Warning: Iraq’s Shi’a Parties Split Over Cabinet Reshuffle Amidst Protests

By Patrick Martin with Emily Anagnostos, Rachel Bessette, and Hannah Werman

Key Take-away: Political violence may erupt in Iraq as supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr continue large-scale protests to pressure the current government to reshuffle the cabinet fundamentally. Sadr had threatened on February 26 to withdraw his support from Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi if such an overhaul did not occur by March 29, 2016. The Sadrists began a large sit-in at the entrance to the Green Zone on March 18 and are harnessing the power of street demonstrations to either compel PM Abadi to comply or make it possible for him to do so. Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his supporters within the State of Law Alliance (SLA), rather than Abadi, seem to be the chief obstacle to a cabinet reshuffle. Other political blocs seek to neutralize this faction while retaining their current representation in cabinet. Meanwhile, some political blocs, including the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and the Sadrist Trend, are in the process of attempting to create a new political alliance that could challenge Maliki’s State of Law Alliance (SLA) as the dominant political bloc. It would need to overcome a plethora of obstacles to succeed, but could be the basis for a cabinet reshuffle process aimed at weakening the SLA and its dominant leader, Nouri al-Maliki. ISCI and the Sadrists may throw a lifeline to Abadi, or he may be political collateral damage in their play to counter Maliki. It is unclear what Sadr will do if there is no cabinet reshuffle by March 29 that meets his standards. He may compromise, as he might sacrifice some of his reform demands in order to strengthen himself or weaken Maliki and his Dawa Party. Alternatively, the Sadrists may continue the sit-in and pull out of the government, as Sadr threatened to do on February 13. The prospect for violence – initiated either by the demonstrators or by the security forces to break up the sit-in – remains a possibility that could destabilize or even collapse the already precarious Abadi government, and it is far from certain that PM Abadi will be able to retain his position if a new government is eventually formed.

Above: Tens of thousands of supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr demonstrated in front of the gates to the Green Zone in Baghdad on March 18 before beginning the sit-in. 

Sadr Pressures the Government

Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced a cabinet reshuffle on February 9, intending to form a government of technocrats. Most other political blocs predictably attempted to use the cabinet reshuffle to forward their own political goals and preserve their positions within the cabinet, and ISW previously assessed that a protracted cabinet reshuffle process could lead to street violence or even PM Abadi’s resignation if political blocs could find a consensus candidate. However, Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr, having moved to position himself as the leader of popular demonstrations against corruption and poor government performance, has organized and attempted to harness street demonstrations to force PM Abadi and the political blocs to enact broader reforms. Sadr gave the government a 45-day deadline on February 13 to conduct comprehensive reforms. He later escalated his pressure on PM Abadi by speaking at a large demonstration in Tahrir Square on February 26 before announcing a sit-in on March 12, calling on his supporters to assemble at the entrance to the Green Zone on March 18. 

PM Abadi and the leaders of political blocs expressed concern over the sit-in, which the Council of Ministers (CoM) and the Interior Ministry rejected on March 16 and 18, respectively, due to security concerns and their legality. Sadr responded with his own rejection of the possibility of shutting down the sit-in. Security forces deployed across Baghdad prior to the start date to prevent demonstrators from accessing the sit-in site, blocking off key roads with concrete barriers and closing off the Republican and Sinak Bridges. The heavy security presence may have led to violence between security forces and thousands of Sadrist supporters converging on the Green Zone; at least one confrontation was recorded in Baghdad, when riot police used water cannons against Sadrist supporters near the Republican Bridge, ostensibly to protect Baghdad Governor Ali al-Tamimi, who was nearby. However, the Baghdad Operations Commander, Abdul-Amir al-Shammari, ordered security forces to re-open entrances into the city and lift the barriers on the Republican and Sinak Bridges. Shammari’s actions reduced the possibility of confrontation but infuriated PM Abadi, who shortly thereafter, marched to the Joint Operations Command (JOC) and announced that the JOC, not Baghdad Operations Command, would thereafter have responsibility for Baghdad’s security file.

Above: Sadrist supporters approach a line of security forces on the Republican Bridge, northeast of the Green Zone, on March 18. Security forces withdrew from the barriers later in the video, allowing the demonstrators to pour through and over the bridge towards the Green Zone. 

