Failed Coup Attempt in Turkey

By: Christopher Kozak, Melissa Pavlik, Jennifer Cafarella, and the ISW research team

The situation

A cadre within the Turkish Armed Forces mounted a failed coup attempt against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) on 15 - 16 JUL.

• Shortly before midnight on July 15, units in the Turkish Land Forces and Turkish Gendarmerie seized key positions in Istanbul and Ankara, including Ataturk International Airport,the Turkish General Staff headquarters, and major bridges across the Bosphorus Strait.
• Elements of the Turkish Air Force conducted airstrikes against key government buildings including the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) headquarters, the Presidential Palace, and the Grand National Assembly.
• A statement broadcasted by the coup plotters on national television announced the formation of a “committee of national peace” to run the country and prevent the erosion of democratic and secular values.
• At about 12:30 AM local time on July 16, President Erdogan issued a live statement via FaceTime, calling for “people to gather in squares, airports.” Mosques and political party offices also repeated the call to action.
• By about 8:00 AM local time on the morning of July 16, at least 2,839 military personnel had been detained, including four generals and twenty-nine colonels, according to Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim.
• Prime Minister Yildirim noted on July 16 that clashes killed at least 265 individuals and wounded at least 1,440 others as anti-Coup demonstrators and military personal reasserted control. 

The coup-plotter did not receive broad-based support within military ranks, political elite, or from foreign countries. They likely intended to spark popular support for removing Erdogan, but failed.

• Most coup plotters were low-to-mid-ranking officers led by Col. Muharrem Kose, the former head of the legal advisory department in the Turkish Armed Forces, and Gen. Akin Ozturk, former commander of the Turkish Air Force.
• The coup lacked unanimous support among high-ranking officers. Plotters were forced to detain Turkish Chief of the General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar and other senior officials early in the coup when they refused to cooperate. Other high ranking officers, including Turkish First Army Commander Gen. Umit Dundar and General Zekai Aksakalli, the commander of the military special forces, condemned the coup publically as events unfolded.
• The three main opposition parties – the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) – all publically renounced the coup.
• U.S. President Barack Obama and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry called upon all parties to respect the “democratically-elected” government roughly two hours after the coup broke out. Other countries quickly followed suit.

Context and Implications

Erdogan has been setting conditions against a military coup since the late 1990’s,slowly purging the military. The failed coup demonstrated the success of these efforts.

• The inability of the junior officers in charge of the coup to broaden their support base indicates that Erdogan has the personal loyalty of most of the senior officer corps.
• Erdogan will take this opportunity to further establish his cult of personality in the military by purging the military at lower levels. Erdogan stated: “This uprising is a gift from God to us because this will be a reason to cleanse our army.”

The size and the scale of popular mobilization against the coup indicates that Erdogan’s domestic base is broad and powerful.

• Erdogan effectively used mosques and religious leaders, in addition to traditional party offices, to draw the masses to the street promptly.
• Thousands of civilians poured into the streets in Istanbul, Ankara, and other cities to protest the coup after Erdogan called for mass unrest. Protestors overwhelmed the Turkish military forces and seized the Ataturk International Airport, forcing the occupying soldiers to surrender. Similar events occurred on smaller levels across Istanbul and Ankara.
• Erdogan has now demonstrated the extent of his domestic support and holds a mandate to purge the military, judiciary, and other bodies under the guise of post-coup reforms without significant public backlash.

Moving forward

Erdogan’s victory on July 15 will allow him to finish consolidating power by eliminating rivals such as members of the Gulen movement.

• President Erdogan blamed the coup attempt on a “parallel state” linked to former political ally Fethullah Gulen, a former cleric who lives in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania, and his support base known as ‘the Gulen movement.’ Gulen has denied the charges. Gulen fled to the U.S. in 1999, and in 2014 the Turkish government issued a warrant for his arrest. This occurred after a fallout with Erdogan over Gulen's allegations of corruption against officials close to Erdogan.
• Ergodan is using the allegation of Gulen’s involvement in the coup attempt to justify a sweeping crackdown against the judiciary in addition to the Turkish Armed Forces. The Turkish government dismissed up to 2,745 judges on July 16 due to suspected links to the Gulen Movement. Arrest warrants have also been issued for at least 188 members of the judiciary. This purge follows efforts by the AKP to consolidate control over the court system.
•  Erdogan has demanded Gulen’s extradition from the U.S.

Conditions are now set for Erdogan to achieve his goal of transitioning Turkey to an authoritarian regime.

