Warning Update: Russia Prepares to Escalate Military Intervention in Syria

By Jonathan Mautner, Genevieve Casagrande, and Christopher Kozak with Omar Kebbe, Kathleen Weinberger, Franklin Holcomb, and Benjamin Knudsen

Key Takeaway: Russia is preparing to escalate its military operations in Syria in order to tout its standing as a great power, reinforce its claims to be a credible partner against violent extremism, and reinvigorate domestic support for its continued participation in the Syrian Civil War. Russia has set conditions for a major demonstration of its military might following the completion of the latest in a long series of ‘humanitarian pauses’ in Aleppo City set to end on November 4. Russia’s sole aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, is expected to arrive off the Syrian Coast in the coming days. The arrival of the Kuznetsov with its accompanying fleet of cruise missile-equipped submarines and frigates signals Russia’s likely intent to conduct a new wave of strikes against strategically significant targets in Syria. The deployment comes amidst a recent opposition offensive to break the pro-regime siege of Aleppo City as well as continued pro-regime gains in the Eastern Ghouta Suburbs of Damascus. Russia will likely exploit opportunities in both Aleppo City and Damascus to highlight its ability to project force against "terrorism" and demonstrate the continued legitimacy of its client regime.

Russia intends to escalate its military operations in Aleppo City and Damascus within the coming days in order to demonstrate its force projection capabilities and bolster flagging public appeal for its involvement in the conflict. Russia deployed its lone aircraft carrier - the Admiral Kuznetsov – to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea on or around October 17. The Kuznetsov is also carrying a contingent of Su-33 and MiG-29K/KUB fighter jets that Russian sources claim are equipped with precision-guided munitions, as well as Ka-52 attack helicopters armed with long-range anti-tank guided missiles.[i] The Kuznetsov is escorted by a battle group that includes as many as three submarines likely equipped with Kalibr long-range cruise missiles. The Kuznetsov reached the Mediterranean Sea on November 1 and is expected to arrive off the Syrian Coast in the coming days, where it will be joined by an additional frigate armed with Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea Fleet.[ii] Once the battle group arrives, it will likely not remain idle. Russia will likely use these new assets to support pro-regime ground operations in Aleppo City or Damascus in an attempt to improve domestic support for its military intervention in the Syrian Civil War through a showcase of its naval and air capabilities. A recent poll by the Levada Center indicated that support for the intervention has begun to slip since 2015.[iii] Russians now doubt the Syrian Civil War as a route to improving Russia’s international image or finding common ground with the West.[iv] Russian President Vladimir Putin will likely attempt to reinvigorate these sentiments through a high-profile demonstration of military might and effectiveness.

Condition Setting for Escalation in Aleppo

Russia has set conditions for a dramatic escalation in military activity in Aleppo City following a series of ‘humanitarian pauses’ and an overall decrease in the tempo of its air campaign. Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian Armed Forces to implement a ten-hour ‘humanitarian pause’ on November 4 in order to allow civilians and opposition fighters to evacuate Eastern Aleppo City. The temporary ceasefire follows a series of similar ‘humanitarian pauses’ in Aleppo City on October 20 – 22. The statement follows claims by the Russian Ministry of Defense that its warplanes have halted all air operations in Aleppo City since mid-October 2016. The tempo of the Russian air campaign against opposition-held areas of Eastern Aleppo City decreased significantly from October 28 to November 1 despite concerted opposition ground operations to break the pro-regime siege of Aleppo City. Russia nonetheless continued to conduct heavy airstrikes against opposition terrain on the southwestern outskirts of Aleppo City and its surrounding countryside as recently as October 26 – 27, according to local activist sources. The relative lull in airstrikes followed increasingly public threats of targeted sanctions from the U.S. and EU as well as calls for investigations into potential war crimes committed by pro-regime forces in Aleppo City, suggesting that Russia may aim to relieve mounting international backlash against its attempts to depopulate Aleppo City through an aggressive air campaign.

