Syria Situation Report: December 8 - 15, 2016

By ISW Syria Team and Syria Direct

Opposition forces agreed to a ceasefire in order to evacuate their remaining positions in Eastern Aleppo City on December 13 following bilateral negotiations between Russia and Turkey. The deal states that all opposition fighters and civilians who wish to depart Eastern Aleppo City will be evacuated to Western Aleppo Province. The initial wave of evacuations scheduled to begin on December 14 failed to materialize after Iran inserted new last-minute conditions that called for simultaneous evacuations from the besieged Shi’a-majority towns of Fu’ah and Kefraya in Idlib Province. The deal resumed on December 15 with medical evacuations from Fu’ah and Kefraya as well as Aleppo City. Meanwhile, ISIS recaptured the city of Palmyra in Eastern Homs Province on December 11 following clashes with pro-regime forces despite heavy air support provided by Russia. The fall of Palmyra marks the first seizure of a major urban center by ISIS in Iraq and Syria since May 2015 and demonstrates the sustained ability of ISIS to command, control, and resource major operations that exploit vulnerabilities among its opponents even as it faces increasing pressure from coalition forces in Ar-Raqqa City and Mosul. The success of ISIS in Palmyra also highlights the fragility of pro-regime forces despite their gains against opposition forces in Eastern Aleppo City.

This graphic marks the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. The graphic depicts significant recent developments in the Syrian Civil War. The control of terrain represented on the graphic is accurate as of December 6, 2016.

Iraq Control of Terrain: December 15, 2016

By Staley Smith, Michael Momayezi, and the ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continued operations to retake Mosul and its environs, consolidating gains along its five axes before breaching the city limits on November 1. The ISF continued to advance north from Qayyarah towards southwestern Mosul, but have yet to breach the city limits there; south from Kurdish-held territory towards northern Mosul, besieging Tel Kayyaf; and in the countryside southeast of Mosul, from where they entered the city itself. The Counter Terrorism Service has retaken upwards of twenty neighborhoods from ISIS in the northeast quarter over the past six weeks, but the Iraqi Army has struggled to advance in Mosul’s southeast quarter. The ISF and Peshmerga also consolidated gains around Makhmur in late October. The Peshmerga, meanwhile, advanced from Bashiqa Mountain to retake Bashiqa, northeast of Mosul, on November 7. Peshmerga involvement in the operation has since largely concluded, while the ISF continues its lines of effort inside Mosul itself and at remaining ISIS-held areas, including the southern axis. ISW is thus changing the respective areas to ISF-, Peshmerga-, and joint ISF and Peshmerga-control. 

Meanwhile, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) launched operations into the western desert, west of Mosul, on October 29. The militias recaptured the Tel Afar airbase on November 16 but Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi called for the ISF, not the PMUs, to recapture the city itself. The PMUs have since expanded west beyond Tel Afar, aiming for ISIS-held Baaj, south of Sinjar, and the Syrian border. ISW is thus changing this area to a control zone where Shi’a militias are the primary security force. 

The ISF launched a minor operation to recapture the eastern bank of the Tigris River across from Shirqat on November 29 in order to counter ISIS’s ability to attack recaptured areas. The ISF deployed the Baghdad-based 60th Brigade of the 17th Iraqi Army (IA) Division alongside tribal forces and an armored battalion to lead the operation, which launched south from Makhmur, making minimal gains. ISW is thus expanding the area of ISF and tribal fighter control to include recent gains from the operation.

ISW ON ALEPPO AND THE BROADER WAR IN SYRIA

The pro-Assad forces’ onslaught in Aleppo marks a key inflection point for the war in Syria. Eastern Aleppo’s imminent fall – to a coalition that includes Russia and Iran and its various proxies – will accelerate the war’s destabilizing effects. Jihadists will further improve their position within the Syrian opposition. Fighters aligned with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad will continue committing atrocities against civilians. The Russian and Iranian regimes will grow more emboldened. The United States, its allies, and its international partners must now confront this new, yet predictable, phase in the Syrian war.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has led a significant effort on Aleppo, tracking developments and putting the situation there in the context of the broader war and U.S. policy. ISW’s analysts have offered trenchant insights on the battle and led the way in forecasting events and trends. ISW will remain a critical resource on the continuing Syrian conflict and its strategic implications.

The following excerpts provide an overview of ISW’s prescient work on Aleppo over the last year:

"Aleppo Campaign Update: Pro-Regime Forces Advance in Aleppo City," Christopher Kozak, November 30, 2016

• “Eastern Aleppo City serves as one of the last remaining major hubs of acceptable opposition groups in Northern Syria. The surrender of Eastern Aleppo City will likely drive these groups into deeper partnership with Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sham, and other Salafi-Jihadist Groups in order to preserve their military effectiveness on the battlefield.”

• “…the fall of Aleppo City will not mark the end of the Syrian Civil War. Opposition groups will likely wage an increasingly-radicalized insurgency across Northern Syria with continued support from regional backers such as Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.” 

Read the full article here. 

“Warning Update: Russia Prepares to Escalate Military Intervention in Syria,” Jonathan Mautner, Genevieve Casagrande, and Christopher Kozak with Omar Kebbe, Kathleen Weinberger, Franklin Holcomb, and Benjamin Knudsen, November 4, 2016

• “Russia will likely use the Kuznetsov and its extant military assets in Syria in order to intensify operations against opposition forces in Aleppo City and its surrounding countryside, bolstering the regime’s crippling siege on opposition-held districts of the city.” 

• “Russia’s support to the Assad regime continues to remove potential partners for the U.S. against ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria from the battlefield.” 

Read the full article here. 

