ISIS's Expanding Campaign in Europe

By Jennifer Cafarella with Jason Zhou

Key Takeaway:  ISIS’s attack campaign in Europe is expanding despite ISIS’s losses of terrain and senior leadership in the Middle East and North Africa. ISIS continues to plan, resource, and execute attacks from its remaining safe havens in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. ISIS has successfully expanded its coordinated attack campaign in Europe to target the UK and Spain. Rising levels of ISIS-inspired attacks in Sweden and Finland may signal growing online ISIS activity targeting vulnerable populations in those states and receptivity among those populations to the ISIS message. Coordinated attack attempts could follow. ISIS is sustaining its attack efforts in its initial target states of France and Germany, meanwhile. ISIS’s activity in Belgium, also an initial target state, is much lower, but the lack of ISIS attacks in Belgium does not signal incapacity. ISIS may be using its networks in Belgium to support attack cells elsewhere in Europe. ISIS also appears increasingly successful at inspiring low-level attacks in Europe despite its territorial losses, indicating its messaging is still resonant. ISIS’s campaign in Europe will continue and may even increase despite its losses in Iraq and Syria. 

Methodology

ISW has refined its methodology for assessing ISIS’s campaign in Europe to leverage new published information such as details from the trials of arrested ISIS members. ISW has curated its database of terrorist attacks in Europe, ranging from clear instances of coordinated ISIS attacks to low-level attacks that may have little to no direct ISIS involvement. This broad collection aperture enables ISW to analyze the rising levels of Salafi-jihadi violence in Europe that ISIS uses to justify and advertise its methodology and ideology. This collection aperture also enables ISW to assess how much of the trend of Salafi jihadi violence in Europe ISIS is actually commanding and controlling.

ISW sorts each attack into one of three categories: coordinated ISIS attacks, inspired ISIS attacks, and unknown attacks. ISW also collects all instances of attempted attacks, which also range from low-level would-be attackers with unknown links to ISIS to complex, coordinated ISIS attack plots. ISW maps both successful attacks and the arrests of thwarted attack cell members to gain insight into where and how ISIS is attempting to penetrate European security and to evaluate the success of ISIS’s campaign.  The Appendix discusses ISW’s methodology for assessing attempted attacks in more detail. The four categories of attacks – both attempted and successful – that ISW has collected are:

• Coordinated ISIS attacks are deliberate, planned attacks that ISIS has designed, resourced, and supported from Syria, Iraq, or Libya. Senior ISIS leaders are often involved in planning these attacks and training recruits. Coordinated ISIS attacks vary in scale and complexity from relatively low-level attacks such as vehicle rammings to sophisticated operations such as the 2015 Paris attacks.[1]  ISW has subcategorized each coordinated ISIS attack based on the type of attacker in order to gain insight into how ISIS is executing its campaign. The attackers in ISIS coordinated attacks to date have been returning ISIS foreign fighters, ISIS refugee operatives, or local ISIS recruits who conducted or attempted to conduct an attack while in contact with an ISIS “cyberplanner.” ISIS cyberplanners are foreign fighters who conduct online recruitment for ISIS, but also perform remote logistical and other support functions by leveraging criminal and other networks in Europe to enable ISIS recruits to access resources necessary for an attack. US-led coalition airstrikes against the ISIS external attack network in Syria and Iraq have focused on eliminating these nodes.[i]

• Inspired ISIS attacks are attacks consistent with ISIS’s methodology and calls for attacks in Europe. ISW assesses an attack to be inspired if the attacker(s) have demonstrated pro-ISIS sympathies such as possessing ISIS propaganda or pledging allegiance to ISIS online. Some of the attacks ISIS has inspired in Europe are consistent with the US military’s doctrinal definition for a “complex attack.”[2] Many of these attacks may actually be coordinated by ISIS cyberplanners, but ISW assesses them to be inspired until or unless the involvement of a cyberplanner has been adequately documented in publically available information. 

• Unknown attacks fit ISIS’s methodology and calls for “lone jihad” but have no clear links to ISIS or in some cases even terrorism in publically available reporting. The attackers may have been inspired by ISIS or other jihadist groups such as al Qaeda, which has also sent operatives to Europe, but ISW cannot assess such links with confidence. ISW categorizes these attacks as “unknown” due to a lack of sufficient evidence of ISIS or al Qaeda sympathies. ISW has included this data because these attacks support ISIS’s claim of momentum and narrative of a growing global war between Sunni Muslim populations and the majority non-Muslim world.

ISW updates its assessment of each attack when new information emerges. The assessment presented below is based on publicly available information as of September 14, 2017.

The Coordinated ISIS Attack Campaign in Europe

ISIS successfully expanded the scope of its coordinated attack campaign in Europe to the United Kingdom and Spain in 2017.

