The Road to ar-Raqqah: Background on the Syrian Democratic Forces

By Genevieve Casagrande
 

The composition and behavior of the force that recaptures ar-Raqqah City will in part determine the long-term success of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS campaign in Syria. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is the U.S.’s most effective partner fighting ISIS in Syria, but it has limitations that risk undermining the gains it makes on the ground. The SDF, although dominated by the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), is not monolithic. The SDF coalition consists of Kurdish, Arab, Syriac Christian, and Turkmen groups. The U.S. built the SDF in late 2015 by recruiting a “Syrian Arab Coalition” to fight alongside the YPG and other local militias. The SDF continued to attract Arab fighters in the lead up to operations against ISIS in ar-Raqqah, including the recent inclusion of members of the Free Officer’s Union, a group of several high-ranking Syrian Arab Army defectors, in October 2016. 

The YPG nonetheless continues to dominate the SDF, despite increased efforts by the U.S. to diversify the coalition and recruit additional Arab fighters. The SDF remains dependent upon the YPG for logistics and experienced fighters, providing the YPG with outsized leverage within the coalition. Turkey considers the YPG to be a terrorist organization due to the group’s ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), placing the SDF in direct conflict with Turkey. Local Arab and Turkmen populations in northern Syria also oppose the YPG, accusing the group of “ethnic cleansing” and forcibly displacing local communities. Moreover, the YPG’s political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), intends to create a semi-autonomous federal region in northern Syria, which Turkey, Arab opposition groups, and other Kurdish parties oppose. The SDF’s effort to advance towards ar-Raqqah City and thereby expand Kurdish influence further into traditionally Arab terrain threatens to exacerbate these tensions and escalate into a more violent Arab-Kurdish and intra-Kurdish struggle in the region.

Read the full backgrounder here. 

The Campaign for Mosul: November 16-21, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and Patrick Martin and the ISW Iraq Team

The campaign for Mosul entered its second month, with current momentum indicating that the operation will last into January 2017. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) remained entrenched in eastern Mosul while facing fierce ISIS resistance from November 16 to 21, and Shi’a militias are on the outskirts of Tel Afar after seizing the nearby airbase on November 16.

The ISF has made little progress over the past week in eastern Mosul; they remain engaged in the same neighborhoods they have occupied since entering eastern Mosul on November 1.The Federal Police announced on November 19 that it had completed operations on Mosul’s southern axis and are positioning to breach the city’s southern border, where they will face an immediate fight over the airport and military base, both of which ISIS still occupies. The 16th Iraqi Army Division remains engaged in operations north of Mosul and has made no indication of a timeline to move into the city itself. Iraqi Shi’a militias advanced towards Tel Afar, west of Mosul, after retaking the nearby airbase on November 16. Ninewa Operations Commander Maj. Gen. Najm al-Juburi stated on November 19 that the 15th Iraqi Army Division advanced alongside the militias, likely in an effort to reduce possible backlash from multiple regional actors, including Turkey, that have rejected any Shi’a militia presence in the majority Turkmen town. The 15th Division’s training may also assist in the recapture of Tel Afar, as Shi’a militias have struggled to retake urban terrain without enduring heavy casualty.

The lack of progress in eastern Mosul may indicate that the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) and Iraqi Army units have paused operationally in order to wait for ISF units nearing Mosul’s northern and southern limits. However, the CTS previously announced its pauses and has not done so now, even though the Joint Operations Command continues to issue daily operations reports. The CTS may also be deliberately slowing operations to ensure that it thoroughly clears neighborhoods before advancing or to wait for reinforcements to arrive.

More likely, the lack of progress may indicate that operations in eastern Mosul are not going as well as the Western or Iraqi media portrays. The CTS and Iraqi Army may be facing a high degree of attrition because of strong ISIS resistance slowing their advance inward. ISIS released a video on November 14 showing numerous, successful Suicide Vehicle-Borne IEDs (SVBIEDs) striking ISF units which tried and failed to stop the attack. The video also showed ISIS militants utilizing captured CTS vehicles. A field report from November 11 revealed that the CTS suffered high casualties in an effort to take al-Samah neighborhood on November 4 and could suggest that the CTS likely suffered similar casualties in following operations. The likely attrition of the CTS is extremely dangerous for the Mosul operation; the CTS is the most elite unit in the ISF and the only one with sufficient training in urban warfare. Moreover, the CTS’s participation in Mosul follows its involvement in Ramadi in January, Fallujah in June, and Qayyarah in August, giving the units limited time to regroup before tackling Mosul.

