Russia in Review: Balkans Campaign Update

Russia in Review is a weekly intelligence summary (INTSUM) produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This ISW INTSUM series sheds light on key trends and developments related to the Russian government’s objectives and its efforts to secure them. Receive future Russia in Review INTSUM products via-email by signing up for the ISW mailing list.

Authors: Michaela Walker, Andrea Snyder, Darina Regio, and Nataliya Bugayova

Key Takeaway: Russia has sustained its campaigns to prevent the expansion of NATO and the EU in the Balkans. The Kremlin is expanding its outreach in Serbia even as EU-mediated negotiations fail to restart talks between Serbia and Kosovo. The Kremlin is also leveraging favorable political actors to block the integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina with NATO and the EU. The Kremlin has supported secessionist powerbrokers and militarization programs that could reignite ethnic tensions in Bosnia with repercussions for the fragile stability of the wider Balkans. The Kremlin could attempt to connect its military and energy projects in Serbia and Bosnia to gain greater influence in the Balkans.

Europe is struggling to restart normalization talks between Kosovo and Serbia. Germany and France hosted a summit in Berlin on April 29 - 30 to restart negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia. The summit failed to achieve progress on key items including border demarcation, trade normalization, and Serbia’s non-recognition of Kosovo. Kosovar and Serbian delegates roundly criticized one another and their hosts but agreed to meet again in Paris in July 2019. Previous negotiations stalled in November 2018 when Kosovo imposed a 100% tariff on goods from Serbia after Serbia blocked Kosovo’s bid to join Interpol. The Kosovar Parliament voted to transform the Kosovo Security Force into the Kosovo Armed Forces in December 2018, prompting Serbia to threaten military intervention.

The stalled talks are expanding friction between Kosovo, Serbia, and the EU. Kosovar President Hashim Thaci stated that the EU is “too weak” and “not united” to deliver a successful deal and called for a “leading role” for the U.S. on May 2. Thaci asserted that “Kosovo remains the most isolated country in Europe thanks to Europe.”[1] Kosovar officials also blamed EU High Representative Federica Mogherini for the challenges in Kosovo’s integration into the EU.[2] Meanwhile, Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic accused France and Germany of using the talks to pressure Serbia to recognize Kosovo.[3] Dacic specifically called for a larger role for Russia.[4] Serbian Defense Minister Aleksandar Vulin stressed on May 2 that Serbia will find a “way to be wanted by other big and powerful countries” if Europe “does not want” Serbia.[5] Both Serbia and Kosovo have been increasingly critical of the EU.

The Kremlin will likely act to exploit these tensions between Kosovo, Serbia, and the EU to block further expansion by the EU and NATO. Russia holds a core strategic objective to halt the expansion of the EU and NATO in the Balkans. It thus maintains a stake in preventing diplomatic normalization between Serbia and Kosovo that could enable one or both of them to join the EU. The Kremlin has also long opposed the independence of Kosovo as an “illegal unilateral action” imposed by NATO on Serbia in 1999.[6] Russian President Vladimir Putin himself has consistently asserted that the intervention by NATO in Kosovo was a blatant abuse of international law by the U.S. that disregarded the interests of Russia. The Russian Parliament recently approved a bill calling on Europe to “condemn NATO’s aggression against Yugoslavia” in March 2019.[7] The Kremlin also likely fears that recognition of Kosovo would embolden similar independence claims by autonomous regions in Russia in the long term. Russia will likely continue to use diplomatic pressure to undermine progress towards normalization between Serbia and Kosovo and hinder the EU and NATO in the Balkans.

The Kremlin is increasingly prioritizing outreach to Serbia as its preferred partner in the Balkans. Putin met with Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic during the One Belt One Road Forum on April 26.[8] Putin previously offered several major deals to Vucic during a “historic visit” to Serbia on January 17 including $1.4 billion in energy infrastructure investment and implied support for a bid by Serbia to join the TurkStream Pipeline.[9] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Dacic held an extensive bilateral meeting on April 14.[10] The Kremlin will also reportedly dispatch new Russian Ambassador to Serbia Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko in June 2019.[11] Putin will leverage this growing relationship to expand his influence in the Balkans and block positive momentum between Kosovo and Serbia as previously assessed by ISW.

Pro-Russian Bosnian Presidency Chairman Milorad Dodik is similarly stalling the integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the EU and NATO. Dodik asserted that he would block any steps to incorporate Bosnia into NATO on April 25. Dodik is also likely sabotaging closer ties between Bosnia and the EU. He submitted an incomplete and overdue questionnaire to the EU Commission regarding the potential accession of Bosnia to the EU in March 2019. He also presided over government deadlock that led to Bosnia’s temporary suspension from the Council of Europe in April 2019.[12] Dodik will retain his rotating position until July 2019. Bosnia remains far from achieving membership in the EU and NATO but its continued disunity will only further impede its progress towards the West to the advantage of the Kremlin.

Dodik has also intensified secessionist rhetoric that threatens to destabilize Bosnia. Dodik is a proponent (and former leader) of the Republika Srpska - the political entity for Serbs within Bosnia. He expressed disillusionment with a united Bosnia and called for the unification of all Serbs on March 24.[13] He also condemned the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords (which ended the Bosnian War) for creating a “divided society” and dysfunctional federal government unable to develop a common future for Bosnia.[14] Dodik has advocated for an independent Republika Srpska and its potential unification into a Greater Serbia - an idea also propagated by nationalist Russians linked to the Kremlin.[15]

Dodik is likely attempting to build an independent military force to support his aspirations for the Republika Srpska. The Republika Srpska National Assembly voted to add more than 1,000 reserve officers to the existing 7,000 Republika Srpska Police on April 18.[16] Republika Srpska Interior Minister Dragan Lukac justified the increase as a response to the migrant crisis in Southern Europe.[17] The move nonetheless raised fears of militarization across Bosnia. The Bosnian Muslim Party for Democratic Action stated that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina - the second political entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina - “will be forced” to implement its own auxiliary police if the Republika Srpska did not halt its expansion of the Republika Srpska Police.[18] Neither the Federation nor the Republika Srpska can legally operate independent militaries since their integration into the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2006. The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords also restrict the size and capabilities of military forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Kremlin will likely leverage its ties with Dodik to advance its strategic objectives in the Balkans. The Kremlin openly opposes the accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina to NATO.[19] The Kremlin will likely maintain its support for Dodik, who advocates for continued close ties between Russia and the Republika Srpska.[20] The Kremlin will also likely support these irregular forces in the Republika Srpska. ISW has assessed that the Russian Security Services were training local “special police” units in Republika Srpska in 2018. Russia also allegedly trains military personnel from Serbia who then develop paramilitary groups in the Republika Srpska.

The Kremlin could ultimately use its footprint in Bosnia as a vector to destabilize neighboring states as well as the wider structures of the EU and NATO. The Kremlin could push for deeper interconnections between Serbia and the Republika Srpska, including military support and participation in joint energy projects such as the TurkStream Pipeline.[21] The Kremlin could also ultimately seek to undermine the 1995 Dayton Accords (which it currently claims to support) as part of its global campaign to reverse the wider international order built after the Cold War, which Putin perceives as unfair and disadvantageous to Russia.[22] ISW will continue to examine additional indicators to assess with a higher degree of confidence the Kremlin’s intent for the Dayton Accords and Greater Serbia.

