The Collapse of Turkey’s Democracy

By Elizabeth Teoman

Key Takeaway: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has emerged from snap elections poised to dominate the next decade of politics in Turkey. Erdogan is empowered to further consolidate his domestic power and degrade the rule of law at the expense of his political opponents. The U.S. will face a more nationalistic – and more intransigent - Turkey that is more willing to buck its alliance with NATO and expand military operations against Kurdish militants in Syria and Iraq.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan achieved his longstanding goal to consolidate his political dominance over Turkey’s failing democracy. Erdogan secured the presidency and a majority parliamentary coalition following snap elections held in Turkey on June 24. Erdogan will preside over an executive presidency with new wide-ranging powers codified after he won a referendum to amend the Turkish Constitution in April 2017. He can now issue presidential decrees with the force of law – a power previously available only during a state of emergency. Erdogan will use his new mandate to erode the few remaining independent arms of the Government of Turkey, starting with the Turkish Central Bank.

Allegations of electoral fraud and manipulations abound. The opposition has nevertheless conceded the elections. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) stated that authorities restricted “fundamental freedoms” and held an “undue advantage” in the election. The Turkish Supreme Elections Committee will announce the finalized results on July 5.

See the note below regarding the validity of the figures in this infographic.

Erdogan is now more dependent on his alliance with the main right-wing party and will likely confront Kurdish militants more forcefully. Erdogan's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost its majority in the Turkish Parliament.[1] He nonetheless retained a parliamentary majority through his alliance with the right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Erdogan must remain responsive to the MHP even though the new executive presidency sharply curbs the power of the legislature. The MHP takes an uncompromising stance in favor of a militarized approach to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its affiliate in Syria. Erdogan will likely satisfy this domestic audience by making good on his promises of expanded operations against the PKK in Iraq and Syria. Erdogan’s campaign against PKK-affiliates partnered with the U.S. in Syria will serve to deepen the rift in the U.S.-Turkish alliance.

Infographic Note: This graphic presents interim election results sourced from Turkish state-run Anadolu Agency endorsed by the Supreme Electoral Council of Turkey. These results reflect a Turkish election that was neither fair nor free with electoral fraud likely.   

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[1] “Cumhurbaşkanı ve 27. Dönem Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri,” Anadolu Ajansi. June 25, 2018.  https://secim(.)aa.com.tr/tr

A "Remarkable" Afghan Ceasefire

By Scott DesMarais

Key Takeaway: The U.S. and Afghanistan have an opportunity to advance their strategic goal of negotiating an acceptable settlement with the Taliban, but not all Taliban members are reconcilable. The Taliban faces a potential rift between its leadership and rank-and-file militants in Afghanistan that threatens the Taliban’s cohesion. Large numbers of rank-and-file militants expressed their support for peace during unprecedented joint celebrations alongside Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) during a nationwide ceasefire for Eid al-Fitr on June 15 - 17. The ceasefire’s events exposed rifts amongst Taliban leadership concerning reconciliation. The U.S. and the Government of Afghanistan could exploit these apparent rifts in order to advance their strategic goal of a negotiated settlement with the Taliban. The new momentum towards peace could nonetheless generate additional pressure for the withdrawal of the U.S. from Afghanistan amidst the scheduled 2018 Afghan Parliamentary Elections. ISIS - Wilayat Khorasan could also exploit these rifts in to bolster its recruitment of hardline Taliban militants and expand its operations in Afghanistan.

What Happened 

The Taliban and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) engaged in “remarkable scenes” of joint celebration during a three-day ceasefire observed by both the Taliban and the ANSF. The Government of Afghanistan estimated that up to 30,000 Taliban militants entered government-held cities across the country during the three-day truce in honor of the end of Ramadan.[1] The gatherings reportedly occurred in several regions that have seen intense fighting during the Taliban’s 2018 Al-Khandaq Offensive including Faryab, Farah, Ghazni, and Kunduz Provinces as well as traditional Taliban strongholds such as Helmand and Kandahar Provinces. Even “senior” leaders reportedly met with government officials in Zabul and Logar Provinces. Taliban fighters interviewed by the media repeatedly expressed their fatigue with continued violence and their growing desire for peace.

The ceasefire could validate President Ghani’s strategy to achieve a negotiated settlement. Ghani offered the Taliban full political reconciliation in exchange for a ceasefire and the resumption of peace negotiations on February 28. The Taliban refused to acknowledge the offer officially, although multiple U.S. officials have claimed that elements of the Taliban including “senior-level leaders” are “clearly interested” in talks with the Government of Afghanistan since Ghani’s peace offer. Ghani later unilaterally announced the ceasefire for Eid al-Fitr on June 7 despite ongoing operations by the Taliban that threatened at least seven provincial capitals around Afghanistan. The Taliban bowed to public pressure and announced their own nominally-unrelated ceasefire on June 9. Ghani has attempted to leverage the apparent success of the truce to spur further political progress. Ghani announced a unilateral ten-day extension of the ceasefire - until June 30 – on June 17. He also stressed that his government is open to negotiations with the Taliban on “issues of mutual concern” including the “presence of foreign forces” in Afghanistan.

