ISIS's Second Resurgence

By Brandon Wallace and Jennifer Cafarella

Key Takeaway: The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is reconstituting a capable insurgent force in Iraq and Syria despite efforts to prevent its recovery by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition. The U.S. Department of Defense stated in August 2018 that ISIS retains nearly 30,000 fighters across Iraq and Syria and is “more capable” than Al-Qaeda in Iraq - ISIS’s predecessor - at its peak in 2006 - 2007. ISIS is waging an effective campaign to reestablish durable support zones while raising funds and rebuilding command-and-control over its remnant forces. On its current trajectory, ISIS could regain sufficient strength to mount a renewed insurgency that once again threatens to overmatch local security forces in both Iraq and Syria. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is issuing a map update depicting ISIS’s current operating areas based on an analysis of its activity from January 1, 2018 to October 1, 2018.

Note: This map depicts ISIS’s operating areas in Iraq and Syria as of October 1, 2018. The graphic presents an assessment of ISIS’s control, support, and attack zones based on openly available reporting from January 1, 2018 to October 1, 2018. ISW’s rigorous methodology conforms to the doctrinal definitions used by the U.S. Armed Forces. Control zones are areas in which ISIS controls and governs civilian populations. Support zones are areas in which ISIS retains the ability to conduct logistics and administrative support functions. Attack zones are areas in which ISIS conducts kinetic attacks against civilians, infrastructure, and local security forces. ISW will publish updates to this assessment as appropriate.

The U.S. Anti-ISIS Campaign has not eliminated the global threat posed by ISIS despite largely accomplishing its stated objectives in Iraq and Syria. The campaign aimed to destroy ISIS’s physical caliphate and “drive down [its] capability” to the point where local forces could maintain security with limited international support. In Iraq, the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition accomplished this mission by April 2018 after finishing the last urban clearing operations in Anbar Province in Western Iraq. The Coalition scaled down its operations to a Building Partner Capacity (BPC) effort aimed at enabling Iraqis to “independently manage” a continued insurgency by ISIS. In Syria, the U.S. and its local partner forces are now attacking a final ISIS territorial stronghold near the Syrian-Iraqi border. ISIS has nonetheless already restructured its operations to return to a regional insurgency. The Pentagon stated in August 2018 that ISIS retains nearly 30,000 fighters across Iraq and Syria and is “more capable” than Al-Qaeda in Iraq - ISIS’s predecessor - at its peak in 2006 - 2007. ISIS is now waging an effective campaign to reestablish durable support zones while raising funds and rebuilding command-and-control over its remnant forces. On its current trajectory, ISIS could regain sufficient strength to mount a renewed insurgency that once again threatens to overmatch local security forces in both Iraq and Syria despite support from the Coalition.

Detecting ISIS’s Reconstitution

ISIS is finding new sources of revenue and rebuilding command-and-control over its scattered remnant forces in order to prepare for a future large-scale insurgency in both Iraq and Syria.

Revenue Generation

ISIS was able to smuggle as much as $400 million out of Iraq and reinvest it into legitimate businesses across the wider Middle East. It also continues to engage in lucrative criminal activity including extortion, smuggling, theft, and money laundering. ISW has observed multiple additional indicators of efforts by ISIS to generate additional revenue, including:

• Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) accused ISIS of taking hostages and extorting their families for sums worth tens of thousands of dollars in Northern Syria. 

• The U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition has interdicted large caches of drugs including Captagon and other amphetamines being trafficked by ISIS in Southern Syria. 

• ISIS has reportedly established a network of front companies - including car dealerships, electronic shops, pharmacies, and currency exchanges - to launder money in Iraq. 

• ISIS reportedly stole an unspecified quantity of drugs during a raid on a healthcare facility near Kirkuk in Iraq in mid-September 2018. ISIS could intend to sell these drugs for a profit. Alternatively, it may be restocking provisions for injured fighters ahead of future operations. 

ISW cannot assess the full scale of revenue being generated through these and other efforts by ISIS. Revenue generation is nonetheless a requirement for any military force to scale up its combat operations. 

Command-and-Control

ISIS can only wage an effective insurgency if it maintains command-and-control over its estimated tens of thousands of remaining fighters. The U.S. Anti-ISIS Campaign has forced some of ISIS’s cells to go to ground and it is unclear how many fighters its senior leaders can directly command. ISIS Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi released an audio message on August 22 calling for his followers to “wage attack after attack” and “unite and organize” against their opponents. ISIS similarly appealed in publications in March - April 2018 for the activation of sleeper cells. These messages suggest that ISIS deliberately embedded operatives to conduct future attacks in recaptured areas across Iraq and Syria. The public orders nonetheless signal that ISIS may lack control mechanisms to issue direct commands to its forces. ISW has observed at least four indicators that ISIS is reconstituting an operational-level command structure in Iraq and Syria as of October 1.

• ISIS announced the formation of two new wilayats (provinces) for Iraq and Syria on July 20. ISW assesses that these new structures are operational-level headquarters responsible for directing ISIS’s military campaign and bureaucratic functions across Iraq and Syria. ISIS retains a roughly equal combat force in each country. The U.S. Department of Defense estimated in August 2018 that ISIS commands 15,500 to 17,000 fighters in Iraq and 14,000 fighters in Syria. 

• Iraq conducted an airstrike targeting a reported ISIS “operations command” at an unidentified location in Syria on August 16. Iraqi officials reported that the strike disrupted a planned suicide vest (SVEST) attack in Iraq. If true, ISIS continues to coordinate cross-border operations despite efforts by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition to secure the Syrian-Iraqi border. The strike may have damaged this command element and thereby disrupted ISIS’s reconstitution. 

• ISIS’s official media outlets have implemented a new format of attack claims aligned with the new wilayats announced by ISIS on July 20. Previous claims had preserved the provincial command structure in place prior to the loss of ISIS’s de facto capitals in Mosul and Ar-Raqqa City. This standardization of communications guidelines indicates a centrally-controlled media campaign across Iraq and Syria. A parallel military command that reports and authorizes the release of content typically accompanies this type of media effort. The standardization of attack claims also allows ISIS to more effectively measure the progression of its own campaigns. 

• ISIS launched a new weekly report on its military activities on August 2. The report details attack statistics in Iraq and Syria as well as Afghanistan-Pakistan, Egypt, Nigeria, Somalia, and the Philippines. This detailed product is similar to the annual reports released by ISIS during its resurgence after the U.S withdrew from Iraq in 2011. It demonstrates that ISIS remains capable of tracking its campaigns across Iraq and Syria as well as its most active wilayats abroad. 