Sadr’s Sit-in

The Sadrist Trend’s management of the sit-in process has been highly disciplined and organized. Notably, Sadr charged Ibrahim al-Jabiri, the leader of the Baghdad branch of Sadr’s charitable foundation, the Office of the Martyr al-Sadr, with overseeing the sit-in and forming a management committee. The day after the announcement, the committee began erecting tents and opening up to 93 centers across Iraq to register volunteers who wished to participate in the sit-in. 

Sadr stressed the importance of non-violence and discipline among the demonstrators, ordering sit-in participants to bring no weapons, initiate no violence, cooperate with the security forces, and obey the sit-in coordinators. He also insisted on maintaining a disciplined and national public image, calling on demonstrators to avoid blocking roads, keep the sit-in site clean, and not to create excessive noise that disturbs local residents. The sit-in’s organizing committee maintains close control over the sit-in participants’ activity, assigning them tents, requiring them to wear an identification badge, and encouraging them to don uniforms bearing the Iraqi flag. The Office of the Martyr al-Sadr has not only supplied tents and food to the demonstrators, but organized events as well, with Jabri leading regular prayer sessions, overseeing a pop-up art and book market, and attending poetry readings while conducting meetings with security forces officials to facilitate stability and coordination. Jabri’s attendance of a wide variety of events and the high level of central organization indicates little chance of the sit-in dispersing due to logistical shortcomings. 

Above: Head of the Baghdad branch of the Office of the Martyr al-Sadr, Ibrahim al-Jabri (bottom center in front of crowd) leads an evening prayer session in the Green Zone sit-in site. Several demonstrators are wearing Iraqi flag shirts, as encouraged by the Sadrist organizing committee. Others can be seen wearing identification cards on lanyards. 

The sit-in has continued since March 18, and Sadr has shown no willingness to back down. Instead, Sadr has taken the initiative and is attempting to force PM Abadi and other political blocs to concede to his reform agenda. The approaching end of Sadr’s 45-day deadline and the sit-in has set political blocs scrambling to come to an agreement over the cabinet reshuffle, but it appears that the only thing blocs can agree on remains their refusal to lose positions within the cabinet. PM Abadi publicly aired his frustration with the political blocs, blaming unspecified ministers for blocking the cabinet reshuffle process in order to keep their positions and privileges. 

The increased pressure has also revealed the divergent opinions of the political blocs on the cabinet reshuffle. Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Alliance (SLA), Ammar al-Hakim’s Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), the Kurdistan Alliance, and the Sunni Etihad Bloc, favor either a partial cabinet reshuffle or measures to preserve their parties’ representation within the cabinet. They are therefore in multi-party negotiations. PM Abadi, President Fuad Masoum, and Council of Representatives (CoR) Speaker Salim al-Juburi hosted senior political bloc leaders at the Presidential Peace Palace to reach an agreement over the cabinet reshuffle on March 19. The parties agreed to the formation of three additional committees to address different aspects of government reform, but they reached no agreement over the cabinet’s final composition. The committee formed to assist PM Abadi with selecting new ministers has not even met. A member of the State of Law Alliance (SLA), the primary political rival of the Sadrist Trend led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, called the meeting “useless,” while an ISCI member noted that the results of the meeting were “not encouraging.” 

Former PM and current Vice President Nouri al-Maliki is steering the cabinet reshuffle process in a manner that is preventing the political blocs from agreeing on the cabinet’s final composition. Maliki is technically a member of Abadi’s own political party, Dawa, a component of the SLA. He and his backers form an important source of parliamentary support for Abadi and his premiership. Maliki, however, is actually Abadi’s primary political rival, because he seeks to regain the premiership and could withdraw his support from Abadi in a manner that collapses his government. Abadi had tried unsuccessfully to force Maliki’s resignation in August 2015 by abolishing the position of the vice presidency, but the effort failed, and Maliki thus retained his position within government. 

Maliki therefore has likely commandeered Abadi’s efforts and holds the keys to the latter’s continued premiership. He is playing to win a greater share of power and patronage, if not the premiership itself, prior to next year’s provincial elections. A senior member of the SLA who is no longer an ardent Maliki supporter, Ali al-Adeeb, complained that the Dawa Party, along with the pro-Iranian Badr Organization and Mustaqilun Bloc, were more concerned with protecting their positions than pursuing genuine reform. This obstructionism has alienated ISCI. One ISCI party member, Muhammad al-Likash stated that ISCI insisted on ensuring the government’s independence from political interests, which could be guaranteed by either a fully independent selection of ministers, PM Abadi’s resignation from the Dawa Party, or his resignation from the premiership. If these options were not possible, then ISCI’s Mowatin Bloc would withdraw from government, as it had no interest in being party of a “Dawa Party government.” 

