Iraq Control of Terrain Map: March 9, 2017

By the ISW Iraq Team

The ISF has continued to make significant progress in operations to recapture terrain from ISIS in Mosul. The ISF cleared the last ISIS-held neighborhood in eastern Mosul on January 24 and launched operations to recapture western Mosul on February 19. As of March 9, the ISF has cleared Mosul International Airport, the Ghazlani Military Base, the Ninewa Government Center, and several neighborhoods in western Mosul. Forces from the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), Emergency Response Division (ERD), and Federal Police (FP) have penetrated southern Mosul and are currently advancing towards the Old City in central Mosul.

Popular Mobilization Units’ (PMU) operations to clear Tal Afar, west of Mosul, and the Jazeera desert in western Ninewa have made marginal progress since November 2016 and are currently stalled. The PMU’s lack of urban clearing capabilities combined with political challenges regarding Iraqi Shi’a militias clearing a majority Sunni Turkmen city have slowed operations. The ISF are on track to clear western Mosul but security breaches in eastern Mosul and the heavy presence of Iraqi Shi'a militias in Ninewa raise serious concerns over the future stability of Ninewa and the future outbreak of sectarian and ethnic conflict.

ISIS Sanctuary Map: March 9, 2017

By Alexandra Gutowski and the ISW Research Team 

ISIS incurred territorial losses in Iraq and Syria between February 27 and March 9, 2017. Pro-regime forces recaptured Palmyra with the assistance of Iran, Russia, and Lebanese Hezbollah on March 2. Pro-regime forces seized additional villages from ISIS in northeast Aleppo province on March 7 and March 9, recapturing critical infrastructure. The U.S.-backed Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) continues to clear the countryside east of Raqqa in an effort to isolate Raqqa city, seizing villages along an interior road on March 9. Iraqi Security Forces captured the Ninewa government building in southwest Mosul on March 7 as well. ISIS retains capable ground forces in Raqqa, eastern Homs, and Deir ez Zour provinces that will continue to attack regime forces in Syria. ISIS has also likely infiltrated broader zones across Iraq and Syria that it will cultivate for future spectacular attack campaigns. ISIS appears to be concurrently surging in Afghanistan, which ISIS may increasingly emphasize within its global campaign as it incurs losses in Iraq and Syria that it cannot immediately offset.

The Campaign for Mosul: March 2-8, 2017

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) recaptured the government complex in central Mosul on March 7. ISIS has increased its use of chemical weapons in its defense.

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) made a push towards central Mosul on March 7, retaking the government complex and securing a second bridge. Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi arrived in Mosul for the occasion. The Federal Police and Emergency Response Division (ERD) continue to advance north by skirting along the river’s edge rather than penetrate into the dense Old City. The Federal Police and ERD have spearheaded operations in western Mosul instead of the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) which is leading a secondary line of effort in southwestern neighborhoods. The move was likely an effort to relieve the weary CTS of bearing the main thrust of the western operations. The ISF will likely continue to advance along the river, where the roads are wider and the ISF can remain in vehicles, until it reaches the 1st “Iron” Bridge. There it can turn west and advance towards the Great Mosque. Recapturing the mosque would be a symbolic victory in the anti-ISIS fight as the location where Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi made his first public appearance as Caliph in July 2014. The 9th Iraqi Army Armored Division alongside Popular Mobilization units meanwhile began efforts on March 7 to recapture the village of Badush, northwest of Mosul, seizing the nearby prison on March 8. 

ISIS increased its use of chemical weapons in the defense of western Mosul. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) stated on March 3 that it treated seven patients for exposure to chemical agents near Mosul. The United Nations likewise stated it treated twelve patients for wounds from a “blistering agent.” ISIS has used chemical weapons before; in November 2016, ISIS used chlorine and mustard gas in Bashiqa against the Peshmerga and burned sulfur plants around Qayyarah to prevent ISF advance. ISIS may increase its use of chemical weapons as the ISF breaks through its lines of defense in western Mosul. It may also try to combine chemical weapons with spectacular attacks, as the Federal Police reported it dismantled a Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED) carrying unspecified chemical weapons on February 26. 

The Coalition must set conditions for political stability and good governance at the local level to prevent ISIS from resurging after the recapture of Mosul. Coalition outreach has thus far been primarily directed at the Iraqi Government. ISIS is already resurging in provinces where local governments suffer from political infighting, such as Anbar. The Iraqi Government and U.S.-led Coalition need to facilitate the Ninewa Provincial Government’s ability to deliver services, reconstruction, and governance while remaining politically stable. Failure to rebuild local institutions and governance in Ninewa and other provinces risks the return to an environment of instability in which ISIS and other Sunni insurgencies thrive. 

Iran's Assad Regime

By Christopher Kozak

Key Takeaway: Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime is neither sovereign nor a viable U.S. partner against ISIS and al-Qaeda. Russia and Iran have penetrated the Syrian Arab Army’s command-and-control authorities at all levels and propped up the force by providing the bulk of its offensive combat power. The pro-regime coalition cannot secure all of Syria and primarily serves as a vehicle for Moscow and Tehran’s regional power projection. Any U.S. strategy in Syria that relies on pro-regime forces will fail to destroy Salafi-Jihadists while empowering Iran and Russia.