ISIS’s Operating Areas

Iraq

ISIS is waging an effective campaign to reestablish durable support zones across Iraq and deny the rehabilitation of communities liberated by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Campaign. ISIS retains a small control zone where it continues to govern a local population north of Baiji in Northern Iraq.[1] It also retains established support zones in areas south of Kirkuk City including Daquq, Hawija, Riyadh, and Rashad Districts as well as rural areas around Lake Hamrin in the Diyala River Valley. ISIS possesses the ability to move freely across this terrain at night and is actively waging attacks to expand its freedom of movement during the day. Its activities have thus far been limited to small arms attacks, targeted assassinations, and suicide vests (SVESTs). ISIS is steadily scaling up the rate of these attacks, conducting as many as four assassinations per week across Northern and Central Iraq. This violence has expelled civilians from small villages in Diyala and Kirkuk Provinces.[2] ISIS also retains a durable support zone in the Hamrin Mountains, where it appears to base some of its leadership. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) regularly claim to kill senior militants during clearing operations in the area.[3] In Baghdad, ISIS’s attack pattern indicates that it is likely reconstituting support and logistical networks throughout the Baghdad Belts, replicating its safe havens in 2006 - 2007. ISIS has not yet returned to the systematic use of vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs), which were a hallmark of its resurgence in 2011 - 2013. ISIS may cross this threshold soon. The Iraqi Ministry of Interior claimed to disrupt an ISIS VBIED cell north of Baghdad on September 6.[4]

ISIS has also established a support zone along the Iraqi-Iranian border that it is using to project capability into Iran. ISIS remnants (including Kurdish Salafi-Jihadist group Ansar al-Islam) have maintained a support zone in the Halabja Mountains in Iraqi Kurdistan since late 2016. Ansar al-Islam pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2014 but remained a distinct unit within its command structure. ISIS fighters from Ansar al-Islam conducted the major spectacular attack in Tehran during Ramadan in June 2017. A similar cell later deployed into Iran and clashed with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in January 2018. A senior leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Peshmerga stated in February 2018 that Ansar al-Islam is leveraging its cross-border links and local knowledge to facilitate infiltration into Iran.[5] ISIS is expanding its support base in Iraqi Kurdistan beyond the Halabja Mountains. Local Kurdish forces have detained numerous alleged cells in Sulaymaniyah Province in Northern Iraq since January 2018.[6]

Syria

ISIS is also reconstituting as an insurgent force across Syria. ISIS has lost all its territorial control in Syria except a twenty-kilometer-long stretch of terrain along the Euphrates River in Eastern Syria near the Syrian-Iraqi border. The area is currently under attack by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition. ISIS is nonetheless reconstituting in areas nominally under the control of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. ISIS negotiated evacuation deals from Damascus and the Golan Heights to relocate its forces to the Syrian Desert east of Damascus in May - July 2018. ISIS has exploited its underground tunnel networks in order to regroup and launch local counter-attacks in this area against both the Russo-Iranian Coalition and the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition. ISIS is also infiltrating Al-Qaeda’s areas of operations in Northern Syria in order to gain access to logistics routes through Turkey. It may also intend to tap into flows of Al-Qaeda-aligned foreign fighters. ISIS has also demonstrated that it retains the ability to mount attacks in areas held by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) including Ar-Raqqa City, Hasaka City, and Qamishli. ISIS is likely regenerating support networks across its former territorial holdings in Northern and Eastern Syria.

Future of the Anti-ISIS Campaign

ISIS’s resurgence will likely accelerate as the Anti-ISIS Campaign falls down the priority list of the Government of Iraq. Iraq shifted its focus towards Iraqi Kurdistan in October 2017 after the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) held a contested independence referendum in September 2017, triggering a military response from both Iraq and Iran in the contested city of Kirkuk. The subsequent military standoff between the Government of Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan disrupted operations against ISIS and created opportunities for ISIS to expand in the Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) with Iraqi Kurdistan.

Iraq’s May 2018 Parliamentary Elections and subsequent political developments have further disrupted the ability of the Government of Iraq to prioritize the Anti-ISIS Campaign. A growing protest movement in Southern Iraq divided the government and disrupted clearing operations against ISIS. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi redeployed part of the elite Iraqi Counterterrorism Services (CTS) to secure government installations in Southern Iraq on July 13.[7] The CTS is the preeminent force against ISIS in Iraq and works closely with the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition. Abadi similarly redeployed part of the Iraqi Emergency Response Division from the DIBs to Southern Iraq on September 9, further degrading security in Northern Iraq.[8]

The U.S. risks finding its options against ISIS in Iraq further constrained by the outcome of the ongoing government formation process in Baghdad. Iran is making a concerted effort to shape a Government of Iraq that is hostile to the U.S. and could demand a full withdraw of the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition. The U.S. is meanwhile using its economic leverage - and threats to revoke bilateral military support - in order to block powerful proxies of Iran from occupying key positions in the Government of Iraq. The outcome of this showdown remains unclear but it could lead to a violent confrontation between rival powerbrokers that would provide new openings for ISIS. The U.S. and its allies must take action to set the political conditions necessary to sustain a long-term campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. ISIS otherwise threatens to return yet again in a form even more dangerous and more capable than its rise to global prominence in 2014.

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[1] [“Successive Clearing Operations in Five Provinces After Monitoring the Movements of ISIS,”] Al-Mada Press, September 26, 2018, http://almadapaper(.)net/Details/213471/%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%91%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B7-%D9%85%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-5-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D8%B5%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%91%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4.
[2] [“Source Reveals the Displacement of Families from South of Kirkuk,”] Sot al-Iraq, June 20, 2018, https://www.sotaliraq(.)com/2018/06/20/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%AD-%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8-%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%88%D9%83/; [“Kurdish Lawmaker: 200 Kurdish Families Displaced from Villages of Daquq District Because of ISIS,”] Sumaria, June 26, 2018, https://www.alsumaria(.)tv/news/240307/%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%86%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%AD-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A8/ar.
[3] [“Popular Mobilization Announces the Killing of an ISIS Leader Northeast of Diyala,”] Sumaria, June 15, 2018, https://www.alsumaria(.)tv/news/239447/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%80%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84/ar; [“Death of a Senior Commander for ISIS in Clashes with Iraqi Forces in the North of the Country,”] The New Arab, June 26, 2018, https://www.alaraby.co(.)uk/politics/2018/6/26/%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B2-%D8%A8%D9%80-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9.
[4] [“Source: Interior Intelligence Thwarted Plan to Revive ‘Wilayat Baghdad’ of ISIS,”] Al-Ghad Press, September 6, 2018, https://www.alghadpress(.)com/news/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82/173347/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%A8%D8%B7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B7%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%88.
[5] [“ISIS Fails in Declaration of ‘Wilayat Halabja’ and Reveals Its Hideouts in Sulaymaniyah,”] Sot al-Iraq, February 5, 2018, https://www.sotaliraq(.)com/2018/02/05/%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%B4%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AC%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%AE/.
[6] [“Asayish Official: ISIS Militants That Clashed with Iranian Forces Entered Iran Through Borders of Kurdistan,”] Sumaria, January 27, 2018, https://www.alsumaria(.)tv/news/228070/%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8A/ar; [“Sulaymaniyah...The Arrest of Two Groups of Terrorists Before the Implementation of Their Plans in the Kurdistan Region,”] Rudaw, January 8, 2018, http://www.rudaw(.)net/arabic/kurdistan/080120186.
[7] [“Basra Police to Mirbad: Incoming Forces Will Protect Facilities and Their Movement Under the Order of Abadi Exclusively,”] Mirbad, July 14, 2018, http://www.almirbad(.)com/news/view.aspx?cdate=14072018&id=41fdb375-61bd-4121-8283-81cb054e4446.
[8] [“Emergency Response Announces the Deployment of Their Formations in Basra to Protect Vital Centers,”] Mirbad, September 14, 2018, http://www.almirbad(.)com/news/view.aspx?cdate=14092018&id=9b320244-1d0d-4ff7-805c-a7b2b2e50d94.

