ISW Fall 2017 Internships

Applications for Fall 2017 internships at the Institute for the Study of War are now being accepted. You may submit your application immediately. We will consider applications on a rolling basis until all positions are filled. We will begin considering applications immediately. 

For all positions, we greatly prefer full-time availability although part-time interns may also be accepted depending on qualifications. 

All internships are unpaid. ISW does not sponsor visas of any kind for international students. 

The fall start dates will be in late August and early September.

To submit your application, please email your cover letter, resume, a brief writing sample (5 pages maximum, excerpts from longer pieces are acceptable), and unofficial transcript to internships@understandingwar.org.

Please format the subject line of your email: FIRST NAME LAST NAME

Please submit all documents in pdf form and submit your resume and cover letter as one document. Documents submitted in word format will NOT BE CONSIDERED. 

Please only submit one application – if you are interested in multiple positions, please list them in rank order at the top of your cover letter. Please also list these in rank order at the top of your email submission. 

Why work for ISW: ISW believes ground realities must drive the formulation of strategy and policy. In pursuit of this principle, ISW conducts detailed, open-source intelligence analysis to provide the most accurate information on current conflicts and security threats. We offer interns a chance to train on work with cutting-edge technologies employed in business and in the intelligence community. Interns at ISW will have an unparalleled opportunity to conduct research that directly informs policy-makers on some of the most pressing issues facing American national security. Our interns work directly with analysts and have many opportunities to engage with Institute leadership on the subjects of their research. ISW offers its interns to be at the front lines of military research and policy, tackling the issues that are in the headlines. ISW has published the work of its interns and hired many onto its staff.

Research Internship – Iraq Project

ISW’s Iraq Project is its original, flagship program and has an outstanding history and reputation.  ISW publishes regular research reports on Iraq in order to inform policy makers and journalists in Washington, DC, as well as the general public.  The Iraq program examines the resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the spillover between Iraq and Syria, Iraq’s internal politics, Iraq's military and paramilitary organizations, and Iraq’s foreign relations. Interns will provide critical assistance to our researchers. Interns will be trained to use innovative technologies to assist their research. Interns are expected to conduct research under the guidance of Research Analysts and Assistants; work in conjunction with other members of the research staff to produce research briefs and analysis; assist with editing, documenting, and supporting materials for products of the Institute; assist with the planning, preparation, and execution of public events and private briefings of employees of the Institute; and conduct other activities in support of Institute projects.

Qualifications: The ideal candidate will be a recent graduate or current undergraduate with coursework in a field of study related to ISW's core mission and research agenda. Graduate-level coursework in a related field is a plus. Interns with the ability to read and conduct research in Arabic are highly desired, as is knowledge of Iraq. Candidates should have excellent writing and analytical skills, and the ability to conduct research using social media and other open sources. Ideal candidates should also have the ability to conduct tasks in a timely and efficient manner.  The candidate must also possess an interest in and enthusiasm for ISW’s research agenda and mission.

Iraq Interns report to the Iraq Research Analysts and Research Manager.

Research Internship – Afghanistan Project

ISW’s Afghanistan Project publishes regular research reports on Afghanistan’s security situation and political developments in order to inform policy makers and journalists in Washington, DC, as well as the general public. The Afghanistan program’s Threat Assessment Map examines the Taliban’s operations and campaigns as well as the growth of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in Afghanistan. The program also studies the intricate dynamics of Afghan politics, warlords, and powerbrokers. Interns will provide critical assistance to our researchers. Interns are expected to conduct research under the guidance of the Research Analysts; work in conjunction with other members of the research staff to produce research briefs and analysis; assist with editing, documenting, and supporting materials for products of the Institute; assist with the planning, preparation, and execution of public events and private briefings of employees of the Institute; and conduct other activities in support of Institute projects.

Qualifications: The ideal candidate will be a recent graduate or current undergraduate with coursework in a field of study related to the ISW's core mission and research agenda. Graduate-level coursework in a related field is a plus, as is familiarity with Afghanistan. Candidates should have excellent writing and analytical skills, and the ability to conduct research. Ideal candidates should also have the ability to conduct tasks in a timely and efficient manner.  The candidate must also possess an interest in and enthusiasm for ISW’s research agenda and mission. Interns with the ability to read the Farsi, Dari, or Pashto language and to conduct research in one of those languages are highly desired.

Interns report to the Internship Coordinator and Research Manager.

Research Intern—Syria Project

ISW’s Syria project has become a leading source of innovative analysis and information about the Syrian Civil War. ISW publishes regular research reports and maps on the conflict in Syria in order to inform policy makers and journalists in Washington, DC, as well as the general public. The Syria program examines the dynamics among domestic actors in the Syrian Civil War, including the regime and the opposition; the role of foreign actors in the conflict, particularly Russia and Iran; the activities of ISIS and Al-Qaeda in Syria; and spillover into neighboring states, including Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan. Interns will provide critical assistance to our researchers. Interns will be trained to use innovative technologies to assist their research, as Syrian social media is a key source of information on this conflict. Interns are expected to conduct research under the guidance of Research Analysts; work in conjunction with other members of the research staff to produce research briefs and analysis; assist with editing, documenting, and supporting materials for products of the Institute; assist with the planning, preparation, and execution of public events and private briefings of employees of the Institute; and conduct other activities in support of Institute projects.

Qualifications:  The ideal candidate will be a recent graduate or current undergraduate with coursework in a field of study related to the ISW's core mission and research agenda. Graduate-level coursework in a related field is a plus, as is familiarity with Syria. Candidates should have excellent writing and analytical skills, and the ability to conduct research using social media and open sources. Ideal candidates should also have the ability to conduct tasks in a timely and efficient manner. The candidate must also possess an interest in and enthusiasm for ISW’s research agenda and mission. Interns with the ability to read and conduct research in Arabic, Kurdish, Turkish, or Farsi are highly desired.

Syria Interns report to the Research Analysts and Research Manager.

Research Intern—Egypt Security Project

ISW is expanding its research into the conflict in Egypt in order to inform policy makers and journalists in Washington, DC, as well as the general public. The project examines the increasing footprint of ISIS in the Sinai as well as internal political dynamics under Sisi’s rule. Interns will provide critical assistance to our researchers. Interns are expected to conduct research under the guidance of the Research Analysts and Assistants; work in conjunction with other members of the research staff to produce research briefs and analysis; assist with editing, documenting, and supporting materials for products of the Institute; assist with the planning, preparation, and execution of public events and private briefings of employees of the Institute; and conduct other activities in support of Institute projects.

