Iraqi Parliament Update: Quorum Reached as Reform Front Fractures, Kurds Lose Leverage

By Emily Anagnostos

Key Takeaway: The Council of Representatives (CoR) successfully reached quorum and convened two sessions on May 29 and May 31. The CoR struggled to reach this threshold since members formed a rump CoR on April 12. Despite the limited success of May 29 and 31, the CoR has not returned to its pre-April 12 state and many political blocs remain withdrawn. The CoR will not likely soon resolve fundamental issues in the political process needed to pass legislation required to acquire the critical International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan or address security breaches in Baghdad, which will likely require a reorganization of security forces in the capital. The sessions also exposed underlying fractures in the Reform Front between hardliners and compromisers, which will weaken the opposition bloc in the CoR and lead to the reintegration of some members to their original parties. The Reform Front is also in danger of losing its tenuous legitimacy and leverage as a nascent political party if the Federal Court strikes down the constitutionality of the rump CoR, the Reform Front’s predecessor. The CoR has already demonstrated that it can and will leave the Reform Front behind to continue to function. Additionally, Kurdish parties have lost their leverage over Baghdad as some Kurdish members ended their boycott without any promise of requested financial assistance. The failure to secure these funds has underscored the limit to Kurdish parties’ power in the Iraqi Government when operating outside the umbrella of the Kurdistan Alliance.

Council of Representatives meets quorum on May 29

The Council of Representatives (CoR) reached quorum and held its first meeting in a month on May 29, marking the slow thawing of political parties’ opposition to the political process. The CoR had fractured on April 12 when a group of members calling for the resignation of the three presidencies – Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, President Fuad Masoum, and CoR Speaker Salim al-Juburi – formed a rump parliament. The rump parliament passed a vote to dismiss Juburi on April 14 and denounced the CoR under Juburi as illegal. Even with the rump CoR acting separately, the legal CoR chaired by Juburi still managed to convene a session on April 26. At that meeting, attending members voted in five new ministers as a part of PM Abadi’s ongoing efforts to reshuffle the Council of Ministers. The success of the April 26 session in face of the rump CoR’s obstruction prompted it to disband and reform as an opposition bloc on April 28. The bloc, the Reform Front, immediately boycotted the CoR, as it maintained the fundamental principle of the rump CoR that Juburi was not the legal Speaker.

The legal CoR lost momentum between April 26 and April 30, likely because the April 30 session was set to vote on major ministerial positions that political blocs, including the Kurds, were unwilling to relinquish. Several parties, including the Kurds and the Sadrist Trend-affiliated Ahrar Bloc, refused to attend the session, so it failed to meet quorum. Sadrist protesters then stormed the Green Zone on April 30, leading to a mass exodus of political parties from parliament. The protests had severed any chance of regaining the momentum of the reshuffle process. The political process subsequently froze in Iraq for nearly a month as each party set specific conditions for its return.

Juburi met with political leaders prior to May 29 ostensibly to discuss the agenda for the CoR session and likely to mobilize members to meet quorum. He stated that the session would be held “in solidarity” with security forces in Fallujah, who were then on the verge of entering into the city limits. This language set a patriotic tone, which many have cited as the reason why enough individual CoR members and political parties attended the session. An unconfirmed number of Kurdish members attended; Kurdish members withdrew from Baghdad on May 1 after security forces failed to protect the CoR from protesters on April 30. The returning members were likely affiliated with the Patriotic Union and Kurdistan (PUK) and Gorran, who have shown a greater inclination to return to Baghdad than the leading Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The PUK also previously announced on May 22 that it would attend any future CoR session, indicating that Kurdish participants were likely from the PUK. The Sadrist Trend-affiliated Ahrar Bloc did not attend the session and continued to demand a vote on a technocratic Cabinet in order to secure its return.

Initially five members short, the May 29 session ultimately reached quorum. PM Abadi made a surprise visit to the session, where he spoke of operations in Fallujah and Mosul and announced his intent to soon present the rest of the ministerial nominations for a CoR vote. Like Juburi, PM Abadi used the operation in Fallujah to call for political solidarity. He will likely continue to try to capitalize on the patriotic ethos in order to reset the political conditions and pass both required legislation and his reform agenda. PM Abadi also needs the political climate to remain stable to provide basic security throughout the country as ISIS attacks are likely to increase during the holy month of Ramadan. The CoR session failed to address both the ministerial reshuffle further and the legislation needed to receive the IMF loan. The IMF had stipulated on May 12 that the Iraqi Government reduce its 2016 federal budget as a condition for receiving major loans from both the IMF and other international financial institutions. Reducing the federal budget requires parliamentary legislation.

The May 29 session unanimously voted to extend the legislative term one month and adjourned until May 30. That session was postponed one day on the prospect of larger numbers of CoR members joining the session, primarily those from the Reform Front. Juburi stated that there were “positive signs” and that he had received a “serious letter” from the Reform Front on the need to hold a unified session. The session did meet on May 31, and several Reform Front members attended. However, the CoR announced that it was on a legislative holiday, usually taken during Ramadan, and that the May 31 session was an extraordinary one. At the session, members further discussed operations in Fallujah but still did not address the IMF loan or the cabinet reshuffle. Juburi announced that the CoR would adjourn until July 1, with the possibility of holding extraordinary sessions when needed. Since May 31, the political scene in Iraq has fallen silent.  

Reform Front may split over Federal Court’s strategy of delay

The Federal Court convened its first session on May 25 to rule on the constitutionality of the April 14 and April 26 CoR sessions. The rump CoR voted to dismiss Speaker Juburi on April 14, and on April 26 the legal CoR approved the five ministers under PM Abadi’s Cabinet reshuffle. The Reform Front maintains that the April 14 session met quorum while challenging that the April 26 session chaired by Juburi met quorum. Likewise, the legal CoR rejects the April 14 session as legitimate and upholds the constitutionality of the April 26 session.

The Federal Court is likely pursuing a strategy of delay in order to force political parties to come to an organic agreement. If the strategy fails, a court ruling could further complicate the political crisis and will likely result in blowback. The Federal Court thus ruled on May 25 that experts were needed to assist in the case; it adjourned the session until May 29, which coincided with the resumption of the CoR. The Federal Court resumed the morning prior to the CoR session, swore in two experts for the case, and then adjourned until June 8 when the experts would present their initial findings. The court later announced on June 6 that the June 8 session would only discuss the appeals against the April 26 session, further delaying discussion of the April 14 rump CoR session. The CoR will be well into their legislative holiday by June 8, so the results will have no immediate effect.