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[1] “Pristina: EU Keeps Silent About Serbia’s ‘Anti-European Behavior’,” N1, May 2, 2019, http://rs.n1info(.)com/English/NEWS/a480674/Pristina-accuses-Brussels-for-ignoring-Serbia-s-anti-European-behaviour.html.
[2] Ibid.
[3] “Serbia’s FM: Berlin Summit Isn’t Format for Belgrade - Pristina Talks,” N1, April 30, 2019, http://rs.n1info(.)com/English/NEWS/a480148/Berlin-summit-not-good-format-for-Belgrade-Pristina-talks-FM-says.html.
[4] [“Speech and Answers to Media Questions by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov During a Joint Press Conference Following Talks with First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia I. Dacic,”] Russian Foreign Ministry, April 17, 2019, http://www.mid(.)ru/ru/maps/rs/-/asset_publisher/GLz7aPgDnSfP/content/id/3618519?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_GLz7aPgDnSfP&_101_INSTANCE_GLz7aPgDnSfP_languageId=ru_RU.
[5] “Serbia Def Min: If Europe Doesn’t Want Us, Someone Does,” N1, May 2, 2019, http://rs.n1info(.)com/English/NEWS/a480770/Minister-says-if-Europe-doesn-t-want-Serbia-there-is-someone-who-does.html.
[6] [“Speech by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation A. Lukashevich at a Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council on the 20th Anniversary of the NATO Bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,”] Russian Foreign Ministry, March 30, 2019, http://www.mid(.)ru/web/guest/vistupleniya_rukovodstva_mid/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/3595333.
[7] “Russia’s Upper House Calls for Condemning NATO Aggression against Yugoslavia,” TASS, March 13, 2019, http://tass(.)com/world/1048450.
[8] [“Meeting with President of Serbia Aleksandr Vucic,”] Kremlin, April 26, 2019, http://kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/60385.
[9] “Joint News Conference with President of Serbia Aleksandr Vucic,” Kremlin, January 17, 2019, http://en.kremlin(.)ru/events/president/transcripts/59693.
[10] [“Speech and Answers to Media Questions by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov During a Joint Press Conference Following Talks with First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia I. Dacic,”] Russian Foreign Ministry, April 17, 2019, http://www.mid(.)ru/ru/maps/rs/-/asset_publisher/GLz7aPgDnSfP/content/id/3618519?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_GLz7aPgDnSfP&_101_INSTANCE_GLz7aPgDnSfP_languageId=ru_RU.
[11] [“Russia Will Send Its New Ambassador to Serbia at the Beginning of the Summer,”] Regnum, April 15, 2019, https://regnum(.)ru/news/2612159.html.
[12] “Bosnia Temporarily Suspended from Council of Europe,” N1, April 9, 2019, http://ba.n1info(.)com/English/NEWS/a337048/Bosnia-temoprarily-suspended-from-Council-of-Europe.html.
[13] [“Milorad Dodik: Serbs Do Not Have a Future in Bosnia and Herzegovina,”] Regnum, February 7, 2019, https://regnum(.)ru/news/2568343.html; [“Milorad Dodik Thinks It Is Time for the Unification of Serbs Within One State,”] TASS, March 24, 2019, https://tass(.)ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/6253192.
[14] [“Dodik Threatened Reunification with Servia if Kosovo Is Accepted into the UN,”] PolitNavigator, April 16, 2019, https://www.politnavigator(.)net/glava-bosnijjskikh-serbov-prigrozil-prisoedineniem-k-serbii-esli-kosovo-primut-v-oon.html.
[15] Carstrad TV, [“Dugin Directive: Greater Serbia,”] YouTube, January 12, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vf2vzDefZWo.
[16] “Bosnian Serb Region Adopts Draft Law Changes Establishing Auxiliary Police Unit,” N1, April 18, 2019, http://ba.n1info(.)com/English/NEWS/a338944/Bosnian-Serb-region-adopts-draft-law-changes-establishing-auxiliary-police-unit.html.
[17] “Internal Affairs Minister: Nobody Should Be Afraid of Police,” N1, April 18, 2019, http://ba.n1info(.)com/English/NEWS/a339070/Internal-affairs-minister-Nobody-should-be-afraid-of-police.html.
[18] “Parties in Bosnia’s Federation Entity Also Want Auxiliary Police Unit,” N1, April 19, 2019, http://ba.n1info(.)com/English/NEWS/a339275/Main-Bosniak-party-wants-auxiliary-police-unit-in-Bosnia-s-Federation-entity.html.
[19] [“Turning Towards NATO: In the United States, Calls to Help Bosnia and Herzegovina Resist the ‘Influence’ of the Russian Federation,”] RT, April 25, 2019, https://russian.rt(.)com/world/article/624774-ssha-bosniya-gercegovina-rossiya-vliyaniye; [“Lavrov: Russia Can Not Agree with the Entry of Bosnia and Herzegovina into NATO,”] TASS, January 16, 2019, https://tass(.)ru/politika/6004637.
[20] Alexander Borisov, [“Milorad Dodik: Serbs Want Friendship with Russia and Do Not Accept NATO Membership,”] Rossiyskaya Gazeta, March 8, 2019, https://rg(.)ru/2019/03/08/milorad-dodik-serby-hotiat-druzhby-s-rf-i-ne-priemliut-vstuplenie-v-nato.html.
[21] “Joint News Conference with President of Serbia Aleksandr Vucic,” Kremlin, January 17, 2019, http://en.kremlin(.)ru/events/president/transcripts/59693; “Bosnia and Herzegovina's Leader Hopes His Country Will Join TurkStream Pipeline Project,” TASS, January 18, 2019, http://tass(.)com/economy/1040591.
[22][“Matvienko: Basic Principles of Dayton Accords Must Be Preserved,”] TASS, April 23, 2018, https://tass(.)ru/politika/5151768; [“Lavrov Declared the Unacceptability of Turning the Balkans into the Subject of Strife Russia and the West,”] Interfax, September 21, 2018, https://www.interfax(.)ru/russia/630167.

Syria Situation Report: April 13 - 30, 2019

By ISW's Syria Team and Syria Direct

The following graphic marks the latest installment of the Syria Situation Report (SITREP) Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and Syria Direct. The map depicts significant developments in the war in Syria during the period April 13 - 30, 2019.

Click image to enlarge.

The Flawed U.S. Approach to Afghanistan

By Scott DesMarais

Key Takeaway: The U.S. will likely fail to secure its national security interests with its current strategy in Afghanistan. The U.S. since 9/11 has sought to deny Afghanistan as a safe haven for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, and that goal remains paramount even today. The U.S. incorrectly believes it can facilitate a legitimate dialogue that leads to a stable political settlement, reconciles the Taliban, and empowers the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) to defeat terrorist groups in Afghanistan. The U.S will struggle to facilitate this dialogue because the reconciliation of former militants is likely to accelerate political competition between multiple factions. Increased political competition between the Taliban and established Afghan powerbrokers could cause negotiations to collapse and risk an ethnically charged civil war. Further, the Afghan Government and the Taliban even if reconciled may prove unwilling and unable to fight together to prevent the growth of Al Qaeda, ISIS, and affiliated terrorist groups in Afghanistan. The U.S. must change its policy to account for the complexity of the reconciliation process and to prepare for these predictable future security and political challenges.

U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

The U.S. has a vital national security interest in preventing Al Qaeda, ISIS, and affiliated terrorist groups from exploiting safe havens in Afghanistan to conduct international terror attacks against the West. This goal is real and indispensable. Al Qaeda, ISIS, Lashkar-e Taiba, the Taliban, and the Haqqani Network – among other designated foreign terrorist organizations – have support and attack zones in Afghanistan. Many of these groups have grown in capacity during the drawdown by the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan that began in 2011 under U.S. President Barack Obama.

