Russia's Syria Mirage: July 17 - August 13, 2017

By Matti Suomenaro, Ellen Stockert, and Genevieve Casagrande

Russia continues to masquerade as an effective anti-ISIS actor in order to lure the U.S. into a counter-terrorism partnership in Syria. Russia seeks to leverage this partnership to expedite an American withdrawal from Syria, removing the U.S. as an obstacle to continued Russian build up and force projection in the Middle East. Russia may achieve short-term territorial gains against ISIS, but will ultimately undermine U.S.-led anti-ISIS efforts in Eastern Syria. The Russian-backed campaign will fail to decisively defeat ISIS and al Qaeda in Syria, however. Russian airstrikes in ISIS-held terrain regularly targeted civilian infrastructure such as mosques, schools, and medical centers from July 17 - August 13, according to local activists. Russian airstrikes also reportedly targeted an internally-displaced persons (IDP) camp in Zour Shamar in Eastern Raqqa province on July 23 - 24. Russia’s punitive strikes against vulnerable Sunni populations will exacerbate local grievances, increase sectarian tension, and pave the way for the resurgence of ISIS, al Qaeda, and other jihadist groups in areas recently seized from ISIS. Moreover, pro-Bashar al Assad regime forces’ rapid advance in Eastern Syria may indicate the regime is not allocating sufficient time or manpower to conduct effective clearing operations. Incomplete clearing operations could permit ISIS to leave behind latent attack cells or create ISIS-permissive zones along the Euphrates River Valley. The pro-regime coalition currently lacks the manpower required to secure and hold these areas in the long-term.

Iran and the Assad regime are already exploiting nascent U.S.-Russian cooperation to expand their control into Eastern Syria at the expense of the U.S. and its partners. Russian airstrikes primarily targeted ISIS-held areas from July 17 - August 13 in support of Iranian and Assad regime advances. Pro-regime forces backed by Russia and Iran recaptured Sukhna, which sits on the Palmyra - Deir ez Zour Highway, from ISIS on August 13 following a wave of ISIS counterattacks against the city from August 8 - 10. Russian airstrikes also targeted villages along the southern bank of of the Euphrates River in southeastern Raqqa Province, allowing the recapture of al Numaysah, al Jaber, and al Kumaysah towns by pro-Iranian and regime forces. These gains were facilitated by manpower freed from recent de-escalation zones brokered by Russia in Southwest Syria, the Eastern Ghouta suburb of Damascus, and northwestern Homs Province. Russia, Iran and Assad seek to leverage these gains to constrain the freedom of action of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition in Syria. Pro-regime positioning along the Euphrates River could block the advancement of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) southeast from Ar-Raqqa City after the completion of Ar-Raqqa City clearing operations. Russia’s gains against ISIS in Syria’s East will ultimately embolden Iran and the Bashar al Assad regime, rather than constrain them.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. The graphic likely under-represents the extent of the locations targeted in Eastern Syria, owing to a relative lack of activist reporting from that region.

High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.

CORRECTION: A previous version of this blogpost stated Russian airstrikes targeted an IDP camp in Raqqa Province on August 23-24. The correct date for the reported Russian strikes is July 23-34.

Syria Situation Report: July 27 - August 9, 2017

By ISW Syria Team and Syria Direct

This series of graphics marks the latest installments of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. These graphics depict significant developments in the Syrian Civil War from July 27 to August 9, 2017. The control of terrain represented on the graphics is accurate as of August 8, 2017.

Special credit to Matti Suomenaro and Sana Sekkarie of the Institute for the Study of War for their contributions to the text and graphics of this series of Syria SITREP Maps.

Syria Situation Report: June 29 - July 27, 2017

By ISW Syria Team and Syria Direct

This series of graphics marks the latest installments of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. These graphics depict significant developments in the Syrian Civil War from June 29 to July 27, 2017. The control of terrain represented on the graphics is accurate as of July 6 or July 16, 2017.

