UA-69458566-1

Friday, March 9, 2018

Russia’s Multi-Front Campaign in Ukraine

By Franklin Holcomb, Emily Markee, and ISW's Russia-Ukraine Team

Russia is intensifying its multifaceted campaign to destabilize Ukraine ahead of Ukraine’s 2019 parliamentary and presidential elections. The Kremlin is leveraging various political and economic tools to complement its ongoing military operations in Eastern Ukraine.[1] Russia has recently expanded its operations to spread ethnic tensions in Western Ukraine in order to drive wedges between Ukraine and its partners in Eastern Europe. The Kremlin also engineered the Russian energy company Gazprom’s vindictive and abrupt disruption in natural gas supply to Ukraine.

Ukraine simultaneously faces its own internal challenges amidst stalling efforts to establish an independent anti-corruption court and other government reforms. The Kremlin will exploit the resultant domestic and international frustrations over the pace of reforms. Russia will escalate its subversive activities over the next year in order to remove the pro-Western government led by President Petro Poroshenko and empower populists and pro-Russia factions. The U.S. must take a clear stance supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and partner more closely with Kyiv to support the passage of key reforms and counter Russian subversion.

The Kremlin intensified its destabilization campaign in Western Ukraine in an effort to undermine Ukraine’s partnerships in Eastern Europe. Ukrainian officials accused Kremlin-backed groups of attacking the Transcarpathian Hungarian Cultural Center in Uzhgorod, Zakharpatiya Oblast on February 4 and 27 to inflame local and regional tensions.[2] Zakharpatiya Oblast Governor Hennadiy Moskal accused the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) of recruiting nationalists to conduct the attacks in Uzhgorod in coordination with intelligence operatives based in Russian-occupied Transnistria in Moldova.[3] Poland detained two suspects connected to the attack on February 4.[4] The suspects are reportedly tied to the far-right Polish ‘Falanga’ movement, and had fought alongside the Russian-backed separatist Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples’ Republics in Eastern Ukraine.[5] These attacks against minorities are part of a wider campaign by Russia to undermine Ukraine’s relationships with Poland and Hungary. Ukrainian authorities previously arrested individuals reportedly connected to the defunct pro-Russia Party of Regions in Ukraine who attempted to destroy a Hungarian monument in Zakharpatiya Oblast in October 2017.[6] Ukrainian and Polish government sources have also accused Russia of attempting to drive a wedge between the two nations by orchestrating anti-Polish protests in Ukraine as well as attacks against Polish monuments and government buildings.[7] The Kremlin will further enflame ethnic tensions over the coming year to fracture Ukraine and drive wedges between Kyiv and its neighbors in Eastern Europe.

Nationalist Hungarian President Viktor Orban has exploited the Kremlin’s subversion campaign in Western Ukraine to strengthen his own domestic support ahead of Hungary’s April 8 general elections. Orban - who holds a close relationship with Russia - has boosted his nationalist credentials by deliberately escalating tensions with Ukraine.[8] Hungary revived its narrative that Hungarians in Ukraine are under attack from Ukrainian nationalists on March 1.[9] Hungarian organizations in Western Ukraine initially agreed with official statements accusing non-Ukrainians of conducting the attack in Zakharpatiya Oblast on February 27 before switching their narrative to accusing Kyiv of allowing “extremists to strengthen their positions” amidst an alleged “anti-Hungarian campaign” in Ukrainian media.[10] These statements mirror similar narratives peddled by the Kremlin. Hungarian groups further escalated tensions by calling for the OSCE to establish a monitoring office in Western Ukraine on March 7.[11] Orban has sustained a belligerent stance against Kyiv’s decision to require schoolchildren in Ukraine to learn both Ukrainian and their native language since September 2017.[12] Hungary has also attempted to stall Ukraine’s cooperation with Western institutions such as NATO and the EU.[13] Orban’s efforts support Russia’s ongoing campaign in Western Ukraine to drive social cleavages that prevent Ukraine’s integration with the West. Orban likely assesses that this escalation will help him gain electoral support. Orban’s Fidesz Party lost the mayoral race in traditionally pro-Fidesz Homdezovasarhely in Southern Hungary on February 25.[14] Orban will thus continue to fuel this crisis for political gain unless his international partners encourage him to de-escalate tensions with Ukraine.

The Kremlin continued its tradition of leveraging energy as a foreign policy weapon against Ukraine. Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom abruptly disrupted the delivery of natural gas to Ukraine on 01 March in response to a February 28 judicial ruling against Gazprom in favor of Ukrainian energy corporation Naftogaz.[15] Gazprom had been found to owe $2.56 billion to Naftogaz in a dispute over supply disruptions to Ukraine by the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.[16] Ukraine immediately signed an agreement with Polish energy corporation PNGiG, stabilizing its energy supply after a week of turmoil.[17] Naftogaz CEO Andriy Kobolyev emphasized that “yet another attempt to use gas as a weapon” failed and warned the EU to “consider this case when making their final decision” on Russia’s NordStream 2 Pipeline.[18] Polish and Latvian officials have repeatedly warned against the threats posed to Europe by the NordStream 2 Pipeline.[19] Gazprom’s decision to cut the natural gas supply to Ukraine reinforces Russia’s long-standing strategy to use energy as a weapon against other countries. The U.S. should encourage its European partners to consider Gazprom’s actions against Ukraine before deciding to expand energy ties to Russia through the NordStream 2 and TurkStream pipelines.