The ISF will face greater challenges as it moves into western Mosul. ISIS’s resistance in eastern Mosul was expected to be the easier fight as the majority of Mosul’s population is concentrated in the west, especially in the Old City where the maze-like, narrow streets will constrict ISF movement and vision. Several of the western neighborhoods were former areas of operation for al Qaeda, so these areas may have lasting insurgent networks capable of contesting ISF control and a population reluctant to trust government forces. The ISF’s struggle to clear eastern Mosul thus raises concern for its ability to overcome greater obstacles in the western half, especially as continued attrition will renders the force less effective. 

Other ISF units will move into the city to assist this main effort, but they may not provide the needed reinforcement for the CTS or a sufficient force to hold the city. The 9th and 16th Iraqi Army Divisions operating to the north and south of Mosul, respectively, are struggling to overcome ISIS obstacles outside of the city limits and are less effective than the CTS in urban warfare. The 9th Division, as the only armored division, is also likely to deploy to western Anbar after the ISF takes Mosul. The Federal Police, moving towards Mosul’s airport from the south, are compromised by Iranian-backed Shi’a militias and have limited training in urban warfare. The use of sectarian violence by some Federal Police units will also undermine security and civilians’ trust in the ISF. Some Coalition-trained units remain in western Anbar and Baghdad, however the Iraqi Government will likely elect to keep these units in western Anbar for the inevitable operation around al-Qa’im and in Baghdad out of wariness that ISIS will strike in the capital in response to losses in Mosul.

ISIS will take advantage of these limitations of the ISF and try to resurge in the city. The ISF’s difficulty in clearing and holding a limited number of neighborhoods now indicates that it will also struggle to hold the whole city. ISIS has already shown its ability to reinfiltrate cleared cities, such as several suicide attacks in Fallujah on November 14 and 17. The holding operation in Mosul will require significant resources and manpower to ensure the city remains secure and that Salafi-Jihadi groups cannot reestablish attack capabilities in the city.

Warning Update: Kurdish Terrorism in Europe

By: Joan O'Bryan

The intensifying Turkish-Kurdish war in Syria and Turkey is spilling over to the European countries to which these ethnic and linguistic groups have immigrated. Violent attacks by Kurdish youth groups have increased across Europe after Turkey arrested fifteen parliamentarians from the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) on November 3, 2016. The continued attacks alongside Kurdish protests have the potential to further damage already fraught relationships between the European Union and Turkey.

Violent attacks by Kurdish youth groups have increased across Europe after Turkey arrested twelve parliamentarians from the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) on November 3. The Apoist Youth Initiative (AYI), a Europe-based Kurdish nationalist group formed in the summer of 2015, has claimed six attacks on Turkish-owned business and organizations in Germany and two attacks in England since November 3, and unknown activists have committed three additional attacks in solidarity in Spain and France. The attacks have increased in frequency and intensity, and the embassies and consulates of the Republic of Turkey are increasingly likely targets.

Concurrently, the Kurdish diaspora populations have protested in major cities in Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, and France. Alawite populations in Europe have also joined the protests in support of Turkish Alawites, who as Shi’a Muslims fear the ruling Sunni Justice and Development Party (AKP). Protests in Cologne, Germany are growing, from attracting thousands on November 5 to tens of thousands on November 12. Germany is the center of the Kurdish diaspora, with a population of at least 700,000 ethnic Kurds. France has the second largest population of ethnic Kurds, numbering at least 120,000.

Turkish state media has attributed all the attacks and demonstrations to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – a designated terrorist group which is currently fighting an active insurgency against Turkey. On November 16, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused Germany of giving the PKK support “implicitly or explicitly.” He then accused Belgium of supporting anti-Turkish militants, calling it “an important center for [the] PKK.” Erdogan’s accusations against the European governments are overstated, but the unrest does show some links to the PKK. The AYI openly seeks the release of PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan, who has been imprisoned in Turkey since 1999. At the demonstrations, protestors have been carrying placards with Öcalan’s picture. Although European governments have condemned the arrests, they have yet to respond to the protests or attacks officially.

Indicators that the unrest will continue are continued calls for protests by leaders of the Kurdish diaspora. The situation could escalate if the AYI injures a Turkish national. Additionally, if Erdogan-loyal Turkish populations begin counter-protesting, the likelihood for violence is high.  The continued AYI attacks and Kurdish protests have the potential to further damage the already fraught relationships between the European Union and Turkey.

European governments will attempt to prevent attacks on consulates but will not suppress Kurdish protests due to protection of free speech, angering a repressive Erdogan. European failure to protect Turkish property or to denounce protest movements could further damage European-Turkish relations. This burgeoning problem could undermine the March 18, 2016 deal between the EU and Turkey, wherein Turkey promised to stem the flow of refugees to Europe in exchange for financial aid, visa-free travel for Turkish citizens, and additional progress towards EU membership. Additionally, soured relationships, as indicated by further statements by Erdogan, could hinder cooperation between Europe and Turkey on the anti-ISIS campaign in Iraq and Syria and further Turkish-Russian rapprochement. 