Special credit to Matti Suomenaro and Sana Sekkarie of the Institute for the Study of War for their contributions to the text and graphics of this series of Syria SITREP Maps.

Ukraine Update: Russia’s Aggressive Subversion of Ukraine

                                                  Catherine Harris, Franklin Holcomb, Charlie Bacsik, and Charles Frattini III

Key Takeaway: Ukraine’s efforts to integrate with the West yielded important progress in the past two months. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s overall pro-Western reformist movement grew more vulnerable to internal destabilization and Russian subversion. Stalling reforms, a poor economy, and an increased focus on the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine provide momentum to populists and pro-Russian political elements, as well as additional opportunities for the Kremlin to exploit as it aims to return Ukraine to its sphere of influence. The Kremlin continued its military aggression in the east and expanded its subversion campaign throughout the country, focusing on low-visibility methods, such as paying individuals to conduct protests. The Kremlin will intensify these efforts in order to destabilize the Ukrainian government as Kyiv prepares for elections in 2019. The U.S. implemented a package of sanctions on August 02 that may restrain the Kremlin’s aggressive behavior in Ukraine and elsewhere. However, the U.S. must also provide full support to Ukrainian reform efforts or risk creating a permissive environment for Kremlin subversion in Ukraine.

Ukraine achieved noteworthy successes in deepening its integration with Western political, economic, and military structures, while the U.S. signaled a more active stance. The E.U. officially implemented a visa-free travel agreement with Ukraine on June 11, and the E.U, ratified an economic association agreement with Ukraine on July 11. Both steps will help Ukraine shift away from Russia’s economic and social spheres in the long term. The U.S. also signaled an interest in playing a larger role in resolving the Russia-backed war in Ukraine following a meeting between Ukrainian President Poroshenko and President Trump on June 21 and through the appointment of former NATO Ambassador Kurt Volker as U.S. Special Representative for the Ukraine . Volker indicated that the U.S. may supply lethal defensive arms to the Ukrainian Armed Forces following a visit to the Donbas frontline on July 24. Volker’s statement was reinforced on August 1 when the Pentagon announced a draft plan to provide defensive aid to Kyiv. Ukraine took important steps toward potentially integrating its military with Western military structures. President Poroshenko signed a bill on June 8 to articulate Ukraine’s intent to apply for NATO membership in 2020. The Armed Forces of Ukraine and the U.S. also conducted large-scale naval exercises in the Black Sea on July 10-22 with numerous NATO member-states.

The reform progress inside of Ukraine began to stall while political actors increasingly focus on positioning for the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections. The Ukrainian parliament adjourned for the summer without passing many expected reforms, including healthcare reform, a new law on national security, the creation of an anti-corruption court, and others. Meanwhile, President Poroshenko revoked the Ukrainian citizenship of his political opponent Mikheil Saakashvili on July 26. Many Ukrainian reformists condemned Poroshenko’s move as one that undermines the democratic ideals of the Euromaidan Revolution. Other political players in Ukraine are also beginning to prepare for the upcoming elections. Populists, including pro-Russian elements, are likely to gain traction while Ukraine’s political reforms and economy stagnate. The combination of these factors makes the government and the reform movement in Ukraine vulnerable to internal destabilization and the Kremlin’s subversion, which will remain true until the Poroshenko administration takes decisive steps to reinvigorate the reform process and economy.

Russia continues to destabilize Ukraine through a variety of low- visibility subversive methods designed not to trigger a major international reaction. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) asserted that Russia conducted a major cyber attack against state and private entities via the malware “NotPetya” on June 27. The attack effectively destabilized many Ukrainian government networks marking the largest cyber attack in Ukraine’s history. The SBU also implicated Russian-backed elements in the assassinations of two top Ukrainian intelligence officers on June 27 and 28. Russia continued its attempts to drive a wedge between Ukraine and its EU allies. Protest participants claimed that Russia-backed elements paid them to instigate anti-Polish Ukrainian nationalist protests at the Polish embassy in Kyiv on July 7. Ukrainian and Polish officials recently accused Russia of conducting additional similar schemes in an effort to inflame nationalist tensions between Poland and Ukraine. The Kremlin’s proxies in Eastern Ukraine continued to conduct offensive operations against Ukraine’s Armed Forces in violation of the Minsk II ceasefire agreements.  The Kremlin’s extensive collection of low-visibility tools, designed to conceal its ongoing campaign to destabilize and eventually remove Ukraine’s pro-Western government, will continue to pose a serious threat Ukraine’s stability and sovereignty if Kyiv’s Western partners do not support efforts to counter them.