The initial waves of ISIS’s coordinated attacks in Europe primarily targeted France, Belgium, and Germany in 2014-2016. Returnee foreign fighters conducted most of these attacks. ISW assesses that ISIS returnee foreign fighters also tried and failed to conduct attacks in at least the UK, Spain, Morocco, Italy, Albania, and Kosovo in that timeframe.

The EU Counterterrorism Chief stated on September 12, 2017 that ISIS still has as many as 2,500 European foreign fighters in its ranks in Iraq and Syria and that at least 1,500 have returned to Europe to date. ISIS’s European foreign fighter population in Iraq and Syria will continue to provide the organization with links to jihadist and criminal networks in Europe even if the foreign fighters do not return to Europe. The foreign fighters that have already returned to Europe provide ISIS with latent capability to conduct attacks in addition to logistical and other support operations. ISIS is likely leveraging its foreign fighter cadres to attack new states rather than execute coordinated attacks in states where levels of ISIS-inspired attacks are rising. 

ISIS’s success demonstrates that it continues to generate attack capability faster than security services can disrupt new ISIS cells. In the UK, an ISIS returnee foreign fighter detonated a suicide vest (SVEST) at a concert venue in Manchester on May 22, 2017 in the first attack in the UK to date that fits ISW’s definition of a coordinated attack. The attacker met with members of an ISIS external operations cell in Libya prior to the attack, indicating that ISIS is leveraging command and control outside of Syria and Iraq to support its European operations. In Spain, members of an ISIS cell conducted two separate car-ramming attacks in Barcelona and Cambrilis as a contingency operation after an explosion at the cell’s TATP factory killed its leader and other members of the cell. TATP is an explosive that ISIS operatives in Europe commonly use.  The cell’s original plan was to conduct a coordinated attack using TATP against the Sagrada Familia Church, a popular tourist destination in Barcelona. The extent of ISIS’s direct support to this attack cell is unclear, due in part to the death of the cell’s leader and numerous other cell members in the explosion of the TATP factory. Reports that the cell’s leader traveled to Belgium in late 2016 could indicate that ISIS has a command-and-control node in Belgium that supported the attack.

More coordinated ISIS attack plots in Europe are likely underway. Unconfirmed reports indicate that ISIS’s external operations node in Libya has also dispatched foreign fighters to Belgium and France in addition to the UK. It is possible that a failed coordinated attack in Paris in 2017 was linked to the Libyan node. ISW cannot confirm any coordinated attack cells in Belgium in 2017, but French and Belgian police arrested one cross-border cell with likely links to ISIS in July 2017. This cell may have been planning attacks. The returnee foreign fighters may also be using Belgium as a base for command and control and logistical operations instead of a base for attacks, as the travel of the Spanish cell’s leader to Belgium suggests. They may have joined a pre-existing ISIS network in Brussels comprised of the initial wave of returnee foreign fighters that reached Belgium before ISIS’s major successful attacks in Paris and Brussels in November 2015 and March 2016, respectively. 

Sustained ISIS attempts to conduct coordinated attacks in France and Germany in 2017 indicate that ISIS continues to prioritize those countries. ISIS’s Iraq-based French cyberplanner, Rachid Kassim, planned a coordinated attack  in Paris, France involving TATP before a coalition airstrike killed him near Mosul, Iraq in February 2017. French police successfully disrupted the attack and arrested 2 cell members on September 6^th, at least one of whom had been in contact with Kassim. German police meanwhile disrupted what could have been a coordinated ISIS attack attempt in Essen by a German foreign fighter in March 2017 who was reportedly recruiting people in the area to conduct an attack.

Future ISIS success are also likely in the states that thwarted coordinated ISIS plots from 2014- 2016, which include at least Italy, Albania, and Kosovo. ISIS’s links to criminal networks in Italy may reduce the group's incentive to attack there in the near term, since law enforcement responses to such attacks could disrupt important support nodes. ISIS could also risk alienating business partners such as elements of the Italian Mafia if it attacks Italy.  The anti-ISIS coalition has eliminated numerous ISIS external operators in Syria tasked with managing ISIS’s attack campaign in Albania and Kosovo in airstrikes in June 2017, meanwhile. These strikes may have disrupted ISIS’s ability to generate attack cells in the Balkans. ISIS may be attempting to leverage Balkan foreign fighters to conduct attacks elsewhere in Europe, however. Italian police arrested a Kosovar cell including at least one returnee ISIS foreign fighter in March 2017 that was planning an explosive attack against the Rialto Bridge. Available reporting does not confirm that ISIS provided direct support to this cell, which could have been merely inspired by ISIS. ISW will update this assessment as new details become available.