Qualifications:  The ideal candidate will be a recent graduate or current undergraduate with coursework in a field of study related to the ISW's core mission and research agenda. Work or academic experience in Egypt is also a plus. Candidates should have excellent writing and analytical skills, and the ability to conduct research independently. Ideal candidates should also have the ability to conduct tasks in a timely and efficient manner. The candidate must also possess an interest in and enthusiasm for ISW’s research agenda and mission. Arabic language skills are mandatory. 

Egypt interns report to the Internship Coordinator and Research Manager. 

Research Internship – Counterterrorism Team

ISW publishes regular research reports on the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) as well as other terrorist networks in the Middle East in order to inform policy makers and journalists in Washington, DC, as well as the general public. This portfolio focuses upon ISIS’s network inside Iraq and Syria, in the immediate region, and globally, and the research team produces regular maps and reports tracking ISIS’s global campaign. Interns are expected to conduct research under the guidance of Research Analysts and Assistants; work in conjunction with other members of the research staff to produce research briefs and analysis; assist with editing, documenting, and supporting materials for products of the Institute; assist with the planning, preparation, and execution of public events and private briefings of employees of the Institute; and conduct other activities in support of Institute projects.

Qualifications: The ideal candidate will be a recent graduate or current undergraduate with military or intelligence experience and coursework in a field of study related to the ISW's core mission and research agenda. Graduate-level coursework in a related field or demonstrated network analysis experience is a plus. Candidates should have excellent writing and analytical skills, the ability to conduct research, and desire to use technology. Familiarity Palantir or other analytical visualization software platforms is preferred. Ideal candidates should also have the ability to conduct tasks in a timely and efficient manner.  The candidate must also possess an interest in and enthusiasm for ISW’s research agenda and mission. Interns with the ability to read and conduct research in Arabic are highly desired. 

The Counterterrorism Interns will report to the Research Analysts and Research Manager.

Research Internship –Russia and Ukraine Project

ISW’s Russia-Ukraine team focuses on innovative analysis and open-source research on current and potential zones of conflict in Eastern Europe and Eurasia developments in order to inform policy makers and journalists in Washington, DC, as well as the general public. This project utilizes unclassified information on military operations and political actors in order to provide expert, in-depth analysis about security issues affecting the region, including Russian intent and capabilities, the intent and capabilities of the Ukrainian government, the potential for political crisis in Kyiv, and Russia’s ongoing intervention in Syria. Interns will provide critical research and analytical assistance to our team. Interns will be trained to use innovative technologies to assist their research, and to gather information from social media as a key source of information on this conflict in order to assist in this research. ISW will be expanding a series of publications and graphical products to inform policy makers and journalists in Washington, DC, as well as the general public. Interns are expected to conduct research under the guidance of Research Analysts and Assistance; work in conjunction with other members of the research staff to produce research briefs and analysis; assist with editing, documenting, and supporting materials for products of the Institute; assist with the planning, preparation, and execution of public events and private briefings of employees of the Institute; and conduct other activities in support of Institute projects.

Qualifications:  The ideal candidate will be a recent graduate or current undergraduate with coursework in a field of study related to the ISW's core mission and research agenda. Graduate-level coursework in a related field is a plus, as is familiarity with Ukraine and/or Russia. Candidates should have excellent writing and analytical skills, and the ability to conduct research using social media and open sources. Ideal candidates should also have the ability to conduct tasks in a timely and efficient manner. The candidate must also possess an interest in and enthusiasm for ISW’s research agenda and mission. Interns with the ability to read and conduct research in Russian or Ukrainian are highly desired.

Russia/Ukraine Interns report to the Ukraine Research Analyst and Research Manager.

Turkish Linguist Internship

The Institute for the Study of War is seeking motivated and experienced university students or recent graduates to fill the position of Turkish Linguist Intern. The linguist will be responsible for reviewing open source data in Turkish to support our various research teams, with a focus on the Syrian conflict and Russo-Turkish relations. The linguist will have the opportunity to collect and analyze data from traditional and social media sources and will be trained to use analytic software to better inform ISW’s already groundbreaking research. The linguist should be a self-starter able to identify critical inflections and trends, but (s)he will also have the opportunity to work under a research team.

Qualifications: The ideal candidate will be a recent graduate or current undergraduate with coursework in a field of study related to ISW's core mission and research agenda. Graduate-level coursework in a related field is a plus. The ability to read and conduct research in Turkish is mandatory. Candidates should have excellent writing and analytical skills, and the ability to conduct research using social media and other open sources. Ideal candidates should also have the ability to conduct tasks in a timely and efficient manner.  The candidate must also possess an interest in and enthusiasm for ISW’s research agenda and mission.

Farsi Linguist Internship

The Institute for the Study of War is seeking motivated and experienced university students or recent graduates to fill the position of Farsi Linguist Intern. The linguist will be responsible for reviewing open source data in Farsi to support our various research teams, with a focus on Iran’s role in the Syria conflict. The linguist will have the opportunity to collect and analyze data from traditional and social media sources and will be trained to use analytic software to better inform ISW’s already groundbreaking research. The linguist should be a self-starter able to identify critical inflections and trends, but (s)he will also have the opportunity to work under a research team.

Qualifications: The ideal candidate will be a recent graduate or current undergraduate with coursework in a field of study related to ISW's core mission and research agenda. Graduate-level coursework in a related field is a plus. The ability to read and conduct research in Farsi is mandatory. Candidates should have excellent writing and analytical skills, and the ability to conduct research using social media and other open sources. The candidate must also possess an interest in and enthusiasm for ISW’s research agenda and mission. Ideal candidates should also have the ability to conduct tasks in a timely and efficient manner. Background knowledge of the Syrian Civil War and Iran’s use of proxies in Syria and Iraq is not mandatory, but also a plus.

Press, Media, and Government Relations Internship

The Institute for the Study of War is seeking motivated and experienced university students or recent graduates to fill the position of Press, Media, and Government Relations Intern. 

The Press, Media, and Government Relations Intern is responsible for assisting the External Relations Department with updating ISW’s press and media tracker (excel document), and helping to create material for a monthly newsletter. The Press, Media, and Government Relations Intern will help assist the External Relations Director with press inquiries including inquiries from major media news outlets including and not limited to CNN, The Wall Street Journal, Fox News, and The New York Times. The Press, Media, and Government Relations intern will contribute heavily to ISW’s mission of providing timely and accurate information to policy-makers and war fighters. Among other duties, the Press, Media, and Government Relations intern will be actively involved with developing ISW’s outreach lists, coordinating events, and producing collateral outreach materials.