Iran and Al Qaeda Exploit Syria Ceasefire

By Genevieve Casagrande

Key Takeaway: The U.S., Russia, Jordan “de-escalation zone” in Southwest Syria advances the interests of U.S. enemies and adversaries, including Iran and al Qaeda. The U.S. likely sought to leverage the agreement to drive a wedge within the Russo-Iranian Coalition, while reducing violence and testing a potential partnership with Russia to improve security in Syria. The deal has temporarily reduced violence, but at great cost to long-term U.S. interests in Syria. The Russo-Iranian coalition is exploiting the agreement to consolidate in the south. Al Qaeda will likewise leverage the deal and the recent cut to U.S. support to vetted Syrian opposition groups to preserve and expand its influence in Southern Syria.

The de-escalation zone brokered by the U.S., Russia, and Jordan does not meaningfully constrain Iranian build up in Southern Syria and along the Golan Heights. The deal is rumored to include an “exclusionary zone” that requires Iranian and other non-Syrian forces to maintain a 30-40 KM distance from the Jordanian border. Iran and Hezbollah flaunted a large re-deployment away from frontlines in Dera’a City immediately after the de-escalation zone went into effect on July 9 in order to falsely demonstrate Iranian commitment to such an exclusionary zone to the United States. Most of the pro-Iranian forces relocated to areas just outside the exclusionary zone – including in the town of Sanamayn located approximately 50 KM from the Jordanian border – and to areas just outside Dera’a City, such as Athman. Hezbollah and other pro-Iranian forces retained many of their longstanding positions within the de-escalation zone and likely maintain some latent forces within Dera’a City, itself. Notably, the deal did not affect the historic pro-Iranian build up on the Golan Heights, a concern voiced by Israel in the weeks following the ceasefire. Iranian and pro-regime capabilities in the south remain largely unchanged. These local re-deployments and troop rotations still allow for Iran to quickly re-deploy to frontlines against anti-Assad forces as necessary.

The de-escalation zone agreement secures the freedom of movement of Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime at the expense of U.S. partners. The deal has allowed Iran to temporarily shift assets away from previously contested frontlines like Dera’a City to reinforce other active fronts against the U.S. and partnered forces. Pro-Iranian and regime forces with Russian air support launched operations against historically U.S.-backed opposition groups in Northern Suwayda and Eastern Rif Dimashq Provinces following the start of the ceasefire. The deal has freed up the pro-Assad coalition to continue to further project force into Eastern Syria. Pro-regime forces backed by Russia and Iran advanced to the outskirts of Sukhna along the ground line of communication (GLOC) between Palmyra and Deir ez Zour City on July 28. Iran, Assad, and Russia seek to reopen this GLOC to besieged regime-held areas of Deir ez Zour. These advances would ultimately constrain the freedom of action of the U.S.-led Anti-ISIS coalition in Eastern Syria and could block further advances by the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) along the Euphrates River Valley.

Russian build up along the frontline stands to deepen the Russo-Iranian coalition’s penetration in Southern Syria. The deal lacks a legitimate, neutral enforcement mechanism and primarily relies upon Russian, Chechen, and Ingush forces to guarantee the agreement along the line of contact between regime and opposition forces. Russia cannot and will not restrain Iran and Assad. Russia deployed hundreds of military police including Ingush units to man observation points along the line of contact. The Russian force is positioned to protect -- not push back -- Iranian positions within this zone.