The Trump Administration intends to secure this critical objective while simultaneously setting conditions for a further military withdrawal from Afghanistan. U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad has engaged in direct negotiations with the Taliban both to reach an agreement that satisfies U.S. counterterrorism concerns and to facilitate negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan Government. The U.S. ultimately desires a political settlement that establishes a stable and effective Government of Afghanistan and empowers the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) to independently contain if not defeat the terrorist groups active in Afghanistan.

The Trump Administration believes that its efforts to facilitate a dialogue between the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan will lead to a timely and effective political settlement that sets conditions for its withdrawal from Afghanistan. It also believes that the Taliban will keep Al Qaeda and ISIS out of Afghanistan despite the Taliban’s past broken promises in this regard. However, any dialogue in reality will be a complicated, protracted, and contentious process involving the Taliban, the Afghan Government, and a multitude of other powerbrokers. It is more likely to undermine the Afghan Government than to resolve the War in Afghanistan. There is no guarantee of a stable outcome and the talks (even if successful) will represent only the first milestone in a long list of conditions required to secure the security interests of the U.S. in Afghanistan. The U.S. will ultimately fail in this regard unless it changes its policy to account for the complexity of the reconciliation process and to prepare for these predictable future security and political challenges.

TALIBAN - TERROR GROUPS DYNAMICS 

A complete and verifiable agreement to break the Taliban’s historical relationship with Al Qaeda is unlikely given Al Qaeda’s continued presence in Afghanistan.

The historical relationship between the Taliban and Al Qaeda likely cannot be broken easily despite the Taliban’s attempts to distance itself publicly from Al Qaeda. Former Al Qaeda Emir Osama Bin Laden pledged bay’at (allegiance) to former Taliban Emir Mullah Mohammad Omar. Mullah Omar’s successor Mullah Akhtar Mansour publicly accepted bay’at from current Al Qaeda Emir Ayman Zawahiri but later removed the pledge from the official website of the Taliban. Zawahiri pledged bay’at to current Taliban Emir Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada in June 2016 although Akhundzada has never publicly accepted it.

Al Qaeda remains active in Afghanistan and likely within the command structure of the Taliban. The U.S. continues to conduct regular operations targeting Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. The UN Security Council assessed that Al Qaeda remains active in areas of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban as of January 2019. One Taliban commander estimated that 2,000 to 3,000 foreign fighters from Central Asia, the Arab Gulf, and Africa operate alongside the Taliban as of November 2018.[1] Many of them are likely affiliated with Al Qaeda. The Taliban would need to take concrete and public measures to denounce Al Qaeda and expel its operatives from Afghanistan to credibly demonstrate its intent and capability to constrain Al Qaeda in a post-U.S. Afghanistan.

The Taliban is not unitary and cannot enforce peace agreements among its followers. The Haqqani Network and other radical factions of the Taliban are unlikely to reconcile with the Afghan Government and could form new organizations or defect to ISIS or Al Qaeda.

The Taliban claims that it is a cohesive organization but it remains likely that some radical elements of the group will reject reconciliation with the Afghan Government. These elements could create a new militant organization or defect to ISIS Wilayat Khorasan or Al Qaeda, further empowering terrorist groups in Afghanistan. The Afghan Government is also unlikely to be able to financially support the reintegration of the Taliban into the weak economy of Afghanistan without substantial aid from the West. This strain could lead many reconciled but disaffected fighters from the Taliban to turn ultimately towards ISIS or Al Qaeda.

FUTURE SECURITY DYNAMICS

The Afghan Government will remain dependent on military aid from the U.S. and NATO to secure the country and target remaining terrorist groups even if the Taliban reconcile.

The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) remains reliant on funding and aid from the U.S. and NATO. The ANDSF will not be able to secure Afghanistan after a withdrawal of foreign forces even in the event of a successful reconciliation with the Taliban. The ANDSF lacks high-end capabilities (such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets) and remains dependent on foreign combat enablers to conduct operations despite some recent improvements in its organic capabilities.[2] Former U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Gen. Joseph Votel testified that the ANDSF remains “dependent on…coalition support” in March 2019. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani also confirmed that the Afghan Government would “not be able to support [its] army for six months without U.S. support and capabilities” due to a lack of funding in July 2018. The ANDSF is unlikely to be able to successfully secure ungoverned spaces in Afghanistan against ISIS, Al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups without this sustained help from the U.S. and NATO.

The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and a reconciled Taliban are not capable of defeating ISIS Wilayat Khorasan.

The U.S. and the ANDSF have repeatedly targeted positions held by ISIS Wilayat Khorasan in Eastern Afghanistan as well as the group’s attack networks leading to Jalalabad and Kabul. The Taliban also regularly attack ISIS in Eastern Afghanistan. However, ISIS still retains the ability to conduct spectacular attacks in both Kabul and Jalalabad, and seize terrain from the Taliban. ISIS may be expanding even further in Southern Afghanistan. The Taliban may be willing to fight ISIS in Afghanistan, but ISIS will likely prove resilient to both the Taliban and the ANDSF.

The U.S. would need to devote significant resources to sustain any counter-terrorism force left to safeguard its vital national security interests after its withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Any small counterterrorism force would require a much larger force of enablers to support the soldiers conducting targeted operations against terrorist groups. Afghanistan in particular covers a large geographic area with substantial rugged and mountainous terrain, making it highly unlikely that a small force could adequately secure the safe havens held by terrorist groups. The idea of a light military footprint may appear attractive and effective, but it will not work in reality. Even the assets currently operating in Afghanistan lack the same breadth, tempo, and reach as their counterparts during the height of Operation Enduring Freedom.

POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION

Bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and the Taliban undermine the Afghan Government’s ability to negotiate a political settlement with the Taliban.

The overall trajectory of the ongoing negotiations between the U.S. and the Taliban remains unclear. Khalilzad has stressed that “nothing is agreed to until everything is agreed to” in order to assuage concerns that the U.S. will negotiate its withdrawal from Afghanistan before facilitating negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan Government. Khalilzad has repeatedly called for a permanent ceasefire but has not offered a specific timeline for how his plan will phase the withdrawal vis-a-vis a ceasefire agreement, domestic negotiations, and the implementation of a political settlement. The Taliban will likely hold little incentive to negotiate a genuine political settlement after it reaches a deal with the U.S. on the terms of withdrawal from Afghanistan, even if the agreement is conditioned upon progress in talks with the Afghan Government.

The Afghan Government is also losing political leverage because of its exclusion from the bilateral talks between the U.S. and the Taliban. The negotiations thus far have isolated and marginalized the Afghan Government, leading to increased tensions between the U.S and Afghanistan. This tension in turn creates a perception of declining support for Afghanistan from the West, further undermining the credibility of the Afghan Government. The Afghan Government may ultimately be forced to agree to a less-than-ideal settlement with the Taliban - especially given the Trump Administration’s urgency to withdraw from Afghanistan.

The Afghan Government cannot form a unified entity to negotiate with the Taliban. Multiple powerbrokers – each with competing interests – will need to participate in any successful negotiations over the future of Afghanistan.

The Afghan Government is not a truly cohesive entity. Khalilzad has stressed the need for a cohesive and inclusive negotiating team to represent the Afghan Government. Ghani has attempted to develop a single Leadership Council for Reconciliation but any government representatives at the negotiating table will in reality represent a complicated web of different ethnic groups, political organizations, and social backgrounds. Each of these groups hold interconnected but competing interests that will lead to a long, complex, and fragile negotiation with a high risk of failure. The U.S. has tried and failed to remedy the disruptive political competition within the Afghan Government. The Taliban’s political reintegration, if achieved, will likely further exacerbate rather than mitigate these contests and increase tribal and ethnic tensions across Afghanistan.