Qualifications: Candidates must be motivated, organized university students or recent graduates with coursework in a related field.  They should have experience with the MS Office including Word, Excel, and PowerPoint.   Experience handling phone calls and responding to external inquiries is preferred though not required.  Familiarity with international and national security topics is a plus.  The applicant must possess excellent writing and editing capabilities. Exceptional candidates will have commitment and interest in ISW's core mission and values.

 The Press, Media, and Government Relations intern will report to the Director of External Relations.

Development and Event Management Internship

The Institute for the Study of War is seeking a highly-motivated, organized, and creative university student or recent graduate to fill the position of Development and Event Management Intern for the 2017 Fall Semester. This position assumes responsibility for assisting the Development Director and President in initiating, implementing, and monitoring ISW’s development initiatives and strategic partnerships. The Intern will play an important role in helping plan and coordinate ISW’s two major hallmark events: ISW’s Annual Security Conference in Washington D.C. and the President’s Circle Dinner in New York. These events gather policy makers at the forefront of national security debate. The Intern will also assist with the mission-critical tasks of researching and developing potential strategic partnerships; drafting communications to prospective and current donors; developing new marketing materials; maintaining records and database information; and assisting the Development Director with tasks as required.

This position offers a unique opportunity for individuals with excellent communication skills and an interest in business development to enhance their credentials and gain valuable marketing, business planning and strategy experience. It is the perfect opportunity for individuals who want to learn more about working for a non-profit, as well as the intelligence, defense and think-tank communities, and are looking to make an over-size impact on a growing and dynamic organization!

Qualifications: Current students or recent graduates with an interest in national security, non-profit management, event planning, and/or marketing are encouraged to apply. Strong candidates will also have a commitment to and interest in ISW’s mission.

The Intern will report to the Development Director.

Presidential Internship

The Institute for the Study of War is seeking motivated, experienced, and creative university students or recent graduates to fill the position of Presidential Intern.The Presidential Intern is responsible for assisting the President of the Institute for the Study of War, Dr. Kimberly Kagan, with a range of responsibilities in non-profit management. Past interns to the president have conducted research projects, designed electronic material for publication, assisted with event coordination, and participated in development events. The Presidential Intern will have the ability to work across different teams as well as attend some briefings and meetings with Dr. Kagan. The Presidential Intern directly assists Dr. Kagan on a daily basis and must be able to juggle responsibilities as well as be very organized and task oriented.Candidates must be motivated and mature university students or recent graduates with coursework in a field related to national security, international relations, or history. Familiarity with international and national security topics is required.  They should have experience with the MS Office including Word, Excel, and PowerPoint. Experience with InDesign and Adobe Creative Suite is a plus as well. The successful applicant will possess excellent writing and editing capabilities and have commitment and interest in ISW's core mission and values.

ISIS’s Global Campaign Remains Intact

By Jennifer Cafarella and Melissa Pavlik

ISIS’s first attack in Iran punctuated two stark realities: the group’s annual Ramadan campaign is alive while the US-led anti-ISIS campaign is on a path to failure. ISIS surges attacks every year during Ramadan in order to gain or increase momentum in its global campaign to maintain its declared caliphate, expand across the Muslim world, and win an apocalyptic war with the West. ISIS has conducted successful attacks in three new countries this year – the United Kingdom, the Philippines, and Iran – and will likely pull off more before the Muslim holy month is over. The jihadist group has sustained a global insurgency despite the considerable military pressure it faces in Iraq and Syria.

ISIS has been waging its global campaign in four separate “rings” since 2014. First, ISIS is defending and attempting to remain in and expand its territorial control in its “core terrain” in Syria and Iraq. Second, ISIS seeks to weaken the Middle East’s power centers of Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Third, ISIS is expanding in other Muslim majority countries through attack networks and, when possible, ground operations. Fourth, ISIS is conducting spectacular attacks in the non-Muslim majority world, or the “far abroad,” in order to polarize those communities and radicalize their minority Muslim populations. ISIS’s Ramadan surges set conditions in these rings, varying its main effort based on its circumstances and the capabilities in Iraq and Syria and of its networks abroad.

ISIS’s first Ramadan surges in 2012, 2013 and 2014 kick started its resurgent campaigns to seize vast swaths of terrain in Iraq and Syria and declare the caliphate. ISIS continues to strike offensively against anti-ISIS forces in Iraq and Syria each Ramadan. ISIS began its campaigns in the “far abroad” and Muslim world as early as late 2013, when the ISIS external operations wing in Syria began to recruit, train, and deploy foreign fighters to conduct spectacular attacks in Europe and across the Middle East and North Africa. In 2014, ISIS sent senior operatives to Libya and Sinai in order to cultivate new affiliates. ISIS’s success in the Muslim world in 2014 enabled it to recognize formal affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Russia’s Caucasus, Nigeria, and Yemen before Ramadan 2015. ISIS did so in order to “remain” in Iraq and Syria and “expand” by creating resilience globally to counter pressure.

The main effort of ISIS’s Ramadan campaigns became the Muslim world and “far abroad” in 2015, after reaching its apex in Iraq and Syria by seizing the cities of Ramadi and Palmyra shortly beforehand. ISIS surged its campaign in the Muslim world, including spectacular attacks at a beach resort in Tunisia and a Shi’a mosque in Kuwait while continuing to deploy attack cells into Europe. ISIS struck a wide variety of targets across the Muslim world and the “far abroad” in 2016, including successful attacks in Bangladesh, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. The same year a terrorist pledging allegiance to ISIS’s leader attacked a nightclub in Orlando, Florida, shortly after the beginning of Ramadan.

ISIS is expanding its reach even further this Ramadan, which began on May 26. ISIS conducted two near-simultaneous, complex, coordinated attacks against symbolic targets in Iran’s capital on June 7. These attacks are a major inflection point that signals growing capability in the second ring of strong Muslim states. ISIS is also gaining momentum in Southeast Asia, part of its third ring, where it launched a major ground offensive in the Philippines, seizing a city and defending it against a counter-offensive by Philippine security forces. ISIS also conducted its first successful suicide attack in the UK, a priority target in the majority non-Muslim fourth ring. This attack suggests ISIS has a growing network in Europe despite increasing European counterterrorism efforts. Other ISIS attack cells have been thwarted in areas with ISIS networks including Spain, Tunisia, and Russia. ISIS has continued to conduct a Ramadan surge in Iraq, though security forces have thwarted some of its attacks.