Both former U.S. President Barack Obama and current U.S. President Donald Trump have considered deeper cooperation with Russia – and thereby Iran and Assad – against ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria. This idea is based on two fundamental fallacies. First, Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime cannot recapture Salafi-Jihadist safe havens and secure them over the long-term given their severe manpower shortages and shortfalls in command-and-control. Second, Assad is not sovereign. Iran and Russia have both inserted themselves deep into the framework of the state. Both states aim to entice the U.S. into actions that advance their own strategic interests and ultimately facilitate the expulsion of the U.S. from the Middle East.

Regime Manpower Shortage

The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) no longer exists as a unified or coherent fighting force capable of independently securing the entire country. Six years of defections, desertions, and combat attrition have more than halved its pre-war combat strength to an estimated 100,000 soldiers as of 2014 – primarily ill-equipped and poorly-trained conscripts. Only a fraction of these forces can reliably deploy in offensive operations – perhaps as few as 30,000-40,000 soldiers. These units largely consist of ‘elite’ forces such as the Republican Guard, Special Forces, and Fourth Armored Division that recruit heavily among Syrian Alawites.

The regime struggled to overcome these structural weaknesses due to a severe manpower shortage. The SAA intensified an indiscriminate conscription campaign in late 2014 amidst reports that the conflict had killed as many as one-third of fighting-age males among Syrian Alawites. Activists reported the conscription of underage children and prisoners into units that received less than one week of training before battlefield deployment. Assad acknowledged these strains in a public speech in July 2015, noting an ongoing “shortfall in human capacity” that forced the state to “give up some areas” in order to focus on more “important regions” in Syria.

Russia’s intervention in Syria in September 2015 has not altered these underlying shortfalls. Reinforcements from Russia, Iran, and Lebanese Hezbollah helped in part to close this gap between the regime’s requirements and capabilities. The regime nonetheless remains fragile and unable to muster sufficient forces for major simultaneous operations. Most notably, ISIS recaptured Palmyra in Eastern Homs Province in December 2016 and increased its attacks against regime positions in Deir ez-Zour City while pro-regime forces focused their main effort against opposition-held districts of Aleppo City. This zero-sum allocation of resources will not be alleviated unless an outside actor conducts a major ground deployment – a step neither Russia nor Iran have been willing to pursue to date.

Breakdowns in Command-and-Control

The Syrian Civil War also forced the regime to surrender control over pro-regime forces on the ground. The regime mobilized tens of thousands of paramilitary and foreign fighters not beholden to the state in order to mitigate and reverse its operational immobility. The regime directs this coalition through an increasingly decentralized and ad hoc network of command-and-control structures that grants expanded operational authority to junior officers in the field. These structures have been coopted by local strongmen as well as Iran and Russia.

The SAA has fractured as a result of policies undertaken to survive internal security threats. Former Syrian President Hafez al-Assad first implemented a system of military decentralization called the ‘quta’a system’ in 1984. This system assigned each combat division to a specific geographical region, assigned it responsibility for local population centers, and granted wide discretionary powers to the commanding officer. These ‘quta’as’ – or sectors – became fiefdoms for senior military officials, giving commanders a stake in preserving local security at the cost of reduced dependence on the state.

The regime further task-organized its maneuver units and consolidated loyal formations into larger units after the start of the Syrian Revolution in 2011 in order to exert command-and-control and improve their combat effectiveness during the Syrian Civil War. These reorganizations extended as low as the battalion level with individual companies, platoons, and soldiers being reallocated into new formations. Many formal combat brigades and divisions no longer exist in 2017 as meaningful frames of reference for operations on the ground.

The regime simultaneously organized a network of paramilitary auxiliaries to supplement its flagging combat forces. These paramilitary groups routinely evade efforts by the regime to impose state control and instead remain loyal to foreign powers, political parties, criminal networks, or individual benefactors, further degrading regime command-and-control. These units closely coordinate with the remnants of the formal military, blurring the lines between official and unofficial combat forces. This fragmentation of command authority granted the regime resiliency against immediate collapse at the cost of receding state sovereignty.

Initial efforts to consolidate these paramilitary groups under state control have regressed since 2015. The regime formed the National Defense Forces (NDF) in 2013 with assistance from Iran in order to bring disparate popular committees, criminal networks, and self-defense groups under a military umbrella. At its peak, the NDF incorporated between 80,000 to 100,000 fighters focused on rear-area security and static defense, freeing valuable manpower for other offensive operations. Over the past year, the NDF reportedly fragmented and reverted to local groups outside the formal command structure as economic turmoil hampered the regime’s ability to match the salaries offered by foreign or private actors.

