The Kremlin’s Expanding Media Conglomerate

By Nataliya Bugayova and George Barros 

Key Takeaway: The Kremlin is building a global media conglomerate and attempting to pull countries around the world into Russia’s information space. Russia uses its information space to expand its influence around the world, mask the Kremlin’s aggression, and spread disinformation that undermines the U.S. and the West.

The Kremlin is adapting the ways in which it expands its global media space. Russian President Vladimir Putin has prioritized growing the reach and influence of Russian media throughout his two decades in power. The Kremlin, however, launched a distinct campaign around 2015 aimed at forming partnerships with local media outlets around the world, moving beyond simply expanding the availability of Russian media networks.

Russia has signed at least 50 media cooperation agreements in the last five years. Most of these agreements focus on content sharing between Russian-controlled media outlets, such as RT and Sputnik, and local outlets in various countries (See Appendix). Some agreements include Russian media training for journalists from other countries. Finally, some of the agreements are intergovernmental cooperation exchanges between Russia’s Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media and its foreign counterparts.

Russia is pursuing a number of objectives through establishing local media partnerships.

• The Kremlin is attempting to make its global information web more resilient and enduring. Russia’s information space will likely be less vulnerable to counter-disinformation efforts if the Kremlin both embeds its media with foreign outlets and secures a network of institutional ties at the governmental level. The Kremlin also seeks to shape the training, methods, and views of journalists around the world so that the Kremlin’s “ways” and narratives continue to live even if host governments expel Kremlin-affiliated outlets. Russian outlets have already conducted a number of such trainings. Sputnik even launched a special “Sputnik School of Young Journalists” project to train emerging reporters globally.[1]

• The Kremlin also likely seeks to turn RT, Sputnik, Ruptly, TASS, and its other controlled outlets into dominant news wire sources worldwide to compete with services like Reuters. The Kremlin is focusing on boosting the prestige and name recognition of Russian media brands. Russia’s local media partners both attribute shared content to Russia and sometimes place the logos of Russian media outlets in their products. Russia also likely seeks to eliminate the distinction between private, independent Western outlets and Kremlin-controlled Russian outlets by placing Russian content next to content from Western media outlets.[2]

• The Kremlin’s push for media agreements supports Russia’s larger campaigns to cultivate influence in certain regions and countries. These media cooperation agreements are often an integrated component of larger packaged deals. There is a clear alignment between Russia’s push in Southeast Asia and the appearance of media cooperation agreements with the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Similarly, media agreements with African countries supported the Kremlin’s push to expand its influence in Africa, a continental campaign that the authors have analyzed in detail.[3]

The Kremlin launched the campaign to cultivate partnerships with local media outlets around the world simultaneously with its revision of Russia’s Information Security Doctrine. The Kremlin revised and published its new doctrine in 2015 and 2016, respectively.[4] The new doctrine defined “growing bias with regards to Russia in the foreign media” and “international efforts to block the activity of Russian media” among Russia’s key challenges.[5] The Kremlin has likely assessed that it needs to create a global information space with lasting ties to local structures and to build media coalitions as essential requirements for securing Russia’s grand strategic objectives of reestablishing Russia as great power and ending “U.S. hegemony.”

The Kremlin’s overall strategic objective in the information space is to shape the narratives surrounding Russia’s and the West’s roles in the world, and to gain acceptance for Russia’s aggressive behavior. The Kremlin wages a wide array of information campaigns in support of various objectives, ranging from normalizing its violations of international norms to undermining the Western sanctions regime.

The Kremlin also has faced a number of setbacks and slowed efforts over the last five years. Russia’s push to sign cooperation agreements has the most momentum outside the West. Russia was able to secure partnership with only a handful of Western outlets. The Kremlin is also facing backlash against its efforts as evidenced by multiple incidents between 2016 and 2020. Estonia forced Russia to shut down its Sputnik office in Estonia in January 2020.[6] Latvia shut down nine Kremlin-linked channels in November 2019.[7] Lithuania deported Sputnik’s chief editor in Lithuania in May 2019.[8] A Bolivian television operator terminated RT broadcasting in November-December 2019.[9] The CEO of a major online news website in the Philippines publicly warned the Philippine government against sending its employees to get information training in Russia during a Philippine Senate hearing on fake news proliferation in January 2018.[10] A Slovakian media outlet revoked a partnership agreement with Sputnik after major pushback from the public in 2016.[11]

The Kremlin will continue to prioritize building out its information space in an effort to expand its global narratives and gain acceptance for Russia’s illegal behavior. The Kremlin might also use its partnerships with local media to obscure the origin of its disinformation campaigns. Most of the current Russian media partners attribute shared content to Russian outlets, as the Kremlin’s current priority is building out the Russian media brand, but this calculus might change. The Kremlin is also likely to double down on its journalism training efforts to cultivate an international cadre of journalists to spread Russian narratives and principles.

ISW will provide a more detailed analysis of the Kremlin’s evolution in the information space in a forthcoming paper focused on Putin’s geopolitical adaptations.

Appendix: Russia’s Media Cooperation Deals 

2015

Serbia – RT signed a content sharing agreement with Serbia’s Studio B public radio station in December 2014. Studio B started to broadcast RT’s Serbian language programs daily in January 2015.[12]

Egypt – Sputnik signed a memorandum of cooperation on information exchange and content sharing with Egypt’s Al-Ahram newspaper in February 2015. Translated Sputnik and RT stories appear in Bawaba Al-Ahram, the paper’s digital website, next to reporting from news agencies like Reuters.[13]

Mexico – The Rossiya Segodnya media group signed a cooperation agreement on Spanish-language content sharing with Mexico’s Notimex state news agency in April 2015.[14]

Cambodia – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on joint projects and content sharing with Cambodia’s Agence Kampuchea Press national press agency in November 2015.[15]

Indonesia – Radio Sputnik signed a content sharing agreement with Indonesia’s Antara news media company in December 2015.[16]

2016

Algeria – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing and joint media products with the Algeria Press Service in April 2016.[17] “Algeria and Russia are working together to build a multipolar and diverse world,” said Oleg Osipov, the Deputy Chief Editor of Rossiya Segodnya media group, which owns Sputnik.

Japan – Sputnik reported that it signed a cooperation agreement on joint projects with Japan’s Kyodo News agency in March 2016.[18] Kyodo News maintains a Sputnik-branded image library on its website.[19]

Syria – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing and joint projects with the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) in June 2016.[20]

Lebanon – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement with Lebanon’s Al Mayadeen TV in June 2016.[21]

Paraguay – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on joint projects and content sharing with Paraguay’s Secretariat of Information and Communication (SICOM) in June 2016. Under the agreement, Sputnik will share information and develop joint projects with the Paraguayan IP news agency, Paraguay TV channel, and Radio Nacional del Paraguay.[22]

Egypt – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing and joint projects with Egypt’s Akhbar Al-Yom newspaper in August 2016.[23]

Italy – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing and joint projects with Italy’s Askanews press agency in October 2016.[24]

2017

Myanmar – Russia’s Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Myanmar’s Ministry of Information in February 2017. The countries agreed to cooperate in the field of mass media.[25]

South Africa – Sputnik signed an agreement on content sharing and joint projects with South Africa’s SAN News government news agency in March 2017.[26]

Turkey – TASS signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing with Turkey’s state-run Anadolu news agency in March 2017.[27]

Cuba – Radio Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on joint radio broadcasting with Cuba’s state news agency Prensa Latina in March 2017.[28]

China – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing with China’s Global Times tabloid newspaper in April 2017.[29]

Iran – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing with the Iranian government-operated Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) in May 2017.[30]

Bulgaria – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing and joint projects with the Bulgarian Standart newspaper in May 2017.[31]

Vietnam – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing and joint projects with Vietnam News Agency, Vietnam’s government news agency, in June 2017.[32]

Mongolia – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing and joint projects with Mongolia’s Montsame, Mongolia’s state news agency, in September 2017.[33]

China – The Rossiya Segodnya media group signed a cooperation agreement with China’s Alibaba Group’s Alibaba Culture Communication aimed at “stimulating innovative processes of production and dissemination of the media content” in September 2017.[34]

Philippines – Russia and the Philippines signed an intergovernmental agreement on mass media cooperation as a part of a broader package in November 2017.[35]

Indonesia – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing with Indonesia’s JawaPos.com newspaper and Radio Republik Indonesia, a state-owned public radio network in December 2017. Sputnik provides Indonesian news outlets with textual journalism and radio broadcast segments.[36]

Malaysia – Sputnik signed an agreement on content sharing, journalistic support, and joint projects with Malaysia’s Bernama national news agency in December 2017.[37]

2018

Iran – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing and joint projects with Iran’s Mehr News Agency in January 2018.[38]

Iran – RT and the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) organization signed a MoU on media cooperation, specifically staff training, in March 2018.[39]

UAE – RT signed a memorandum of cooperation with UAE’s state news agency Emirates News Agency (WAM) to facilitate the exchange of information including news and broadcast content in February 2018.[40]

West Bank and Gaza – Sputnik and RT signed cooperation agreements on content sharing and joint projects with the Palestinian National Authority’s WAFA News Agency in February 2018.[41]

Armenia – Ruply signed a cooperation agreement on video content development with Armenia’s state-owned ARMENPRESS news agency in April 2018. The cooperation agreement aims at bringing ARMENPRESS videos up to "international standards."[42]

Cuba – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing, joint projects, and journalistic training with Cuba’s Institute of Radio and Television in June 2018.[43]

India – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing and joint projects with the Indian Asian News International (ANI) news agency in September 2018.[44]

China – China Media Group signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing and joint projects with Rossiya Segodnya media group in September 18.[45]

Philippines – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing and journalist exchanges with the Philippines News Agency (PNA), the official news agency of the Philippine government, in November 2018. PNA staff went to Moscow for training.[46]

Morocco – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing and journalist exchanges with Morocco’s government-run Agence Maghreb Arabe Presse (MAP) news agency in December 2018.[47]

2019

Indonesia – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing and joint projects with the Indonesian Sindonews.com news web portal in February 2019.[48]

Pakistan – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing with the Pakistani newspaper The Nation in February 2019.[49]

Uruguay – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on Spanish-language content exchange with Radiodifusión Nacional del Uruguay national public broadcaster in February 2019.[50]

Argentina – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing with Argentina’s Federal Media and Public Content System in February 2019.[51]

UAE – Sputnik signed a MoU on content sharing with the UAE’s state news agency, Emirates News Agency (WAM), in March 2019.[52]

India – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing with the United News of India news agency in May 2019. The agreement aims to develop "true democratization and the elimination of the Western media bias in presenting international information."[53]

Republic of the Congo – The Russian government signed a bilateral cooperation agreement with the government of the Republic of the Congo in May 2019. Russia and the Republic of the Congo plan to forge connections between their state news agencies and TV broadcasters, share media programs, develop joint projects, and train journalists. Russia claims it will provide the Congo technical assistance to switch to digital broadcasting.[54]

Democratic Republic of the Congo – Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on French- and English-language content sharing and joint programs with Radio-Television Nationale Congolaise, the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s state broadcaster, in May 2019.[55]

Eritrea – RT signed a cooperation agreement on training, program exchanges, and RT-provided sourcing with Eritrea’s state-owned television station Eri-TV in May 2019.[56]

Cote D'Ivoire – Radio Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement on French-language content sharing with Cote D'Ivoire’s Agence Ivoirienne de Presse (AIP) news agency in August 2019.[57]

China – Sputnik signed a memorandum of cooperation on content sharing with China’s Dongbeiwang (DBW), a major media outlet in northern China, in August 2019.[58]

