accepting increased gas prices or further Union State integration in ongoing negotiations, but Lukashenko might be able to slow and shape the process. Lukashenko has conducted a delicate balancing act between Russia and the West for decades. His ability to resist Russian pressure will rely on his ability to bundle various issues to dilute Russia’s leverage, keep Putin on the defensive in the information space, and get Western support on key issues, such as diversifying Belarus’s oil supplies. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met with Lukashenko on February 1 and stated that American energy producers are ready to sell oil to Belarus. Pompeo also dispelled rumors that Belarus might be added to the administration’s travel ban. This meeting, and Pompeo’s statements, will likely empower Lukashenko to resist Russian pressure.[20] Belarus will be unable to fully replace Russian supplies, but will likely be able to replace the minimum requirements to keep Belarusian refineries open during continued negotiations with Russia, allowing for leverage in tariff negotiations. Greater American and European supplies to Belarus during the negotiation process will strengthen his hand against Putin. However, Lukashenko has little leverage on gas subsidies, particularly following Russian successes in opening new avenues of gas transit in Ukraine and the ongoing NordStream and TurkStream projects in the Baltic and Turkey, respectively.[21]

Lukashenko likely understands he cannot wholly resist Russian integration, and will attempt to use sectors in which he has leverage, such as oil, to shape the Union State roadmap by stalling negotiations to attain limited Russian concessions. A Kremlin victory by increasing control over the Belarusian economy would further empower Putin, freeing up economic resources currently going to Belarus for other malign actions, and further the Kremlin’s goal of dominating the post-Soviet space. The West should support Lukashenko diplomatically and by providing oil import substitutions to protect Belarusian sovereignty and reduce the likelihood of an empowered Kremlin dominating Belarus.

---

[1] Nataliya Bugayova, Darina Regio, Mason Clark, and Michaela Walker with Alexandra McClintock, “Russia in Review: Domestic Discontent and Foreign Policy,” Institute for the Study of War, August 6, 2019, https://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/08/russia-in-review-domestic-dissent-and.html.

[2] “Lukashenko Calls on Putin to Resolve All Disputes Before December 8,” TASS, July 18, 2019, https://tass((.))com/world/1069256; [“Everything Secret Becomes Equal,”] Kommersant, December 9, 2019, https://www.kommersant((.))ru/doc/4187269; [“Putin and Lukashenko Talked for Five and a Half Hour. How did the Negotiations End?”] BBC Russia, December 8, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-50695675; [“Negotiations between Putin and Lukashenko Lasted more than Five Hours,”] Vedemosti, December 7, 2019, https://www.vedomosti((.))ru/politics/news/2019/12/07/818129-peregovori.

[3] “Lukashenko Calls on Putin to Resolve All Disputes Before December 8,” TASS, July 18, 2019, https://tass((.))com/world/1069256; [“Everything Secret Becomes Equal,”] Kommersant, December 9, 2019, https://www.kommersant((.))ru/doc/4187269; [“Putin and Lukashenko Talked for Five and a Half Hour. How did the Negotiations End?”] BBC Russia, December 8, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-50695675; [“Negotiations between Putin and Lukashenko Lasted more than Five Hours,”] Vedemosti, December 7, 2019, https://www.vedomosti((.))ru/politics/news/2019/12/07/818129-peregovori.

[4] [“Belarus Wants in 2020 to Increase the Tariff for Oil Transit from Russia by 16.6%,”] Kommersant, December 17, 2019, https://www.kommersant((.))ru/doc/4197537.

[5] Ariel Cohen, “Russia Loses Billions in Druzhba Oil Pipeline Contamination Crisis,” Forbes, May 10, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2019/05/10/russia-loses-billions-in-druzhba-oil-pipeline-contamination-crisis/#654d5d797795.

[6] [“Belarus Wants in 2020 to Increase the Tariff for Oil Transit from Russia by 16.6%,”] Kommersant, December 17, 2019, https://www.kommersant((.))ru/doc/4197537.

[7] “Russia Halts Oil Supply to Belarus Amid New Contract Dispute,” RFERL, January 3, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-halts-oil-supply-to-belarus-amid-new-contract-dispute/30358774.html.