The ceasefire deal allows al Qaeda to preserve its strength and expand its influence in Southern Syria. Al Qaeda had begun to reinvigorate its campaign to transform the Syrian opposition in its own image prior to the declaration of the de-escalation zone. Al Qaeda dispatched approximately thirty senior officials to Southern Syria in May 2017. Al Qaeda likely seeks to replicate its recent success in Idlib Province in the South. The ceasefire deal will provide Al Qaeda with time and space to further network itself within the opposition, including through local governance and security structures. U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to halt some covert support to vetted opposition groups in Western Syria will only accelerate al Qaeda’s potential rise in the south. Syrian rebels have expressed dissatisfaction over U.S. demands to abandon the fight against President Assad and decreased U.S. support to rebels. Al Qaeda will exploit these grievances and attempt to fill the vacuum. Al Qaeda will position itself to eventually spoil the agreement, but will do so in a timeframe that supports its own interests.

Special credit to Matti Suomenaro and Sana Sekkarie for their research contributions to this publication.

Syria Situation Report: June 7 - 29, 2017

By ISW Syria Team and Syria Direct

This series of graphics marks the latest installments of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. These graphics depict significant developments in the Syrian Civil War from June 7 to June 29, 2017. The control of terrain represented on the graphics is accurate as of June 15 or June 22, 2017.

Special credit to Matti Suomenaro and Sana Sekkarie of the Institute for the Study of War for their contributions to the text and graphics of this series of Syria SITREP Maps.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: Pre- and Post-Ceasefire

By Genevieve Casagrande and Ellen Stockert

The Russian military is reshaping its air campaign in Syria in order to compel the U.S. into partnering with Russia, which cannot destroy jihadists, roll back Iran, or set conditions for a desirable settlement to the war. Russia prioritized airstrikes against ISIS in Homs, eastern Hama, and Deir ez Zour Provinces in support of the Bashar al Assad regime from June 8 – July 16. Russia also conducted a series of high-profile strikes, including long-range strategic bombing runs from Russia and cruise missiles launched from the Eastern Mediterranean against ISIS between May and July 2017. Russia de-prioritized its air campaign against the Syrian opposition in June and early July as part of an effort to encourage the U.S. to accept Russia’s proposal for a “de-escalation zone” in Southwest Syria. The U.S. later agreed to the de-escalation zone agreement on July 7 following a meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russia is disguising its strategic intent by masquerading as a reliable counterterrorism partner for the U.S. in Syria. President Trump’s reported decision to end support for some anti-Assad opposition fighters will likely only encourage Putin to seize greater control over the conflict and continue rolling back U.S. influence in the country.

The ‘de-escalation zone’ deal has further secured Russia’s freedom of action to support Iran and Bashar al Assad’s campaign. Russia has consistently used ceasefires in Syria to temporarily shift and reorient resources elsewhere in the theater. The U.S.-Russia-Jordan ceasefire is no exception. The deal has freed up Russian resources to surge airstrikes in support of pro-regime operations to disrupt the U.S. and its partner forces in Eastern Syria under the guise of fighting ISIS. Pro-regime forces with support from Russian airstrikes launched operations against U.S.-backed groups in Northern Suwayda and Eastern Rif Dimashq Provinces from July 8 – 10 amidst the start of the ceasefire, reportedly seizing over a “dozen” small villages and positions from rebels in the area. Russia has likewise surged strikes in support of pro-regime forces near Palmyra and Deir ez Zour. This shift seeks to constrain U.S. operations and provide leverage for Russia in future negotiations over a potential second ceasefire in Eastern Syria. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. The graphic likely under-represents the extent of the locations targeted in Eastern Syria, owing to a relative lack of activist reporting from that region.

High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.