The impending decision of the Federal Court is linked to the conditions of the return of the Reform Front as it refuses to return to the CoR as long as Juburi remains chair. This attitude, however, precludes the group from negotiating with other political parties who do not consider Juburi’s position as up for negotiation. Moreover, the Reform Front’s stringent demand that Juburi is removed is a high risk to take if the Federal Court rules in Juburi’s favor.

The Reform Front does not currently operate under a unified framework. The Front is divided between two dominant parties, elements of the Dawa Party that support former Prime Minster Nouri-al Maliki and members of Ayad Allawi’s Wataniya party. These two parties, as well as Maliki and Allawi, will use the Reform Front’s size and leverage to accomplish their own interests in the CoR. Both Maliki and Allawi will also try to commandeer the Reform Front as a vehicle for their return to power. Despite the political freeze, events continue to progress that require parliamentary participation and approval, including the impending IMF loan. Operations in Fallujah will soon require parliamentary discussion on reconstruction efforts and management of the internally displaced refugees (IDP). The CoR will not wait for the Reform Front to participate if it can achieve quorum without them.

The risk of being left behind in the CoR has also split the Reform Front between those who would and would not compromise with the CoR in order to return to the political process. Many hardliners in the Reform Front maintain that they will not return until the Federal Court reaches a decision, and they have stated that they will not accept any “political settlement” for their return. These hardliners have also denied reports that the Reform Front is discussing proposals on how to return to the CoR session if Juburi survives the Federal Court case. The Federal Court’s delayed ruling on the April 14 session further jeopardizes the Reform Front’s relevancy if it remains distant from the political stage for too long. The Front will also lose its leverage if the CoR can find a way to resume the political process without the opposition bloc.

The continued delay has forced the return of Reform Front members who cannot afford to wait for the Federal Court to come to a decision - a reported ten Reform Front members attended the May 29 session. Some of the members were reportedly from Anbar Province and had to attend the session because it dealt with Fallujah. The Reform Front’s boycott is incompatible with individual partisan responsibilities, and those members will need to remain active in the decision making process in order to serve their constituencies and further their unique party interests. The May 31 session also reportedly included several Reform Front members. A Reform Front member had stated that 15 members had elected to attend the session as an opposition party, rather than boycott the sessions until Juburi was removed from his position. These members may be under similar pressure to remain active in the political scene in order to achieve specific demands. Their participation may also suggest that the hardline approach is unsustainable as a party line and that the Reform Front does not have the vision to be a functional political entity.

If the Federal Court invalidates the rump CoR’s actions, the hardliners will likely remain divided between Allawi and Maliki while the compromisers will likely return to the CoR, either to their former political parties or as a weakened opposition bloc. If the Reform Front wants to remain a credible political entity in the CoR, it must create a political agenda that can exist outside the simple black-and-white framework of whether Juburi remains as CoR speaker.  

Kurdish blocs lose leverage in Baghdad

The Kurdistan Alliance withdrew from the political process on May 1, citing the failure of security forces to protect CoR members from the protesters on April 30. The Kurdistan Alliance later announced on May 5 that the conditions of their return were centered on financial concessions from Baghdad. The international community and major political officials in Iraq engaged the Kurdish parties the following two weeks to secure their return to the CoR, focusing the majority of these efforts on the PUK and Gorran, both opposition parties within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The softening of the PUK and Gorran’s stance regarding the enticement of the impending IMF loan compounded by the announcement of a new political alliance between the PUK and Gorran on May 18 led to the fracture of the Kurdistan Alliance, as the leading KDP party remained opposed to returning to Baghdad. The PUK announced on May 22 that it would return to the next CoR session, breaking from the umbrella of the Kurdistan Alliance. It later appended its statement on May 23 to note that their return would follow negotiations alongside other Kurdish parties with PM Abadi regarding their demands.

Kurdish political leaders met with PM Abadi on May 28 to discuss conditions of their return, but they failed to extract any valuable concessions. The KDP was not present at that meeting. Pictures have shown only PUK parliamentary leader Ala Talabani, Gorran parliamentary leader Hoshyar Abdullah, and Gorran Second Deputy Speaker Aram Sheikh Muhammad with PM Abadi. A later report on June 6 confirmed that three Kurdish parties went to Baghdad and participated in the CoR sessions – the PUK, Gorran and the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) as the likely third party – while two remained in Iraqi Kurdistan, the KDP and likely the Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG).

Prime Minister Abadi (far right) meets with (l-r) PUK parliamentary leader Ala Talabni, Gorran parliamentary leader Hoshyar Abdullah, and Gorran Second Deputy CoR Speaker Aram Sheikh Muhammad in his office on May 28. Source: PMO.iq

The Kurdish Alliance previously enjoyed its power in numbers as it occupied nearly one-fifth of the parliamentary seats. The Kurds could leverage their unified size in the CoR in return for financial concessions. The splinter of the political process highlighted internal fractures within the Kurdistan Alliance, however, primarily between the PUK and Gorran and the KDP. When individual parties sought concessions from Abadi outside of the Kurdish Alliance, the parties no longer had the upper hand in negotiations. As such, the Kurdish blocs returned to the CoR without much to show for their month-long boycott. Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) parliamentary leader Muthanna Amin stated that PM Abadi during the May 28 meeting had not signaled any intention of granting the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) any portion of international loans. PM Abadi has not made any public indication to support or deny this accusation. The greatest incentive for the Kurdish parties to remain active in the political process was the prospect of receiving a significant international financial assistance, notably the IMF loan, which could drag the Kurds out of their own economic crisis and support ongoing military operations. Kurdish members may have returned to the CoR on May 29 without the guarantee of financial concessions in hopes that it can more easily extract concessions from within Baghdad than from Arbil. The Kurdish parties do not have the individual clout to seek negotiations in Baghdad, however, and are at risk of receiving less financial assistance from Baghdad than they did before. The federal government has effectively outlasted the Kurdish boycott and eliminated the Kurdish leverage over the government.  