Syria Situation Report: September 13 - 26, 2018

By ISW's Syria Team and Syria Direct

This graphic marks the latest installment of the Syria Situation Report (SITREP) Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and Syria Direct. The map depicts significant developments in the war in Syria during the period September 13 - 26, 2018.

Russia in Review: September 14 - 25, 2018

Russia in Review is a weekly intelligence summary (INTSUM) produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This ISW INTSUM series sheds light on key trends and developments related to the Russian government’s objectives and its efforts to secure them. Receive future Russia in Review INTSUM products via-email by signing up for the ISW mailing list at www.understandingwar.org.

Reporting Period: September 14 - 25, 2018 (The previous Russia in Review INTSUM is available here.)

Authors: Catherine Harris and Jack Ulses with the ISW Research Team

Key Takeaway: Russia is setting conditions to escalate militarily in Eastern Ukraine. The Kremlin may seek to use this buildup to intimidate and influence the 2019 Ukrainian Presidential Election; to respond to pushback by the U.S. and Turkey in Syria and Ukraine; to distract from continued domestic discontent in Russia; or all of the above. The Kremlin is simultaneously driving protests in Latvia in a likely effort to confuse the West and preclude a swift response by NATO to Russia’s main effort to destabilize Ukraine. NATO must be prepared for the Kremlin to escalate one or more of these conflicts simultaneously in order to uphold the alliance and deter further aggression by Russia.

Russia is setting conditions to escalate militarily in Eastern Ukraine. The Kremlin is assembling new military units under its command and control to deploy in Eastern Ukraine. Russia may be repurposing preexisting (or building new) units of Russian Cossacks to function as rapid reaction forces under the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army positioned near the Russia-Ukraine Border. Ukrainian Military Intelligence reported that some of these detachments are deployed alongside other separatist forces led by Russia in Eastern Ukraine as of September 13.[1] The size of these new units remains unclear.

Russia is also consolidating control over its existing proxy forces in Eastern Ukraine. Elements likely backed by the Kremlin assassinated separatist Donetsk People’s Republic President Alexander Zakharchenko on August 31. Zakharchenko had reportedly refused to integrate his militias into command structures led by Russia. The Kremlin may be tightening control over its proxies to dampen ongoing militia infighting and protect its efforts to influence the March 2019 Ukrainian Presidential Election. These efforts also set conditions for a future escalation by Russia in Ukraine, even if that is not their present purpose.

The Kremlin attempted to use large-scale military exercises to conceal its condition-setting on the Russia-Ukraine Border. The Kremlin capitalized on international focus on its scheduled Vostok-2018 military exercises to shift assets from Eastern and Central Russia to the Russia-Ukraine Border. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry reported that Russia transported artillery units from Eastern Russia to the Russia-Ukraine Border during Vostok-2018 from September 11 - 17. The Kremlin in recent weeks also reportedly shifted large numbers of T-62 tanks from Eastern Russia to the Russia-Ukraine Border.[2] Estimates of the transfer range from five hundred to one thousand tanks. The Kremlin may intend to assign some of this equipment to its proxy forces during large-scale snap military exercises that will occur in the Southern Military District through the end of October 2018.[3]

Russian President Vladimir Putin may escalate in Eastern Ukraine in response to recent deterrence efforts by NATO. The Trump Administration’s decision to prolong its military engagement in Eastern Syria places long-term constraints on Russia. The U.S. also backed a successful effort by Turkey to block an offensive by Syria, Russia, and Iran in Northern Syria. Turkey is also contesting other areas of strategic interest for the Kremlin. Turkey and Ukraine agreed to strengthen defense cooperation on the Black Sea on September 7. The Kremlin likely perceives this agreement as a threat to Russia. The Kremlin uses the Black Sea to project power into both the Mediterranean Sea and Ukraine. Turkish Eastern Orthodox leadership may also soon erode another tool of political leverage for the Kremlin in Ukraine by granting a writ of autocephaly (self-rule independent of the Moscow Patriarchate) to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.[4] The Kremlin could turn to military escalation in Eastern Ukraine as a means to regain leverage in the face of these positive steps by the U.S. and Turkey to counter a revisionist Russia.

Putin could also use a foreign policy distraction in Ukraine to divert attention from increasing discontent in Russia. Putin faces mounting domestic unrest over controversial results in the September 2018 Russian Regional Elections. Putin’s direct endorsement of preferred political candidates failed to ensure victory in several key districts across Russia. The Kremlin allowed local party branches to use slogans linking Putin directly to his political party - United Russia.[5] Several candidates nonetheless lost in districts where the slogan was used.[6] The Kremlin also fabricated election results in Eastern Russia to guarantee victory for a candidate from United Russia but subsequently annulled the results to save face after public outcry.[7] The Kremlin thus may seek to refocus the domestic population on its foreign policy. This effort will likely fail. Putin’s approval ratings remain at their lowest level since February 2014.[8] An independent polling center also recently found that only 16% of Russians approve of the foreign policy pursued by Putin with citizens growing increasingly frustrated with spending abroad at the expense of social services in Russia.[9] Putin continues to demonstrate that he is out of touch with his population and might miscalculate that displays of a strong foreign policy could alleviate domestic pressure on his government.

The Kremlin still remains most likely to use the threat of military action to support its ongoing low-costs efforts to destabilize Ukraine. Russia stands to pay a high cost for military escalation at this time. The U.S. and EU are likely to pass additional sanctions on the Kremlin in response to any operation in Eastern Ukraine. Russia would also be forced to fund a sustained ground operation at a time when its economy is weakening. The Kremlin will likely wait until the conclusion of the 2019 Ukrainian Presidential Election to determine whether or not a military escalation would produce a net gain for the Kremlin. Indicators of such a future escalation include the mobilization (rather than just reinforcement) of the Russian Armed Forces along the Russia-Ukraine Border, the deployment of military assets to reinforce separatist rear areas within Eastern Ukraine, and Russia’s formal withdrawal from the Minsk II Agreement.

NATO must nonetheless be prepared for a near-term escalation in multiple theaters by the Kremlin. Russia is simultaneously attempting to escalate tensions among ethnic Russians in Latvia. Kremlin-backed elements held demonstrations in Latvia on September 15 ahead of the October 6 Latvian Parliamentary Elections.[10] The protests condemned a controversial language law that will phase out the use of Russian in schools in Latvia. Russia is likely attempting to garner additional support ahead of the elections in an effort to secure a new government of Latvia friendlier to the Kremlin. These protests are the latest reflection of the multiple subversive campaigns undertaken by Russia at minimal cost to contest the U.S., EU, and NATO. The U.S. and its allies must be prepared to counter and respond to escalation by Russia in multiple theaters over a relatively short amount of time in order to demonstrate their strong commitment to NATO.