Sadr stated on March 21 that PM Abadi, Masoum, Juburi, and political bloc leaders displayed “ignorance” over the well-being of citizens and repeated calls for comprehensive government change. More worryingly, a senior al-Ahrar Bloc member, the main political party of the Sadrist Trend, dismissed the results of the meeting and warned that demonstrators could “storm the Green Zone” if reforms did not materialize by the March 29 deadline. Sadr had vaguely alluded to this possibility on February 26, when he stated that “we are on the walls of the Green Zone, and tomorrow, the people will be in it,” though a senior Sadrist official later insisted that demonstrations would remain peaceful. In addition, on March 22, Sadr announced that a committee he had formed on February 20 to nominate technocrats for the new cabinet had completed its work, producing a 90-name list for government nominations to be passed to PM Abadi. An al-Ahrar Bloc member insisted the list be reviewed and voted on in the CoR, lest al-Ahrar withdraw confidence from PM Abadi. By referencing the deadline, providing nominations, threatening a withdrawal of confidence, and continuing the sit-in, Sadr is escalating pressure on PM Abadi and other political blocs to support a comprehensive overhaul of government. 

The Cross-Sectarian Bloc and the Anti-Dawa Party Movement

On March 24, three notable events occurred that indicated that ISCI was challenging PM Abadi and the SLA. First, one of the most senior members of ISCI, Oil Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi, resigned from his post and stated that he would no longer attend cabinet meetings. Although many ministers have offered their resignations in the past to indicate their support for reforms, Abdul-Mahdi appears to have actually resigned with the intention of vacating his position. It is unclear if he did so on Hakim’s order and if he is still receiving his salary. Second, ISCI leader Ammar al-Hakim met with Muqtada al-Sadr in Najaf to discuss the ongoing reforms as Abadi met with the pan-Shia National Alliance in Baghdad. The National Alliance is an umbrella group for all major Shi'a political parties, including the SLA, ISCI, the Sadrist Trend, Fadhila Bloc, and the National Reform Trend. The National Alliance’s role is to unite and coordinate Shi'a political activity in Iraq, but it has largely been unable to overcome existing differences between political blocs. Third, Hakim also met with Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri to discuss reforms. The Badr Organization is an Iranian-supported proxy militia that fractured from ISCI in 2012. Maliki has lately cultivated its support, as he has with other Iranian proxy militias, since he otherwise lacks a powerful military organization. The meetings indicate that Hakim has been attempting to form agreements with senior political and military leaders regarding next steps in the cabinet reshuffle process. 

Finally, on March 24, Fail al-Shammari, a member of the Mowatin Bloc, which is a component of ISCI, stated that ISCI was in the process of forming a “cross-sectarian” bloc with a unified vision regarding the reforms. The statement reveals that efforts persist to form a new political alliance composed of members of multiple blocs. PM Abadi had called for such a bloc on February 27 to support national reform efforts. Sadr and Hakim met on March 2 and jointly expressed support for the creation of the bloc, which also received support from individual members of various Sunni, Kurdish, and Shi’a parties, including Dawa Party, Mustaqilun, Etihad, the Sadrist Trend, and ISCI’s Mowatin Bloc. The bloc aimed to produce a majority in the CoR in order to allow PM Abadi to pass reforms and legislation. Members of other parties, including the secular Wataniya Alliance and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, are also reportedly interested in supporting Hakim’s effort to build the alliance. However, an SLA member, Rasul Abu Hasna, dismissed talk of the new bloc as “rosy dreams,” suggesting that the bloc faces opposition from within the SLA. It is important to note that Shammari’s account was not fully accurate – he also announced that all three ISCI members had withdrawn from government, which an ISCI spokesperson swiftly denied. However, the statement did indicate that backroom discussions over the cross-sectarian bloc were still in progress. 