The Kurdish parties will use the month-long legislative holiday to regroup, and it is likely that they will present on July 1 a more unified framework towards the federal government. PUK Second Secretary General Barham Salih stated on June 1 that the PUK would work to maintain relations with the KDP and stressed the need for coordination between all Kurdish political actors in the interests of Iraqi Kurdistan. KDP member and KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani reaffirmed the need for dialogue between Baghdad and Arbil. He stated that there is no intention for a KRG delegation to visit Baghdad, but that some Kurdish political actors may go “individually.” An unconfirmed source leaked on June 2 that the major parties in the KRG had reached an agreement to redistribute positions in the Kurdish government, suggesting that Gorran would resume the position of parliamentary speaker, and the KDP would give the position of prime minister to the PUK as President Masoud Barzani would stay in his position. This agreement would continue until 2017 elections. The report is unverified, but it suggests that the Kurds have witnessed the blowback caused by a lack of Kurdish consensus in Baghdad and are reevaluating how the Kurdish political parties operate in both Baghdad and Arbil.

The ongoing financial issues in the KRG will push the Kurds to resurrect the Kurdistan Alliance as the Kurdish parties are unlikely to give up demands regarding financial assistance. KDP member Najiba Najib spoke on behalf of the Kurdistan Alliance on June 4, calling for 17% of any financial assistance given to Iraq as a constitutional right. Iraqi Kurdistan, as a part of Iraq, legally stands to gain a portion of any financial assistance given to Iraq. The specific percentage is not constitutionally specific and 17% is the percentage of the Iraqi federal budget allocated the region each year. Najib had previously stated on May 10 that the “partnership between Baghdad and Arbil had collapsed.” Najib’s inflammatory rhetoric likely aimed to drive Baghdad to offer greater concessions in order to prevent political separation between Arbil and Baghdad. The KDP will likely try to restore the leverage that the Kurdistan Alliance had in early May when they announced the boycott in order to receive financial support from Baghdad.

The KDP, however, will also try to restore the Kurdistan Alliance in a way to benefits their party interests and reestablishes their dominance over the other Kurdish parties, most notably the PUK-Gorran Alliance, which formed on May 18. KDP member Kamal Kujar stated on June 6 that the split in the Kurdish parties over the return to the May 20 and 31 sessions was a “misunderstanding,” and that the PUK now “regrets” their return to Baghdad as PM Abadi did not guarantee any of their demands. Kujar announced that the Kurdish parties share a common “vision” of returning to Baghdad, but that the Kurdish people pressured the Kurdish parties to boycott the CoR and demand concessions from the federal government. The KDP will likely leverage the PUK’s failure to achieve concessions from Baghdad in order to pressure the PUK to return to a Kurdish agenda determined by the KDP.

The Ramadan holiday will likely witness internal Kurdish negotiations regarding the timeframe of a full Kurdish return to Baghdad and the political stance of the Kurdistan Alliance regarding the Iraqi Government. The KDP knows that the PUK cannot return to Baghdad successfully without it, so the group will likely use their own return as a bargaining chip to maintain their dominance in Kurdish politics in both Baghdad and Arbil. The PUK can undermine this leverage by threatening to return to Baghdad alone, but doing so would both undermine the group’s ability to gain concessions for Iraqi Kurdistan and alienate the party from the greater Kurdistan Alliance. The KDP could use the PUK’s misstep to reaffirm its preeminent position in the KRG and resume negotiations with Baghdad with the full force of the Kurdistan Alliance behind it.  

The conditions in Iraq by July 1 will likely require urgent action in the CoR, possibly allowing the Kurdistan Alliance to re-secure its leverage over Baghdad. Operations in Fallujah will likely have progressed into the city, and as ISIS is squeezed out it will increase attacks in other areas as retaliation. The financial situation is unlikely to improve given ongoing military operations, and the Iraqi Government will likely find itself burdened with an increased IDP crisis following operations in Fallujah. The Iraqi Government will no longer have the flexibility to further delay the CoR and political process to its benefit. Instead, it will need to meet the conditions of the Kurdish parties’ return in order to maintain a CoR quorum and pass needed legislation. The Kurdistan Alliance will likely have the opportunity to reform its conditions, and if it can present reasonable and feasible ones, the Iraqi Government will likely meet them.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: May 13 - June 2, 2016

By Genevieve Casagrande

The tempo of Russian air operations has dramatically escalated in Syria. The rate and breadth of Russian airstrikes nearly tripled from May 29 – June 2 in comparison to the previous five day period. ISW was able to assess a total of 29 Russian airstrikes with low and high confidence beginning on May 29 and only 10 locations from May 24 -28. This escalation marks a dangerous shift in the Russian airstrike pattern to levels only seen prior to the brokering of the Cessation of Hostilities agreement in late February 2016. This expansion of the Russian air campaign coincides with the further breakdown of Geneva negotiations, including the resignation of Chief Opposition Negotiator Mohammad Alloush on May 30 due to a reported lack of political progress and continued bombardment of civilians in opposition-held terrain.

Russia is clearly demonstrating its freedom of action in Syria. It has pivoted its air operations towards mainstream elements of the armed opposition across Western Syria. An anonymous U.S. intelligence official confirmed on June 3 that “Russia and [Syrian President Bashar al-] Assad have “primarily targeted the moderate opposition,” despite their claims to the contrary. Russian air operations against the Syrian opposition expanded beyond the targeting of critical frontlines in Aleppo and once again began to target deep within opposition-held terrain in Idlib Province from May 30 – June 2. ISW was also able to assess two Russian airstrikes with low confidence in Dera’a Province on May 31, marking the first assessed Russian strikes in the province since February 25. The strikes targeted terrain largely held by factions within the U.S.-backed Southern Front coalition. Russia also continued its intense bombardment against the opposition in Aleppo in a likely condition setting effort for the pro-regime encirclement of Aleppo City, targeting key locations along the opposition’s last remaining supply route into the city.

ISW has changed its assessment methodology regarding low- and high-confidence strikes since the last publication of a Russian airstrikes map on May 28. Both the Russian Ministry of Defense and Western officials have altered their patterns of reporting on Russian air operations within recent weeks. ISW has therefore amended the criteria for determining high-confidence reporting to rely more heavily on key indicators of Russian airstrikes, rather than statements from Russian and Western officials. Key indicators of strikes include precision, flight patterns, and time of strikes as well as an examination of picture intelligence.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. 

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.

ISIS Collapses Opposition Frontline in Northern Aleppo Province

By Christopher Kozak

The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has mounted a major offensive against opposition groups in Northern Aleppo Province over the past week, threatening the total collapse of the last pocket of opposition-held terrain along the Syrian-Turkish Border. ISIS seized at least six villages in Northern Aleppo Province on May 27, besieging the critical opposition stronghold of Mare’a and entering the outskirts of the border town of Azaz. ISIS later entered the town of Mare’a on May 28 under the cover of up to nine Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improved Explosive Device (SVBIED) detonations before withdrawing in the face of heavy resistance from the opposition. Opposition groups successfully recaptured several villages near Azaz in a counterattack on May 28 - 30, but the situation remains tenuous. ISIS has launched near-continuous attacks against Mare’a over the past week, while the Syrian Kurdish YPG assumed control over the adjacent town of Sheikh Issa on May 30 in exchange for the safe passage of more than 6,000 civilians from the town. Meanwhile, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) warned that the fighting has displaced thousands of civilians in Northern Aleppo Province where over 160,000 civilians already live in temporary residences, informal settlements, or humanitarian camps.