The looming 2019 Afghan Presidential Election – scheduled for September 28 – has politicized and complicated the reconciliation process.

Khalilzad has stated that he hopes to facilitate an agreement that allows the Taliban to participate as a political entity in the 2019 Afghan Presidential Elections set for September 28. This desire has accelerated the required timeline for meaningful progress in talks between the U.S. and the Taliban. It has also politicized the reconciliation process as a whole. Fourteen of the eighteen candidates in the election – including former Afghan National Security Advisor Hanif Atmar and current Afghan Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah – are boycotting Ghani’s Consultative Loya Jirga on reconciliation with the Taliban, accusing him of using it to further his own reelection. The intense political competition that accompanies Afghan Presidential Elections will make it increasingly more difficult to unite different factions and negotiate with the Taliban.

The Taliban are not willing to reintegrate into the current Afghan Government. Many Afghans are similarly unwilling to accept a political role for the Taliban.

The Taliban has remained evasive regarding its ultimate political objectives although it has indicated that it will not accept the current Afghan Constitution. The Afghan Government, wider Afghan urban society and the international community are all unlikely to accept major constitutional revisions - especially changes that undermine or reverse the dramatic social progress achieved in Afghanistan since 2001. It also remains unclear whether the Taliban are genuinely willing to reintegrate as a political party into even a modified system or will instead attempt to reestablish the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Taliban has claimed that it does not seek to control Afghanistan and its political representatives have indicated that it is open to transforming into a political party. The Taliban also met with multiple powerbrokers including many leaders of the Northern Alliance in February 2019, suggesting that it could coexist peacefully with its historic rivals. The Taliban nonetheless continues to view itself as the legitimate “government in waiting” and it may seek to leverage its robust shadow government structures to reassert its total control over the country once the U.S withdraws from Afghanistan. The Taliban’s reconciliation will ultimately accelerate competition – either political or military – between established powerbrokers and the reintegrated Taliban for control over power and resources in Afghanistan.

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[1] The Taliban commander – who is also a member of the Taliban’s leadership council – specifically stated that the foreign fighters hail from China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Chechnya, Tunisia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.
[2] U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) designated Afghanistan as its main effort in February 2018 in order to shift key combat enablers to support operations by the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). The reallocation of resources slowed the Taliban’s momentum but also demonstrated the continued reliance of the ANDSF on the U.S. and NATO to secure Afghanistan.

ISIS Reasserts Global Reach for Ramadan 2019

By Brandon Wallace with Jennifer Cafarella

Key Takeaway: ISIS has orchestrated an annual campaign of intensified attacks around the Islamic holy month of Ramadan since 2012, first in Iraq and then globally. It has sustained this recurring surge in its global operations every year despite its concurrent territorial losses in Iraq and Syria. ISIS’s latest Ramadan campaign began in late April 2019, two weeks before the start of Ramadan on May 5. ISIS has thus far declared a new province in Central Africa, conducted a devastating attack in Sri Lanka on Easter Sunday, and launched rare attacks in Saudi Arabia and Bangladesh. ISIS Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi also released his first video statement since his declaration of the Caliphate in 2014, emphasizing his survival, foreshadowing upcoming campaigns, and shaping the future trajectory of ISIS. ISIS is likely to continue demonstrating its global reach by conducting additional major attacks during this upcoming Ramadan in order to offset its loss of core terrain and maintain its image as the world’s deadliest terror organization.

ISIS demonstrated its continued global reach with a complex attack against Christians and Westerners in Sri Lanka on Easter Sunday 2019. The attack was neither an isolated success nor a last gasp of desperation. Rather, ISIS supported the attack as part of a regular annual surge in its worldwide activity around the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. ISIS has continued to wage a coordinated global campaign despite the loss of its Caliphate in Iraq and Syria as ISW warned in 2017. Sri Lanka foreshadows what will likely be a deadly campaign by ISIS during Ramadan 2019. 

This report examines ISIS’s historic pattern of operations in the weeks before and during Ramadan. It also analyzes recent attacks that likely comprise the start of ISIS’s 2019 Ramadan campaign. 

ISIS’s Ramadan Campaigns

ISIS (and its predecessor Al-Qaeda in Iraq) has conducted a coordinated campaign for Ramadan every year since 2012. The scope, scale, and focus of these campaigns vary by year but generally involve a major escalation in attacks in the weeks leading up to and throughout Ramadan. They also are often used to announce major strategic inflections for the organization. Al-Qaeda in Iraq announced its annual campaigns during Ramadan. ISIS Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the Caliphate on the first day of Ramadan 2014. ISIS expanded to a global attack pattern during Ramadan 2015. ISIS now typically uses the month to conduct major spectacular attacks targeting foreign countries and declare the creation of new “provinces” (or wilayats) in its Caliphate. ISIS has deliberately cultivated this global footprint in order to diversify its holdings and mitigate against its territorial losses in Iraq and Syria. ISIS tailors its campaigns across this footprint to support its wider operational and strategic objectives, highlighting its continued employment of professional military design at a grand strategic level. 

ISIS has continued to expand its operations each year around Ramadan despite its setbacks in Iraq and Syria, proving that its loss of core terrain has not significantly disrupted its ability to design and execute global campaigns. The U.S-Led Anti-ISIS Coalition had successfully recaptured Eastern Mosul and isolated Ar-Raqqa City by February 2017, contesting ISIS’s core urban centers in Iraq and Syria. Yet ISIS’s 2017 Ramadan campaign remained incredibly active with major bombings and offensive operations in Britain, Iran, and the Philippines in May - June 2017. Its 2018 Ramadan campaign was more limited but included a coordinated suicide bombings targeting churches and law enforcement in Indonesia two days before Ramadan. ISIS likely made a strategic decision to deprioritize its global operations for Ramadan 2018 in order to focus on two superseding objectives: (1) shifting back into an insurgency in Iraq and Syria, and (2) setting conditions in its provinces abroad for escalation in 2019. 

ISIS’s 2019 Ramadan Campaign Begins 

ISIS launched its latest global campaign in late April 2019, slightly more than two weeks before the official start of Ramadan. The campaign has thus far included the devastating attack on Easter Sunday in Sri Lanka, the creation of a new province in Central Africa, significant attacks in Saudi Arabia and Bangladesh, and a rare video statement by Baghdadi. This section details these events in chronological order and assesses their strategic significance for ISIS in 2019. 

Congo. ISIS announced the creation of a new wilayat (province) called Wilayat Central Africa in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on April 18. ISIS Wilayat Central Africa claimed responsibility for a raid targeting a barracks in Bovata near the Congolese-Ugandan Border. ISIS subsequently featured Wilayat Central Africa in Issue 179 of its digital Al-Naba Magazine, claiming three additional attacks against the Congolese Army in Butembo on April 20. Local media and non-governmental organizations confirmed the attacks. The claims originated from both local and centralized media organs that ISW has assessed as responsive to the senior leadership of ISIS. They thus effectively constituted a formal declaration of Wilayat Central Africa. 

ISIS will likely focus on further expansion in Africa during Ramadan 2019. Wilayat Central Africa demonstrates to supporters the continued global expansion of ISIS. It could directly support the resurgence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria given that external affiliates have previously contributed financial and military resources to ISIS in Syria. It could also serve as a training ground for disaffected African Muslims who seek to join ISIS. ISIS set conditions to expand into the Democratic Republic of the Congo as part of a wider surge in Africa that began in 2018. 

ISIS will likely conduct one or more major attacks in Africa during Ramadan 2019. It could aid its local affiliates to shift their tactics to align more closely with those used by ISIS in Iraq and Syria, or otherwise direct them to target interests of the West during Ramadan. It may also declare additional formal provinces in Africa. Pro-ISIS media channels recirculated a photo allegedly depicting “soldiers of the caliphate” in Mozambique on May 30. Pro-ISIS media released a similar video in the Congo in October 2017, previewing the establishment of Wilayat Central Africa. 