Myanmar – Russia’s Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media signed a cooperation agreement with the government of Myanmar in September 2019. Under the agreement, RT and Myanmar will forge connections between their state news agencies, including Myanmar’s “Myawaddy” military television channel.[59]

China – Rossiya Segodnya media group reported that it signed a cooperation agreement on technological development and media content distribution with the Chinese Huawei company in September 2019. Huawei will provide Rossiya Segodnya its “latest technological solutions” to help produce and distribute media content, including though specialized mobile platforms.[60]

India – Sputnik and the Indian Zee Media Corporation Limited’s WION TV channel exchanged letters of intent on increasing Russian-Indian media content sharing in September 2019.[61]

DPRK – TASS signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing and journalist exchanges with North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) in October 2019.[62]

Saudi Arabia – Rossiya Segodnya media group signed a cooperation agreement on content sharing with Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Media Affairs in October 2019. Under the agreement, Saudi Arabia will host a Sputnik office.[63]

Panama – Sputnik signed a MoU on content sharing with Panama’s Agencia de Noticias Panamá news agency in October 2019.[64]

China – Sputnik and Chinese state-run Xinhua news agency signed an agreement on exchanging content in Spanish and Arabic in October 2019.[65]

BRICS – Sputnik convinced the BRICS group to endorse a plan to create a unified “fact-checking” platform to “counter the dissemination of false information” at the 11th BRICS summit in November 2019.[66]

Withdrawn Deals

Estonia – Sputnik’s office in Estonia ceased its operations on January 1, 2020 after approximately three dozen of its employees resigned. Sputnik Estonia’s employees said that their resignation was a direct result of pressure from Estonian police: "Estonia’s Police and Border Guard Board has presented each of us with an ultimatum…either we terminate our labor contracts...and no longer work for Sputnik Estonia or they open criminal cases against us." Estonian law enforcement sent Sputnik's Estonia a warning saying that staff members could face prosecution due to European Union sanctions against Russia in December 2019.[67]

Bolivia – Bolivia’s major private TV operator Cotas terminated RT Spanish broadcasts in Bolivia in December 2019.[68]

Latvia – Latvia’s broadcast regulator suspended in November 2019 the broadcasting of nine television channels owned by Yuri Kovalchuk. Kovalchuk is on the EU’s sanctions list for undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty.[69]

Lithuania – Lithuania’s Border Guard Service deported Marat Kasem, Sputnik’s chief editor in Lithuania, in May 2019 and banned Kasem from Lithuania for five years, claiming Kasem is a "threat to national security." A Vilnius court ruled to block Sputnik’s Lithuanian language website for repeatedly publishing protected content from the Lithuanian Radio and Television Commission without permission in July 2019.[70]

Mexico – The Russian embassy in Mexico claimed the Rossiya Segodnya media group signed a cooperation agreement on Spanish-language content sharing with Mexico’s Notimex state news agency in April 2019. The embassy has since deleted the statement, potentially indicating setbacks in the deal.[71]

Spain – Spain welcomed Russia’s offer to establish a joint Spanish-Russian cybersecurity group to combat misinformation in November 2018.[72] There is no indication from openly available information that the group has been created, however.[73]

Philippines – The CEO of a major online news website in the Philippines warned the Presidential Communications Operations Office against sending its employees to get information training in Russia during a Philippines Senate hearing on fake news proliferation in January 2018.[74] A senior Filipino communications official said RT offered to teach a "different kind of reporting" designed to “improve and share their best practices that are different compared to Western Media” to journalists working for Philippine government media outlets in October 2019.[75]

Slovakia – Slovakia’s TASR public news agency withdrew from a cooperation agreement on content sharing with Sputnik in March 2017 a day after the agreement was signed due to pushback from the public and Slovak government.[76]

Argentina – The government of Argentina almost expelled RT from Argentinean cable in June 2016. RT successfully turned the situation around and signed an expanded media cooperation agreement with Argentina in July 2016.[77]