Russia will likely use the Kuznetsov and its extant military assets in Syria in order to intensify operations against opposition forces in Aleppo City and its surrounding countryside, bolstering the regime’s crippling siege on opposition-held districts of the city. The imminent arrival of the Kuznetsov to the Syrian Coast is currently set to coincide with the expiration of the latest ‘humanitarian pause’ on November 4. Russia will likely use the airframes and cruise missile-equipped submarines accompanying the carrier as part of a new blitz against Eastern Aleppo City as well as core opposition-held terrain in Western Aleppo and Idlib Provinces. Recent infighting between opposition factions may render Eastern Aleppo City particularly vulnerable to such an escalation. Clashes erupted between the increasingly hardline Islamist opposition group Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki and current U.S.-backed TOW anti-tank missile recipient Fastaqim Kama Umirat in Eastern Aleppo City on November 2. Russia may attempt to exploit continued infighting by targeting these recently-exposed seams. Despite the infighting, neither the Kuznetsov nor the vessels in its battle group possess sufficient military capability to achieve a decisive victory for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Aleppo City. An escalation will nonetheless enable Russia to highlight its ability to project force against “terrorists” in a major urban center, draw parallels to ongoing operations by the U.S. in Mosul, and demonstrate its strength before a domestic audience.

Russia Prepares to Support Regime in Damascus

Russia could also leverage its renewed military intervention to enable the regime to successfully clear opposition forces from Damascus. Damascus holds more strategic significance to Russia than Aleppo City due to its political importance as the seat of government as well as its military role as the hub for military operations throughout Southern Syria. Russia currently weights its military efforts towards Northern Syria due to the threat that opposition groups pose to the regime in Aleppo City. However, Russia currently faces favorable conditions for its air campaign to expand to the capital. Pro-regime forces have set conditions for a major breakthrough in the capital city over the past three years through a brutal siege-and-starve campaign against the opposition-held suburbs. This campaign has now reached a critical tipping point. Pro-regime forces forced the surrender of the key opposition-held town of Darayya in the Western Ghouta Suburbs of Damascus on August 25, resulting in the forced displacement of the seven hundred opposition fighters and several thousand civilians that remained in the town. The regime concluded similar partial evacuations from the nearby opposition-held suburbs of Moadamiyeh, Qudsayya, and Hamah in October 2016 as part of ‘reconciliation agreements’ that brought the towns back under regime control. Pro-regime forces also tightened the siege on the remaining opposition-held pocket of Khan al-Shih in Western Ghouta after seizing the neighboring village of Deir Khabiyah on October 14.

Meanwhile, pro-regime forces have also achieved significant gains against the opposition-held Eastern Ghouta Suburbs of Damascus. An eruption of opposition infighting between Salafi-Jihadist group Jaysh al-Islam and rival Islamist group Faylaq al-Rahman in May 2016 allowed the regime to secure significant gains in the rural farmland that serves as the breadbasket of the besieged opposition-held region. Pro-regime forces seized a steady string of towns over the intervening months, most recently the villages of Tel Kurdi and Tel Sawwan on October 29. These gains have brought pro-regime forces within five kilometers of the opposition stronghold of Douma near Damascus. These continued advances appear to have drawn interest from Russia, which resumed steady air operations targeting both Khan al-Shih and Eastern Ghouta in Damascus beginning in late September 2016. Russia may seek to exploit the demonstrated vulnerability of opposition factions in Damascus as another venue to demonstrate its military prowess and enable success for pro-regime forces on the ground.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad appear increasingly confident in the possibility of their victory in the Syrian Civil War. Assad has conducted a public relations blitz since September 2016, conducting interviews with a number of media outlets in the U.S. and Europe with an eye towards demonstrating the stability of his position and the legitimacy of his rule. Syrian First Lady Asma al-Assad conducted a similar interview with state-owned ‘Rossiya 24’ in Russia on October 18 in her first public interview since 2011. This outreach peaked in a two-day conference held in Damascus on October 30 – 31 for several dozen journalists and analysts from the U.S. and Britain in which Assad stated his intent to finish his presidential term through at least 2021. These statements suggest that Putin and Assad do not anticipate a meaningful challenge to their position in Damascus – highlighting the likely intent of Russia to expand its offensive combat operations in the near-future.