Sri Lanka. ISIS conducted a devastating coordinated attack against Christians and Westerners in Sri Lanka on April 21, Easter Sunday. A cell of fighters detonated seven suicide vests (SVESTs) at three churches and three luxury hotels in three separate cities, killing over 250 civilians. The blasts marked the first attack by ISIS in Sri Lanka. ISIS formally claimed the attack on April 23 and later released a posthumous video of eight attackers pledging allegiance to Baghdadi. Sri Lanka investigators had identified eight of nine suicide bombers as of April 25. 

Sri Lanka has since uncovered a robust militant network actively planning additional operations. Officials quickly identified multiple additional bombs at several sites. The wife of one of the bombers detonated an SVEST as police attempted to detain her at a private residence on April 21. Sri Lankan Police performed a controlled detonation of a van parked containing three IEDs on April 22 and the Sri Lankan Air Force defused an additional IED found near Colombo’s Bandaranaike International Airport. Raids on multiple safe houses uncovered additional SVESTs and bomb components. Three militants detonated SVESTs after clashing with security forces unit at their safe house on April 27. ISIS formally claimed the latter incident and released a posthumous photo of two of the militants, suggesting that the cell planned further attacks. It is possible that more individuals linked to the cell remain at large. 

ISIS’s cells in Sri Lanka demonstrate its continued commitment to generating global attack networks. ISW assesses that ISIS tasked external elements to enable the cells, which drew upon preexisting local militant groups in Sri Lanka. One of the attackers reportedly travelled to Syria to train under ISIS before returning to Sri Lanka and as many as four others may have travelled to Turkey, Iraq, or Syria. ISW assesses that ISIS has also built a support network in India, which may have enabled the attack network in Sri Lanka. The alleged cell leader previously travelled to preach to supporters in Kerala Province in Southern India. Foreign fighters from Kerala Province previously travelled to join ISIS in Afghanistan in 2016. 

ISIS will likely attempt to conduct additional external attacks against Christians during Ramadan 2019. Russia thwarted at least two attempted attacks in late April 2019 that could be attributable to ISIS as part of its planned surge for Ramadan.[1] These attacks are consistent with ISIS’s longstanding campaign to inflict losses on civilian populations, instill fear, and otherwise destabilize countries outside the bounds of its Caliphate. ISIS intends to provoke backlash against vulnerable populations of Muslims to divide society, fuel radicalization, and enable recruitment. 

Saudi Arabia. ISIS conducted a new attack in Saudi Arabia, where it has only conducted infrequent operations since declaring the Caliphate in 2014. Four Saudi-born militants rammed a car into a gate outside a security building in the town of Zulfi north of Riyadh on April 21. Security guards killed three of the attackers in a firefight while the fourth died while attempting to detonate an SVEST. The attack marked ISIS’s first operation in Saudi Arabia since July 2018, when three militants attacked a checkpoint in Buraidah in Northern Saudi Arabia. ISIS released a posthumous video of the four attackers pledging allegiance to Baghdadi and asserting their intent to “avenge our brethren … in Iraq and Syria and everywhere.” The scale of the attack and the release of an official video both mark an inflection for ISIS in Saudi Arabia. 

ISIS views Saudi Arabia as a key challenger to the religious legitimacy of its Caliphate and seeks to coordinate and inspire attacks against the kingdom to punish it for its support to counter-terrorism operations in Iraq and Syria. The attackers in their video accused Saudi Arabia of “[enabling] the enemies of Allah, from the Jews and the Christians and the [Shi’a] and the pagans, and [making] them the masters and the pioneers in the country of the two sacred mosques” and vowed to “avenge our religion and … return the slap.” The video did not reference any of ISIS’s three formal provinces in Saudi Arabia: Wilayat Najd, Wilayat Hejaz, and Wilayat Bahrain. ISIS may have deprioritized these affiliates to focus on generating attack cells on the Arabian Peninsula. 

Bangladesh. ISIS also resumed its attacks in Bangladesh. ISIS claimed responsibility for the detonation of an IED targeting police officers in Dhaka on April 29.[2] ISIS had not conducted an attack in the country since March 2017, when militants detonated two IEDs during a raid on safe house in Northern Bangladesh. ISIS’s first major operation in Bangladesh was a deadly attack on cafes frequented by Westerners in Dhaka during Ramadan 2016. 

ISIS could declare a formal province in Bangladesh during Ramadan. Bangladeshi militants first pledged allegiance to ISIS in August 2014 but ISIS never established a wilayat in Bangladesh. ISW previously forecast that ISIS could act on this pledge during Ramadan 2016. It may now choose to take this step during Ramadan 2019 in order to offset its territorial losses in Iraq and Syria despite the smaller footprint and decreased capabilities of its cell in Bangladesh. ISIS has suffered from numerous raids against its cells in Bangladesh since its attack in Dhaka in 2016. ISIS could alternatively create a wider province that incorporates India or the Indian Subcontinent. 

Baghdadi Video Release. ISIS Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi released a rare video statement on April 29, marking his first public appearance since declaring of the Caliphate at Al-Nuri Mosque in Mosul in June 2014. Baghdadi used his statement to highlight ISIS’s expanding global campaign and dismiss its losses in Iraq and Syria. He asserted that ISIS is fighting a “war of attrition” that its opponents will inevitably lose and spent most of the video praising actions by affiliates of ISIS outside of Iraq and Syria. He accepted pledges of allegiance from militants in Burkina Faso and Mali, indicating a strategic priority to expand further into Africa. He praised the recent attacks (detailed above) in Sri Lanka and Saudi Arabia. He also received a number of physical reports referencing a previously unannounced wilayat in Turkey. ISIS likely released the video to preview upcoming operations and inspire new attacks by its supporters during Ramadan. 

ISIS’s latest global campaign is still unfolding and could continue until the end of Ramadan on June 4. ISW will continue to monitor this campaign and publish updates as needed.

The authors thank James Barnett of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute for his valuable contribution to this analysis.

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[1] [“FSB of Russia Together with the Police Detained Members of Banned in the Russian Federation MTO "Islamic State", Had Planned to Commit an Act of Terrorism,”] Russian Federal Security Service, April 26, 2019, http://www.fsb(.)ru/fsb/press/message/single.htm!id=10438366@fsbMessage.html; [“Counterterrorism Operation Began in Tyumen,”] Interfax, April 12, 2019, https://www.interfax(.)ru/russia/658081.

[2] “Crude Bomb Hurled at Police in Dhaka,” Dhaka Tribune, April 30, 2019, https://www.dhakatribune(.)com/bangladesh/dhaka/2019/04/30/crude-bomb-hurled-at-police-in-dhaka.

Russia in Review: Moldova's Elections

Russia in Review is a weekly intelligence summary (INTSUM) produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This ISW INTSUM series sheds light on key trends and developments related to the Russian government’s objectives and its efforts to secure them. Receive future Russia in Review INTSUM products via-email by signing up for the ISW mailing list.

Special Topic Update: Moldova's Elections

Author: Darina Regio

Key Takeaway: Moldova will likely require a new parliamentary election to resolve its current political deadlock, leaving it without a functioning legislature for most of 2019. The Kremlin benefits from the continued impasse and fracturing of the political landscape in Moldova. Moldova could lose some of its long-term ability to effectively balance between Russia and the West, granting a stronger foothold for the Kremlin to increase its pressure in the region, specifically on Romania, Poland, and Ukraine.