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[1] [“The Kremlin got into an interesting dead end, in the Donbass,”] insomni.ru, June 18, 2018, https://inosmi(.)ru/politic/20180618/242514038.html ; “Russian-led forces ban military-age males from leaving "LPR/DPR" to Russia,” UNIAN, September 24, 2018 https://www.unian(.)info/society/10272453-russian-led-forces-ban-military-age-males-from-leaving-lpr-dpr-to-russia-intel.html

[2] [“Radio Svoboda traced the route of Russian tanks from Buryatia to the Ukrainian border,”] Radio Svoboda, September 4, 2018, https://www.radiosvoboda(.)org/a/russian-tanks-from-buryatia-near-ukrainian-border/29470360.html

[3] [“About 45,000 military of the South-Eastern Military District are involved in the exercises until the end of October,”] RIA Novosti, September 17, 2018, https://ria(.)ru/defense_safety/20180917/1528683799.html?referrer_block=index_archive_1

[4] “Patriarch of Constantinople Pledges to Grant Autocephaly to Ukraine Church Soon,” Sputnik, September 23, 2018, https://sputniknews(.)com/world/201809231068271418-patriarch-constantinople-ukraine-autocephaly/

[5] [“"United Russia" party declared himself president in crisis regions,”] Svoboda, August 22, 2018, https://www.svoboda(.)org/a/29447068.html

[6] “United Russia loses ground, as the Communist Party gains it. Here are the main results of Sunday's regional elections,” medusa.io, September 10, 2018, https://meduza(.)io/en/feature/2018/09/10/united-russia-loses-ground-as-the-communist-party-gains-it-here-are-the-main-results-of-sunday-s-regional-elections

[7] [“The Bell: the purpose of rigging elections in Primorye was not the victory of the governor, but the cancellation of results,”] meduza.io, September 19, 2018, https://meduza(.)io/news/2018/09/19/the-bell-tselyu-falsifikatsiy-na-vyborah-v-primorie-byla-ne-pobeda-gubernatora-a-otmena-rezultatov

[8] “Putin’s Approval Ratings,” Yuri-Levada Analytical Center, http://www.levada(.)ru/en/ratings/

[9] [“Relationship with Putin,”] levada.ru, August 9, 2018, https://www.levada(.)ru/2018/08/09/otnoshenie-k-vladimiru-putinu-3/

[10] “About 5,000 rally in Riga against reform of Russian-language schools in Latvia,” TASS, September 15, 2018, http://tass(.)com/society/1021758 

Russia in Review: August 28 - September 13, 2018

Russia in Review is a weekly intelligence summary (INTSUM) produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This ISW INTSUM series sheds light on key trends and developments related to the Russian government’s objectives and its efforts to secure them. Receive future Russia in Review INTSUM products via-email by signing up for the ISW mailing list at www.understandingwar.org.

Reporting Period: August 28 - September 13, 2018 (The previous Russia in Review INTSUM is available here.)

Authors: Catherine Harris, Jack Ulses, and Mason Clark, with Jennifer Cafarella, Elizabeth Teoman, Matti Suomenaro, John Dunford, and Michael Land

Key Takeaway: Russia is setting conditions to attack the U.S. and its partner forces in Syria in a limited and plausibly-deniable way in the near term. The Kremlin is also reshaping its proxy governments and their military forces in Ukraine to continue undermining Ukrainian integration into the West. These condition-setting activities would allow Putin to escalate militarily to challenge U.S. strategic interests in multiple theaters simultaneously if he so chose.

Russia, Iran, and the Syrian regime will likely attack U.S. forces in Syria in the near-term. Western diplomatic support to Turkey likely reinforced Turkey’s ability to block a Russia-led ground offensive into Idlib Province in northwestern Syria, bordering Turkey. Pro-regime forces may now shift resources east to attack U.S. and U.S.-backed forces in Syria. Pro-regime forces already responded militarily to the U.S. decision to remain in Syria. U.S. defense officials stated Russia warned the U.S. that pro-regime forces are prepared to attack a U.S. base on the Jordan-Syria-Iraq border after pro-regime forces fired on this location on September 1. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has repeatedly warned that Russia, Iran, and the regime are preparing to attack U.S. forces and the U.S. primary ground partner – the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – in Eastern Syria. Russia will attempt to conceal its role in an attack on U.S. forces. The outcome of previous probing attacks in Eastern Syria indicate the U.S. will not hold the Kremlin accountable for attacks on U.S. forces conducted by non-uniformed Russian personnel. The Kremlin will likely use a mixture of plausibly deniable forces and attempt to foment a pseudo-insurgency in U.S.- and SDF-held terrain. Alternatively, Russia may bring to bear substantial conventional force against the U.S. and the SDF under the guise of counter-ISIS operations in Eastern Syria in a most dangerous scenario. An increase in the scale of advanced Russian hardware deployments into Syria may indicate the Kremlin is preparing to undertake this option.

The Kremlin may be preparing to escalate militarily in Donbas, Ukraine if its political efforts to destabilize Kyiv fail. Russia reportedly shifted between 500-1000 T-62 tanks from eastern Russia to the Russia/Ukraine border at the end of August. The Kremlin is also consolidating control over its proxies in a possible effort to exert more effective command and control before a military operation. The Kremlin will likely pursue a low-cost political course of action before a military operation, however. Russia is pushing to hold elections in Donbas in November 2018. Its new proxy leadership supports these elections. The Kremlin seeks to create the perception that its proxies are functioning political entities ahead of Ukrainian elections in 2019 in order to reset negotiations between newly elected Ukrainian officials and its proxies. Russia’s long-term objective is to integrate its proxies into Ukrainian government structures in order to acquire a degree of control over decision-making in Kyiv. This approach – if successful – would de facto legitimize Russia’s proxies and undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty from within its own government. Ukraine’s progress toward integration with Western structures, namely NATO and the EU, would be at risk of stalling or reversing.

What to Watch For

Russia is attempting to acquire naval basing on the Red Sea that will allow it to constrain U.S. freedom of movement. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced plans to build a Russian logistics center at an undisclosed port in Eritrea following talks with Eritrean officials in Moscow on August 31. The Kremlin may deploy anti-access area-denial systems to this facility providing Russia with significant leverage to contest access to the Bab al-Mandab Strait. This position will also give Russia access to the Yemeni conflict that it may use to support Iranian-backed elements in the war and strengthen its regional coalition with Iran. This position will also allow the Kremlin to rotate private military contractors and deploy more advanced hardware, such as armored vehicles, into conflicts in Africa if desired.

Syria Situation Report: August 28 - September 12, 2018

By ISW's Syria Team and Syria Direct

This graphic marks the latest installment of the Syria Situation Report (SITREP) Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and Syria Direct. The map depicts significant developments in the war in Syria during the period August 28 - September 12, 2018.

Syria Situation Report: August 6 - 28, 2018

By ISW's Syria Team and Syria Direct

This set of graphics marks the latest installment of the Syria Situation Report (SITREP) Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and Syria Direct. The two maps depict significant developments in the war in Syria during the periods August 6-16 and August 16-28, 2018.

Intra Shi'a Civil War Begins in Iraq

By Jennifer Cafarella and Kimberly Kagan with Aaron Hesse, Samantha Leathley, and Jason Zhou

An intra-Shi’a civil war is beginning in Iraq. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi and Iranian proxy leader Hadi al Ameri are locked in a power struggle to dominate the formation of the next Iraqi government. The U.S. is backing Abadi and temporarily disrupted Iran’s play in late August. ISW warned on August 28^th that Iran could escalate militarily in response. Abadi and Ameri separately declared coalitions of Council of Representatives (CoR) members sufficient to gain the status of the “largest bloc” on September 2^nd. The largest CoR block has the constitutional right to choose the next Iraqi Prime Minister.  The resulting stalemate has protracted government formation negotiations past legal deadlines. Each side is escalating with force in order to break this political stalemate.