• He will likely use this moment to press for his long-term objective of a constitutional transition from a parliamentary system to an executive presidency under his rule.
• This effort may include a call for new elections that solidify the parliamentary majority currently held by the AKP, allowing it to cross the three-fifths threshold required for unilateral constitutional amendments.
• Erdogan has slowly consolidated control in Turkey through cracking down on media organizations, setting limits on freedom of speech, and broadening anti-terrorism laws. These efforts will likely only increase in the wake of the coup attempt.
• Over the long-term, Turkey will likely trend towards increasing religious radicalization under the authoritarian regime of President Erdogan – raising tough questions for the U.S. and NATO.

ISIS's Campaign in Europe: March 25th - July 15th 2016

By Caitlin Forrest and Dina Shahrokhi

ISIS is pursuing its campaign to punish, polarize, and destabilize the West by inspiring and enabling terrorist attacks in Europe. ISIS likely inspired the terrorist attack in Nice, France on July 15, when a suspect drove his car into a group of civilians celebrating Bastille Day. The attack killed at least 84 and wounded over 200 civilians. ISIS spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani encouraged terrorist attacks on Europe and the U.S. in a speech on May 21. The group uses its online propaganda and messaging to inspire individuals to conduct attacks in its name abroad in order to advance its global objective of destabilizing and provoking an eventual apocalyptic war with the West. Adnani’s speech also inspired a pro-ISIS militant to kill two French police officers in a stabbing in Magnanville outside Paris, France on June 13. The assailant posted a video claiming that the attack was a direct response to Adnani’s call. ISIS also used its foreign fighter networks to conduct a complex attack against the Ataturk airport in Istanbul, Turkey on June 28, displaying the continued maturation of ISIS attack nodes across Europe. ISIS may take advantage of a likely security reshuffle and intensify spectacular attacks in Turkey after a failed coup by military officials on July 15. Attacks in Europe are not a “desperate” reaction to losses in Iraq and Syria as Secretary of State John Kerry suggested, but rather a continuation of its global objectives in spite of them. ISIS is likely inspiring terrorist attacks to prompt a backlash against Muslim communities and fuel radicalization and recruitment in Europe. ISIS also seeks to break European unity by raising security requirements, exacerbating tensions between states, and damaging the economy through spectacular attacks. The successful Brexit campaign that capitalized on the panic of security threats advances ISIS’s objective to divide and destabilize the EU, and threats by other EU nations to follow suit may empower ISIS. The anti-ISIS coalition must take simultaneous action to eliminate the group’s safe havens in the Muslim world, neutralize its European attack networks, and counter its online messaging in order to destroy the ISIS threat to the Europe.  

Pro-Regime Forces Close Main Opposition Supply Route to Aleppo City

By Christopher Kozak with Genevieve Casagrande

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is within two miles of besieging over 200,000 civilians in Aleppo City. Pro-regime forces established fire control over the primary ground line of communication into opposition-held districts of Aleppo City on July 8 after seizing a key hill overlooking the Castello Highway north of the city. Regime forces including the elite Syrian Arab Army Republican Guard later launched an offensive in the Khalidiyah Industrial District of Northern Aleppo City on July 12, advancing from the south towards the Castello Road. The advances mark the latest high-water mark in a multi-phase campaign to encircle and besiege Syria’s largest urban center, an effort that began in October 2015 with support from Russian airpower and Iranian ground reinforcement. The Assad regime has long relied upon siege-and-starve tactics in order to force the submission of opposition pockets throughout the Syrian Civil War. The threat of a looming siege in Aleppo has already begun to impact conditions in neighborhoods across the city. The price of staple foods such as flour and rice reportedly more than tripled over the past few days as municipal leaders implemented mandatory rationing and fell back upon prepared stockpiles of supplies. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) warned on July 13 that humanitarian agencies only have enough assistance in position to provide one month of food for 145,000 out of an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 civilians living in opposition-held parts of Aleppo City.

A successful siege would constitute a serious blow to the non-jihadist opposition and would ensure the further radicalization of the Syrian opposition in northwestern Syria. Aleppo City has remained the priority effort for Russia and Iran in Syria. The regime and its allies will likely leverage the siege to secure meaningful political concessions from the international community. An anonymous source quoted by Al-Rai in Kuwait claimed that Russia, Syria, and Iran agreed as early as June 10 to close the supply line into Aleppo City and thereby impose a ceasefire by force as the first step towards political negotiations that favor the regime. If true, this vision appears close to becoming a reality – particularly given recent steps towards a limited military partnership between the U.S. and Russia in Syria. The Syrian Sunni population will not accept a negotiation that allows President Assad to remain in power. Political negotiations that fail to address the legitimate grievances of Syrian Sunnis will only strengthen the hand of irreconcilable groups such as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra at the expense of acceptable opposition groups. The siege of Aleppo City thus does not represent the beginning of the end of the Syrian Civil War, but rather the driver of a new, deadlier phase of long-term disorder in the Middle East. 