These gains by ISIS mark the latest in a series of recent setbacks for the opposition in Northern Aleppo Province. On April 7, the Hawar Kilis Operations Room – a coalition of opposition groups backed by the U.S. and Turkey that includes fighters vetted by the U.S. Department of Defense - captured the ISIS-held town of Al-Rai in Northern Aleppo Province with the aid of cross-border artillery fire and coalition airstrikes. The operation was part of a wider offensive to clear ISIS from the Syrian-Turkish Border. The rapid advance along the border nonetheless left opposition forces vulnerable to an attack on their exposed southern flank. ISIS launched a two-pronged counteroffensive on April 10 - 11, seizing several villages near Azaz and recapturing the town of Al-Rai – a key route for illegal smuggling of foreign fighters and supplies. On April 14, ISIS mounted another attack that temporarily entrapped opposition groups against the Syrian-Turkish Border after entering four towns including Hawar Kilis – the namesake of the Hawar Kilis Operations Room. The opposition continued to suffer a steady erosion in terrain over subsequent weeks despite continued coalition support and several effective local counterattacks against ISIS.

The looming defeat of opposition groups in Northern Aleppo Province poses a significant risk to the long-term success of the anti-ISIS campaign. The U.S. and Turkey have provided varying levels of support to opposition factions along the so-called ‘Mare’a Line’ as part of a wider effort to isolate the ISIS stronghold of Ar-Raqqa City from the Syrian-Turkish Border. Turkey has repeatedly called for the U.S. to increase its support for Sunni Arab opposition groups in Northern Aleppo Province as an alternative to deepening cooperation with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – a U.S.-backed coalition led by the Syrian Kurdish YPG, considered by Turkey to be a terrorist organization due to its links with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The U.S. airdropped ammunition and other supplies to vetted opposition groups in Mare’a on June 2 in a symbolic effort likely aimed at acknowledging these demands. The collapse of the Mare’a Line will nonetheless foreclose this alternative and instead drive the U.S. to deepen its current overreliance on the Syrian Kurdish YPG – setting the conditions for long-term ethnic conflict in the region and further limiting opportunities for partnership with Sunni Arabs in Northern Syria as part of the anti-ISIS campaign. In a reflection of this shift, the U.S. provided direct support to an SDF-led operation to seize the key cross-border transit hub of Manbij in Eastern Aleppo Province that began on June 1 despite long-standing reservations from Turkey regarding further Syrian Kurdish expansion along its border. The start of this operation despite these political tensions indicates that the U.S. may have already decided to abandon its support for Sunni Arabs in Northern Aleppo Province in favor of the Syrian Kurds – sacrificing long-term regional stability for short-term tactical gains against ISIS. 

Iraq Situation Report: May 24 - June 1, 2016

By Patrick Martin and Emily Anagnostos

Iraq's political situation remains tenuous as security forces escalate a major military operation in Fallujah. Iraqi Shi'a militias, tribal fighters, and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continued recapturing territory around Fallujah and began probing attacks into the city of Fallujah. However, there are numerous reports that the Popular Mobilization engaged in sectarian violence in Garma sub-district, reportedly destroying a mosque with explosives, looting homes and buildings, and kidnapping and executing civilians. While the reports could not be confirmed, this conduct is not anomalous for many of the Iraqi Shi'a militias operating in the area. Continued sectarian violence will have serious consequences on the stability of the Fallujah area, providing a support base for Sunni extremist groups and increasing the stabilization force requirements to hold the area. The visit of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) - Quds Force commander Qassim Suleimani to the area and the prominent role of Iran's proxy militias underscore the level of influence Iran has over the conduct of the operation; the Popular Mobilization appears content to let the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) with Coalition airstrikes recapture Fallujah city itself while Iraqi Shi'a militias establish themselves in the area and take the credit. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani likely influenced this decision, who insisted on May 25 that security forces respect civilian lives and not to be "extreme." Sistani's statement indicates increasing concern among the Iraqi Shi'a religious establishment over Iran's prominent role in the Fallujah operation.

ISIS also continued to launch spectacular attacks in Baghdad and the northern Belts in areas that have been repeatedly targeted in recent weeks. Despite increased levels of security forces in and around Baghdad, repeat attacks in areas such as Sadr City and al-Shaab suggest that ISIS retains access in Baghdad and underscores the failure of the security forces to address fundamental vulnerabilities in their security system. Similarly, an ISIS attack in Muqdadiyah comes amidst the largest deployment of forces to Diyala Province since 2008. The ISF, occupied with operations in Fallujah, does not have the reserves to increase its presence in these areas. The Fallujah operation in the short-term will drive an increase in ISIS attacks in retaliation for territorial loss; attacks in Baghdad will increase the burden on the security forces to preserve a standard of security with limited resources.  

Fallujah Control of Terrain Map: May 31, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and Patrick Martin

The operation to retake Fallujah has advanced towards the city limits since ISW’s May 26 Fallujah map, as joint forces from the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Popular Mobilization, and Sunni tribal fighters close in on a multiple-axis assault to encircle the city. The ISF and Popular Mobilization continue to recapture terrain north of Fallujah, including al-Sajar, and consolidate holdings around Garma District, which was recaptured on May 23. Popular Mobilization Deputy Chairman Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, a U.S. designated terrorist and Iranian proxy leader, arrived in Arimiyah, north of Saqlawiyah, on May 31, in order to oversee operations on the western axis, as the ISF and Popular Mobilization work to uproot ISIS from the area. Joint forces retook Saqlawiyah’s city center on May 30, but they will need to secure the area before moving into Fallujah city. The ISF entered Fallujah’s city limits on May 30, when forces from the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) reached Hayy al-Shuhada, the southernmost neighborhood in Fallujah, where they face stiff ISIS resistance against moving into the city.

Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias maintain a steady presence in northern Fallujah, where reports have surfaced of abuses against Sunni populations. Several local sources claim that Popular Mobilization fighters destroyed the Great Mosque in Garma while chanting sectarian slogans and vowing to kill residents. Sources claimed that militias prevented the Sunni Waqf head from entering Garma to organize Friday prayers, have looted homes and factories around Garma, and arrested civilians. A notable tribal sheikh in Garma claimed that Popular Mobilization militants kidnapped 73 men from Garma District and executed 17 of them on charges of belonging to ISIS. Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, however, criticized media outlets for distorting the truth and inciting sectarianism through false reporting on events in Fallujah.

Shi’a militia abuses against the Sunni population might further radicalize Iraq’s Sunni population. Fallujah’s population has suffered under ISIS’s rule for over two years, but residents may be inclined to remain complicit or even identify with ISIS’s extreme sectarian ideology if they feel terrorized by Shi’a militias. Joint forces have opened several corridors for safe passage out of the city that lead primarily to recaptured terrain to the north and south of Fallujah. However, the U.N. has reported that only 3,700 civilians out of the estimated 50,000 remaining in the city have fled from Fallujah over the past week. ISIS has prevented civilians from leaving the area, by force and by requiring a steep payment to leave. Nevertheless, historically anti-government Sunni residents, some of whom were complicit when ISIS first took the city in January 2014, may be inclined to support ISIS rather than seek aid from Shi’a militias. The mindset that Iraqi Sunnis are better off under extremist ideology than in a Shi’a-driven government can perpetuate the Salafi-jihadi movement in Iraq. Until Iraq can guarantee Sunni representation and security, extremist groups will continue to find shelter amongst Iraq’s Sunni population.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: April 30 - May 26, 2016

By Genevieve Casagrande

Russia has continued its air campaign against the Syrian opposition, despite its claims to temporarily suspend airstrikes against Syrian al Qaeda-affiliate Jabhat al Nusra and the opposition. The Russian Ministry of Defense announced a temporary pause in its air campaign against Jabhat al Nusra in order to give opposition groups time to distance themselves from the jihadist group on May 25 and again on May 27. The withdrawal of opposition forces from key frontlines jointly held with Jabhat al Nusra – particularly in Aleppo – would likely render core opposition-held terrain vulnerable to advances by pro-regime forces. Russia is conducting a concerted effort against opposition forces in Aleppo, following opposition gains against pro-regime forces in southern Aleppo throughout April and May 2016. Russian air operations have largely concentrated against positions along the opposition’s last remaining supply route into Aleppo City from May 13 - 26, including against towns northwest of the city and areas in Aleppo’s northern industrial outskirts. Pro-regime forces remain positioned to encircle and besiege opposition forces in Aleppo City by severing this supply route. Pro-regime forces continued low-level ground operations supported by Russian airstrikes from May 12 -17 to complete the encirclement through the city’s northern industrial districts, although these efforts were unsuccessful.

Russia remains a decisive military force in the Syrian conflict, despite its alleged drawdown. Operation Inherent Resolve Spokesperson Col. Steve Warren stated that Russian currently retains “almost identical” military capabilities following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of a partial withdrawal on March 14. The distribution of Russian air operations in northwestern Syria demonstrates Russia’s continued prioritization of support to the Assad regime. The military assets that Russia maintains in theater allow it to respond within 24 hours to threats to regime terrain. Russian airstrikes escalated against opposition forces in northern Homs Province and southern Hama Province from May 12 – 16 and again from May 19 – 22 in response to renewed opposition operations against regime forces in the area. This concentration of strikes in defense of pro-regime terrain, however, was largely unable to reverse opposition gains.

Russia has meanwhile continued to present itself as an effective partner in the fight against terrorism, while continuing to function as a destabilizing force in the Syrian conflict. Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced on May 20 that Russia had presented a plan to the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition to begin joint airstrikes against “international terrorist and illegal armed groups” that violate the cessation of hostilities agreement. U.S. officials subsequently denied the existence of any such agreement. Russia caveated its proposal for joint strikes, stating that Russia would not accept any arrangement that prevented it from conducting unilateral airstrikes in Syria. Russia is unlikely to halt military action against mainstream elements of the Syrian opposition, which remain the Assad regime’s largest adversaries. Russia has continued to indiscriminately target both Jabhat al Nusra and mainstream opposition factions in northwestern Syria despite the International Syria Support Group’s agreement to new measures to reinforce a nationwide cessation of hostilities on May 17. Russian airstrikes continued to primarily target opposition forces in northwestern Syria from May 13 - 26, rather than terrorist organizations such as ISIS. ISW was only able to assess one Russian airstrike against ISIS for the two-week period from May 13 – 26 with low confidence, despite continued ISIS operations throughout Syria.  

The following graphic depicts ISW's assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia's air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.  

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Iraq Situation Report: May 11-24, 2016

by Patrick Martin, Hannah Werman, and Emily Anagnostos

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Popular Mobilization, and tribal fighters launched a major operation to retake Fallujah on May 23. The joint force quickly recaptured northern terrain on the first day, including Garma District, a historic hotbed for Sunni extremists including ISIS’s predecessor Al Qaeda in Iraq. The joint force continued to consolidate surrounding terrain on May 24 as it advances towards central Fallujah. Security concerns, already heightened by an increase of ISIS attacks in Baghdad, could intensify as the Fallujah operation increases the likelihood of sectarian violence. The ISF must ensure that civilians fleeing Fallujah are not exposed to sectarian violence from Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias both during and after the operation.

Baghdad’s political and physical security are facing grave threats from ISIS, the Sadrist demonstrators, and Iraq’s own politicians. Sadrist demonstrators stormed the Green Zone on May 20 and broke into major government buildings, including the facilities housing the Council of Ministers (CoM), Council of Representatives (CoR), and Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi’s office, before Interior Ministry security forces ejected protestors. The chaos follows a significant increase in ISIS activity in Baghdad and the Baghdad Belts. Deadly attacks targeted civilians in northern Baghdad on May 11 and 17, prompting the Sadrist militia Saraya al-Salaam to briefly deploy across Baghdad’s Shi’a neighborhoods before Sadr ordered their withdrawal on May 18. ISIS’s activity is significantly increasing in Baghdad’s northern Belts area. The group launched spectacular attacks in the districts of Balad on May 12 and 13 and Dujail on May 21, and carried out a large attack aimed at damaging the Taji Gas Plant near Camp Taji on May 15. Increased ISIS activity in the northern Belts and Baghdad could deteriorate the security situation to levels not seen since late 2014.