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[1] “Sputnik School of Young Journalists Enrolls Students from 23 Countries,” Sputnik, October 31, 2017, https://sputniknews((.))com/agency_news/201710311058692476-sputnik-school-young-journalists/.
[2] Matt Robinson, “On Serbian Airwaves, a Battle for Heart of Balkans,” Reuters, May 3, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-serbia-russia-media-analysis/on-serbian-airwaves-a-battle-for-heart-of-balkans-idUSKBN17Z0X1; [“The International News Agency ‘Russia Segodnya” and “Al-Ahram’ Foundation Sign a Memorandum of Cooperation,”] Sputnik Arabic, November 2, 2015, https://arabic.sputniknews(.)com/arab_world/201502111013393610/; Nathaniel Greenberg, “Russian Influence Operations Extend into Egypt,” The Conversation, February 12, 2019, http://theconversation(.)com/russian-influence-operations-extend-into-egypt-111167; Nathaniel Greenberg, “Russia Opens Digital Interference Front in Libya,” MERIP, October 4, 2019, https://merip.org/2019/10/russia-opens-digital-interference-front-in-libya/.
[3] Nataliya Bugayova, Mason Clark, Michaela Walker, Andre Briere, Anthony Yanchuk, and George Barros, “The Kremlin’s Inroads after the Africa Summit,” Institute for the Study of War, November 8, 2019, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlins-inroads-after-africa-summit; Nataliya Bugayova and Darina Regio, “The Kremlin’s Campaign in Africa: Assessment Update,” Institute for the Study of War, August 2019, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20-%20The%20Kremlin%20Campaign%20in%20Africa%20-%20August%202019.pdf.
[4] [““Kommersant” became aware of the provisions of the new “Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation,”] Kommersant, October 9, 2015, https(:)//www.kommersant.ru/doc/2829842;[“Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated December 05, 2016 No. 646: On Approving the Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation,”] Kremlin, December 5, 2016, http://kremlin((.))ru/acts/bank/41460/page/2.
[5] [“Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated December 05, 2016 No. 646: On Approving the Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation,”] Kremlin, December 5, 2016, http://kremlin((.))ru/acts/bank/41460/page/2.
[6] “Russian News Agency Sputnik Closes Estonia Operations After Employees Quit,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, January 1, 2020. https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-news-agency-sputnik-closes-estonia-operations-after-employees-quit/30355321.html; [“MIA ‘Rossiya Segodnya’ Answered to the Lawlessness of the Estonian Regime: What Awaits Sputnik Estonia,”] Sputnik Estonia, December 31, 2019, https://ee.sputniknews(.)ru/estonian_news/20191231/18892543/V-MIA-Rossiya-segodnya-otvetili-na-bespredel-estonskogo-rezhima-chto-zhdet-Sputnik-Estoniya.html.
[7] Latvian Broadcast Regulator Suspends Nine Russian TV Channels,” Latvian Public Broadcasting, November 20, 2019, https://eng.lsm(.)lv/article/society/society/latvian-broadcast-regulator-suspends-nine-russian-tv-channels.a339012/.
[8] “Lithuania Expels Chief Editor Of Sputnik’s Local Branch,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, May 28, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/lithuania-expels-chief-editor-of-sputnik-local-branch/29968909.html; [“COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT DECISION TO BLOCK SPUTNIKNEWS.LT CAME INTO EFFECT IN 2019. JULY 12,”] Lithuanian Radio and Television Commission, July 12, 2019, https://www.rtk(.)lt/pranesimai-spaudai/del-autoriu-teisiu-pazeidimo-priimtas-sprendimas-blokuoti-interneto-svetaine-sputniknews-lt/; “Lithuania Arrests Local ‘Sputnik’ Editor-in-Chief, Barring Him from Country for Five Years as ‘National Security Threat,’” Meduza, May 28, 2019, https://meduza(.)io/en/news/2019/05/28/lithuania-arrests-local-sputnik-editor-in-chief-barring-him-from-country-for-five-years-as-national-security-threat.
[9] [“Russia Rejects Cessation of Signal to RT Station in Bolivia,”] Hoy Tamaulipas, November 28, 2019, https://www.hoytamaulipas(.)net/notas/403377/Rusia-rechaza-cese-de-senial-a-emisora-RT-en-Bolivia.html; [“Zakharova Commented on Disabling RT Broadcasting in Bolivia,”] Rossiya Segodnya, November 11, 2019, https://ria(.)ru/20191128/1561706279.html; “Bolivian TV Operator Shuts Down RT Spanish Broadcasts,” RT, November 27, https((:))//www.rt.com/news/474513-rt-spanish-bolivia-taken-off-air/.
[10] Camille Elemia, “PCOO Warned vs Getting info Dissemination Training from China, Russia,” Rappler, January 30, 2018, https://www.rappler(.)com/nation/194814-maria-ressa-pcoo-training-china-russia.
[11] [“Slovak TASR Canceled Cooperation with an Agency that Propagates pro-Kremlin Propaganda,”] Česká televise, March 30, 2017, https://ct24.ceskatelevize(.)cz/svet/2072052-slovensky-tasr-zrusil-spolupraci-s-agenturou-ktera-siri-prokremelskou-propagandu; “TASR Withdraws from Contract with pro-Putin Newswire,” The Slovak Spectator, March 30, 2017, https://spectator.sme(.)sk/c/20496508/tasr-withdraws-from-contract-with-pro-putin-newswire.html; “TASR Cancels Contract With Sputnik Under Pressure From Authorities,” Sputnik, March 30, 2017, https://sputniknews(.)com/agency_news/201703301052134354-tasr-sputnik-contracr/; “Slovak Agency To Cancel Contract With Russia's Sputnik After Uproar,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, March 30, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/slovakia-news-agency-cancels-sputnik-contract-russia/28400557.html; “Sputnik Signs Cooperation Agreement With Slovak News Agency TASR,” Sputnik, March 29, 2017, https(:)//sputniknews.com/art_living/201703291052069837-sputnik-slovak-news-cooperation/.
[12] “Russia Today Start Broadcasts from Serbia,” Balkan Insight, January 1, 2015, https://balkaninsight.com/2015/01/01/russia-today-starts-broadcast-on-belgrade-radio/; Matt Robinson, “On Serbian Airwaves, a Battle for Heart of Balkans,” Reuters, May 3, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-serbia-russia-media-analysis/on-serbian-airwaves-a-battle-for-heart-of-balkans-idUSKBN17Z0X1.
[13] Nathaniel Greenberg, “Russian Influence Operations Extend into Egypt,” The Conversation, February 12, 2019, http://theconversation(.)com/russian-influence-operations-extend-into-egypt-111167; Nathaniel Greenberg, “Russia Opens Digital Interference Front in Libya,” MERIP, October 4, 2019, https://merip.org/2019/10/russia-opens-digital-interference-front-in-libya/.
[14] [“Information on Annual Activities,”] Notimex, April 14, 2016, http://www.notimex.gob(.)mx/archivosTransparencia/Transparencia_00883.pdf; [“News Agencies Rossiya Segodnya and Notimex Sign Cooperation Agreement,”] Sputnik Latin America, April 29, 2015, https://mundo.sputniknews(.)com/america-latina/201504291036929149/.
[15] [“Sputnik Develops Collaboration with Cambodian Media,”] Ria Novosti, November 24, 2015, https://ria(.)ru/20151124/1327344874.html.
[16] [“Indonesia’s Leading Media Signs Cooperation Agreement with Sputnik,”] Sputnik, November 17, 2015, https://ru.sputnik((.))kg/world/20151117/1020169839.html; Sok Lou, Facebook, November 15, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/SokLouKampongthom/posts/645978238876456/.
[17] “Sputnik News Agency, Algerie Press Service Sign Cooperation Deal,” Sputnik, April 27, 2016, https://sputniknews((.))com/agency_news/201604271038709041-deal-press-sputnik/; “Moscow Region, Russia, 27th Apr 2016,” Alamy, April 27, 2016, https://www.alamy((.))com/stock-photo-moscow-region-russia-27th-apr-2016-abdelhamid-kacha-2nd-l-director-103081752.html.
[18] “Sputnik Starts Cooperation with japan’s Kyodo News Agency,” Sputnik, March 14, 2016, https://sputniknews(.)com/world/201603141036233903-sputnik-kyodo-cooperation-agreement/; [“Sputnik News,”] Kyodo News Imagelink, Accessed January 14, 2020, https://imagelink.kyodonews(.)jp/web-Sales/web/partner.html?p_name=rossiya_segodnya.
[19] [“Sputnik News,”] Kyodo News Imagelink, Accessed January 14, 2020, https://imagelink.kyodonews(.)jp/web-Sales/web/partner.html?p_name=rossiya_segodnya.
[20] “SANA and Sputnik Sign Cooperation Agreement,” SANA, June 6, 2016, https://sana(.)sy/en/?p=79471.
[21] “Sputnik Expands into Arab Countries,” Sputnik, June 6, 2016, https://sputniknews((.))com/agency_news/201606061040850152-sputnik-expands-arab-states/.
[22] “Sputnik Increases News Content in Spanish,” Sputnik, June 20, 2016, https://sputniknews(.)com/agency_news/201606201041624227-news-agency-spanish-content/.
[23] “Sputnik Expands Cooperation with Egypt,” Sputnik, August 15, 2016, https://sputniknews(.)com/agency_news/201608151044274652-cooperation-sputnik-egypt-media/; “Akhbar Al Youm Signs Cooperation Agreement with Sputnik, Editor-in-Chief Says we need ‘Other Aspects of the Truth,’” Enterprise, August 16, 2016, https://enterprise.press/stories/2016/08/16/akhbar-al-youm-signs-cooperation-agreement-with-sputnik-editor-in-chief-says-we-need-other-aspects-of-the-truth/.
[24] [“Sputnik Begins Cooperation with Askanews,”] Ria Novosti, October 20, 2016, https://ria(.)ru/20161020/1479632221.html; [“Askanews Signs Collaboration Agreement with Russian Sputnik,”] Askanews, October 20, 2016, https://www.askanews.it/esteri/2016/10/20/askanews-sigla-accordo-di-collaborazione-con-russa-sputnik-pn_20161020_00392/.
[25] “MoU Signed for Collaborative Development of Communication Sector,” Global New Light of Myanmar, February 17, 2017, https://www.globalnewlightofmyanmar.com/mou-signed-for-collaborative-development-of-communication-sector/.
[26] [“Sputnik Strengthens Relations with South African Media,”] Russia Segodnya, March 7, 2015, https://россиясегодня(.)рф/news/20170307/37651.html.
[27] “Russia’s TASS Signs Cooperation Deal with Turkey’s Anadolu News Agency,” RFERL, March 11, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-tass-signs-cooperation-agreement-anadolu-turkish-news-agency/28363230.html.
[28] [“On the Signing of a Cooperation Agreement Between Sputnik and Prensa Latina Agencies,”] Russian MFA, March 20, 2017, http://www.mid(.)ru/ru/maps/cu/-/asset_publisher/ZCoR8WfDPJng/content/id/2700393; [“Russian Propaganda Medium Joins Cuban Agency to Expand in Latin America,”] Radio Television Marti, March 21, 2017, https://www.radiotelevisionmarti.com/a/cuba-sputnik-prensa-latina-acuerdo-colaboracion/141466.html.
[29] “Global Times Begins Cooperation with Sputnik,” Global Times, April 19, 2017, http://www.globaltimes(.)cn/content/1043165.shtml; [“Sputnik Starts Partnership with China’s Global Times Online,”] Ria Novosti, April 19, 2017, https://ria((.))ru/20170419/1492502204.html.
[30] “IRNA, Sputnik Sign Cooperation Agreement,” Iran Daily, May 30, 2017, http://www.iran-daily(.)com/News/193832.html?catid=3&title=IRNA--Sputnik-sign-cooperation-agreement; “Sputnik Connects with Iran,” Sputnik, May 30, 2017, https://sputniknews((.))com/agency_news/201705301054114354-sputnik-connects-with-iran/.
[31] [“Sputnik is Expanding its Partnership Network in Eastern Europe,”] RIA, November 5, 2017, https((:))//ria.ru/20170511/1494115466.html; [“RIA Novosti and Standard Signed a Cooperation Agreement,”] Utro, May 12, 2017, https://utroruse.com/article/735282/; [“I am Honored to Partner with Sputnik,”] Bulgarian Journalist Union, May 15, 2017, http((:))//www.sbj-bg.eu/index.php?t=35511.
[32] “Vietnam News Agency Inks Cooperation Deal with Sputnik,” Vietnam News, June 30, 2017, http((:))//vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/379298/vietnam-news-agency-inks-cooperation-deal-with-sputnik.html.
[33] “MONTSAME and Sputnik Expand Their Cooperation,” Montsame, September 21, 2017, https://montsame(.)mn/en/read/131547; Montsame, Partnering Agencies page, accessed on January 14, 2020, https(:)//www.montsame.mn/en/more/411.
[34] [“Russia Today and Alibaba Start Cooperation,”] Rossiya Segodnya, September 6, 2017, https(:)//россиясегодня(.)рф/news/20170906/43902.html; [“Russian Sputnik News Agency and Alibaba Group Sign Strategic Cooperation Memorandum,”] Global News, September 6, 2017, https((:)//world.huanqiu(.)com/article/9CaKrnK54QF.
[35] Pia Ranada, “PH, Russia Sign 8 Agreements, including Extradition Treaty,” Rappler, November 14, 2017, https(:)//www.rappler.com/nation/188378-ph-russia-sign-bilateral-agreements;
Camille Elemia, “PCOO Warned vs Getting Info Dissemination Training from China, Russia,” Rappler, January 30, 2018, https(:)//www.rappler.com/nation/194814-maria-ressa-pcoo-training-china-russia; [“PH, Russia Communication Offices to Partner in Info Dissemination,”] Interaksyon, May 30, 2017, http(:)//www.interaksyon.com/breaking-news/2017/05/30/75431/ph-russia-communication-offices-to-partner-in-info-dissemination/; “Russia Today International Seminar in Moscow,” Facebook, Embassy of Russia in Nigeria, August 6, 2018, https://www.facebook.com/nigeria.mid.ru/photos/russia-today-international-seminar-in-moscowrt-channel-is-pleased-to-invite-jour/899398883583206/; “Russian Propaganda Arm RT to Train PH Gov’t Media,” Rappler, October 14, 2019, https://www.rappler.com/nation/242519-russian-propaganda-arm-rt-to-train-philippine-government-media.
[36] [“Indonesian Media will Receive Content from Sputnik,”] Rossiya Segodnya, December 18, 2017, https((:))//россиясегодня.рф/news/20171218/48497.html; Azer Parrocha, “Sputnik News Agency Eyes Expansion in SE Asia,” Philippine News Agency, November 2, 2018, https((:))//www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1052784; Puguh Hariyanto, “Spuntik to Expand Partner Network in Indonesia,” SINDOnews, February 20, 2019, https://en.sindonews.com/read/1380430/195/spuntik-to-expand-partner-network-in-indonesia-1550654071.
[37] “Sputnik is Expanding its Presence South-East Asia,” Rossiya Segodnya, December 17, 2017, https(:)//россиясегодня(.)рф/news/20171211/47919.html; “Bernama Signs MOU with Russia's Sputnik on 'News Exchange',” Malaysiakini, December 17, 2017, https((:))//www.malaysiakini.com/news/405103; Nikkei Asian Review, “Russia Courts Southeast Asian Partners with Authoritarian Streaks,” January 16, 2018, https((:))//asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Asia-Insight/Russia-courts-Southeast-Asian-partners-with-authoritarian-streaks.
[38] “Sputnik Boosts Media Cooperation with Iran,” Mehr News Agency, January 30, 2018, https(:)//en.mehrnews.com/news/131748/Sputnik-boosts-media-coop-with-Iran.https(:)//en.mehrnews.com/news/131748/Sputnik-boosts-media-coop-with-Iran
[39] “IRIB World Service, RT sign MoU to Boost Cooperation,” PressTV, March 12, 2018, https((:))//www.presstv.com/Detail/2018/03/12/555247/IRIB-Press-TV-RT-Peyman-Jebelli-Alexey-Nikolov-MoU; ‘IRIB World Service, RT sign MoU to Boost Cooperation,” Pars Today, March 12, 2018, https(:)//parstoday.com/en/news/iran-i78867-irib_world_service_rt_sign_mou_to_boost_cooperation.
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[56] “Eritrean Television and Russia Today (RT) Sign Cooperation Agreement,” Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, May 16, 2019, http://english.mofcom.gov(.)cn/article/newsrelease/counselorsoffice/westernasiaandafricareport/201905/20190502863438.shtml; “Eritrean TV (ERi-TV) and Russian Today (RT) Sign Cooperation Agreement,” East Afro, May 14, 2019, https://www.eastafro(.)com/2019/05/14/eritrean-tv-eri-tv-and-russian-today-rt-sign-cooperation-agreement.
[57] [“Sputnik Strengthens its Presence in Africa,”] Rossiya Segodnya, August 12, 2019, https://россиясегодня(.)рф/news/20190812/81857.html; [“Côte d'Ivoire / AIP signs a partnership with the Russian press agency Sputnik,”] Agence Ivoirienne De Presse, August 8, 2019, https://aip(.)ci/https-aip-ci-cote-divoire-laip-signe-un-partenariat-avec-lagence-de-presse-russe-sputnik/
[58] [“Sputnik Expands News Exchange With China's Regional Media,”] RIA Novosti, August 14, 2019, https://ria(.)ru/20190814/1557492868.html; [“DBW Signed a Contract with Russia Segodnya International News Agency to Strengthen Exchanges and Cooperation,”] DBW, August 14, 2019, https://heilongjiang.dbw(.)cn/system/2019/08/14/058246377.shtml.
[59] [“Russia and Myanmar Agree on Cooperation in the Field of Information and Communications Technology,”] Russian Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media, September 19, 2019, https://digital.gov(.)ru/ru/events/39342/; Kang Wan Chern, “Russia Offers to Help Myanmar with Digital Legislation, E-govt,” Myanmar Times, September 19, 2019, https://www.mmtimes(.)com/news/russia-offers-help-myanmar-digital-legislation-e-govt.html; “Officials from MoTC, MoI, Private Media Meet with Russian Deputy Minister,” The Republic of the Union of Myanmar Ministry of Information, September 19, 2019, https://www.moi.gov(.)mm/moi:eng/?q=news/19/09/2019/id-19171.
[60] “Huawei & Russian Media Group Rossiya Segodnya Sign Deal on Strategic Cooperation,” RT, September 4, 2019, https://www.rt(.)com/business/467970-huawei-rossiya-segodnya-deal/.
[61] [“A new partner appeared for Sputnik in India,”] Rossiya Segodnya, September 4, 2019, https://россиясегодня(.)рф/news/20190904/82637.html; “WION Ties up With Russian News Agency Sputnik,” DNA India, September 6, 2019, https://www.dnaindia(.)com/india/report-wion-ties-up-with-russian-news-agency-sputnik-2787739; “India-Russia ties were first cemented by pictures but of another kind: WION Editor-in-Chief Sudhir Chaudhary at Sputnik event,” WION, November 29, 2019, https://www.wionews(.)com/india-news/india-russia-ties-were-first-cemented-by-pictures-but-of-another-kind-wion-editor-in-chief-sudhir-chaudhary-at-sputnik-event-265328.
[62] “TASS, KCNA News Agencies Sign New Cooperation Agreement,” TASS, October 8, 2019, https://tass(.)com/society/1082121; Colin Zwirko, “N. Korea Hopes Russian State Media Helps Fight “Fake News” in DPRK Coverage: TASS,” NK News, October 9, 2019, https://www.nknews(.)org/2019/10/n-korea-hopes-russian-state-media-helps-fight-fake-news-in-dprk-coverage-tass.
[63] “MIA "Russia Today" will Open a Representative Office in Saudi Arabia,” RIA Novosti, October 14, 2019, https://ria(.)ru/20191014/1559780284.html; “Saudi Ministry Signs Media Cooperation Agreement with Russian News Agency,” Arab News, October 15, 2019, https://www.arabnews(.)com/node/1569041/media; “Saudi Ministry Signs Media Cooperation Ggreement with ‘Sputnik,’” Al Arabiya, October 15, 2019, http://english.alarabiya(.)net/en/media/television-and-radio/2019/10/15/Saudi-Ministry-signs-media-cooperation-agreement-with-Sputnik-.html.
[64] [“Sputnik Continues to Expand its Partner Network in Latin America,”] Rossiya Segodnya, October 9, 2019, https://ria(.)ru/20191101/1560473629.html; [“ANPanama and Sputnik Agency of Russia Sign Collaboration Agreement,”] ANPanama, October 10, 2019, https://anpanama(.)com/9013-ANPanama-y-Agencia-Sputnik-de-Rusia-firman-acuerdo-de-colaboracion.note.aspx; “Russian 'Propaganda Vehicle' Opens Offices in Saudi Arabia,” The New Arab, October 15, 2019, https://www.alaraby.co(.)uk/english/news/2019/10/15/russian-propaganda-vehicle-opens-offices-in-saudi-arabia.
[65] “Russia's Sputnik, China's Xinhua Sign Deal on Exchanging Content in Spanish, Arabic,” Sputnik, October 31, 2019, https://sputniknews(.)com/agency_news/201910311077188536-russias-sputnik-chinas-xinhua-sign-deal-on-exchanging-content-in-spanish-arabic/.
[66] [“Sputnik Continues to Expand its Partner Network in Latin America,”] Rossiya Segodnya, October 9, 2019, https://ria(.)ru/20191101/1560473629.html; “BRICS Nations' Media Outlets to Adopt Fact-Checking Platform at Suggestion of Sputnik,” Sputnik, November 1, 2019, https://sputniknews(.)com/world/201911011077199015-brics-nations-media-outlets-to-adopt-fact-checking-platform-at-suggestion-of-sputnik/; Sana Yamin, “BRICS Media to Adopt Fact-Checking Platform at Sputnik’s Suggestion,” ACE News, November 1, 2019, https://acenews(.)pk/brics-media-to-adopt-fact-checking-platform-at-sputniks-suggestion/; Janaína Camara da Silveira, “Time for BRICS Media Groups to Strengthen Cooperation,” China Daily, November 1, 2019, https://www.chinadaily.com(.)cn/a/201911/01/WS5dbb972ca310cf3e35574e55.html.
[67] “Russian News Agency Sputnik Closes Estonia Operations After Employees Quit,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, January 1, 2020. https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-news-agency-sputnik-closes-estonia-operations-after-employees-quit/30355321.html; [“MIA ‘Rossiya Segodnya’ Answered to the Lawlessness of the Estonian regime: What Awaits Sputnik Estonia,”] Sputnik Estonia, December 31, 2019, https://ee.sputniknews(.)ru/estonian_news/20191231/18892543/V-MIA-Rossiya-segodnya-otvetili-na-bespredel-estonskogo-rezhima-chto-zhdet-Sputnik-Estoniya.html.
[68] [“Russia Rejects Cessation of Signal to RT Station in Bolivia,”] Hoy Tamaulipas, November 28, 2019, https://www.hoytamaulipas(.)net/notas/403377/Rusia-rechaza-cese-de-senial-a-emisora-RT-en-Bolivia.html; [“Zakharova Commented on Disabling RT Broadcasting in Bolivia,”] Rossiya Segodnya, November 11, 2019, https://ria(.)ru/20191128/1561706279.html; “Bolivian TV Operator Shuts down RT Spanish Broadcasts,” RT, November 27, https((:))//www.rt.com/news/474513-rt-spanish-bolivia-taken-off-air/.
[69] “Latvian broadcast regulator suspends nine Russian TV channels,” Latvian Public Broadcasting, November 20, 2019, https://eng.lsm(.)lv/article/society/society/latvian-broadcast-regulator-suspends-nine-russian-tv-channels.a339012/.
[70] “Lithuania Expels Chief Editor Of Sputnik’s Local Branch,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, May 28, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/lithuania-expels-chief-editor-of-sputnik-local-branch/29968909.html; [“COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT DECISION TO BLOCK SPUTNIKNEWS.LT CAME INTO EFFECT IN 2019. JULY 12,”] Lithuanian Radio and Television Commission, July 12, 2019, https://www.rtk(.)lt/pranesimai-spaudai/del-autoriu-teisiu-pazeidimo-priimtas-sprendimas-blokuoti-interneto-svetaine-sputniknews-lt/; “Lithuania Arrests Local ‘Sputnik’ Editor-in-Chief, Barring Him from Country for Five Years as ‘National Security Threat,’” Meduza, May 28, 2019, https://meduza(.)io/en/news/2019/05/28/lithuania-arrests-local-sputnik-editor-in-chief-barring-him-from-country-for-five-years-as-national-security-threat.
[71] [“RIA Novosti and Notimex Sign Cooperation Agreement,”] Sputnik, May 11, 2010, https((:))//mundo.sputniknews.com/noticias/20100511126249156/; [“MIA Rossiya Segodnya and Notimex Agreed on Cooperation,”] Russian Embassy to Mexico, October 15, 2019, https://mexico.mid(.)ru/novosti/-/asset_publisher/nj5rNmPYOTCj/content/mia-rossia-segodna-i-agentstvo-notimex-dogovorilis-o-sotrudnicestve?_101_INSTANCE_nj5rNmPYOTCj.
[72] “Spain and Russia agree to Set up Joint Cybersecurity group,” Associated Press, November 6, 2018, https://apnews.com/00061a7eb8814fc38ebef55880c3fd18.
[73] [“The Russian Ambassador Calls Information about Russian Agents a ‘Fantasy,’”] Notimerica, November 22, 2019, https://www.notimerica(.)com/politica/noticia-rusia-embajador-ruso-tilda-fantasia-informaciones-agentes-rusos-proces-20191122135906.html.
[74] Pia Ranada, “Russian Propaganda Arm RT to Train PH Gov't Media,” Rappler, October 14, 2019, https://www.rappler(.)com/nation/242519-russian-propaganda-arm-rt-to-train-philippine-government-media; Pia Ranada, “PNA to Enter into 'News Exchange' deal with Russia's Sputnik,” Rappler, November 12, 2018, https://www.rappler(.)com/nation/216496-philippine-news-agency-deal-russia-sputnik; Camille Elemia, “PCOO Warned vs Getting info Dissemination Training from China, Russia,” Rappler, January 30, 2018, https://www.rappler(.)com/nation/194814-maria-ressa-pcoo-training-china-russia.
[75] Pia Ranada, “Russian Propaganda Arm RT to Train PH gov't Media,” Rappler, October 14, 2019, https://www.rappler(.)com/nation/242519-russian-propaganda-arm-rt-to-train-philippine-government-media.
[76] [“Slovak TASR Canceled Cooperation with an Agency that Propagates pro-Kremlin Propaganda,”] Česká televise, March 30, 2017, https://ct24.ceskatelevize(.)cz/svet/2072052-slovensky-tasr-zrusil-spolupraci-s-agenturou-ktera-siri-prokremelskou-propagandu; “TASR Withdraws from Contract with pro-Putin Newswire,” The Slovak Spectator, March 30, 2017, https://spectator.sme(.)sk/c/20496508/tasr-withdraws-from-contract-with-pro-putin-newswire.html; “TASR Cancels Contract With Sputnik Under Pressure From Authorities,” Sputnik, March 30, 2017, https://sputniknews(.)com/agency_news/201703301052134354-tasr-sputnik-contracr/; “Slovak Agency To Cancel Contract With Russia's Sputnik After Uproar,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, March 30, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/slovakia-news-agency-cancels-sputnik-contract-russia/28400557.html; “Sputnik Signs Cooperation Agreement With Slovak News Agency TASR,” Sputnik, March 29, 2017, https(:)//sputniknews.com/art_living/201703291052069837-sputnik-slovak-news-cooperation/.
[77] “Argentina Announces Suspension Of Russia's RT TV Broadcasts,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, June 11, 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/argentina-announces-suspension-russian-state-rt-news-broadcasts/27791747.html; “RT, Argentina Reach Broadcasting Agreement, Expand Cooperation,” July 22, 2016, https://www.rt(.)com/about-us/press-releases/rt-argentina-cooperation-agreement/.