Implications

The Russian escalation as part of a Syrian regime offensive in Damascus and a counter-offensive in Aleppo will accelerate the radicalization of the opposition. Russian strikes by air and by sea will target acceptable opposition groups as they have during previous escalations to eliminate legitimate alternatives to the Assad regime. This continued pressure will hasten the ongoing transformation of the opposition into a movement dominated by Salafi-Jihadist groups such as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria. In the absence of better options, acceptable opposition groups will increasingly cleave to extremist factions for self-preservation in the face of concerted pro-regime advances enabled by the Russian air campaign. Russia’s support to the Assad regime continues to remove potential partners for the U.S. against ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria from the battlefield. The U.S. must therefore be willing to counter the support that Russia is currently providing to the Assad regime in order to achieve its national security objective in Syria.

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[i] https://in(.)rbth(.)com/economics/defence/2016/05/30/first-batch-of-mig-29k-kub-deck-based-fighters-placed-in-service_598547; http://rbth(.)com/defence/2016/11/03/admiral-kuznetsov-aircraft-carrier-group-prepares-for-battle-in-syria_644707

[ii] http://www(.)pravdareport(.)com/news/world/asia/syria/03-11-2016/136065-russia_frigate-0/

[iii] http://www(.)levada(.)ru/2016/10/31/sirijskij-konflikt/

[iv] http://www(.)levada(.)ru/2016/10/31/sirijskij-konflikt/

The Campaign for Mosul: November 1-3, 2016

By Michael Momayezi, Kevin Cooper, and Staley Smith

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) began advancing into Mosul’s eastern and southeastern neighborhoods on November 1-3, marking the first time the ISF has had any presence in the city since ISIS captured it in mid-2014. The Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) stormed Gogjali, Mosul’s easternmost suburb, on November 1 and continued clearing operations on November 2. The CTS then breached Mosul’s eastern city limits, entering al-Karama on November 2 and retaking the neighborhood of Samah on November 3. Units from the 9^th Iraqi Army (IA) Division and the 1^st Rapid Intervention Division recaptured several villages southeast of Mosul before entering the southeastern neighborhoods of Judaya al-Mufti on November 1 and al-Intasar on November 3. The entry into the neighborhoods marks the start of a long operation to clear ISIS’s capital in Iraq block-by-block.

The ISF will face new challenges as it moves beyond ISIS’s outer defenses and into the city itself. ISIS successfully slowed the CTS advance on the eastern edge of the city, where security forces encountered IEDs, boulders obstructing roads, and snipers. ISIS militants had also set fire to oil trenches on the outskirts of the city in order to obscure targets from Coalition airstrikes and deter forces from advancing. Mosul’s urban terrain will further impede advances as the security forces approach the more compact neighborhoods of Mosul’s old city and industrial sectors, and ISIS’s resistance will likely increase and intensify. The risk of civilian casualty is also high, especially among those trapped inside by ISIS to use as human shields. The Iraqi Government has already begun efforts to mitigate this risk, as the Iraqi Ministry of Defense reported that the ISF opened a safe route for civilians to escape fighting on November 3, and some have been transported in Iraqi military vehicles and buses to an Internally-Displaces Persons (IDP) camp in Khazar.

Security forces have made progress recapturing terrain on Mosul’s western and southern axes. Iraqi Shi’a militias made quick gains moving northwest towards the city of Tel Afar, west of Mosul, recapturing many majority-Sunni villages along the southwestern axis from November 1-3. Iranian-backed proxy militias pushing towards Tel Afar, including the Badr Organization, Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), are likely to engage in sectarian violence, though they have encountered few civilians during clearing operations thus far. Meanwhile, the ISF advanced north toward Hammam al-Alil, the last major city between the security forces and Mosul on the southern axis, reaching the city’s outskirts on November 2. From Hammam al-Alil, the ISF can advance to Mosul’s southern limits, where it will likely aim to recapture an airport and military base to use as staging grounds for further operations into the city.