The Government of Ukraine’s commitment to reform is simultaneously wavering at the time when it is most required. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s government is at risk of failing to approve the creation of an independent anti-corruption court in line with standards set by the IMF and EU.[20] The IMF, EU, and Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) have repeatedly stressed the importance of choosing independent judges for the court via the Public Council of International Experts.[21] The Ukrainian Parliament has nonetheless relegated the council to a de-facto advisory role, undermining the court’s ability to maintain its independence from the Government of Ukraine.[22] Poroshenko asserted that “Ukraine did not do reforms for the IMF [but rather] for the Ukrainian people” and emphasized his government’s success in enacting other important reforms on March 6.[23] The U.S. and its partners must recognize the important progress achieved thus far on reform in Ukraine but sustain pressure on Kyiv to establish an independent anti-corruption court in line with EU, IMF, and NABU recommendations. If Kyiv fails to do so, it will likely fuel public frustration, lose a much-needed tranche of financial support from the IMF, frustrate its international partners, and empower pro-Russia and populist factions in the 2019 elections.

The U.S. and its partners must be willing to both support Ukraine against Russian subversion and simultaneously challenge Kyiv to meet its own reform obligations. The U.S. has taken key steps to support Ukraine, including most recently authorizing the sale of Javelin Anti-Tank Guided Missile Systems to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.[24] U.S. military support will help Ukraine defend itself from the Armed Forces of Russia and its proxy forces in Eastern Ukraine. The U.S. also extended sanctions on Russia for its ongoing invasion of Eastern Ukraine.[25] The U.S. nonetheless must recognize the multi-faceted nature of Moscow’s campaign against Kyiv, which includes many political and economic, in addition to military, components. The Kremlin will intensify this subversion campaign over the next twelve months before Ukraine’s March 2019 parliamentary and presidential elections. The U.S. must focus its efforts over the next year on enabling effective counter-intelligence operations and tangible reforms in Kyiv lest the coming elections result in a windfall for populist and pro-Russia forces in Ukraine.