“Syrian Opposition Plans Operation to Break Aleppo Siege,” Jennifer Cafarella, October 24, 2016

• “Russia feigned receptivity to international concern over the Aleppo siege while shifting air assets to target other opposition-held areas outside of Aleppo. Russia may also have used the pause to complete some maintenance on its air frames in Syria.”

• “[Jabhat Fatah al-Sham Emir Abu Muhammad al-] Joulani will also undoubtedly condemn the US for failing to prevent Russian war crimes in Aleppo and characterize the fight for Aleppo as a struggle against the enemies of Sunni globally in order to fuel the growing alienation of Syrian civilians and opposition fighters from the US.”

Read the full article here and a follow-up article here. 

“Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 13 – October 11, 2016,” Jonathan Mautner, October 13, 2016

• “Russian air power alone likely will not enable pro-regime forces to recapture the densely-populated urban terrain of Aleppo City. Rather, the regime and Iran will have to deploy more combat-effective ground forces in order to leverage the asymmetric effect of the Russian air campaign to clear Aleppo City of the Syrian opposition.”

• “Russia will likely continue to coordinate its air operations with regime siege-and-starve tactics that aim to neutralize opposition forces in dense urban terrain with minimal military resources.”

Read the full article here. 

“Russian Airstrikes in Aleppo Province: September 20 – 22, 2016,” Jonathan Mautner, September 23, 2016

• “Russia has periodically intensified and tempered its air operations in Aleppo Province during negotiations with the U.S., wielding the threat of even deeper humanitarian crisis and the defeat of the acceptable opposition in Aleppo City in order to extract concessions.”

• “Russia will not accede to a partnership with the U.S. except on its own terms, and will continue to wage its air campaign in Syria coercively in order to secure them.”    

Read the full article here. 

“Russian Airstrikes in Syria: Pre- and Post-Cessation of Hostilities,” Genevieve Casagrande, September 21, 2016

• “Both Russia and the Syrian regime will continue to use subsequent ceasefires to solidify gains against the Syrian opposition in Aleppo City and to employ siege-and-starve tactics to force the defeat of the opposition in critical terrain.”

• “Russia and the regime will therefore pursue a strategy to remove mainstream opposition forces from the battlefield either through their submission, destruction, or the transformation of these groups into radical elements that can be rightfully targeted as terrorists. Russia is purposefully driving this radicalization through its deliberate targeting of civilian and humanitarian infrastructure.”

Read the full article here. 

“Opposition Forces Break the Siege of Aleppo City,” Christopher Kozak, August 8, 2016

• “The estimated quarter-million remaining residents of Eastern Aleppo City nonetheless face a continued threat of siege amidst ongoing clashes and heavy aerial bombardment by Russian and Syrian warplanes that have prevented humanitarian groups and civilians from using the newly-established supply route.”

• “These grievances provide Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham an opportunity to leverage their integral role in lifting the siege to generate public support and draw opposition groups into a closer partnership. This integration would advance the long-term goal of al Qaeda to unify the jihad in preparation for the establishment of an Islamic Emirate.” 

Read the full article here. 

“Opposition Forces Launch Offensive to Break the Siege of Aleppo,” Genevieve Casagrande and Jennifer Cafarella, August 3, 2016

• “The regime and Russia will pursue a protracted ‘siege and starve’ campaign in order to force the submission of these remaining acceptable groups, solidifying the dominance of the Salafi jihadist opposition in northwestern Syria.” 

• “The collapse of acceptable armed opposition groups in Aleppo would not only solidify the staying power of hardline opposition factions in northwestern Syria, but would also ensure a continued Salafi jihadist safehaven in Idlib Province.”

Read the full article here. 

“Syria 90-Day Forecast: The Assad Regime and Allies in Northern Syria,” Genevieve Casagrande, Christopher Kozak, and Jennifer Cafarella, February 24, 2016

• “…Assad now sits within reach of several of his military objectives, including the encirclement and isolation of Aleppo City and the establishment of a secure defensive perimeter along the Syrian Coast.”

• “Russian campaign designers have clearly planned the ongoing operations in northern Syria, introducing to the Syrian battlefield signature Russian doctrinal concepts such as frontal aviation, cauldron battles, and multiple simultaneous and successive operations.” 

Read the full article here.   

“American Security is at Risk in Aleppo,” Jennifer Cafarella, February 23, 2016

• “Russian airstrikes are weakening the opposition’s defenses in the outskirts of Aleppo, setting conditions for a final assault by pro-regime forces. They are also destroying critical infrastructure and hospitals to force civilians to flee.”

• “The opposition forces now inside the city include U.S.-supported groups that are relatively independent from jihadist forces. They cannot prevent the encirclement of Aleppo, however, and may not survive the siege. Those who do survive are more likely over time to submit to the leadership of Al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, and other hardline elements that can help them endure when no one else offers assistance.” 

Read the full article here. 

“The Russian Air Campaign in Aleppo,” Genevieve Casagrande, February 13, 2016

• “The distribution of Russian airstrikes in Aleppo Province demonstrates that its air campaign is primarily directed at weakening the armed Syrian opposition generally, not ISIS or al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra.”

• “Russia obscures its true intentions in Syria through an active disinformation campaign.”

Read the full article here. 

“Syrian Armed Opposition Forces in Aleppo,” Jennifer Cafarella and Genevieve Casagrande, February 13, 2016

• “The U.S. has a short time frame in Aleppo to prevent the upcoming humanitarian catastrophe and preserve opposition groups the U.S. needs in order to destroy ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra in the long term.”

• “There is very little to indicate that Russia, Iran, or the Syrian regime have any intention of halting their military campaign in northern Syria, despite this diplomatic overture.”

Read the full article here. 