The deadly attacks indicate that ISIS is taking advantage of Iraq’s unstable political situation. ISIS has demonstrated intent to both exacerbate sectarian tensions and increase the possibility of intra-Shi’a conflict; its attacks have generated friction between the Sadrists, rival Iranian-backed proxy militias, and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).The Sadrists are exacerbating tensions by putting thousands of unruly demonstrators out on the streets against Iranian proxy militia forces and units from the Interior Ministry, controlled by the rival Badr Organization, who have little interest in seeing the Sadrists succeed. ISIS will have opportunities to increase its attack capabilities while the ISF and the Popular Mobilization are engaged in operations on multiple fronts, including recent successful operations which regained control over Rutba District on May 19 and the Ramadi-Jordan highway on May 20. However, both the ISF and Popular mobilization have also committed significant forces towards completing the encirclement of Fallujah and clearing ISIS from western Diyala Province. These efforts have required further forward deployments of Baghdad and southern-based security forces away from their bases in southern Iraq. Forces shifting in southern Iraq leaves the area vulnerable to a resurgence in ISIS attacks and opens avenues for ISIS to launch attacks into Baghdad from the South.

Iraq Control of Terrain Map: May 23, 2016

By Patrick Martin with Emily Anagnostos and Hannah Werman

Key Takeaway: The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) has made significant gains in the Euphrates River Valley over the past two months, recapturing almost the entirety of the southern bank. The ISF, backed by tribal fighters and Coalition airstrikes, recaptured Hit District, west of Ramadi, on April 14 before recapturing nearly the entirety of the area between Hit and Baghdadi Sub-district over the subsequent weeks. Some villages, particularly on the northern bank of the river, remain under ISIS control. ISW is changing the status of these areas to Joint ISF-Sunni Tribal Fighter Control Zones.

Joint ISF and Popular Mobilization forces have launched operations to recapture the Fallujah area. Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced the effort to recapture Fallujah on May 23 at a meeting with senior ISF officials and proxy militia leaders, including Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri. The ISF, large numbers of Popular Mobilization fighters, and Iranian proxy militiamen engaged in a concerted push to clear Fallujah's northern environs. The groups cleared Garma Sub-district, a historical safe-haven for Sunni extremist groups and a longtime base for ISIS attacks into the Baghdad area, on May 23. The ISF, backed by Coalition airstrikes and tribal fighters, also recaptured a stretch of highway south of Fallujah between the Habaniya base and Amiriyat al-Fallujah, a town that faces constant pressure from ISIS, on May 7. ISW is thus changing the status of this area to ISF Control Zone.

The ISF also recaptured Rutba, a district that sits along the Jordan-Ramadi highway in western Anbar, on May 10. ISW is thus changing the status of Rutba to ISF-held location. Claims by the Joint Operations Command (JOC) that the ISF fully control the highway between the Trebil border crossing with Jordan and Ramadi could not be confirmed.

A joint Iraqi Shi'a militia, Turkmen, and Peshmerga force recaptured the Shi'a Turkmen village of Bashir, south of Kirkuk, from ISIS on April 30. The operation was a symbolic victory for Iraqi Shi'a militias and Turkmen militias, as Bashir was the site of a massacre of Turkmen in late 2014. However, security arrangements remain tenuous, as the Peshmerga belonging to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) often have friction and occasionally clash with Iraqi Shi'a militias and Turkmen militias, particularly in the joint-held town of Tuz Khurmato, south of Bashir. Bashir could thus be an additional source of friction between Turkmen and Kurds. ISW is changing the status of Bashir to Joint Peshmerga and Iraqi Shi'a militia Control.

Iraq Awaits Court Ruling on Legitimacy of Parliamentary Actions

By Emily Anagnostos

Key Takeaway: Iraq’s Federal Court will issue an important ruling on May 25 that could have a major impact on the political crisis.  The issues at stake are the legitimacy of Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi’s ministerial appointments and the speakership of the Council of Representatives.  Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is a driver of the political party that has raised the legal challenges. Iraq has been experiencing a political crisis since April 12, and protesters have stormed the Green Zone twice since April 30. They were followers of Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who has been trying to channel a populist protest movement that has been underway since August.  One main issue at stake is the composition of the Cabinet. Sadr and Prime Minister Abadi are not close allies, but they both have sought to replace political party elites with technocratic ministers. Their chief opponent has been Nouri al-Maliki, the former Prime Minister and a rival of both. The appointment of ministers requires approval of Iraq’s parliament, the Council of Representatives (CoR). The body had fractured on April 12, when a group of members staged an overnight sit-in against Prime Minister Abadi’s slate and the conduct of the Council of Representatives under Speaker Salim al-Juburi.  The group consisted of parliamentarians from many political parties and ultimately claimed a false quorum and enacted legislation. This rump parliament lasted for two weeks, but then disbanded. Some of its members formed a political bloc, called the Reform Front, and launched a legal case to try to preserve some of their rump parliamentary decisions and block some of the ministerial changes underway. The Reform Front is struggling for legitimacy as a legal entity and political power. The crux of the bloc’s legitimacy and its future in the political process has been relegated to the Federal Court to decide. The Federal Court, under longtime Maliki-ally Chief Justice Medhat al-Mahmoud, announced it will hold the first session on May 25 regarding the legitimacy of the legislation passed by the rump CoR on April 14 and the ministerial changes enacted by Prime Minister Abadi on April 26. The Federal Court’s ruling could change the composition and leadership of the Council of Representatives and influence the momentum of Abadi’s reforms.

Background

Iraq’s parliamentary crisis emerged from gridlock over a cabinet reshuffle that Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi had announced on February 9 and has tried to execute since then. PM Abadi announced his intent to replace ministers in in Cabinet, which has been a source of patronage for political elites. Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr supported the reshuffle and called for the changes to be technocratic, instead of political, appointments. Sadr pressured PM Abadi to present a fully technocratic list by staging a mass sit-in at the entrance of the Green Zone on March 18 and drumming up popular support. The pressure worked and PM Abadi presented a fully technocratic list to the Council of Representatives (CoR) for a vote on March 31. The list was praised by Sadr for its technocratic composition, but other political blocs denounced it due to their lack of input on ministerial candidates. PM Abadi returned the CoR on April 12 and presented a second list which was a compromise of both technocratic and political ministerial candidates. Despite the compromise, political blocs rejected the new list as a partisan attempt to keep the quota system, so it was not put to a vote. When CoR Speaker Salim al-Juburi adjourned the session without taking action on the list, several political blocs rejected the delay and demanded an immediate vote. Protesting CoR members, including those from the Sunni Etihad bloc, State of Law Alliance (SLA), the Sadrist-affiliated Ahrar Bloc, the secular Wataniya bloc, and the Kurdish parties, began a sit-in that evening in the CoR building in order to implement reforms.