Iraq Situation Report: January 7 - 9, 2020

By Brandon Wallace and Katherine Lawlor

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is assessing the ongoing unrest in Iraq and its effects on political-security dynamics. The Iraq Situation Report (SITREP) series summarizes key events and likely developments to come. This Iraq SITREP map covers the period January 7 - 9, 2020.

Key Takeaway: President Donald Trump declined to retaliate for an Iranian attack in Iraq that caused no casualties, thereby de-escalating immediate hostilities. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) launched at least 16 ballistic missiles targeting the al-Assad base in Anbar and U.S. personnel in Arbil on January 8 in retaliation for the U.S. strike that killed Qassem Soleimani. American defensive preparations prevented casualties. Meanwhile, Iranian proxies’ behavior indicates that Iran is exerting control to prevent further immediate escalation and may be organizing a new effort to expel U.S. forces violently. Finally, Iraqi President Barham Salih approved a list of new Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) judges from major political blocs. Saleh’s action rebuffs protesters’ demands for a fully independent IHEC.

Click the image to view the enlarged Iraq Situation Report Map.

Iraq Situation Report: January 4 - 6, 2020

By Katherine Lawlor, Brandon Wallace, and Jason Zhou

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is assessing the ongoing unrest in Iraq and its effects on political-security dynamics. The Iraq Situation Report (SITREP) series summarizes key events and likely developments to come. This Iraq SITREP map covers the period January 4 - 6, 2020.

Key Takeaway: Iraq’s parliament passed a non-binding resolution to revoke U.S. and coalition basing privileges in retaliation for the U.S. strike that killed Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani and Popular Mobilization Commission Deputy Chairman Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis. It is unclear whether Iraq’s caretaker Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mehdi can legally rescind the executive agreement that underpins the U.S. military presence in Iraq, given his resignation on November 29, 2019. Meanwhile, Iraq’s highest Shi’a religious authority offered Iran’s Supreme Leader condolences for Soleimani’s death in a letter, marking the first public contact between the rival Shi’a religious leaders.

Click the image to view the enlarged Iraq Situation Report Map.

Iranian Escalation Timeline

By Nicholas Heras, Frederick Kagan, Kyra Rauschenbach, and Jason Zhou 

This analysis is co-published by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute.

Iran has been escalating its attacks on American and allied targets since May 2019. Iran has shot down an American drone, attacked American bases with rockets culminating in the death of an American contractor, and assaulted the U.S. Embassy in Iraq. These Iranian attacks established the context for the U.S. drone strike that killed Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) commander Qassem Soleimani and leading Iranian proxy in Iraq Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis on January 3, 2020. Iran’s escalations occurred in phases and were part of an orchestrated campaign to achieve its strategic objectives, including sanctions relief and the ouster of the U.S. from Iraq and the region. The graphic below illustrates those phases.

Click the image to view the enlarged timeline graphic.