“Assad Regime Gains in Aleppo Alter Balance of Power in Northern Syria,” Christopher Kozak, February 5, 2016

• “The regime and its allies have waged a multi-pronged campaign in Aleppo Province over the past four months to set conditions for an offensive to isolate and ultimately seize Aleppo City…The operations in Aleppo Province have hinged upon heavy military support from both Russian warplanes and Iranian proxy fighters.”

• “The flows of displaced persons generated by this campaign will place additional strain upon regional U.S. allies while fueling further resentment and radicalization among the refugee population.”   

Read the full article here. 

Please visit ISW’s main website  for updates.

For media and general inquiries, please e-mail press@understandingwar.org. 

Ukraine Update:November 9-December 13, 2016

                                                                                 By: Franklin Holcomb, and Ben Knudson

The Ukrainian government implemented a series of reforms in the face of rising public dissatisfaction and protests. The slow pace of reform and perceived corruption of the Ukrainian government manifested in demonstrations of over 5,000 protestors in November. These movements enjoy the support of pro-Russia and populist parties that are making a concerted effort to capitalize on increasing public frustration in order to strengthen their movements and undermine the legitimacy of pro-western president Petro Poroshenko. Lack of unity and a clear direction from populist parties will likely prevent them from gaining meaningful traction among the Ukrainian electorate in the short term, however. Ukraine’s reformist movement also continued to voice its dissatisfaction with the Poroshenko administration. Former governor of Odessa Oblast, Mikheil Sakaashvili, announced the creation of a new reformist political party, held protests and launched a fundraising effort. President Poroshenko attempted to quell dissatisfaction by enacting reforms doubling the minimum wage, restructuring the health care system to make insurance universally available and protecting depositors against bank fraud. President Poroshenko will likely seek high-profile public victories, particularly EU visa liberalization, in order to stabilize support for his government.

Ukraine also continued to strengthen its military and political ties with the EU and NATO in its effort to distance itself from Russia and modernize its infrastructure and military. Ukraine and the EU signed a memorandum of understanding on a strategic energy partnership that enhances cooperation in efficiency and facilitates energy market integration in the future. The deal also makes progress towards a visa-free travel regime for Ukrainians visiting EU nations. Ukraine launched numerous domestically manufactured surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles near Crimea, forcing a strong Russian reaction. In an effort to avoid prompting Russian military action against their forces, Ukraine shifted the tests further inland, revealing its ability to utilize its military buildup in Crimea to alter Ukraine’s use of its sovereign territory. Russia went so far as to assert that it would use its military assets in Crimea against another Black Sea power. Despite Russian pushback, the missile tests demonstrated the growing capabilities of Ukraine’s military and domestic arms industry, which continues to improve and modernize from its post-Soviet state of disrepair.

ISIS Recaptures Palmyra in Major Blow to Pro-Regime Forces

By Christopher Kozak and Alexandra Gutowski

ISIS recaptured the historic city of Palmyra in Eastern Homs Province on December 11 following the withdrawal of pro-regime forces, marking the first seizure of a major urban center by ISIS in Iraq and Syria since ISIS last captured Palmyra in May 2015. ISIS launched a multi-axis offensive against the outskirts of Palmyra beginning on December 8, 2016, seizing several nearby regime-held oil and natural gas fields as well as critical positions in the mountains overlooking the city. Local activists stated that Russia and Iran withdrew their garrisons from Palmyra as this outer line of defenses began to collapse, leaving the city under the control of only several hundred ill-trained and poorly-motivated militiamen from the National Defense Forces. These fighters proved unable to hold the city despite heavy air support provided by Russia. ISIS subsequently capitalized upon its advances to launch an attack against the T4 (Tiyas) Airbase between Palmyra and Homs City. Heavy clashes reportedly remain ongoing as of December 13.

The fall of Palmyra demonstrates ISIS’s sustained ability to command, control, and resource major operations even as it mounts the defense of Mosul in Iraq and Ar-Raqqa City in Syria. ISIS exploited the ongoing main effort of pro-regime forces in Aleppo City in order to recapture Palmyra with an offensive maneuver characteristic of its previous campaigns, allowing ISIS to shift the pervading narrative that it is on its heels in Iraq and Syria. Palmyra is key terrain that positions ISIS to project force into regime-held ‘central corridor’ of Western Syria, including Damascus, Homs City, and Hama City. ISIS may continue its offensive south and west of Palmyra in Central Syria in order to maximize its gains as ongoing offensives against Al-Bab in Northern Aleppo Province and Ar-Raqqa City challenge its urban holdings in Northern Syria. Notably, ISIS claimed to replenish its arsenal with dozens of armored vehicles, anti-tank missiles, and other systems left behind by pro-regime forces in Palmyra. The seizure of Palmyra by ISIS may also be a blocking maneuver to protect its holdings in Eastern Syria or a diversionary effort to set conditions for a renewed offensive against pro-regime positons in Deir ez-Zour City. In either case, ISIS will likely use its offensives against the regime in order to expand its influence, leverage, and recruitment among the opposition following the upcoming fall of Eastern Aleppo City.

The success enjoyed by ISIS in Palmyra also highlights the fragility of pro-regime forces despite their recent gains in Western Syria, foreshadowing the difficulty that the regime and its allies will face in securing the country over the long-term. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad remains reliant upon a small cadre of elite military units and foreign fighters – including Russian Spetznaz, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shia Militias – in order to secure gains against his opponents on the ground. The regime reportedly redeployed the majority of these assets to enable its successful operations to clear opposition forces from Eastern Aleppo City over the past several months, generating vulnerabilities on other battlefronts including Central Syria. Pro-regime forces remain unlikely to deploy in large numbers to Eastern Homs Province in the near-term. Russia will likely use this renewed threat in order to press the U.S. for increased cooperation against ISIS in Syria. Nonetheless, the regime remains incapable of reestablishing security across the country without sustained foreign support – and thus remains incapable of meeting the long-term strategic objectives of the U.S. in Syria. 