Hakim’s pursuit of the cross-sectarian bloc – and the dismissal of it by an SLA member – makes sense in that he has been attempting to position himself as a powerful political figure for some time but has been consistently blocked by the SLA. Hakim had tried to secure the leadership of the National Alliance in January and February of 2015 with the support of Sadr, but never managed to obtain it, as the SLA – nearly three times the size of ISCI within the CoR – insisted that senior SLA member Ali al-Adeeb chair the National Alliance and blocked Hakim’s efforts. Unable to come to an agreement, the National Alliance political blocs reached a stalemate, and previous chairman and current Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari simply stayed on in his position. Hakim’s effort to build a new bloc could thus be a way for Hakim, who does not hold political office within the government, to increase his political power at the expense of Maliki and the SLA. By cutting out the senior SLA leadership – namely, pro-Maliki Dawa Party members – from the new alliance, ISCI would neuter the ability of the SLA to influence decision-making and increase ISCI’s influence, but would consequentially fracture the pan-Shi’a National Alliance. 

A new cross-sectarian alliance would also benefit other political blocs as it would level the playing field between them and the SLA. Members of minority groups, such as Sunni blocs and the Kurdistan Alliance, would benefit from any weakening of Maliki, who is a sectarian actor. The Sadrist Trend would benefit in that it could weaken Maliki, Sadr’s primary opponent, and strengthen the Sadrist Trend as a political force at the expense of the SLA. Pro-Maliki members of the SLA, such as components of the Dawa Party and the Badr Organization, however, are motivated to keep the National Alliance intact, as they are the dominant force within the National Alliance. The SLA is likely preoccupied with preserving its power within the cabinet – Adeeb’s statement on March 12 complaining about the SLA’s intransigence is a major indicator of this trend. 

If successful, the new cross-sectarian bloc would thus serve to unite a number of political blocs that are opposed to Maliki creating what is essentially an anti-Dawa Party alternative to the National Alliance. However, opposition to Maliki may not be sufficient to create a functioning alternative, as the new bloc would still have to overcome a bevy of other differences that exist between blocs. Etihad and ISCI, for example, differ greatly in their position towards Iran, with Etihad being generally opposed to Iranian activity in Iraq, and ISCI being amenable towards it. They also differ in what they view to be the ideal outcome of the cabinet reshuffle. Hakim, for example, supports a partial cabinet reshuffle, while Sadr is a vocal advocate of a complete overhaul of the government and replacing sitting ministers with technocrats. This sort of alliance could be viable in the short-term to disempower the SLA, but it is far from clear if it would be sustainable in the long-term, as the inability of Kurdish, Sunni, and Shi’a parties to come to agreements on important legislation has prevented major laws, such as the Federal Judiciary Act, the National Guard Law, and the Justice and Accountability Law from passing in the CoR.

Courses of Action

PM Abadi is in an extremely difficult situation. Many political blocs do not want him to overhaul the government, despite their public insistence that this is the case. Most of the major political blocs have not even submitted nominations for cabinet positions, indicating that they are still attempting to negotiate what the final composition of the cabinet will be amongst themselves. The only exception has been the Sadrist Trend’s 90-name list, which may not even be considered, because the list’s technocratic nature threatens to remove political party members from senior governmental positions. Yet many blocs, aside from pro-Maliki components of the SLA and affiliated parties, are opposed to Maliki and could form a united front against the Dawa Party-dominated SLA in order to promote their interests. This may be sufficient grounds for disparate parties to form a compromise over the final cabinet composition. 

There are several courses of action the cabinet reshuffle process may take, all of which can be problematic for U.S. interests. If PM Abadi attempts to initiate reforms along the lines of Sadr’s proposals, political blocs could obstruct their passing, as Sadr’s reforms would replace senior political bloc members with technocrats. If ISCI decides to form an agreement with the SLA and abandons talk of the cross-sectarian bloc and support for Sadr to protect its positions within the cabinet, then Sadr would react poorly, escalating his supporters’ street activity and potentially even leading to violence. Clashes between Sadrist supporters and the security forces would severely undermine the stability of the government and intensify the political crisis. Alternatively, security forces and even members of Iraqi Shi’a militias opposed to Sadr might attempt to break up the sit-in or keep demonstrators from reaching the Green Zone during the regular demonstration time on Friday, March 25, which might also lead to violence and instability. 