 

Syria Situation Report: December 17, 2019 - January 7, 2020

By Michael Land (ISW Syria Team), Nada Atieh (Syria Direct), Calvin Wilder (Syria Direct), and William Christou (Syria Direct)

The following Syria Situation Report (SITREP) Maps summarize significant developments in the war in Syria during the periods December 17 - 28, 2019 and December 29, 2019 - January 7, 2020. Key SITREP events during these periods include Russian President Vladimir Putin's first visit to Syria since 2017, continued protests in Southern Syria against the Bashar al-Assad and Iranian regimes, an ISIS bombing attack in Eastern Syria, and pro-Assad regime forces' preparation for operations near Aleppo City in Northern Syria.

Click the images to view enlarged versions of the maps.

Map 1: December 17 - 28, 2019

Map 2: December 29, 2019 - January 7, 2020

Iraq Situation Report: December 27, 2019 - January 3, 2020

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is assessing the ongoing unrest in Iraq and its effects on political-security dynamics. The Iraq Situation Report (SITREP) series summarizes key events and likely developments to come. These Iraq SITREP maps cover the period from December 27, 2019 - January 3, 2020. 

December 27-31, 2019

Key Takeaway:  Iran’s proxies triggered a series of violent reprisals with the U.S. in Iraq by killing an American contractor and wounding multiple American soldiers in a proxy rocket attack in Kirkuk Province on December 27. The U.S. conducted multiple airstrikes against the Iranian proxy militia Katai’b Hezbollah (KH) in Syria and Iraq in response on December 28 in an attempt to deter further attacks. Instead, KH then organized an attack on the U.S. embassy in Baghdad on December 31 in a clear threat of future violence.

By: Brandon Wallace, Katherine Lawlor, and Jason Zhou

January 01-03, 2020

Key Takeaway: The United States killed Iranian IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani and several senior proxy militia officials, including Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, in a drone strike outside of Baghdad International Airport. The strike places the months-long U.S.-Iranian escalation cycle on an unprecedented trajectory. Iranian reprisals for the death of their second most important figure will include leveraging Iranian influence in the Iraqi parliament and proxy militia groups to expel U.S. troops from Iraq, thereby precluding the U.S. from sustaining its mission in Syria which depends on Iraqi basing. 

By: Katherine Lawlor

Iraq's Parliament Votes to End U.S. Troop Presence in Iraq

By Katherine Lawlor

Key Takeaway: Iraq’s Parliament, the Council of Representatives (CoR), passed a non-binding resolution to cancel the request for military aid from the government of Iraq to the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition. The resolution does not require a U.S. withdrawal, which only the Prime Minister can order by rescinding the 2014 executive agreement with the U.S.. It is unclear whether caretaker Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mehdi has the authority to do so. The CoR resolution sets political conditions to justify subsequent Iranian proxy attacks on U.S. forces and installations, however. Nationalist Shi’a Cleric Muqtada al Sadr also called for the mobilization of new “resistance” groups to support such attacks.

Iraq’s parliament passed a non-binding resolution rejecting the presence of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq. 172 members of the Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) convened on Sunday, January 5 in an “extraordinary session” to discuss the U.S. airstrike that killed Iranian IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Committee Deputy Chief and Kata’ib Hezbollah commander Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis on January 3, 2020. Kurdish political parties boycotted the session, as did many Sunni political parties. Caretaker Prime Minister (PM) Adel Abdul Mehdi submitted the resolution. It passed with 170 votes.[1]

The resolution does not require an immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces. The CoR’s resolution asks the Government of Iraq (GoI) to cancel the 2014 military aid request from the GoI to coalition forces.[2] The resolution states that the GoI “must work to end the presence of any foreign troops on Iraqi soil and prohibit them from using its land, airspace or water for any reason."[3] It also calls on the Iraqi government to establish a timetable for the withdrawal of all foreign troops. The CoR cannot itself cancel the 2014 request for coalition support, which requires executive action from the PM. It is unclear if PM Mehdi has the legal authority to do so given his status as a caretaker PM. Mehdi resigned on November 29, 2019 during mass protests.

Nationalist Cleric Muqtada al-Sadr may participate in attacks on US forces and installations. The leader of Sadr’s Toward Reform bloc issued a statement to the CoR on Sadr’s behalf that included demands for an even greater response. In addition to withdrawing from U.S. security agreements, Sadr called for the immediate closure of the “Embassy of American Evil in Iraq,” the closure of U.S. bases in the country, the “humiliating expulsion” of U.S. troops, the “criminalization” of any communication with the U.S. government, and the boycott of American products.[4] In a tweet following the session, Sadr condemned the CoR resolution as insufficient and called on “the Iraqi resistance factions in particular and the factions outside of Iraq for an immediate meeting to announce the formation of “international resistance groups.”[5]

Implications: This resolution renders the maintenance of a U.S. or coalition military presence in Iraq politically difficult but does not yet legally require a U.S. withdrawal. However, it solidifies the Iranian narrative of a U.S. “occupation” of Iraq and sets political conditions to justify subsequent attacks on U.S. forces across the Middle East. These escalations will likely come not only from Iran’s direct proxy militias, but also from a pan-Shi’a resistance movement that Muqtada al-Sadr is now attempting to generate. The Iraqi Security Forces have up until this point depended on coalition military support to sustain pressure on the Islamic State (ISIS). Any withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq offers ISIS increased freedom of movement and improves conditions for ISIS to reconstitute itself inside of Iraq and Syria.

Note: A previous version of this piece incorrectly stated that the Status of Forces Agreement between the U.S. and Iraq was still in place. After 2011, executive agreements between the Prime Minister of Iraq and the United States have permitted U.S. forces to operate in Iraq. The piece has been updated to reflect this correction.

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[1] DO NOT GO TO SITE: “Shiite MPs draft legislation seeking to expel US troops from Iraq” Rudaw, 05 January 2020. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/05012020
[2] “Iraqi Lawmakers Urge End U.S. Troop Presence as Iran Mourns a Slain General,” New York Times, 05 January 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/world/middleeast/iran-general-soleimani-iraq.html
[3]“Iraqi Parliament Passes Resolution to End Foreign Troop Presence,” Voice of America, 05 January 2020. https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/voa-news-iran/iraqi-parliament-passes-resolution-end-foreign-troop-presence
[4] DO NOT GO TO SITE: Iraqi Council of Representatives Readout of CoR Session, 05 January 2020. http://ar.parliament.iq/2020/01/05/%d9%85%d8%ac%d9%84%d8%b3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%86%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%a8-%d9%8a%d8%b5%d9%88%d8%aa-%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%89-%d9%82%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d9%86%d9%8a%d8%a7%d8%a8%d9%8a-%d8%a8%d8%a5%d9%86%d9%87%d8%a7%d8%a1/
[5] Muqtada al-Sadr Twitter 05 January, 2020: @Mu_AlSadr https://twitter.com/Mu_AlSadr/status/1213829592789782529

Syria Situation Report: December 4 - 17, 2019

By Michael Land (ISW Syria Team) and Nada Atieh (Syria Direct)

The following Syria Situation Report (SITREP) Map summarizes significant developments in the war in Syria during the period December 4 - 17, 2019. Key SITREP events include an expansion of the anti-Bashar al-Assad regime insurgency in Southern Syria, joint Assad regime-Russia airstrikes in Idlib Province, and Russia-Turkey cooperation in reopening a section of the M4 Highway in Northern Syria.

Click the image to view an enlarged version of the map.

Iraq Situation Report: December 10 - 18, 2019

By Brandon Wallace and Katherine Lawlor

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is assessing the ongoing unrest in Iraq and its effects on political-security dynamics. The Iraq Situation Report (SITREP) series summarizes key events and likely developments to come. This Iraq SITREP map covers the period December 10 - 18, 2019.

Key Takeaway: Iraq’s political elite has oriented around three initiatives to placate protesters before holding new parliamentary elections: 1) to create a new electoral commission to oversee future elections; 2) to pass an electoral law reforming how seats are won in the parliament, and 3) to choose a prime minister to replace the resigned, but still caretaker, PM Adel Abdul Mehdi until elections occur. Iraq’s parliament, the Council of Representatives (CoR), approved a new electoral commission on December 5. The CoR twice failed to reach consensus on a new election law before the scheduled votes on December 11 and 18. President Barham Salih extended the deadline to select a replacement prime minister but attempted to pass his constitutional responsibility to identify the largest parliamentary bloc to the CoR speaker. Neither official has identified the largest bloc and no coalition has consolidated around any one candidate, exacerbating infighting among political elites and their militias. Iran’s proxy militias, meanwhile, continue to deliberately and violently target three groups—protesters, nationalist Shi’a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and his supporters, and the U.S.-led Coalition—in order to drive political action in Iran’s favor. Sadr, who is in Iran, willingly or unwillingly made two concessions in the face of Iranian pressure: shutting down his popular Facebook page and closing some offices affiliated with the Sadrist Movement for a period of one year. Sadr, however, retains his core sources of political power: his militia, his personal brand, and popular religious veneration for his family. Sadrist parliamentarians continue to oppose all PM candidates proposed by Iran-friendly political parties.

11 Dec: Iraqi Parliament Fails to Vote on Electoral Reform. The Council of Representatives (CoR) convened in a scheduled session to vote on an electoral reform law but adjourned after failing to hold a vote. Members of Parliament (MPs) stated that the disagreement between blocs is primarily over Article 15 of the bill, which will determine what percentage of MPs will derive from party lists or independent candidacies. All current MPs won their seats by party list and wish to maintain the status quo. Sadr’s populist Toward Reform bloc is the only party advocating for abolishing list-based voting completely.

15 Dec: President Salih Attempts to Dodge Constitutional Requirements and Deadlines. Iraqi President Barham Salih sent a formal letter requesting that CoR Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi identify the largest bloc in the CoR. The President of Iraq is constitutionally responsible for inviting the largest bloc within the CoR to designate a prime minister, who then has 30 days to form a Council of Ministers. President Salih never formally identified the largest bloc during the 2018 elections, but rather allowed an informal coalition to nominate the consensus candidate, Adel Abdul Mehdi. Salih stated in his letter to Halbousi that the resignation letter of Caretaker PM Mehdi reached the President’s office on December 4, not December 1 as previously understood. Salih used this legal loophole to extend the 15-day deadline to nominate a new PM to December 19.

16 Dec: Parliament Ducks Salih’s Request. CoR Speaker Halbousi did not respond to President Salih’s letter, but CoR Deputy Speaker and Toward Reform member Hassan al-Kaabi responded to President Salih’s request with a formal letter stating that Salih had been “notified” of the largest bloc following the 2018 election. Kaabi implied that the largest bloc which elected current Caretaker PM Mehdi could again choose a new PM. The coalition of parties which compromised to elect Mehdi has since splintered into opposing blocs.

13-16 Dec: Political Blocs and Grand Ayatollah Sistani Reject Possible PM Deal. Iran-friendly Conquest Alliance (47 parliamentary seats) likely floated the name of Mohammed Shi’a al-Sudani as a replacement PM candidate. Sudani immediately resigned from the Dawa Party and the State of Law Alliance (25 seats) in order to appear more independent. Iranian proxy militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) organized a protest march in Central Baghdad in support of Sudani on December 14. Anonymous sources in Najaf close to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani told AFP that Sistani vetoed Sudani as a candidate. One hundred seventy members of the CoR also reportedly signed a petition on December 16 stipulating that the new PM must not be a member of a political party, must not have held any political office since 2003, and must not hold dual citizenship—stipulations which Sudani clearly does not meet. Sudani has served in multiple cabinet and elected positions since 2003. One hundred sixty-five MPs constitute the absolute majority required in Iraq’s parliament in order to approve a new government. Demonstrators have vocally denounced Sudani.

