Russian Air Power Shapes Strategic Balance in Northern Syria

By Christopher Kozak

Russia prioritized its air support for a major pro-Bashar al-Assad regime ground campaign into Idlib Province between January 22 and February 11, 2018. The Russian Armed Forces focused its air operations in support of a wider pro-regime ground campaign to capture terrain in opposition-held Greater Idlib Province. Russia enabled a successful pro-regime offensive that seized full control of the Abu Dhuhur Airbase in Eastern Idlib Province on January 20. Russia subsequently supported a pro-regime advance towards the town of Saraqib in Idlib Province that began on January 31. Russia conducted heavy airstrikes targeting opposition-held villages along pro-regime frontlines across Eastern Idlib and Southern Aleppo Provinces. Russia also launched near-daily air raids against Saraqib itself that prompted the opposition Saraqib Local Council to declare a ‘disaster zone’ in the town. Saraqib occupies a strategic position along the M5 Highway that would provide an ideal staging ground for future pro-regime operations to reach Idlib City or the besieged pro-regime enclave of Fu’ah and Kefraya – two majority-Shi’a villages that represent a key Iranian priority in Syria. 

Russia adjusted its air operations after the combat loss of one of its warplanes in early February. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – Al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria – claimed responsibility for the downing of a Russian Su-25 ‘Frogfoot’ near Saraqib with a Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) on February 3. The Russian Armed Forces in response ordered all warplanes to increase their flight altitude outside the range of potential MANPADS. Russia also reportedly deployed new electronic air defense and surface-to-air missile systems to Northern Syria. Russia simultaneously launched a punitive air campaign targeting key civilian infrastructure across Greater Idlib Province including Idlib City and Jisr al-Shughur on the Syrian-Turkish Border. Pro-regime aircraft also intensified their air and artillery bombardment of the opposition-held Eastern Ghouta Suburbs of Damascus, killing at least 200 civilians. Russia likely participated in these strikes, although ISW could not validate a low-confidence strike during the reporting period.

Russia is leveraging the operational effects of its air campaign to shape ongoing strategic negotiations with Turkey in Northern Syria. Russia likely enabled the pro-regime offensive on Saraqib in part to pressure Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to adhere to prior commitments reached at the Astana Talks. Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly urged Erdogan to expedite the deployment of observation posts by the Turkish Armed Forces in Northern Syria on January 31. Russia later deliberately shifted its air campaign in order to allow Turkey to establish two outposts in Eastern Idlib Province on February 5 and February 9. Russia nonetheless sustained – if not intensified - its indiscriminate air campaign against opposition groups backed by Turkey in Idlib Province. Russia will use its air assets as both an enabler and a deterrent to shape the long-term future of Northern Syria in negotiation with Turkey, Iran, and Syria.

The preceding graphic depicts ISW's assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia's air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. The graphic likely under-represents the extent of the locations targeted in Eastern Syria, owing to a relative lack of activist reporting from that region.

High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.

Electoral Shifts Likely Following Deadline Extension for Candidates

By Jessa Rose Dury-Agri

Iraq’s political parties will use a week-long extension on the submission of electoral list candidates to reshape unofficial and official electoral list alliances.

Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) extended the submission deadline for electoral list coalition candidates from February 10 until February 15. The candidate lists determine how seats will be allocated after the election on May 12, 2018. Political alliances have become unusually fluid since January 11, IHEC’s official deadline for alliance formation. The extension gives additional time for electoral list coalitions to establish the order and quota of member parties on their candidate lists. The bonus week also allows parties to split and join electoral list coalitions unofficially by coordinating their candidate list submissions. IHEC may also bend to political pressure and allow legal means for alliances to form officially. 

Political alliances show signs of upcoming change.

Kurdish political parties met on February 6 to discuss the formation of a unified electoral list to run in Iraq’s disputed territories in upcoming elections. Kurdish parties are attempting to overcome internal divisions to run on a unified list in oil-rich Kirkuk Province. Separately, Sunni Al-Watan al-Iraqi (Iraqi Homeland) party leader Mishan al-Jubouri of Salah al-Din Province announced his party’s intention to join Vice President Ayad al-Allawi’s Itilaf al-Wataniyah (National Coalition) electoral list on February 8. Jubouri split from the Hadi al-Amiri-led Tahalaf al-Fatah (Conquest Alliance) on January 16. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi will use the additional week to form a consensus on Itilaf al-Nasr (Victory Coalition) candidates after Ammar al-Hakim’s political bloc split on January 29. ISW detailed Victory Coalition fractures on February 2.

U.S. Strategy in Syria is Failing

By: Matti Suomenaro and the ISW Syria Team

Key Takeaway: America's adversaries in Syria are using military force to undermine U.S. forces and their partners. The Russian and Iranian military coalition backing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad coordinated a major attack against the U.S.-led Anti-ISIS Coalition in Eastern Syria. The U.S. responded tactically by striking its attackers in self defense, stopping the offensive. But this tactical success demonstrates that U.S. strategy in Syria is failing. Russia and Iran seek ways to capitalize on U.S. failures and act to constrain, disrupt, and ultimately expel the U.S. from Syria and the Middle East. Turkey, meanwhile, has invaded Syria to challenge Kurdish forces, some of which the U.S. backs. The U.S. risks losing the gains it has made fighting ISIS to Russia and Iran.

Russia and Iran intentionally attacked U.S. and partnered forces in Eastern Syria. Several hundred pro-Syrian regime fighters launched a “coordinated attack” against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – the main U.S. partner in Syria – in Eastern Deir ez-Zour province on February 7. The U.S. has long had its own military personnel in the base. The U.S. responded with successful force protection strikes.