[8] Belarus received an average of 1.5 million tons a month in 2019. Olga Yagova, Andrei Makhovsky, Gleb Gorodyankin, “Lukashenko Asks to Meet Putin with Russian Oil Supplies to Belarus Set to Dry Up,” Reuters, Jnauary 24, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-belarus-oil-russia/safmar-seen-as-sole-supplier-of-russian-oil-to-belarus-in-february-idUSKBN1ZN1H0; “Russia Resumes Limited Oil Supplies to Belarus Amid Talks,” Associated Press, January 4, 2020, https://apnews.com/1bfde0f0a13627c17c1d6ec834b7f919; “Belarus, Russia Officials Reach Deal to Reopen Oil Deliveries,” RFERL, January 4, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-russia-officials-reach-deal-to-reopen-oil-deliveries/30360183.html.

[9] “Belarus Scrambles for Oil amid Supply Standoff with Russia,” RFERL, January 14, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-scrambles-for-oil-amid-supply-standoff-with-russia/30376740.html.

[10] “Lukashenka Accuses Moscow of Pressuring Belarus into Russian Merger,” RFERL, January 25, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/lukashenka-belarus-accuses-russia-pressuring-merger/30396235.html.

[11] Yuras Karamanau, “Belarus Imports Oil from Norway after Russia Halts Supplies,” Associated Press, January 21, 2020, https://apnews.com/d9da311459fa561e4db06e9c4b0c8e85; “First Batch of Norwegian Oil Reaches Belarus,” Belsat, January 27, 2020, https://belsat.eu/en/news/first-batch-of-norwegian-oil-reaches-belarus/.

[12] “Lukashenka Says Russia Blocking Kazakhstan from Delivering Oil to Belarus,” RFERL, January 21, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/lukashenka-says-russia-blocking-kazakhstan-from-delivering-oil-to-belarus/30389521.html.

[13] “Tariff on Russian Oil Transit via Belarus to Rise by Over 6% as from 1 February,” Belarussian Telegraph Agency, January 30, 2020, https://eng.belta((.))by/economics/view/tariff-on-russian-oil-transit-via-belarus-to-rise-by-over-6-as-from-1-february-127711-2020/.

[14] “Russia Agrees to Short-Term Gas Deal with Belarus amid Union Push,” RFERL, December 31, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-agrees-to-short-term-gas-deal-with-belarus-amid-union-push/30354289.html.

[15] “Russia Agrees to Short-Term Gas Deal with Belarus amid Union Push,” RFERL, December 31, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-agrees-to-short-term-gas-deal-with-belarus-amid-union-push/30354289.html.

[16] [“’Where is this Seen?’ – Lukashenko Spoke about Russia’s Desire to Sell Oil to Belarus above World Prices,”] Belarus Telegraph Agency, January 9, 2020, https://www.belta((.))by/president/view/gde-eto-vidano-lukashenko-rasskazal-o-zhelanii-rossii-prodavat-belarusi-neft-vyshe-mirovyh-tsen-375416-2020/.

[17] “Belarus to Resume Gas Talks with Russia in January,” Belarus Telegraph Agency, January 16, 2020, https://eng.belta((.))by/economics/view/belarus-to-resume-gas-talks-with-russia-in-january-127311-2020/.

[18] [“’Where is this Seen?’ – Lukashenko Spoke about Russia’s Desire to Sell Oil to Belarus above World Prices,”] Belarus Telegraph Agency, January 9, 2020, https://www.belta((.))by/president/view/gde-eto-vidano-lukashenko-rasskazal-o-zhelanii-rossii-prodavat-belarusi-neft-vyshe-mirovyh-tsen-375416-2020/.

[19] “Lukashenka Accuses Moscow of Pressuring Belarus into Russian Merger,” RFERL, January 25, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/lukashenka-belarus-accuses-russia-pressuring-merger/30396235.html.

[20] “Pompeo: Belarus Doesn’t Need to Pick Between U.S. and Russia,” RFERL, February 1, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/pompeo-belarus-relations-normalize-counter-russian-aggresion/30411255.html; “Secretary Pompeo’s Meeting with Belarusian President Lukashenka,” US Department of State, February 1, 2020, https://www.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-meeting-with-belarusian-president-lukashenka/; [“Meeting with US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo,”] President of Belarus, February 1, 2020, http://president.gov((.))by/ru/news_ru/view/vstrecha-s-gosudarstvennym-sekretarem-ssha-majklom-pompeo-22969/.