Paramilitary groups linked to a wide variety of benefactors, causes, and ideologies fight alongside the regime, generating intense friction with the state. These factions include political militias organized by the Syrian Arab Ba’ath Party and Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Palestinians, private militias run by wealthy businessmen, and tribal organizations. Several branches of the state security apparatus – including the four rival intelligence agencies – also recruit their own paramilitaries. These groups reportedly engage in a wide range of criminal activity that exploits local populations to bolster their meager incomes. Paramilitary groups have even engaged in direct confrontations with state authorities. For example, Assad reportedly ordered the withdrawal of nearly 900 individuals from two prominent paramilitary groups - the ‘Desert Hawks’ and ‘Naval Commandos’ - after their forces allegedly interfered with a presidential convoy in Latakia City in February 2017.

Foreign Dominance

Iran currently provides the high-end manpower capable of securing significant gains for pro-regime forces on the ground. Iran operates a coalition of nearly 30,000 fighters that includes the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi’a militias, and Afghan Shi’a fighters. These forces likely constitute one-sixth to one-eighth of total pro-regime forces – this ratio only increases when compared to the small number of combat-effective regime units.

Iran has deployed at least 7,000 of its own fighters to Syria. These forces include elements of the IRGC-Ground Forces and Iranian ‘Artesh’ that represent the first expeditionary deployment of conventional forces by Iran since the Iran-Iraq War. Iran also leads a coalition of roughly 20,000 foreign fighters in the country, including 6,000 to 8,000 from Lebanese Hezbollah, 4,000 to 5,000 from Iraqi Shi’a militias, and 2,000 to 4,000 Afghan Shi’a fighters. These totals exclude the wide array of local paramilitary groups supported by Iran in Syria. This coalition provides a disproportionate amount of the combat-capable infantry used in major pro-regime operations. For example, Iran and its proxies reportedly provided more than half of the 10,000 fighters assembled for the year-long regime campaign to seize Aleppo City in 2015. These forces also played key roles in the two operations launched to recapture Palmyra over the past year.

Iran has created a self-sufficient method of combined force operations that excludes a major role for the regime’s military. The IRGC has developed a model of cadre-warfare that allows Iran to implant military leadership over a base of irregular fighters that it organizes, funds, and equips in a host country. Iran operates sophisticated infrastructure – including a strategic air bridge from Tehran to Damascus via Baghdad - to train, equip, manage, and redeploy these forces across the region in line with its own strategic priorities. The IRGC – Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah lead key operations and relegate the SAA to providing heavy support including artillery, armor, and airstrikes to foreign infantry forces.

Iran gradually co-opted the regime’s remaining command structure as its combat forces became the most asymmetric advantage in the conflict. Iran reportedly assumed control of key operations rooms and ad hoc headquarters in both Latakia and Dera’a Provinces in 2015. The transitions were accompanied by widespread claims of purges, executions, and transfers of low-ranking regime officers to other fronts. The takeover also extended to senior officers who resisted the expansion of Iran’s influence. In the most prominent example, Syria Political Security Directorate Head Rustom Ghazalah died in April 2015 following a severe beating rumored to be related to his resistance to the increased Iranian deployment to Southern Syria.

Iran also played an integral role in the development of pro-regime paramilitary groups ostensibly under regime authority in order to establish the long-term infrastructure of a ‘Syrian Hezbollah.’ Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah played a foundational role in building the NDF based on the Iranian ‘Basij.’ Iran also oversaw enlistment campaigns across the country – in some cases competing directly with the regime for new recruits by providing competitive salaries and military equipment. Iran nurtured its pool of future manpower through religious outreach including funding for theology schools and revolutionary youth groups among Alawites on the Syrian Coast. Iran worked to develop independent infrastructure against Israel on the Syrian Golan Heights as demonstrated by the deaths of key Lebanese Hezbollah operatives such as Jihad Mughniyeh in January 2015 and Samir Kantar in December 2015.

Russia, by contrast, strengthened the regime’s military and security services’ formal structures. Russia provides the majority of its military aid, including advanced weaponry and air support, directly to the SAA. This support included the provision of advanced armored vehicles such as T-90 Main Battle Tanks and BTR-82 Armored Personnel Carriers to elite units such as the Syrian ‘Tiger Forces’ and Republican Guard. Russia took great pains to present its military engagement as a bilateral agreement between two legitimate governments against terrorism through high-profile basing deals and public coordination with senior regime officials. These efforts complement the actions of Iran in Syria while simultaneously allowing Russia to develop an independent partner for long-term influence. 

Russia also tried to reconsolidate paramilitary groups under state control via new headquarters and command structures. Russia drove the establishment of the Fourth Storming Corps in Latakia Province in October 2015 and the Fifth Storming Corps in Damascus in November 2016. These new corps structures reportedly intend to consolidate paramilitary groups under state control with Russian command-and-control support, funding, and equipment. The Fifth Storming Corps spearheaded the pro-regime offensive that recaptured Palmyra from ISIS in March 2017 with backing from Russia, Iran, and Lebanese Hezbollah.