Moldova still lacks a government eight weeks after the 2019 Moldovan Parliamentary Election. The Moldovan Parliament has been in recess since its first session on March 21, as the elected parties are still unable to form a 51-seat majority coalition.[1] The parliament will remain on hiatus until a government is formed or new elections are called. The Moldovan Parliament is deadlocked among the Kremlin-leaning Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM) led by Moldovan President Igor Dodon; the pro-Western Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM) of oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc; and the pro-EU ACUM Alliance. None holds a clear path to a majority.

Moldova will likely require a new election to resolve its political impasse. The ongoing negotiations are unlikely to succeed. Only the PSRM and ACUM are currently negotiating a possible coalition.[2] Their demands are too divergent, however, to lead to a deal.[3] ACUM has demanded the right to nominate the next Prime Minister and Parliament Speaker of Moldova under a de facto informal coalition with the PSRM. It has also called for the abolition of the mixed electoral system as well as a series of anti-oligarchic reforms, previously adopted by the PDM, with which it hopes to restore micro-financial assistance from the EU. The PSRM has rejected these proposals and stressed its own right to name the Prime Minister and Parliament Speaker under a formal coalition with ACUM.[4] Both ACUM and the PSRM have refused to negotiate with Plahotniuc’s PDM - ACUM due to PDM’s oligarchic support and the PSRM due to its perceived opposition to the Kremlin.[5] The fourth-place Sor Party has opted to stay out of the negotiations entirely and instead stated “the negotiations need to happen between the U.S. and Russia to resolve the deadlock in Moldova…since interested parties will be able to speak directly without intermediaries”.[6]

Dodon will likely call for new elections to the Moldovan Parliament in late 2019. Dodon holds the constitutional right to dissolve parliament and call new elections if a recess persists after June 21. He has repeatedly promised to exercise this right, most recently on April 24.[7] However, the results of any new election would likely remain deadlocked and require further coalition talks, leaving Moldova without a functional legislature through most of 2019. ISW previously assessed that Moldova would be forced to hold new elections after the 2019 Moldovan Parliamentary Elections.

The Kremlin will likely benefit from both the governance gap and potential new elections in Moldova. Russia intends to keep Moldova in its sphere of influence and halt its integration with the West. The Kremlin likely understands that it cannot immediately secure its preferred political outcomes in Moldova. It is therefore focusing on improving its overall position in the political landscape of Moldova, which is already quite favorable to the Kremlin’s policies.

The Kremlin has effectively foreclosed its least preferred outcome in Moldova - namely, an expansion of political power for Vlad Plahotniuc. Plahotniuc is a major competitor of Dodon and an obstacle to the Kremlin’s interests in Moldova. His coalition previously demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria and later sponsored a resolution on the issue in the UN General Assembly (UNGA).[8] He has also actively pushed for Moldova’s further integration and association with the EU. Plahotniuc has thus far been sidelined from talks over the next Government of Moldova.

The Kremlin also benefits from fractured pro-Western political space in Moldova as it would likely slow Moldova’s integration with the West. The pro-Western elements in the Moldovan government have served as an effective check on Dodon and his attempts to push Moldova towards closer ties with Russia.[9] Pro-Western elements have also taken steps to counter subversion efforts by Russia. The Kremlin thus likely views the current impasse as a means to reduce competition with its strategic interests, preserve the status quo, and slow Moldova’s integration with the West.

Moldova thus faces a key risk to its long-term ability to balance against the Kremlin. Russia could use expanded influence in Moldova to exert additional pressure on Ukraine, Romania, Poland, and the EU. The West should support pro-Western political forces Moldova that have proven critical in countering the subversive campaigns of the Kremlin. The West should also expand its economic assistance to Moldova in order to diversify its export partners and reduce its economic dependence on Russia.

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[1] [“Parliament Selected: What Next? Seven Questions About the Political Situation in the Country,”] ESP, March 26, 2019, https://esp(.)md/podrobnosti/2019/03/26/parlament-vybrali-chto-dalshe-sem-voprosov-o-politicheskoy-situacii-v-strane.
[2] [“Coalition: Parties Are Ready for Negotiations, but Do Not Know with Whom,”] Sputnik, April 10, 2019, https://ru.sputnik(.)md/politics/20190410/25443741/koalitsiya-partii-peregovory.html.
[3] [“Igor Dodon: Whether There Will Be Government Depends on the PSRM Position,”] MK, April 17, 2019, https://mk.kn(.)md/politics/2019/04/17/igor-dodon-ot-pozicii-psrm-zavisit-budet-vlast-ili-net.html.
[4] “Right-Wing ACUM Bloc at Moldovan Parliament Declines Socialists’ Proposal on Negotiating Coalition,” Interfax, April 10, 2019, http://www.interfax(.)com/newsinf.asp?pg=3&id=896972; [“We Should Not Think That Plahotniuc Is White and Fluffy: He Is Capable of Killing,”] Kommersant, April 4, 2019, https://www.kommersant(.)ru/doc/3930341; [“Socialist Party of Moldova Thinks ACUM Bloc Is Not Ready for Coalition Negotiations,”] RIA, April 23, 2019, https://ria(.)ru/20190423/1552965736.html.
[5] [“Coalition with ACUM or Early Elections: Republican Council of PSRM Decided to Continue Negotiations with the Right-Wing Opposition,”] News Maker, April 12, 2019, http://newsmaker(.)md/rus/novosti/koalitsiya-s-acum-ili-dosrochnye-vybory-respublikanskiy-sovet-psrm-reshil-prodolzh-42923.
[6] [“Sor Party Found a Solution to Unlocking the Political Crisis,”] Alfa News, April 23, 2019, http://alfanews(.)md/index.php?newsid=9788.
[7] [“For a Balanced Foreign Policy,”] MK, April 24, 2019, https://mk.kn(.)md/politics/2019/04/24/za-vzveshennuyu-vneshnyuyu-politiku.html.
[8] Diana Preasca, [“The Chisinau Parliament Calls for the Withdrawal of Russian Troops from the Territory of the Republic of Moldova,”] Moldova, July 21, 2017, https://www.moldova(.)org/parlamentul-de-la-chisinau-cere-retragerea-trupelor-ruse-de-pe-teritoriul-republicii-moldova/; “Moldova’s President Criticizes UN Resolution on Russian Troops’ Pullout from Transnistria,” TASS, July 15, 2018, http://tass(.)com/world/1013208.
[9] [“Moscow “Will Have To Respect Our Decision”: Dodon Spoke Like Plahoutniuc,”] Regnum, April 6, 2019, https://regnum((.))ru/news/2606425.html

Ukraine's New President: The Stakes for Ukraine and the West

By Nataliya Bugayova

Key Takeaways

• Comedian Volodymyr Zelensky won the second round of the 2019 Ukrainian Presidential Elections on April 21. Zelensky may yet pleasantly surprise his critics and serve as an effective reform-oriented president. Until he does the U.S. should recognize the risks his presidency poses for Ukraine and the West.

• The Kremlin likely sees Zelensky as an opportunity to gradually regain economic and political influence in Ukraine. The West and Ukraine could risk mistaking the Kremlin’s likely shift in approach for a shift in the underlying goals held by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

• Other actors including oligarchs and allies of the former pro-Russian Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych also perceive an opportunity for a comeback under Zelensky. Their regressive agenda has the potential to disrupt critical reforms in Ukraine.

• Ukraine has much to lose, including its course towards a free and open society and its integration with the West. The ability of Ukrainian reformists to consolidate ahead of the October 2019 Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections will be key to Ukraine’s ability to preserve its gains since the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution.