The Taliban leadership has thus far rejected further extension of a ceasefire and has resumed its attacks in some remote locations. The Taliban spokesperson stated that the group has “no intention to extend the ceasefire" on June 17 and resumed offensive operations throughout Afghanistan including on June 18. Taliban militants conducted significant attacks in Faryab, Badghis, and Farah Provinces since their ceasefire’s expiration. The Taliban may intend to exploit the government’s extended ceasefire to amass fighters and launch a coordinated operation against vulnerable provincial capitals in Faryab or Farah Provinces. The Taliban also executed smaller attacks in many provinces where joint celebrations occurred such as Kunduz, Logar, Nangarhar, and Helmand.

Implications 

The Taliban faces a potential rift between its leadership and rank-and-file militants in Afghanistan that threatens the Taliban’s cohesiveness. Taliban militants repeatedly violated a formal directive from their leadership to avoid government-controlled areas on June 16. Taliban fighters also demanded an extension to the ceasefire in parts of Paktika Province controlled by the hardline Haqqani Network. The Taliban released an official post-ceasefire statement stressing the organizational cohesion and control demonstrated by the “successful implementation” of the truce despite the clear violations of leadership orders.[2] The Taliban leadership also allegedly considered a ten-day ceasefire for late 2018 due to growing pressure for a negotiated settlement within the Taliban. The Government of Afghanistan and the U.S. could attempt to exploit the apparent divisions within the Taliban to split rank-and-file fighters from their leadership if the Taliban refuses to engage with Kabul.

The Taliban also faces a power struggle within its ruling Quetta Shura. The ceasefire could exacerbate a rift between Taliban leaders who are open to reconciliation and hardliners unwilling to negotiate a settlement. The joint celebrations reportedly surprised and angered some Taliban leaders including Taliban Second Deputy Leader Mullah Yaqoob.[3] Taliban leader Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada – a reported moderate - may use widespread support for peace amongst the rank-and-file to consolidate his control within the Quetta Shura vis-à-vis hardliners such as Mullah Yaqoob and First Deputy Leader Siraj Haqqani. This power struggle predates the ceasefire. Akhundzada reportedly reshuffled multiple shadow governors and senior leaders to increase his control over the movement in February 2018. Rumors of additional post-ceasefire leadership changes may further demonstrate shifting dynamics in favor of Akhundzada. The weakening of hardliners like Haqqani - who maintains close ties to al Qaeda and Pakistan - in favor of Akhundzada could open space for peace-inclined factions of the Taliban to pursue a negotiated settlement. Hardline elements are likely to continue the fight against Kabul.

The U.S. could exploit these apparent rifts in order to advance its strategic objectives in Afghanistan. The U.S. intends to use military and diplomatic means to pressure the Taliban to negotiate a peace settlement with the Government of Afghanistan. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that the U.S. is “prepared to support, facilitate, and participate” in peace negotiations that would include “a discussion of the role of international actors and forces” in Afghanistan on June 16. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Alice Wells reaffirmed the willingness to participate in negotiations but reiterated the established U.S. position that the Taliban must negotiate directly with the Government of Afghanistan on June 20. Incoming U.S. Forces – Afghanistan Commander Lt. Gen. Scott Miller has also testified that a political settlement must end the War in Afghanistan.

The U.S. nonetheless must remain cautious that the peace process does not jeopardize its access to Afghanistan. Members of the both houses of the Afghan Parliament have criticized the U.S. role in Afghanistan since May 2018. Some members of the upper house have called for the review or cancellation of the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between the U.S. and Afghanistan.[4] Meanwhile, peace protesters marching from Helmand Province to Kabul to encourage reconciliation with the Taliban have also demanded a specific timeline for the withdrawal of the U.S. from Afghanistan. Taliban sources have also claimed that a clearly-defined timeline for withdrawal could have persuaded Taliban leadership to accept a ceasefire extension after Eid al-Fitr. These converging demands for the withdrawal of the U.S. from Afghanistan could begin to spiral into a widespread populist movement ahead of the scheduled 2018 Afghan Parliamentary Elections and 2019 Afghan Presidential Elections. The U.S. must not depart abruptly or under a fixed timeline but rather through a gradual drawdown after setting and testing the conditions for sustained peace in Afghanistan.

ISIS could also exploit the ceasefire and possibility of a negotiated settlement to expand its operations in Afghanistan. ISIS’s Afghanistan branch, ISIS Wilayat Khorasan, claimed two separate attacks that targeted joint celebrations between the Taliban and ANSF in Nangarhar Province during Eid al-Fitr. The statements noted that the attacks targeted gatherings of both the ANSF and “the apostate Taliban Movement.” The Taliban later released a post-ceasefire statement arguing that the Taliban is the only movement leading “jihad across the country,” and adding that “multiple parties [are] not participating in this jihad.”[5] The statement - while directed against the U.S. assessment of a fractured jihadist movement in Afghanistan - may also highlight the Taliban leadership’s concern that the ceasefire will harm their credentials as the leaders of the jihad in Afghanistan. ISIS could position itself to recruit dissatisfied hardline members of the Taliban if Taliban leadership begin openly pursuing a peaceful settlement with the Government of Afghanistan.