Coordinated ISIS attacks using refugees

ISIS’s coordinated attack campaign in Germany relies less on a foreign fighter cadre than elsewhere in Europe. ISIS is also using recruited and possibly trained refugees to conduct coordinated attacks in Germany.  ISIS has conducted two successful coordinated attacks in Germany using one returnee foreign fighter and one refugee operative to date. The refugee was a Syrian who had reportedly fought with ISIS before leaving for Europe in 2013. He detonated an SVEST outside a concert in Ansbach on July 24, 2016. German police later discovered chemicals and other bomb-making materials in his room at a refugee center in Germany. German authorities have reportedly thwarted six coordinated ISIS attack attempts, involving three refugees, two returnees, and one local who was likely in contact with an ISIS cyberplanner. Germany authorities have reportedly thwarted an additional nine attacks that could include attempted ISIS coordinated attacks, but for which adequate information does not yet exist.

Refugees have conducted attacks in other countries, but ISW cannot assess any coordinated ISIS involvement with confidence at the time of writing. ISW’s assessment places ISIS-inspired attacks conducted by refugees into the same category as all other instances of ISIS-inspired attacks. Future ISW products will examine the trend of ISIS-inspired attacks in Europe in more detail, to include when and where refugees have conducted such operations.

Attacks consistent with ISIS’s calls for “lone Jihad”

ISIS seeks to create momentum behind a campaign of attacks in Europe that will require less direct input from ISIS over time. ISW assessed in November 2015 that ISIS’s goal in Europe was to provoke overreactions by European governments that would alienate Muslim communities and radicalize them over time. ISIS designed a campaign to inject violence into European societies in order to jumpstart a campaign of low-level attacks against non-Muslim populations in Europe that would further polarize European communities. 

The scope and volume of low-level attacks that fit ISIS’s calls for “lone jihad” in Europe nearly quadrupled in Europe from January 2014 to September 2017. This trend could signal a growing resonance of ISIS’s messaging to vulnerable populations despite ISIS’s territorial losses in Iraq and Syria. If so, this trend would demonstrate ISIS success generating a campaign of violence in Europe that requires progressively less direct input from ISIS to sustain.

 

It is still possible that ISIS cyberplanners or returnee foreign fighters coordinated many of these attacks, however. Available information does not enable ISW to assess these attacks to be coordinated at the time of writing. Attacks consistent with the ISIS calls for “lone wolf” jihad expanded to Spain,[ii] Italy,[iii] Switzerland,[iv] and Finland[v] in 2017. The attacks in Finland and rising levels of similar attacks in Sweden are the most likely to have been coordinated by ISIS, since they are in a new theater. Finland raised its threat level in early 2017, which could signal intelligence indicating ISIS was actively attempting to coordinate attacks. The chief of Sweden’s security service (SAPO) warned in June 2017 that extremist activity was rising in multiple Swedish cities. Norway also raised its threat level  in early 2017, possibly indicating new ISIS attack efforts. It is also possible that some of these attacks have been inspired or enabled by al Qaeda rather than ISIS, but the available data does not confirm al Qaeda links.

Conclusion

The success of anti-ISIS operations in Europe remains limited. ISIS continues to generate and inspire attacks on a scope and scale larger than European security services can handle. New countermeasures such as “vehicle mitigation barriers” can reduce the lethality of ISIS tactics but are unlikely to disrupt ISIS’s ability to inspire and recruit attackers. Anti-ISIS operations in Syria and Iraq have not severed the link between ISIS’s senior leadership and its operatives abroad, moreover. Coalition airstrikes in Iraq and Syria have eliminated many ISIS external operatives, but have not sufficiently degraded ISIS’s capability. ISIS also continues to use safe haven in Libya as a base from which to support attacks in Europe even after its loss of Sirte, demonstrating how removing ISIS from cities is insufficient to prevent ISIS from conducting attacks. The anti-ISIS coalition is unlikely to dismantle the global ISIS attack network without broadening the scope of anti-ISIS operations beyond a narrow terrain focus. ISIS can use safe-havens in rural and even desert areas to plan, coordinate, and support the conduct of attacks in the West.

It must also refocus on addressing the grievances and fears of vulnerable Sunni populations that make them vulnerable to ISIS messaging. The widespread perception that European states and the U.S. are aligned with Iran and the Assad regime against Sunni populations in Syria and Iraq, as well as the rise of anti-Muslim sentiments and perceived anti-Muslim policies in Europe and the U.S. will continue to fuel toleration of and limited but growing support for ISIS (and al Qaeda) attack operations in the West. ISIS is waging a social and informational campaign to gain support among Western populations—Western states will not be able to kill and arrest their way out of this problem.