Possible Terrorist Attack in Nice, France against Bastille Day Crowd

By Melissa Pavlik

A truck drove into a crowd in Nice, France in a possible terrorist attack, killing up to 73 and injuring up to 100 during a Bastille Day parade. There have not yet been any claims of responsibility.

French authorities issued a warning on 13 JUL 2016 of possible ISIS-linked attacks in France in the near future. 

• French officials briefed that ISIS will use VBIEDs and other IEDs to perpetuate attacks in France
• French internal security cited concerns about a “serious threat” on 14 JUL 2016, which is Bastille Day

 ISIS-linked individuals have used this tactic previously in France.

•  On 21 DEC 2014 a pro-ISIS individual rammed a car into a crowd in Dijon, France, injuring 13 individuals
• On 22 DEC 2014 a driver rammed his vehicle into a crowd of shoppers in Nantes, France, injuring 11 individuals

An attack targeting French soldiers in Nice in early 2015 may have also been linked to ISIS.

•  On 03 FEB 2015 French police arrested a man, Moussa Coulibaly, for using a knife to attack three soldiers guarding a Jewish community center in Nice, France.

This incident, if confirmed as a terrorist event, would advance ISIS by showing the group’s continued ability to perpetrate attacks in major European countries, even as it loses territory in core terrain. ISW has assessed that ISIS is pursuing such a strategy. It also demonstrates the limitations of European countries to prevent such attacks, even when security forces possess intelligence suggesting their likelihood.  

More information and analysis to follow.

Read ISW's report on likely ISIS actions during Ramadan in ISIS Forecast:  Ramadan 2016 (27 MAY) as well as our round-up of ISIS actions in ISIS's Regional Campaign: Ramadan 2016 (13 JUL).

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: June 18 - July 13, 2016

By Genevieve Casagrande with Jonathan Mautner

Russia continues to use its air campaign in Syria in order to constrain the U.S. and other regional actors into a partnership in the Syrian Civil War. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow on July 14 to discuss a recent proposal from the White House for bilateral military cooperation in Syria. The proposal calls for the establishment of a “Joint Implementation Group” based in Amman, Jordan that would facilitate synchronization of U.S. and Russian air operations against both al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS, according to a leaked copy of the proposal. The meeting is ongoing and it remains unclear if Russia intends to accept the alleged proposal. It would, however, grant Russia authority to conduct unilateral strikes if Russian personnel faced an “imminent threat” or if extremist groups were to expand territorial control outside of “designated areas.” Russia has consistently targeted mainstream elements of the Syrian opposition and U.S.-allied groups under the guise of “fighting terrorism,” and has cited threats to civilians and regime-held terrain as justification for targeting these groups. Russia ultimately seeks to subordinate U.S. policy in Syria to Russian objectives, which include the preservation of its client regime in Damascus and a solidified foothold on the Mediterranean. If it accepts, Russia would likely exploit the loopholes in the proposal to legitimize a continued campaign against the broader opposition in support of the Assad regime.  

Russia set conditions for the proposal through a calculated expansion and subsequent tapering of its air campaign throughout June and July 2016. The tempo of the Russian air campaign in Aleppo Province decreased significantly from June 29 – July 13, following a major escalation of the Russian air campaign in early June 2016. However, Russian warplanes continued targeted strikes in support of pro-regime ground operations to encircle and besiege Aleppo City. Russian airstrikes continued to target discreet locations along the opposition’s last ground line of communication (GLOC) into Aleppo City. Pro-regime forces with Russian air support established fire control over the Castello Road north of Aleppo City on July 7 after seizing the nearby Tal Jabenja hill. The number of locations targeted by Russian airstrikes in Aleppo Province fell by roughly 50 percent from June 29 – July 13 in comparison to the preceding two-week period in which Russian airstrikes escalated to levels only seen prior to the brokering of the Cessation of Hostilities agreement in February. Russia likely intends to frame the decrease in its air campaign since June 29 as a confidence-building measure meant to facilitate the potential military partnership with the United States. Russia has previously used temporary decreases in air operations in Aleppo to present itself as a constructive partner in the fight against terrorism in Syria.

Russia’s air campaign nonetheless continued to prioritize the targeting of mainstream elements of the Syrian opposition and U.S. allied groups from June 29 – July 13. Suspected Russian warplanes conducted several airstrikes in the vicinity of the Hadalat Refugee Camp along the Syrian-Jordanian border on July 12. The strikes killed at least 12 and wounded over 40 others, including family members of fighters from U.S.-backed TOW anti-tank missile recipient Jaysh Asoud al Sharqiya. Russian air operations intensified against ISIS in eastern Homs Province from July 9 - 12, but only following the salafi-jihadist group’s shoot down of a Russian Mi-25 helicopter near Palmyra on July 9. Russian Armed Forces subsequently sortied six TU-22M3 ‘Backfire’ strategic bombers from an unidentified airbase in Russia on July 12, targeting alleged ISIS training camps and ammunition warehouses in the eastern countryside of Palmyra. The potential resurgence of ISIS in the vicinity of Palmyra may require Russia to divert some air assets from northwestern Syria in the coming weeks in order to counter the salafi-jihadist threat and preserve pro-regime gains in the area. Limited Russian air operations against ISIS offer Russia further opportunity to garner legitimacy as an effective anti-ISIS actor in Syria and subsequent authority to continue its air campaign. Deal or no deal, Russia will likely continue to prioritize its support for pro-regime operational objectives over the fight against violent extremists in Syria. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. 