The scope of ISIS’s current global Ramadan campaign, its continuity with past campaigns, and its resilience within Iraq and Syria demonstrates that the US has failed to contain ISIS or to reclaim the initiative, much less destroy the organization. Secretary of Defense James Mattis has said America’s goals against ISIS are to “crush ISIS’s claims of invincibility, deny ISIS a geographic haven from which to hatch murder, eliminate ISIS ability to operate externally, and eradicate their ability to recruit and finance terrorist operations.” Current US-led operations in Syria and Iraq will not accomplish these objectives. These operations amount to chasing the ISIS external attack cell around the battlefield through successive linear, tactical assaults that tie up our military capability without achieving decisive results. The ISIS external attack cell has now moved from Raqqa, the main effort of U.S.-backed operations, to southeastern Syria near the Iraqi border, an area where America’s ground partners cannot now project force.

ISIS is globalizing its external attack capability in order to endure even a total loss of its terrain in Iraq and Syria, which even today extends beyond Mosul and Raqqa, respectively. ISIS is deliberately “[fostering] interconnectedness among its scattered branches, networks, and supporters, seeking to build a global organization,” according to an assessment released by the anti-ISIS coalition in March 2017. The US has increased the tempo of operations against high-value ISIS operatives, but has not disabled the external operations cell. ISIS has shifted to mobilizing prospective fighters in place rather than bringing them to Syria, Iraq, or Libya as foreign fighters. ISIS’s expansion in farther flung areas like Afghanistan and Southeast Asia also generates alternative basing options for command-and-control elements and potential fighting forces.

President Donald Trump’s supposed “acceleration” of the anti-ISIS campaign he inherited from his predecessor has minimally increased the speed of tactical gains in Raqqa and Mosul while doing little to ensure that the U.S. achieves its strategic objectives The liberation of Mosul and Raqqa in 2014 might have defeated the organization, but it no longer suffices. ISIS’s global attack network is now more robust, dispersed, and resilient than ever. ISIS will remain dedicated to its global objectives after Mosul and Raqqa fall and will continue to wage a calculated global campaign. ISIS’s global success generates a momentum for jihadism that will endure even if the US manages to defeat the organization, moreover. Al Qaeda is waiting to pick up the mantle of the global war against the West, and could be even more successful than ISIS. The threat the US faces from jihadism vastly overmatches its current hyper-tactical campaign in Iraq and Syria. The first step in placing the US and its allies back on a path to victory is to recognize that the existing strategy of tactics will not suffice.

Jennifer Cafarella is the Lead Intelligence Planner at the Institute for the Study of War. Melissa Pavlik is a Counter-terrorism Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War.

Russia’s Maneuvers in Syria: May 1 - June 7, 2017

By Ellen Stockert and the ISW Syria Team

Russia has reshaped its military campaign in Syria to constrain the U.S.’s current operations and future options. Russia deprioritized its airstrikes against opposition-held terrain in Western Syria following the announcement of four ‘de-escalation zones’ brokered by Russia, Iran, and Turkey on May 6. Russia claimed this shift was a continuation of its supposed counter-terrorism campaign in Syria. Russia’s actual target for this new operational phase is not ISIS or Al-Qaeda, but rather the U.S. and its partners and allies.

Russia positioned pro-Bashar al-Assad regime forces to disrupt the U.S. in Syria under the guise of anti-ISIS operations. Russian airstrikes supported pro-regime forces in a major offensive in Eastern Aleppo Province that culminated with the seizure of Maskanah - the last urban center held by ISIS in Aleppo Province - on June 4. These gains nonetheless placed the pro-regime coalition on the border between Aleppo and Ar-Raqqa Provinces within 55 miles of Ar-Raqqa City. Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime could use this region as a base to disrupt ongoing U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) operations to seize Ar-Raqqa City from ISIS. Russia similarly reasserted its capabilities with cruise missile strikes against ISIS logistics positions near Palmyra in Eastern Homs Province on May 31. The Russian Navy’s Mediterranean Task Force simultaneously conducted exercises with Russian Marines off the Syrian coast. Russia’s actions in Eastern Aleppo Province, Homs Province, and the Mediterranean demonstrate Russia’s resolve to compete with and undermine U.S. influence throughout Syria.

Russia continued to leverage partnerships with local forces in order to maximize the impact of its air campaign in Syria. Russian airstrikes targeted U.S.-backed opposition groups Jaysh Asoud al Sharqiya and the Ahmed Abdo Martyrs Brigade near the Zaza Junction in the Badia region of Eastern Homs Province on May 31. Pro-regime forces advanced throughout April and May toward the joint U.S.-Syrian opposition base at Tanaf on the Syrian-Iraqi border until U.S. airstrikes on May 18 and halted pro-regime forces from further incursion into an established “de-confliction” zone. The U.S. conducted additional strikes against pro-regime forces near Tanaf on June 6 and June 8. Pro-regime advances near Tanaf could impede U.S. freedom of movement along the Syrian-Iraqi border and deter potential U.S. operations against ISIS launched from Eastern Deir ez-Zour Province. Russia has also resumed air support for pro-regime ground efforts in Dera’a City in Southern Syria despite the ‘de-escalation zone’ agreement brokered by Russia, Iran, and Turkey in Dera’a Province. Pro-regime forces reportedly deployed from Aleppo City and Damascus to Dera’a City between May 29 - 31. Russia and the pro-regime coalition may attempt to use the deployment to Dera’a City to consolidate pro-regime control over Southern Syria and block potential U.S.-Jordanian mobilization along the Syrian-Jordanian border.

Russia also advanced political efforts to constrain potential U.S. action in Syria. Russian officials met with representatives from Iraq, Iran, and the Assad regime in Moscow on May 21 to discuss terrorism and cooperation on Syrian-Iraqi border security. An Iraqi partnership with the Russia-Iran-Assad axis would undermine U.S.-Iraqi relations and open the door to greater Russian influence in Iraq. U.S. and Jordanian officials reportedly met with Russian representatives in Amman, Jordan, to discuss a de-escalation zone along the Syrian-Jordanian border. The expansion of Russian influence along Syria’s borders will put Russia and the U.S. in greater competition in Southern and Eastern Syria. The U.S. risks losing opposition partners and influence by partnering with Russia and must not misconstrue Russian air and missile strikes against ISIS as an indicator of Russian reliability in Syria.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. The graphic likely under-represents the extent of the locations targeted in Eastern Syria, owing to a relative lack of activist reporting from that region.