The Campaign for Ar-Raqqa City: June 20 – July 17, 2017

By Christopher Kozak

The U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) achieved small but significant gains against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City between June 20 and July 17. The SDF completed its full encirclement of Ar-Raqqa City on June 29 after seizing a number of villages on the southern bank of the Euphrates River. Operation Inherent Resolve Commander Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend stressed that the maneuver emplaced a “physical band” that would “prevent escape or reinforcement” by ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City. The SDF later breached the heavily-fortified Old City of Ar-Raqqa on July 3 after coalition airstrikes destroyed two twenty-five meter sections of the historic Rafiqah (Old City) Walls. These breaches enabled partner forces on the ground to avoid pre-positioned ISIS defenses at existing channels through the wall, including prepared direct and indirect fire zones, land mines, IEDs, and SVBIEDs. The SDF simultaneously continued to secure incremental gains along both the eastern and western axes of Ar-Raqqa City.

The battle for Ar-Raqqa City nonetheless stands to protract over the next several months. The SDF has reportedly encountered intensified resistance and “better-emplaced defenses” over the past four weeks following initial rapid gains in districts on the outskirts of Ar-Raqqa City. ISIS has extensively leveraged innovative tools to slow coalition advances, including drone-borne munitions and a new type of motion-activated IED. The SDF has struggled for over a month to penetrate one “significant defensive IED belt” on the northern outskirts of Ar-Raqqa City. The SDF must also contend with continued pressure to protect and evacuate the estimated 30,000 to 50,000 civilians that remain trapped in Ar-Raqqa City. These challenges have been exacerbated by the poor combat performance of elements of the Syrian Arab Coalition of the SDF. Most clearing operations are reportedly led by the Syrian Kurdish YPG while allied Sunni Arabs – often suffering from lower standards of training, equipment, and motivation – serve as the rear holding force. ISIS has exploited these seams to mount successful local counteroffensives against several districts originally cleared by the Syrian Kurdish YPG. These failures highlight future problems likely to be faced by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition in the establishment of a reliable local holding force such as the Raqqa Internal Security Forces.

Russia's Mediterranean Threat to NATO

By Charles Frattini III and Genevieve Casagrande

Key Takeaway: Russian President Vladimir Putin is establishing a long-term military presence in the Mediterranean Sea in part to contest the United States’ ability to operate freely and hold NATO’s southern flank at risk.[1] Russia’s military has deployed approximately 15 naval vessels as part of a permanent Mediterranean Task Force (MTF) as of July 5, 2017.[2] Russia secured long-term naval basing for the MTF in Tartous, Syria in January 2017 after signing a bilateral agreement with the Bashar al Assad regime that extends the previous lease on the Russian Naval Facility for the next 49 years.[3]

Russian warships from the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s MTF launched two series of Kalibr cruise missile strikes against ISIS positions in Syria on May 31 and June 23.[4] The MTF’s June 23 strikes included coordinated fixed wing airstrikes.[5] This strike highlighted Russia’s ability to execute a combined arms assault utilizing forward observation positions on land, strategic assets from the sea, and follow-on strikes from the air within an active combat zone. The increasing complexity of Russia’s coordinated strikes is indicative of Moscow’s dedication to the development and modernization of its military and to showcasing its arsenal for multiple audiences. Putin is exploiting the Syrian war to test Russia’s newest naval assets and weaponry in combat, including the P-800 Onyx supersonic anti-ship missiles.[6] The MTF will continue to receive the Russian Navy’s most advanced warships outfitted with Russia’s intermediate- and long-range land and ship attack cruise missiles. Russian officials have claimed that the MTF has also conducted a variety of operational and logistical naval exercises near the Libya and Egyptian coasts.[7] Russia, which is in a strategic coalition with Iran, will continue to utilize the MTF to expand Russian military influence along the Mediterranean basin, while simultaneously increasing the risk to U.S. freedom of maneuver in the Middle East and North Africa.[8] Russia’s growing naval capabilities, partnerships, and future basing expansion could threaten major global maritime trade chokepoints, including the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Bab al Mandab Strait, in the long term.[9]

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[1] John W. Miller and Fredrick W. Kagan, “The New Cold War in the Mediterranean,” Fox News, February 17, 2016, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2016/02/17/new-cold-war-in-mediterranean.html