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.

Iraq Control of Terrain Map: July 14, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Popular Mobilization completed the operation to recapture Fallujah on June 26, securing  the city and its environs from ISIS control. The operation, which began on May 23, breached the city limits on June 8 and secured the government complex on June 17. The Popular Mobilization agreed with the ISF to remain outside of Fallujah’s city limits, out of ISF and Coalition fears of Shi’a sectarian reprisals on Fallujah’s Sunni population. Despite this agreement, pro-Iranian elements within the ISF allowed proxy militias to operate inside the city.  Fallujah’s security apparatus after the end of the operation remains firmly under ISF control, while Popular Mobilization continue to secure terrain in its environs. ISW is thus changing the status of Fallujah to an ISF-held location.

The ISF launched an operation to retake Shirqat and Qayyarah on June 18, seizing Qayyarah airfield on July 9. The ISF opened the front northwards from Baiji to Qayyarah as ISF units operating under Ninewa Operations Command continued efforts westwards from Makhmur. The ISF, backed by tribal fighters and Coalition airstrikes, secured Qayyarah Airfield West on July 9. The U.S.-led Coalition will use Qayyarah airbase for logistical and air support for future ISF operations to retake Mosul. The U.S. announced on July 11 that it will deploy an additional 560 soldiers to the base for this purpose. The ISF also arrived at the western bank of the Tigris River on July 13. ISF units under Ninewa Operations Command secured Hajj Ali, on the eastern bank, on July 2. The two fronts made contact, effectively severing the ground line of communication between Shirqat and Qayyarah. ISW is thus changing the status of Qayyarah Airfield West to an ISF-held military base and the status of its environs to an ISF control zone. 

Iraq Situation Report: July 7-13, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

Key Takeaway: The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) retook Qayyarah Airfield West on July 9, meeting little ISIS resistance to secure the airbase. U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter made a surprise visit to Baghdad on July 11, where he announced that the U.S. will deploy an additional 560 soldiers to Qayyarah airbase in order to provide logistical support for future ISF operations to retake Mosul. The increase of the U.S. troop level in Iraq is an acceleration of anti-ISIS operations in northern Iraq, where the ISF continues efforts to retake Shirqat and the city of Qayyarah. The ISF also secured the village of Ajhala on July 12, on the western bank of the Tigris, across from Hajj Ali, on the eastern bank, which ISF units under Ninewa Operations Command recaptured on July 5. The recapture of the two villages allowed ISF forces to link up across the Tigris River and effectively severed Shirqat from Qayyarah, two of ISIS’s remaining strongholds south of Mosul. 

The Council of Representatives (CoR) started a new legislative term on July 12. The session met quorum, as the majority of the Kurdistan Alliance and Reform Front attended, and largely focused on the July 3 Karrada attack. The Reform Front submitted requests to question the Ministers of Defense, Transportation, and Finance, as a prerequisite for dismissal. The CoR approved the requests during the session on July 13. The Reform Front may by trying to undermine the control of the Abadi government by bottlenecking the legislative process with unnecessary and time-consuming demands. The Sadrist Trend-affiliated Ahrar Bloc continued to boycott the sessions, demanding technocratic reforms. Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr called on July 11 for mass demonstrations on July 15, having returned from Iran after a two-month absence, reportedly on June 29. Sadr reaffirmed demands for technocratic reforms, including a replacement of the three presidencies (Prime Minister, President, and CoR Speaker). Sadr’s mass protest on July 15 will come as Baghdad is still coping with the aftermath of the July 3 Karrada bombing and the security reshuffle in the capital. Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi accepted the resignation of Minister of Interior and Badr Organization member Muhammad al-Ghabban on July 8, and dismissed the leader of Baghdad Operations Command the same day as well. Sadr’s return comes at a vulnerable moment in the Iraqi political and security situation, and ongoing unrest in the capital due to Sadrist protests or ongoing ISIS attacks will further undermine PM Abadi’s tenuous control over the government.