The sit-in parties demanded the dismissal of the three presidencies, President Fuad Masoum, Prime Minister Abadi, and Speaker Juburi. Members reported on April 13 that they had collection a petition of 171 signatures, which would allow both quorum and absolute majority, required in passing legislation. This was never confirmed and pictures of the list of signatures never seemed to suggest more than 115 signatures, far below the quorum of 165 members. Juburi chaired an emergency CoR meeting the next day on April 13 in accordance with the protesters’ demands in order to discuss the Cabinet reshuffle and quell the protesters’ anger. Sources stated that the meeting met quorum at 174 members. The session, however, quickly descended into chaos after a fight broke out amongst CoR members. Juburi adjourned the meeting until April 14.

The rump CoR formed on April 14 in defiance of Juburi who had arrived to the CoR on April 14, announced that the meeting lacked quorum, and left. The protesters convened their own session, maintaining that the April 13 session remained open and that the quorum reached on April 13 still applied to the session on April 14. Some claimed that the April 14 session also reached 171 CoR members, though later reports stated that it only reached 131 members. The protesters had lost several members overnight, including members from the Kurdish parties and the Etihad bloc. The rump CoR nevertheless claimed they had met quorum and that the actions of April 14 were legal and binding. Under these terms, the protesters voted to dismiss Juburi and replace him with an interim Speaker - Wataniya member and former Baathist Adnan al-Janabi. Janabi adjourned the session until April 16.

However, the rump CoR did not make quorum on April 16, following withdrawals from the Badr Organization, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), and Etihad. The Kurds had likewise begun withdrawing their support on April 13 and denounced the dismissal of Juburi on April 14. Rump CoR members fell as low as 125 members, far below the quorum threshold of 165 members. The rump CoR lacked the legitimacy to undertake any further legal actions and continued to weaken as an entity which could overtake the legal CoR as the true legislative body.

The Rump CoR Loses Legitimacy

The failure of the rump CoR to meet quorum on April 16 drove the protesters to seek legitimacy from the Shi’a religious establishment. The Shi’a establishment instead rebuked the actions of the rump CoR and called for political agreement, not division. The rump CoR also botched an attempt to gain legitimacy by tricking withdrawn political blocs into returning to a session on April 19, as called for by President Masoum to resolve the split in the CoR. The session made quorum but Juburi failed to appear at the session for unknown reasons. When it was revealed that Juburi would not chair the session and instead the rump CoR was in charge, the Kurdish blocs left in an outrage. The rump CoR claimed that the initial presence in the meeting had met quorum and the meeting was valid, even though the walk-out of several parties left the session far below quorum. The rump CoR suffered another blow when the Ahrar Bloc withdrew from on April 20. As the beacon of technocratic reforms in the April reshuffle process, the Ahrar Bloc had initially provided the rump CoR a stamp of approval of its legitimacy. The absence of the Ahrar Bloc not only further reduced the rump CoR’s numbers far below quorum, but also indicated that the rump CoR could not assume the position of being the “true” CoR and was relegated to a rogue group of CoR members operating outside of the political framework.

The rump CoR continued to fall short of legitimacy and their failure to meet quorum, which they needed in order to operate according to legitimate standards, weakened the rump CoR’s efforts. Even members of the movement saw the continued lack of quorum as a sign of failure and suggested reintegrating into the “legal” CoR.  Meanwhile, the “legal” CoR, chaired by Juburi, made marked success when it convened on April 26 and voted in five new ministers as a part of the Cabinet reshuffle. The rump CoR physically tried to obstruct the vote and claimed that the session lacked quorum, but the vote continued. The success of the CoR to implement reforms in contrast to the weakened rump CoR tarnished the movement and made it clear that the rump CoR would never gain legitimacy next to the legal CoR.

Establishment of the Reform Front

The rump CoR formally ended its sit-in on April 27, moving to form an opposition bloc on April 28. The Reform Front represents the new political bloc under which the members of the now-disbanded rump CoR have organized. ISW assesses that the Reform Front has 84 members, primarily from the Dawa Party and Wataniya bloc. The Reform Front, despite the failure of the rump CoR, continues to maintain that the rump CoR was a legitimate legal body. It maintains that the decisions made in the rump CoR, primarily the dismissal of Juburi, were constitutional and binding. The Reform Front has added to the political stalemate in the CoR by boycotting until Juburi leaves his position and new elections are held. This stance has put the Reform Front at odds with the other political blocs who have rejected the legitimacy of the rump CoR. The Kurdistan Alliance and Etihad have boycotted the CoR as well, but their boycott was the result of the failure to protect CoR members from the April 30 protest which stormed the Green Zone. Ahrar continues to boycott until a technocratic government is installed. Their conditions for return are party-specific, but ultimately hinge on the assumption that Juburi remains as speaker.

Reform Front Composition

The composition of the Reform Bloc currently exists in a two-party polarity between Wataniya members and pro-Maliki members of the Dawa Party, following the withdrawal of the majority of its original participants. This odd alliance between two political rivals, former PM Maliki and his competitor in the 2010 election Ayad Allawi, rests on a similar search for power and influence rather than on common policy objectives. The Reform Front originally claimed to have 98 members on April 28, the majority from Wataniya and Dawa. The Reform Front also boasts a majority of the members from the Dawa in Iraq Party, a party in the SLA but distinct from Maliki’s Dawa Party, as well as several members who have defected from their political blocs.

The Reform Front is not a united front, however, as it has two dynamic leaders within the bloc each vying for control of the Front and the future Iraqi Government.  The pro-Maliki members dominate the Reform Front with an alleged 42 members, and as such Nouri al-Maliki has a strong claim to the bloc as its leader. Maliki had announced his support of the protests in the CoR on April 14, calling the events in the CoR a “mature political movement” in opposition to earlier Green Zone sit-ins that aimed to “bring down the political process.” Maliki denied on April 21 any rumors that he was leading the rump CoR despite the heavy presence of pro-Maliki supporters in the movement. Maliki’s position with the rump CoR offers possible legitimacy to the movement, however his position in Iraqi politics is deeply controversial, and even a deal-breaker, among other political parties and leaders, including Ayad Allawi.