[2] “Russia’s Mediterranean Group Incorporates Fifteen Black Sea Fleet Ships,” TASS Russian News Agency, June 01, 2017 http://www.tass(.)com/defense/948989 ; Russian naval deployments to MTF after June 1, 2017: SB-739 Tugboat, [“The Black Sea Fleet’s New Rescue Tugboat Began to Perform Tasks in the Mediterranean Sea”], Russian Ministry of Defense, June 28, 2017, http://www.function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12131320@egNews ; Vasily Tatishchev Reconnaissance Ship, “Russian Navy Reconnaissance Ship Deployed off Syria,” Interfax, June 26, 2017, http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=762557 ; Redeployment of Admiral Essen Frigate, “Admiral Essen Frigate to Join Russian Mediterranean Grouping-source,” TASS Russian News Agency, July 9, 2017, http://www.tass(.)com/defense/955483

[3] Rod Nordland, “Russia Signs Deal for Syria Bases; Turkey Appears to Accept Assad,” New York Times, January 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/20/world/middleeast/russia-turkey-syria-deal.html

[4] “Russian Cruise Missiles Hit Terrorist Targets Near Palmyra,” TASS Russian News Agency, May 31, 2017, http://www.tass(.)com/defense/948581 ; “Russian Warships C Cruise Missiles, Destroy IS Arms Depots in Syria.” TASS Russian News Agency, June 23, 2017, http://www.tass(.)com/defense/95298

[5] Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Facebook Page, June 23, 2017, https://www.facebook.com/1492252324350852/videos/vb.1492252324350852/1944936562415757/?type=3&theater ; Ellen Stockert and the ISW Syria Team, “Russia’s Maneuvers in Syria: May 1 – June 7, 2017,” Institute for the Study of War, June 2017. Publication available upon request.

[6] Genevieve Casagrande and Kathleen Weinberger, “Putin’s Real Syria Agenda,” Institute for the Study of War, March 2017. Publication available upon request.

[7] Sharkov, Damien, “Russia Set for Rocket Fire Off Libya, Coast, U.S. FAA Warns,” Newsweek, July 5, 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/russia-set-rocket-fire-libya-us-faa-warns-610943 ; [“Russia Warns about its Fleet Live-Fire Training off the Coast of Libya”], RBC Information Systems, May 17, 2017, http://www.rbc(.)ru/politics/17/05/2017/591b90c09a7947e06e8652e0 ; “Russia’s Black Sea Fleet Holds Drills in the Mediterranean,” TASS Russian News Agency, May 23, 2017, http://www.tass(.)com/defense/947124 ; “Russian Warships Conduct Anti-Sub Drills in Mediterranean,” Al Defaiya Arabian Defense and Aerospace Business, May 30, 2017, http://www.defaiya.com/news/Regional%20News/MENA/2017/05/30/russian-warships-conduct-anti-sub-drills-in-mediterranean; [“Russia closed the area off the coast of Libya to carry out missile strikes”], Lenta, May 17, 2017, https://lenta(.)ru/news/2017/05/17/po_komu_priletit/

[8] Putin, Vladimir and Rogozin, Dmitry, et al.,“Russian Federation Marine Doctrine,” President of Russia Website, July 26 2015, http://en.kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/50060 ; Christoper Kozak, “The Strategic Conversion of Russia and Iran,” Institute for the Study of War, February 2017. Publication available upon request.

[9] Jennifer Cafarella, Kimberly Kagan, and Frederick W. Kagan, “U.S. Grand Strategy: Destroying ISIS and al Qaeda, Report Four – America’s Way Ahead in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War and Critical Threats Project, March 2017 ; Genevieve Casagrande, “Russia Moves to Supplant U.S. Role,” Institute for the Study of War and Critical Threats Project, March 2017. Publications available upon request.