Iraq Situation Report: June 29 - July 6, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

Key Takeaway: ISIS detonated a suicide vehicle-borne IED (SVBIED) in the majority Shi’a neighborhood of Karrada in central Baghdad on July 3, resulting in the deadliest attack in Iraq since 2003 with upwards of 250 people killed. The attack comes at the end of the holy month of Ramadan, during which ISW assessed that ISIS would attack Baghdad at a time of political unease in order to break Iraq as a state. The Karrada attack has advanced that objective as it prompted Minister of Interior (MOI) Muhammad al-Ghabban to submit his resignation to Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi on July 5. Ghabban, a Badr Organization member, charged PM Abadi to either reform the security apparatus in Baghdad, by placing the security file fully under the control of the MOI, or to accept his resignation. Baghdad’s security file is currently split between the Ministries of Defense and Interior. The Ministry of Interior is ostensibly controlled by Iranian proxy, the Badr Organization, which has allowed pro-Iranian elements to compromise units in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Full MOI control of the Baghdad security file would allow pro-Iranian forces, particularly the Federal Police, more control in the capital, which may constrain U.S. and Coalition movement in and around Baghdad. It will also increase the likelihood of sectarian violence by pro-Iranian elements in the ISF against Sunni and minority residents. Even if PM Abadi accepts Ghabban’s resignation, the position will likely transfer to either Ghabban’s deputy, who is also a Badr Organization member, or Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri, who has shown interest in the position in the past. Ghabban has successfully moved the conditions of the Karrada bombing in Iran’s favor. He has forced PM Abadi to either submit security in Baghdad under control of pro-Iranian forces or accept Ghabban’s resignation with the chance that his replacement will further empower the Badr Organization and its control of the security in Baghdad. Neither of these options aligns with U.S. interests in Iraq, and both will serve to weaken PM Abadi’s tenuous control over the Iraqi Government.

ISW Russian Airstrikes Maps: September 2015- June 2016

By Genevieve Casagrande

ISW has produced nearly 60 maps on Russian airstrikes in Syria since they first began on September 30, 2015.  The first map appeared less than 24 hours after the Russians began strikes and they continue today as do the strikes despite a declared "cessation of hostilities" and an alleged Russian withdrawal. These maps quickly became the media's trusted source for the locations of Russian airstrikes and appeared around the world in major media outlets inprint, broadcast, and online.  These maps helped show the world that Russia's claims of striking "terrorists" were clearly not accurate as they repeatedly attacked mainstream opposition groups, particularly those working with the West.  When intentionally false maps were produced by the Russian Ministry of Defense to show where they claimed strikes were occurring -- and that they were striking ISIS -- ISW's maps and analysis showed these claims to be untrue. 55 maps 10 months Thousands of strikes Hundreds of locations All tracked by ISW and spearheaded by Genevieve Casagrande, Syria Analyst, and the ISW Syria Team. See the entire Russian Airstrikes Map Collection.

ISW Russian Airstrikes Maps: September 2015- June 2016 from Institute for the Study of War

Iraq Situation Report: June 21 - 28, 2016

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: The Iraqi Federal Court ruled that two key sessions of the Council of Representatives (CoR) in April, one held by legitimate CoR and the other held rebelling members of a rump parliament, were illegal. The ruling stated that the April 14 rump CoR session, when rebelling CoR members illegally voted to remove CoR Speaker Salim al-Juburi from his position, was invalid as it did not meet quorum. The Federal Court also ruled that the April 26 regular CoR session that voted in five new technocratic ministers was invalid due to unconstitutional procedure of the session. The former decision deals a blow to the Reform Front – the incarnation of the rebelling CoR members and the rump parliament – as one of its primary objectives has been to remove Speaker Juburi from office and replace him with a member of the Reform Front. Some of their members stated that the group would return to the CoR and attempt to vote out Speaker Juburi once more. The Reform Front’s return could help the CoR make quorum and recommence legislative work, but political stability is far from likely. The second decision to nullify the April 26 session undermines PM Abadi’s credibility by highlighting his inability to carry out even a compromise cabinet reform, let alone a preferred full reshuffle. The CoR is slated to reconvene in early July. Even if it reaches quorum, the perpetually-stalled reform agenda, calls by Muqtada al-Sadr and other firebrand CoR members for resignations of senior government members, and a fracturing Kurdistan Alliance all but ensure a delay on progress for important legislation. Continued disruptive behavior and obstructionism will likely continue within the CoR, and further momentum could build for a no-confidence vote in PM Abadi in the wake of Federal Court’s decision.