[1] “Ministry of Defense: Russia-backed militants fail to respect the recent ceasefire,” uacrisis(.)org, March 6, 2018, http://uacrisis.org/64996-hutsulyak-14
[2] [“Statement of the MFA of Ukraine in connection with the arson premises of the Society of Hungarian culture in Transcarpathia,”] Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 27, 2018, http://mfa.gov(.)ua/ua/press-center/comments/8532-zajavamzs-ukrajini  
[3] “Transnistrian mastermind behind arson at Hungarian NGO in Uzhgorod – Governor Moskal,”unian.info, March 5, 2018, https://www.unian(.)info/society/10030982-transnistrian-mastermind-behind-arson-at-hungarian-ngo-in-uzhgorod-governor-moskal.html ; “Molotov cocktail hurled at Hungarians Union building in Uzhgorod,”unian(.)info, February 4, 2018, https://www.unian(.)info/society/2381628-molotov-cocktail-hurled-at-hungarians-union-building-in-uzhgorod.html ; “Building of Hungarian Culture Association burns again in Uzhgorod,” 112.international, February 27, 2018, https://112(.)international/ukraine-top-news/building-of-hungarian-culture-association-burns-again-in-uzhgorod-26045.html  
[4] “Poles suspected of arson attack on Hungarian center in Ukraine,” thenews.pl, February 27, 2018, http://thenews(.)pl/1/10/Artykul/351494,Poles-suspected-of-arson-attack-on-Hungarian-centre-in-Ukraine ;
[“Internal Security Agency detained Poles suspected of trying to set fire to the building of the association of Hungarian culture in Ukraine,”] wiadomosci.onet.pl, February 27, 2018, https://wiadomosci.onet(.)pl/swiat/abw-zatrzymala-polakow-podejrzanych-o-probe-podpalenia-budynkustowarzyszeniakultury/yw1mdfj?utm_source=wiadomosci_viasg&utm_medium=nitro&utm_campaign=allonet_nitro_new&srcc=ucs&utm_v=2  
[5] “Putin’s Falanga: meet the Polish neo-fascists who tried to burn down a Hungarian center in Ukraine,” euromaidanpress.com, March 5, 2018, http://euromaidanpress(.)com/2018/03/05/the-falanga-group-in-poland-whos-really-behind-the-arson-attacks-on-hungarian-associations-in-uzhhorod/
[6] Nataliya Bugayova, “The Kremlin Targets Ukraine Through Hungary,” Understandingwar.org, October 31, 2017, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin-targets-ukraine-through-hungary ; [“In MVD tied series resonant crime audio band, whose members are detained (added),”] novosti.dn(.)ua, October 2, 2017, http://novosti.dn(.)ua/news/274911-v-mvd-svyazaly-ryad-rezonansnykh-prestuplenyy-s-odnoy-bandoy-uchastnyky-kotoroy-zaderzhany  
[7] “Attack on Poland’s Consulate General in Northwestern Ukraine seen as provocation,” euromaidanpress.com, March 29, 2017, http://euromaidanpress(.)com/2017/03/29/polands-consulate-general-attacked-in-lutsk/ ; ["If Ukraine does not receive a visa-free regime, it will be a scandal" - Ambassador of Poland to Ukraine,”] lb.ua, April 4, 2017, https://lb(.)ua/world/2017/04/04/363012_yakshcho_ukraina_otrimaie_bezvizovogo.html ; Catherine Harris, Franklin Holcomb, Charlie Bacsik, and Charles Frattini III, “Ukraine Update: Russia’s Aggressive Subversion of Ukraine,” ISW Research Blog, August 4, 2017, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2017/08/ukraine-updaterussias-aggressive.html ; Franklin Holcomb and Kyle Miller, “Moscow Seeks to Destabilize Increasingly Vulnerable Ukraine,” ISW Research Blog, October 10, 2017, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2017/10/moscow-seeks-to-destabilize.html ; Benjamin Knudsen, Alexandra Lariiciuc, and Franklin Holcomb, “Ukraine Update: Russia's Active Campaign in Ukraine,” ISW Research Blog, May 12, 2017 http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2017/05/ukraine-update-russias-active-campaign.html ;
“Polish foreign ministry "concerned" over attack on Polish school in Ukraine – media,” unian.info, June 1, 2017,
https://www.unian(.)info/society/1953886-polish-foreign-ministry-concerned-over-attack-on-polish-school-in-ukraine-media.html ; “Polish Consulate General in Ukraine’s Lutsk shot at, Consul considers incident "terrorist act",” unian.info, March 29, 2017,
https://www.unian(.)info/society/1847584-polish-consulate-general-in-ukraines-lutsk-shot-at-media.html ; Lviv “RSA says 3rd party behind desecration of Polish memorials,” unian.info, March 13, 2017, https://www.unian(.)info/society/1819852-lviv-rsa-says-3rd-party-behind-desecration-of-polish-memorials.html  ; “"Useful idiots" both in Poland, Ukraine play into Russia’s hands – Envoy,” unian.info, December 11, 2017,
http://www.unian(.)info/politics/2290341-useful-idiots-both-in-poland-ukraine-play-into-russias-hands-envoy.html  ; “Poor Ukrainian-Polish ties benefit Russia: Ukrainian vice-PM,” thenews.pl, February 2, 2018, http://www.thenews(.)pl/1/10/Artykul/347731,Poor-UkrainianPolish-ties-benefit-Russia-Ukrainian-vicePM ; “Ukrainian FM condemns ‘provocation’ after Polish bus damaged near Lviv,” thenews.pl, December 11, 2017, http://thenews(.)pl/1/10/Artykul/339166,Ukrainian-FM-condemns-%E2%80%98provocation%E2%80%99-after-Polish-bus-damaged-near-Lviv ; “Monuments of contention: a study into Russia’s interference in Ukrainian-Polish relations (video),” Inform Napalm, December 5, 2017, https://informnapalm(.)org/en/monuments-of-contention-a-study-into-russias-interference-in-ukrainian-polish-relations-video/ ; [“Overlap road Lviv - Rava-Ruska investigated as incitement of ethnic hatred,”] zaxid.net, March 29, 2017,  https://zaxid(.)net/perekrittya_dorogi_lviv__ravaruska_rozsliduyut_yak_rozpalyuvannya_mizhnatsionalnoyi_vorozhnechi_n1421918  
[8]“Putin Tells Hungary's Orban Nuclear Plant Expansion To Start Next Year,” RFE/RL, August 29, 2017 https://www.rferl(.)org/a/putin-hungary-orban-judo/28700669.html ; “Putin’s Hungary Visit Aimed at Cementing Ties With Orban,” Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2017, https://www.wsj(.)com/articles/putins-hungary-visit-aimed-at-cementing-ties-with-orban-1486072262  
[9] “A brutal attack has been launched against national minorities in Ukraine,” Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 1, 2018, http://www.kormany(.)hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade/news/a-brutal-attack-has-been-launched-against-national-minorities-in-ukraine ;Torn flag in western Ukraine to be last straw for Hungary,” dninews.com, November 17, 2017, https://dninews(.)com/article/torn-flag-western-ukraine-be-last-straw-hungary ;Ukrainian nationalists threatened the Hungarian minority,” visegradpost.com, March 18, 2016, https://visegradpost(.)com/en/2016/03/18/ukrainian-nationalists-threatened-the-hungarian-minority/ ;Ukrainian nationalists tear down, try to burn Hungarian flag (VIDEO),” RT, November 15, 2017, https://www.rt(.)com/news/409884-ukraine-hungary-flag-nationalists/  