ISW now assesses that the Peshmerga has recaptured Batnaya, a Christian town north of Mosul. Sources reported control of the city as early as October 20, but no official statement was made and sources continued to report movement into the city. The current movement of forces beyond Batnaya and video of Peshmerga forces celebrating inside the city, however, suggests that Batnaya is under Peshmerga control. The recapture of Batnaya pushes Coalition control closer to Mosul’s northern limits as the ISF and Peshmerga continue operations to retake Tel Kayyaf and Bashiqa, respectively.

Turkey deployed additional troops on November 2 to the Turkish town of Silopi on the Turkey-Iraq border. Turkish President Recep Erdogan’s announced the deployment on October 29, cautioning against Shi’a militia abuses against Turkmen populations in Tel Afar, west of Mosul. Other senior Turkish leaders also warned against the establishment of a Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) stronghold in Sinjar and called the build-up a “precaution,” not a threat. Turkey is unlikely to engage in a major operation in Iraq, particularly as it is heavily invested in Syria. However, it is possible that Turkey deploys small units into northern Iraq in order to counter any movement by the PKK or Shi’a militias which it deems hostile. Turkey may also use its build-up as leverage in discussions regarding Mosul’s post-ISIS administration. The Iraqi Government will respond to a deployment of any size as major violation of sovereignty, escalating tensions between Iraq and Turkey and undermining the anti-ISIS Coalition. 

Iraq Situation Report: October 26 - November 1, 2016

By Patrick Martin and the ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: Iraqi security forces made significant gains in the Mosul campaign amid growing humanitarian concerns and fears of sectarian violence. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) broke through ISIS defenses around Mosul, recapturing the ISIS-held town of Shura south of the city on October 29. The Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) also recaptured a television station in eastern Mosul on October 31, marking the first time the ISF entered the city since ISIS captured it in June 2014. As security forces continue to advance into Mosul’s city limits, reports indicate that ISIS is corralling civilians near its positions to serve as human shields while intensifying its executions of non-compliant civilians and former ISF members. ISIS’s deliberate efforts to maximize civilian casualties indicate that operations to clear Mosul’s center will prove far more difficult than past operations in ISIS-held cities like Fallujah and Ramadi. Meanwhile, the Popular Mobilization launched operations to recapture Tal Afar, a majority Turkmen town west of Mosul, on October 29, as well as majority Sunni Arab villages in the Jazeera desert, southwest of Mosul. The advance consists of Shi’a Arab and Shi’a Turkmen militias spearheaded by Iranian proxy militias, whose participation in operations in majority-Sunni areas will increase the likelihood of sectarian violence. ISIS and Sunni insurgent groups will be able to exploit sectarian, ethnic, and tribal divisions to reestablish themselves in recaptured terrain and among disaffected Sunni populations. Tal Afar has a particularly bloody history of sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shi’a Turkmen and historically served as hub of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI); failure of the Iraqi forces to minimize sectarian and ethnic violence during clearing operations will increase the possibility that Sunni insurgent groups will once again resurge in the area, thus undermining the long-term stability of Ninewa Province and Iraq as a whole. 

The Campaign for Mosul: October 29-31, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) reached Mosul’s eastern city limits on October 31 to begin the initial push into the city. Meanwhile, Iraqi Shi’a militias, including Iranian proxies and U.S.-designated terrorist groups, opened up a western axis on October 29 with the intention to retake Tel Afar, west of Mosul. 

The ISF has concentrated on the northern and eastern axes of the Mosul operation and is making progress towards Mosul’s eastern city limits. The Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) reached the border of Mosul’s city limits on October 31, where it clashed with ISIS. The CTS is currently operating around Gogjali, a village bordering Mosul’s eastern limits. The CTS has not yet breached Mosul’s city limits, despite local reports. Meanwhile, units from the 9th Iraqi Army (IA) Division are advancing towards Mosul from the southeast, moving beyond Hamdaniya, which the ISF recaptured on October 22. The 16th IA Division is approaching the city from the north, composing part of the third axis working on breaching Mosul’s eastern side. The 16th IA Division also continues the offensive around Tel Kayyaf, which it reportedly stormed on October 31.