High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.

Syria Situation Report: June 1 - 8, 2017

By ISW Syria Team and Syria Direct

The U.S. and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) launched operations to seize full control of Ar-Raqqa City from ISIS. The SDF formally announced the start of clearing operations along three axes and later entered an outlying district of Ar-Raqqa City. Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) Commander Lt. Gen. Steve Townsend predicted a “long and difficult fight” for the city but stressed that the offensive would “deliver a decisive blow” to ISIS in Iraq and Syria. ISIS has fortified Ar-Raqqa City to a level similar to Mosul in Northern Iraq with the likely intent to inflict heavy casualties upon the SDF. ISIS has also reportedly redeployed a large portion of its leadership and external attack capabilities to Deir ez-Zour Province in Eastern Syria, limiting the strategic impact of operations against Ar-Raqqa City.

The U.S. demonstrated its continued intent to defend its operations in Southern Syria. The U.S. conducted a second airstrike targeting a pro-regime convoy advancing against opposition groups backed by the U.S. and Jordan at Al-Tanaf on the Syrian-Iraqi Border. The incident follows a similar strike against a pro-regime convoy near Al-Tanaf on 18 MAY. The U.S. stressed that the Anti-ISIS Coalition does “not seek to fight” pro-regime forces but reiterated its willingness to “defend itself” if pro-regime forces fail to depart a “well-established deconfliction zone” in Southern Syria. Russia, Iran, and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad will likely continue to challenge the Anti-ISIS Coalition along the Iraqi-Syrian Border to preempt any long-term expansion by the U.S. in Eastern Syria.

This graphic marks the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. This graphic depicts significant recent developments in the Syrian Civil War. The control of terrain represented on the graphic is accurate as of May 31, 2017.

Syria Situation Report: May 19 - June 1, 2017

By ISW Syria Team and Syria Direct

ISIS launched a wave of spectacular attacks in Western Syria prior to the start of Ramadan on May 26. ISIS detonated one VBIED targeting the majority-Alawite Zahraa District of Homs City on May 23. On the same day, pro-regime forces intercepted two bombers wearing SVESTS near the Shi’a Sayyida Zeinab Shrine in Damascus. ISIS also conducted a double SVEST - IED attack targeting a meeting of Salafi-Jihadist group Ahrar al-Sham in Eastern Idlib Province on May 22. These attacks follow a major ground attack by ISIS against two majority-Ismaili towns in Eastern Hama Province on 18 MAY. The attack wave demonstrates that ISIS retains the capability and intent to intensify its operations against both pro-regime and opposition forces in Western Syria despite its continued withdrawal from large stretches of Southern and Central Syria towards Eastern Syria. 

NATO leaders agreed to formally join the Anti-ISIS Coalition in Iraq and Syria during the NATO Summit in Brussels on May 25. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated that the agreement sends a “strong signal” of “commitment to fight global terrorism” but stressed that the bloc will not “engage in combat operations” against ISIS. NATO will instead expand its "airspace management" and aerial refueling mission for coalition aircraft as well as the deployment of special forces teams to train local partner forces. NATO will also establish a "terrorism intelligence cell" to improve information-sharing on foreign fighters. The decision likely aimed to meet the priorities of U.S. President Donald Trump, who has repeatedly questioned the value of the alliance while stressing the need to expand its counter-terrorism capabilities. The measure remains largely symbolic.

This graphic marks the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. This graphic depicts significant recent developments in the Syrian Civil War. The control of terrain represented on the graphic is accurate as of May 31, 2017.

Russia Lays a Trap in Syria

By Genevieve Casagrande and Ellen Stockert

Russia seeks to use the establishment of “de-escalation zones” to reset its operations and constrain U.S. policy options in Syria. Russia, Turkey, and Iran signed an agreement to establish four de-escalation zones in western Syria on May 4. The agreement intends to preempt the unilateral establishment of “interim zones of stability” by the U.S. in Syria. The de-escalation zone agreement has provided Russia, Iran, and the Bashar al-Assad regime with a period of rest and refit to refocus their efforts in Eastern Syria, particularly in areas where the U.S. is leading operations with Syrian rebels. Russia pivoted its air campaign to focus on ISIS-held terrain in Eastern Syria from May 1 - 18.  Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime likely intend to use the period of de-escalation to disrupt joint U.S.-rebel operations to push north against ISIS in Homs and Deir ez Zour Provinces, while bolstering pro-regime advances against ISIS in both central Homs and eastern Aleppo. Pro-regime forces seized Jirrah Airbase from ISIS in eastern Aleppo Province on May 13 with Russian air support. Pro-regime forces also advanced towards a joint rebel-U.S. base at Tanaf in eastern Homs Province amidst the period of de-escalation. The U.S. responded to the threat against Tanaf by striking pro-regime and Iranian-backed militia forces near the base on May 18, however. 

Russia has also used the de-escalation agreement to reshape its deployment to Syria. Russia claimed to withdraw 30 aircraft from the Bassel al-Assad International Airport in Latakia Province upon signing the de-escalation agreement on May 4. The alleged withdrawal does not represent the degradation of Russian capabilities in Syria, nor does it preclude Russia from conducting airstrikes. Rather, Russia likely seeks to replace particular air assets with alternate air frames and capabilities better suited for the next phase of pro-regime operations in Syria, similar to previous Russian “withdrawals” throughout 2016. Russia reportedly deployed at least 21 M-30 Howitzers and a new shipment of missiles for the advanced S-400 Surface-to-Air Missile System operated by Russia in Syria in early May. Russia also deployed at least one A-50U ‘Mainstay’ Aerial Early Warning and Control Aircraft to Bassel al-Assad International Airport on the Syrian Coast as of May 3. 

Russia deliberately drove fluctuations in the levels of violence in rebel-held Syria in order to compel local and international actors to submit to the Russian-Iranian-Turkish de-escalation zones. Russia escalated and subsequently tapered its air campaign in Syria prior to the Astana Talks in Kazakhstan from May 3 – 4, after which Russia, Turkey, and Iran signed the ‘de-escalation zone’ agreement. Prior to the agreement, Russia intensified its air campaign against mainstream elements of the Syrian opposition, relief providers, and civilian infrastructure such as hospitals in Idlib and Hama Provinces from April 26 – 30. However, Russia subsequently halted its air campaign on the proposed de-escalation zones on May 1 and shifted its focus toward ISIS-held terrain in eastern Syria from May 1 - 18.  The de-escalation zones provided Russia and its Iranian allies with a period of reset to recover following heavy losses in clashes with opposition forces in northern Hama Province throughout April 2017. Pro-regime forces have meanwhile begun to slowly escalate violence within the de-escalation zones, repeatedly violating the agreement with artillery strikes in Dera’a and Hama Provinces. Russia’s continual use of violence to coerce local and international actors to accept agreements that primarily serve Russia, Iran, and Syrian President Bashar al Assad precludes any possibility of a legitimate, Russian-backed ceasefire agreement in Syria.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. The graphic likely under-represents the extent of the locations targeted in Eastern Syria, owing to a relative lack of activist reporting from that region.