[21] George Barros and Nataliya Bugayova, “Europe Cedes Opportunity in Russia-Ukraine Energy Deal,” Institute for the Study of War, January 30, 2020, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2020/01/europe-cedes-opportunity-in-russia.html.

Iraq’s Political Elite Identify Consensus Candidate for Prime Minister-Designee

By: Brandon Wallace

Key Takeaway: Iraq’s President Barham Salih asked Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi to attempt to form a government and serve as prime minister. Allawi holds no parliamentary, popular, or military leverage and is unlikely to gain the necessary political capital to address the demands of protesters or challenge parliamentary powerbrokers. Allawi will not immediately take office – his cabinet must still be formed and approved.

Iraqi President Barham Salih formally nominated former Minister of Communication Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi to replace the caretaker Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mehdi.[1] Former Prime Minister Mehdi had originally resigned on November 29, 2019 following a brutal crackdown against an ongoing popular protest movement, which prompted Iraq’s highest religious authority, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, publicly to withdraw his support. Iraq’s parliament accepted the resignation but left Mehdi and his government in place as caretakers until the President selected a new premier.[2]

President Salih had to enforce a self-imposed deadline for political action to name a premier. President Salih announced on January 29, 2020 that he set a deadline of February 1 for the largest political blocs in Iraq to agree upon a candidate whom Salih could invite to form a government. [3] The law originally required Salih to identify a replacement premier by December 15, 2019. However, Salih attempted to pass his constitutional responsibilities to the speaker of parliament and disregarded the constitutional deadlines.[4] President Salih did not nominate a premier from the largest bloc within the Iraqi parliament as the Constitution requires.  Instead, Salih, in concert with the largest political blocs, selected the candidate who faced the least political resistance.

President Salih selected the candidate who faced the least parliamentary resistance to attempt to form a government. Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi emerged as a potential compromise candidate during internal political discussions in mid-January. President Salih reportedly cleared Allawi and three additional candidates as acceptable premiers with Iranian proxy leader Hadi al-Ameri as well as other major bloc leaders in a conversation on January 19.[5] The leaders of the two largest political blocs, Ameri’s Conquest Alliance and Moqtada al-Sadr's Toward Reform, had reportedly agreed on Allawi by January 30.[6] However, anonymous sources told reporters that Conquest Alliance member and State of Law leader Nouri al-Maliki was lobbying the political blocs to reject Allawi. [7] President Salih appears to have named Allawi with the approval of Ameri and Sadr despite Maliki’s disapproval. President Salih likely calculated that Allawi could form a government that would gain the absolute majority of 165 members of parliament needed to approve the Cabinet and the premier.

PM-designee Allawi emerged as a consensus candidate, not outright vetoed by any powerful actor in Iraq. The elite politicians, the Shi’a religious leadership, Iran, and the U.S. all reportedly raised no red line objection to Allawi, according to AFP.[8]  The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad welcomed the nomination but stressed it “must be followed up with efforts… [to form] an independent and honest government committed to addressing the needs of the Iraqi people.”[9] The powerful actors that shape Iraq did not reject Allawi, but his actions are constrained.

PM-designee Allawi holds no political leverage in the parliament. The position of PM-designee is Allawi’s first position since leaving government in 2012. Allawi was not selected for PM while serving as a sitting member of parliament.[10] Allawi twice served as Minister of Communications in 2006 and 2010-2012 under the Premiership of Nour al-Maliki. Allawi resigned twice in protest of Maliki’s corruption and sectarian actions.[11] Allawi, during his ministerial post, was a member of the secular Iraqiyah Coalition led by his cousin Iyad Allawi which since dissolved.[12] Allawi is viewed now as malleable. Allawi’s own description of his career from Facebook indicates he has not joined a new political party since leaving government.[13] One anonymous Iraqi official told the National, “’Iran wants him because he is weak... That's why Mr. Sadr and Mr. Amiri have supported him.’”[14] 