The U.S. must help stabilize Eastern Syria in order to prevent ISIS from returning to its stronghold in Ar-Raqqa City, from which anti-ISIS coalition drove the terrorist organization in late 2017. The U.S. is using its primary ground partner – the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – to restore some semblance of civilian life in formerly ISIS-held terrain. U.S. military personnel advise these partners. These efforts also serve to contain the influence of Russia and Iranian proxies in Eastern Syria, which the U.S. has partially constrained to the south side of the Euphrates.

Russia, Iran, and the Syrian regime planned the operation in advance. They began preparing the attack weeks in advance and aimed to increase Iranian presence east of the Euphrates River in order to seize valuable oil and gas fields. Russia and Iran have for months sought to reintegrate by force critical areas in Eastern Syria held by the SDF - including Ar-Raqqa City as well as key oil and natural gas fields in Eastern Syria - back into the Assad regime. The oil and gas fields are critical for stabilizing the Syrian economy and Assad's regime. They also provide a source of revenue for these Russian and Iranian efforts.

Russia used proxy partners and official messaging to obfuscate its involvement, using a hybrid warfare technique common in Ukraine. Russian private military contractors and Lebanese Hezbollah [1] participated in the attack. Russian officers maintained continuous communication with U.S. military officials through the deconfliction hotline during the attack in order to obfuscate Russia’s direct role in the incident. Russia both supported the attack and simultaneously gave the impression of genuine efforts to prevent the attack in order to confuse senior U.S. decision makers.

U.S. deterrence in Syria is failing. Russian and Iranian-backed forces had already directly challenged U.S. forces and their partners twice in 2017. Russia and Iran conducted similar probing attacks near Ar-Raqqa City and the U.S.-Rebel Base on the Syrian-Iraqi Border in mid-2017 prompting the U.S. to conduct protective strikes. Russia and Iran successfully concluded operations to limit U.S. freedom of movement of in Eastern Syria, including the seizure of Abu Kamal on the Iraqi-Syrian Border in November 2017. The U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition is also struggling to deter similar attacks by Turkey against U.S. partners in Northern Syria.  The U.S. has forces deployed between Turkish-backed forces and U.S. partners near Manbij in Northern Syria in order to deter an expansion of Turkish operations. Senior U.S. officials are conducting diplomatic visits to Turkey to negotiate a de-escalation of territory around Manbij as a future flashpoint between Turkish-backed forces and U.S. partners.

Turkish military operations in Northern Syria have created opportunities that Russia and Iran tried to exploit. The Turks invaded Syria’s Northern Afrin region on January 20 to oust from the area Kurdish forces, some of which are fighting an insurgency against Turkey. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Eastern Syrian and other Kurdish forces consider losing a primarily Kurdish district to Turkey as an existential threat. SDF reinforcements have therefore deployed to northwestern Syria in order to defend Kurdish-majority Afrin. These reinforcements included the U.S. armed Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) – the main component of the SDF – and several other SDF-subcomponents including the U.S.-trained Raqqa Internal Security Forces intended to stabilize post-ISIS Ar-Raqqa City. The battle against Turkey in northwestern Syria distracts the SDF from the fight against ISIS in Eastern Syria.

The U.S. is drawing down in Iraq and Syria while all other actors are escalating. The four-star headquarters responsible for the Middle East announced on February 7 that the U.S. was drawing down some of its air power and intelligence assets from Iraq and Syria. U.S. Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump have tried to isolate the fight against ISIS from the rest of the Syrian Civil War. In contrast, U.S. enemies, adversaries, and even allies correctly see the problems in Syria as intertwined. The U.S. must recognize it cannot sustainably pursue its objectives in Syria without taking into account the objectives of Russia, Iran, and Turkey. The U.S. must formulate a comprehensive Syria policy and commit the necessary resources to accomplish American interests rather than declare arbitrary victory and withdraw.

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[1] https://www(.)tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1396/11/19/1651917/اختصاصی-مستشاران-روس-میان-کشته-شدگان-حمله-آمریکا-به-دیرالزور-سوریه

Israel Falls Deeper into the Syrian Civil War

By Christopher Kozak

Israel and Iran initiated their largest confrontation in Syria since the start of the Syrian Civil War. Israel intercepted and destroyed an Iranian UAV that reportedly violated its airspace over the Golan Heights on February 10. Israel later conducted airstrikes targeting the drone’s control vehicle at the T4 Airbase in Eastern Homs Province - a known joint basing area for the Russo-Iranian Coalition. Syrian Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (SAMS) engaged the jets during their return and successfully shot down an Israeli F-16 over Northern Israel in the first such combat loss for the Israeli Air Force since the 1982 Lebanon War. Israel in response launched a “large-scale attack” against at least a dozen targets near Damascus including three air defense batteries and four military positions for Iran in Syria. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) characterized the escalation as “more than confrontation but less than war” and warned its adversaries against “playing with fire” by allowing Iran to launch attacks against Israel via Syria. Israel nonetheless stressed that it is “not looking to escalate the situation”. Russia also issued a press release that urged all parties to “exercise restraint” but stressed the need for “unconditional respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity” of Syria.

Israel and the Russo-Iranian Coalition are poised for future conflict over the Golan Heights. Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have entrenched a network of foreign and domestic proxies across Syria under the umbrella of the Russian Armed Forces. Iran and Hezbollah have also exploited the terms of the de-escalation zone brokered by Russia, Jordan, and the U.S. in Southern Syria to further develop their military infrastructure along the Golan Heights. Israel and the U.S. have failed to meaningfully constrain or reverse this trend. Israel has also repeatedly stressed its “absolute freedom of action” to respond to future violations of its “redlines” by Iran, including its establishment of permanent military basing in Syria and its transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah via Syria. Israel could nonetheless perceive that this window for action is closing as the Russo-Iranian Coalition consolidates its position in Syria. These developments set the stage for further confrontation that risks escalation into a regional conflict between Israel and Iran. 