High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.

Iraq Situation Report: May 6 - 20, 2017

                                                                  By Jessa Rose Dury-Agri and the ISW Iraq Team

Iran-backed Shia militias set conditions to disrupt or deny U.S.-backed forces freedom of maneuver near the Iraq-Syria border. Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Unit (PMU) forces began clearing territory in western Ninewa Province toward the Syrian border. Iran-backed PMU forces also conducted offensives against ISIS in northern Diyala and Salah al-Din provinces, and defended positions north of the Makhoul Mountains and southwest of Tuz Khurmatu from ISIS ground assaults. ISIS remains operational in eastern Iraq, particularly in Diyala Province, despite clearing operations led by the Badr Organization since late 2014. ISIS also launched attacks in and around Baghdad in the week prior to its annual Ramadan campaign, anticipated to begin on May 26.

Syria Situation Report: May 10 - 18, 2017

By ISW Syria Team and Syria Direct

Russia, Iran, and Syria redeployed forces to constrain the activities of the U.S. in Eastern Syria. Pro-regime forces reportedly deployed hundreds of fighters along the Damascus - Baghdad Highway in Central Syria at the urging of Russia following several weeks of advances in the area by opposition groups backed by the U.S. and Jordan. The U.S. later conducted an airstrike against a pro-regime convoy advancing against opposition groups at Al-Tanaf on the Syrian-Iraqi Border on May 18. Pro-regime forces also seized the Jirah Airbase in Eastern Aleppo Province from ISIS on May 12. These movements suggest that pro-regime forces intend to insert themselves into the campaigns against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City and Deir ez-Zour Province - thereby preempting long-term expansion by the U.S. in Eastern Syria. ISW has previously recommended that the U.S. refocus the campaign against ISIS towards Deir ez-Zour Province as a long-term base for operations against both ISIS and the Russo-Iranian Coalition in Syria. 

The U.S. and Turkey likely failed to overcome their strategic divide during a meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Turkish President Recep Erdogan on May 16. Trump reiterated his support for Turkey in the “fight against terror groups” including as ISIS and the PKK but did not address his recent decision to directly arm the Syrian Kurdish YPG. Erdogan condemned the decision as an “absolutely unacceptable” measure that presented a “clear and present danger” to Turkey. Erdogan also reiterated his calls for the U.S. to extradite exiled cleric Fethullah Gulen. The White House likely offered greater cooperation with Erdogan against the PKK in Turkey and Northern Iraq to mitigate the risk of an imminent rift with Turkey. These efforts nonetheless remain insufficient to reverse the growing strategic divergence between the U.S. and Turkey. 

This graphic marks the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. This graphic depicts significant recent developments in the Syrian Civil War. The control of terrain represented on the graphic is accurate as of May 10, 2017.

Syria Situation Report: April 20 - May 10, 2017

By ISW Syria Team and Syria Direct

Russia, Iran, and Turkey agreed at a new set of Astana Talks on May 3 - 4 to establish four large “de-escalation” zones over opposition-held regions of Western Syria. The deal allows for the three countries to deploy forces along the borders of the “de-escalation zones” to monitor a faltering nationwide ceasefire that excludes all opposition forces “associated” with Al-Qaeda and ISIS in Syria. Activists reported a general decrease in violence except along key frontlines such as Damascus and Northern Hama Province after the deal went into effect on May 6. Russia likely intends to leverage to “de-escalation zones” to subordinate the political process to its objectives, reset its military deployments, and block future unilateral action to implement so-called “zones of stabilization” by the U.S. in Syria. Pro-regime forces will likely also use the relative lull in Western Syria to refocus their military campaign towards Eastern Syria to preempt the U.S. from establishing a long-term foothold in regions formerly held by ISIS in Syria. Conditions on the ground remain unfit for a durable ceasefire or political settlement to end the Syrian Civil War. 

The U.S. signaled its intent to move forward with an imminent offensive to seize Ar-Raqqa City from ISIS that includes the Syrian Kurdish YPG despite clear objections from Turkey. U.S. President Donald Trump signed an order on May 8 authorizing the U.S. Department of Defense to directly provide weapons, ammunition, and other equipment to the YPG “as necessary” in support of upcoming operations against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City. Pentagon Spokesperson Dana White stated that the weapons deliveries will be “limited, mission specific, and metered out incrementally” in order to prevent the transfer of weapons to the PKK in Turkey. The U.S. also floated plans to expand an intelligence fusion center based in Ankara targeting the PKK in Turkey. These efforts remain insufficient to address the security concerns of Turkey. The decision will likely fuel a further breakdown in relations between Turkey and the U.S. that could include new cross-border operations by Turkey against the YPG in Northern Syria. This strategic break will form a core area of disagreement during a face-to-face meeting between Trump and Turkish President Recep Erdogan in Washington D.C. on May 16.

These graphics mark the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. These graphics depict significant recent developments in the Syrian Civil War. The control of terrain represented on the graphics is accurate as of April 3, 2017, and May 10, 2017, respectively.

Ukraine Update: Russia's Active Campaign in Ukraine

By Benjamin Knudsen, Alexandra Lariiciuc, and Franklin Holcomb

Key Takeaway: Russia has continued its destabilization campaign in Ukraine using its proxy forces and other means of subversion. The Trump Administration has indicated it is willing to support Ukraine as the Eastern European country faces Russian aggression. President Trump must act to strengthen the U.S.-Ukraine partnership and increase pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin as part of a broader campaign to deter Russian aggression globally.

U.S. officials emphasized their support for Ukraine in a series of diplomatic meetings in May. U.S. President Donald Trump held separate meetings with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin in Washington on May 10 during which he reportedly stressed “Russia’s responsibility to fully implement the Minsk agreements.” This rhetoric echoes previous statements by Trump administration officials. U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said the U.S. will maintain sanctions against Russia “until Moscow reverses the actions that triggered them.”