Russia has nonetheless eroded the regime’s sovereignty. Russia took control over major operations in Northern Syria in late 2015, including key battlefronts in Latakia and Aleppo Provinces. Russia’s increasing influence in operational planning and strategic decision-making generated noticeable changes in pro-regime campaign design, including the use of frontal aviation and major cauldron battles against the opposition in Aleppo Province. On the diplomatic front, Russia attempted to impose its own constitutional draft upon both the regime and opposition in order to resolve the Syrian Civil War under favorable terms that preserve its long-term basing rights on the Syrian Coast.

Implications

The U.S. will not find a partner willing or capable of advancing its national security interests within the pro-regime coalition. Pro-regime forces are not capable of independently expelling ISIS and al-Qaeda from Syria. Iran currently provides the high-end combat units that lead pro-regime offensives on the ground. Any policy that leverages Russia and Assad against Salafi-Jihadist groups will thus empower Iran in Syria by default. Conversely, any effort to drive a wedge between Russia and Iran in Syria in the near-term will also fail due to the critical role of Iran in supporting both parties. Russia has no proxy in Syria without Iran. Russia and Assad cannot afford to divorce themselves from Iran even if they intended to do so. Neither Russia nor Iran requires an end to the Syrian Civil War or the defeat of ISIS in Syria. Rather, Russia and Iran have consistently intervened in the conflict in order to suppress the opponents of the regime, enhance their own regional freedom of action, and oust the U.S. from the Middle East. Their public appeals for political and military cooperation with the U.S. are disingenuous and unconstructive. The U.S. must focus on regaining leverage and extracting meaningful concessions from the pro-regime coalition rather than surrendering to the interests of strategic adversaries for unsustainable gains against ISIS and al-Qaeda.

Al Qaeda Resumes Offensive Operations in Syria

Jennifer Cafarella

Al Qaeda in Syria has resumed offensive operations against the Syrian regime in northern Syria after the fall of Aleppo City. The recapture of Aleppo City by Syrian president Bashar al Assad and his external backers was a turning point in the Syrian civil war, but it did not seal Assad’s victory. It was instead a victory for Al Qaeda because it defeated Al Qaeda’s main competitors in northern Syria. Al Qaeda consolidated its strength and resumed offensive operations against pro-Assad forces in February 2017. Pro-Assad forces could begin to lose terrain to Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda will increasingly pose a threat to the West as its strength in northern Syria grows. The contest between Al Qaeda and pro-Assad forces, which include Iran and Russia, will increasingly challenge U.S. policy options in Syria.

Al Qaeda won a victory in Aleppo in two important ways. First, it won favor with opposition groups in August and October 2016 by launching two offensives to break the regime’s siege of opposition held neighborhoods of the city, the first of which temporarily succeeded. Al Qaeda’s effort – and temporary success – demonstrated its value to the Syrian opposition and its commitment to defending populations in opposition-held areas. Al Qaeda did not test whether it was strong enough to prevent Aleppo from falling after failing to keep the siege broken. Assad and his external backers used horrifying tactics to recapture Aleppo City, which Al Qaeda exploited to recruit. The fall of Aleppo City also neutralized opposition groups that had constrained Al Qaeda’s influence in northern Syria. Al Qaeda meanwhile preserved its own military strength and resources for future operations.

Al Qaeda took steps to advance its goal of merging all northern opposition groups under its leadership after the battle for Aleppo. Al Qaeda attacked numerous U.S.-backed groups in Idlib in January and February 2017 and forced them and other independent groups to merge under Ahrar al Sham on January 26. Prior to the merger, Ahrar al Sham’s leader reaffirmed the group's ideology and goals, which align with Al Qaeda. The statement served as a guarantee that the absorption of moderates would not dilute Ahrar al Sham. Al Qaeda’s formal affiliate in Syria, Jabhat Fatah al Sham (JFS), then absorbed four smaller, allied opposition groups and siphoned off hundreds of fighters from Ahrar al Sham on January 28 and rebranded itself into Hayyat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS). The creation of HTS involved a full merger of all military forces into a single fighting force, according to the statement announcing the formation. Al Qaeda intends to demonstrate how a full merger can increase the combat effectiveness of the whole. HTS will now lead a major offensive campaign in order to revive the opposition’s war effort after the fall of Aleppo City.

Al Qaeda obfuscated the success of its merger by appointing a veteran Al Qaeda commander formerly within Ahrar al Sham named Hashim Al-Sheikh to command HTS. Al Qaeda likely chose to elevate Hashim Al Sheikh because of his reputation as an effective military commander and because the U.S. has not listed him as a specially designated terrorist. Al Qaeda continues to prioritize staying below the threshold of American policy as it proceeds with its program to transform the Syrian opposition in Syria into a global Salafi-Jihadi base. Hashim al Sheikh is also likely viewed more favorably by Syrian opposition elements that remain hesitant to merge fully with Al Qaeda. Former JFS leader Abu Mohammad al Joulani meanwhile took control of HTS military forces in order to build his reputation as an effective anti-Assad commander.