18 Dec: Political Blocs Provide Last-Minute Candidates as Acceptable Replacements for PM Deal. Several political blocs and independent candidates put forward names to fill the PM post in the hours before the December 19 deadline to designate a new prime minister. Iran-friendly parties State of Law (25 seats) and Conquest Alliance (47 seats) put forward a new candidate, Qusay al-Suhail, who is the current Minister of Higher Education in PM Mehdi’s caretaker government. He is a former member of Sadr’s Toward Reform party but left to join the State of Law Coalition. Alternatively, a representative of Wisdom Trend (29 seats) suggested that Mustafa al-Kadhimi, the current head of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, has the best chance of becoming PM because he is not linked to any political party. Political blocs did not vocally reject Kadhimi. Current MP Faiq Sheikh Ali also announced his independent candidacy in a letter to President Salih. Ali is a proponent of electoral reform, a secular liberal, and a longstanding critic of the Iraqi political establishment. He enjoys a significant social media following but has not yet been backed by a powerful bloc.

18 Dec: Parliament Fails Again to Vote on Electoral Reform. The CoR held two consecutive sessions in a failed attempt to pass an electoral reform bill. The CoR voted in the first session to pass just 14 of the 50 total articles comprising the pending bill, stopping short of the key reform. CoR Speaker Halbousi immediately started a new session, but the total number of present MPs fell from 224 to 207. Halbousi received requests to postpone votes on Articles 15 and 16 for further discussion and amendment, but only 71 of the 207 MPs voted to postpone. Halbousi, however, was forced to abruptly end the session because the CoR lost quorum. The CoR is scheduled to reconvene on December 23.

11-13 Dec: Demonstrators Kill and Lynch Boy. Unidentified demonstrators killed and lynched a 16-year-old from a traffic light near Wathba Square in Central Baghdad on December 11. The boy reportedly fired a weapon into the air in order to deter protesters from congregating near his home. Protesters then swarmed and stabbed him repeatedly before hanging his body from a lamp post. Police were present at the scene but did not intervene. Nationalist Shi’a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr stated that if the persons responsible for the killing were not found within 48 hours, he will order the Blue Hats to withdraw from the square. The Blue Hats are a reference to men loyal to the Sadrist Movement who wear blue baseball caps and are under orders to protect protesters. Some Blue Hats have been given training by Sadr’s militia, Saraya al-Salam. The Blue Hats reportedly conducted a de facto citizens’ arrest of four people on December 13 in relation to the December 11 attack.

13 Dec: Sadr Attempts to Deescalate With Some Concessions, But Retains Key Capabilities. Moqtada al-Sadr closed a massively popular Facebook page that he uses to communicate with followers following targeted violence by Iranian proxy militias. The page, “Mohammed Saleh al-Iraqi,” posted one word: “Goodbye.” It has not yet been updated. Sadr also issued an official statement announcing the closure of the offices of the Sadrist Movement for one year. Sadr notably “excluded” his personal office, thereby retaining his personal brand; the shrines of his father and two brothers, thereby retaining his religious influence; and the Saraya al-Salam militia, thereby retaining his ability to participate in armed conflict. The members of Sadr’s political party, Toward Reform, continued to participate normally in parliamentary proceedings.

10-16 Dec: Iranian Proxies Continue Targeted Attacks on Protesters. Iranian proxies escalated their campaign against activists and organizers in Baghdad and across Southern Iraq using kidnappings, knives, guns, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Militias are identifying protesters through security cameras and government databases, according to Iraqi newspaper al-Mada. The widespread kidnappings, torture, and assassinations targeted at least 18 activists and their families between December 10-16 in Baghdad, Basra, and Diwaniyah. Most of these incidents are not reported to authorities. Hundreds of protesters are reportedly still missing following recent kidnappings in Baghdad alone. Several activists were immediately admitted into intensive care units following their release.

10-13 Dec: Iranian Proxy Forces Exchange Assassination Attempts with Sadrists Following Clashes in Baghdad. Likely Iranian proxy militias detonated an IED targeting the home of a Sadrist official in Amarah, Maysan Province, after midnight on December 10. Likely Sadrist Saraya al-Salam militants detonated three IEDs on the same night in Amarah targeting the leader of local Iranian proxy militia Ansar Allah al-Awfiya', a medical complex affiliated with Iranian proxy AAH, and an unspecified local AAH leader. Masked gunmen, likely from Iranian proxy militias AAH and Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), clashed with unarmed Sadrist Blue Hats in Central Baghdad on December 6. Assessed Iranian proxies performed a drive-by shooting targeting a vehicle containing the son of Ja'far al-Musawi, a spokesman for the Sadrist movement, in the Zafaraniya District in Baghdad on December 13. Musawi’s son survived.

11 Dec: Iranian Proxies Conduct Another Rocket Attack Near Baghdad International Airport. Iranian proxy militias, assessed to be KH and AAH, fired two Katyusha rockets which struck the “outside perimeter” of Baghdad International Airport near a base holding U.S.-led Coalition forces. The rockets caused no significant damage. This latest attack brings the total number of attacks on or near Coalition positions to at least ten since protests began in October.

11-15 Dec: U.S. Officials Openly Identify and Call Out Iran for its Proxy Violence toward Coalition Soldiers. Anonymous senior U.S. military officials told Reuters and the New York Times on December 11 that Iranian proxy militias, specifically KH and AAH, are to blame for the recent rocket attacks on facilities housing American personnel in Iraq. At least 11 separate rocket attacks have targeted such facilities since early October. U.S. officials said that Iranian proxy militias are approaching a “red line.” Secretary of State Michael Pompeo warned in an official statement on December 13 that “any attacks by [Iran], or [its] proxies of any identity, that harm Americans, our allies, or our interests will be answered with a decisive U.S. response.” U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper spoke with PM Mehdi by phone on December 15 and asked Iraq to help prevent such attacks.

Russia in Review: The Kremlin's Block in the Balkans

Russia in Review is a weekly intelligence summary (INTSUM) produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This ISW INTSUM series sheds light on key trends and developments related to the Russian government’s objectives and its efforts to secure them. Receive future Russia in Review INTSUM products via-email by signing up for the ISW mailing list.

Authors: Nataliya Bugayova and Anthony Yanchuk

Key Takeaway: The Kremlin is increasing its influence in Serbia in support of Russia’s strategic objective – preventing the Balkan states from integrating with the West. The Kremlin secured new security and economic deals with Serbia. The Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) signed a free trade agreement with Serbia. Russia is launching new infrastructure and energy projects, including a nuclear research center. Russia has sold Serbia advanced air defense systems and signed several agreements with Serbian law enforcement agencies. The Kremlin is also using its information operations to undermine the normalization of the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo. The normalization talks have stalled for over a year now, which precludes either Kosovo or Serbia from joining the European Union (EU). The Kremlin is facing some pushback to its efforts in the Balkans, including its attempts to further deepen military cooperation with Serbia and expand the EEU in the Balkans. These setbacks reveal the limitations of Russia’s value proposition – even to its close partners – and provide an opportunity for the West to counter the Kremlin’s subversion.

The Kremlin is raising the threshold of its military cooperation with Serbia, where Russia likely seeks to establish a military footprint in the long term. Russia deployed Pantsir and S-400 air defense systems to Serbia during the “Slavic Shield-2019” joint exercises from October 24-27.[1] This deployment marked the first time Russia used these systems in military exercises outside of Russia and Crimea, Ukraine (illegally occupied by Russia).[2] Serbia purchased the Pantsir system from Russia following the drills, which Russia says it will deliver in coming months.[3] Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic expressed his desire on December 2 to buy the more advanced S-400, but complained about the system’s high cost.[4] Russia likely seeks to use military exercises and sales of advanced weapons to set conditions for a long-term Russian military presence in Serbia. A strategic Russian military position in Serbia would be an inflection. It would enable Russia to pressure NATO from within its geographical boundaries and to block Balkan states’ integration with the EU – an objective of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The Kremlin’s outreach in Serbia also supports a wider effort to expand Russia’s military footprint through the deployment of additional S-400 systems. Russia has advanced this effort this year in the Arctic, and in Kaliningrad. Russia has also boosted sales of the S-400 to other countries, including U.S. partners Turkey (a NATO member) and India.[5] Russia will also likely use joint air defense drills like “Slavic Shield” to market its air defense systems to other countries.

Western actions and exposed Russian influence campaigns in Serbia are likely slowing the Kremlin’s recent push to expand its military ties with Serbia. Vucic walked back his statement regarding a future S-400 purchase. He said on December 3 that Serbia will stop buying arms and refocus on modernizing its military.[6] Vucic’s statement might have been a result of the U.S. cautioning Serbia against buying the S-400, citing a “risk” of sanctions.[7] Vucic also said on December 7 that he “could not confirm” Serbia’s plans to jointly produce military equipment with Russia – contradicting a December 4 statement by the Serbian ambassador to Russia who said that Russia and Serbia had plans for joint production of weapons.[8] Vucic continues to attempt to balance between Russia and the West.

Covert Russian efforts to court Serbian military officials have also been exposed recently, straining Serbian-Russian ties. Serbian investigators stated on November 21 that former Russian Assistant Military Attaché to Serbia Lt. Col Georgy Kleban bribed Serbian military officials.[9] Vucic later confirmed the allegations.[10]

Putin attempted to smooth over tensions during his meeting with Vucic on Dec 4.[11] Russia delivered four Mi-35M helicopters on December 2 previously purchased by Serbia ahead of schedule, likely to set favorable conditions before the meeting.[12] Putin also assured Vucic that Russia would support Serbia’s energy needs.[13] Serbia currently depends on Russian gas supplies.[14] Russia will likely continue pushing for an S-400 deal if only to increase acceptance for lower profile Russian activities in Serbia, such as the sale of Pantsir systems and other types of military support.

Russia is simultaneously expanding its influence over Serbian law enforcement using the umbrella of counter-terrorism cooperation. Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev and Serbian Interior Minister Nebojsa Stefanovic signed two agreements on November 20 to fight organized crime and terrorism.[15] The Serbian Ministry of Justice signed a cooperation agreement with the Russian Prosecutor General office to expand Russian-Serbian judicial cooperation on cybersecurity, drug trafficking, and accelerated criminal proceedings on September 27.[16] The Kremlin is using cooperation on counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, and drug trafficking – areas in which Russia is often a malign actor – as a means to pull countries into Kremlin-led partnerships and narratives, as well as to expand influence over the bureaucracies of its partner states.

The Kremlin is expanding the range of economic instruments it uses in its campaign to prevent the Balkan states’ integration with Western economic structures.