[10] Olena Babakova, “Putin’s Falanga: meet the Polish neo-fascists who tried to burn down a Hungarian center in Ukraine,” euromaidanpress.com, March 5, 2018, http://euromaidanpress(.)com/2018/03/05/the-falanga-group-in-poland-whos-really-behind-the-arson-attacks-on-hungarian-associations-in-uzhhorod/ ; [“In the Hungarian association, I am convinced that their office was not blown up by Ukrainians,”] euro-integration.com, February 27, 2018, http://www.eurointegration(.)com.ua/news/2018/02/27/7078133/ “Brenzovych sees the anti-Hungarian campaign in the Ukrainian media as the cause of the incident in the KMKSZ office,” uzhgorod.in, March 1, 2018, http://uzhgorod(.)in/en/news/2018/mart/brenzovych_sees_the_anti_hungarian_campaign_in_the_ukrainian_media_as_the_cause_of_the_incident_in_the_kmksz_office
[11] [“The Hungarians' Union of Transcarpathia wants to introduce into the region a permanent OSCE mission,”] Pravda, March 7, 2018, https://www.pravda(.)com.ua/news/2018/03/7/7173900/
[12] “Ukraine’s decision is harmful for the Hungarian minority and particularly unfair,” Office of the Prime Minister of Hungary, September 11, 2017, http://www.kormany(.)hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/ukraine-s-decision-is-harmful-for-the-hungarian-minority-and-particularly-unfair
[13] [“Hungary blocked the meeting of Ukraine-NATO Commission,”] Interfax, February 9, 2018, http://interfax.com(.)ua/news/political/483897.html ; Eugen Theise, “Hungary threatens Ukraine's EU ties over new education law,” dw.com, October 13, 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/hungary-threatens-ukraines-eu-ties-over-new-education-law/a-40944967
[14] Palko Karasz,“Hungary’s Opposition Sees Hope After Orban’s Candidate Falls,” New York Times, February 26, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/europe/hungary-viktor-orban-opposition.html
[15] “Ukraine 'Stabilizes' Gas Supply Amid Fresh Energy Dispute With Russia,” REF/RL, March 3, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-stabilizes-gas-supply-amid-fresh-dispute-with-russia/29076472.html ; “Russia's Gazprom to terminate gas contracts with Ukraine,” dw.com, March 3, 2018, http://www.dw.com/en/russias-gazprom-to-terminate-gas-contracts-with-ukraine/a-42814931 ; Vladimir Soldatkin and Natalia Zinets, “Gazprom seeks to halt Ukraine gas contracts as dispute escalates,” Reuters, March 2, 2018 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-ukraine-gas/gazprom-seeks-to-halt-ukraine-gas-contracts-as-dispute-escalates-idUSKCN1GE2DW
[16] [“Gazprom announces the termination of all treaties with Ukraine,”] depo.ua, March 2, 2018, https://www.depo(.)ua/ukr/politics/gazprom-zayavlyaye-pro-rozirvannya-dogovoriv-z-ukrayinoyu-20180302736499 ; “Ukraine's Naftogaz claims $2.56 billion victory in Gazprom legal battle,” Reuters, February 28, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-gazprom/ukraines-naftogaz-claims-2-56-billion-victory-in-gazprom-legal-battle-idUSKCN1GC2Z8  “Ukraine's Naftogaz Claims $2.5 Billion Victory In Legal Battle With Gazprom,” RFE/RL, March 1, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-naftogaz-gazprom-legal-victory/29069422.html
[17] [“Naftogaz and Polish PGNiG signed a gas supply agreement,”] RIA Novosti, March 2, 2018, https://ria(.)ru/economy/20180302/1515634846.html ; “Ukraine 'Stabilizes' Gas Supply Amid Fresh Energy Dispute With Russia,” RFE/RL, March 3, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-stabilizes-gas-supply-amid-fresh-dispute-with-russia/29076472.html
[18] “Poland’s PGNiG to supply gas for Naftogaz in Ukraine,” Hydrocarbons Technology, March 6, 2018, https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/news/polands-pgnig-supply-gas-naftogaz-ukraine/  
[19] [“Nord Stream 2 contravenes the principles of the Energy Union - the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia,”] ukrinform,ua, March 6, 2018,  https://www.ukrinform(.)ua/rubric-world/2417065-nord-stream-2-superecit-principam-energeticnogo-souzu-mzs-latvii.html; “Nord Stream 2 will make Russo-Ukrainian war more likely: Polish PM,” thenews.pl, February 15, 2018,  http://www.thenews(.)pl/1/10/Artykul/349432,Nord-Stream-2-will-make%20-RussoUkrainian-war-more-likely-Polish-PM
[20] Oleg Sukhov, “Poroshenko puts up more resistance to independent anti-corruption court,” Kyiv Post, March 7, 2018, https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/poroshenko-rejects-demands-create-independent-anti-corruption-court.html
[21] “Ukraine Moves Closer To Anticorruption Court, But Doubts Remain,” RFE/RL, March 1, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-anticorruption-court-passes-first-reading/29070605.html ; “Successful anti-corruption fight is impossible without the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Court — Artem Sytnyk,” National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, February 22, 2018, https://nabu.gov(.)ua/en/novyny/successful-anti-corruption-fight-impossible-without-establishment-anti-corruption-court-artem ; “Attempts to limit the independence of the NABU will cause irreversible consequences for the fight against corruption in Ukraine,” National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, December 7, 2017, https://nabu.gov(.)ua/en/novyny/attempts-limit-independence-nabu-will-cause-irreversible-consequences-fight-against; “In 26 out of 86 NABU’s proceedings the trials have not started yet,” National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, September 11, 2017,  https://nabu.gov(.)ua/en/novyny/26-out-86-nabus-proceedings-trials-have-not-started-yet ; ;  “IMF mission supports functional independence of NABU,” National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, November 11, 2016, https://nabu.gov(.)ua/en/novyny/imf-mission-supports-functional-independence-nabu  
[22] Oleg Sukhov, “Lawmakers advance flimsy anti-corruption court,” Kyiv Post, March 2, 2018, https://www.kyivpost(.)com/ukraine-politics/lawmakers-advance-flimsy-anti-corruption-court.html
[23] “President in an interview to Financial Times: We do reforms not for the IMF, but for the Ukrainian people,” Office of the President of Ukraine, March 6, 2018, http://www.president.gov(.)ua/en/news/mi-robimo-reformi-ne-dlya-mvf-dlya-ukrayinciv-prezident-v-in-46182  
[24] “U.S. State Department Approves 'Javelin' Missile Sale to Ukraine,” RFE/RL, March 2, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/us-state-department-approves-javelin-anti-tank-missile-sale-ukraine/29072069.html
[25] “Executive Order on the President’s Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Ukraine,” The White House, March 2, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-presidents-continuation-national-emergency-respect-ukraine/   