Alternatively, Sadr, ISCI, and other political blocs could successfully form a united anti-Dawa Party front through the new cross-sectarian bloc that sees Maliki’s power reduced. This would be contingent upon Sadr sacrificing some of his demands, as no other political party seriously wants their ministers removed from the cabinet. However, Sadr could be placated and could call off his sit-in if there is progress towards forming the new cross-sectarian bloc and loosening Maliki’s dominance over the government. Yet it is not clear if PM Abadi would be able to survive as the premier in this scenario, as PM Abadi, a Dawa Party member, may not be able to unshackle himself from the SLA. Both Sadr and members of ISCI have mused on the possibility of life after PM Abadi, however, and they may be comfortable attempting to identify a consensus candidate from within their own ranks if they cannot pry PM Abadi out of Maliki’s grip. It is also not clear if the new bloc can even function, as it must overcome myriad differences to achieve anything. 

How Sadr responds to the ongoing cabinet reshuffle, however, remains the major question regarding how the cabinet reshuffle process will play out. Sadr’s position differs from the other political blocs in that his motivations are not purely based on increasing his political power within the government through the accumulation of ministerial or senior government positions. He has been pursuing other paths to influence, including attempting to take the role of the leader of popular street demonstrations, a role that Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani played prior to February 2016, when he ceased giving political sermons. He also appears to be attempting to reassert control over his own movement, including al-Ahrar Bloc; his public distancing from the bloc, the referral of the bloc’s two ministers to the Integrity Commission for corruption investigation, and the “detention” of former Deputy Prime Minister Bahaa al-Araji may indicate that he is distancing himself from the bloc’s behavior while attempting to reestablish control over its members. In addition, Sadr’s nominations for cabinet positions is more technocratic than representative of the Sadrist Trend, indicating that he may be willing to cede power within the cabinet in exchange for maintaining his role as a leader of the anti-corruption movement and bolstering his personal role in Iraqi politics. 

Sadr thus has several options. If the government undergoes a partial cabinet reshuffle, then he could incite his supporters to engage in further street demonstrations and possible political violence. Sadr may also resort to less extreme options. He might, for example, withdraw the al-Ahrar Bloc from the government and opt to continue the sit-in while preserving his position as the leader of popular demonstrations against corruption. Considering the historical lack of discipline of Sadr’s supporters, an extended sit-in and repeated demonstrations could also lead to instability and political violence; the fact that Sadr’s supporters reportedly almost attacked the Baghdad Governor is a poor indicator for the sit-in movement’s long-term discipline and adherence to non-violent behavior. Sadr might alternatively accept an increased number of Sadrists within the government – in effect, abandoning the idea of a comprehensive cabinet reshuffle for increased cabinet representation. This would however require Sadr to sacrifice much of his legitimacy as a leader of the anti-corruption performance, which is highly unlikely. 

Stuck amidst the realignment of interests within the Iraqi Shi’a political scene remains PM Abadi, who is tethered to Maliki through his membership to the Dawa Party but genuinely appears to want to undertake reform. Hakim and Sadr may be willing to keep PM Abadi in his position if they can accumulate enough collective power to form an anti-Dawa Party movement, but are likely equally willing to pursue deposing him if PM Abadi is unable to separate himself from Maliki. Similarly, the SLA may be willing to force PM Abadi to resign if he is unable to conduct reforms to their liking, and could attempt to pursue other Shi’a blocs of forming a new government with a new prime minister, such as current National Alliance chairman Ibrahim al-Jaafari. PM Abadi thus appears to be stuck between the Shi’a political blocs, and may not survive as premier no matter which direction he decides to take the reforms.

Iraq Situation Report: March 15 - 21, 2016

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: Supporters of Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr began a large sit-in in front of the entrance to the Green Zone on March 18. The sit-in escalates pressure on Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi to follow Sadr’s reform agenda. PM Abadi, along with Council of Representatives Speaker Salim al-Juburi and President Fuad Masoum, met with the leaders of major political blocs on March 20 to discuss the cabinet reshuffle, but the assembled leaders could not form an agreement on the final shape of the cabinet. PM Abadi blamed unspecified individuals for blocking the reshuffle process for fear of losing their positions and privileges, indicating that political blocs are unwilling to lose control over ministries and the patronage that follows. Further disagreement over the cabinet cannot continue for much longer without provoking a response from an increasingly bold Sadr. He ordered the sit-in to continue on March 18 in defiance of orders from the Council of Ministers and the Interior Ministry banning the sit-in, and repeated calls for a full overhaul of the government, while a senior member of the Sadrist Trend, Sabah al-Ta’i, warned that protesters could “storm the Green Zone” if a technocratic government was not in place by March 29. PM Abadi thus faces no good options for completing the cabinet reshuffle process. Political blocs could obstruct PM Abadi if he attempts to impose a technocratic government that deprives political blocs of their ministerial positions. However, Sadr could incite further demonstrations or even violence if PM Abadi decides to conduct a partial reform that preserves political blocs’ power within the cabinet. Sadr could attempt to force PM Abadi’s hand through some bold action by the March 29 deadline that threatens to destabilize the government and end PM Abadi’s tenure.