HTS resumed offensive operations against pro-Assad forces in late February 2017. HTS launched a complex, coordinated attack against two regime military installations in Homs City on February 25. Five HTS sleeper cell members detonated Suicide Vests (SVESTs) outside the State Security and Military Intelligence Offices in the al-Mahatta and al-Ghouta Districts of Homs City. The attack killed dozens of regime soldiers including two high-ranking generals. It set conditions for follow-on military operations by disrupting the regime’s command and control and possibly fixing pro-regime forces in Homs City. HTS’ most likely operational objective is to attack Hama City, which has symbolic resonance for the Salafi Jihadi movement because of the 1982 massacre conducted by former Syrian president Hafez Al Assad against the Muslim Brotherhood and its alleged supporters. HTS may alternately launch an offensive against the regime’s coastal stronghold in order to shake the regime’s confidence and possibly to threaten Russia’s military bases in Latakia and Tartous.

A major HTS-led campaign against pro-Assad forces would require Assad and his external backers to dedicate significant resources to defense. It would likely deny them the ability to launch clearing operations in Idlib Province after consolidating in Aleppo City. It may force Russia and Iran to dedicate more resources to the Syrian theater in order to defend key regime-held terrain. HTS could degrade the regime’s defenses enough to create opportunities for ISIS to advance after the regime’s recapture of Palmyra. ISIS has conducted regular attacks deep into Homs City, indicating that it is positioned to exploit regime vulnerabilities that HTS may inflict and vice versa. It is also possible, although less likely, that HTS and ISIS will coordinate tactically against the regime in the Homs-Hama corridor. Most dangerous possibilities include simultaneous and possibly coordinated Al Qaeda and ISIS offensives that overmatch the Syrian regime’s defenses north of Damascus. Russia and Iran are taking steps to bolster the regime’s ability to defend terrain against major offensives, but it is unclear how rapidly they can respond or how many positions they can defend at once.

President Trump will face a decision point on how to respond to the resumption of large-scale violence in western Syria. Russia will attempt to draw the U.S. into a counterterrorism partnership in Syria in reaction to HTS’ upcoming offensive. President Trump must avoid ceding more power to Russia in Syria in return for a counterterrorism partnership that would only radicalize Syria’s population further. Al Qaeda’s continued rise demonstrates that a counterterrorism strategy is inappropriate, furthermore. The U.S. will not destroy Al Qaeda’s army in Syria through precision airstrikes against individual high profile Al Qaeda operatives. President Trump must instead adopt a new long-term strategy that integrates American efforts against Al Qaeda and ISIS to destroy both armies while depriving them of local support. 

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: January 26 – February 28, 2017

By Jonathan Mautner

Russia waged an aggressive air campaign against critical civilian infrastructure in southern and northern Syria from February 12 – 27, marking the continuation of a policy Russia has implemented since the start of its intervention in the Syrian Civil War. Russia conducted heavy waves of airstrikes against opposition terrain in southern Dera’a Province during this period, supporting pro-regime forces after U.S.-backed Southern Front-affiliated groups and prominent Salafi-jihadi factions launched a joint offensive to capture the regime-held Manshiya District in Dera’a City. Russian warplanes repeatedly targeted medical facilities and other vital civilian infrastructure in the area, aiming to depopulate opposition-held districts of the city and draw opposition forces away from front lines. Russian airstrikes also targeted hospitals in southern Idlib and western Aleppo Provinces, likely in anticipation of a pending opposition offensive against regime-held Hama City. Notably, the UN concluded two weeks prior that Russian and regime airstrikes extensively targeted hospitals in Aleppo City from July – November 2016, such that “no hospitals were left functioning” in December. The UN findings and recent wave of hospital strikes indicate that Russia will continue to flout international humanitarian law and target civilian infrastructure as part and parcel of its way of war in Syria.

The Russian air campaign in southern and northern Syria also rendered acceptable opposition groups increasingly vulnerable to Salafi-jihadist attacks. Russian airstrikes in and around Dera’a City enabled ISIS affiliate Jaysh Khalid ibn al Walid to seize several towns from opposition forces in the vicinity of the nearby Yarmuk Basin, an area dominated by the Southern Front. Russian warplanes also targeted a headquarters of former U.S.-backed TOW anti-tank missile recipient Jaysh Idlib al Hur in southern Idlib Province on February 15, likely emboldening al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate to threaten the weakened group ten days later. Although Russian airstrikes facilitated pro-regime gains against ISIS in eastern Homs Province from February 8 – 11 and 26 – 28, the ambit of Russia’s anti-ISIS effort extends only so far as it aligns with its goal to preserve the Syrian regime. In contrast, Russia will continue to invest heavily in the targeting of acceptable opposition groups, so as to make them more susceptible to recruitment and attack by ISIS and al Qaeda. As Russia continues to both violate international legal norms and accelerate the radicalization of the armed opposition, it all but disqualifies itself as a viable partner for the U.S. counter-terrorism coalition.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. The graphic likely under-represents the extent of the locations targeted in Eastern Syria, owing to a relative lack of activist reporting from that region.

High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.