Appendix: ISW methodology for analyzing attempted attacks

The first graphic in this report depicts the number of attacks and attempted attacks per month in Europe from January 2014 to September 14, 2017. The chart begins in January because it is the month when the first known ISIS attack operative entered Europe after ISIS’s separation from al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al Nusra in mid-2013. French police arrested that operative, named Abdelkader Tliba, thereby preventing what would have been the first coordinated ISIS attack in Europe. ISW’s data set includes every such known attempted attack in Europe since January 2014.

                                              

ISW’s data set most likely under-represents the number of thwarted ISIS attack cells in Europe, which are the most difficult to discern from openly available reporting. The “count” of attempted attacks per month in Europe is the number of thwarted attack cells with proven links to ISIS or that ISW assesses are possibly linked to ISIS based on openly available reporting. The “count” is not estimate of the number of attacks that any given cell would have conducted if not arrested. The actual number of attacks that ISIS has attempted to conduct in Europe may be higher than the graphic in this report conveys, therefore.

The “count” also does not measure the complexity of the thwarted attack cell’s structure or geographic disposition. Some of the attack cells included in this data set are individual attackers who were planning to conduct a single operation based on instructions from an ISIS cyberplanner. Others are larger networks of operatives spread between numerous safe houses in numerous countries. Many fall somewhere in between, or reflect instances where European security services arrested a cell before it had finalized an attack plan.

Comparing attempted vs successful attacks in Europe

The “count” for the successful attacks in Europe is the sum of the locations at which successful attacks occurred. For example, the ISIS attack in Paris November 2015 has a “count” of six. ISW has coded the attack data based on each attack location because each separate attack location reflects a separate successful attack operation that ISIS chose to coordinate and execute simultaneously. This approach is in line with the methodologies used by U.S. military forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, which tally each individual kinetic event even when multiple attacks take place in a coordinated fashion simultaneously, but in different locations.

The comparison of attempted attacks versus attacks provides a proxy for assessing the success of ISIS’s campaign in Europe. The ratio favors ISIS, as ISIS appears to be able to generate attacks faster than  European security services can disrupt them.

ISW’s data set does not include instances of partial disruption of an ISIS attack cell. An example of a partial disruption would be the arrest of one of five suicide bombers that reduced the “count” of the successful attack to the observed four attacks.  This data set is not an exhaustive accounting of all of the successes of European security services against ISIS, therefore.

ISW has sorted attempted attacks into the same four categories as successful attacks based on available evidence as of September 14, 2017: attempted coordinated ISIS attacks, attempted ISIS-inspired attacks, and unknown attempted attacks for which few details are publically available. ISW routinely updates and re-evaluates the assessment of each attempted attack as new details become available, such as new information about a given would-be attacker’s links to ISIS cyberplanners. ISW will publish updates and refined assessments as appropriate.

ISW’s Data Set vs. Official European Reporting

ISW’s data set includes more events and counts differently than official European reports. For example, ISW’s data for 2016 includes eleven more attacks in EU countries than the EU’s 2017 counterterrorism report and dozens more attempted attacks. The primary reason for these differences is that ISW counts events that the EU member states have not definitively ruled as terrorism. European states must discuss terror attacks on the basis of definitive evidence and the proper application of European laws. ISW’s approach enhances analysis of the ISIS campaign in Europe by widening the aperture to include the entire set of events that likely fit within the ISIS campaign even if insufficient evidence exists at present confidently to designate each event as a terrorist attack. ISW also seeks to inform analysis of the perceived trend of attacks in Europe, which ISIS and other jihadist groups use to recruit even if based in part of false attribution of some acts of violence, as this report explains.

ISW’s methodology to consider each attack location a separate attack also contributes to differences between ISW and European reporting. The EU report considers the March 2016 ISIS attack in Brussels to be a single attack, for example; ISW counts it as three separate, coordinated attacks.

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The authors would like to thank Ryan Rockwell for his tremendous research support to this product.

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[1] ISW derived this type of attack from the US military’s doctrinal definition of a coordinated attacks which is: “an attack that exhibits deliberate planning conducted by multiple hostile elements, against one or more targets from multiple locations. A coordinated attack may involve any number of weapon systems. [The] key difference between complex and coordinated is that a coordinated attack requires the indication of insurgent long term planning.”

[2] “An attack conducted by multiple hostile elements which employ at least two distinct classes of weapon systems (i.e. indirect fire and direct fire, IED and surface to air fire) against one or more targets.”

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[i] For example, the US killed ISIS’s Albanian foreign fighter and attack planner Lavdrim Muhaxeri in an airstrike on June 7, 2017 near Mayadin, Syria.