Russia nevertheless continued to fuel the war in Ukraine and destabilize the country politically while waging a disinformation campaign to portray Ukraine as the aggressor. Russian-backed separatist forces violated their obligations under the Minsk Ceasefire Agreement. They resumed attacks against Ukrainian forces near the strategic cities of Mariupol, Donetsk, and Popasna following a brief lull for the celebration of Orthodox Easter on April 16. Russia resisted efforts to deploy international peacekeepers in order to preserve its proxies’ freedom of action. Russia also continued to exploit social tensions in Ukraine. Pro-Russia hooligans clashed with pro-Ukrainian activists, nationalists, and law enforcement personnel across Ukraine during Victory Day Celebrations on May 9. These provocations failed to create widespread public discontent, but demonstrate the persistent Russian-backed campaign to destabilize Ukraine from within. Russia also likely continues to try and undermine Ukraine’s relationships with European nations. Unidentified assailants attacked Polish and Lithuanian diplomatic facilities in Lutsk on March 29 and Kyiv on April 24, respectively. Ukrainian and Polish officials previously accused Russia of using similar incidents to drive a wedge between Ukraine and its Eastern European partners.

Ukraine’s government made progress in combating corruption and creating a favorable business environment as it confronts a stagnant economy. President Petro Poroshenko expanded the critical e-declaration system on March 27, through which Ukrainian government officials must publicly reveal their assets. Ukraine also launched a number of corruption investigations into officials in the banking and government sectors. Ukraine’s Ministry of Economic Development and Trade announced that the GDP decreased from projected estimates due to the ongoing conflict. The financial burden from the war has contributed to slow economic growth, which increasingly undermining public confidence in the government.

The U.S. must not only support Ukraine in its economic and political reform efforts, but also take a strong stance against Russia’s aggression. Previous levels of Western pressure have failed to effect a significant change in the Kremlin’s policy toward Ukraine, including in the period since President Trump took office. Russian President Vladimir Putin will likely fuel the war and foment instability until he returns Ukraine under his sphere of influence or until the cost of continued aggression becomes unacceptable. The U.S and its allies must support Kyiv’s efforts to maintain a stable economy, advance political reforms, and strengthen the Armed Forces of Ukraine, or risk growing Russian aggression and subversion in a country and region vital to America’s national interests.

The U.S.-Turkey Divide Beyond Raqqa

By Elizabeth Teoman and Ethan Beaudoin

Key Takeaway: The U.S. should start to reorient its long-term relationship with Turkey during the upcoming meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Turkish President Recep Erdogan on May 16. The U.S. and Turkey suffer from a deep strategic divergence that goes far beyond operational disagreements over the offensive against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City. The U.S. must instead prioritize its remaining leverage on efforts to halt and reverse this mounting divide and reenlist Turkey as a legitimate NATO ally against the threats posed by Salafi-Jihadist Groups and the Russo-Iranian Coalition.

The current friction between the U.S. and Turkey extends beyond operational disagreements over the anti-ISIS operation in Ar-Raqqa City. Turkey’s strategic objectives diverge from those of the U.S. in key ways. Turkish President Recep Erdogan ultimately seeks to reassert Turkey’s status as a regional power throughout the sphere of influence of the former Ottoman Empire. Erdogan promotes the spread of Islamism across the Middle East and North Africa as a means to create governments responsive to him and his Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP). His aspirations drive an independent regional policy that eschews traditional partnerships with the U.S. and Europe. He also leverages tools of the state to consolidate his increasingly authoritarian rule at home. These objectives - and the manner in which he pursues them – undermine the strategic goals of the U.S. in the Middle East and Europe. Erdogan’s distinct brand of ‘Neo-Ottomanism’ leads him to support Salafi-Jihadist Groups such as Ahrar al-Sham that serve as a vector for al Qaeda. His embrace of populist nationalism fuels an active conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is waging an insurgency in Turkey. The PKK’s Syrian branch – the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) – is the primary anti-ISIS ground force partner for the United States. Erdogan’s attempts to forge an independent foreign policy prompt him to pursue superficial yet deepening ties with Russia and Iran.

The U.S.’s myopic focus on the campaign against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City has ignored – and often exacerbated - the growing strategic divergence with Turkey. U.S. President Donald Trump has doubled-down on his predecessor’s preference for an offensive against Ar-Raqqa City led by the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The president authorized the U.S. Department of Defense on May 8 to provide direct material support, including weapons and ammunition, to the YPG despite the long-standing objections of Turkey. This decision subordinates long-term regional stability to short-term military expediency. It increases the risk that the U.S. will fail to secure its objectives because any near-term gains against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City will likely prove ephemeral. The YPG-led SDF will ultimately struggle to provide a political alternative acceptable to a Sunni Arab majority population that will not submit to the YPG’s vision even when it is implemented by other Sunni Arabs. This outcome will create an environment permissive for Salafi-Jihadist groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda. The decision also increases the risk that Turkey will launch cross-border operations targeting the YPG in Northern Syria, particularly against the town of Tel Abyad in Northern Ar-Raqqa Province. The U.S. may attempt to prevent this move - including with new military deployments along the border as well as expanded intelligence sharing against the PKK – but such responses will fail to address Turkey’s fundamental concerns. These efforts also risk expending sources of available leverage that the U.S. could instead use to drive a strategic realignment with Turkey on key issues such as the threats of al Qaeda, the Russo-Iranian coalition, and the wider Turkish-Kurdish War.

The U.S. should act to prevent Turkey from being drawn further into the Russo-Iranian orbit in Syria. Turkey’s cooperation with Russia and Iran is transactional and contingent upon Erdogan’s perceived foreign policy gains. Turkey circumvents the European Union-regulated Southern Gas Corridor through Russian-backed TurkStream in order to transport gas supplies to southern Europe. Turkey also signaled its intent to purchase the S-400 air defense system from Russia as an allegedly more affordable option to NATO member states’ defense systems. Turkey participates in the Russian-led Astana talks as a guarantor in order to legitimize itself as a key actor in the Syrian theater. The December 2016 “cessation of hostilities” deal and the recent announcement of “de-escalation zones” support this effort by reinforcing Turkey’s de facto zones of control in Idlib Province and territorial control seized in Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield.