Ukraine Crisis Update: March 18, 2016

By Marta Kosmyna and ISW Russia and Ukraine Team

Russian President Vladimir Putin is likely attempting to leverage his gains in the Syrian Civil War to expand Russia’s freedom of action in eastern Ukraine. Russia and the separatists began to escalate operations in eastern Ukraine in mid-February, directly coinciding with the implementation of the Syrian cessation of hostilities agreement on February 27 and subsequent drawdown of Russian forces. The Syrian and Ukrainian theaters have been linked before. In September 2015, the Ukrainian military reported a partial withdrawal of heavy artillery and armor from the front line and a decrease in clashes with Russian-backed separatist forces, coinciding with Russia’s launch of its air campaign in Syria. Putin again directly linked the two theaters in his March 14 phone call with President Barack Obama on the Russian drawdown in Syria, stressing “the need for the complete fulfilment of the Minsk Agreements by the Ukrainian authorities.”

Russia and its proxies have escalated operations involving re-deployed heavy weapons in eastern Ukraine in February and March in order to set conditions for future operations and to test the levels of escalation the international community is willing to overlook. Russian-backed separatists likely intend to target multiple pressure points in order to stretch Ukrainian forces along the separatists’ western front in an attempt to disguise their intentions about which single position they intend to prioritize. 

Specifically, separatists based around Donetsk city, who had concentrated fire on government positions to its west in February, redirected their attacks north of the stronghold in early March. Separatists escalated attacks on Avdiivka, north of Donetsk city, firing rare heavy artillery, tanks, and mortars and clashing with Ukrainian troops starting March 4. Separatists also launched “Grad” multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), banned from the front line by the “Minsk II” ceasefire agreement,  west of Donetsk airport on March 3 and on February 16, showing their intention to escalate the conflict despite the ceasefire. Despite a mid-February withdrawal of separatist forces from a long-contested village east of Mariupol, separatists increased the scope of indirect fire attacks on Ukrainian positions east and northeast of the strategic port city. The tandem escalation of attacks in close proximity to the most populated government-controlled city in the region and Donetsk city may increase pressure on the Ukrainian government to make political concessions tied to the “Minsk II” ceasefire agreement, including recognizing the special legal status of occupied Donbas, in an effort to deescalate the conflict. 

Heightened separatist operations in March are part of a larger trend of escalation since December 2015. Separatists have phased their operations as follows: 

 A)  December 2015; January-March 2016: Separatists seize uncontrolled village of Kominternove, east of Mariupol; separatists increase mortar attacks east of Mariupol

 B)  February-March 2016: Separatists target frontline government-controlled civilian checkpoints (northeast of Mariupol, south and west of Donetsk city, north of Horlivka)   

 C)  February 16 and March 3, 2016: Separatists launch “Grad” MLRS (northwest of Donetsk city)

 D)  March 4, 2016: Separatists shift focus of offensive operations from west to north of Donetsk city 

The unenforced “Minsk II” ceasefire agreement grants Western leaders an attractive non-military response to limiting Russian aggression through negotiations, supported by strict U.S. and European economic sanctions.  The “Minsk II” agreement, however, has allowed Russia to expand its political and military leverage over Ukraine. Russia is a belligerent posing as a mediator and can increase and decrease violence in order to coerce Ukraine into concessions. President Putin continues to blame hostilities along the front line on the Ukrainian authorities’ failure to uphold political obligations under the “Minsk II” ceasefire. European leaders’ support for maintaining sanctions may be weakening; the German and French economy ministers have made statements this year supporting the lifting of sanctions in the near term. The foreign ministers of Germany and France, who may prioritize the resolution of the Syrian Civil War over the war in eastern Ukraine, recently expressed hope that Ukraine would allow elections to be held in occupied Donbas by June 2016. 