[ii] An attack consistent with ISIS’s calls for “lone jihad” targeted a Spanish-Moroccan border post on July 25, 2017 before the ISIS cell in Barcelona conducted its attacks.

[iii] The first attack consistent with ISIS’s calls for “lone jihad” to target Italy occurred on May 18, 2017. ISW assesses the attacker was inspired by ISIS.

[iv] The first attack consistent with ISIS’s calls for “lone jihad” to target Switzerland occurred on July 24, 2017.

[v] The first attack  consistent with ISIS’s calls for “lone jihad” to target Finland occurred on August 18, 2017. ISW assesses the attacker was inspired by ISIS.

Syria Situation Report: August 31 - September 14, 2017

By: ISW Syria Team and Syria Direct 

This graphic marks the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. This graphic depicts significant developments in the Syrian Civil War from August 31 to September 14, 2017. The control of terrain represented on the graphic is accurate as of September 14, 2017.

Special credit to Sana Sekkarie of the Institute for the Study of War for the text of this Syria SITREP Map.

The Kremlin's Irregular Army: Ukrainian Separatist Order of Battle

By Franklin Holcomb

Russian President Vladimir Putin's political-military campaign in Ukraine undermines Ukraine's sovereignty and threatens Europe more than three years after Russia's invasion. The Kremlin, in violation of agreements it has signed, fuels the conflict in pursuit of its goal to assert dominance over the territory of the former Soviet Union. Russian leaders will continue to extend and exploit the war to destabilize Ukraine and prevent its further integration with the West until the costs of their campaign change their calculus.

This report and accompanying Order of Battle demonstrate how Russia's proxy forces operating in Eastern Ukraine -- the so-called Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic -- have evolved and continue to threaten Ukraine, Europe, and U.S. national security interests. These forces retain the capability to fight the Armed Forces of Ukraine only with sustained and direct Russian backing. Russia and its proxies are driving a war facilitated by the Kremlin's subversion campaign across Ukraine and its active military support. Russia continues to inflict major costs on Ukraine, use violence as a lever of influence, and attempt to impede critical political and economic reform efforts by Ukraine's leaders.

An acceptable end to the war in Ukraine under the right conditions remains a critical component of securing a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace. Increased United States and allied support in strengthening an independent and sovereign Ukraine capable of defending its territorial integrity and in pushing back against Russian aggression will be essential to achieve this end. 

Read the full report. 

Syria Situation Report: August 23 - 30, 2017

By: ISW Syria Team and Syria Direct 

This graphic marks the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. This graphic depicts significant developments in the Syrian Civil War from August 23 - 30, 2017. The control of terrain represented on the graphic is accurate as of August 8, 2017.

Special credit to Sana Sekkarie of the Institute for the Study of War for the text of these Syria SITREP Maps.

Syria Situation Report: August 8 - 23, 2017

By: ISW Syria Team and Syria Direct 

This series of graphics marks the latest installments of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. These graphics depict significant developments in the Syrian Civil War from August 8 - 23, 2017. The control of terrain represented on the graphics is accurate as of August 8, 2017.

Special credit to Sana Sekkarie of the Institute for the Study of War for her contributions to the text of these Syria SITREP Maps.

Moldova Update: Kremlin Will Likely Seek to Realign Chisinau

                                                             Franklin Holcomb, Sean Jones, Nataliya Bugayova


Russia likely perceives a requirement to subvert the Moldovan government before Moldova’s 2018 parliamentary elections or risk surrendering influence over the country’s decision-making. The broadly pro-Western Moldovan government recently took steps to curb Russia’s subversion, and expand its cooperation with Ukraine and NATO. Moldova’s pro-Russia President Igor Dodon has thus far failed to make meaningful progress in pushing Moldova into the Kremlin’s orbit. Russian President Vladimir Putin will likely attempt to destabilize the government of Moldova and empower President Dodon to reset the political situation in Chisinau in the Kremlin’s favor. The U.S. must support the forces in Moldova defending the country’s sovereignty against Russian aggression.

Moldova’s pro-Russia president Igor Dodon is attempting to push Moldova into Russia’s orbit, but is facing effective resistance from pro-Western elements of the government.[1] Dodon, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s key ally in Moldova, supports Moldova’s integration into Russia-controlled structures, including Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). He is currently unable to initiate membership talks or achieve any important progress without parliamentary support.[2] Dodon attempted to transition the country from a parliamentary system to a presidential one in order to expand his power.[3] The Moldovan Constitutional Court disrupted Dodon’s plan on July 27 by finding his planned September 2017 referendum on the issue unconstitutional.[4]  