• The West can also play a major role in helping preserve these gains. The West must nonetheless strike a nuanced balance between supporting reforms and not inadvertently enabling Russia's interests in Ukraine.

Comedian Volodymyr Zelensky won the second round of the 2019 Ukrainian Presidential Elections held on April 21. His presidency presents at least six key risks for Ukraine and the West.

RISKS

Risk #1: Zelensky is vulnerable to external influences.

Zelensky lacks well-defined policy positions. He has shared only a limited vision for Ukraine’s future rooted in populist promises such as direct democracy via referendums.[1] His team is the primary source on his political platform and it is not obvious how he came to adopt its contents.[2] He has largely avoided policy debates.[3] His few public policy statements have reflected poorly on his understanding of key issues, particularly regarding national security. For example, he has stated that Ukraine “should just stop shooting” as a first step to end its conflict with Russia in Eastern Ukraine.[4] This statement ignores the nature of the conflict, multiple prior failed ceasefires violated by Russia and its proxies, and the Kremlin’s overall goals in Ukraine.

Zelensky’s lack of political experience or informed policies creates a risk of dependency on external advisors and powerbrokers. His policy team includes some reformists but there is no guarantee that they will be the dominant or longest-lived voice in his inner circle.[5] Necessary reforms will likely be deeply unpopular with both the electorate and the domestic oligarchs weighing their support for Zelensky. Oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyi in particular could outcompete the reformists through his own associates who are on the team advising Zelensky.[6] The Kremlin is also almost certain to attempt to influence the personnel and policy surrounding Zelensky.

Risk #2: Kolomoiskyi’s agenda will likely have a negative impact on Ukraine’s reform progress and will not be necessarily anti-Russian.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has assessed that Kolomoyskyi holds influence over Zelensky that he seeks to use to pursue policies favorable to his business interests in Ukraine.

Kolomoyskyi’s policy preferences will likely impede or reverse the reform process in Ukraine’s critical energy and banking sectors. He intends to regain a controlling stake in oil and natural gas producer Ukrnafta as well as PrivatBank – the largest commercial bank in Ukraine – after losing major equity in both organizations under incumbent Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko.[7] Kolomoyskyi will also likely attempt to entrench his interest by facilitating the creation of a coalition for Zelensky in the Ukrainian Parliament.[8] Zelensky might thus end up aligned with populists such as Yulia Tymoshenko or politicians favorable to Russia if reformists do not coalesce around him.

Kolomoyskyi is also not necessarily an opponent of Russia. Kolomoyskyi did act to halt the advance of Russian-controlled separatists in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in 2014 by directly funding militia units. He is unlikely to intentionally empower Russia in Ukraine. He has nonetheless acted – and will continue to act – primarily in line with his business interests, which might require concessions to Russia. The Kremlin may also choose not to work directly against Kolomoyskyi given that his self-interested pursuits will likely slow domestic reform efforts and thereby indirectly support Russia’s goals in Ukraine.

Risk #3: Former powerbrokers displaced by the Euromaidan Revolution in 2014 see an opportunity to resurge.

Allies of former Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych, whose pro-Russian regime was run out of office after the 2014 revolution, have expressed optimism regarding Zelensky, framing him as a “chance for change” in Ukraine.[9] These actors likely perceive an opportunity to regain political and economic influence in Ukraine. Their return would bring regressive policies likely to curb reform gains and civil liberties. They may also seek to take revenge against reformists and other political rivals who played a role in Euromaidan.

Risk #4: Zelensky’s presidency could polarize reformists in Ukraine.

Reformists are not unified over questions regarding Zelensky’s personal competence, integrity, and independence as well as the merits of serving in his administration. The presence of reformists in the Ukrainian Government and Ukrainian Parliament is one of the major gains of the Euromaidan Revolution. For years, public service had been unattractive to reform-oriented professionals for a number of reasons. Euromaidan provided an unprecedented window of opportunity for such individuals to enter government or effectively support it from the outside, albeit still in insufficient quantities with insufficient authority. Zelensky’s presidency threatens to fracture this already fragile group and thereby reduce its sustainability and influence.

Zelensky’s victory could on the other hand provide an impetus for reformers to unite and run as a consolidated bloc in the 2019 Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections on October 27.

Risk #5: Zelensky’s presidency could provide a vector for the Kremlin to regain its influence in Ukraine.

The Kremlin understands that it will not immediately be able to regain its dominant influence over Ukraine. It is instead focusing on improving its overall position in the political landscape of Ukraine throughout the 2019 Ukrainian Presidential and Parliamentary Elections. Its interim objective is to nudge Ukraine out of alignment with the West and closer to Russia’s orbit. Its strategic objectives remain the same: to politically reorient Ukraine towards Russia and ensure that Ukraine does not become a functional democracy that could challenge the authoritarianism of the Kremlin and Putin.

The Kremlin likely perceives an opportunity to start reorienting Ukraine towards Russia’s orbit in the long-term. It had already begun to soften its domestic propaganda narrative towards Ukraine and Zelensky in anticipation of his victory in the 2019 Ukrainian Presidential Elections.

If Putin manages to gain this renewed foothold in Ukraine, he will likely focus on guaranteeing long-term influence over Kyiv. The Kremlin’s likely approach could encompass elements of the following dangerous scenarios.

Gradual Trade over Rapid War

The Kremlin will likely prioritize a gradual revival of its economic presence in Ukraine in its effort to regain influence. The Kremlin can potentially exploit favorable sentiment among those segments of business class in Ukraine, which stands to benefit from renewed trade with Russia. These actors include many oligarchs as well as Yanukovych’s allies.

Russia’s economic outreach could well provide a short-term boost to Ukraine’s weak economy. The Kremlin would likely reinforce its effort with an information campaign to create the perception Ukrainians are living better.

However, this veneer of progress would conceal Ukraine’s growing economic dependence on the Kremlin. Ukrainians would in reality be surrendering their economic sovereignty and ceding any prospect of structural economic reforms. The Kremlin would likely push to roll back reforms in the energy sector and thereby reassert Ukraine’s energy dependence on Russia. Russia would aim to limit Ukraine’s domestic gas production, regain control over its transit system, and subordinate it to the natural gas monopoly wielded by the Kremlin.

The Kremlin might also choose to reduce overt military tensions in Eastern Ukraine over time, although it might increase military pressure in the short run. The Kremlin could then leverage its global propaganda machine to broadcast this decision as a step towards peace in Ukraine. The West might nonetheless view this narrative positively as it plays into a common sentiment that ‘stopping the fighting’ is more important than defending Ukraine’s sovereignty. Putin could thereby undermine sanctions against his regime by shifting only his approach rather than his underlying goals.

Away from the West

The Kremlin will also likely attempt to exploit Zelensky’s calls for referenda on Ukraine’s potential membership in NATO and the EU.[10] These proposals are inherently regressive. The Ukrainian Parliament codified Ukraine’s aspiration to join NATO and the EU in the Ukrainian Constitution. Referenda are also vulnerable to manipulation. Russia is likely to use disinformation and electoral subversion to ensure decisive defeats for these referenda, the results of which would be difficult to reverse.

Trojan Horse Inside Ukraine

The Kremlin will likely attempt to exploit Zelensky’s lack of foreign policy experience to convert Russia’s military campaign into political gains in Ukraine. Zelensky has already made several conciliatory statements on the need to meet “halfway” with Putin and establish a ceasefire in Eastern Ukraine.[11] These statements reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict in the Donbas. Russia illegally invaded Ukraine and built a proxy separatist force in Donetsk and Luhansk. The Kremlin retains the ability to escalate and deescalate the level of violence at will in Eastern Ukraine.