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[1] The Government of Afghanistan initially announced a unilateral eight-day ceasefire from June 12 - 20 before extending it to June 30. The Taliban’s “unrelated” ceasefire only lasted from June 15 - 17.

[2] “Statement of Islamic Emirate regarding end of three day Eid ceasefire,” Voice of Jihad. June 17, 2018. https://alemarah-english(.)com/?p=30455%5C

[3] Mullah Yaqoob is the son of the Taliban’s founder – Mullah Omar.

[4] Including Mohammad Alam Ezedyar – the First Deputy Speaker of the Afghan Parliament and a “leading” member of Jamiat-e Islami

[5] “Statement of Islamic Emirate regarding end of three day Eid ceasefire,” Voice of Jihad. June 17, 2018. https://alemarah-english(.)com/?p=30455%5C

The Kremlin's Campaign in Egypt

By Nataliya Bugayova with Jack Ulses

Key Takeaway: The Kremlin has successfully expanded its influence in Egypt – a historic partner of the U.S. and the West. Russia has secured approval to establish an industrial zone in Port Said; concluded major energy deals, including the construction of Egypt’s first nuclear power plant; increased weapons sales; and obtained Egypt’s diplomatic backing on a number of regional initiatives. The Kremlin is likely attempting to secure a naval base in Egypt in order to expand its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and contest U.S. freedom of maneuver through the Suez Canal. Russia cannot compete in the long-term with the U.S., which provides nearly $1.3 billion in annual military aid to Egypt. The Kremlin will therefore focus on offering to support Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in areas of core concern for his constituencies, such as security, food, and energy. Russian activity in Egypt is part of the Kremlin’s regional campaign to expand its influence in the Middle East and Africa. The U.S. must use its leverage with Egypt not only to sustain its partnership with a key regional actor and guarantee its freedom of maneuver in the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal, but also to curb Sisi’s continued use of oppressive measures against his own population.

Read the full version of this article on the ISW website.

Russia Challenges Ukraine in the Sea of Azov

By Catherine Harris and Jack Ulses

Key Takeaway: The Kremlin is conducting hybrid operations to secure a combined land and sea arc spanning from the occupied Crimean Peninsula through the Sea of Azov to Eastern Ukraine. Russia’s Caspian Sea Flotilla deployed naval vessels to the Sea of Azov in late May 2018. The ships ostensibly will defend a new bridge connecting Russia to Crimea. The Kremlin also used signature irregular warfare methods including information operations and snap military exercises to sow confusion and instability in port cities held by Ukraine along the Sea of Azov. The Kremlin holds a long-standing interest in obtaining de facto control over the region in order to secure economic resources and block Ukraine’s access to maritime industries. Russia may also intend to use these operations as a venue to destabilize Ukraine ahead of the scheduled 2019 Ukrainian Presidential and Parliamentary Elections. The Kremlin could also leverage a long-term consolidation around the Sea of Azov as a base from which to intensify military pressure on NATO in the Black Sea.

Contours of Anti-U.S. Iraqi Government Emerge

By Jessa Rose Dury-Agri, Patrick Hamon, and Omer Kassim 

Key Takeaway: Key Iraqi Shi’a and Kurdish leaders have signaled their support for a new Iran-backed political alliance, setting up a potential coalition with enough parliamentary seats to form the next Iraqi government. Such a governing coalition would further strengthen Iran’s position in Iraq and undermine the U.S. ability to secure its own interests in Iraq.

Iraqi nationalist Shi’a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and Iranian proxy and Badr Organization head Hadi al-Ameri formed an alliance on June 12, 2018. Their respective electoral lists represent the two winningest alliances in Iraq’s federal legislative elections that occurred on May 12, 2018. Former Iraqi Prime Minister and current Vice President Nouri al-Maliki, Shi’a cleric Ammar al-Hakim, and two major Kurdish parties have signaled their support for the Sadr-Ameri alliance. A formal coalition emerging among these actors and the electoral lists they lead would clear the 165-seat majority threshold required to form a government. A Sadr-Ameri alliance under this scenario would not need support from blocs led by current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and secularist Ayad Allawi.

Al-Hakim’s Tayar al-Hikma al-Watani (National Wisdom Trend, NWT) is likely to join the Sadr-Ameri alliance. The NWT had previously announced its intention to ally with Sadr. An NWT leader indicated the group is a “cornerstone” of the Sadr-Ameri alliance, although the NWT has not yet formally announced its participation in the alliance. Maliki - the leader of the Itilaf Dawlat al-Qanoun (State of Law Alliance) – maintains an antagonistic relationship with Sadr but close ties to Iran and is positioning himself to join the alliance. Maliki seeks to leverage his electoral weight and strong ties with Ameri to secure a key position in the Iraqi government by overcoming a potential Sadr veto against his participation. The Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan are likely setting conditions to join the Sadr-Ameri alliance following a joint statement declaring the Sadr-alliance “a positive step.”