Tuesday, March 6, 2018

Regime Gains in Damascus, Syria: February 22 - March 6, 2018

By Christopher Kozak

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his allies in Russia and Iran seized over a quarter of the besieged Eastern Ghouta Suburbs of Damascus. Syrian Salafi-Jihadist group Jaysh al-Islam stated that opposition forces deliberately withdrew from rural areas in order to consolidate in urban terrain in the face a “scorched earth” campaign of heavy air and artillery bombardment by Syria, Russia, and Iran. Assad in turn vowed to continue the “fight against terrorism” even as pro-regime forces intensified their targeting of civilian populations and infrastructure in Eastern Ghouta. Pro-regime forces also removed medical supplies and imposed other restrictions on a humanitarian aid convoy that entered Douma in Eastern Ghouta on March 5. Civilians will come under increased threat in the coming weeks as the fighting moves closer to heavily-populated urban suburbs including Ayn Terma, Zamalka, Irbeen, Harasta, and Douma in Eastern Ghouta.


Monday, February 26, 2018

Turkey Clears First Hurdle in Northern Syria’s Afrin

By Elizabeth Teoman

Key Takeaway: Turkish forces and Turkish-backed rebels seized the final stretch of the Syria-Turkey border in Afrin from the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) on February 26, 2018. The seizure of the border accomplishes the first of five assessed Turkish operational objectives in Afrin. The next two assessed operational objectives are to isolate Afrin City and secure ground lines of communication to the border. Turkey deployed additional forces to Syria including Turkish Gendarmerie and Police Special Forces on February 26 to continue its advance despite a U.N. demand for a nationwide ceasefire in Syria. The Institute for the Study of War assesses that Turkey also seeks to seize the Mennagh airbase in future operations and to establish a new forward line of troops with pro-Bashar al Assad regime forces southeast of Afrin City.




Friday, February 23, 2018

Russia's Air Campaign against Civilians Shifts to Damascus

By Matti Suomenaro

Russia is setting diplomatic and military conditions for a pro-regime offensive to expel the opposition from the Eastern Ghouta Suburbs of Damascus. Russia shifted its air campaign to participate in an intense aerial bombardment that has killed hundreds of civilians and fueled a widening humanitarian catastrophe in Eastern Ghouta. Russia is exploiting a de-escalation zone implemented by Turkey in Idlib Province in order to redirect pro-regime manpower and assets towards Damascus. Russia remains a net driver of violence rather than stability in the Syrian Civil War.

Russia is directly participating through its air campaign in an emergent humanitarian catastrophe in Eastern Ghouta. Russia and Syria dramatically intensified their airstrikes and artillery shelling on the besieged opposition-held Eastern Ghouta Suburbs of Damascus, killing more than four hundred civilians and targeting at least five hospitals on February 18 - 22. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied that Russia or its allies in Iran and Syria are responsible for the violence, stressing that all three states are engaged in an “absolute war against terrorism” in Syria. Russian Ambassador to the UN Vasily Nebenzia also accused global media of spreading “disinformation” regarding the situation in Damascus. ISW nonetheless confirmed airstrikes in nearly every opposition-held district of Eastern Ghouta by Russia on February 19 - 21. Russia also reportedly delivered large quantities of aerial munitions to the Syrian Arab Air Force at the Dumayr and Sayqal airbases outside Damascus on February 20. Russia remains culpable for the current humanitarian suffering in Eastern Ghouta.