Iraq Situation Report: November 9-17, 2016

By Kevin Cooper and Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

ISIS escalated its execution campaign in and around Mosul, targeting former Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) officers and civilians accused of collaborating with the ISF in order to maintain control and inflict fear as the ISF closes in. The UN, Human Rights Watch (HRW), and local sources reported that ISIS has executed hundreds of civilians on charges of collaborating with the ISF and has executed or kidnapped over 600 former ISF officers when it withdrew from terrain, including Hammam al-Alil and near Tel Afar. ISIS is using the execution campaign to demonstrate control over its population, deter the ISF from advancing lest ISIS retaliates with executions, and tamp down on possible internal resistance. It will likely increase this tactic as the ISF closes in on Mosul where the majority of the estimated 1.5 million civilians still remain, raising the likelihood of high human causalities during the operation to retake the city.  

ISIS reactivated networks in Anbar, allowing it to carry out suicide attacks in secured locations near Fallujah and Karbala. ISIS carried out successful suicide attacks near Karbala and at a checkpoint in Fallujah on November 14 and in Amiriyat al-Fallujah on November 17, targeting Shi’a pilgrims, security forces, and civilians. The attack in Fallujah marks the first attacks since the city’s recapture in June. The locations of the attacks suggest that ISIS has reestablished or consolidated networks in the area or found residents that remain either tolerant of ISIS’s ideology or opposed to the government enough to allow ISIS to infiltrate. ISIS will continue to exploit the gaps left in local security due to the large deployment of ISF and Popular Mobilization units away from Fallujah to northern Iraq in order to carry out attacks.

Warning Update: Russia Escalates Its Air Campaign in Syria

by Chris Kozak, Kathleen Weinberger, Genevieve Casagrande and Jonathan Mautner

Key Takeaway: Russia resumed its air campaign against Aleppo City on November 15 after a nearly month-long pause on strikes in the besieged city. The operations included sorties launched from the newly-arrived Russian aircraft carrier ‘Admiral Kuznetsov’ and its accompanying battlegroup in order to showcase the military strength and power projection capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces. Russia also announced the deployment of up to seven additional S-300 anti-aircraft systems to Syria in order to reinforce its existing air defense network. Russia aims to advance its short-term goal to force the surrender of the opposition in Aleppo City while setting conditions to constrain the options of the U.S. in Syria in the long-term.  

Russia launched a new intensive air campaign throughout Northern Syria on 15 NOV in order to showcase the capabilities of its newly-deployed air and naval units.

• Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu announced the start of a “major operation” targeting positions allegedly held by ISIS and Al-Qaeda in Idlib and Homs Provinces.

• Activist reports indicated that Russia resumed airstrikes against opposition-held districts of Aleppo City, breaking a nearly month-long moratorium on strikes in the city. Russian Ministry of Defense Spokesperson Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov denied the reports as “public rhetoric” and “blatant lies” from the U.S. State Department.

• Russia also reportedly intensified its wider air campaign against core opposition terrain in Aleppo and Idlib Provinces. Despite Shoygu’s earlier statements that Russian forces would target positions in Homs province, activists did not report any intensified air operations.

• Russia launched combat sorties from the newly-arrived Russian aircraft carrier ‘Admiral Kuznetsov’ based in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, marking the first such use of an aircraft carrier in combat by Russia.

• The Russian Frigate ‘Admiral Grigorovich’ conducted cruise missile strikes from the Mediterranean Sea in support of the offensive. Russia also claimed that Bastion-P Anti-Ship Missiles were fired against ground targets in Syria in a show of land attack capability.

• These developments support ISW’s forecast at the start of the month that Russia would escalate its air campaign against Aleppo City and Damascus over the near-term in order to tout its standing as a great power, reinforce its claims to be a credible partner against violent extremism, and reinvigorate domestic support for its continued participation in the Syrian Civil War.

Meanwhile, Russia continued to strengthen its regional air defense capabilities in order to set long-term conditions to maintain its de-facto no-fly zone over much of Syrian airspace.

• The Russian Armed Forces announced the deployment of seven additional S-300V4 air defense systems to Syria on 15 NOV.[i]

• Russia has built up a de-facto no-fly zone in northern Syria using a combination of S-400, S-300 and shorter range (Buk, Pantsir) air defense missile systems.