ISIS Sanctuary: July 18, 2017

By Alexandra Gutowski, Jessa Rose Dury-Agri, and Jessica Lewis McFate

ISW is issuing a correction to the map published on July 10, 2017. The three corrections are circled as changes on this version. ISW removed ISIS’s control zone in eastern Qalamoun, northeast of Damascus. ISIS retreated from this zone on 25 MAY 2017. ISW expanded ISIS’s control zone east of Tel Afar, west of Mosul. ISIS held this terrain from 2014 onward, which ISW had under-represented historically. ISW refined an estimate for ISIS’s support zones in Idlib province. ISIS re-infiltrated Idlib province in 2015, in conjunction with its loss of critical border crossings in Aleppo and Raqqa provinces. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and other al-Qaeda linked groups are presently attempting to disrupt ISIS’s operations in Idlib.

The Campaign for Mosul: May 12-June 21, 2017

By: Jessa Rose Dury-Agri and the ISW Iraq Team

ISIS is conducting spectacular attacks on security services, civilians, and symbolic sites in order to detract from Mosul and Ninewa Province operations and to prevent the emergence of a stable post-ISIS state. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) recaptured 12 neighborhoods in northwest Mosul, tightening the noose around ISIS in Mosul’s Old City. ISIS responded with attacks to the north, south, and west of the Old City on June 14. An estimated 100,000 civilians remain trapped in ISIS-held areas of the city. ISF created evacuation routes, however, ISIS militants have shot or executed civilians attempting to flee. ISIS also destroyed al-Nuri Great Mosque on June 21. ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the “caliphate” from this mosque in 2014.

ISIS seeks to undermine ISF morale and devastate Mosul’s infrastructure, thereby diminishing the value of the city’s liberation and prospects for post-ISIS governance and security. The 15th Iraqi Army Division cleared areas west of Mosul near Mount Badush in its advance toward ISIS-held Tel Afar. Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) meanwhile began surrounding Qayrawan on May 13, and had reached the Syrian border by June 2. The operation included seizing Baaj, Baghdadi's former safe haven, on June 4. ISIS countered these gains by launching ground attacks on Hatra, south and west of Shirqat, Mount Badush, and near the Iraq-Syria border. Iran played a prominent role in the operations; senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps commander Shaaban Nassiri died in clashes near Baaj on May 27 and Lebanese Hezbollah commander Abd al-Hamid Mahmoud Shari died near Qayrawan on June 2. Iran seeks to hinder U.S. freedom of maneuver along the Iraq-Syria border by maintaining a border presence and shaping post-Mosul security in Iraq. It may also hope to position its proxies to lead Hawijah’s recapture rather than U.S.-backed forces.

The Campaign for Ar-Raqqa City: June 6 – 20, 2017

By Christopher Kozak and ISW Syria Team

The U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) began operations to clear ISIS from Ar-Raqqa City in Northern Syria on June 6. This urban combat phase marks the culmination of successful shaping operations conducted over the last eight months to isolate Ar-Raqqa City under Operation Euphrates Wrath. These operations included the seizure of the Tabqa Dam in Western Ar-Raqqa Province on May 10. Ar-Raqqa City is currently isolated along its three axes with only limited water traffic to the south across the Euphrates River. The fight for the city will nonetheless prove difficult. ISIS retains at least 2,500 fighters in the city behind an elaborate system of berms, tunnels, improvised explosive devices, and other defenses “very similar” to its posture in Mosul, Iraq. ISIS’s forces are intermingled with an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 civilians, raising the complexity and requirements of ongoing clearing operations. ISIS has thus far mounted a kinetic defense, ceding some outlying districts in favor of raids, ambushes, sleeper cells, and suicide attacks as the group falls back towards the dense urban core of Ar-Raqqa City. The capability of the SDF – a coalition of irregular forces dominated by the Syrian Kurdish YPG – to sustain its offensive and overcome these challenges remains doubtful despite expansive support from the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition.