The Campaign for Mosul: December 6-12, 2016

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) made significant gains in northeastern Mosul from December 6 to 12, but struggled to advance in the southeast. The ISF ordered a change in tactic on December 4 in order to address the lopsided eastern offensive, attempting to make rapid advances in the southeast rather than grind through neighborhood-by-neighborhood clearing operations. The shift, however, failed drastically when the rapid gains left the ISF open to ISIS counterattacks, resulting in heavy casualties on December 6 and 7. In response, the ISF moved units previously allocated to breach Mosul’s southwestern neighborhoods to reinforce efforts in the southeast on December 10.

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) pushed to accelerate and complete operations in eastern Mosul from December 6 to 12 in order to reach the Tigris River and launch an offensive into western Mosul as the second month of the operation comes to an end. Efforts in the southeast, largely under the command of the Iraqi Army, however, have struggled to match efforts in the northeast, led by the elite Counter Terrorism Forces (CTS). 

The CTS, with the support the 16^th Iraqi Army Division entering from the north, made significant gains in northeastern Mosul from December 6 to 12. These gains have been the result of weeks of intensive and difficult block-by-block clearing operations. The CTS used this tactic in operations in Ramadi and Fallujah; it is not having the same level of effectiveness in Mosul as it did before, largely due to the dense civilian population remaining in the city whom ISIS has used as human shields. As a result the CTS requires additional time to advance, but it is still able to make gains against ISIS because of its superior skills and experience in urban warfare.

In the southeast quarter, the less experienced Iraqi Army has not been able to overcome ISIS’s resistance by grinding through block-by-block. As a solution, the ISF ordered a change in tactic on December 4, calling for “surprise” operations that would seek rapid extensions into ISIS-held areas. The tactic was put to the test on December 6, when a unit from the 9th Iraqi Army Armored Division made a quick offshoot west in order to retake the Salaam Hospital, near the bank of the Tigris River. The move, however, left the ISF open to ISIS counterattacks and ISIS, hidden in the area, launched a massive ambush on the unit on December 6 and 7. The failure required a Coalition airstrike and a rescue by the CTS to extract the unit on December 7, which reported one hundred casualties.

The ISF and Coalition are now focusing efforts in the southeast in order to accelerate the entire eastern operation. The ISF moved three brigades from the 5th Federal Police Division, or roughly 4,000 men, from the southern axis to reinforce the ISF in the southeast on December 10. These forces, previously allocated to spearhead operations into the Mosul airport and military base, will reportedly operate in the same neighborhood of the failed hospital offensive. They are currently mobilizing in Hamdaniya, southeast of Mosul, before they move into the city itself. Additionally, sources reported that a Coalition airstrike targeted the fifth and final bridge connecting east and west Mosul. The destruction of the bridge will reduce ISIS’s ability to transport equipment and people into eastern Mosul and will help anti-ISIS forces box in remaining ISIS militants in order to advance west. If the ISF can succeed in pushing ISIS out of southeastern Mosul, forces in the southeast may move to breach Mosul’s airport and military base from the east where it could establish a forward operating base for further operations into western Mosul. 

The Order of Battle of the Ukrainian Armed Forces: A Key Component in European Security

The Order of Battle of the Ukrainian Armed Forces: A Key Component in European Security

Franklin Holcomb and the ISW Russia/Ukraine Team

The United States and its partners can improve regional security and stability in Eastern Europe by supporting the modernization and reform of the Armed Forces of Ukraine more aggressively. Ukraine has suffered from consistent Russian military aggression since Russia occupied the Crimean Peninsula and militarily intervened in the eastern Ukrainian Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in 2014. The overall unpreparedness of the Ukrainian military and its inability to match the capabilities of Russian forces allowed Russian and Russian proxy forces to gain a foothold in eastern Ukraine from which they continue to destabilize the entire country. The Ukrainian armed forces have been partially restructured and strengthened in the face of this constant pressure, enough to stabilize the front lines for a time.  They require significantly more support of all varieties, however, if they are to stop the advance of Russia and its proxies permanently, to say nothing of reversing the armed occupation of Ukrainian territory.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to fight Russian troops and proxy forces operating in Ukraine in a war that has claimed approximately 10,000 lives. Ukraine has engaged in an ambitious military reform program to modernize its armed forces and meet standards required for NATO accession by 2020. These reform efforts have seen important successes in recent years, but the Ukrainian military remains vulnerable to conventional and unconventional warfare. U.S. General John Abizaid (former Commander of U.S. Central Command), U.K. General Nick Parker (former Commander of Britain’s Land Forces), and other western military leaders are in Ukraine to support the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s efforts to restructure itself and reform its forces.The U.S., NATO, and individual western states can support these reform efforts and shape the Ukrainian military into a force capable of protecting Ukrainian sovereignty and becoming a key player in Eastern European security.The effectiveness of Ukraine’s land forces has increased due to ongoing reform efforts and two years of combat experience. These forces still suffer from a lack of modern equipment and from an incompletely reformed organizational structure. Ukrainian front-line soldiers have learned much from the protracted conflict and now outmatch separatist forces operating in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine has made progress in overcoming the low morale and poor discipline that confronted the Ukrainian Ground Forces Command in the early stages of the conflict. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko announced that conscripts would no longer serve at the front line on November 2, for example. This step is critical in order to improve the effectiveness of Ukraine’s forces in the field and create a more professional army.  