• The newly deployed S-300V4 systems will provide additional coverage for Russian naval units and build further redundancy into its integrated air defense system (IADS).

Russia will likely attempt to achieve its short-term aim to clear opposition forces from Eastern Aleppo City while positioning itself to maintain its long-term influence amidst a new incoming administration in the U.S.

• Russia will leverage the asymmetric advantage of its air and naval assets in an attempt to force the surrender of besieged districts in Aleppo City, defeat the acceptable opposition in Northwestern Syria, and precipitate the transformation of the opposition into a movement dominated by Salafi-jihadist groups.  

• The successful bombardment of Aleppo by Russian air and naval units is meant to bolster Russian domestic support for the intervention and President Vladimir Putin’s regime.

• Strengthening Russian IADS by deploying redundant systems will further constrain U.S. options for engagement in Syria.

• Russia aims to exploit the radicalization of the opposition to legitimize its continued intervention in Syria and create leverage to negotiate a military partnership with the incoming U.S. administration. A military partnership along Russia’s terms would significantly confine U.S. action in Syria and allow Russia to consolidate its position of regional influence at the expense of U.S. national security interests.

For Further Reading:

“Russia Advances its IADS in Syria,” Chris Harmer and Kathleen Weinberger

“Warning Update: Russia Prepares to Escalate Military Intervention in Syria,” Jonathan Mautner et al.

“Russian Airstrikes in Syria: October 12 - November 8, 2016,” Jonathan Mautner

“Russia’s False ISIS Narrative in Syria,” Hugo Spaulding

“The Russian Air Campaign in Aleppo,” Genevieve Casagrande

“Russian Airstrikes in Syria: Pre- and Post-Cessation of Hostilities,” Genevieve Casagrande

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[i] http:\\www.interfax.ru/world/537117

Ukraine Warning Update: Increasing Public Frustration Threatens to Destabilize Ukraine

                                           By: Franklin Holcomb, Nicholas Conlon, and Dmytro Hryckowian

Key Takeaway: Ukraine is entering a period of high political instability as pro-Russia and populist actors exploit the growing discontent of the Ukrainian public with the government of President Petro Poroshenko. Russia and pro-Russia actors may take advantage of this discontent and halt or reverse Ukraine’s efforts to integrate with the West. The situation threatens the survival of the Poroshenko government.

Hundreds of Ukrainians gathered outside the Ukrainian parliament and National Bank of Ukraine on November 14 in highly-orchestrated protests against the Poroshenko administration and the Bank.  The number of protestors grew to 6,000 on November 15, and nearly 2,000 people continued to protest on November 16. Demonstrators expressed conflicting reasons for their attendance. Some claimed to receive payment for their participation, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) reported a group of about 30 young men preventing demonstrators from leaving the protest, suggesting orchestration of the protests by outside elements. The pro-Russian Opposition Bloc and Yulia Tymoshenko’s Batkivshina (Fatherland) party have called on citizens dissatisfied with the government to join in protests. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) accused Russia of orchestrating the protests. The current demonstrations are much larger than similar protests over the past two years, suggesting that the anti-western parties orchestrating the protests are increasingly confident of their ability to exert pressure in Kyiv.[1] The Ukrainian government deployed over 5,000 law enforcement personnel into Kyiv to maintain order, but there have yet to be any provocations or incidents related to the protests. 

The protests in Kyiv come as the political situation in Ukraine deteriorates and President Poroshenko and his government face significant pressure from internal and external opposition:

·         

•       Public dissatisfaction with the government due to the slow pace of reform may be approaching levels that allow anti-western forces to destabilize the Ukrainian government.  Over 50,000 Ukrainian officials released e-declarations of their assets on October 31 in a positive step towards reducing corruption and increasing transparency in the Ukrainian government. This move has created public backlash, however, after it was revealed that many officials held large amounts of savings in offshore accounts and in cash. Moreover, a study published by Transparency International on November 16  revealed that 38% of Ukrainians reported paying bribes to access basic services, 64% believe “most” or “all” members of parliament are corrupt, and 86% rated the government’s anti-corruption efforts as “bad” or “very bad.”

• Reformist politicians in Ukraine continue to withdraw support from Poroshenko’s government, weakening its credibility. Mikheil Saakashvili, the prominent governor of Ukraine’s Odessa region, along with National Police Chief Khatia Dekanoidze and Odessa Customs Chief Yulia Marushevska, resigned from their positions in November, citing widespread corruption in the government. Pro-reform politicians have been leaving the Ukrainian government for similar reasons since Aivaras Abromavicius resigned as Economic Minister on February 3. Saakashvili announced the creation of a new political party on November 11 and advocated for early parliamentary elections.