Ayad Allawi joined the rump CoR sit-in himself on April 13 and has operated as a public and vocal spokesman for the Reform Front. Allawi, however, claimed that he has a “fundamental disagreement” with Maliki on May 12, indicating that the Reform Front does not represent a new political party with shared interests but rather a coalition of forces who still answer to their original political affiliations. Allawi and Maliki share a history which will continue to put the two leaders at odds. Allawi’s Wataniya party won the popular elections in 2010, earning the right to the form the government. Allawi was in line to become the next prime minister and replace Maliki, who had held the premiership from 2005. However Maliki persuaded the Federal Court to reword the definition of “largest bloc,” allowing the SLA to gather more political allies in the CoR and reclaim the premiership. Maliki remained Prime Minister and Allawi struggled to remain politically relevant.

The Reform Front made claims of having over 100 members as of May 18. ISW has assessed that the Reform Front has 84 members as of May 19, giving credence to the possibility that the Front does have significant numbers. The Reform Front has attracted most of its members from the SLA, diminishing the latter’s size dramatically. This new configuration would legally make the Reform Front the largest bloc in the CoR, giving it the right to form the government and chose the prime minister. The Reform Front has not yet made claim to this right and the SLA has avowed on May 17 that it still holds the right to the premiership. The weak legitimacy of the Reform Front, however, diminishes its claim to the right to form the government. However, a favorable upcoming ruling from the Federal Court could put the Reform Front in a stronger position as a political bloc in the CoR.

The Federal Court Decides on Legitimacy of Rump CoR

The Federal Court, the highest judicial body in Iraq, will issue a ruling on May 25 regarding the constitutionality of CoR sessions held on April 14 held by the rump CoR and the April 26 session which voted in new ministers under the chairmanship of Speaker Juburi. The court announced on May 12 that it had received six lawsuits regarding the CoR. Three cases regarded the dismissal and replacement of ministers on April 26 and three regarding the constitutionality of two April CoR sessions. The Federal Court announced on May 18 that it would hold the first hearing of those on May 25 in order to rule on the legality of the April 14 and April 26 CoR sessions. A decision regarding the April 14 rump CoR session, during which protesters voted out Juburi, would be a de facto ruling on the legality of Juburi’s position as CoR speaker. A decision regarding the constitutionality of the April 26 will likewise either validate or undermine the future of PM Abadi’s reform program.

Implications of the Court Ruling

A decision regarding the April 14 session will decide whether the actions of the rump CoR were constitutional to dismiss Juburi and elect an interim speaker. The Reform Front has stated it will respect the decision of the Federal Court, however an unfavorable ruling would further diminish the Reform Front’s legitimacy. The Reform Front has maintained that it will not return to the CoR while Salim al-Juburi is speaker. A ruling that established that the rump CoR lacked quorum on April 14 will erase the dismissal of Juburi and eliminate the Reform Front’s leverage over the political process. The Reform Front will need to return the CoR and heed Juburi as speaker or else lose its ability to act as a political party as it has lost its ability to act as political entity following the collapse of the rump CoR.

The decision of the Federal Court on May 25 will affect the decision of other boycotting political parties to return as well. Osama al-Nujaifi, leader of the Mutahidun in the Etihad bloc, announced on May 18 that the party is waiting for the decision of the Federal Court regarding the way forward. The ISCI-affiliated Mowatin bloc likewise announced on May 21 that it is waiting on the decision of the Federal Court “to solve the crisis.” Spokesman for the Mowatain Bloc Habib al-Tarafi stated on May 19 that “the logical and right solution is to wait for a ruling from the Federal Court by resuming CoR sessions again,” and that such court decision will be binding. A judicial ruling could provide the push to break the stalemate in the political process by offering a solid foundation for political blocs to move forward and rebuild the political process.

Likewise, the Federal Court’s ruling on the April 26 session will either add credibility or destroy PM Abadi’s attempts to implement his Cabinet reshuffle. The April 26 CoR session is also under question for reaching quorum, and should the session be found lacking, the decision will set back PM Abadi’s attempts to implement reforms and cost what little momentum he gained from the session. SLA member Jassim Muhammad Jaafar stated that he expected the Federal Court will return the condition of the CoR to what is was before April 26, adding that PM Abadi will be forced to present his new Cabinet again before the session. Jaafar stated that these conditions are “most likely to satisfy both sides” in the CoR, and that he expected the CoR to be unable to hold sessions until after the ruling.

However, it is unclear if all political parties will return to the negotiation table even if the obstacles of the constitutionality of April 14th and 26th are resolved. The issue of legality was only one hurdle for the Reform Front, who may be unwilling to fully cooperate with Juburi as CoR Speaker and may seek new leverage in order to guarantee their return. The Reform Front will continue to seek more members to add to its ranks in order to force the government’s hand into conceding to its demands. The Reform Front will continue to hold the dismissal of Juburi as one of their primarily demands even if the Federal Court rules in favor of his survival. The Reform Front could stall the political process at a time of thawing in political relations, most notably with the announcement that some Kurdish parties will return to Baghdad. The Reform Front sent a delegation to the Kurdistan Region on May 22 to meet with Kurdistan Regional President Masoud Barzani and a delegation from the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which has not yet announced their return to the CoR. The Reform Front will continue to bid for the KDP’s return to the CoR as a part of the Front. The Reform Front’s growing size and pressure on the government could successfully be used as leverage to achieve its demands through nonconventional means.

The Reform Front has consistently seen that the future of Iraqi politics will be a two-party dynamic between a larger Reform Front and a bloc formed from the current government. Maliki cleverly has a foot in both parties as a prominent leader within the ruling State of Law Alliance and a notable supporter of the Reform Front. Nouri al-Maliki even issued an initiative for political solution on May 23 in which he noted that only he was able to bring the Reform Front back into the fold of the CoR, and that to do so the next CoR session would need to vote on the survival of CoR presidency. If Maliki can successfully reunite the two CoRs, he will cement his position as a leader in the Reform Front and in the future political process. It will also displace Ayad Allawi as leader of the Reform Front.

The Federal Court’s upcoming rulings on May 25 may provide a staging area to resume political dialogue as it can provide a binding resolution to controversial questions. However, beyond May 25, the decisions of the Federal Court will likely prove superficial. The Reform Front is unlikely to renege its demand that Juburi leave its position, if the Federal Court rules in Juburi’s favor, and instead will seek to gain addition leverage over the CoR, likely by courting more political parties, such as the Kurdish parties, to grow its ranks. The ruling can also further complicate the already complex political situation, allowing Maliki the opportunity to work the confusion in his favor and reestablish himself at the forefront of the political scene in Iraq.