Ukrainian forces nevertheless lack experience in counter-insurgency operations, a lacuna which will become an increasingly exploitable vulnerability if they regain control of separatist territory in eastern Ukraine. The Armed Forces of Ukraine are in the midst of a transition from the Soviet structure on which they were based and remain inefficiently-organized. This cumbersome, inefficient, and brittle organization left Ukrainian front line units vulnerable to the rapid advance of Russian and Russian proxy forces throughout the conflict, leading to multiple serious defeats. Ukrainian front-line troops also lack standardized modern weaponry. Ukraine’s defense sector remains highly productive, but the Armed Forces of Ukraine does not have the modern weaponry necessary to allow them to counter Russian military intervention. Russian and pro-Russian forces in eastern Ukraine continue to use heavy armor and electronic-warfare systems that Ukraine has struggled to counter, leading to some of their most serious defeats in the conflict. Ukrainian forces remain highly vulnerable to conventional military forces as long as they lack the means to counter massed heavy armored formations. Ukrainian Ground Forces will be unable to provide a true deterrent to offensive action by regional aggressors until these problems are addressed.

The Ukrainian Air Force plays a key role in protecting Ukrainian sovereignty but faces capability gaps that undermine its ability to support Ukrainian ground forces in combat or consistently assert sovereignty over Ukrainian airspace. At the outset of the conflict in 2014, the underfunded Ukrainian Air Force used Soviet equipment and was not prepared for major combat operations. It nevertheless played a decisive role in supporting Ukrainian ground forces in early stages of the conflict. The years of neglect took their toll, and Ukraine’s air forces suffered heavy losses during the initial four months of intensive air operations, losing 18 aircraft and helicopters, mostly to man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and heavier anti-aircraft installations. Ukraine ceded its right to conduct air operations in the conflict zone in eastern Ukraine on September 19, 2014 in an effort to deescalate the conflict, and the Ukrainian Air Force has not operated against hostile targets since. The Ukrainian Air Force’s high vulnerability to even limited deployments of Russian anti-air systems raises serious concerns about its ability to fight against a conventional combined arms force. Ukraine and its western partners should prioritize supporting the refurbishment of the Ukrainian Air Force in order to allow the Ukrainian Air Force to operate in its own airspace. 

The Ukrainian Navy was nearly destroyed by the Russian occupation of the Crimean peninsula and has struggled to reform itself in order to be a force capable of asserting Ukrainian sovereignty. Multiple high-profile defections during the initial stages of the Russian occupation of Crimea weakened the leadership of the Ukrainian navy, which proceeded to lose at least 51 ships, the majority of which were captured by Russia. The current flagship of the Ukrainian Navy, the frigate Hetman Sahaydachniy, along with several patrol boats and cutters, are the only combat-ready vessels available to the Armed Forces of Ukraine as of September 2016.  

Ukraine’s loss of its primary naval facilities in Crimea remains the largest hurdle to the reconstitution of the Ukrainian Navy. Ukrainian Minister of Defense Stepan Poltorak reported on June 28, 2016 that Ukraine had allocated $100 million to construct a new naval base in Odessa to serve as the headquarters for the Ukrainian Navy as well as plans to repair and modernize Ukraine’s remaining vessels. Even when this expansion has been completed and these reforms implemented, Ukraine’s navy would likely face extreme difficulty protecting its key port cities of Odessa and Mariupol against the Russian Black Sea Fleet. 

The Ukrainian Navy is currently the weakest navy in the Black Sea region. It is weaker than the Russian Black Sea Fleet as well as the navies of NATO members Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria, though is slightly stronger than the Georgian Coast Guard. It is, and likely will remain in coming years, incapable of asserting Ukrainian sovereignty around the occupied Crimean peninsula or over Ukrainian resource rights on the Black Sea should Russian forces in the region seek to prevent it from doing so. The U.S. has pledged $500 million to support the reformation of the Ukrainian Navy, $30 million of which was delivered in 2016.The reconstruction of the Ukrainian Navy will take time, particularly so long as Ukraine is denied access to its bases in Crimea, and will require continued focus from both Ukraine and its partners if the Ukrainian Navy is to be able to defend Ukraine’s coast and waters. 

Ukrainian Special Forces play a key role in countering conventional and unconventional threats to Ukrainian sovereignty, and the effort to reform them has had great success. Much of Russia’s aggressive action in Crimea, Donbas, and elsewhere in Ukraine relied on small groups of special operators or light infantry who infiltrated Ukrainian territory, caused chaos, seized key terrain, and thereby undermined the morale and effectiveness of Ukrainian units ahead of the main body of pro-Russia forces. Ukrainian forces’ initial inability to counter this type of warfare demonstrated the need for a highly-motivated, well-trained special operations force to counter Russian infiltration, reconnaissance, and sabotage teams.Ukraine has therefore prioritized reforming the structure and practices of its special operations forces with support from U.S. and NATO. These reforms, intended to streamline the command structure of Ukrainian special operations units, will play a critical role in Ukrainian efforts to create armed forces capable of protecting Ukrainian sovereignty. President Poroshenko signed a law on July 26, 2016 officially establishing the separate Special Operations Command in the Ukrainian armed forces. Poroshenko noted that “in 2014 special operations forces had nothing except morale” and praised the necessary efforts to reform Ukraine’s special operations capabilities. Ukraine’s Special Operations Command is still nascent, however, and Ukrainian special operations forces have yet to become a fully mature force.

Ukraine has prioritized obtaining NATO assistance in reforming and retraining its armed forces since 2014. Ukraine and NATO’s partnership has existed since Ukraine declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and improved significantly in recent years. Ukraine expanded its efforts to train with NATO in order to support its armed forces’ initiatives to improve their overall readiness, modernize their training and tactics, support structural reform, and improve interoperability with NATO forces. These ongoing efforts included expanded participation in large-scale NATO exercises, such as Agile Spirit 2015 in Georgia, Sea Breeze 2016 in the Black Sea, Flaming Thunder 2016 in Lithuania and Rapid Trident 2016 in Ukraine. These exercises allow members of Ukraine’s armed services to share best practices across disciplines with their counterparts in NATO.  These exercises also give Ukrainian soldiers and officers the opportunity to become more accustomed to Western military practices, on which they are basing many of their reforms. The Armed Forces of Ukraine have shown a strong desire to expand interoperability with western military structures and improve military relationships with NATO in order to counter and deter further Russian aggression. 