• Localized political violence in Ukraine continues, contributing to the overall atmosphere of volatility. The right-wing Azov Battalion established its own political party, “the National Corps,” on October 14. The volunteer militia also participated in minor protests in Kyiv in September and stormed the regional police headquarters in Cherkasy on November 05.

• Internal tensions in the Ukrainian parliament are high. Physical altercations between the leader of the populist Radical Party Oleh Lyashko and members of the pro-Russia Opposition Bloc occurred on November 14 and 15 after Lyashko accused the Opposition Bloc deputies of taking orders from Moscow.

• Ukrainian hackers released emails from Vladislav Surkov, a top advisor to Vladimir Putin, on October 25 indicating that Putin plans to destabilize Ukraine in order to put a more pro-Russia government in power between November 2016 and March 2017. The emails revealed detailed plans to mobilize dissent and anti-government action in 10-15 regions of Ukraine throughout November. 

• The victories of pro-Russia parties in elections in Moldova and Bulgaria and the arrival of a new U.S. presidential administration may threaten Ukraine’s position in the international community. Ukraine is unsure of the future of its partnership with the United States as a new administration takes office.

The continued dissatisfaction of the Ukrainian public with the level of corruption and slow rate of reform has created a political situation highly susceptible to destabilization by pro-Russia actors.

•           The most likely scenario is that the current crisis in confidence will gradually escalate and undermine President Poroshenko’s government, leading to its inability to govern without support from pro-Russia, pro-reform, or populist parties. Government dysfunction, or refusal to implement necessary reforms, could magnify public discontent and drive support for snap elections in coming months. Snap elections present an opportunity for pro-reform parties to gain more influence in government if they successfully coalesce behind one party and platform, but also threaten to enable the more unified pro-Russia and populist parties. 

•  The most dangerous scenario is that pro-Russia actors play on public dissatisfaction and mobilize support for snap elections before pro-reform and pro-western forces can consolidate, resulting in the victory of a consolidated pro-Russia/populist coalition. A decisive victory for pro-Russia forces would return Ukraine into Russia’s political orbit and undermine the efforts to reform the country’s government and economy made since the current pro-western coalition came to power in 2014.

Potential indicators that the crisis will continue to escalate are the continuation or expansion and spread of protests across Ukraine, particularly in the Kharkiv, Odessa, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts, resignations by pro-reform officials and increasing dysfunction and tension within the Ukrainian parliament. If pro-Russian forces are unable to draw populist parties into their coalition, it is likely that the Poroshenko government will maintain power if it increases its cooperation with pro-reform parties in response to increasing public dissatisfaction. Russia may act to continue or exacerbate the crisis in Ukraine to give its political proxies time to consolidate and delegitimize pro-western actors in Ukraine. Russia could generate public clashes between pro-Russia provocateurs and other factions, fund and orchestrate large public protests in politically volatile regions, leak negative information about pro-western politicians, or surge the activity of its proxy forces operating in eastern Ukraine.

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[1] “Financial Maidan: Thousands Hit the Streets in New Kiev Protest,” Sputnik News, April 20, 2015. Available: https://sputniknews(.)com/europe/201412231016155133/

“Ukraine: 'Financial Maidan' protesters besiege Verkhovna Rada in Kiev,” Ruptly, April 9, 2015. Available: https://www.vbox7(.)com/play:5bbf5d8097 https://www.rt(.)com/news/260905-clashes-fire-kiev-protest/

“Clashes, tires on fire outside Ukrainian parliament in Kiev,” RT, May 21, 2015. Available: https://www.rt(.)com/news/260905-clashes-fire-kiev-protest/

The Campaign for Mosul: November 8-15, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

As the fight between the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and ISIS in and around Mosul compresses, the high stakes of the operation and close-contact warfare are increasingly placing Mosul’s civilian population in the crossfire.

The ISF is consolidating gains to the north and south of Mosul as it continues to contest neighborhoods in eastern Mosul. The Federal Police continued its advances along the western Tigris River bank, looking to breach the city limits through the airport. On the eastern bank, the Iraqi Army and tribal fighters recaptured several villages north of the Great Zab River from November 8 to 15, including the ancient Assyrian city of Nimrud on November 13. ISIS destroyed much of the fabled ruins, which it deemed idolatrous, in the spring of 2015. Meanwhile, army units are positioning to enter Mosul from the north after retaking Bahwiza and its environs on November 8. Inside the city, units from the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) and Iraqi Army are engaged in over a dozen neighborhoods in eastern Mosul, announcing recapture of three neighborhoods in northeastern Mosul on November 12 and 13.