The Syrian Civil War is not over. The 'Wars after ISIS' have begun. Syria remains a dangerous nexus for overlapping regional conflicts and great power struggle despite the claimed defeat of ISIS in Eastern Syria. The confrontation between Iran and Israel in Syria is only one of the fissures that will fuel the next stage of the Syrian Civil War. Turkey opened its direct conflict against the Syrian Kurdish YPG with its military intervention into the majority-Kurdish Afrin Canton in Northern Syria on January 20. Turkey, Iran, and Russia are also engaged in a three-way struggle over long-term future of opposition-held Idlib Province that resulted in the downing of a Russian Su-25 ‘Frogfoot’ on February 3. The U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition faces intensified confrontation with the Russo-Iranian Coalition after the U.S. repelled a major pro-regime attack with force protection strikes in Deir ez-Zour Province on February 7. The increasing tempo of these incidents is not a coincidence but rather the predictable outcome of the mounting ‘Wars after ISIS’ in Syria. The U.S. has long attempted to distance the Anti-ISIS Campaign from the wider context of the Syrian Civil War. This artificial division is not - and was not - sustainable. The U.S. must craft a coherent strategy to meet this new reality lest it find itself reactively mired in the next phase of the Syrian Civil War.

Syria Situation Report: January 24 - February 7, 2018

By: ISW Syria Team and Syria Direct

This series of graphics marks the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. These graphics depict significant developments in the Syrian Civil War from January 24 - February 7, 2018. The control of terrain represented on the graphics is accurate as of February 8, 2018.

Special credit to Sana Sekkarie of the Institute for the Study of War for the text of these Syria SITREP Maps.

Iraq’s Judiciary Rules against Sunni Politician Ahead of Iraqi Elections

By Omer Kassim 

Key Takeaway: Vice President Nouri al-Maliki–seeking to regain the premiership–is likely leveraging his influence over the judicial process to marginalize political rivals ahead of the legislative and provincial elections, slated for May 12, 2018. Maliki previously influenced Iraq’s judiciary and ostensibly independent bodies to eliminate rival candidates and politicians during his two terms as Prime Minister (2006-2014). Politically-motivated decisions by Iraq’s so-called Independent Bodies are likely to increase as the election approaches. 

The Rusafa District Misdemeanors Court in Baghdad on January 21 sentenced former Ninewa Province Governor Atheel al-Nujaifi in absentia to three years in prison, seized his money, identified him as a fugitive, and forbade him from travelling abroad in response to a lawsuit filed against him by Diwun al-Waqf al-Shia’i (the Shia Religious Endowment). The court charged Nujaifi with money laundering and integrity violations. Nujaifi––probably in Turkey–called the sentence “abhorrent sectarianism.” He claimed the action was part of a revenge campaign by the Shia Endowment, led by Allah al-Musawi, to punish him for not granting the Endowment ownership over historic Sunni mosques in Mosul during Nujaifi’s time as Governor from 2009-2015. It is unclear if Iraq’s Integrity Commission–an independent body responsible for pursuing corrupt figures–will call on Turkey to extradite Nujaifi.

The Shi’a Religious Endowment filed a suit against Nujaifi in 2014 to deactivate an order he issued in 2013 to stop all government institutions in Ninewa– particularly the real estate directorate– from dealing with the Endowment. Iraq’s Shi’a and Sunni Religious Endowments are powerful, ministry-level, state-funded institutions that oversee Sunni and shi’a mosques, religious schools and other affiliated educational institutions as well as charity foundations. The Endowment argued that Nujaifi’s order impeded the application of orders from Iraq’s Council of Ministers on dividing the ownership of religious institutions between the Shi’a and Sunni religious endowments.

Nujaifi is a prominent anti-Iranian Sunni political leader of the influential Ninewa-based Mutahidoon bloc– a Turkish-funded, anti-Iranian political organization which holds significant influence among Sunni. Nujaifi is a fierce political rival of Iranian-aligned political and military actors, especially Vice President Nouri al-Maliki. Nujaifi, who was governor when ISIS captured Mosul, has stated the policies of Prime Minister Maliki led to the city’s fall and has criticized the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Atheel Nujaifi and Mutahidoon have joined the “Decision Coalition” led by his brother Vice President Osama al-Nujaifi. The brothers will likely oppose Maliki in the upcoming elections and try to align with a different Shi’a politician.

Political considerations were likely behind the decision. Maliki—who seeks to return to the premiership and likely exercises some degree of influence over the Iraqi judiciary—may have affected the timing of the decision in order to undermine Nujaifi’s electoral chances further. The Iraqi election law, passed on January 22, stipulates that a candidate must be “in good standing and behavior and not sentenced with a crime against honor.” Atheel al-Nujaifi also faces an outstanding arrest warrant issued in 2016 by the Iraqi Central Court of Investigations for “corresponding with a foreign power.” The warrant was based on a 2015 lawsuit filed by Sunni politicians friendly to Maliki. The charges stem from Nujaifi’s leadership of the Ninewa National Guard, a force that received training from a Turkish force stationed in Bashiqa, Ninewa Province, Iraq since 2015.