Putin has long desired to legitimize the self-proclaimed separatist republics that he created in Eastern Ukraine. Legal autonomy for the Donbas would grant the Kremlin a permanent lever of influence over Ukraine. It would also set a number of dangerous international precedents by de facto legitimizing the invasion of a sovereign nation, the principle that states have a right to intervene militarily ostensibly on behalf of related minorities, and the notion of truncated sovereignty for states that were part of the former Soviet Union. It would set a model for others to follow, namely that an aggressor can legitimize an invasion if it subsequently manipulates the internal political dynamics of the victim to “accept” its aggression.

Risk #6: Ukraine’s progress toward a free society will face challenges.

Ukraine’s current trajectory towards an open and free society should not be taken as a given. Ukraine, which faces major challenges, maintains a media landscape and civil society both capable and willing to criticize the Ukrainian Government. These liberties remain fragile despite their expansion since the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution.

Ukraine’s social progress under Zelensky will likely face converging pressures from the oligarchs, former powerbrokers, populists, and the Kremlin under Zelensky. Russia in particular has an incentive to disrupt a successful democratic model in Ukraine that could threaten Putin’s regime.

STAKES FOR THE U.S. IF THE KREMLIN REGAINS INFLUENCE IN UKRAINE

The Kremlin’s Ambitions 

Ukraine holds inherently asymmetric value to Russia. The Kremlin perceives Ukraine as not only a buffer state but also part of its cultural, economic, and military core. The Kremlin devotes a significant amount of its foreign policy bandwidth to its campaign to regain political control over Ukraine given the value Putin assigns to this goal. If the Kremlin regains its influence in Ukraine, it will likely be further emboldened and free some of its resources to focus elsewhere.

Cascading Effects in Europe 

The Kremlin intends to achieve a multi-layer zone in Europe with states that are Russia-neutral or Russia-friendly. It is working establish a core group of countries within the immediate orbit of Russia including Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. It is also attempting to create a second outer circle of Russia-neutral states by prying Hungary, the Baltics, and other countries away from the U.S. and NATO. The Kremlin in this vein has fueled internal instability and supported populist political parties and polarizing ideologies across Europe. Russia will have additional levers to politically and militarily pressure Europe and drive further wedges within NATO if it regains dominant influence in Ukraine.

Effects on the Rules-Based International Order

Russia’s gradual restoration of influence in Ukraine would legitimize its aggressive actions, including its illegal occupation of Crimea, its invasion of Eastern Ukraine, and its continued subversion campaigns across Ukraine. Other states such as China are likely to emulate this behavior.

Loss of Insight on Russia’s Operations 

Russia’s increased influence over Ukraine will likely result in a corresponding loss of influence and access for the U.S. and Europe. The U.S. and NATO could limit their economic, defense, and government reform cooperation with Ukraine in response to its deepening ties with Russia.

All pragmatic arguments aside, it is also in the national interest of the U.S. to support the genuine aspirations of nations to achieve democratic societies rooted in the rule of law and not stand aside when an authoritarian state erodes and destroys an emerging democracy.

CONCLUSION

Zelensky’s victory thus poses risks for Ukraine’s reform progress and integration with the West. It may open an opportunity for regressive forces ranging from oligarchs and former corrupt powerbrokers to the Kremlin to regain influence in Ukraine. The ability of reformists to mature their political platform and consolidate their influence will be critical to preserve and build upon the progress made by Ukraine since the Euromaidan Revolution. The 2019 Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections will play a deciding role in this effort. The U.S. should take steps to ensure that Ukraine’s reforms do not unravel. The U.S should specifically support reformists and civil society to ensure sustained momentum in favor of political and economic reforms.

The U.S. should also work to ensure that Europe maintains its support for Ukraine and its sanctions on Russia until the Kremlin withdraws its forces and halts its aggression against Ukraine. The U.S. should help keep an international spotlight on the conflict and ensure that Ukraine – not Russia – controls the narrative about the situation in Eastern Ukraine. Ukraine will become more vulnerable to Russia the moment it disappears from Western governments’ statements. The U.S. must be alert to quiet attempts by the Kremlin to expand its influence in Ukraine and not confuse shifts in Putin’s approach with shifts in his underlying strategic goals.

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[1] [“Election Program of Volodymyr Olekcandrovich Zelensky,”] Ukrainian Central Election Commission, February 27, 2019, http://www.cvk.gov(.)ua/pls/vp2019/WP009?PT021F01=233&PT001F01=719.
[2] Yuriy Smirnov, [“Zelensky’s Plan. The First Ten Decisions in Case of Victory,”] Liga, April 10, 2019, https://www.liga(.)net/politics/articles/plan-zelenskogo-pervye-desyat-resheniy-v-sluchae-pobedy.
[3] [“Media Movement Calls on Zelensky to Go to the Press Before April 19,”] Radio Svoboda, April 16, 2019, https://www.radiosvoboda(.)org/a/news-mediaruh-zaklykaye-zelenskogo-vyity-do-presy/29883668.html.
[4] Roman Kravets, [“Volodymyr Zelensky: April 1 - An Honorable Day to Win the Clown,”] Ukrayinska Pravda, January 21, 2019, https://www.pravda.com(.)ua/articles/2019/01/21/7204341/.
[5] Bermet Talant, “Who Are Key People on Zelensky’s Campaign?” Kyiv Post, April 12, 2019, https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/who-are-key-people-on-zelenskiys-campaign.html; Bermet Talant and Matthew Kupfer, “Presidential Front-Runner Zelensky Presents His Team Two Days Before Election,” April 18, 2019, https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/presidential-front-runner-zelenskiy-presents-his-team-2-days-before-election.html.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Artem Ilyin, “Ukrainian Oligarch Kolomoyskyi’s Diminishing Influence in the Oil Market,” Hromadske, June 6, 2018, https://en.hromadske(.)ua/posts/ukrainian-oligarch-kolomoiskys-diminishing-influence-in-the-oil-market; Bermet Talant, “Kolomoyskyi Rails Against Ukraine and Poroshenko,” Kyiv Post, November 23, 2018, https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/kolomoisky-rails-against-ukraine-and-poroshenko.html; Oleksiy Sorokin, “Update: Kolomoisky Wants the Government to Return His Former PrivatBank Shares, Court Case to Be Held on April 18,” Kyiv Post, April 8, 2019, https://www.kyivpost.com/business/oligach-kolomoisky-says-he-wants-2-billion-in-compensation-for-privatbanks-nationalization.html; Nikola Mikovic, “The Role of Oligarchs in Ukraine’s 2019 Presidential Elections,” Global Security Review, March 27, 2019, https://globalsecurityreview.com/oligarchs-2019-ukraine-presidential-elections/.
[8] [“Negotiations on a Coalition Under Zelensky Began in the Rada, - Sources,”] RBK-Ukraine, April 11, 2019, https://www.rbc(.)ua/rus/news/rade-nachalis-peregovory-koalitsii-zelenskogo-1554965733.html.
[9] Olena Lukash, Facebook, April 7, 2019, https://www.facebook.com/ElenaLukash.ua/posts/2079554865677212.
[10] [“Election Program of Volodymyr Olekcandrovich Zelensky,”] Ukrainian Central Election Commission, February 27, 2019, http://www.cvk.gov(.)ua/pls/vp2019/WP009?PT021F01=233&PT001F01=719.
[11] Sevodnya, [“An Exclusive Interview with Volodymyr Zelensky,”] YouTube, April 7, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WqDbdqQzY7Q; [“Zelensky Is Ready to Negotiate with Putin,”] Korrespondent, April 7, 2019, https://korrespondent(.)net/ukraine/vibory2019/4083836-zelenskyi-hotov-k-perehovoram-s-putynym.