Syria Situation Report: February 24 - March 2, 2017

By ISW Syria Team and Syria Direct

Opposition groups backed by Turkey in Operation Euphrates Shield attacked the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) near Manbij in Northern Aleppo Province on March 1. The SDF-affiliated Manbij Military Council later claimed on March 2 that its fighters will turn over a number of frontline villages outside of Manbij to pro-regime ‘border guards’ as part of a deal brokered by Russia to deescalate the clashes and prevent further expansion by Turkey in Northern Syria. Meanwhile, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) - the successor of Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat Fatah al-Sham - conducted simultaneous attacks targeting two regime intelligence branches in Homs City with gunfire, IEDs, and SVESTs on February 25. HTS Military Emir Abu Mohammad al-Joulani stated that the attacks aimed to undermine the ongoing Geneva Talks on the Syrian Civil War. Finally, pro-regime forces recaptured Palmyra in Eastern Homs Province on March 2 after ISIS withdrew from the city. ISIS recaptured Palmyra in December 2016 while pro-regime forces conducted operations to seize full control of Aleppo City.

These graphics mark the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. The graphic depicts significant recent developments in the Syrian Civil War. The control of terrain represented on the graphic is accurate as of February 16, 2017.

The Campaign for Mosul: February 22 - March 1, 2017

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) isolated Mosul completely on March 1 as units advanced within the city towards the government center. The Popular Mobilization are nearing Tel Afar from the west and could breach the city in the coming weeks.

Increased U.S. investments in Mosul since December 2016 have ensured smoother and quicker operations in the western half of the city. The U.S. increased its involvement in December 2016 when the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) appeared close to culminating in eastern Mosul. The U.S. and Coalition embedded advisors at the brigade- and battalion-level, rather than at the division-level, improving the ISF’s cross-axis coordination. Recent reports also revealed that the December directives granted advisors the ability to call in airstrikes without going through a joint operations cell in Baghdad. The new directive was lauded as adding “precision” to ground operations; it also underscores that U.S. personnel are increasingly at the frontlines of the operation. Indicators from the new U.S. Administration, including a proposed 10% budget increase for the Department of Defense, suggest that it may expand the level of U.S. involvement in Iraq, beyond the Mosul operation. 

The ISF isolated Mosul completely after units from the 9th Iraqi Army Armored Division took the Tel Afar-Mosul road on March 1. The division will continue along the road to the west, looking to retake the ISIS-held town of Badush on the Tigris River, and will likely turn east as well in order to breach Mosul’s northwestern neighborhoods. Operations inside of Mosul have steadily advanced after the initial push to recapture the airport and military base on February 24. Units from the Iraqi Army, Federal Police, and Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) retook three adjacent neighborhoods from February 25 to 28 and have seized the western side of the Fourth Bridge, marking full control of one of five bridges that span the Tigris River in Mosul. All five bridges are inoperable, but the ISF may now be able to repair the Fourth Bridge to transit supplies and personnel in from the east. The ISF is now preparing to advance further into Mosul’s city center. 

ISIS’s resistance remains capable and deadly, despite these advances. ISIS launched indirect fire at the Mosul airport after the ISF declared it under control, killing four Iraqi soldiers on February 23. ISIS also began to burn civilian homes and vehicles on February 27, producing thick black smoke. ISIS similarly burned tires and oil in eastern Mosul to produce smoke cover in October 2016. ISIS’s resistance may increase as the ISF nears the Old City and government center, especially if escape routes are cut. However, ISIS could also attempt a counteroffensive in eastern Mosul in order to draw forces back across the river. 

The Popular Mobilization, meanwhile, is nearing Tel Afar, now a primarily Sunni Turkmen town and a historic insurgent hotspot. The militias, alongside two army brigades, will likely breach the city from the west within the coming weeks. Other militias currently operating further east of the city may make up ground during that time and match the western axis’s advance. The Popular Mobilization has cited the Iraqi Army Aviation (IAA) as a key participant in their advance towards the city and the IAA has been increasingly assessed to be providing the bulk of airstrikes for the militia operations. Doing so, however, reduces the U.S.’s ability to effectively leverage its airstrikes in order to condition militia participation in operations. The U.S. must establish a strategy that secures sufficient leverage over Iran to reduce its influence over Iraq’s security forces and ensure continued U.S. presence in Iraq beyond the Mosul operation.

Turkey Prepares Offensive Against Syrian Democratic Forces in Manbij

By Christopher Kozak

An open conflict will likely erupt imminently between Turkey and the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the town of Manbij in Northern Syria. Turkey considers the Syrian Kurdish YPG – the main component of the SDF - to be an extension of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is currently waging an insurgency in Southern Turkey. The fight for Manbij will derail the U.S.-backed campaign against ISIS and create opportunities for al Qaeda to expand further in Syria. The U.S. must reduce its dependence upon both Turkey and the Syrian Kurdish YPG.

Turkish President Recep Erdogan has repeatedly stated his intent to expel the Syrian Kurdish YPG – the main component of the SDF – from Manbij to the Euphrates River’s eastern bank. 

• Turkish President Recep Erdogan reiterated on February 28 that Turkish-backed opposition groups in Operation Euphrates Shield will advance against Manbij in Eastern Aleppo Province after they finish consolidating control over Al-Bab, located twenty five miles to the west. Turkish-backed forces in Operation Euphrates Shield seized Al-Bab in Northern Aleppo Province on February 23 after ISIS withdrew from the city and its environs toward Ar-Raqqa City. 