RELATED READING: 

KIMBERLY KAGAN AND FREDERICK W. KAGAN, "THE U.S. CAN DEFUSE IRAQ'S CRISIS," THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, SEPTEMBER 13, 2018

Iran’s proxies conducted a warning shot against the U.S. embassy in Baghdad in an attempt to compel Abadi to back down. Abadi visited the headquarters of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) on September 3^rd and declared his authority over all of Iraq’s armed forces. [1] His goal was likely to disrupt Ameri’s ability to use Iranian proxies within the PMF as coercive leverage against either Abadi or members of Abadi’s coalition. In response, ten Iranian proxy militias within the PMF declared they will respond to Abadi’s “irresponsible takeover” of Iraqi institutions and called on the Dawa party to limit Abadi’s behavior on September 4^th. [2] The groups stated they will use “all possible means” to force coalition troops out of Iraq. Multiple mortars landed near the U.S. Embassy compound in Baghdad at night on September 6^th. ISW assesses that an Iranian proxy, likely Asa’ib Ahl Al Haq (AAH), conducted the attack.

Shi’a actors aligned with Abadi and with Ameri are also escalating within a pre-existing protest movement in Basra. Abadi has lost control in Basra, where Shi’a protesters have defied a curfew and unidentified Iraqi Security Force (ISF) units have used live fire ammunition against protesters on multiple occasions since August 31^st. An appeal by Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani on September 4^th did not prevent future use of live ammunition. Attacks in Basra targeted multiple government buildings in addition to Iranian proxy militia headquarters and the headquarters of militias and political parties aligned with Abadi on September 6^th. It is possible but unlikely that protesters alone conducted these attacks. Militias aligned with nationalist Shi’a Cleric Muqtada al Sadr, a member of Abadi’s coalition, were likely involved in the attacks against Iranian proxy militia headquarters. Iranian proxies were likely similarly responsible for attacks against the Dawa party and possibly government buildings.  At minimum, the deteriorating conditions in Basra raise the likelihood of intra-Shi’a violence at a time when Shi’a powerbrokers have resorted to armed action to affect a protracted government formation struggle in Baghdad.

Mutual kinetic escalation between actors aligned with Abadi and those with Ameri will escalate into a full-blown civil war unless one side capitulates. ISW is monitoring the situation closely and will provide updates as appropriate.

___

[1] "Abadi leads the Popular Crowd," All Iraq News. September 3, 2018. Available: http://www.alliraqnews(.)com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=77269

[2] "10 Iran-backed Shia militia groups threaten Abadi, Foreign troops in Iraq," September 5, 2018. Available: http://www.kurdistan24(.)net/en/news/382a3b08-dc0c-4b3a-8703-90d9f37b8b26

Russia in Review: The Kremlin's Campaign in the Balkans

Russia in Review is a weekly intelligence summary (INTSUM) produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This ISW INTSUM series sheds light on key trends and developments related to the Russian government’s objectives and its efforts to secure them.

Special Topic Update: The Balkans

Authors: Catherine Harris, Jack Ulses, and Chase Johnson

Key Takeaway: Russia is waging a campaign to increase its influence and limit the growth of NATO and the EU in the Balkans. The Kremlin is establishing proxies and training local separatist forces from the Balkans in Russia. Russia is also actively attempting to sow internal discord within the Balkans in an effort to stall or block further expansion by NATO and the EU. Russia intends to use the Balkan Peninsula as a critical geographic foothold in Europe from which it can launch subversive operations meant to fracture the long-term unity of the West. Its activities could encourage a renewal of the ethnic violence of the 1990s and create fertile conditions for the expansion of Salafi-Jihadism among Muslims in the Balkans.

Russia is supporting irregular forces in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina that it could use to destabilize the Balkans. The Kremlin is providing diplomatic and military support to the autonomous region of Republika Srpska as it seeks to secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Russian Security Services are training and developing local “special police” units in both Russia and the Republika Srpska. Russia also allegedly trains military personnel from Serbia who later return to develop and lead paramilitary groups in the Republika Srpska. These separatist groups reportedly train in “cultural centers” run by Russia in Serbia and recruit members from criminal networks in Serbia as well as populations that support Pan-Slavism. The Kremlin - in coordination with nationalists in Serbia - likely intends to leverage these forces to support hardline Bosnian Serbs (such as the current President of Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik) in their efforts to acquire independence from Bosnia-Herzegovina. This action would undo the agreements that ended the massive ethnic cleansing of the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s. The Kremlin could also leverage a position in the Republika Srpska as a base for destabilization operations targeting regional member-states of the EU and NATO as part of its long-term effort to undermine institutions in the West. This instability could also provide an opportunity for Salafi-Jihadist groups to expand in the Balkans and Europe.

Russia is attempting to spoil ongoing negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo to block further expansion by NATO and the EU. Russia has used diplomatic pressure and cultural outreach to spoil normalization talks between Serbia and Kosovo that could position both states to join the EU. Serbia and Kosovo are holding formal negotiations to redraw their disputed border. Russia has responded by increasing its engagement with Serbia and will likely seek to pressure Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić to forsake normalization initiatives led by the West. The Kremlin has long opposed the independence of Kosovo as an illegal unilateral action imposed by NATO on Serbia. It also likely fears that recognition for Kosovo would embolden autonomous regions in the Caucuses to declare their own independence from Russia. Russia may nonetheless cite the ongoing border discussions as a legal precedent to legitimize its own support for separatist movements in Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Donbas on the grounds that these breakaway regions hold the same legal authority to declare autonomy as Kosovo. The Kremlin has previously used operations by NATO in the Balkans as justification for its own aggression in the Caucasus.

Russia is also supporting nationalist groups to block the accession of Macedonia to NATO. Greece and Macedonia reached an agreement to settle their long-running dispute over Macedonia’s name in June 2018. The deal lifts the last obstacle blocking the accession of Macedonia to NATO. Greece later expelled several Russian diplomats attempting to bribe officials to block the deal and charged a Russian national with financing several nationalist groups to incite protests against the name change. Russia will likely continue such low-cost subversive activity - such as biker-gang tours, cultural outreach, and applied economic pressure - to raise tensions ahead of the scheduled referendum on the deal on September 30.

The Kremlin is increasing energy investment in key regional states to increase its leverage in the Balkans. The Kremlin will seek to secure its energy dominance on the Balkan Peninsula through a combination of maneuvers aimed at blocking investment in diversification measures from the West. The Balkans still rely heavily on energy imports from Russia. Russia has proposed to build power plants and gas pipelines in Croatia. It has also revamped negotiations to construct a nuclear power plant in Bulgaria despite the previous cancellation of the project due to financial sustainability concerns. Bulgaria reversed the decision and subsequently sought renewed investment from Russia following a series of high-level negotiations with counterparts in Moscow. Bulgaria has also expanded a regional gas pipeline to Turkey in a bid to convey natural gas from the Russia-Turkish TurkStream Pipeline into Europe.

Russia will likely escalate its subversive activities as the Balkans move closer to the West. Russia regularly intervenes to disrupt all stages of the accession of aspirant states into NATO and the EU, and it has a history of previous escalation in this regard in the Balkans. Russia will continue to stoke ethnic and nationalist tensions from the 1990s in order to fracture its opponents and build space for networks of deniable proxies that it can activate as needed. Russia - if left unimpeded - will successfully position itself to use diplomatic and military subversion to further challenge the southern flank of NATO. This instability could also provide an opening for the expansion of Salafi-Jihadist groups in the Balkans and Europe.