Maliki has historically exercised political pressure and influence over several ranks of the Iraqi judiciary, including the Chief Justice of the Iraqi Supreme Court Medhat al-Mahmoud, and compelled the courts to adopt his preferred legal interpretations, oust his political opponents, and disqualify rival candidates in the elections. The Iraqi supreme court–upon a request submitted by Maliki’s State of Law coalition several days before the announcement of the 2010 election results–swung the balance of the 2010 elections to Maliki’s favor. The court stated the largest bloc upon which the responsibility of forming the government is granted can be an electoral coalition or a coalition formed after the elections. This gave Maliki—who came in second place with 89 seats after the Iraqiyya coalition, which had 92 seats—the opportunity to ally with the Shi’a National Alliance in order to form the government. Iraqi courts, beginning in 2011, re-instituted Saddam-era laws designed to prosecute any critics of the former president. This led to the sidelining of many Maliki critics including former parliament members Sabah al-Saidi, Haider al-Mulla and Adnan al-Janabi. Maliki also was accused of influencing judicial rulings to oust Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi and finance minister Rafia al-Isawi on charges of terrorism in 2011 and 2012 respectively. Maliki also has been also accused of pushing to disqualify many leaders from the Iraqiyya coalition on charges of affiliation to the Baath party. Disqualifications were occasionally rescinded following weeks of negotiations involving international actors. The Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), prior to the 2010 elections, had disqualified more than 500 Sunni and Shi’a candidates including leaders of the Iraqiyya Coalition–Maliki’s chief rival in the elections. An Iraqi appeals court revoked the decision following weeks of behind the scenes negotiations and a visit from then U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden to Iraq.

The judicial decision reduces the likelihood that Maliki’s Sunni and Shi’a rivals can create a formidable cross-sectarian alliance denying him the premiership. Osama al-Nujaifi has sought to strengthen ties with Maliki’s Shi’a rival clerics Ammar al-Hakim and Sadr prior the elections. Nujaifi congratulated Hakim on his split from the Iranian-aligned Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) to form the Hikma Trend, praising Hakim’s “Nationalist spirit,” in a reference to Hakim’s perceived distancing from Iran. Sadr, a nationalist two has distanced his movement from Iran and drawn closer ties to Sunni Arab countries, has reportedly been working to forge a cross-sectarian alliance–led by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and consisting of Sunni figures including Nujaifi and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Many of Iraq’s pre-election alliances have fizzled and will likely form instead after the vote.

The decision also advances attempts by Iranian-aligned proxies–present militarily from the Ninewa valley all the way to the Syrian border– to spread their political, cultural and religious influence in order to control the multi-ethnic Ninewa Province and other mixed provinces. To do so, proxies likely seek to install friendly political figures, facilitate the presence and expansion of the Shi’a community in the province, and engrain its traditions in the cultural fabric of the province. Thus this judicial decision serves as a warning for the current Ninewa governor Naufal al-Aqoob–hobbled by corruption allegation–and future governors not to impede such efforts. Turning Ninewa into an Iranian-friendly province will legitimize Iranian presence near the border with Turkey, and secure Iranian secondary route into Syria through Ninewa. It will also likely escalate existing Sunni grievances against the Iraqi government.

Indicators of escalation against Nujaifi: The Iraqi government may pursue Nujaifi abroad by calling on the International Police (Interpol) to place him on the red list, thus informing countries that he is wanted by Iraq based on an arrest warrant. It is also unclear if the Iraqi government will call on the Turkish government to extradite Nujaifi to Iraq, much like it did for former Trade Minister Abdul-Falah al-Sudani who was implicated in 2012 in a corruption case and sentenced in absentia to seven years in prison. 

Indicators of further political deterioration: Iraq’s savvy and powerful politicians may use judicial, legislative, and procedural means to disqualify their opponents or break up opposing coalitions, especially after candidate lists are filed on February 10. Such disqualifications pose a problem for U.S. interests if they undermine the legitimacy of the Iraqi government in ways that accelerate insurgency, thus negating the military gains the U.S. has made against ISIS.

Turkey Exploits Seams of Russo-Iranian Coalition in Idlib

By Elizabeth Teoman with Bradley Hanlon and the ISW Syria Team 

Key Takeaway: Turkey is succeeding in its campaign of imposing cost on pro-regime forces in northwestern Syria. Turkey’s recent deployment to reinforce the de-escalation zone in Idlib Province capitalizes on the divergent tactical prioritizations between Russia and Iran in Syria. Turkey will continue to prioritize this campaign in order to preserve a safe haven for the Syrian opposition in al Qaeda-dominated Idlib Province. 

Turkey successfully established a blocking position against pro-regime forces south of Aleppo City. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) deployed a convoy of up to 100 armored vehicles to establish an observation post near the town of al Eis - a key position on frontlines between opposition groups and pro-regime forces south of Aleppo City - on February 5. The TSK also confirmed ongoing efforts to establish two additional “observation points” at unspecified locations in northern Syria. Turkey conducted the deployment under the framework of the reported de-escalation zone across Idlib Province and parts of Aleppo Province brokered by Russia, Iran, and Turkey at the Astana Talks. Turkey withdrew from a previous attempt to establish a base near al Eis on January 29 after its forces were targeted by shelling from Iranian-backed proxy forces and a suspected VBIED from unidentified militants. 

Turkey likely sought renewed guarantees from Russia to ensure the safety of the Turkish Armed Forces in Idlib Province; however, these guarantees remain insufficient. Pro-regime forces reportedly shelled the new observation post following its establishment at al Eis on February 5, killing at least one Turkish soldier. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Iran likely intend to disrupt any deal that enshrines a long-term presence from Turkey in Syria. Iran likely also views the deployment as an attempt to block a future pro-regime offensive to lift a siege of the majority-Shi’a towns of Fu’ah and Kefraya near Idlib City. Turkey could attempt to exploit these tensions to drive a wedge between Russia and Iran over the de-escalation zone in Greater Idlib Province. Russian media has positively framed the recent deployment as an effort to “sustain” the de-escalation zone – a message consistent with Russia’s diplomatic efforts to expedite the “end” of the Syrian Civil War. 