The pro-Western Moldovan Parliament and the Prime Minister Pavel Filip have taken decisive steps to counter Russian subversion and integrate with Western structures. The Moldovan Parliament demanded that Russia’s “peacekeeping forces,” illegally deployed in the Russian-controlled separatist Transnistria region since 1992, withdraw from Moldovan territory on July 21.[5] Moldova also denied a number of high-profile Russians, including Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin and a member of the Russian parliament, access to the country.[6] Moldova also expanded its security cooperation with Ukraine. Moldova reiterated its support for Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s proxy forces in Eastern Ukraine.[7] Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and Moldovan Prime Minister Pavel Filip participated in the opening of a joint border crossing designed to expand customs control and prevent smuggling, and likely intelligence activity, from Transnistria on July 17. The two governments agreed to expand that control on August 14.[8] Moldova continues to fight the ongoing flow of Russian mercenaries to and from Moldova and Eastern Ukraine.[9]  The Moldovan government expelled five Russian diplomats on May 29, whom it accused of recruiting Moldovans to fight alongside Russia’s separatist proxies in Eastern Ukraine.[10] The Moldovan government also continues to expand its ties with NATO, most recently agreeing to open a NATO liaison office in Chisinau.[11]  

Russia views these developments, in particular, Moldova’s steps to advance its cooperation with Ukraine and NATO as a threat to its regional security interests. The Kremlin uses its illegal military basing in Transnistria to threaten Moldova, Ukraine’s western flank and NATO member Romania. The Kremlin sees Moldova-Ukraine border posts as an attempt to isolate its base in Transnistria.[12] Russia has had difficulty moving troops and supplies into Transnistria due to its war in Ukraine, and expanding Ukraine-Moldova cooperation threatens to cut off its access to the region entirely. [13]The Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation Council’s Committee on Defense and Security Bair Zhamsuev said on August 08 that Russia would use military force to protect Transnistria should Moldova or the West attempt to invade it.[14] 

Russia will likely escalate its efforts to undermine Moldova’s broadly pro-Western government. President Dodon’s legal options to achieve his goals are now highly limited, which is likely to prompt the Kremlin to directly subvert the Moldovan government. The Kremlin’s most likely course of action will be to use disinformation and political subversion to weaken the pro-Western government in order expand Dodon’s influence. The Kremlin’s most dangerous course of action would be to use its military and intelligence forces operating out of Transnistria to destabilize and, potentially, collapse the pro-Western government ahead of 2018 parliamentary elections. In both cases, the Kremlin is also likely to frame the Western presence in Moldova as a provocation in order to justify an expansion of Russian involvement in Transnistria.[15] Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin has already claimed the U.S. is training Moldovan saboteurs to infiltrate Transnistria at a military base undergoing U.S.-funded renovation in Bulboaca, Moldova on August 07.[16] Dodon promised to watch the base for signs of a regional conflict provoked by the U.S.[17] The Kremlin will also likely exploit the growing political tensions, rising ahead of the 2018 elections. The Moldovan Parliament passed a controversial bill on July 20 that would change Moldova to a mixed electoral system. The legislation, which was criticized for perpetuating larger parties’ control of the government, caused protests and clashes between police and protesters.”[18] The Kremlin may use such discontent to foster further political instability.

The Trump Administration must support pro-Western political forces in Moldova in their efforts to counter Russian subversion and strengthen Moldova’s internal resiliency. The US must help Moldova secure its sovereignty and territorial integrity, develop a transparent and accountable government, and deter potential Russian aggression. Such support should include a range of assistance programs, including military and border security assistance. The US must reemphasize that Russian forces are illegally occupying Transnistria and must withdraw from Moldovan territory.

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[1] Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Republic of Moldova Parliament: Last Elections,” ipu.org, http://www(.)ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2215_E.htm

[2] Alexander Tanas, “Moldova President sees Move Towards Russia-led Trade Union in 2017,” Reuters, July 28, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-moldova-dodon-idUSKBN1AD253 Novinite Staff, “Moldova President Supports the Eurasian Economic Union,” Novinite, July 12, 2017, http://www.novinite(.)com/articles/181167/Moldova+President+Supports+the+Eurasian+Economic+Union TASS Staff, “Moldovan President Hopes Putin will Visit Moldova Next Year,” TASS, July 25, 2017, http://tass(.)com/world/957763 Allessandra Prentice and Alexander Tanas, “Pro-Russian Candidate Triumphs in Moldova Presidential Race,” Reuters, November 13, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-moldova-election-idUSKBN1380TNMihai Popsoi, "Why did a Pro-Russian Candidate Win the Presidency in Moldova?" FPRI, November 23, 2016, http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/11/pro-russian-candidate-win-presidency-moldova/

[3] Mihai Popsoi, “Moldovan President Seeks Regime Change via Referendum,” Jamestown Foundation, March 06, 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/moldovan-president-seeks-regime-change-via-referendum/