Update: Pro-Regime Forces Setting Conditions to Attack U.S. Forces in Eastern Syria

By Catherine Harris with Jennifer Cafarella and the ISW Syria Team

Key Takeaway: Russia, Iran, and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad are continuing to set conditions to attack the U.S. and its primary ground partner - the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) - in Eastern Syria while international attention is focused on a possible pro-regime offensive in Idlib Province. Pro-regime forces are amassing in Deir ez-Zour Province and consolidating control over infrastructure that could enable future attacks across the Euphrates River. The Russo-Iranian Coalition likely intends to extract concessions from the SDF and U.S. by threatening kinetic escalation in Eastern Syria. They nonetheless remain prepared to use force if negotiations fail.

RELATED READING: Russia in Review (September 14, 2018)

Russia and Iran have taken additional steps to set conditions for a potential offensive against the U.S. and its partners in Eastern Syria. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) previously warned in June 2018 that the Russo-Iranian Coalition is preparing to attack the U.S. and its partnered Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Pro-regime forces have taken a number of steps since June that will shorten or eliminate the operational pause required to pivot from operations in Western Syria to a main effort in Eastern Syria.

• Russia may be preparing for cross-river operations in Deir ez-Zour Province. Russian Military Police reportedly assumed control over all frontline checkpoints and river crossings (primarily informal ferry crossings) along the Euphrates River in Deir ez-Zour Province in mid-August 2018.[1] Russia is ostensibly asserting order after increasingly violent disputes between pro-regime forces over revenue from cross-front trade with SDF-held areas. This consolidation also positions Russian Military Police for future operations against U.S. and SDF. Russia can construct temporary bridges at these river crossings to enable military movements across the Euphrates River. It has previously deployed combat engineers with bridging equipment to Deir ez-Zour Province.[2] Russia also claims that personnel from the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations are currently rebuilding infrastructure in Deir ez-Zour Province.[3] It is possible these personnel could also be used for infrastructure projects to support military operations in Eastern Syria. 

• Russia and Iran are consolidating command-and-control structures in Eastern Syria. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) reportedly arrested the local commander of the regime’s National Defense Forces (NDF) in Deir ez-Zour Province on August 18 after Russian Military Police detained him for several days.[4] The arrests followed several days of violent clashes between militias backed by Iran and the NDF in Deir ez-Zour Province. Russia and Iran are likely reorganizing existing local command structures to exert more effective control over pro-regime forces in Eastern Syria. Russia’s assertion of control over the river crossing likely supports this effort. This consolidation is a necessary step ahead of any upcoming combat operation against the U.S. and SDF in Eastern Syria. 

• The Russo-Iranian Coalition also continued efforts to destabilize areas held by the SDF and U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition in Syria. Pro-regime agents reportedly distributed leaflets calling on civilians to fight U.S. and SDF personnel in Raqqa City on August 23.[5] ISW previously warned that pro-regime forces began infiltrating terrain held by the SDF as early as February 2018. Pro-regime forces are building on tribal networks to disrupt and threaten the U.S. and the SDF. 

Russia, Iran, and Assad likely still hope to compel the SDF to cut a deal and break from the U.S.

• Assad still seeks a deal that reintegrates the SDF into the Syrian state. Negotiations between the SDF and Damascus are ongoing. Assad has previously emphasized that the regime would not hesitate to use force if these talks fail.[6] He has thus far refused to meet the terms proposed by the SDF and instead opted to escalate politically in Northern Syria. He is pressing forward with plans to extend nationwide local elections scheduled for September 16 to areas held by the SDF. The Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) - the political wing of the SDF - has rejected the vote and detained multiple candidates for office across Northern Syria.[7] Assad’s political escalation has caused a stalemate in the negotiations with the SDF. The SDF and Assad also remain deadlocked over the control of key infrastructure including utilities, dams, and oil fields in Eastern Syria.[8] The SDF has asserted that it will continue to manage oil and natural gas fields in Deir ez-Zour Province until it reaches a full political settlement with Assad.[9] Assad may apply military pressure to coerce greater concessions from the SDF. 

Russia and Iran will likely prioritize their current main effort to reconquer parts of opposition-held Idlib Province in Northern Syria and later pivot to Eastern Syria. They could attempt to exploit international focus on Idlib Province to conduct deniable operations against the U.S. in Eastern Syria, however.

The U.S. has begun to block pro-regime tribal outreach but must still prepare for possible military escalation in Eastern Syria. The U.S. sent a senior delegation to meet with local tribes across SDF-held areas of Eastern Syria in late August. The delegation communicated a renewed U.S. commitment to countering both ISIS and Iran in Syria. The visit is an inflection in the level of local engagement and could indicate the U.S. has decided to retain forces in Syria. The framing of U.S. policy in Eastern Syria as anti-Iran is also an inflection and likely reflects a U.S. effort to start blocking the entrenchment of Iran in Deir ez-Zour Province.[10] This outreach is a positive first step toward consolidating gains against ISIS and blocking the ability of Iran, Russia, and Assad to coopt the SDF. The U.S. must be prepared to defend against a military escalation as well. Renewed U.S. engagement in Eastern Syria could prompt pro-regime forces to abandon their diplomatic effort and escalate militarily instead.

Looking Ahead

Pro-regime forces have reshuffled their force disposition on the western bank of the Euphrates River in Deir ez-Zour Province in areas adjacent to ongoing clearing operations by the SDF against ISIS in the area of Hajin.[11] The full scope of these deployments is unclear at the time of this writing. Further deployments of pro-regime forces along the Euphrates River Valley or Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) along the Syrian-Iraqi Border could be an indicator of an imminent attack against U.S. forces or the SDF. Multiple reported attacks against SDF-held oil infrastructure in Eastern Syria in late August could reflect probing attempts by the Russo-Iranian Coalition. The attacks may alternately be conducted by ISIS. ISW will release a refined assessment of the pro-regime force posture in the coming days.