Turkey likely seeks to raise the cost of pro-regime operations to seize terrain in Idlib Province. Turkey likely escalated its engagement in Idlib Province partly as a response to continued pro-regime advances towards the key opposition-held town of Saraqib in Idlib Province. Saraqib sits along the strategic M5 Highway between Hama City and Aleppo City and provides an ideal staging ground for further operations towards Fu’ah and Kefraya or Idlib City. Turkey deployed into Idlib Province after Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS) - al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria - claimed responsibility for the downing of a Russian Su-25 “Frogfoot” in eastern Idlib Province on February 3. Turkey may have provided HTS with the man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) to signal its dissatisfaction with Russia’s ongoing air campaign in support of pro-regime forces in Idlib Province. Turkey previously provided military equipment to opposition forces in an attempt to block the ongoing pro-regime offensive towards Abu al Dhuhur Airbase in eastern Idlib Province in early January 2018. This military support included armored vehicles as well as the potential provision of MANPADS. Turkey will continue to prioritize its efforts to protect a durable safe haven for opposition forces in al Qaeda-dominated Idlib Province alongside its ongoing operations against the Syrian Kurdish YPG in northern Syria. 

This is an update to ISW’s series on Turkey’s military operations in northern Syria, most recently to include “Turkey Escalates against Pro-Assad Forces to Protect Afrin Operation.” 

Iraq Prime Minister’s Electoral Coalition Fractures, Signaling Change of Premier

By Jessa Rose Dury-Agri with Omer Kassim

Key Takeaway: The U.S. should reassess military and political plans that rest on Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s continued premiership after Iraq’s May 12, 2018 elections. A series of splits from Abadi’s electoral list will increase opportunities for alternative candidates to gain the premiership. Abadi’s failed political alliance with Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces and inability to maintain the confidence of Ammar al-Hakim’s political allies signals that Abadi is unable to manage varying political interests and will struggle to hold together a post-election coalition. Abadi must prevent additional fractures in his electoral list, ensure friendly candidates have funding, and block alternate political blocs such as Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition from achieving competitive electoral success. Abadi will likely make major political concessions post-election to retain the premiership if unable to meet these requirements, compromising his will and ability to pursue policies compatible with U.S. national security interests.

Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) leaders briefly joined and subsequently withdrew from U.S. - favored Haider al-Abadi’s electoral list on January 14, 2018. 

The Popular Mobilization Forces Tahlaf al-Fatah (Conquest Alliance) includes several lethal Iranian-backed militias, such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and the Badr Organization, and Iranian-friendly parties like the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). Badr Organization head Hadi al-Ameri is the leader of the Conquest Alliance. The Conquest Alliance joined Abadi’s Itilaf al-Nasr (Victory Coalition) for just one day before withdrawing. Several PMF-affiliated politicians cited as reason for the split the inclusion of Ammar al-Hakim-led Tayar al-Hikma al-Watani (National Wisdom Trend) and Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in the Victory Coalition. Separately, AAH’s political wing pointed to the participation of “corrupt blocs and figures” within the Victory Coalition. Hadi al-Ameri stated the Conquest Alliance split for “technical” reasons and denied a link between the decision to withdraw and Hakim or Sadr’s inclusion.

Hakim announced his party’s split from the Victory Coalition on January 29, and six other parties reportedly followed suit as of January 30. 

Hakim split from ISCI in July 2017, established a new political party, and likely sought to join an electoral list with a less Iranian-aligned actor as its leader. Hakim likely lost confidence in Abadi’s ability or willingness to secure Council of Representatives and Provincial Council seats for National Wisdom Trend candidates as Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission’s (IHEC) February 10 deadline for the submission of electoral list candidates rapidly approached. 

Abadi’s faltering electoral list leadership and increasing demands are the likely cause of Hakim’s loss of confidence. Abadi reportedly rejected the use of a quota system, which would ordinarily guarantee National Wisdom Trend candidates inclusion on the list. Rumors also suggest Abadi insisted Victory Coalition parties could not submit lists of candidates to be considered for the electoral list by party, but rather had to nominate independent candidates. Most importantly, Abadi reportedly demanded the Victory Coalition’s candidate list include only individuals with a [“good reputation of integrity and sincerity”] ranked by skill and experience level. Abadi likely sought to place fellow, technocratic Hizb al-Dawa al-Islamiya (Islamic Call Party) members at the top of the Victory Coalition’s list, which would push National Wisdom Trend candidates lower and decrease the likelihood they would acquire seats. Abadi may have also have rejected placing Hakim in a desired ministerial position.

Hakim is likely unable to join or create an alternate electoral list due to IHEC procedures, and will rather run the National Wisdom Trend as a party on a singular electoral list in Iraq’s federal and provincial elections. 

Abadi must adjust his electoral strategy in order to retain the premiership following May elections.

Abadi has historically made concessions to other politicians and parties to achieve his political objectives because he does not have a sufficiently large or strong political base within the Iraqi CoR or Council of Ministers. Abadi’s electoral list politics suggest he has deviated from a compromise strategy, however, and has instead adopted a firm stance that is pushing his Victory Coalition members away. Abadi’s unwillingness to compromise on the Victory Coalition's electoral list and consequential inability to maintain unity within his coalition poses serious risks to his continued tenure as Iraqi Prime Minister, even if it is a component of a long-view electoral plan. 

Abadi will need to prevent additional fractures in his electoral list, ensure regional state actor funding for his candidates, and block alternate political blocs such as Maliki’s Itilaf al-Dawlat al-Qanoun (State of Law Coalition) from achieving competitive electoral success. Abadi is at risk of losing Sadr to the more secular Vice President Ayad al-Allawi. Sadr stated he was shocked by Abadi’s attempt to form an electoral list with “sectarians” and reiterated his insistence in participating on a cross-sectarian list. Abadi is also at risk of losing the confidence and funding of regional actors such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. 