• The end of combat operations in Al-Bab frees Erdogan to pursue his strategic aim to roll back the de-facto contiguous autonomous zone controlled by the YPG along the Syrian-Turkish Border.

The U.S. reportedly gave a deadline of February 27 for Turkey to present an alternative operational plan to seize Ar-Raqqa City as part of a wider review of the campaign against ISIS due to U.S. President Donald Trump on the same day.

• Turkey proposed inserting opposition forces into Tel Abyad in Northern Ar-Raqqa Province and forming a ‘corridor’ through terrain held by the SDF as part of a its preferred plan for an offensive against Ar-Raqqa City during a meeting between Turkish Chief of the General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar and U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford on February 17. 

• Senior U.S. officials remain unwilling to contemplate proposals to exclude the SDF from operations against Ar-Raqqa City despite high-level lobbying by Turkey. Instead, U.S. Secretary of Defense Gen. James Mattis met with Turkish Defense Minister Fikri Isik on February 15 and offered increased intelligence support for operations against the PKK in Northern Iraq. 

• Erdogan has already demonstrated his willingness to take actions in Syria that undermine U.S. policy positions and admonitions. Turkey threatened to partner with Russia to conduct joint airstrikes against ISIS in Al-Bab, and then did so after the U.S. ignored its repeated requests for air support. 

The U.S. has taken overt actions to deter an attack by Turkey and reaffirm its support for the SDF over the past several weeks given the growing risk of a direct military conflict.

• U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Gen. Joseph Votel and Operation Inherent Resolve Commander Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend met with senior SDF leaders in Northern Syria on February 24. Anonymous sources claimed that the U.S. pledged to protect Manbij against attacks from Turkey. CENTCOM denied any such assurances. 

• CENTCOM publicized several photos over the past week highlighting the role of the Manbij Military Council (MMC) in the campaign against ISIS in Northern Syria. The MMC is a component of the Syrian Democratic Forces that retains close organizational ties to the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) - the political wing of the YPG. 

• The U.S. led a field inspection with a delegation from the Turkish Armed Forces in December 2016 to demonstrate that the YPG had withdrawn completely from Manbij. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu later stated that the visit failed to satisfy concerns that the town remains controlled by proxies of the group. Thousands of residents held demonstrations in Manbij on February 13 calling for the release of imprisoned PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan. 

• Unconfirmed activist reports claim that some of the 500 U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) currently present in Northern Syria may have been deployed to frontlines on the Sajur River near Manbij within the past several days in order to deter further aggression by Turkey. 

Turkish leaders met on February 27 and likely made the decision to proceed with operations against Manbij rather than wait on coalition support for an offensive against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City.

• Erdogan called unscheduled meetings with Turkish Defense Minister Fikri Isik and Turkish Chief of the General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar in Istanbul on February 27. 

• Turkish Presidential Advisor Ilnur Cevik claimed on February 27 that Turkey plans to end its military operations in Syria after establishing a fifty-mile “buffer zone” in Manbij. 

• Turkey has continued to deploy additional armored vehicles to Northern Aleppo Province in recent weeks. These reinforcements could be deployed against Manbij as well as the isolated Kurdish Afrin Canton in Western Aleppo Province. 

Further escalation between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds would severely jeopardize – and likely halt indefinitely - the campaign against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City.

• The U.S. has relied extensively upon the YPG as the main component of the SDF – the preferred coalition partner on the ground against ISIS in Northern Syria. 

• Open fighting between Turkey and the SDF would allow ISIS to retain its hold on Ar-Raqqa City and potentially secure new gains across Northern Syria. 

• The U.S. must exercise all of its sources of leverage over Turkey – including its military presence in Syria as well as bilateral military-to-military assistance, humanitarian support, and economic investment – in order to prevent a Turkish offensive against the SDF. 

• The U.S. should also consider slowing down or halting further SDF advances in order to avoid fueling a wider conflict between Arabs and Kurds in Northern Syria. The U.S. must not sacrifice long-term stability for a quick victory against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City. 

• The U.S. must ultimately build an alternative partner force of Syrian Sunni Arabs that is both willing to fight Salafi-jihadi groups and is independent from the political project of the PYD. The U.S. cannot rely upon the Turkish-backed opposition force due to its inclusion of Salafi-jihadi groups, including Ahrar al-Sham, that serve as a vector for al Qaeda in Syria. 

Further Reading

• 24 FEB 2017: “The Campaign for Ar-Raqqa: February 24, 2017,” Tom Ramage, Institute for the Study of War. 

• 13 FEB 2017: “Warning Update: Turkish Aggression Against Syrian Kurds Threatens to Halt U.S. Anti-ISIS Operations in Syria,” Tom Ramage, Institute for the Study of War. 

• 22 NOV 2016: “The Road to Ar-Raqqah: Background on the Syrian Democratic Forces,” Genevieve Casagrande, Institute for the Study of War. 