This emerging coalition may encounter obstacles before it can proceed to form the next Iraqi government. Disagreements over the position of Prime Minister and key ministerial posts may drive the different factions within the coalition apart. There will likely be a partial manual recount of votes following allegations of widespread electoral fraud that may change the final election results.

Iran-Backed Political Alliance Forms in Iraq

By Jessa Rose Dury-Agri, Patrick Hamon, and Omer Kassim

Key Takeaway: Iraq may form a government that undermines U.S. interests, tries to eject the U.S. from the region, and supports Iran. Nationalist Iraqi Shi’a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has allied with Hadi al-Ameri, the leader of the coalition of Iranian-backed militias and their political wings. Sadr and Ameri lead the two winningest alliances in Iraq’s federal legislative elections and are nearing the 165-seat threshold necessary to form a government if Shi’a cleric Ammar al-Hakim (19 seats) and secularist Ayad Allawi (21 seats) follow through on their previously announced intention to ally with Sadr.

Sadr and Ameri will likely attempt to woo current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi or former Prime Minister and current Vice President Nouri al-Maliki to gain support of one of their coalitions, or alternatively seek to fragment both leaders’ respective coalitions to form a government. They may also seek to gain support from some or all Kurdish parties and Iran friendly Sunni parties in order to reach the government formation threshold. Both Sadr and Ameri may push for the full expulsion of U.S. forces from Iraq and will further the entrenchment of Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces in the Iraqi security apparatus.

For the full Iraq Council of Representatives seat allocation figures, see ISW's election results graphic.

Syria Situation Report: May 2-29, 2018

By ISW's Syria Team and Syria Direct

This graphic mark the latest installment of the Syria Situation Report (SITREP) Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. The map depicts significant developments in the war in Syria during the period May 2-29, 2018. The control of terrain represented on the map is accurate as of May 25, 2018.

Breaking Down Iraq's Election Results

By Jessa Rose Dury-Agri and Patrick Hamon

Iraq held a federal election on May 12, 2018 – the fifth nationwide election since Saddam Hussein’s ouster in 2003. The election was marked by a historically low turnout rate and fraud allegations, yet witnessed fewer security incidents than elections in previous years.

None of the electoral lists secured the 165-seat majority required to begin forming the next government. Preliminary results that Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court has yet to certify indicate populist Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his “Toward Reform” list won the election with 54 Council of Representatives seats. The Iran-backed “Conquest Alliance” led by Iranian proxy and Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al-Ameri took second place with 47 seats, while the “Victory Alliance” list led by current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi – in power since 2014 – finished third with 42 seats. Sadr and other key powerbrokers are in negotiations to form a governing coalition that reaches the 165-seat threshold.

The accompanying graphic below breaks down Iraq’s Council of Representatives seat allocation based on initial election results.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) will provide continuous updates on the government formation process and the attendant implications for U.S. interests and policy in Iraq. You can sign up for e-mail updates on ISW’s website.

Click the image below to view an enlarged version.

Syria Situation Report: March 21 - April 17, 2018

By ISW's Syria Team and Syria Direct

These graphics mark the latest installment of the Syria Situation Report (SITREP) Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. The maps depict significant developments in the Syrian Civil War from March 21 - April 3, 2018 and from April 4 - April 17, 2018. The control of terrain represented on the maps is accurate as of April 17, 2018.

Map Text Credit: Sana Sekkarie

Military Movements after the April 2018 Chemical Weapons Attack

By Matti Suomenaro, Aaron Hesse, and the ISW Research Team

The U.S. has assessed that the Bashar al Assad regime is responsible for a chemical weapons attack in Damascus, Syria on April 7, 2018. The Assad-Russia-Iran coalition has been relocating its military assets and personnel in advance of an expected U.S.-led military operation intended to deter future use of chemical weapons. Iranian proxies are repositioning in order to mitigate the effects of a strike. The map accompanying the data below identifies key pro-regime military movements from April 8 – 12, 2018.

*Correction issued April 18, 2018: The map above has been updated since its original publication on April 12, 2018. The previous iteration of the map included ranges for two S-300 surface-to-air missile systems at Tartous and Latakia in Syria. ISW has changed the map to reflect the updated assessment that Russia likely had one S-300 system in Syria, based at Tartous, and that it withdrew that system in June 2017 (Russia deployed a new S-400 system to Masyaf in the months following this withdrawal). The previous iteration of this map also included a note regarding Russia’s deployment of multiple additional S-300 systems at unknown locations in Syria. ISW has removed this note based on a re-evaluation of reporting from 2016 on Russian deployments and the updated assessment regarding Russia’s current S-300 systems in Syria. Forthcoming ISW products will include updated assessments of Russia’s military posture in Syria and of the movement of the broader Russia-Iran-Bashar al Assad regime coalition’s movements since the April 14, 2018 U.S.-U.K.-France operation in Syria. 