Allawi has no mandate and faces popular opposition. Prime Minister-designate Allawi addressed the country on February 1 via the official channel and office of the Prime Minister, welcoming the opportunity to form a government.[15] Allawi promised to form a more representative cabinet, hold early parliamentary elections, and ensure formal charges are brought against those who killed and injured protesters since early October. Hours earlier, Allawi had addressed the country with a message posted to his Twitter account, saying “I will ask you to keep up the protests, because if you are not with me, I won't be able to do anything.” [16] Allawi recognizes he lacks leverage without popular support. Yet, demonstrators have already begun demonstrating against Allawi across central and southern Iraqi cities, including chanting, “Allawi is rejected, Allawi is rejected!”[17] Demonstrators associate Allawi with the political establishment and identify him as a pawn of the corrupt powerbrokers. A self-organized group of protesters in the southern city of Nasiryah issued a written statement calling Allawi a “candidate that belongs to the sectarian power sharing political system we are protesting against,” categorically rejecting him. [18]

Moqtada al-Sadr is seeking to suppress and redirect popular street opposition away from Allawi. Sadr previously withdrew his cover for Iraq’s popular protest movement on January 24, setting conditions for a subsequent security crackdown against the protesters by Iraqi government and Iranian proxy militia forces. Protesters railed against the act as a “betrayal.” [19] Sadr reversed this position on January 31 by attempting to re-establish himself among the popular protesters. Sadr issued a statement calling for mass demonstrations and sit-ins writing that all demonstrators are brothers and forbid people from “mentioning my name [Moqtada al-Sadr.]”[20] However, Sadr did not provide genuine support to the protesters. Rather, he undermined his own populist, nationalist, and reformist agenda by siding with the Iranian proxy network and political elite. Sadr issued a second statement via Twitter on February 1 endorsing Allawi calling it “a good step.” [21] Sadr then instructed his supporters known as “blue hats” to intimidate and clear anti-Allawi protesters from central Baghdad overnight on February 1. The blue hats armed with batons beat demonstrators and took control of the “Turkish restaurant” – an unfinished building that serves as logistical and organizing hub for protesters.[22]

President Salih has re-created the conditions of the Mehdi government by choosing a compromise candidate who cannot implement the reforms favored by protesters or ensure that Iraq’s elections break the elite politicians’ monopoly on power. If Allawi can form a government, he will be viewed as responsible for holding new elections. Moqtada al-Sadr’s own advisor admitted that Allawi is receiving support from the established political elite so that he can call for snap elections – not to overhaul the system.[23] Iraq passed a new electoral law on December 24, 2019 in a shallow attempt to placate protester demands.[24] The law does not adequately prevent parties from retaining their collective power and does not establish the necessary mechanism for carrying out the new elections.  The 2019 election law did away with party lists, which were widely seen as a key source of corruption. Party lists prevented voters from casting votes for individuals, instead allowing them to only vote for a grouping of pre-determined candidates by party. The 2019 election law also divides Iraq into districts rather than provinces. The Government of Iraq has no agreed upon census data upon which to establish electoral districts. The 2019 law also does not prevent national parties from flooding money and candidates into districts only to reorganize as parties in parliament. Allawi is unlikely to gather the political capital necessary to execute reforms or fair elections. Indeed, Iraqi political parties may have agreed to his premiership precisely because they would prefer a weak caretaker prior to elections. Political elite are more likely to repress protesters with a weak PM in office. However, the designation of Allawi furthers the very conditions that protesters are demonstrating against.

---

[1] Aziz El Yaakoubi and Nadine Awadalla, “Iraqi president appoints Mohammed Allawi as new PM: state TV,” Reuters, February 1, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-politics/iraqi-president-appoints-mohammed-allawi-as-new-pm-state-tv-idUSKBN1ZV3SY.

[2] Jason Zhou, Brandon Wallace, and Katherine Lawlor,” Iraq Situation Report: November 29 - December 9,” Institute for the Study of War, December 13, 2019, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/12/iraq-situation-report-november-29.html.

[3] [”Barham Saleh gives political blocs four days to resolve the nomination of Prime Minister-designate,”] NINA, January 29, 2020, https://ninanews(.)com/Website/News/Details?key=810113.

[4] Brandon Wallace and Katherine Lawlor,” Iraq Situation Report: December 10 - 18, 2019, ” Institute for the Study of War, December 19, 2020, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/12/iraq-situation-report-december-10-18.html.

[5] [“Iraq .. Expectations of an impending decisive candidate for the Prime Minister,”] al-Jazeera, January 20, 2020, https://www.aljazeera(.)net/news/politics/2020/1/20/%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%85-%D9%88%D8%B4%D9%8A%D9%83-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AD-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1.