[4] RFERL Staff, “Moldovan Court Finds President Dodon’s Referendum Plan Unconstitutional,” RFERL, July 27, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-president-dodon-referendum-unconstitutional/28642832.html

[5] Diana Preasca, “The Chisinau Parliament Calls for the Withdrawal of Russian Troops from the Territory of the Republic of Moldova,” Moldova.org, July 21, 2017, [Romanian] http://www.moldova(.)org/parlamentul-de-la-chisinau-cere-retragerea-trupelor-ruse-de-pe-teritoriul-republicii-moldova/Russian Ministry of Defense, "Peacekeeping Operation in Transnistria," Russian Ministry of Defense, http://eng.mil(.)ru/en/mission/peacekeeping_operations/more.htm?id=10336232@cmsArticle

[6] RFERL Staff, “Igor Dodon Threatens to Punish Those who Cause Worsening of Bilateral Relations with Russia,” RFERL, July 28, 2017, [Romanian], https://www.europalibera(.)org/a/28645115.html

RFERL Staff, “Dmitry Rogozin, Declared Undesirable in Moldova,” RFERL, August 02, 2017, [Romanian] https://www.europalibera(.)org/a/28654834.html

[7] RFERL Staff, “The Republic of Moldova Condemns the Proclamation of the so-called “Malorossiya” by the Secessionists in the Donetsk Region,” RFERL, July 21, 2017, [Romanian] http://www.moldova(.)org/republica-moldova-condamna-proclamarea-de-catre-secesionistii-din-regiunea-donetk-a-asa-zisei-malorusia/

[8] RFERL Staff, “Ukraine and Moldova have Opened a Common Border Crossing,” RFERL, July 17, 2017, [Russian] https://www.svoboda.org/a/28621398.html

RFERL Staff, “Moldova, Ukraine to Extend Joint Control at All Border Crossing Points on the Transnistrian Segment,” RFERL, August 14, 2017, [Romanian] https://www.europalibera(.)org/a/28676134.html

[9] Cristi Vlas, “Another Moldovan Mercenary Arrested for Fighting for Separatist Entities in Eastern Ukraine,” Moldova.org, June 28, 2017, http://www.moldova(.)org/en/another-moldovan-mercenary-arrested-fighting-separatist-entities-eastern-ukraine/

[10] UNIAN Staff, “Moldova Expels 5 Russian Diplomats,” UNIAN,  May 29, 2017, https://www.unian(.)info/politics/1948686-moldova-expels-5-russian-diplomats.html

[11] RFERL Staff, “The NATO Liaison Office in Chisinau Could be Opened in August,” RFERL, July 21, 2017, https://www.europalibera(.)org/a/28630897.html

[12] RFERL Staff, “Igor Dodon Assures Russia that the Moldovan Authorities will not make Transnistrian Problems Through Joint Customs Control with Ukraine,” RFERL, July 19, 2017, https://www.europalibera(.)org/a/28625964.html

[13] Stratfor Staff, “How Ukraine is Obstructing Russia in Transnistria,” Stratfor, June 12, 2017, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/how-ukraine-obstructing-russia-transdniestria RFERL Staff, “Moldova Refuses Russia “the Right to Cross its Airspace and Land Aircraft” at Russian Military Airports in Chisinau and Tiraspol,” RFERL, [Romanian] July 20, 2017, https://www.europalibera(.)org/a/28628072.html

[14] Nikita Kondratov, “Duma Member: “Russia Will Protect Transnistria,” First Transnistrian, August 08, 2017, [Russian] https://tv.pgtrk(.)ru/news/20170808/59941

[15] Steven L Hall, “Why the West should Pay More Attention to Moldova,” Stratfor, February 20, 2016, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/why-west-should-pay-more-attention-moldova TASS Staff, “Transdniestria Leader Accuses Moldova of Stepping up Cooperation with NATO,” TASS, July 05, 2016, http://tass(.)com/world/886438

[16] Realitatea Staff, “Dmitry Rogozin: US Prepares Saboteurs and Soldiers of the Special Forces of Moldova for a new Transnistrian Conflict,” Realitatea.md, August 07, 2017, [Romanian] http://www.realitatea(.)md/dmitri-rogozin--sua-pregateste-sabotori-si-militari-ai-fortelor-speciale-din-r--moldova-pentru-un-nou-conflict-transnistrean_62197.html