Bashar al Assad Regime-Russia-Iran Coalition

Two Russian Su-24M ‘Fencer’ attack aircraft conducted several low-altitude passes in close proximity to the USS Donald Cook and the French frigate Aquitaine in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea on April 11. The Russian Navy conducted a firing drill off the Syrian coast in a likely attempt to deter U.S. and allied naval maneuvers near Syria on April 11.

Russia reportedly deployed four Tu-95MS ‘Bear’ and Tu-160M ‘Blackjack’ strategic bombers as well as an unspecified number of Il-78M tanker aircraft from the Engels Air Base in Southern Russia. Their final destination is unknown although they may be bound for Syria or the Hamedan Air Base in Western Iran. Russia previously targeted locations in Eastern Syria from the Engels Air Base. 

Russian and regime forces enhanced the air defenses around Syria’s capital, Damascus, where the regime conducted its chemical weapons attack on April 7. Pro-regime forces deployed short- to medium-range surface-to-air missiles, including six Russian Pantsir-S2s, to the Mezzeh Military Air Base and other sites in Damascus. Pro-regime officials also reportedly issued an alert to the Syrian Arab Army to evacuate personnel and assets from military bases across Syria.

Regime and Russian aircraft relocated closer to heavily-defended commercial airfields across Syria. Aircraft relocated from the Seen (Sayqal), Dumayr, Shayrat, and the T-4 (Tiyas) Air Bases to the Bassel al Assad International Airport in Latakia Province, the Nayrab Air Base outside Aleppo City, and the Damascus International Airport.

Iranian proxies, including Lebanese Hezbollah, reportedly began exiting Syria. Hezbollah reportedly relocated a number of fighters from Syria into Lebanon. Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies reportedly also entered Iraq from positions along the Syria-Iraq border, including Abu Kamal in Eastern Syria.

Unspecified pro-regime elements reportedly evacuated a branch of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) in Jamraya near Damascus. The SSRC is a Syrian government body responsible for research and development on advanced weapons systems, including ballistic missiles and chemical weapons.

Yemen

The Iranian-backed al Houthi movement escalated its series of ballistic missile strikes targeting Saudi Arabia. The strikes fit a pre-existing escalatory pattern but also coincide with Saudi Arabia’s expressed support for a military response in Syria. The al Houthi movement targeted Riyadh and two other locations in Saudi Arabia with a ballistic missile and kamikaze drones on April 11. It remains unclear if Iran directed the escalation against Saudi Arabia.

United States

The U.S. Navy announced that the guided-missile destroyer USS Donald Cook departed from Larnaca, Cyprus to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea on April 9. The guided-missile destroyer USS Porter is also operating in the Navy’s Sixth Fleet area of operations. The U.S. Navy announced on April 11 that the USS Harry Truman Carrier Strike Group departed from Norfolk, Virginia for a regularly scheduled deployment in support of ongoing operations by the Navy’s Fifth and Sixth Fleets, the headquarters for which are located in Bahrain and Italy, respectively.  

France

The cruise missile-capable French frigate Aquitaine is stationed in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.

United Kingdom

Britain reportedly ordered the deployment of an unspecified number of cruise missile-capable submarines to the Mediterranean Sea within range of Syria.

Turkey

Turkey maintains at least one warship stationed near Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. The Turkish Navy originally deployed to block offshore hydrocarbon exploration by Italy and France in the territorial waters of Cyprus on February 3, 2018.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman announced his “readiness to work with allies on any military response in Syria if needed” following a meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris on April 10.

The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute contributed to the Yemen-related content in this publication.

America's Interests in Syria Beyond Deterring Chemical Weapons Use

By Jennifer Cafarella

Key Takeaway: President Donald Trump will likely authorize a campaign of strikes in Syria to deter future use of chemical weapons. The strikes would add credibility to American deterrence efforts worldwide by affirming American resolve to uphold stated “red lines”. They would fall short of halting the pro-Bashar al Assad regime war effort, however. The U.S. must do more in Syria to affect the war’s outcome, and must use tools beyond the military instrument. President Trump should use this opportunity to reset his entire Syria strategy. Vital American interests in Syria include: defeating al Qaeda and ISIS and replacing them with a viable and legitimate alternative; expelling Iranian military and proxy forces; limiting Iranian influence; facilitating the emergence of Sunni Arab armed forces and governing structures; bringing the war in Syria to a stable and enduring end that allows refugees to return; and de-escalating great power and regional competition in Syria that risks regional war and sets conditions for a great-power conflict.

President Trump will likely authorize a campaign of strikes against Syrian regime military targets in coming days in order to punish and deter chemical weapons use. American and British intelligence assessments have determined that the Assad regime is responsible for a chemical attack using a nerve agent against an opposition enclave in Douma on the outskirts of Damascus on April 7, 2018. President Trump first authorized a missile strike on a Syrian airfield in April 2017 after Syrian President Bashar al Assad conducted a similar attack using sarin gas on an opposition-held town. President Trump has reiterated his commitment to deterring future use and is now considering his military options.