[6] [”News about the 'other' and 'Al-Fatah' consensus on a new candidate to succeed Abdul-Mahdi,”] Sot al-Iraq, January 30, 2020, https://www.sotaliraq(.)com/2020/01/30/%d8%a3%d9%86%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%a1-%d8%b9%d9%86-%d8%aa%d9%88%d8%a7%d9%81%d9%82-%d8%b3%d8%a7%d8%a6%d8%b1%d9%88%d9%86-%d9%88%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%81%d8%aa%d8%ad-%d8%ad%d9%88/.

[7] [” Maliki’s office denies that there has been contact with the President of the Republic about the candidate for prime minister,”] Sumaria, January 30, 2020, https://www.alsumaria(.)tv/news/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/333073/%D9%85%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84.

[8] Ammar Karim, “Iraqi president names new PM, dividing protesters,” AFP, February 1, 2020, https://news.yahoo.com/stalemate-over-iraq-pm-pick-deadline-looms-111403795.html.

[9] U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, Facebook, February 1, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/USEmbassyBaghdad/posts/10158072475769304.

[10] Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/pg/mohammed.t.allawi/about/?ref=page_internal; Alissa J. Rubin, “Iraq Names New Prime Minister Who Praises ‘Bravery’ of Protesters,” New York Times, February 1, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/01/world/middleeast/iraq-names-new-prime-minister-who-praises-bravery-of-protesters.html.

[11] ”Iraqi Blocs Select New PM-Designate After Weeks of Jockeying,” Associated Press, February 1, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2020/02/01/world/middleeast/ap-ml-iraq-prime-minister-.html.

[12] Stephen Wicken, ”IRAQ WEEKLY UPDATE #35”, Institute for the Study of War, August 31, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraq-weekly-update-35.

[13] Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/pg/mohammed.t.allawi/about/?ref=page_internal.

[14]  Mina Aldroubi, ” Iraq: two names emerge as possible PM candidate,” the National, January 30, 2020, https://www.thenational(.)ae/world/mena/iraq-two-names-emerge-as-possible-pm-candidates-1.971985.

[15] Government of Iraq, Twitter, February 1, 2020, https://twitter.com/IraqiGovt/status/1223736252463222784.

[16] Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi, Twitter, February 1, 2020, https://twitter.com/MohammedAllawi/status/1223618782725361665; Ammar Karim,” Iraqi president names new PM, dividing protesters,” AFP, February 1, 2020, https://www.yahoo.com/news/stalemate-over-iraq-pm-pick-deadline-looms-111403795.html.

[17] Maya Gebeily, Twitter, February 1, 2020 https://twitter.com/GebeilyM/status/1223634770615308288; Mustafa Salim, Twitter, February 1, 2020, https://twitter.com/Mustafa_salimb/status/1223628821238362112.

[18] Linah Alsaafin, “Mohammed Allawi appointed new Iraq PM, protesters reject him,” al-Jazeera, February 1, 2020, https://www.aljazeera(.)com/news/2020/02/iraq-president-appoints-mohammed-allawi-pm-state-tv-200201150554113.html.

[19] Katherine Lawlor and Brandon Wallace, “Sadr Withdraws Support for Iraq's Popular Protest Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 29, 2020, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2020/01/sadr-withdraws-support-for-iraqs.html.

[20] Moqtada al-Sadr Calls on Iraqis to Renew Peaceful Anti-Government Protests in Baghdad,” SITE Intelligence Group, January 31, 2020, https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/muqtada-al-sadr-calls-iraqis-to-renew-peaceful-anti-government-protests-in-baghdad.html.

[21] “Washington: Iraq Needs Government That Meets the Needs of Its People,” Asharq al-Awsat, February 2, 2020, https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/2111351/washington-iraq-needs-government-meets-needs-its-people.

[22] Aziz El Yaakoubi and Nadine Awadalla, “Iraqi cleric Sadr tells followers to clear sit-ins after PM appointed,” Reuters, February 2, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-protests/iraqi-cleric-sadr-tells-followers-to-clear-sit-ins-after-pm-appointed-idUSKBN1ZW0DW.

[23] Haider al-Jabri, Twitter, February 1, 2020, https://twitter.com/haideraljabri2/status/1223690652552253445.

[24] Falih Hassan and Alissa J. Rubin, ”Iraq’s New Election Law Draws Much Criticism and Few Cheers,” New York Times, December 24, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/24/world/middleeast/iraq-election-law.html.