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[1] [“Russia receives river crossings in Deir al-Zour,”] Smart News-Agency, August 17, 2018, Available: https://smartnews-agency(.)com/ar/wires/317899/%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%B1 ; [“An agreement between the regime and SDF to open the crossing Salehia Deir al-Zour,”] Smart News-Agency, August 27. 2018, Available: https://smartnews-agency(.)com/ar/wires/319773/%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%88-%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%AD-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1.
[2] “Russia Ships More Military Equipment To Syria,” South Front, April 13, 2018, Available: https://southfront(.)org/russia-ships-more-military-equipment-to-syria-photos/
[3] “Bulletin of the Centre for the Reception, Allocation and Accommodation of Refugees (August 21, 2018),” Russian Ministry of Defense, August 21, 2018, Available: http://eng(.)mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12191859@egNews
[4] [“Mounting differences between Iranian militias and regime in Deir ez Zour, and al-Iraqiya held in Sayeda Zeinab prison,”] SNN, August 18, 2018, Available: www.shaam(.)org/news/syria-news/تصاعد-الخلافات-بين-ميليشيات-إيران-والنظام-في-دير-الزور-و-العراقية-يزج-في-سجن-السيدة-زينب.html ; “Russian police slapped an ‘Assad militia’ in Deir al-Zour,” El Dorar, August 13, 2018, Available: https://eldorar(.)com/node/124858
[5] Sound and Pic. August 23, 2018 Available: https://twitter(.)com/soundandpic/status/1032719606430019584
[6] “‘We were close to direct conflict between Russia & US inside Syria’ – Bashar Assad” Russia Today, May 31, 2018, Available: https://www.rt(.)com/news/428299-assad-syria-russia-interview/
[7] [“Riad Derar denies the formation of any joint committees with the Syrian regime”] PYD Rojava, August 12, 2018, Available: https://pydrojava(.)net/arabic/archives/38483; [“Al-Hasakah .. Arrest of candidates and the closure of private schools renew the dispute between the regime and the Democratic Union”] Zaman al Wasl, August 21, 2018. Available: https://www(.)zamanalwsl.net/news/article/91163/
[8] “Kurdish Delegation Met Syrian Gov't Officials to Discuss Political Settlement,” Sputnik News, Available: July 27, 2018, Available: https://sputniknews(.)com/middleeast/201807271066741101-kurdish-damascus-political-settlement/
[9] [“President of the SDC...Yes, I met Assad in Damascus, and the fate of the oil fields was not on the table”] Zaman al Wasl, August 19, 2018, Available: https://www(.)zamanalwsl.net/news/article/91075/; [“Ilham Ahmed: Yes, I met Assad in Damascus and we may be part of the regime’s army if the agreement is reached”] SNN, August 19, 2018, Available: www.shaam(.)org/news/syria-news/إلهام-أحمد-التقيت-الأسد-في-دمشق-وقد-نكون-جزءاً-من-جيش-النظام-حال-الاتفاق.html; [““Within restrictions” with the President of the Executive Board of the Syrian Democratic Council, Ilham Ahmed”] BBC Arabic, August 17, 2018, Available: http://www.bbc(.)com/arabic/45228102
[10] “US Troops Poised to 'Stay' in Syria as DoS Official Visits Kurdish-Held Areas,” Sputnik, August 26, 2018, https://sputniknews(.)com/middleeast/201808261067485266-syria-us-forces-daesh-fight/;
[11] [“Russia controls crossings in Deir ez Zour and Hama after expulsion of regime forces,”] Halab Today, August 17, 2018, Available: https://halabtodaytv(.)net/news/26527 ; [“Deir ez Zour Province is witnessing tripartite movements of ISIS, the Syrian regime, and the SDF on both sides of the Euphrates and the latter seek to defeat ISIS"] SOHR, August 21, 2018, Available: http://www.syriahr(.)com/2018/08/21/محافظة-دير-الزور-تشهد-تحركات-ثلاثية-من/

Iraq Warning Update: Major Protests Likely in Iraq This Weekend

By Aaron Hesse with Samantha Leathley

KT: Rival Iraqi Shi’a powerbrokers are calling for competing protests on Friday, August 31, 2018. Iranian-backed proxy forces, nationalist Shi’a cleric Moqtada al Sadr, and former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki all intend to use street demonstrations to gain leverage in negotiations over the next Government of Iraq ahead of a key constitutional deadline on September 3. These dueling protests in majority-Shi’a Southern Iraq could turn violent. ISW is tracking the situation closely and will continue to provide updates.

Iran and its proxies are likely fueling new protests against the U.S. that erupted in Baghdad on August 29. Protesters near the Green Zone held banners depicting U.S. Special Envoy to the Anti-ISIS Coalition Brett McGurk and warning that “anyone who negotiates with [McGurk] is a traitor to Iraqi martyrs.” Iranian-backed proxy forces have openly threatened to attack U.S. forces as recently as July 2018. ISW warned on August 28 that Iran could retaliate after the temporary disruption of its attempts to select the next Prime Minister of Iraq by renewed engagement of the U.S. on behalf of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi. Iran likely intends to use the protests in Baghdad to discredit and outmaneuver Abadi in the still-ongoing negotiations for the next Government of Iraq. In a most dangerous scenario, Iran may use the protests to set conditions for a kinetic escalation against Abadi, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), or the U.S. in Iraq or Syria. 

Rival Iraqi Shi’a powerbrokers have also called for protests this weekend, raising the risk of violent street confrontations. Nationalist Shi’a cleric Moqtada al Sadr called for a “million-man” protest in Najaf on August 31. Sadr is politically aligned with Abadi and likely seeks to demonstrate his continued clout amidst government formation negotiations. Sadr’s call may fuel ongoing protests over poor government service provision in Southern Iraq. The failure of water-treatment facilities has spread waterborne diseases that hospitalized as many as 18,000 in Basra in August 2018. Iraqi Vice President Nouri al Maliki is also attempting to coopt these demonstrations for political gain. Maliki publicly condemned the “lack of services in Basra and other governorates” of Iraq on Twitter on August 30. Maliki is politically aligned with Badr Organization Chairman Hadi al Ameri - a senior proxy of Iran - and may seek to offset Sadr’s influence in Basra. Violence could thus erupt between competing protests in majority-Shi’a Southern Iraq. Iranian-backed proxy militias could also clash with units of the ISF deployed in Southern Iraq or U.S. forces in Eastern Syria.

RELATED READING

Warning Update: Iraqi Government Formation Showdown Could Turn Violent, August 28, 2018

Russia in Review: August 21 - 28, 2018

Russia in Review is a weekly intelligence summary (INTSUM) produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This ISW INTSUM series sheds light on key trends and developments related to the Russian government’s objectives and its efforts to secure them.

Reporting Period: August 21 - 28, 2018 (The previous period's INTSUM is available here.)

Authors: Jack Ulses and Catherine Harris

Key Takeaway: The Kremlin continues to pursue aggressive foreign policy objectives that undermine the global influence of the U.S. despite domestic economic setbacks that stem in part from new U.S. sanctions. The Kremlin will likely increase its efforts to posture as a security guarantor in Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to supplant U.S. regional influence in South Asia. Russia may also seek to cultivate new sources of support among international actors in order to mitigate future economic damage from sanctions. The Kremlin nonetheless is being forced to take action to respond to domestic discontent and may readjust its approach towards long-term economic problems in order to ensure continued strong support for Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The Kremlin is courting Pakistan to undermine U.S. regional influence in South Asia. Russia is vying with several regional actors to court support from Pakistan. Russia and Pakistan held the inaugural Russia-Pakistan Joint Military Consultative Committee (JMCC) in Rawalpindi on August 6 - 7 where they signed an agreement allowing Pakistani servicemen to study at military institutions in Russia. The deal followed a U.S. decision to halt similar training programs for Pakistan. The Kremlin is capitalizing on Pakistan’s desire to replace U.S. support in the long term.[1] Russia is likely also leveraging increased cooperation with Pakistan to shape tentative peace talks with the Afghan Taliban in Moscow that will undermine U.S efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. Russia may also increase its security operations near Afghanistan to posture as a security guarantor in Central Asia. The Kremlin will nonetheless continue to balance its growing relations with Pakistan against its objective to maintain a strategic partnership with India.