Ukraine has also made efforts to develop military relationships with individual NATO member states in order to expand its network of partners who support ongoing reform efforts. Since 2014, Ukraine has conducted exercises with many western countries including Poland, Canada, Estonia, Lithuania, Turkey, and the UK. Ukrainian forces joined a joint Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian brigade in September 2014 and have since proposed a joint military brigade with Bulgaria and Romania. These multilateral partnerships, combined with ongoing NATO efforts to improve the logistics and standardization of the Ukrainian armed forces, constitute a concerted investment in Ukrainian security by both NATO and Ukraine. The continuation and expansion of these efforts will build on the progress Ukraine has made in reforming its armed forces while using this momentum to further integrate into NATO and Ukraine’s efforts to maintain its sovereignty and counter Russian aggression.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine have made significant strides towards their objective of reforming into a modern military force by 2020, but they continue to face major challenges. As U.S. and Western policymakers consider the most effective path forward for European security, they should focus on supporting the ongoing reformation of the Ukrainian armed forces into a fully professional and modern force that can help maintain stability in Eastern Europe. Ukraine’s partners in the West should prioritize supporting Ukraine’s efforts to complete systemic structural reforms, modernize their military hardware, and rebuild its navy. These efforts will allow Ukraine to defend its sovereignty against regional aggressors and play a greater role in contributing to the security of Europe and the Black Sea Region.

To read the full report, please visit our website.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: November 8 - December 6, 2016

By Jonathan Mautner

Russia leveraged the asymmetric advantage of its air power in Syria in order to facilitate major pro-regime gains in eastern Aleppo City from November 26 – December 7, bringing the regime close to securing the city’s ultimate surrender. Russia conducted targeted airstrikes against a contiguous swathe of five opposition districts in northeastern Aleppo City from November 25 – 26, enabling pro-regime forces to recapture four neighborhoods in the area. At the same time, opposition forces withdrew from five additional neighborhoods in the vicinity of the Kurdish-held Sheikh Maqsud District in northern Aleppo City, ceding control of the districts to the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces. Most recently, pro-regime forces seized the Sha’er District on December 6 and advanced into the dense urban terrain of Aleppo’s Old City on December 7 after the withdrawal of opposition fighters, establishing control of more than three-fourths of the opposition’s urban pocket. The withdrawal of those fighters to more open areas of the city will render them increasingly vulnerable to Russian airstrikes and place them under greater pressure to accede to regime surrender and evacuation proposals.

Russia also intensified its air operations against schools, markets, and other civilian infrastructure in the suburbs north and west of Aleppo City and in neighboring Idlib Province from November 25 – 28 and December 3 – 6, respectively, aiming to extract a high cost for the opposition’s continued resistance in Aleppo City. Russia will continue to wage its air operations in northwestern Syria for both military and punitive effect, at least until the regime’s siege-and-starve campaign coerces Aleppo City’s remaining opposition districts to surrender. As Russia acts deliberately to reinforce that campaign, opposition-held eastern Aleppo City and its bastion of acceptable opposition factions will likely surrender before the incoming U.S. administration takes office. This eventuality would not only bolster the regime and its allies, but also threaten the national security objectives of the U.S. in Syria. Lacking alternatives, the remnants of those once acceptable opposition forces will likely withdraw to core opposition terrain in Idlib Province and cooperate more closely with Salafi-jihadist groups in order to continue their insurgency against the Syrian regime. Although committed to overthrowing the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Salafi-jihadist groups such as ISIS and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham are also invested in attacking the U.S. and its allies. If the regime achieves victory in Aleppo City, the U.S. will face both a continuing civil war and an increasingly durable Salafi-jihadist safe haven in northern Syria from which groups can plan and potentially execute external attacks.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. 

High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.

Syria Situation Report: December 2 - 8, 2016

By ISW Syria Team and Syria Direct

Pro-regime forces backed by heavy airstrikes seized at least fifteen districts in Eastern Aleppo City including large parts of the Old City of Aleppo, shrinking the pocket held by opposition forces by more than seventy-five percent. Activists stated that opposition groups had withdrawn from the area to regroup in Southern Aleppo City and noted that more than 80,000 civilians have fled Eastern Aleppo City since the start of the pro-regime offensive on November 15. The Aleppo Leadership Council - a committee of all opposition groups in Aleppo City - released a statement on December 7 calling for a five-day ceasefire, medical evacuations, and free passage for civilians to Northern Aleppo Province. Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Germany to discuss a potential deal to evacuate opposition-held districts of Eastern Aleppo City. Anonymous sources stated that the proposal calls for the safe evacuation of all civilians and opposition fighters from Eastern Aleppo City except for members of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham - the successor of Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. The meeting ended without any major breakthrough. Russia and China previously vetoed a UN Security Council Resolution calling for a seven-day ceasefire in Aleppo City on December 5.

This graphic marks the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. The graphic depicts significant recent developments in the Syrian Civil War. The control of terrain represented on the graphic is accurate as of December 6, 2016.