The Popular Mobilization is moving to take the military base southwest of Tel Afar as a strategic stepping stone towards the city of Tel Afar, west of Mosul. The base could also serve as a launch pad for intended militia operations into Syria. The capture of the Tel Afar base would give the primarily Iranian-backed paramilitary force a major foothold in northern Iraq, adding to the Popular Mobilization legitimacy as an Iraqi security institution. The establishment of a formal Shi’a militia base in northern Iraq will likely increase the risk of sectarian violence and create conflict with both local Sunni Arab and Kurdish populations and with Turkey, the latter of which threatened on October 30 undisclosed action if the Shi’a militias “terrorized” the region.

ISIS’s resistance has become increasingly brutal over November 8 to 15 in response to the ISF’s advance towards Mosul’s city center. Its defensive mechanisms include the use of the high number of civilians still living in the neighborhoods as human shields to slow and deter the ISF. ISIS has deployed snipers to rooftops of still-inhabited houses, denying the ISF the ability to call in airstrikes lest striking the families inside. ISIS has also been pulling civilians into the city from surrounding villages to be used as shields while executing hundreds of civilians accused of collaborating with the ISF. Meanwhile, Human Rights Watch (HRW) confirmed on November 11 that ISIS used blistering agents against both civilians and security forces in Qayyarah in late August. The report,  following accounts of chlorine and mustard gas attacks in Bashiqa, northeast of Mosul, and the burning sulfur plant north of Qayyarah, underscores that ISIS will continue to use chemical weapons as part of its defense as well.

The ISF and Peshmerga have also been accused of human rights violations, which could undermine the mission to defeat and prevent the reconstitution of insurgent groups in Iraq. Amnesty International reported on November 10 that men in Federal Police uniforms had carried out extrajudicial killings of accused ISIS members in towns south of Mosul, while HRW accused in a November 15 report ISF members of mutilating ISIS corpses and executing surrendered militants, both of which constitute war crimes. HRW also issued a report on November 10 accusing both ISF and Peshmerga officials of unlawfully detaining or disappearing suspected ISIS militants at screening centers and camps around Mosul. Officials from the Iraqi and Kurdistan Regional Governments have denied the reports. Nevertheless, reports of human rights abuses underscore the high risk that the violations will increase as forces move into the dense urban terrain and the line between civilian and militant blurs. If the ISF fails to prove itself a better champion to Mosul’s population than ISIS was in 2014, it sets conditions for another insurgent group to exploit the seams between civilians and the government and resurge in ISIS’s wake.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: October 12 - November 8, 2016

By Jonathan Mautner

Russia continued to conduct a limited air campaign likely designed to set conditions for a coordinated pro-regime offensive against opposition-held districts of Aleppo City. The Russian ‘Admiral Kuznetsov’ – an aircraft carrier carrying a contingent of Su-33 and MiG-29K/KUB fighter jets allegedly equipped with precision-guided munitions – arrived off the Syrian Coast on or around November 9. The ‘Admiral Kuznetsov’ and its battlegroup of missile cruisers and up to three submarines equipped with ‘Kalibr’ long-range cruise missiles will reportedly conduct ‘training exercises’ in the waters between Cyprus and Greece from November 10 – 15 and November 17 – 22.[i] Russia will likely use the ‘training exercises’ to obscure an aggressive assault on Aleppo City that leverages the Kuznetsov in a projection of force against “terrorism” and thereby bolsters domestic support for its operations in Syria. The carrier, however, will not likely provide sufficient military capability to achieve an immediate victory for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Aleppo City; rather, Russia will use the escalation in support of a long-term strategy to render the city uninhabitable and depopulate its opposition-held districts. Russia used its air campaign to target core opposition terrain in Idlib Province and Western Aleppo Province in advance of the carrier’s arrival, hindering the movement of opposition forces vying to reinforce besieged Aleppo City. Russia also conducted targeted airstrikes in support of pro-regime forces on the southwestern outskirts of Aleppo City after opposition factions launched a new operation to break the siege of the city on October 28. Although limited, these strikes blunted the opposition offensive, preserving the siege and rendering opposition-held districts increasingly vulnerable to the upcoming escalation.

In advance of the expected escalation in Aleppo City, Russia also continued to cultivate the false perception that it is intervening in order to defend civilian populations in regime-held western Aleppo City against aggression from the opposition. Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu accused opposition forces on November 1 of regularly targeting “peaceful civilians” in Aleppo City since the start of a series of humanitarian pauses twelve days before, stating that “prospects for the start of a negotiation process” to end the Syrian Civil War have been “postponed for an indefinite period” due to the ongoing attacks. In effect, Russia conditioned the resumption of its air campaign in Aleppo City on the basis of a red line that the opposition had already crossed, highlighting its continuing efforts to portray its operations in the city as a legitimate response to opposition provocation. With this purported justification in hand, Russia will likely exploit international focus on the recent U.S. presidential election in order to renew concerted efforts to force the ultimate surrender of opposition groups in Aleppo City.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. 