The U.S. needs to sever the link between Turkey and Salafi-Jihadist groups. Turkey channels its support for anti-regime operations through al Qaeda-aligned opposition groups. Turkey notably supported the “Jaysh al Fatah Operations Room” led by al Qaeda in Syria to seize the city of Idlib in 2015. Turkey included Ahrar al Sham – a Salafi-Jihadist group allied with al Qaeda – in its Operation Euphrates Shield. Turkey also tolerated ISIS’s territorial control along its southern border as an acceptable YPG deterrent. This outreach empowered irreconcilable actors on the ground at the expensive of acceptable opposition groups, blocking any prospect of a legitimate negotiated settlement to the Syrian Civil War. This empowerment also ensures continued safe haven for ISIS, al Qaeda, and other Salafi-Jihadist groups that threaten the U.S. and Europe. The U.S. thus cannot allow Turkey to unilaterally shape governance in Ar-Raqqa City or Northern Syria. The U.S. must over time persuade Turkish leaders that backing al Qaeda linked groups actually threatens Turkey’s interest. Turkey’s backing of al Qaeda-aligned groups exacerbates the risk of domestic terrorism in Turkey, elevates the terror threat to NATO member countries, and even competes with Erdogan’s own quasi-imperial vision of the Middle East.

The U.S. should seek to capitalize on points of short-term cooperation and set conditions to shape a long-term strategic convergence with Turkey against Russia, Iran, and Salafi-Jihadist groups. The U.S. and Turkey still share fundamental strategic objectives and short-term interests. The announced de-escalation zones in Syria benefit the Bashar al-Assad regime and the Russo-Iranian coalition more than advance Turkey’s interests. Both the U.S. and Turkey need to block the expansion of Russian and Iranian military presence in Syria. This deal will enable pro-Assad regime forces to regroup and reset for offensive operations in central and southern Syria, far from Turkey’s area of interest. Turkey is not likely to cede areas of opposition control to fully implement the agreement. The U.S. and Turkey can also cooperate on counter-terrorism operations inside Turkey.    

The U.S. still retains multiple sources of leverage over Turkey outside of Syria. The coordinated use of these levers can support a strategy to bring Turkey back into alignment with the United States. The U.S. can begin to roll back Turkey’s support for Salafi-Jihadist groups by addressing Turkey’s concerns over the YPG’s growing influence in northern Syria and taking tangible steps to pressure the Assad regime. The U.S. can assuage Turkish fears of PKK expansion by supporting operations to remove the PKK from Sinjar, Iraq.  Expanding economic aid could supplement Turkey's capacity to rebuild northern Syria.  Enhanced U.S. military and intelligence cooperation through NATO can bolster the weakened, post-restructuring Turkish Armed Forces that face a growing Russian-Iranian military footprint, provided that Erdogan curbs his post-coup authoritarian crackdown. The U.S. also has a range of counter-terrorism sanctions measures it can use to address the threat posed by al Qaeda-linked networks in Turkey. The U.S. can also pressure Turkey over human rights violations during Erdogan’s crackdown on domestic dissent.

The U.S. needs a broader strategic outlook on cooperation with Turkey. Turkey is an ally rapidly drifting away from the U.S. and Europe. Focusing exclusively or primarily on near-term anti-ISIS gains in Syria will put long-term U.S. strategic interests at grave risk. The Trump Administration must reframe the terms of engagement with Erdogan or risk losing an important NATO partner in Turkey. A Turkey that acts like a NATO ally can be an effective part of a U.S. strategy to destroy Salafi-Jihadist groups and roll back the influence of the Russo-Iranian coalition.

The Campaign for Mosul: April 29-May 11, 2017

By Jessa Rose Dury-Agri and the ISW Iraq Team 

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) surged in northwest Mosul in a bid to clear the city prior to Ramadan, anticipated to begin on May 26. Emergency Response Division (ERD) and Federal Police (FP) units joined 9th and 15^th Iraqi Army Division units in northwest Mosul on April 28. The combined forces recaptured the neighborhoods of Mushairfa and 30 Tamouz, and are fighting to seize the denser neighborhoods of Harmat, 17 Tamouz, and Hawi Kanisa as of publication. Meanwhile, Counter-Terrorism Services (CTS) recaptured three neighborhoods in western Mosul. ISF are unlikely to clear the city prior to Ramadan. ISIS claimed to launch attacks to retake two Old City gates, Bab al-Jadid and Bab al-Toub. ISIS will also continue to defend the Old City by conducting suicide attacks and attempting to draw fire on civilian gatherings. ISIS will concentrate its defenses around al-Nuri Great Mosque, where ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi appeared publicly in 2014.

ISIS Sanctuary: May 10, 2017

By Alexandra Gutowski and Jessa Rose Dury-Agri 

U.S.-backed forces continue to advance on the major ISIS-held urban centers of Mosul, Iraq and Raqqa, Syria. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have encircled ISIS in Mosul’s Old City. The U.S.-backed, Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) captured Tabqa, a city adjacent to Raqqa that contains Syria’s largest dam. ISIS also lost terrain in southern Syria, as various factions of the Syrian opposition, including some with U.S. backing, cleared ISIS from positions in Suweida and the Qalamoun mountains. ISIS will attempt to offset these losses during its annual Ramadan offensive campaign, anticipated to begin around May 27. ISIS’s campaign in 2017 increasingly resembles its 2013 insurgent campaign; ISIS’s Ramadan plan will likely focus on synchronizing spectacular attacks across different locations for combined effect. Potential targets include religious sites, security forces, and oil infrastructure. ISIS may also conduct ground attacks in Salah ad Din, Anbar, and central Syria where ISIS retains latent combat capability.

Iraq Situation Report: April 21 - May 5, 2017

By Jessa Rose Dury-Agri and the ISW Iraq Team

ISIS is setting conditions for its annual Ramadan campaign, anticipated to begin on May 26 with intent to exploit security vulnerabilities across the country. ISIS tested security in and around Baghdad by conducting a successful Suicide Vehicle-Borne IED (SVBIED) attack in central Baghdad and attempting additional attacks in Balad, Tarmiyah, and Jurf al-Sakhr. ISIS strained Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) resources by increasing the tempo of attacks in Ramadi and far west Anbar Province. ISIS attempted numerous attacks in Salah al-Din province, which the ISF foiled. The attacks indicate ISIS's continued attack capabilities in this zone. ISIS attacked Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) near Mosul in a potential bid to incite sectarian violence and detract from Mosul operations. Security forces must complete the campaign for Mosul while protecting Baghdad and repelling ISIS attacks across Anbar, Salah al-Din, Diyala, and Ninewa Provinces. ISF resources are further strained in Maysan and Basra Provinces, which mobilized two operations commands to address tribal violence. ISIS will continue to create and exploit weaknesses in Iraqi security prior to its Ramadan offensive.