ISIS Sanctuary Map: December 8, 2016

By Alexandra Gutowski and the ISW Research Team 

ISIS lost significant control zones near Mosul, Raqqa, and al-Bab since October 17, 2016. Anti-ISIS forces fully encircled Mosul and penetrated the eastern side of the city. Meanwhile in Northern Aleppo, rival Kurdish-led Operation Euphrates Wrath and Turkish-backed Operation Euphrates Shield encroached on ISIS-held terrain near Raqqa and al-Bab, respectively. Operation Euphrates Wrath forces are positioned 30 km north of Raqqa as of December 8, 2016. Operation Euphrates Shield forces remain halted on the outskirts of al-Bab. Arab-Kurdish tensions in northern Syria threaten to compromise both operations. ISIS responded to its loss of terrain and to the potential loss of Mosul and Raqqa by rejuvenating attack zones throughout Iraq, notably in Baghdad, Hilla, and Samarra. On December 8, 2016, ISIS also launched an offensive in Eastern Homs. ISIS also conducted attacks in new locations including Bab al-Hawa, Syria and Darbandikhan, Iraq on December 3, 2016 and December 4, 2016 respectively, demonstrating that ISIS is still expanding its freedom of action in Iraq and Syria. 

Iraq Situation Report: December 1-6, 2016

By Staley Smith, Michael Momayezi, and the ISW Iraq Team

ISIS spectacular attacks in Baghdad decreased from December 1-5, allowing the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to deploy security forces from Baghdad to northern Iraq. The decrease is part of a trend over the past few weeks of limited or minor suicide attacks in Iraq’s capital. The ISF deployed an Iraqi Army (IA) brigade from Baghdad to eastern Mosul on December 1 to provide support to and operate alongside the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) in ongoing operations to recapture the city. This deployment follows the movement of the Baghdad-based 60th Brigade from the 17th IA Division to Shirqat on November 29. ISIS may try to exploit the reduced security in Baghdad and attempt further attacks in the city in order to draw ISF units back to Baghdad or prevent additional ISF units from deploying to northern Iraq. 

The Council of Representatives (CoR) met to discuss the 2017 federal budget on December 4 and 5 but failed to put the budget to a final vote. One of the primary obstacles to passing the budget was a disagreement between the Shia National Alliance and the Sunni Etihad bloc over the Popular Mobilization Law, which passed on November 26 and institutionalizes and finances the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) as part of the ISF. The two blocs differed on the proportion of Shi’a and Sunni units currently within the Popular Mobilization that will benefit under the new law, which did not specify which militias qualify for these benefits. The CoR needs to reach an agreement on which forces will receive funding in order to pass the budget, but Sunni parties could try to stall the vote in order to guarantee greater allocations to Sunni tribal fighters. If the structure of the PMU is decided by a clause within the budget and voted on by the CoR, the Shi’a majority within the CoR can solidify Shi’a militias as the majority in the new structure, furthering Sunni alienation from Iraqi Government.

The Campaign for Mosul: November 29 - December 5, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) made limited gains in Mosul from November 28 to December 5, but moved additional assets from Baghdad into the region in order to reinforce current lines of effort in Mosul and improve security in southern Ninewa. 

The ISF opened a new line of effort away from Mosul on November 29 to recapture the eastern bank of the Tigris River across from Shirqat. ISIS has frequently attacked Shirqat, on the western bank, by crossing the Tigris River from its position on the eastern bank. The ISF launched the operation from Hajj Ali and is working its way south along the river. The ISF deployed the Baghdad-based 60th Brigade of the 17th Iraqi Army (IA) Division in order to lead the operation alongside tribal forces and an armored battalion. If the ISF can extend its holdings along the eastern bank, it will increase security for recaptured cities on the western bank, including Shirqat and Qayyarah, reduce ISIS’s ability to attack recaptured terrain, and set up the ISF to launch future operations in the Zab region, a Sunni insurgent stronghold, at the confluence of the Little Zab and Tigris Rivers. 

The ISF set conditions for the 16th IA Division to enter Mosul’s northeastern city limits alongside the embattled Counter Terrorism Service (CTS). The division connected ISF-held terrain north of the city with ISF-terrain on the eastern axis, effectively closing in ISIS on the eastern side, on December 3. The 16th Division will likely aim to enter the city limits over the coming week in order to support operations which have stalled due to fierce ISIS resistance and remaining civilian populations. The ISF deployed a second unit from Baghdad, the 43rd Brigade of the 11th IA Division, on December 1, to eastern Mosul to reinforce efforts in the eastern neighborhoods. The CTS, meanwhile, has made limited advances in Mosul’s northern neighborhoods.

The deployment of Baghdad-based units north could suggest that security in the capital is stable enough to deploy these forces north. The deployment of the 60th and 43rd Brigades north follows the deployment of the entire 1st Rapid Intervention Division out of the capital, first into western Anbar and later to Mosul, in late October. ISIS continues to launch attacks in Baghdad, but not to the same scale as it has in previous weeks. The ISF will still need to be aware that ISIS will try to take advantage of reduced forces in Baghdad in order to use carry out attacks. ISIS may increase its the attacks in Baghdad to undermine the legitimacy of the Iraqi Government, as it did in July when a deadly Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED) led to the resignations of senior security officials including the interior minister.

Kurdish Seams Threaten Anti-ISIS Coalition in Iraq and Syria

By Christopher Kozak with Leah Danson and Howlader Nashara

The U.S. Anti-ISIS Campaign has inadvertently emboldened select factions of Kurds in Iraq and Syria in a manner that threatens to exacerbate preexisting political and ethnic divisions, stoke regional conflict, and disrupt current momentum against ISIS. The U.S. has provided extensive military assistance to both the Syrian Kurdish YPG and the Iraqi Kurdish Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) as indispensable partners in the Anti-ISIS Campaign, enabling both groups to consolidate their control over large swaths of terrain outside of the regions traditionally held by Kurds in Iraq and Syria. The empowerment of these factions in turn revitalized nationalist aspirations within Kurdistan. The Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) – a political coalition led by the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) – declared the establishment of an autonomous Federation of Northern Syria - Rojava in March 2016. Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Masoud Barzani has become increasingly vocal regarding the possibility of formal independence from Iraq. This wave of nationalism has also reinvigorated insurgencies against the state among the sizeable populations of Kurds in Turkey and Iran.