High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.

ISW was unable to assess any Russian airstrikes in Syria with high confidence during this reporting period.

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[i] http://www(.)interfax(.)ru/world/536174.  

Warning Update: Economic and Political Instability in Egypt

By Wesam Hassanein

Key Takeaway: The Muslim Brotherhood called for mass protests on Friday, November 11 in response to harsh economic reforms by the Egyptian government. Egypt is at risk of major economic and political instability following President Sisi's decision to implement severe economic policies in pursuit of a loan from the IMF, which he hopes will stabilize Egypt's turbulent economy. Egypt's dire economic situation is compounded by geopolitical tension. Most notably, Saudi Arabia's decision to halt oil shipments put the Egyptian government in a very precarious financial and political position. Islamist and militant groups will likely take advantage of this instability, and use it as an opportunity to gain power in Egypt.

 

Egypt's dismal economic situation prompted the Egyptian government to implement unpopular economic reforms. Egypt's economic woes began in 2011, when political uprisings prompted the collapse Egyptian tourism, the country's most crucial industry. The tourism industry further deteriorated following ISIS's bombing of a Russian plane in October 2015. Egypt also struggled to attract foreign direct investment after mass protests and a coup in 2013. Furthermore, the Egyptian government began to invest heavily in large public works projects, such as the extension of the Suez Canal, following President Sisi's inauguration in June 2014. These events diminished the state's coffers and put pressure on Egyptian currency. Moreover, the Gulf countries, particularly the United Arab Emirates, reportedly halted their aid to Egypt as of October 2016, in order to further pressure the Egyptian government into reforming its own economy. President Sisi has asked the IMF for a loan, which comes with stringent conditions. The Egyptian government has taken several actions in order to comply with the IMF requirements:

• The Egyptian government floated its currency and raised fuel subsidies by 30-48% on November 3, 2016.
• Additionally, it secured six billion dollars from outside sources, including two billion dollars from Saudi Arabia in September and a $2.7 billion currency swap deal with China in October.
• Furthermore, the Egyptian Cabinet approved 15-20% cut in government spending
• The Egyptian Parliament passed the Civil Service Law in October in order to reform Egypt's bloated bureaucracy.
• The Egyptian Parliament also passed a Value Added Tax Law in August.

Egypt's ability to cope with the IMF's mandated reforms is very limited. President Sisi's popularity declined by fourteen percent between September and November 2016. Inflation rates in Egypt are at their highest in seven years. Egyptian non-oil business activity has not grown in thirteen months, and Egypt is also experiencing severe shortages of sugar and of medical supplies. 

  

Egypt has a history of political instability following drastic economic reforms. Egypt previously experienced mass demonstrations after the lifting of subsidies and price hikes in 1977 and in 2008. 

• In 1977, the Egyptian economy's sluggish performance prompted then-President Anwar Sadat to request a loan from the IMF. The Egyptian government subsequently lifted food and fuel subsidies as conditions for receiving this loan.  Mass protests erupted throughout the country, prompting President Sadat to restore order through military action and to backtrack on economic reforms.
• Similarly, in 2008, grain shortages and high food prices prompted thousands to protest in several Egyptian cities. The Egyptian government blamed the Muslim Brotherhood for provoking these protests, and increased security presence in major squares throughout the country. 

The Muslim Brotherhood has previously taken advantage of protests in Egypt in order to destabilize the Egyptian regime, as it did during the so-called Arab Spring of 2011. Social and economic grievances were a main driver of the mass protests that led to former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak's resignation in February 2011. 

The risk of political instability brought about by Egypt's dire economic situation is compounded by geopolitical tension. The Egyptian oil minister announced on November 7, 2016 that Saudi Arabia notified Egypt it would halt oil shipments until further notice.  This decision sent shockwaves through Egypt, and rattled its already unstable economy. Tensions between Saudi Arabia and Egypt are increasing. The nuclear deal between the United States and Iran prompted a shift in Saudi Arabia's strategic priorities towards integrating and containing Islamist forces in order to present a unified Sunni bloc against Iranian influence in the region.  Conversely, the Egyptian regime views Islamist forces, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, as an existential threat to its stability. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have since found themselves at odds in several theaters:

• The Egyptian government has refused to send ground troops to support Saudi efforts against Houthis in Yemen. Additionally, the Egyptian government came out in March 2016 against the idea of sending ground troops to fight Assad and ISIS in Syria. 
•  Meanwhile, Egypt attempted to placate Saudi King Salman during his visit to Egypt in April 2016 by transferring control of two small islands in the Red Sea.  However, the Egyptian court halted the transfer in June. 
• Most importantly, the strain on Saudi-Egyptian relations surfaced publicly following Egypt's decision to vote in favor of a Russian resolution in the U.N. Security Council on October 12, 2016. Two resolutions regarding international involvement in the ongoing civil war in Syria came before the U.N. Security Council in early October. The first resolution, presented by the French, demanded an end to airstrikes and the implementation of a no-fly zone. The Russian resolution called for a ceasefire, and did not acknowledge the French resolution. Egypt voted in favor of both, and in doing so explicitly voted against the position of Saudi Arabia in its support for the Russian resolution. The Saudi envoy to the United Nations called Egypt's position "painful," and well known Saudi Arabians went to social media to criticize President Sisi for being disloyal, and even "anti-Arab."

In light of the decreasing geopolitical cooperation between the two countries, and especially in response to Egypt's vote with Russia in the U.N. Security Council, Saudi Arabia suddenly halted oil deliveries to Egypt on October 11, 2016. Subsequently, the Egyptian government has resorted to buying oil from the international market at a much higher cost.  This increased financial strain on Egypt's foreign currency reserves, and Egypt's hard currency reserves declined by $550 million in October.

 

The Egyptian government's decision to reform its economy presents adversaries with an opportunity to exploit the resulting instability. The Muslim Brotherhood has already taken advantage of this opportunity with its call for protests on Friday, November 11. Whether ordinary Egyptians will heed the call of the Muslim Brotherhood remains to be seen. However, Sisi's regime is on a dangerous path toward turbulent political and economic conditions, compounded by the Muslim Brotherhood's increasing popularity, rising levels of inflation due to drastic, IMF-mandated economic reform measures, ill-timed investments in mega projects by the regime, and the loss of economic support from Gulf countries. These conditions will foster instability and discontent in Egypt, ripe for exploitation.

 

Powerful states, Islamist political groups, and Salafi-jihadi militant organizations will likely seek to take advantage of Egypt's political and economic instability in the short term. The Muslim Brotherhood will likely take advantage of the eruption of any protests in Cairo in order to come back to power. Gulf states, dissatisfied with Egypt's political and economic behavior, may back these Islamist groups. Similarly, Salafi -Jihadi organizations will exploit tensions in Egyptian society and take advantage of governance gaps in order to threaten the Egyptian state. If the economic and political situation deteriorates further, a security vacuum will emerge which could lead various militant organizations, such as ISIS's Wilayat Sinai, to achieve a greater foothold in the Egyptian mainland. As economic conditions threaten President Sisi's hold on power, Egypt could turn in desperation to new sources of economic and political aid - such as Russia and Iran. Russia would demand concessions from Egypt; likely in the form of naval privileges or possibly even establishment of a base on the Mediterranean. 

Ukraine Update: October 13-November 9, 2016

                                                                      By: Franklin Holcomb and Dmytro Hryckowian


Despite the Ukrainian Government’s continued efforts to enact anti-corruption reforms, confidence in the government continues to fall. The Ukrainian parliament established the“Independent Anti-corruption Committee of Defense” and passed amendments to the tax code on October 26th in a public effort to reduce corruption and increase transparency. Ukrainian government officials also released ‘e-declarations’ of their personal assets in order to expose outsized earnings and assets of some government officials. This positive step to make the government more accountable to citizens was, however, greeted with outrage as Ukrainians realized the sharp disparities in earnings and wealth between average Ukrainians and some of their leaders. In another blow to the government’s reformist image, the Governor of Odessa Oblast Mikheil Saakashvili resigned on November 7, citing vast corruption and distrust in President Petro Poreshenko’s government. President Poroshenko will need to enact more substantial reforms targeting corruption in order to preserve trust in the post Euromaidan government.

Increased instability within the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) suggests a lack of control by the separatist leadership. The Commander of the DNR’s veteran “Sparta” Battalion Arseny Pavlov “Motorola” was assassinated on October 16th, and militant police chiefs and members of the DNR security forces were arrested in Donetsk city on November 2nd. This activity in the DNR follows a recent coup attempt and similar arrests in the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR), indicating a general trend of internal purges aimed at reestablishing control over competing factions within the separatist territories. DNR leader Alexander Zakharckenko’s decision to further postpone local elections suggests that the purges may also be an effort to eliminate internal opposition before elections take place. If separatist leadership is unable to quell infighting amongst separatist ranks, Russia may become more active in order to maintain stability and control of pro-Russia forces in Donbas.