ISIS in Southeast Asia: April 22 to June 23, 2016

By Jessica Lewis McFate and Caitlin Forrest

Four ISIS-linked Salafi-Jihadi groups in Philippines released a video on June 21, 2016 including an official logo for ISIS in Philippines, implying direct affiliation with ISIS. The four groups in the video are the Abu Khubayb Brigade, the Jundallah Battalion, the Abu Sadr Battalion, and the Abu Dujana Brigade. The video included fighters speaking either from Philippines or from Raqqa, Syria. The fighters announced that groups in Philippines have both consolidated as one organization and are operating under an emir, Abu Abdullah al-Filipini aka Isnilon Hapilon, which would meet two prerequisites for official wilayats outlined by ISIS’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2014. Isnilon Hapilon is the leader of Abu Sayyaf Group, a former associate of al-Qaeda that pledged bayat to Baghdadi twice between 2014 and 2016. ISIS’s official weekly newsletter al Naba also referred to Hapilon as a commander in Philippines in April 2016, indicating a previous endorsement by ISIS. The groups in the video are operationally capable and conducting attacks, some likely including fighters that have returned from Syria. ISIS began to claim attacks by these groups in Philippines in April 2016. ISIS has not announced Wilayat Philippines officially, but it may do so as part of its Ramadan campaign to demonstrate that it continues to expand to new regions. ISIS may declare additional wilayats during Ramadan, for example in Bangladesh, where similar prerequisites have already been met.  

Iraq Situation Report: June 14 - 20, 2016

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) made significant gains in recapturing Fallujah from ISIS, but areas recaptured in the future face the risk of instability. As of June 20, the ISF have cleared most of the neighborhoods in Fallujah, excluding some of its northern neighborhoods. Nevertheless, the proliferation of Iraqi Shi’a militias in Fallujah’s northern suburbs could pose a serious problem to the area’s stability. Reports of abuses against Sunni civilians north of Fallujah by Popular Mobilization and Federal Police were serious enough that security forces encouraged Sunni civilians to flee south towards Amiriyat al-Fallujah. Members of the Badr Organization’s 5th Brigade, whose commander is also a senior commander in the Federal Police (FP), entered the city alongside the FP and Emergency Response Division (ERD), forces linked to the Badr Organization-controlled Interior Ministry (MoI), during the course of the operation. The presence of Iraqi Shi’a militias both inside and around Fallujah increases the possibility of sectarian violence against the Sunni Arab residents of Fallujah, which has long served as a support zone for extremist Sunni groups against the locally unpopular Shi’a-dominated national government. Meanwhile, the Iraqi government will likely rely on local Sunni Arab tribes with knowledge of the area’s human networks to provide fighters for recaptured areas’ security and identifying ISIS collaborators. This collaboration could result in the government empowering certain Sunni tribal power brokers over others with whom they are rivals, which may lead to inter- and intra-tribal violence and settling of old scores as Internally-Displaced Persons (IDPs) return to their homes in the Fallujah area. 

Fallujah’s stability is critical to the success of future operations against ISIS in Ninewa and western Anbar. Furthermore, the Iraqi government must demonstrate its ability to provide for its citizens to regain the trust and support of the Sunni-Arab populations currently living in ISIS territory; if violence against Fallujah’s Sunni Arabs continues, conditions for IDPs in camps remain poor, Fallujah’s heavily damaged interior and suburbs are not rebuilt, and reconstruction money is stolen, then Sunni Arabs in ISIS-held areas of Iraq may not welcome the ISF when their areas are recaptured. The ISF must recapture and hold Fallujah and all other predominantly-Sunni Arab areas in an inclusive manner devoid of ethnic, sectarian, and tribal violence, which will require a force that excludes Iraqi Shi’a militias and includes Sunni Arab fighters. Territorial victories will otherwise be accompanied by long-term instability, allowing ISIS or other extremist groups an opportunity for resurgence. The Iraqi Government and the U.S.-led anti-ISIS Coalition will need to keep these lessons in mind as the ISF commence the difficult push from northern Salah al-Din Province into Ninewa towards Mosul.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: May 27 - June 17, 2016

By Genevieve Casagrande

Russia has escalated its air campaign in Syria in an effort to deter and undermine Western military action. ISW assesses with high confidence that Russian airstrikes targeted areas held by the U.S.-backed New Syrian Army near the Syrian al Tanaf border crossing with Iraq on June 16. The U.S. trained and equipped the New Syrian Army to fight ISIS in southeastern Syria. The U.S. sent jets to intercept and prevent additional attacks, but Russian warplanes returned to conduct a second strike against New Syrian Army positions while the American jets refueled, according to anonymous U.S. Defense Officials. Russia and the U.S. held a teleconference on June 18 to discuss the incident, during which Russia requested that the U.S. “share coordinates” of U.S.-backed opposition groups in Syria. The Russian Ministry of Defense announced that the two sides agreed to “[aim] to improve the coordination on fighting the terrorist organization in Syria,” but did not specify any new measures to prevent the targeting of U.S.-backed groups. The strikes are a clear demonstration of Russia’s willingness to escalate with the U.S. and likely belief that the U.S. will be unwilling to sufficiently counter the provocation.