• 30 AUG 2016: “Turkish Incursion in Northern Syria Signals Turning Point in Anti-ISIS Fight,” Jennifer Cafarella with Leah Danson, Institute for the Study of War. 

• 10 JUN 2016: “The Competing Campaigns Against ISIS in Northern Syria,” Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War.

Iraq Situation Report: February 17-28, 2017

By the ISW Iraq Team

ISIS could be facing difficulty coordinating successful attacks in Iraq as losses in Mosul are forcing it to transform from a governing to guerrilla style terrorist organization. ISIS did not carry out the wave of complex attacks predicted to occur in response to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) launching operations to retake western Mosul on February 19. The deviation from the expectation may be a result of ISIS losing coordination between cells across Iraq as it takes time to regroup or as the ISF puts pressure on lines of communication in northern Iraq. The ISF may also be improving in its ability to preempt or thwart attacks. ISIS launched a major attack against checkpoints near the Syrian-Jordan-Iraqi border from February 22 to 24 and targeted checkpoints in Diyala Province on February 23. However, these attacks alone do not match the intensity of ISIS’s previous responses, in which ISIS either carried out major attacks in generally quiet areas, such as Kirkuk City or Sinjar, or ramped up the frequency or scale of attacks in usual attack zones, such as Baghdad. ISIS may have planned for attacks in Samarra, Karbala, and Abu Ghraib to reach the response threshold, but these attacks were thwarted by the ISF over the course of February 21 to 24. The decline in ISIS’s response is not likely a sign of permanent loss of ability to attack, but rather an indication that ISIS may take time to sufficiently regroup its command and logistical hubs as it deals with losses in Mosul and northern Iraq. 

ISIS Sanctuary Map Update: February 27, 2017

By Alexandra Gutowski and the ISW Research Team 

Update: The Syrian regime seized additional towns from ISIS southeast of al-Bab on 27 FEB 2017 after ISIS withdrew. Regime control now abuts US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces and also Turkish-backed opposition forces. ISIS will continue to launch spectacular attacks along this seam at which the interests of local and global anti-ISIS actors compete directly.

Key Takeaway: ISIS launched offensives against the Syrian regime in Deir ez Zour, eastern Homs province, and eastern Damascus province in January 2017, exploiting the regime’s focus on Aleppo and attempting to offset or divert regime operations near al-Bab. Regime forces began to reverse ISIS’s gains in Homs province on February 14. ISIS lost additional territory in Mosul to the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition in early 2017. ISIS also lost al-Bab, Syria to Turkish-backed Operation Euphrates Shield on February 23. ISIS may increasingly infiltrate opposition-held territory in northwest Syria as U.S.-backed, Kurdish-dominated Operation Euphrates Shield threatens its control of Raqqa. ISIS-linked opposition group Liwa al-Aqsa conducted numerous attacks in northern Hama and southern Idlib provinces against opposition groups in early 2017, especially those affiliated with al-Qaeda’s de facto affiliate in Syria, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. Liwa al-Aqsa subsequently negotiated a withdrawal from villages in northern Hama province, which may remain an attack zone for ISIS. ISIS’s affiliate in southwest Syria, Jaysh Khalid ibn al-Walid, also seized towns in Dera’a province in February, exploiting the focus of local opposition groups on an offensive in Dera’a City. ISW is placing a watch on ISIS in Damascus province and in Jordan, where ISIS may have latent potential to launch attacks in response to further losses in Raqqa and Mosul. A depiction of ISIS sanctuary in Jordan is forthcoming.

ISIS Sanctuary Map: February 26, 2017

By Alexandra Gutowski and the ISW Research Team 

ISIS launched offensives against the Syrian regime in Deir ez Zour, eastern Homs province, and eastern Damascus province in January 2017, exploiting the regime’s focus on Aleppo and attempting to offset or divert regime operations near al-Bab. Regime forces began to reverse ISIS’s gains in Homs province on February 14. ISIS lost additional territory in Mosul to the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition in early 2017. ISIS also lost al-Bab, Syria to Turkish-backed Operation Euphrates Shield on February 23. ISIS may increasingly infiltrate opposition-held territory in northwest Syria as U.S.-backed, Kurdish-dominated Operation Euphrates Shield threatens its control of Raqqa. ISIS-linked opposition group Liwa al-Aqsa conducted numerous attacks in northern Hama and southern Idlib provinces against opposition groups in early 2017, especially those affiliated with al-Qaeda’s de facto affiliate in Syria, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. Liwa al-Aqsa subsequently negotiated a withdrawal from villages in northern Hama province, which may remain an attack zone for ISIS. ISIS’s affiliate in southwest Syria, Jaysh Khalid ibn al-Walid, also seized towns in Dera’a province in February, exploiting the focus of local opposition groups on an offensive in Dera’a City. ISW is placing a watch on ISIS in Damascus province and in Jordan, where ISIS may have latent potential to launch attacks in response to further losses in Raqqa and Mosul. A depiction of ISIS sanctuary in Jordan is forthcoming.