The Russo-Iranian Coalition is setting diplomatic and military conditions for a pro-regime offensive against Eastern Ghouta. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warned that pro-regime forces could “deploy the experience of freeing” Aleppo City to Eastern Ghouta on February 19. Syria reportedly deployed at least ten warplanes and reinforcements including the elite Syrian Arab Army (SAA) Tiger Forces to the outskirts Eastern Ghouta on February 17 - 20. Russia similarly deployed at least eleven additional warplanes to the main Russian airbase at Bassel al-Assad International Airport on February 22. The reinforcements from Russia included four Su-25 ‘Frogfoot’ Ground Attack Aircraft and four Su-35 ‘Flanker-E’ Air Superiority Fighters as well as two prototype Su-57 Stealth Air Superiority Fighters. Russia simultaneously impeded a draft resolution ordering a thirty-day ceasefire in Eastern Ghouta at the UN Security Council on February 22 - 23. Russia has attempted to further muddy the debate and justify its actions through allegations of “relentless shelling” by “terrorist” groups in Damascus.

The Russo-Iranian Coalition has enabled its escalation in Damascus through a corresponding de-escalation in Northern Syria. Russia shifted its airstrikes away from frontlines in Eastern Idlib Province and Southern Aleppo Province after Turkey moved to implement the terms of a de-escalation zone previously brokered by Russia, Iran, and Turkey at the Astana Talks. Russia began shifting its air campaign after Turkey established two observation points in Eastern Idlib Province on February 5 and February 9. Turkey established[1] a third such observation point in Eastern Idlib Province on February 15. Russia also deployed military police to enforce the de-escalation zone near the town of Hadher in Southern Aleppo Province on February 14. Russia nonetheless sustained its airstrikes in Southern Idlib and Northern Hama Provinces, despite the relative calm along the front lines. Russia likely intends to leverage this relative calm to free pro-regime manpower and air assets for the anticipated ground operations in Eastern Ghouta. The Russo-Iranian Coalition successfully leveraged de-escalation zones under the same framework in order to intensify their operations against ISIS and the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition in Eastern Syria in 2017. 




[1]“TSK konvoyu, yeni gözlem noktası için İdlib’e intikal etti,” Anadolu Agency, February 9, 2018, http://aa.com(.)tr/tr/gunun-basliklari/tsk-konvoyu-yeni-gozlem-noktasi-icin-idlib-e-intikal-etti/1059152; “Turkey army moves to set Syria ceasefire observation point,” Yeni Safak, February 15, 2018, https://www(.)yenisafak.com/en/world/turkey-army-moves-to-set-syria-ceasefire-observation-point-3114742.

Syria Situation Report: February 7 - 21, 2018

By: ISW Syria Team and Syria Direct

This series of graphics marks the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. These graphics depict significant developments in the Syrian Civil War from February 7 - 21, 2018. The control of terrain represented on the graphics is accurate as of February 22, 2018.

Special credit to Sana Sekkarie of the Institute for the Study of War for the text of these Syria SITREP Maps.

Thursday, February 22, 2018

Regime Gains in Damascus: May 1, 2016 - February 22, 2018

By Christopher Kozak

Pro-regime forces including Russia and Iran have launched an offensive to clear the besieged opposition-held Eastern Ghouta Suburbs on the outskirts of Damascus. This graphic depicts the military situation in Damascus as of February 22, 2018. This graphic only depicts control of terrain changes that occurred after May 1, 2016.

Friday, February 16, 2018

Weak U.S. Response to Russian Proxies Undermines Deterrence in Middle East and Eastern Europe

By: Bradley Hanlon with the ISW Research Team

Key Takeaway: The Russian Wagner private military company and Lebanese Hezbollah attacked U.S. and partner forces in Eastern Syria on February 7, 2018. Wagner is part of the business empire belonging to Putin ally Evgeni Prigozhin, whom Special Counsel Robert Mueller indicted on February 16.  The Kremlin uses proxy forces in Ukraine as well as Syria to maintain plausible deniability and avoid accountability for aggressive actions abroad. A proxy directly attacking U.S. forces is a significant escalation in the Kremlin’s use of irregular forces. The U.S. responded tactically in self-defense, but Secretary of Defense James Mattis did not hold Russia accountable, questioning whether Moscow had ordered the attack. The U.S. failure to hold Russia accountable and respond strategically to this attack sets a dangerous precedent, enabling the expansion of Russian proxy warfare. The Kremlin can use deniable proxies to attack U.S. forces and partners in other theaters, such as Eastern Europe and the Baltics.

The Russo-Iranian military coalition supporting the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad used a Russian private military company to launch a coordinated attack on U.S. and partner forces in Eastern Syria. Several hundred pro-Assad regime fighters launched a coordinated attack against a base occupied by U.S. and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – the main U.S. partner in Syria - in Eastern Deir ez-Zour province on February 7. Russian private military company (PMC) Wagner participated in the attack.

The Kremlin officially denied knowledge of the assault and employed an information operation to muddle the true narrative of the event. Russian military officials maintained contact through ‘deconfliction’ channels with U.S. forces throughout the attack, while denying that they knew that Wagner and its Lebanese Hezbollah partner forces had engaged. Russia thereby sought to obscure its role in the attack. The Kremlin has subsequently obfuscated the number of Russian mercenaries involved, the number killed, and the motivation for the attack using techniques common to Russia’s information campaign in Ukraine.