The attack against the New Syrian Army follows an increased American military response to Russian activity in Syria over recent weeks. The U.S. deployed the USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group on June 3 to the Mediterranean Sea in order to conduct strikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria and offset increased Russian naval capabilities in the Mediterranean. Russia subsequently deployed long-range naval reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare aircraft to theater, which local Syrian activists documented in Aleppo Province on June 5. Russia also began to project force into Eastern Syria from June 5 - 17, intensifying its own aerial bombardment of ISIS-held terrain in ar-Raqqa and Deir ez-Zour Provinces. The U.S. has nonetheless continued to conduct strikes against ISIS from the Mediterranean. The U.S. also deployed the Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group to the Mediterranean on June 13, which will reportedly remain in the Mediterranean after the Truman returns to the U.S. in late June. The deployments of U.S. strike carrier groups are likely an effort to deter a continued Russian buildup of air and naval anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Russia’s attacks against American-backed groups in Syria and the expansion of its air campaign into ISIS-held terrain demonstrate that Russia will continue to change conditions on the ground in Syria in order to undermine American interests. Russian airstrikes during the first two weeks of June increased to rates that “exceeded the pre-cessation of hostilities totals” in Aleppo Province, according to Director of the CIA John Brennan. In response, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated on June 15 that the U.S. is not “going to sit there while Assad continues to offensively assault Aleppo and while Russia continues to support in that effort.” Russia nonetheless continued to bombard opposition-held areas in Aleppo Province amidst a temporary ceasefire agreement in Aleppo City from June 16 - 17. ISW assessed a total of 14 Russian strike locations in the Aleppo area with low and high confidence during that time period. Russia’s claim to adhere to a ceasefire despite continuing its air campaign obfuscates its role in exacerbating the Syrian conflict. Russia’s violation of the ceasefire agreement demonstrates that it remains undeterred from continuing its campaign against the Syrian opposition despite American rhetoric threatening greater U.S. response.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. 

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.

Fallujah Control of Terrain Map: June 17, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

Key Takeaway: The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) has made significant progress in its operation to retake Fallujah, but the city is not fully cleared. Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced the full recapture of Fallujah on June 17, following the recapture of the government complex. However, the northern neighborhoods of the city remain controlled by ISIS, and several western neighborhoods are still contested. Even as the ISF operation is on the verge of military success in Fallujah, it is poised to be a political failure. The Badr Organization, an Iranian-backed Shi’a proxy militia, has entered the city limits alongside pro-Iranian ISF elements. The Badr Organization’s presence, following continued Shi’a abuses against Sunni residents, will be a sectarian trigger that will undermine the Iraqi Government’s efforts to reconcile Sunni elements. The Fallujah operation will be a mission failure – even if the city is physically recaptured – as long as the Iraqi Government does not address the Sunni political marginalization which made Fallujah passive towards ISIS’s takeover of the city in December 2013.

The ISF continue operations to retake neighborhoods in Fallujah, securing Khudra on June 15 and Hayy al-Shuhada on June 16, and Nazal and Sinai, Fallujah’s industrial center, on June 17. The ISF also secured the mayoral building and the entire government complex on June 17. The ISF is still contesting areas in western Fallujah and have moved into Risala and Andalus on June 15 and encircled Fallujah General Hospital in Dhubat on June 17. Jubeil likewise remains contested. The ISF and Sunni tribal fighters continue to consolidate terrain to the southwest of Fallujah, recapturing Felahat on June 11 and al-Jafah on June 13, while efforts are ongoing to secure Halabsa. The ISF secured control over the Fallujah Dam, directly south of Fallujah, on June 14. Control of the dam will allow forces currently south of the river to link up with forces on the northern bank.

The Badr Organization, an Iranian-backed Shi’a proxy militia, has entered the city limits of Fallujah alongside the Federal Police and Emergency Response Division (ERD). Badr’s entry in the majority Sunni city follows the expiration of Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri’s ten-day deadline for Fallujah residents to leave. The deadline expired on June 14. Amiri and the 5^th Badr Brigade were present in Hayy al-Shuhada on June 15 and reached 60th Street, the boundary between Shuhada and Nazal, on June 16, in coordination with the Federal Police and ERD. The 5^th Badr Brigade was also reported alongside the Federal Police near the mayoral building on June 17. Elements of both the Federal Police and ERD are co-opted by the Badr Organization and are strongly receptive to Iranian direction. These elements have also operated alongside Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), major Iranian-backed proxy militias with a history of sectarian violence. It is possible that Iranian actors, who have been sited previously in Fallujah’s environs, are also in the city. The Badr Organization is not likely leading the operations to retake these areas, as they have been pictured in these areas the day following the ISF announcement of their recapture. Instead, Badr is shadowing the ISF operations towards the center of the city. The militia involvement represents a breach of agreement within the ISF that Shi’a militias would not enter the city, indicating that pro-Iranian ISF elements will undermine top ISF orders out of affiliation to Iran. This will limit the ISF’s ability to set the terms of militia involvement. Other militias, including AAH and KH, may see Badr’s entry into Fallujah as a green light to enter as well.