The southern axis advanced after nearly a week of limited progress. The Federal Police recaptured Shura, the former Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) hub, on October 29. Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi visited the city on October 31 after a visit to the Qayyarah Airbase, which landed cargo planes on October 30 for the first time since 2014. The Federal Police now progress north towards Hamam al-Alil, the last major city on the southern axis before Mosul. 

Iraqi Shi’a militias launched an operation on Mosul’s western axis on October 29 in order to retake Tel Afar, a district with a significant Shi’a Turkmen population. The militias include Iranian-backed proxies such as the Badr Organization, Kata’ib Hezbollah, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), a U.S.-designated terrorist group. IRGC-Quds Force Commander Qassem Suleimani also appeared on the frontline on an unspecified date, indicating senior-level Iranian involvement in the planning and coordinating of the operation. The militias’ presence will complicate the Mosul operation and its success in defeating and preventing insurgent groups from resurging in recaptured territories. Many of the militias have a record of sectarian abuses against Sunni civilian populations and could carry out sectarian reprisals on the majority Sunni villages they pass through, as they did during their previous anti-ISIS operations in Fallujah and Tikrit. Sectarian attacks could drive Sunni populations to either seek a protectorate outside of the Iraqi government, including ISIS, or become a foothold for other insurgents, such as AQI, to resurge in Iraq. Tel Afar served as a Sunni insurgent and AQ stronghold in the early years of the Iraq War and could retain dormant AQI networks. Shi’a militia participation in greater Mosul operations also gives them a say in the post-ISIS governance of Mosul. Shi’a militias’ presence in Ninewa, combined with disputes with Kurds over the control of terrain, could marginalize Sunni Arab representation in the future provincial administration, exacerbating conditions for a renewed future Sunni insurgency after Mosul is recaptured.

Turkey may see the militias’ presence in Tel Afar, an ethnically Turkmen town, as grounds for greater intervention in northern Iraq. Turkish President Recep Erdogan stated on October 29 that Turkey would have a “different response” if Shi’a militias “unleash terror” on the city. Erdogan also announced that Turkey will be reinforcing its troops on the Iraqi border in the Turkish border town of Silopi. The town had reportedly already witnessed a military build-up when the Mosul operation began on October 17. The intervention of Shi’a militias into the Mosul operation could thus further ingrain Mosul as the convergence of regional and Iraqi actors, thereby undermining the sovereignty of the Iraqi government in northern Iraq.

Syrian Opposition Launches Second Operation to Break Aleppo Siege

By: Genevieve Casagrande and Jennifer Cafarella

The Syrian armed opposition launched an offensive to break the regime’s siege of Aleppo City on October 28, marking the second major opposition counteroffensive to break the siege since its initial imposition on July 28. Opposition forces led by Jabhat Fatah al Sham (JFS) – successor of al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al Nusra – and Salafi Jihadist group Ahrar al Sham successfully lifted the initial pro-regime siege of the city on August 6. Pro-regime forces with Russian air support, however, re-established the siege once again on September 4.

The offensive seeks to once again break the siege from the city’s southwestern outskirts, which favors the opposition’s style of warfare. The hardline Jaysh al Fatah Coalition – led by JFS and Ahrar al Sham – and the Aleppo-based Fatah Halab Operations Room seized the Dahiyat al Assad district in the southwestern outskirts of Aleppo City on October 28 after JFS and Ahrar al Sham detonated at least three Suicide Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIEDs) and a remote-controlled bulldozer-borne IED in the area. The opposition is now attacking pro-regime forces to the north and south of Dahiyat al Assad, likely in an attempt to fix pro-regime forces in those positions and enable a penetration of the regime’s encirclement through the center.