The campaign for Ar-Raqqa City also faces significant challenges beyond the urban fight. Continued U.S. support to the YPG risks alienating local Sunni Arabs whose support will be required to secure and govern the city over the long term against the threat posed by ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other Salafi-Jihadist groups. The local population’s long-standing ethnic and political grievances will not be addressed by the participation of Sunni Arabs in the Syrian Arab Coalition (SAC) or Raqqa Civilian Council – both of which locals view as mere puppets of the YPG in Northern Syria. The decision to back the YPG in Ar-Raqqa City also furthers a widening divide between the U.S. and Turkey in Syria. Turkey views with deep suspicion the institutional links between the YPG and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization that is currently waging an active insurgency in Southern Turkey. Turkish President Recep Erdogan mounted a failed lobbying campaign to convince both U.S. President Donald Trump and former U.S. President Barack Obama to halt their support for the SDF in Northern Syria in favor of opposition groups backed by Turkey. Turkey retains the capability to launch a major cross-border intervention against the YPG along the Syrian-Turkish Border - particularly at the border town of Tel Abyad in Northern Ar-Raqqa Province. Turkey nonetheless will likely eschew any intervention over the near term and instead hope that the YPG weakens itself through a sustained engagement in Ar-Raqqa City. The Russo-Iranian Coalition also remains poised to exploit any setbacks suffered by the SDF in Ar-Raqqa City. Forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad advanced into regions directly abutting the SDF in Tabqa in Western Ar-Raqqa Province on June 13. The U.S. later shot down a Syrian Arab Air Force fighter jet after the aircraft dropped munitions near positions held by the SDF near Tabqa on June 18. Russia, Iran, and Assad likely intend to block further gains by the SDF near Ar-Raqqa City as part of a wider effort to constrain the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition in Eastern Syria that began in May 2017.

ISIS ultimately will not suffer a fatal blow in Ar-Raqqa City. Intelligence officials and local activists report that the group has already relocated the majority of its leadership, media, chemical weapons, and external attack cells south of Ar-Raqqa City to the town of Mayadin in Deir ez-Zour Province in Eastern Syria. The SDF and U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition as well as the Russo-Iranian Coalition both cannot easily access this terrain – located deep along the Euphrates River Valley – with their current force posture. ISIS stands to retain safe haven for the indefinite future despite the loss of its ‘de facto’ capital. The fall of Ar-Raqqa City will be symbolic – but it will not be decisive.  

Iraq Control of Terrain Map: June 16, 2017

By the ISW Iraq Team

Iraqi Shi’a militias in the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) recaptured most of the populated areas of the Ninewa desert areas, concluding operations in western Ninewa Province on June 10. The PMU also recaptured al-Baaj, a former safe haven for ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, on June 4. The PMU will likely refit and turn their attention towards clearing the rest of the Iraq-Syria border in Ninewa Province towards al-Qa’im in western Anbar Province. The PMU push could threaten the U.S.’s ability to operate along the Iraq-Syria border area by positioning Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias proximate to U.S. areas of interest along the Euphrates River Valley. The PMU may also position significant assets towards the ISIS-held Hawija Pocket to pressure the ISF to recapture Hawija with the PMU. The PMU’s recent statements about preparing for Hawija Operations, likely under the Badr Organization-controlled “East Dijla Operations Command,” suggest that they will allocate forces towards Hawija in the near future.

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continue to fight to clear ISIS from western Mosul and the Old City amid fierce ISIS resistance. Political challenges surrounding the composition of forces continues to stall the Tal Afar operation, as Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias continue to desire a role in clearing the city, which Turkey and the U.S. oppose. The ISF will likely clear Tal Afar after recapturing Mosul once the completion of Mosul operations frees up manpower for additional clearing operations. Meanwhile, the 9th Iraqi Army Armored Division continued clearing operations west of Mosul, recapturing most of the ISIS-held towns near Mount Badush and the Badush Dam and Prison areas in March 2017 and making slow progress towards Tal Afar from the east.

The map reflects adjustments to the Hawija Pocket control assessment in the March 2017 iteration of the map based on a reevaluation of previous operations; no forward progress against ISIS has been made in that area since March 2017.