Badr’s presence in Fallujah could spoil the anti-ISIS campaign and setback government efforts of Sunni reconciliation. This setback may already be triggered. Iranian proxy militias continue to carry out violations against the Sunni population fleeing the city. Anbar Governor Suhaib al-Rawi reported on June 13 that Popular Mobilization fighters in Saqlawiyah had executed 49 Sunni men and disappeared 643 civilians the week before, following reports of similar actions around Garma. Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a report on June 9 further detailing militia abuse against Sunni residents. The Popular Mobilization has denied or downplayed these allegations. Popular Mobilization activity in Fallujah’s environs has demonstrated that militias are likely to treat residents in Fallujah as complicit with ISIS. The U.N. estimated that 40,000 residents had fled the city over the past three weeks. Many began to flee the city on June 17 as the ISF entered the inner neighborhoods. The U.N. had estimated that as many of 90,000 people were in the city when the ground operation began on May 23. It is unclear how many still remain. Residents have likely remained in Fallujah until now for a variety of reasons, including physical obstacles preventing their escape, the difficulty of escape, and loyalty to the city itself. Residents likely believe that hardships faced by remaining under ISIS’s control in Fallujah is preferable to living in refugee camps or anywhere else that may leave them vulnerable to abuse by Shi’a militias.

A historic distrust and disdain towards the Iraqi Government among the people of Fallujah has made them resistant to outside intervention and susceptible to complicity with radical ideology. The U.S. encountered that anti-government aggression during efforts to take the city from AQI in 2004 and 2006. Fallujah’s animosity towards the previous Shi’a-led government reached its height when former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki arrested several high-profile Sunni politicians in 2012, leading to year-long anti-government protests across Iraq and particularly in Fallujah. AQI’s resurgence, and consequent evolution into ISIS, was incubated among these protests. ISIS seized Fallujah at the end of December 2013 by capitalizing on that anti-government sentiment amongst a population that did not fight back.

The Iraqi Government can salvage the Fallujah operation by changing the composition of the forces in the city. Continued Shi’a militia involvement in Fallujah will undermine the military success of the operation and efforts of Sunni reconciliation. Militias must be withdrawn. The Iraqi Government will also need to consider the composition of the forces needed to hold Fallujah after its recapture. Fallujah will not accept a security system maintained explicitly by the ISF and certainly not one connected to the Popular Mobilization. The government needs to generate and support a local tribal force that can secure the city and act as a liaison between Fallujah and Baghdad. The Iraqi Government also needs to ensure that its Sunni population participates in the government as a means to achieve demands, rather than seek insurgent or extreme methods. In the long term, the Iraqi Government needs to develop a framework that can address the fundamental issue that Sunnis are underrepresented in the government and a frequent victim of institutional sectarian abuse. Failure to adequately address Sunni demands of equal representation and political participation will inevitably lead to the resurgence of either ISIS or a successor in Fallujah and elsewhere in Iraq.

Iraq Situation Report: June 8-13, 2016

By Patrick Martin and the ISW Iraq Team

Intra-Shi’a tensions reached a boiling point in Iraq when Sadrist demonstrators defaced headquarters buildings of both rival Shi’a political parties and at least one Iranian proxy militia in Baghdad and southern Iraq. The demonstrations, which began on Ramadan on June 6, were small and not likely centrally coordinated; some demonstrators defaced the headquarters buildings of al-Ahrar Bloc, the Sadrist Trend’s main political party. The violent attacks are particularly destabilizing as security forces are preoccupied with the Fallujah operation and securing the country from ISIS attacks – a serious threat during Ramadan. Iraq’s major Shi’a parties, including the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), Fadhila, and the State of Law Alliance, as well as Iranian proxy groups like Kata’ib Hezbollah and the Badr Organization, denounced the attacks, as did Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi. The wide-spread rejection of the demonstrators’ methods, likely combined with strong pressure from Iran, forced Muqtada al-Sadr to call off demonstrations until after Ramadan. Some small demonstrations may continue due to the Sadrist Trend’s large size and lack of discipline, but the suspension of demonstrations underscores the serious nature of the threat of intra-Shi’a conflict. Meanwhile, security forces continue to make progress in recapturing central Fallujah without participation from the Popular Mobilization. However, reports of civilian abuses continue to emerge, indicating that the area may remain unstable for an extended period of time and vulnerable to ISIS resurgence. This risk may amplify if sectarian violence continues and Iraqi Shi’a militias retain a long-term presence in the Fallujah area.