U.S. sanctions have not deterred Russia from pursuing an aggressive foreign policy. U.S. sanctions are negatively impacting the domestic economy of Russia. The Russian ruble dropped to its lowest level since 2016. The Kremlin is also attempting to hide financial assets from future sanctions. The Kremlin has nonetheless not been deterred from its aggressive foreign policy agenda. Russia may be setting conditions to support an offensive by Iran and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to retake Idlib Province in Northern Syria. The Kremlin also continues to support proxy forces in Eastern Ukraine in a likely effort to destabilize the country ahead of the 2019 Ukrainian Presidential Elections. Russia at this time will not likely acquiesce to U.S. demands to get sanctions lifted but rather continue its attempts to counter U.S. financial pressure. Russia may seek to frame additional sanctions as a net negative for Europe in an effort to dissuade additional sanctions by the EU. The Kremlin may also seek to galvanize support for an anti-Western economic bloc that it can use to prop up its domestic economy.[2]

The Kremlin is reacting to domestic discontent that threatens long-term support for Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Kremlin is responding to domestic discontent over a controversial pension reform bill that raises the retirement age close to life expectancy in Russia. Putin announced a proposal to water down the pension reform bill during a televised speech on August 29.[3] The Kremlin previously sought to distance Putin from the controversial bill by directing public backlash for the initial proposal towards Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev.[4] The Kremlin likely assesses that Putin’s reversal will boost his approval ratings and help candidates from his political party win upcoming local elections in key industrial cities where voters rely heavily on pensions.[5] Russia will still need to acquire new sources of revenue to pay for pensions. The Kremlin may attempt to acquire loans from international organizations such as the BRICS New Development Bank. The Kremlin may similarly respond to domestic pressure against subsequent economic reforms that severely impact quality of life for Russian citizens.

What to Watch For

Russia and China may increase bilateral cooperation to reduce U.S. influence in the Middle East and Asian-Pacific Theater. Russian media reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping will hold a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok on September 3. Chinese troops will also participate in the Russian “Vostok 2018” military exercises held in Russia’s Eastern Military District in early September.[6] Russia has taken steps to transfer LNG supplies to China in an effort to cut transportation costs and promote energy cooperation with China. Russia and China may agree to further boost their energy ties at the Eastern Economic Forum in order to strengthen their relationship amidst U.S. sanctions on Russia and trade tensions between the U.S. and China.

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[1] “Russian envoy meets Imran Khan at Bani Gala”, The Express Tribune, August 9, 2018, https://tribune(.)com.pk/story/1777055/1-russian-envoy-meets-imran-khan-bani-gala/
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Warning Update: Iraqi Government Formation Showdown Could Turn Violent

By Aaron Hesse with Samantha Leathley and Jennifer Cafarella

Key Takeaway: The U.S. has temporarily disrupted Iran’s play to form a new Government of Iraq hostile to the U.S. Renewed U.S. diplomatic engagement in Iraq and the re-imposition of sanctions on Iran have strengthened Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi’s leverage ahead of a deadline for the first phase of government formation on September 3. Abadi blocked a bid by Iran to use the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) to grant concessions to Iraqi Sunnis in return for their support for a proxy-led governing coalition. The U.S. is now helping Abadi broker a deal with Iraqi Sunnis and the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) that would exclude Iran’s proxies. Iran has a range of response options in Iraq and could choose to escalate militarily against Abadi, Iraqi Security Forces, or the U.S. in Iraq. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is tracking the situation closely and will continue to provide updates.

Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al Abadi is attempting to reassert command-and-control over Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Iraqi Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) Deputy Chairman Abu Mehdi al Muhandis is a designated terrorist and a senior proxy of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) - Quds Force. Muhandis issued two sets of orders in early August 2018 directing units of the PMF to withdraw or redeploy from parts of majority-Sunni Ninewa and Anbar Provinces without approval from Abadi. Abadi reversed the directives and asserted his sole authority to relocate military forces in a meeting with defense officials on August 24. He also directed PMC Chairman Fallah al Fayyadh to assume the duties of Muhandis, who did not attend the meeting.

Abadi is targeting Iran’s proxies in the PMF in order to shape government formation negotiations ahead of a key deadline on September 3. Badr Organization Chairman Hadi al Ameri - another senior proxy of Iran - won the second-most seats in the May 2018 Iraqi Parliamentary Elections. Ameri and Abadi are locked in a tight competition to assemble a political coalition capable of dominating government formation and choosing the next Prime Minister of Iraq. Each seeks to acquire the support of Sunni and Kurdish blocs in order to complete a coalition and form the next Government of Iraq.

Abadi has temporarily disrupted Iran’s government formation strategy in Iraq. Muhandis’ order for the PMF to withdraw from Ninewa and Anbar Provinces was a concession intended to secure support from Sunnis for Ameri. Abadi may also have disrupted efforts to force defections from his own coalition. Fayyadh ran in the elections with Abadi’s Victory Coalition but withdrew his support for Abadi on August 20, potentially swinging a large block of seats to Ameri. His attendance at the meeting on August 24 could indicate his return to Abadi, possibly in return for a position on the Iraqi Council of Ministers or even the office of Prime Minister.

Renewed U.S. support for Abadi may enable him to outcompete Iran and its proxies for the backing of Iraqi Sunnis and Kurds. The re-imposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran has likely strengthened Abadi’s leverage in government formation negotiations. The U.S. may have threatened to remove Iraq’s exemptions from secondary sanctions if Iranian proxy leaders are given senior positions in the next Government of Iraq. These sanctions would economically cripple Iraq. Abadi reportedly sent a delegation from the Iraqi Central Bank to ask for trade waivers from the U.S. Treasury on August 28. The U.S. could grant these waivers with conditions meant to exclude senior proxies from the Government of Iraq. The U.S. may also have threatened to designate specific proxy leaders that could enter the new government including Ameri and Asa’ib Ahl al Haq Secretary-General Qais al Khazali.

Continued U.S. engagement is essential. The U.S. also increased its diplomatic support to broker a deal between Abadi and Iraqi Sunni and Kurdish blocs in July 2018. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met with Abadi at a NATO Summit in Brussels on July 12 and later spoke with him via telephone on August 14, stressing the “importance of forming a moderate new” Government of Iraq. U.S. Special Envoy to the Global Anti-ISIS Coalition Brett McGurk also met with Abadi on July 25 in Baghdad ahead of meetings with former Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Masoud Barzani on August 1 and Iraqi Sunni Vice President Osama al-Nujaifi on August 16. Pompeo also allegedly may have intervened to block efforts by Qatar to support outreach to Iraqi Sunnis by Iran.

Iran must now recalibrate in Iraq and could choose military escalation. Iran has a range of options to respond in Iraq. IRGC-Quds Force Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani is reportedly holding meetings with key political power-brokers in Baghdad alongside Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Iraj Masjedi. Soleimani and Masjedi may request meetings with Abadi in coming days in order to coerce him to reconsider his intervention in the PMF. Soleimani still retains control over Iran’s proxy units within the PMF despite the nominal constitutional authority held by Abadi. Abadi has not yet ordered the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to confront the PMF and it is unclear whether he is willing to use force if his orders are not obeyed. Soleimani could ultimately decide to order kinetic action against the ISF, Abadi, or (in a most dangerous scenario) the U.S. in Iraq. Asa’ib Ahl al Haq - another not-yet-sanctioned proxy - sent representatives to Iran on August 25, potentially to discuss kinetic options.

U.S. support is essential because it helped to halt the imminent formation of a new Government of Iraq by Iran’s proxies in Baghdad. This engagement may dampen or accelerate further escalation by Iran. In the most likely scenario, Iran will be deterred from kinetic escalation by the ability and willingness of the U.S. to impose direct and secondary sanctions on Iran in Iraq. In a most dangerous scenario, however, a mutual escalation in Iraq could expand into an intra-Shi’a civil war that draws in other regional actors including Saudi Arabia and Turkey. U.S. military forces and diplomats could be caught in the crossfire. ISW is tracking the situation closely and will continue to provide updates.