[17] Arina Livadari, “What Dodon Found at the Bulboaca Military Polygon,” Moldova.org, August 14, 2017, [Romanian] http://www.moldova(.)org/en/dodon-found-bulboaca-military-polygon/ RFERL Staff, “Despite Russian Allegations, Moldova’s Dodon Finds no Fault with Training Base,” RFERL, August 14, 2017. [Romanian] https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-dodon-refutes-russia-rt-allegations-military-base/28676040.html TASS Staff, “Moldovan President Accuses West of Attempting to Involve Chisinau in Regional Conflict,” TASS, August 14, 2017, http://tass(.)com/world/960270

[18]  RFERL Staff, “PPE and ALDE Call on the EU to Stop Moldova’s Funding and Assess the “Decline of the Rule of Law and Democratic Standards,” RFERL, July 26, 2017, [Romanian] https://www.europalibera(.)org/a/28639018.html; RFERL Staff, “The Parliamentary Majority in Chisinau Voted Unexpectedly in Favor of the Transition to the Mixed Electoral System at Final Reading,” RFERL, July 20, 2017, [Romanian] https://www.europalibera.org/a/28628262.html Diana Preasca, “Altercations Wednesday Evening in front of the Parliament in Chisinau. Two People Detained,” Moldova.org [Romanian] http://www.moldova(.)org/altercatii-miercuri-seara-in-fata-parlamentului-de-la-chisinau-doua-persoane-retinute-video/ RFERL Staff, “Appeals from the Opposition from Moldova to Protest Against the Vote in the Parliament on the Modification of the Electoral System,” RFERL, July 19, 2017. [Romanian] http://www.moldova(.)org/igor-dodon-a-promulgat-legea-privind-reforma-guvernului-voi-insista-ca-si-numarul-deputatilor-sa-fie-redus/

Russia's Syria Mirage: July 17 - August 13, 2017

By Matti Suomenaro, Ellen Stockert, and Genevieve Casagrande

Russia continues to masquerade as an effective anti-ISIS actor in order to lure the U.S. into a counter-terrorism partnership in Syria. Russia seeks to leverage this partnership to expedite an American withdrawal from Syria, removing the U.S. as an obstacle to continued Russian build up and force projection in the Middle East. Russia may achieve short-term territorial gains against ISIS, but will ultimately undermine U.S.-led anti-ISIS efforts in Eastern Syria. The Russian-backed campaign will fail to decisively defeat ISIS and al Qaeda in Syria, however. Russian airstrikes in ISIS-held terrain regularly targeted civilian infrastructure such as mosques, schools, and medical centers from July 17 - August 13, according to local activists. Russian airstrikes also reportedly targeted an internally-displaced persons (IDP) camp in Zour Shamar in Eastern Raqqa province on July 23 - 24. Russia’s punitive strikes against vulnerable Sunni populations will exacerbate local grievances, increase sectarian tension, and pave the way for the resurgence of ISIS, al Qaeda, and other jihadist groups in areas recently seized from ISIS. Moreover, pro-Bashar al Assad regime forces’ rapid advance in Eastern Syria may indicate the regime is not allocating sufficient time or manpower to conduct effective clearing operations. Incomplete clearing operations could permit ISIS to leave behind latent attack cells or create ISIS-permissive zones along the Euphrates River Valley. The pro-regime coalition currently lacks the manpower required to secure and hold these areas in the long-term.

Iran and the Assad regime are already exploiting nascent U.S.-Russian cooperation to expand their control into Eastern Syria at the expense of the U.S. and its partners. Russian airstrikes primarily targeted ISIS-held areas from July 17 - August 13 in support of Iranian and Assad regime advances. Pro-regime forces backed by Russia and Iran recaptured Sukhna, which sits on the Palmyra - Deir ez Zour Highway, from ISIS on August 13 following a wave of ISIS counterattacks against the city from August 8 - 10. Russian airstrikes also targeted villages along the southern bank of of the Euphrates River in southeastern Raqqa Province, allowing the recapture of al Numaysah, al Jaber, and al Kumaysah towns by pro-Iranian and regime forces. These gains were facilitated by manpower freed from recent de-escalation zones brokered by Russia in Southwest Syria, the Eastern Ghouta suburb of Damascus, and northwestern Homs Province. Russia, Iran and Assad seek to leverage these gains to constrain the freedom of action of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition in Syria. Pro-regime positioning along the Euphrates River could block the advancement of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) southeast from Ar-Raqqa City after the completion of Ar-Raqqa City clearing operations. Russia’s gains against ISIS in Syria’s East will ultimately embolden Iran and the Bashar al Assad regime, rather than constrain them.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. The graphic likely under-represents the extent of the locations targeted in Eastern Syria, owing to a relative lack of activist reporting from that region.

High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.

CORRECTION: A previous version of this blogpost stated Russian airstrikes targeted an IDP camp in Raqqa Province on August 23-24. The correct date for the reported Russian strikes is July 23-34.