Abadi may secure the chance to form a government as premier despite these risks, however, because he remains a unique candidate within Iraqi and international political circles. Both Badr’s Conquest Alliance and Hakim’s National Wisdom Trend expressed interest in forming a coalition with Abadi after elections. Abadi holds an incumbent’s advantage, and he has earned some cross-sectarian political legitimacy during his tenure as Prime Minister. Abadi also maintains support levels from the international community and may actually be attempting to garner more by refusing to bow to other political actors. He is seeking additional popular support through an anti-corruption campaign, even if that campaign will likely be directed at his political rivals such as Maliki.

Abadi will not cede his aspirations for the premiership even if he is unable to mitigate these risks. He will rather make major post-election concessions, possibly to Iranian-backed actors such as the Conquest Alliance, to retain his position. U.S. interests lie in the restoration of an inclusive Iraqi government not dominated by Iranian-backed actors. Abadi’s flirtation with the Conquest Alliance and failure to hold together an electoral list may suggest it is time for the U.S. to reassess our favor toward Abadi as Iraq’s Prime Minister. Certainly, the U.S. must not assume Abadi will remain premier. The U.S. risks losing its military basing and freedom of action to pursue ISIS remnants in Iraq if a pro-Iranian premier takes office. It must plan now for that contingency. 

Afghanistan Political Showdown between Ashraf Ghani and Mohammad Atta Noor

By Scott DesMarais with Caitlin Forrest

Key Takeaway: Stalled negotiations between Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and his political rival Balkh warlord Mohammad Atta Noor may lead to a protracted conflict that would endanger the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. Atta has negotiated with Ghani for over a year in order to gain a greater share of power for himself personally and for his political party, Jamiat-e Islami. Atta has threatened imminent mass demonstrations if Ghani does not agree to electoral and constitutional reforms that would likely set favorable conditions for Atta to run for president in 2019. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan met separately with key Afghan leaders to de-escalate the crisis on January 30. President Ghani stated on January 31 that he will make constitutional changes, but did not give a deadline by which he will make those changes. The most likely outcome of this crisis is a negotiated settlement that expands the political power of Atta and his party, Jamiat-e Islami, but ultimately delays enacting a power-sharing deal that would alter and legitimize the temporary, extra-constitutional positions that the U.S. helped to create in order to bring forth a National Unity Government (NUG). The power-sharing deal would enshrine CEO Abdullah Abdullah’s position as Prime Minister and give him, and Jamiat, additional advantages in government. The most dangerous outcome could be that the country fractures and the National Unity Government loses all control over Northern Afghanistan as warlords essentially secede their power bases.

Tripwire: Mohammad Atta Noor has threatened imminent mass protests unless his party, Jamiat-e Islami, and Ghani’s National Unity Government reach an agreement. Atta reportedly issued a final warning to the National Unity Government on January 29 that threatened mass demonstrations if negotiations do not progress. Jamiat is demanding electoral reforms that will likely increase its representation in parliament and influence in government, while Atta is likely maneuvering to set favorable conditions in advance of 2019 Presidential elections. Ghani and Jamiat had reportedly reached an agreement on several of Jamiat’s conditions [see Chart 1] on January 18, 2018. The two sides have agreed to implement parts of the National Unity Government agreement, including establishing a constitutional amendment commission and holding a constitutional Loya Jirga after parliamentary and district council elections (although elections are unlikely to occur as planned in 2018). They have not made progress discussing amendments to the election law that would likely give Jamiat an additional share in parliament before the 2019 Presidential elections. It is not entirely clear what amendments Jamiat is referencing; however it is likely they are referring to the National Unity Government-mandated Special Election Reform Commission’s 2015 proposal to create a mixed proportional representation system that would allocate one-third of parliamentary seats to “political parties with a national consistency.”[1]

Background: Atta is a powerbroker in the Jamiat e-Islami political party. He commanded elements of the United Front, the northern military grouping primarily of ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras that fought the Taliban in the 1990s, which evolved into the Northern Alliance with which the U.S. worked to topple the Taliban government. He has served as the governor of Balkh Province since 2004. He had backed Ghani’s rival, and fellow Tajik and Jamiat member, Abdullah Abdullah, in the contested 2014 presidential election.

The U.S. brokered the National Unity Government agreement to resolve the disputed Afghan presidential election and avert a crisis. The NUG agreement established a power-sharing agreement between Ghani and Abdullah. A Presidential decree established a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) position “with the functions of executive prime minister” and gave that office to Abdullah Abdullah. Part of the agreement outlined plans to hold a constitutional Loya Jirga to consider turning the CEO formally into a constitutionally mandated-Prime Minster position.

Ambiguities in the text of the NUG agreement led to tensions between Ghani and Abdullah. Based on the text of the NUG agreement Abdullah and his supporters expected an equal share of governing power, while Ghani has operated with the belief that the presidency’s established constitutional powers give him final say in governance. Abdullah’s supporters—especially Atta and Jamiat—have increasingly criticized him for failing to “protect” their political interests and for his failure to assert his role in what Jamiat leaders believed was “genuine power-sharing agreement."

Pattern: Tensions have been mounting between Ghani and Atta since friendly negotiations broke down in early 2017. Atta began negotiating with Ghani in late 2016 on behalf of Jamiat because CEO Abdullah had failed to use his post to advance Jamiat’s interests. Atta confirmed he was discussing a “role” in the central government on January 30, 2017, and Jamiat subsequently announced its support for Atta’s ongoing negotiations. Ghani may have offered Atta a key position in the government during these discussions in order to weaken Atta by bringing him closer into the National Unity Government in Kabul and removing him from his power base in Balkh. As negotiations progressed, Ghani formally re-appointed Atta to be Balkh governor on February 20 (Ghani decreed all provincial governors would serve in an acting capacity would ultimately be replaced upon taking office. Atta refused to leave his post, and Ghani quietly allowed Atta to remain the acting governor). Atta thanked Ghani for the re-appointment while saying he would consider resigning as Balkh governor “to participate in the upcoming elections” on March 21, which fueled speculation that Atta would align with Ghani for the 2019 elections.