The Kremlin nevertheless likely knew of and permitted the attack on U.S. and partner forces on February 7. The Kremlin has used proxy forces in the past to maintain plausible deniability and shed accountability for aggressive actions abroad. Wagner is a private military company with close ties to the Kremlin and Russian military forces. Dmitry Utkin – a former Russian special forces officer – founded the company. Wagner reportedly trains recruits at a shared base with Russian Special Forces near Molkino, Russia. It has played an important role supporting Russian military operations. Wagner operated as a Kremlin proxy in Ukraine, fighting alongside Russian-backed separatists and in coordination with the Armed Forces of Russia.[1] Wagner deployed to Syria in 2015 and played a key role in the Russia-backed offensives to retake oil-rich areas in Palmyra and Deir ez-Zour Province from the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). The Russian Ministry of Defense has provided direct support to Wagner in Syria through both arms and transport.[2]

The indictments handed down by U.S. Special Counsel Robert Mueller significantly reduce the plausibility of attempts to deny Kremlin control over Wagner's actions. Russian businessman Evgeni Prigozhin is a close ally of President Vladimir Putin and a known associate of Dmitry Utkin. His business empire includes Wagner. The Kremlin leverages Prigozhin's businesses as a proxy tool to achieve various foreign policy objectives while maintaining plausible deniability. Special Counsel Mueller indicted Prigozhin for attempting to undermine the 2016 U.S. presidential election on February 16, 2018. Prigozhin served as the financier of a company that purchased private networks in the U.S. to establish fraudulent social media profiles allegedly posing as U.S. persons in order to defraud U.S. elections according to the indictment.


The Kremlin likely benefits economically from Wagner’s involvement in Syria as well. Utkin commands Wagner in seizing and securing Syrian oil fields in Eastern Syria. The Prigozhin-led company Evro Polis signed a contract with the Syrian regime’s state-owned petroleum company. The contract allocates 25 percent of all revenue from oil and gas facilities in Syria seized with the assistance of Russian forces to Evro Polis. These revenues are likely channeled to support the Putin regime.

The U.S. failure to hold the Kremlin accountable for its mercenaries' attack on U.S. and partner forces sets a precedent that the Kremlin will likely exploit in Syria and in Eastern Europe. The U.S. response to the pro-Assad regime attack on February 7 will not be enough to deter Russia from the future use of proxies, despite its tactical success. The U.S. has previously failed to hold the Kremlin accountable for the actions of its proxy forces against Ukraine, encouraging Moscow to expand its use of this tool. The U.S. response to the February 7 attack further signals to the Kremlin that it will not be held accountable for the actions of its proxies – beyond a tactical cost – even when those proxies directly threaten American forces.




[1] ["Ukraine's security service: Uncontrolled militant leaders in Donbas eliminated by Russia's Wagner,"] UNIAN, October 9, 2017, https://www(.)unian.info/war/2177591-ukraines-security-service-uncontrolled-militant-leaders-in-donbas-eliminated-by-russias-wagner.html
[2]  ["The Wagner List,"] Fontanka, August 21, 2017, at  http://www[.]fontanka[.]ru/2017/08/18/075/

The al Qaeda Blind Spot for the U.S. Approach to Turkey


By Elizabeth Teoman and Jennifer Cafarella with the ISW and CTP Teams

Key Takeaway: A genuine U.S.-Turkey rapprochement will require Turkey to counter al Qaeda in Syria. The U.S. and Turkey released a joint statement on February 16, 2018 during Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s trip to Ankara that expressed resolve to fight against terrorists, including al Qaeda. Yet Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been expanding Ankara’s partnership with al Qaeda in Syria. Future negotiations with Turkey over political and security structures in Syrian Kurdish-dominated terrain, which will start with Manbij according to Secretary Tillerson, may de-escalate tensions. A broader U.S. effort to realign with Turkey in order to achieve American objectives will not survive Erdogan empowering al Qaeda in Northern Syria, however.

Turkey launched the main effort of its campaign against the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in the Afrin District of Northern Syria. Turkey and Turkish-backed opposition forces started a new cross-border military push to seize the town of Jinderis southwest of Afrin City on February 9, 2018. This line of advance likely represents the main effort to isolate Afrin City, as previously assessed by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). Turkey and Turkish-backed opposition forces have also continued clearing operations on multiple axes along the Syrian-Turkish border.[1]

Turkey launched its main effort after renegotiating the terms of its air operations in Northern Syria with Russia. Russia temporarily denied airspace access to Turkey over Northern Syria after al Qaeda affiliate Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS) shot down a Russian Su-25 in Idlib Province on February 3. This downing triggered a flurry of bilateral diplomatic engagements between Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Russia reportedly demanded the handover of the deceased pilot and access to the crash site in return for reopening the airspace to Turkey.[2] Turkish-backed opposition fighters delivered the pilot to Russia via Turkey on February 6. Russia later allowed Turkey to resume its air operations in Afrin Canton on February 9 following a conversation between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin on February 8.