A new round of strikes will most likely impose costs and degrade the regime’s capability to launch such attacks by damaging Assad’s remaining air force. President Trump’s 2017 strike destroyed twenty percent of Assad’s air force. President Trump may attempt to destroy Assad’s remaining air capabilities in addition to destroying his chemical weapons facilities. He may also strike targets that impose costs on Iran and Russia. He has publicly stated his intent to hold them accountable for supporting Assad’s crimes. Russian and Iranian forces collocate on many bases across Syria.

The strikes will reaffirm President Trump’s commitment to deterring chemical weapons use but will not solve the Syria problem. They are unlikely to alter the overall trajectory of the Syrian civil war and will not prevent Assad from continuing to slaughter his rebelling population with conventional munitions. They will not weaken Russian and Iranian resolve to continue supporting Assad, even if they destroy Assad’s air force. Alone, tactical military action is not a strategy.

The U.S. must do more and must use tools beyond the military instrument. President Trump should use this opportunity to reset his entire Syria strategy and remove the constraints on American action in Syria that he inherited from President Obama.

The U.S. has vital national security interests in Syria beyond deterring chemical weapons use. These include:

1. Defeating al Qaeda, as well as ISIS, and facilitating the emergence of a viable and legitimate Sunni Arab leadership that will prevent the re-emergence of jihadist actors. 
2. Expelling Iranian military forces and most of Iran’s proxy forces from Syria in order to secure American allies and partners in the region, to deny Iran access to Syrian economic resources, to reduce the regional sectarian conflict that is driving Sunni jihadist recruitment, and to constrain Russia’s ability to project force through Iranian basing; 
3. Limiting Iranian influence over the Syrian government and territory; 
4. Facilitating the emergence of a Sunni Arab armed force and governance structures that are: seen as legitimate by the Sunni Arab communities in Syria; willing and able to expel ISIS and al Qaeda and keep them out; and willing and able to serve as interlocutors for Syria’s rebelling Sunni community in negotiations with the pro-regime Alawite community and others; 
5. Bringing the war in Syria to a stable and enduring end in a negotiated settlement acceptable to all sides that allows refugees to return in a manner that ensures jihadist actors do not gain sanctuary within a resettled and insecure population; and 
6. De-escalating the competition among Turkey, Russia, Iran, and the Gulf States that risks regional war and is setting conditions for a great-power conflict in the Middle East. 

President Trump faces no easy decisions in Syria. Desirable options vanished over the eight years of vicious civil war. The cost and difficulty of acting in Syria will only continue to grow the longer the US tries to avoid these problems, however. The war continues to escalate. Russia, Iran, Assad, and Turkey are all attacking American forces and local partners in Syria. Israel and Iran are in an escalation pattern that could quickly become a regional war. The withdrawal of America’s limited forces in Syria would create a vacuum that leads to further escalation or enables American adversaries to grow stronger.

The growing international consensus behind striking Assad for chemical weapons use and holding his backers accountable provides an opportunity. President Trump should assert the leadership that the Obama administration shied away from and chart a new way forward in Syria.

Map: Russia and Iran in Southwest Syria

By ISW's Syria Team

April 2018 Syria Chemical Weapons Attack

ISW Senior Intelligence Planner Jennifer Cafarella answers three key questions in the aftermath of the Bashar al Assad regime-Iran-Russia coalition’s April 2018 campaign in Syria’s capital and the associated chemical weapons attack on civilians: read the Q&A on ISW's main website here.

Updated ISW map of the Assad-Iran-Russia posture and control of terrain assessments (for a PDF version, please visit ISW's main website):

Regime Gains in Damascus, Syria: March 12 - 26, 2018

By Christopher Kozak

Pro-Bashar al-Assad regime forces, including Russia and Iran, forced the reconciliation and evacuation of two of the three opposition-held pockets in the besieged Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Syria’s capital, Damascus. Salafi-Jihadist group Ahrar al-Sham fully evacuated the town of Harasta under a deal brokered by Russia. Activists reported that roughly 4,500 local residents, including more than 1,400 fighters, ultimately departed Harasta for Idlib Province on March 22 – 23. Islamist group Faylaq al-Rahman agreed to a similar evacuation deal in Irbeen, Zamalka, Ayn Tarma, and Jobar in Eastern Ghouta on March 23. Activists reported the departure of at least 13,100 local residents on March 24 - 26. Salafi-Jihadist group Jaysh al-Islam – the last remaining opposition powerbroker in the region - is meanwhile negotiating its own surrender and disarmament in its stronghold of Douma in Eastern Ghouta. Assad will soon claim a near total victory in Damascus.

Russia Eyes Latvia Ahead of Election

By Franklin Holcomb, Catherine Harris, and the ISW Russia and Ukraine Team

Key Takeaway: Russia will likely intensify its campaign to disrupt Latvia’s political stability ahead of Latvia’s fall 2018 parliamentary elections. The Kremlin may use rising social tensions over a new Latvian educational bill as just one tool to fuel divisive narratives and trigger large-scale protests. The U.S. should support NATO ally Latvia as it confronts Russia’s hybrid warfare and use the upcoming April 2018 Baltic Summit to reinforce its commitment to defend Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania.