Negotiations faltered shortly after a series of security breaches. A spectacular May 31, 2017 attack targeted the German Embassy in Kabul. Separately, the Deputy Speaker of the Afghan Senate’s son was killed by Kabul police when protesting the embassy attack. Then, unidentified militants attacked his funeral, which many Jamiat leaders attended. These attacks prompted Atta’s initial criticism of the government. Atta then formed the political opposition coalition, the Coalition for the Salvation of Afghanistan (CSA), with other former Northern Alliance figures such as exiled First Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum and Deputy CEO Mohammad Mohaqiq in June 2017. Atta and the CSA have repeatedly criticized Ghani’s administration since and called for a number of “systematic reforms” that include the full implementation of the National Unity Government power sharing agreement in addition to altering the central government’s security, budgetary and administrative systems.

Ghani unexpectedly announced he had “accepted” Atta’s resignation on December 18, 2017. Atta immediately rejected his alleged resignation and refused to leave his post. Atta reportedly had previously submitted an undated conditional resignation letter, which Ghani surprisingly resurfaced and attempted to use as a means to remove Atta. Although Atta has confirmed the veracity of the letter, he stated he would not resign because Ghani has not met the conditions they had established after which he would resign. This unexpected surfacing of the resignation letter has led to a protracted dispute.

Timing: Ghani is attempting to remove opposition warlords from Afghan politics. He began by allowing his embattled First Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum to travel to Turkey in May 2017 and then preventing his return in July 2017. Ghani also likely intends to neutralize the CSA and may be working with Turkish President Erdogan to keep Dostum exiled in Turkey. The Afghan National Directorate of Security arrested several Turkish dissidents living in Afghanistan on December 12, 2017 and was reportedly planning to extradite them to Turkey, a conciliation that Ghani made to Erdogan with whom he met the following day.

Ghani’s dismissal of Atta in December 2017 was likely Ghani’s attempt to remove Atta from his Jamiat power base and from Balkh province. First, Ghani managed to gain the support of CEO Abdullah and the Foreign Minister Salahuddin Rabbani—the acting leader of Jamiat. Abdullah claimed he and Jamiat’s leadership supported Atta’s removal prior to the announcement. Ghani immediately appointed a successor to Atta’s governorship, Mohammad Dawood, who claimed Rabbani suggested him to Ghani.

Ghani likely assessed he could effectively oust Atta at this time for three reasons. First, powerbrokers from Atta’s own party reportedly supported Ghani. Second, Dostum’s exile undermined the CSA. Third, Ghani likely thought the U.S. and NATO would support his efforts. Ghani was allegedly “emboldened” when President Trump said the U.S would continue to support Afghanistan in August 2017. Additionally, NATO commander General John Nicholson was reportedly “angered” when Atta prevented NATO fuel contractors from entering Balkh in November 2017. Finally, NATO also reportedly helped Ghani prevent Atta from attending an opposition political rally in Kandahar on December 2, 2017, organized by Kandahar Police Chief General Abdul Raziq and another opposition party with links to former President Hamid Karzai.

U.S. policy supports negotiations. Both U.S. Vice President Mike Pence and the American ambassador to Afghanistan John Bass expressed the need for a negotiated settlement to defuse the crisis on January 17 and 18, 2018. The U.S. therefore was unlikely to support any military operations to remove Atta. The two sides reportedly made progress towards a negotiated settlement, but their failure to resolve the crisis prompted an official White House statement that reiterated the need for both sides “to quickly and peacefully resolve” the crisis on January 24. Finally, US Deputy Secretary of State John J. Sullivan discussed “the importance of maintaining political stability” during meetings with Ghani, Abdullah, and Rabbani on January 30. Following this meeting, Ghani’s first public comments on the dispute likely indicated he would seek a peaceful negotiated settlement. Ghani said the dispute would be solved through constitutional and legal means while adding that there is no one, not even himself, who has “the right to endanger” the interests of Afghanistan.

Assessment: Ghani’s efforts to depose Atta and split Jamiat are failing. Atta is actually consolidating power within Jamiat. Rabbani turned on Ghani after the formal announcement of Atta’s “resignation” likely partly because Atta received strong “grassroots” support from within Jamiat. Rabbani is now leading the Jamiat negotiating team on Atta’s behalf and has visited Mazar-e Sharif to confer with him several times. Atta is also expanding support within the broader Tajik base. He met with Ahmad Wali Massoud, the late Ahmad Shah Massoud’s younger brother, in Mazar-e Sharif on January 21 and 22. Ahmad Wali Massoud had previously expressed his opposition to Ghani, but he did not initially state his support for the ongoing negotiations. Massoud announced his support for Atta after they met and called on the government to fully implement the National Unity Government agreement.

Jamiat’s demands also evolved as Atta consolidated power within the party. Initially, both Atta and Jamiat focused on improving Jamiat’s position within the National Unity Government. Specifically, Jamiat sought control of the Ministry of Education and the Economy and two embassies in addition to choosing Atta’s successor as Balkh governor. Atta has increasingly promoted a populist reform agenda that emphasizes improved security, ending corruption, electoral and constitutional reforms, and the “fair distribution of resources across Afghanistan.” Both sides agreed in January that the governor and police chief in Balkh will “be determined on the basis of a recommendation by Jamiat-e Islami,” and Jamiat has agreed that Atta will resign once “key” conditions are accepted by the government. Additionally, the two sides were in the process of negotiating Jamiat’s control over two ministries. Despite reaching an agreement on his original demands, Atta is now threatening protests unless the two sides reach an agreement on broader electoral reforms. Additionally, Atta recruited the support of other political parties to strengthen his and Jamiat’s position in negotiations. On February 01 eight political parties including Jamiat, Hizb-e Islami, Mehwar-e Mardum as well as the parties of the other CSA founders called on the Afghan government to amend the election laws to expand the “role of political parties and movements” in upcoming parliamentary and district council elections.