Turkey is attempting to exploit Russia’s desire for a ‘de-escalation’ zone in Idlib Province to reinforce Turkish leverage in Syria. The Turkish Armed Forces established two forward operating bases near the towns of Tel Touqan and Surman in Eastern Idlib Province on February 9 and February 15, respectively.[3] The deployments follow the establishment of a similar outpost by Turkey at al Eis in Eastern Idlib Province on February 5 despite earlier resistance from pro-Bashar al Assad regime forces. Pro-regime targeting of the Turkish convoy indicates Turkey conducted the deployments outside of negotiated parameters for the de-escalation zone. However, Putin seeks to preserve the de-escalation zone at the cost of tensions with the Bashar al Assad regime and Iran. Russia shifted its air campaign away from the frontlines in Eastern Idlib Province after February 3 to allow Turkey’s deployment to its observation posts in Eastern Idlib Province. This shift occurred after HTS shot down the Russian Su-25. It underscores Putin is willing to abate hostilities in Idlib in order to avoid incurring significant setbacks ahead of Russian elections on March 18. Russian military police reportedly established their own forward base adjacent to Turkey’s near al Eis on February 15 to deter Iranian or Assad regime provocations against Turkey.

Erdogan is willing to provide intelligence to al Qaeda-linked forces to disrupt pro-regime expansions and degrade YPG defenses. Turkey continues to prioritize its objectives to replace the Assad regime with a government friendly to Turkey’s interests and to eradicate a safe haven for the YPG’s Turkey affiliate—the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—in Syria. Turkey prioritizes these objectives over U.S. counterterrorism goals against ISIS or al Qaeda. Turkey supported the formation of a new joint operations room to consolidate opposition groups against a pro-regime offensive in Eastern and Southern Idlib Province on February 3. The ‘Repelling the Invaders’ Operations Room includes participation from Syrian Salafi-Jihadist groups including Ahrar al-Sham—a historic Turkish client—and may be orchestrated by HTS. Turkey may have provided intelligence to al Qaeda-aligned group Nour al Din al Zenki that led to Zenki’s interdiction of two arms shipments traveling to YPG forces defending Afrin. Zenki forces are also reportedly participating in Turkey’s offensive in Afrin.

Turkey deepened cooperation with al Qaeda to halt the pro-regime offensive in Idlib Province. ISW previously assessed that Turkey aimed to impose high costs on pro-regime forces and ultimately block their advance deeper into Idlib Province. Pro-regime forces halted their military operations in eastern Idlib Province on February 9. These changes reflect Turkey’s success in leveraging military pressure to compel a halt to the pro-regime offensive. Turkey’s positions are near frontlines with pro-regime forces and enable Turkey to block future pro-regime offensive operations deeper into Idlib Province. Turkey coordinated its establishment – and likely defense – of its bases in Idlib with HTS. Turkey relies upon al Qaeda-linked forces for force protection and logistical resupply of vulnerable positions in Idlib. Turkey is on track to expand its cooperation with and empowerment of al Qaeda in Syria. Turkey has reportedly also inspected former regime military bases in Ma’arrat al-Numan and Taftanaz farther south in Idlib Province. Turkey may establish additional positions at these facilities in the coming weeks.

Turkey’s actions in Syria make a true rapprochement with the U.S. increasingly difficult. Turkey is fostering al Qaeda’s consolidation in Northern Syria. Turkey’s deployment deep into Idlib will preclude Turkey from actively supporting possible future U.S. operations against al Qaeda in Syria. Turkish forces in Idlib would be immediately vulnerable to al Qaeda counter-escalation. Turkey’s logistical support to its forward bases in Idlib Province also transit through al Qaeda-held terrain. This vulnerability nullifies the U.S. strategy to outsource a counter-al Qaeda strategy to Turkey. The U.S. must address Turkey’s drift into a partnership with al Qaeda as a priority even while U.S. officials focus on near term de-escalation between Turkey and the YPG in Manbij in Northern Syria. New deployments of Russian troops to Idlib to accompany Turkish deployments would further draw Turkey, a NATO alliance member, into a military partnership with Russia and complicate any future U.S. operations against al Qaeda in Northern Syria.



This is an update to the Institute for the Study of War’s “Wars after ISIS” series. Read the previous update “U.S. Strategy in Syria is Failing.”






[1] “'Operation Olive Branch' to Afrin,” Anadolu Agency, February 11, 2018, http://aa.com(.)tr/en/pg/photo-gallery/new-batch-of-military-vehicles-are-deployed-in-border-province/0#.
[2] Afrin'e hava harekatına Rusya engeli... 4 Åžubat'tan bu yana hava operasyonu yapılmıyor,” Cumhuriyet, February 8, 2018, http://www(.)cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/922078/Afrin_e_hava_harekatina_Rusya_engeli..._4_Subat_tan_bu_yana_hava_operasyonu_yapilmiyor.html.
[3]“TSK konvoyu, yeni gözlem noktası için İdlib’e intikal etti,” Anadolu Agency, February 9, 2018,  http://aa.com(.)tr/tr/gunun-basliklari/tsk-konvoyu-yeni-gozlem-noktasi-icin-idlib-e-intikal-etti/1059152; “Turkey army moves to set Syria ceasefire observation point,” Yeni Safak, February 15, 2018, https://www(.)yenisafak.com/en/world/turkey-army-moves-to-set-syria-ceasefire-observation-point-3114742.