Russians and Russia-linked actors are escalating tensions over a controversial Latvian education bill. The Latvian Parliament approved the final reading of a draft language bill on March 22, 2018.[1] The bill aims to gradually transition Latvia’s education system from mixed Latvian-Russian language instruction to Latvian-language based.[2] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the Latvian government of forcing Russians in Latvia to abandon their heritage.[3] Moscow-linked political-social organizations have attempted to halt, delay, or alter the legislation.[4] The Russian government-linked Russian Union of Latvia (RUL) organized protests against the bill, including protests of around 1,000 individuals on February 24 and March 10, though pro-Russia sources claimed 3,000-5,000 people attended.[5] The RUL is currently attempting to challenge a decision by the Latvian government blocking a public referendum on the bill in Latvia’s Supreme Court.[6] The RUL is also petitioning the EU to recognize the bill as an infringement on minority rights. It called on several EU and NATO states, namely Hungary and Romania, to support the “Rescue Package for National Minorities” which would grant minority groups across the EU increased autonomy.[7]

The Kremlin may fuel these tensions to destabilize Latvia ahead of the fall 2018 Latvian elections. The Kremlin seeks to destabilize Latvia in order to reassert influence over the former Soviet state, to test NATO unity, and to drive further divisions within the EU. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assesses that the Kremlin is most likely to undertake a multifaceted approach, potentially including the use of irregular troops, if it chooses to escalate in Latvia rather than conduct a large-scale, short-notice conventional ground operation. The Kremlin regularly uses tensions over language as means of destabilization. ISW assesses that the Kremlin is fueling escalation between Hungary and Ukraine over a similar Ukrainian language bill in order to seed social unrest in Western Ukraine and drive a wedge between Ukraine and its neighbors. The Kremlin could exploit existing tensions surrounding the Latvian language bill to boost divisive narratives and destabilize the political landscape.

Latvian officials have already expressed concerns about the Kremlin’s intensifying interference in Latvian affairs, which may be indicative of the Kremlin’s increasing campaign of subversion. The Latvian Foreign Minister warned about the Kremlin’s escalating disinformation campaign ahead of the elections while he was in Washington on March 7, 2018. Latvian parliament member Ainars Latkovskis warned on February 21 that the Kremlin is attempting to “add more fuel to the fire” of a Latvian banking crisis in order to “create chaos in Latvia by portraying it as a failed state.”[8] Latvia’s Defense Ministry warned on February 20 that “there is a high probability [of an] externally organized widespread information operation…that, by its structure and execution, is identical to those observed in pre-election periods in the U.S., France, and Germany.”[9] Latvia’s Security Police warned on March 19 that Russian intelligence services continue to pose a “significant threat” to Latvia and are continuing their efforts to recruit Latvians and infiltrate key Latvian government institutions.[10] Signs of the Kremlin’s accelerating campaign to destabilize Latvia could include large-scale protests, sudden attacks on Russian-language speakers, and cyber attacks.

The U.S. and its Western allies should support NATO ally Latvia’s efforts to bolster its defenses as it confronts Russia’s hybrid campaign. Latvia should continue with its gradual approach to implement the language bill, if passed, so it does not provide additional opportunities for the Kremlin to exploit. The U.S. and its partners should support Latvia in its efforts to deny Russia the ability to foment political unrest and vie for domestic political influence. These countermeasures could include bolstering efforts to ensure that Kremlin-backed media does not dominate the information space for Russian-speaking Latvians, increasing tailored support to Latvian intelligence and law enforcement, and other mechanisms that can support an early detection and adequate response to a Russia-fueled destabilization campaign. The upcoming Baltic Summit in April 2018 hosted by President Donald Trump presents an opportunity to reinforce the U.S. and NATO commitment to defend allies against the full range of Russian warfare. 

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[1] “Saeima supports transition to Latvian as the only language of instruction in schools,” Latvijas Republikas Saima, March 22, 2018, http://www.saeima.lv/en/news/saeima-news/26706-saeima-supports-transition-to-latvian-as-the-only-language-of-instruction-in-schools

[2] “The parliament passes bills about gradual transition to Latvian-only education,” baltic-course.com, March 23, 2016, http://www.baltic-course(.)com/eng/education/?doc=138352 ; ” Bill against Russian language in Latvian schools passed in second reading,” TASS, March 9, 2018, http://tass(.)com/society/993327

[3] “Moskalkova accused the authorities of Latvia of discriminating against Russian-speaking residents,” RIA, February 25, 2018, https://ria(.)ru/world/20180225/1515253741.html ; “Moskalkova urged the UN and the OSCE to prevent cultural apartheid in Latvia,” RIA, February 25, 2018, https://ria(.)ru/world/20180225/1515253980.html ; “Lavrov accused Latvia of Russian forced to abandon their heritage,” rubaltic.ru, March 15, 2018, https://www.rubaltic(.)ru/news/15032018-lavrov-obvinil-latviyu-v-prinuzhdenii-russkikh-otkazatsya-ot-svoego-naslediya/