Most Likely Outcome: The most likely outcome is that the two groups will reach a negotiated settlement that will strengthen Atta and Jamiat before the 2019 Presidential elections. In this course of action, Atta would likely resign as Balkh governor after the government agrees to electoral reforms that would strengthen Jamiat’s position in parliament. He would likely maintain significant influence and possibly outright control over the new Balkh governor. Ghani’s administration would mostly agree to implement a number of overdue reforms they were supposed to have implemented by 2016 under the terms of the National Unity Government Agreement. This settlement will likely calm current tensions, but will set the stage for future conflict when Ghani’s administration is unable or unwilling to enact the agreement’s reforms.

Most Dangerous Outcome: The most dangerous course of action is a military conflict between Atta and the Afghan National Security Forces. Both Atta and Ghani have reportedly prepared for a possible military operation to remove Atta as the Balkh Province governor using force. Military conflict between Atta and the National Unity Government will severely undermine the U.S. and NATO missions and further destabilize the country.

A military conflict is more likely in two scenarios. The first scenario might occur if neither Ghani nor Jamiat is willing to compromise over the final points of contention, which is possible since neither side has made any major concessions. The second scenario might occur if Ghani is able to reverse Atta’s consolidation of power within Jamiat. Ghani may be able to exploit existing divisions within Jamiat to split the party if he offers an anti-Atta Jamiat faction an attractive negotiated settlement. Some Jamiat leaders, including Rabbani, are reportedly interested in the possibility that Ghani run for reelection with a Jamiat member as his vice president.

Indicators of potential military conflict: Increased reporting that Atta is preparing his militias with supplies or training, or reports of his militias traveling south towards Kabul, may indicate that Atta intends to initiate a military conflict with Ghani and the National Unity Government. Alternatively, if Ghani continues discussions on military options, it may indicate Ghani intends to abandon negotiations and launch an operation to remove Atta from the governorship by force. If Atta calls for protests and they turn violent, it may prompt a military response from Atta or Ghani that would lead to armed conflict. Some Jamiat leaders reportedly believe it might be possible to force Ghani to resign through massive civil demonstrations in Kabul. If there is evidence of a large number of Jamiat supporters traveling to Kabul it may indicate they are planning such a demonstration. Attempts to compel such resignation may turn violent. Additionally, groups like ISIS and the Taliban may capitalize on the protests by attacking them in order to incite conflict. This could prompt a military response from Atta against the responsible group, which would severely complicate ongoing U.S. and NATO counterterrorism operations.

Indicators of peaceful negotiation: Atta and Jamiat have made multiple warnings that they will call for protests if a settlement is not reached; however, Atta’s most recent deadline expired on January 30 without an agreement and without any demonstrations. Should protests fail to materialize in the coming days it could indicate both sides are close and committed to a peaceful solution. If Atta were to call for protests that remain peaceful, they might place pressure on Ghani to negotiate a settlement with Jamiat. Ghani has already indicated he seeks a peaceful settlement by constitutional means. If Ghani is genuine, he may offer a settlement that significantly expands Jamiat’s share in the government while asking for patience in enacting electoral reforms or Ghani could request one-on-one negotiations with Atta.

Implications of the Crisis: It will be difficult for Ghani to salvage his legitimacy. Jamiat is not likely to have much incentive to compromise at this point, since it is unlikely Ghani could risk the consequences of a protracted military conflict. Given the security situation in Kabul, it would be difficult for Ghani to justify a military operation to remove a governor whose province is one of the most secure in Afghanistan. Therefore, any negotiated settlement is likely to empower Atta and Jamiat, possibly setting a precedent for resisting Ghani’s authority. Any negotiated settlement is unlikely to address systemic issues in the failed National Unity Governments power sharing agreement, making an intense and possibly violent competition for control of the Afghan government likely in 2019.

Crisis Timeline

January 30 2017: Atta in discussions with Ghani for a “role” in the central government

February 20 2017: Ghani formally re-appoints Atta to Balkh governorship

May 31 2017: German Embassy attack in Kabul sparks Atta’s criticism of Ghani

June 29 2017: Atta, Dostum, and Mohaqiq form Coalition for the Salvation of Afghanistan in opposition to the NUG

July 18 2017: Ghani prevents Dostum’s return to Afghanistan; effectively exiles him to Turkey

December 18 2017: Ghani escalates by announcing Atta’s resignation and sparks the current crisis

January 18 2018: Jamiat and the NUG reach an agreement on several conditions, but not all

January 24 2018: White House releases a statement encouraging a peaceful resolution to the crisis

January 29 2018: Atta threatens mass protests if negotiations do not progress

January 30 2018: U.S. Deputy Secretary of State holds meetings with Ghani, Abdullah, and Rabbani to defuse crisis

January 31 2018: Ghani indicates he seeks a peaceful, negotiated settlement through constitutional means

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[1] Technically, Afghan electoral law stipulates that political parties must have representatives from at least 22 provinces amongst their founders to be considered a “national party.” No political parties, including Jamiat, would now qualify. Jamiat could seek to use an already agreed upon constitutional amendment commission to alter the electoral law so that the proportional system would benefit Jamiat.