The opposition is conducting numerous supporting efforts to prevent the regime from reinforcing southwestern Aleppo City and to disrupt Russian and regime airpower. Opposition forces burned tires to obstruct the visibility of warplanes over the city. Ahrar al Sham and other opposition groups also shelled numerous regime-held areas distant from the axis of attack in order to fix pro-regime forces across multiple fronts. Opposition forces may also intend to set conditions for a second major attack against pro-regime forces from inside the city. The target of the most considerable bombardment was the Nayrab Airbase in eastern Aleppo City, which the opposition claimed to target “Russian officers” with “hundreds” of grad rockets. The opposition may have intended either to disrupt the regime and Russian coordination of pro-regime forces in the city or disrupt the regime’s ability to conduct rotary-wing bombardment including chlorine gas canisters. 

Turkish-backed opposition forces north of Aleppo City may join the operation to break the siege. Turkish-backed group Nour al Din al Zenki announced the formation of the “Victory Bloc” Operations Room under the Turkish-led Operation Euphrates Shield. Zenki’s statement declared the opposition’s intent to “alleviate pressure on Aleppo City” and included vague references to targeting pro-regime forces. There is no indication that Turkey has authorized Zenki or other groups in Operation Euphrates Shield to participate in the operation to break the siege. These Turkish-backed forces would need to advance through Syrian Kurdish YPG-held terrain north of Aleppo City in order to reach a front line with pro-regime forces. Zenki’s statement may indicate that it and other rebel groups north of Aleppo City may nonetheless shell pro-regime held areas, further suppressing pro-regime forces inside the city to enable opposition groups to break the siege. 

The Campaign for Mosul: October 25-28, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

Operations to retake Mosul have made minimal progress since the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) announced an operational pause on October 25 in order for the five axes approaching Mosul to re-sync before advances into the city limits begin.

The northern and eastern axes are nearing Mosul’s city limits. The northern axis continues to focus on regaining the towns of Batnaya and Tel Kayyaf, north of Mosul, in order to position forces to breach Mosul’s northern city limits. The Peshmerga entered the Christian town of Batnaya on October 25, but are not assessed to be in control of the city. The Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) is poised to breach Mosul's outskirts from both the east and northeast but called for an operational pause on October 25 in order to wait for the southern axis to advance such that the encirclement of the city is evenly distributed.

The southern axis, however, has made limited progress during this pause. Operation Inherent Resolve Commander Lt. Gen. Steve Townsend described this area of ISIS’s defense as a “very hard external crust,” outside of Mosul’s hard core and a soft middle on October 26. The ISF has faced resistance from ISIS’s suicide attacks and is limited by a shortage in manpower. ISIS has also created a chemical barrier by igniting a sulfur plant on fire located near the confluence of the Tigris and Zab Rivers, north of Qayyarah, when they withdrew from the plant on October 20. The toxic plume of smoke will continue to halt forward movement until the sulfur fire is mitigated or MOPP suits are delivered, though the additional layers of clothing will likely further slow forward progress. 

The ISF finally breached Shura’s city limits, north of Qayyarah, on October 28, having encircled the city since October 19. The ISF will need to break through ISIS’s external crust and quickly make up progress towards Mosul, lest the axes grow out of sync. The southern axis may require additional reinforcements as it will face more attrition than the other axes due to its longer distance to travel towards Mosul.

New players are entering the operation. One thousand five hundred members of the Turkish-backed Ninewa Guard Force, based out of Zaylkan, are assessed to be operating alongside the 16th Iraqi Army Division around Tel Kayyaf. It is unclear if the group’s Turkish advisors are among the forces or if they remain at their base in Zaylkan, where another 1,500 members remain in reserve. All major Iraqi parties, especially the Shi’a militias, have rejected Turkey’s presence in northern Iraq; Turkish direct or indirect participation in the Mosul operation could escalate tensions between Turkey and Iraq. Shi’a militias have also stepped up their involvement in the Mosul operation and are working to open a western axis towards Tel Afar from their current position alongside the Federal Police near Qayyarah. Militia involvement could spark intra-Coalition tensions, especially if Kurdish, Turkish, ISF, and militia forces converge in an area with a proclivity for Sunni insurgency.