The Kremlin is attempting to expand the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in the Balkans. Serbia and the EEU signed a free trade agreement (FTA) on October 25.[17] The EU would require Serbia to nullify the FTA to obtain full membership in the EU.[18] The EU warned Serbia of this condition prior to the signing of the FTA with Russia.[19] Serbia is not the EEU’s only target. Russia invited Albania and North Macedonia to sign FTA agreements with the EEU after French President Emmanuel Macron blocked Albania’s and North Macedonia’s EU membership talks on October 30.[20] Northern Macedonia declined Russia’s offer and Albania reaffirmed its commitment to the EU.[21]

The Kremlin will also likely leverage the new free-travel zone between Serbia, Albania, and North Macedonia to expand its influence in Albania and North Macedonia through Serbia. The three countries signed an agreement to create a “mini-Schengen” on October 10 that emulates the European Schengen Zone and allows the free movement of capital, goods, services, and people across national borders.[22] Officials in Kosovo – which shares borders with the three states – warned that the “mini-Schengen” enables Russian and Chinese influence in the Balkans.[23]

The Kremlin is unlikely to sway the Balkans away from their EU aspirations through the EEU, but Russia will attempt to expand the EEU’s geopolitical weight. The EEU’s value proposition remains limited. The EU is the Balkans states’ main trading partner. Serbia sells $13 billion in goods to the EU annually, compared to $1.1 billion in goods sold to the EEU.[24] The economic benefits of this FTA for Serbia are also nominal.[25] Serbia already had free trade agreements with three of the five EEU members.[26] The Kremlin, however, is using FTAs as a vehicle to expand the EEU, as Russia’s initial push to engage countries through formal membership failed.[27] The EEU signed an FTA with Singapore, began preferential trade with Iran in October 2019, and is negotiating future FTAs with numerous countries.[28]

Russia is expanding its influence over Serbian infrastructure and energy. Russian Railways signed a $230 million deal with Serbia on October 19 to modernize rail from Belgrade to the border with Montenegro and to build a rail logistics center.[29] Russia will provide Serbia with $179 million in credits to finance these projects. Russian Railways may also take over the management of a portion of Serbian railways through a future concession agreement. Several Russian companies producing railway and automotive equipment plan to localize production in Serbia.[30] Russia is additionally expanding its energy ties in Serbia. Russia’s state atomic energy corporation Rosatom signed an agreement in October to build a nuclear research center in Serbia.[31] The research center will host a reactor and labs to train specialists on nuclear energy.[32] The Kremlin is engaged in a global effort to cultivate nuclear energy markets. Rosatom signed multiple similar agreements with African countries this year.[33] Rosatom likely aims to secure a deal to build a nuclear power plant in Serbia. Rosatom is currently building numerous power plants in Europe, including in Finland and Hungary. Russia likely seeks to make Serbia more dependent on Russian products and services, and expand its physical presence in Serbia through infrastructure projects.

The Kremlin is boosting Serbia’s campaign to deny the legal status of Kosovo in the information space. Russia maintains a stake in preventing diplomatic normalization between Serbia and Kosovo that could enable one or both of them to join the EU. The Kosovo-Serbia peace talks have stalled for more than a year.[34] American and European officials have stated that Serbia must recognize Kosovo’s independence in order to join the EU.[35]

The Kremlin supports Serbia’s campaign to frame Kosovo as an illegitimate entity. Russian officials called Kosovo a “quasi-state entity” on September 5 and added that the “growing number of countries, which revoked recognition of Kosovo’s ‘independence,’ confirms this [status as a ‘quasi-state entity’].”[36] Kremlin-run media outlets also amplify often inaccurate reports from Serbian officials about additional countries’ withdrawals of recognition of Kosovo.[37] The Kremlin has long opposed the independence of Kosovo as an “illegal unilateral action” imposed by NATO on Serbia in 1999.[38] The Kremlin also likely fears that recognition of Kosovo would embolden similar independence claims by autonomous regions in Russia in the long term.

The West should counter the Kremlin’s efforts to curb the Balkan states’ aspirations to integrate with the EU and NATO. The Kremlin will continue to use a diverse toolkit, including economic influence (especially energy) and its information operations, to undermine progress towards normalization between Serbia and Kosovo and hinder the EU and NATO in the Balkans. Russia’s recent outreach in Serbia, however, demonstrates the limitations of the Russian value proposition. It also demonstrates that the West has more leverage than it often perceives to curb the Kremlin’s subversive efforts.