[4] “At the CEC refusal to hold a referendum - to answer a march on March 10!” rusojuz.lv, March 05, 2018, http://www.rusojuz(.)lv/ru/ourevents/26265-na-otkaz-cika-v-provedenii-referenduma-%E2%80%93-otvetim-marshem-10-marta/

[5] “Latvia: Russian community protest bill ending Russian language in schools,” eblnews.com, February 24, 2018, https://eblnews(.)com/video/latvia-russian-community-protest-bill-ending-russian-language-schools-338007 ; “Pictures from the rally on February 24 dedicated to 229 anniversary of the first Russian school in Latvia,” rusojuz.lv, February 24, 2018, http://www.rusojuz(.)lv/ru/ourevents/26262-fotoreportazh-s-mitinga-24-fevralja-posvjaschennogo-229-godovschine-pervoj-russkoj-shkoli-latvii/ ; “Miroslav Mitrofanov: Thank you all! March in defense of Russian schools turned out! We are waiting for new, higher goals!” rusojuz.lv, March 13, 2018, http://www.rusojuz(.)lv/ru/ourdeputy//26277-miroslav-mitrofanov--vsem-spasibo--shestvie-v-zaschitu-russkih-shkol-poluchilos-nash-zhdut-novie-bolee-visokie-celi/ ; “Pictures from the march in Riga March 10, 2018,” rusojuz.lv, March 10, 2018, http://www.rusojuz(.)lv/ru/ourevents//26270-fotoreportazh-s-shestvija-v-rige-10-marta-2018-goda/ ; “The beat of drums: in Riga took place many thousands march in defense of Russian schools,” Sputnik Latvia, March 10, 2018,
https://ru.sputniknewslv(.)com/Latvia/20180310/7620465/boj-barabanov-riga-sostojalsja-mnogotysjachnyj-marsh-zashhitu-russkih-shkol.html ; “In Riga, three thousand people attended the rally in support of Russian schools,” RIA, February 25, 2018, https://ria(.)ru/world/20180225/1515235538.html?inj=1

[6] Vladimir Akopov, “The founding fathers of Latvia were "for", and spoke out against the Central Election Commission,” baltnews.lv, March 5, 2018, http://baltnews(.)lv/news/20180305/1021745696.html ; “At the CEC refusal to hold a referendum - to answer a march on March 10!” rusojuz.lv, March 5, 2018, http://www.rusojuz(.)lv/ru/ourevents/26265-na-otkaz-cika-v-provedenii-referenduma-%E2%80%93-otvetim-marshem-10-marta/

[7] “’The rescue package for national minorities’ - what is it?” rusojuz.lv, March 10, 2018, http://www.rusojuz(.)lv/ru/ourevents/26253-spasatelnij-paket-dlja-nacionalnih-menshinstv-%E2%80%93-chto-eto-takoe/ ; “’The rescue package for national minorities’: signatures collected in Latvia,” baltnews.lv, March 12, 2018, http://www.baltnews(.)lv/riga_news/20180312/1021771205.html

[8] “Ainars Latkovskis: Russia Latvia is once again trying to show as a failed state,” lsm.lv, February 21, 2018, https://www.lsm(.)lv/raksts/zinas/latvija/ainars-latkovskis-krievija-latviju-atkal-megina-paradit-ka-neizdevusos-valsti.a268753/ ; “Latvia banking crisis: Riga wary Russia could be to blame for 'hybrid warfare',” CNBC, February 22, 2018, https://www.cnbc(.)com/2018/02/22/latvia-banking-crisis-riga-wary-russia-could-be-to-blame-for-hybrid-warfare.html

[9] “Latvia Signals Russia May Be Interfering in Banking Crisis,” Bloomberg, February 20, 2018, https://www.bloomberg(.)com/news/articles/2018-02-20/latvia-signals-russia-may-be-interfering-in-banking-crisis

[10] “Russian special services have seriously threatened the security of Latvia in 2017 – PB,” rus.lsm.lv, March 19, 2018, https://rus.lsm(.)lv/statja/novosti/politika/rossiyskie-specsluzhbiserezno-ugrozhali-bezopasnosti-latvii-v-2017-godu-pb.a271878/ ; “The Security Police shall publish a report on the functioning of the service in 2017,” dp.gov.lv, March 19, 2018, http://www.dp.gov(.)lv/lv/noderigi/publikacijas/drosibas-policija-publice-parskatu-par-dienesta-darbibu-2017.-gada.art99

Syria Situation Report: March 6 - March 20, 2018

This graphic marks the latest installment of the Syria Situation Report (SITREP) Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. This graphic depicts significant developments in the Syrian Civil War from March 6 - March 20, 2018. The control of terrain represented on the map is accurate as of March 22, 2018.

Map credit: Sana Sekkarie