This nationalist upheaval raises the likelihood that historic tensions along any number of established seams – both among competing factions of Kurds as well as between Kurds, Arabs, and Turks – could erupt into open conflict over the near-term. These long-standing seams include:

• Turkey – PKK: The insurgency waged by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Eastern Turkey resumed in July 2015. The PKK – and an offshoot organization called the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) – have conducted a steady campaign of major bombings across Southern Turkey as well as Istanbul and Ankara. The PKK maintains outposts and headquarters in the Qandil Mountains of Northern Iraq that Turkey has repeatedly targeted in cross-border operations.

• Turkey – PYD: Turkey launched an intervention against ISIS in Northern Syria called Operation Euphrates Shield in August 2016 in large part to prevent further expansion along the Syrian-Turkish Border by the PYD, which Turkey considers to be an extension of the PKK. Opposition groups backed by Turkey in Operation Euphrates Shield have engaged in intensifying clashes with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – a military coalition dominated by the armed wing of the PYD, the Syrian Kurdish YPG. These clashes could escalate into open conflict as both the YPG and Turkey attempt to seize control over the key town of Al-Bab in Northern Aleppo Province, undermining coalition operations spearheaded by the SDF to isolate and seize Ar-Raqqa City from ISIS.

• KDP – PUK: The dominant position held by the KDP in Northern Iraq has fueled a political crisis within the KRG between the KDP and its political rivals, including the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Gorran. President Barzani has leveraged the current security situation to retain his position long past the expiration of his already-extended term in August 2015, spurring mass outcry from opposition parties and the effective collapse of the government. The KRG remains unable to address critical challenges, including a crippling financial crisis, amidst this political paralysis. Low-level partisan violence also threatens to escalate over the medium-term.  The KDP and PUK previously fought an intense civil war in the mid-1990s.

• KRG – Iraq: The relationship between the KRG and Baghdad continues to suffer from persistent disagreements over sensitive political issues, including the structure of oil and natural gas revenue-sharing as well as the distribution of government portfolios to Iraqi Kurds. The ongoing financial crisis in Iraq has exacerbated these tensions and widened the division between the two sides, providing fuel to calls for the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan. At the same time, the current occupation of key regions in Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salah ad-Din, and Diyala Provinces by the Iraqi Peshmerga risks the eruption of future conflict over the long-term status of the Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) contested between Baghdad and Arbil

• PYD – Syria: The relationship between the PYD and Damascus remains tense despite reports of deepening cooperation between the two sides against opposition forces in Northern Syria. The regime has thus far tolerated the formation of an unofficial autonomous zone run by the PYD in Northern Syria in order to concentrate its forces on other battlefronts. The regime nonetheless remains unlikely to cede its sovereignty to this autonomous zone over the long-term. The PYD has engaged in minor clashes with pro-regime forces inside their remaining outposts in Hasaka City and Qamishli in Hasaka Province. These tensions set the stage for future conflicts that could erode coalition gains against ISIS in Eastern Syria.

• Kurds – Arabs: Both the Syrian YPG and the Iraqi Peshmerga face mounting resistance from local Sunni Arab populations as the fight against ISIS carries the Kurds outside of their traditional ethnic strongholds. Opposition groups, tribal fighters, and unidentified insurgents regularly conduct attacks against the YPG and Peshmerga in regions dominated by Sunni Arabs in Iraq and Syria. At the same time, human rights groups have accused the YPG and Peshmerga of conducting ethnic cleansing and other heavy-handed repressive acts against Sunni Arabs in order to punish locals for their alleged support of ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other Salafi-Jihadist groups. These incidents usually occur along historical fault lines where previous regimes in both countries attempted to alter ethnic demographics in order to favor Sunni Arabs over Kurds.

• KDP – PYD: The Syrian PYD and Iraqi KDP maintain their own political rivalry as both factions compete to cultivate allies and remove potential competitors across the entirety of the terrain held by Kurds in Iraq and Syria. The KDP backs an affiliated political branch called the KDP-S in Northern Syria that suffers from routine arrests and repression by the PYD. The KDP also hosts several thousand fighters from political factions opposed to the PYD - the so-called ‘Syrian Peshmerga’ – in Northern Iraq.  Meanwhile, the Syrian PYD and PKK have both deployed forces to Sinjar in Northern Iraq in an attempt to establish their own local base of support. This competition could escalate into open conflict over the long-term.

• Kurds – Iran: Kurdish separatists affiliated with both the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) and Iran-Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) escalated their attacks against security forces in Western Iran beginning in May 2016. These groups largely operate from bases in Iraqi Kurdistan across the Iraqi-Iranian Border. Although the current level of violence does not threaten the stability of the Government of Iran, the attacks will likely strain relations between Iraq and Iran.

The eruption of a conflict along one or more of these seams would directly undermine the Anti-ISIS Campaign in Iraq and Syria. The coalition remains over-reliant upon the Syrian Kurdish YPG and the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga for military gains against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Any outbreak of violence that fragments the coalition and turns coalition actors against one another – either politically or militarily – threatens to stall ongoing operations against Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa City in Syria. These seams also stand to fuel the widespread regional disorder that provides optimal safe haven to ISIS, al Qaeda, and other Salafi-Jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria. The U.S. Anti-ISIS Campaign risks the long-term failure of its mission to degrade and destroy ISIS in Iraq and Syria if the coalition proves unable to reduce tensions along these seams and rebalance its campaign to incorporate a wider variety of partner forces on the ground.