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[1] “Russia, Serbia Follow ‘Slavic Shield’ With Second Joint Military Drill,” The Moscow Times, November 11, 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes(.)com/2019/11/01/russia-serbia-follow-slavic-shield-with-second-joint-military-drill-a68000; “Crimean air defense troops start drills with S-400 missile systems,” TASS, February 8, 2019, https(:)//tass.com/defense/1043788.
[2] [“S-400 division and a ‘Pantsir-S’ battery of the Russian Aerospace Forces are transferred to Serbia, where they will take part for the first time in exercises in the territory of a foreign state,”] Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, October 24, 2019, https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12258382@egNews.
[3] “Serbia To Receive Russian Antiaircraft Missiles Despite U.S. Sanctions Risk,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, November 7, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-to-receive-russian-anti-aircraft-missiles-despite-u-s-sanctions-risk/30257307.html.
[4] “Serbia To Receive Russian Antiaircraft Missiles Despite U.S. Sanctions Risk,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, November 7, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-to-receive-russian-anti-aircraft-missiles-despite-u-s-sanctions-risk/30257307.html; [“Serbia expressed interest in purchasing S-400,”] Izvestia, December 2, 2019, https://iz(.)ru/949683/2019-12-02/v-serbii-vyrazili-zainteresovannost-v-pokupke-s-400. Aleksandar Vasovic, “Serbia faces risk of U.S. sanctions over Russian arms deal,” Reuters, November 8, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-serbia-usa-sanctions/serbia-faces-risk-of-u-s-sanctions-over-russian-arms-deal-idUSKBN1XI199; “Serbia gives up purchase of S-400 systems over threat of US sanctions,” TASS, November 6, 2019, https://tass(.)com/defense/1087242.
[5] Jeremy Chin, “Russia Deploys Fourth S-400 Battalion in Crimea,” Missile Threat: CSIS Missile Defense Project, November 29, 2018 https://missilethreat.csis.org/russia-deploys-s-400-air-defense-system-battalion-in-crimea/; “Russia deploys a battery of S-400 missile systems in Kaliningrad region,” UAWIRE, March 16, 2019, https://uawire(.)org/russian-deploys-a-battery-of-s-400-missile-systems-in-kaliningrad-region; [“The Ministry of Defense Deployed S-300 Missile System to the Afghan Border,”] RBK, October 26, 2019, https://www.rbc(.)ru/politics/26/10/2019/5db412c19a7947180b68e72c; Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India's plan for S-400 gets boost from Turkey's defiance on US sanctions,” The Economic Times, June 25, 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes(.)com/news/defence/indias-plan-for-s-400-gets-boost-from-turkeys-defiance-on-us-sanctions/articleshow/69932396.cms?from=mdr.
[6] Maja Zivanovic, “Serbia to Stop Buying Weapons, President Says,” Balkan Insight, December 3, 2019, https://balkaninsight.com/2019/12/03/serbia-to-stop-buying-weapons-president-says/.
[7] Aleksandar Vasovic, “Serbia faces risk of U.S. sanctions over Russian arms deal,” Reuters, November 8, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-serbia-usa-sanctions/serbia-faces-risk-of-u-s-sanctions-over-russian-arms-deal-idUSKBN1XI199; “US cautions Serbia against acquiring ‘significant Russian military systems,’” The Defense Post, November 10, 2019, https://thedefensepost(.)com/2019/11/10/us-serbia-russia-military-systems-pantsir-s-400/.
[8] “Serbia: Vucic denied joint production of weapons with Russia,” Nuova Europa, December 7, 2019, http://www.ansa(.)it/nuova_europa/en/news/sections/politics/2019/12/07/serbia-vucic-denied-joint-production-of-weapons-with-russia_69cf1a66-e74e-4b78-9dbb-062e560472e2.html; “Serbia Exploring Possibility of Purchasing Russian MC-21,” Sputnik News, December 6, 2019, https://sputniknews(.)com/military/201912061077494387-serbia-exploring-possibility-of-purchasing-russian-mc-21/; [“RTV (Serbia): what did the meeting between Putin and Vučić bring to Serbia?”] Inosmi, December 8, 2019, http://www.inosmi(.)info/rtv-serbiya-chto-prinesla-serbii-vstrecha-putina-i-vuchicha.html.
[9] Aleksandar Vasovic, “Serbia's president accuses Russia of spying,” Reuters, November 21, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-serbia-russia-intelligence-kremlin/serbias-president-accuses-russia-of-spying-idUSKBN1XV129.
[10] “Serbia's president Aleksandar Vucic confirms Russian spy operation after bribe video,” DW, November 21, 2019, https://www.dw(.)com/en/serbias-president-aleksandar-vucic-confirms-russian-spy-operation-after-bribe-video/a-51359672
[11] [“Vladimir Putin in Sochi receives President of Serbia Alexander Vucic,”] First Channel, December 4, 2019, https://www.1tv(.)ru/news/2019-12-04/376834-vladimir_putin_v_sochi_prinimaet_prezidenta_serbii_aleksandra_vuchicha.
[12] [“Vuchich thanked Russia for the early delivery of Mi-35 helicopters,”] RIA Novosti, December 4, 2019, https://ria(.)ru/20191204/1561944054.html; Maja Zivanovic, “Serbia to Stop Buying Weapons, President Says,” Balkan Insight, December 3, 2019, https://balkaninsight.com/2019/12/03/serbia-to-stop-buying-weapons-president-says/.
[13] [“RTV (Serbia): what did the meeting between Putin and Vučić bring to Serbia?”] Inosmi, December 8, 2019, http://www.inosmi(.)info/rtv-serbiya-chto-prinesla-serbii-vstrecha-putina-i-vuchicha.html.
[14] “Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security,” Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, January 10, 2018, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf.
[15] “Serbia’s Minister signs two security deals in Moscow,” N1, November 20, 2019, https://rs.n1info(.)com/English/NEWS/a545609/Serbia-s-Interior-Minister-signs-two-Belgarde-Moscow-deals-on-security-issues.html; [“Heads of Security Councils of the Russian Federation and Serbia agree to cooperate in the fight against crime and terrorism,”] TASS, November 22, 2019, https://tass(.)ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/7178665.
[16] “MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND PROSECUTOR-GENERAL’S OFFICE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION SIGN A COOPERATION AGREEMENT,” Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Serbia, September 27, 2019, https://www.mpravde.gov(.)rs/en/vest/26935/ministry-of-justice-and-prosecutor-generals-office-of-the-russian-federation-sign-a-cooperation-agreement.php.
[17] “Serbia Signs Trade Agreement With Russia-Led Eurasian Economic Union,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, October 25, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-to-ink-trade-agreement-with-russia-led-eurasian-economic-union/30235917.html.
[18] Milica Stojanovic, “Serbia Signs Trade Deal With Russia’s Eurasian Union,” Balkan Insight, October 25, 2019, https://balkaninsight(.)com/2019/10/25/serbia-signs-trade-deal-with-russias-eurasian-union/; Dominik Istrate, “Serbia signs FTA with Eurasian Economic Union,” Emerging Europe, October 28, 2019, https://emerging-europe.com/news/serbia-signs-fta-with-eurasian-economic-union/.
[19] “EU warns Belgrade over free trade deal with Russia’s Eurasia,” Euractiv, October 22, 2019, https://www.euractiv(.)com/section/politics/news/eu-warns-belgrade-over-free-trade-deal-with-russias-eurasia/.
[20] “European Union warned of 'historic mistake' as Emmanuel Macron blocks Balkan enlargement talks,” The Telegraph, October 18, 2019, https://www.telegraph.co(.)uk/news/2019/10/18/europe-union-warned-historic-mistake-emmanuel-macron-blocks/; James McAuley, “France’s Macron Wants to Make it Harder to get into the E.U. Club,” Washington Post, November 22, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/frances-macron-wants-to-make-it-harder-to-get-into-the-eu-club/2019/11/22/27a4ac76-0bb5-11ea-8054-289aef6e38a3_story.html, Aleksandar Borisov, [“Albania and North Macedonia were invited to the EAEU,”] Rossiskaya Gazeta, October 10, 2019, https://rg(.)ru/2019/10/30/albaniiu-i-severnuiu-makedoniiu-pozvali-v-eaes.html; “No Consensus – Three EU Countries Oppose Accession Talks with Albania and N. Macedonia,” Exit News, October 15, 2019, https://exit(.)al/en/2019/10/15/no-consensus-three-eu-countries-oppose-accession-talks-with-albania-and-n-macedonia/.
[21] Guy Delauney, “European snub to North Macedonia fuels frustration in Balkans,” BBC News, November 2, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50260379; Georgi Gotev, “Albania offers first comments on Macron’s enlargement damper,” Euractive, October 31, 2019, https://www.euractiv(.)com/section/enlargement/news/albania-offers-first-comments-to-macrons-enlargement-damper/.
[22] Luke Bacigalupo, “Western Balkans: A ‘Mini-Schengen’ Zone,” Global Risk Insights, October 20, 2019, https://globalriskinsights(.)com/2019/10/western-balkans-a-mini-schengen-zone/.
[23] [“‘Mini-Schengen’ as a door for Russia and China in the Balkans,”] Bota Sot, November 21, 2019, https://www.botasot(.)info/lajme/1190719/mini-shengeni-si-dere-per-rusine-dhe-kinen-ne-ballkan/.
[24] Misha Savic and Gordana Filipovic, “Serbia Inks Deal With Russia’s Answer to the EU Following Snub,” Bloomberg, October 25, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-25/serbia-to-ink-deal-with-russia-s-answer-to-the-eu-following-snub.
[25] EEU member states include Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.
[26] Serbia has an EEU with Russia, Belarus and KZ “Free Trade Investments,” Development Agency of Serbia, Accessed December 13, 2019, https://ras.gov(.)rs/export-promotion/free-trade-agreements.
[27] Golam Mostafa and Monowar Mahmood, “Eurasian Economic Union: Evolution, challenges and possible future directions,” Sage Journal of Eurasian Studies, July 1, 2018, https://journals.sagepub(.)com/doi/full/10.1016/j.euras.2018.05.001; Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, “The Eurasian Economic Union: Deals, Rules and the Exercise of Power,” Chatham House, May 2017, https://www.chathamhouse(.)org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-05-02-eurasian-economic-union-dragneva-wolczuk.pdf.
[28] George Barros and Nataliya Bugayova, “Russia in Review: The Kremlin's Outreach to Singapore,” Institute for the Study of War, October 18, 2019, https://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/10/russia-in-review-kremlins-outreach-to.html, “Interim Agreement leading to formation of a free trade area between the Eurasian Economic Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, of the other part,” Eurasian Economic Commission, Accessed December 13, 2019, http://www.eurasiancommission(.)org/ru/act/trade/dotp/Pages/%d0%92%d1%80%d0%b5%d0%bc%d0%b5%d0%bd%d0%bd%d0%be%d0%b5-%d1%81%d0%be%d0%b3%d0%bb%d0%b0%d1%88%d0%b5%d0%bd%d0%b8%d0%b5-%d1%81-%d0%98%d1%80%d0%b0%d0%bd%d0%be%d0%bc.aspx, [“EAEU sets deadline for creating free trade zones with Singapore and Egypt,”] RBK, September 30, 2019, https://www.rbc(.)ru/politics/30/09/2019/5d891b059a79470807abedb7?from=from_main, Chhut Bunthoeun, “Nation set to ink agreement with Russia-led economic bloc,”Khmer Times, November 6, 2019, https://www.khmertimeskh(.)com/657467/nation-set-to-ink-agreement-with-russia-led-economic-bloc/, “Trade agreement with EAEU officially declared to Iranian customs,” Tehran Times, November 8, 2019, https://www.tehrantimes(.)com/news/441768/Trade-agreement-with-EAEU-officially-declared-to-Iranian-customs.
[29] [“Russian Railways and the Government of Serbia agree on the modernization of the railway line from Belgrade to the border with Montenegro,”] Investing, October 20, 2019, https://ru.investing(.)com/news/economy/article-1922906, [“Russian Railways and Serbia agree to implement a number of railway projects,”] RIA Novosti, October 19, 2019, https://ria(.)ru/20191019/1559979230.html.
[30] [“We take a loan from Russia for the construction of a railway of 172 million euros,”] Nova Ekonomija, November 4, 2019, https://novaekonomija(.)rs/vesti/vesti-iz-zemlje/od-rusije-uzimamo-kredit-za-izgradnju-%C5%BEeleznice-od-172-miliona-evra; Zeeshan Aziz, “Moscow, Belgrade Sign Agreements On Export Loan, Localization Of Russian Enterprises,” UrduPoint, October 19, 2019, https://www.urdupoint(.)com/en/business/moscow-belgrade-sign-agreements-on-export-lo-741267.html; “MIL-OSI Russia: The Ministry of industry and trade: some Russian companies interested in placing production in Serbia,” Foreign Affairs, October 20, 2019, https://foreignaffairs.co(.)nz/2019/10/22/mil-osi-russia-the-ministry-of-industry-and-trade-some-russian-companies-interested-in-placing-production-in-serbia/.
[31] “Medvedev’s visit to Serbia,” Accessed December 13, 2019, Government of the Republic of Serbia, https://www.srbija.gov(.)rs/specijal/en/59887.
[32] “Russia, Serbia to build nuclear research centre,” World Nuclear News, October 21, 2019, https://www.world-nuclear-news(.)org/Articles/Russia-Serbia-to-build-nuclear-research-centre?feed=feed; “Russia, Serbia sign deal on cooperation in construction of Center for Nuclear Science, Technology and Innovations,” NS Energy, October 21, 2019, https://www.nsenergybusiness(.)com/news/russia-serbia-sign-deal-on-cooperation-in-construction-of-center-for-nuclear-science-technology-and-innovations/; “Serbia, Russia sign interstate agreements,” Government of the Republic of Serbia, January 27, 2019, https://www.srbija.gov(.)rs/vest/en/136133/serbia-russia-sign-interstate-agreements.php. Serbia’s nuclear aspirations with Russia began when the two states signed a cooperation agreement during Vladimir Putin’s visit to Serbia on January 17.
[33] Nataliya Bugayova, Mason Clark, Michaela Walker, Andre Briere, Anthony Yanchuk, and George Barros, “The Kremlin’s Inroads After the Africa Summit,” Institute for the Study of War, November 8, 2019, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlins-inroads-after-africa-summit.
[34] Misha Savic, “”Kosovo’s Election Winner Signals Tough Stance Toward Serbia,” Bloomberb, October 6, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-06/kosovo-opposition-wins-election-that-may-help-bid-for-eu-nato.
[35] “US diplomat pushes for return to Kosovo-Serbia dialogue,” Prishtina Insight, November 11, 2019, https://prishtinainsight(.)com/us-diplomat-pushes-for-return-to-kosovo-serbia-dialogue/; Snezana Bjelotomic, “Palmer: ‘Serbia will not join the EU unless it recognizes Kosovo’s independence,’” Serbian Monitor, November 4, 2019, https://www.serbianmonitor(.)com/en/palmerserbia-will-not-join-the-eu-unless-it-recognizes-kosovos-independence/; Fatos Bytyci, “Serbia must accept Kosovo independence to join EU: German foreign minister,” Reuters, February 14, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kosovo-germany-serbia/serbia-must-accept-kosovo-independence-to-join-eu-german-foreign-minister-idUSKCN1FY329.
[36] Russian Mission OSCE, Twitter, September 6, 2019, https://twitter.com/RF_OSCE/status/1169899455383887876?s=20.
[37] Talha Ozturk, “Ghana withdraws recognition of Kosovo: Report,” AA, November 13, 2019, https://www.aa(.)com.tr/en/africa/ghana-withdraws-recognition-of-kosovo-report/1643753; Agata Palikova, “15 countries, and counting, revoke recognition of Kosovo, Serbia says,” Euractiv, August 27, 2019, https://www.euractiv(.)com/section/enlargement/news/15-countries-and-counting-revoke-recognition-of-kosovo-serbia-says/; “Nauru withdraws recognition of Kosovo’s independence, Pristina denies,” N1, November 22, 2019, http://rs.n1info(.)com/English/NEWS/a546106/Dacic-says-95-countries-do-not-recognise-Kosovo-as-state-after-Nauru-s-withdrawal.html; “Serbia’s gratitude for Suriname’s decision to revoke recognition of the unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, November 2, 2017, http://www.mfa(.)gov.rs/en/press-service/statements/17134-serbias-gratitude-for-surinames-decision-to-revoke-recognition-of-the-unilaterally-declared-independence-of-kosovo; [“Dacic: Burundi withdraws recognition, fragile independence of Kosovo,”] N1, February 17, 2018,
http://rs.n1info(.)com/Vesti/a365229/Dacic-o-godisnjici-proglasenja-nezavisnosti-Kosova.html;
“’We’re Friends of All, Enemies of None’: Papua New Guinea Foreign Minister,” Sputnik News, November 14, 2018, https://sputniknews(.)com/interviews/201811141069786451-papua-new-guinea-russia/; [“The Kingdom of Lesotho withdrew recognition of Kosovo,”] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, October 16, 2018, http://www.mfa(.)gov.rs/sr/index.php/pres-servis/saopstenja/20377-2018-10-16-15-46-59?lang=lat; [“Union Chamber withdraws recognition of Kosovo,”] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, November 7, 2018, https://www(.)srbija.gov.rs/vest/343004/unija-komora-povukla-priznanje-kosova.php; “Another county no longer recognizes Kosovo- FM announces,” B92 News, November 2, 2018, https://www(.)b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2018&mm=11&dd=02&nav_id=105442=lat; “Grenada retracts recognition of Kosovo, N1 Belgrade, November 4, 2018, ”http(:)//rs.n1info.com/English/NEWS/a433192/Grenada-retracts-recognition-of-Kosovo.html; Xhemajl Rexha, [“Exclusive: Solomon Islands notify Kosovo government of withdrawal of recognition,”] Koha net, December 2, 2018, https(:)//www.koha.net/arberi/132175/ekskluzive-ishujt-solomon-e-njoftojne-qeverine-e-kosoves-per-terheqjen-e-njohjes/; Renaud Raharijaona, [Serbia announces Madagascar cancels recognition of Kosovo,”] Orange Madagascar, December 8, 2018, https://actu.orange.mg/la-serbie-annonce-que-madagascar-annule-sa-reconnaissance-du-kosovo/; [“Republic of Palau annuls recognition of Kosovo,”], Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, January 21, 2019, http://www.mfa(.)gov.rs/sr/index.php/pres-servis/saopstenja/20782-2019-01-21-12-28-27?lang=cyr; Eve-anna Travers “Kosovo’s foreign policy ‘needs a software update,’”] Pristina Insights, August 2, 2019, https://prishtinainsight.com/kosovos-foreign-policy-needs-a-software-update-mag/; [“Republic of Naurus recognizes the Republic of Kosovo,”] Office of the President of Kosovo, February 17, 2008, https://www.president-ksgov.net/?page=1,6,860; “Ghana withdraws recognition of Kosovo as an independent state,” November 12, 2019, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Ghana-withdraws-recognition-of-Kosovo-as-independent-state-798367#; Rudic Filip, Die Morina, “Kosovo Accuses Serbia of Bribing Countries with Arms,” Balkan Insight, July 23, 2018, https://balkaninsight.com/2018/07/23/kosovo-says-serbia-bribing-countries-with-arms-07-23-2018/
[38] [“Speech by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation A. Lukashevich at a Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council on the 20th Anniversary of the NATO Bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,”] Russian Foreign Ministry, March 30, 2019, http://www.mid(.)ru/web/guest/vistupleniya_rukovodstva_mid/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/3595333.

Iraq Situation Report: November 29 - December 9

By Jason Zhou, Brandon Wallace, and Katherine Lawlor

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is assessing the ongoing unrest in Iraq and its effects on political-security dynamics. The Iraq Situation Report (SITREP) series summarizes key events and likely developments to come. This set of Iraq SITREP maps covers the period November 29 - December 9, 2019.

NOVEMBER 29 - DECEMBER 2 MAP

DECEMBER 3 - 5 MAP

DECEMBER 6 - 9 MAP