Putin is taking steps to change political as well as military realities on the ground. The separatist “Donetsk People’s Republic” (DNR) began issuing its own passports on March 16, a landmark in Russian-backed efforts to transform the occupied regions of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts into polities. The leaders of the DNR claimed the passports would be required to participate in local elections in the occupied region, thereby excluding internally displaced persons and pro-Ukrainian individuals from the vote. Despite Russia publically not recognizing the DNR as an independent state, the move may have been approved by President Putin to undermine Western-backed efforts to arrange elections in occupied territory in accordance with Ukrainian law and OSCE standards.

Russia will likely support political and military escalation in eastern Ukraine in the coming months while painting Kyiv as the spoiler of the ceasefire. Russian-backed separatists will continue to gradually escalate indirect fire attacks on Ukrainian positions and shift operations along the front near Donetsk city and Mariupol. Russia may privately support preparations for separatist pseudo-elections in 2016 in an attempt to bolster the legitimacy of its proxies. Previous separatist elections were held in November 2014 without Ukrainian approval, and the threat of another round of elections may be used as a bargaining chip during ceasefire negotiations. Western leaders previously engaged Russia to postpone separatist elections during the operational pause in eastern Ukraine in Fall 2015 and might again ask Russia to make this temporary concession, giving Putin leverage to request concessions from the West and from Kyiv.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: February 29 - March 15, 2016

By Genevieve Casagrande

Russia reportedly withdrew approximately fifteen of its airframes from the Bassel al Assad International Airport in Latakia Province from March 15 - 16, following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of a drawdown on March 14. Five Russian Su-34 bombers, four Su-25s, five Su-24s, and at least one Su-30 had left the airbase to return to Russia as of March 16, according to a Reuters investigation of Russian state media. Russian officials asserted that Russia would nonetheless continue its counterterrorism efforts, a term Russia has previously used to obfuscate its air campaign in support of President Bashar al Assad against mainstream elements of the Syrian opposition. Russia has yet to withdraw many of its other aircraft from the base, including numerous short- and medium-range bombers. Putin has messaged his determination to defend both the airfield at Bassel al Assad and Russia’s naval basing in Tartous as well as his intent to retain the S-400 air defense system in Latakia. Russia has therefore gained significant capabilities along the Eastern Mediterranean that it intends to secure. Russia will therefore continue to be able to rapidly deploy long- and medium-range air assets into the theater through its airbase in Latakia. As Russia’s air campaign had operated at decreased levels since the cessation of hostilities agreement on February 27 and had lowered its rate of airstrikes even further from March 14 – 15, Russia may be removing excess airframes from the base.  

Russian airstrikes in Syria have notably decreased since Putin’s announcement and partial drawdown. ISW was only able to confirm strikes in the vicinity of the ISIS-held town of Palmyra in central Homs Province with both high and low confidence from March 14 - 15. Pro-regime forces launched a renewed campaign to seize Palmyra in early March, backed heavily by Russian and regime fixed and rotary wing strikes. Russia will likely continue its air operations in support of the regime ground offensive against Palmyra, despite the drawdown. The combination of Russian airpower and likely Iranian reinforcement has brought Assad’s forces within four kilometers of Palmyra as of March 16. The current “cessation of hostilities,” which does not apply to ISIS targets and which has reduced overall levels of violence has likely allowed the regime to refocus efforts on clearing ISIS’s presence in central Homs. Russia will also use its air operations against ISIS as a means to further project itself as a provider of international security and to legitimize its continued presence inside Syria. Russia’s airstrikes against ISIS, however, come at a cost. Alleged videos and photos from Palmyra show the damage caused by the intensity of Russia’s air campaign in the area, while local sources continue to report civilian casualties, highlighting the continued indiscriminate nature of Russian airstrikes. The Russian air campaign and recovery of Palmyra may on the surface seem to support U.S. objectives against ISIS, but over the long term may exacerbate grievances and insurgency.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.  

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Iraq Situation Report: March 8 - 14, 2016

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key take-Away: ISIS reportedly withdrew its forces from Hit District, west of Ramadi, ISIS’s first reported withdrawal from a major urban center in Iraq. Between March 8 and March 14, security forces west of Ramadi have made rapid progress in recapturing villages from ISIS and are reportedly less than seven miles from Hit District’s southern perimeter. Hit District is a critical town for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) as it lies on the Euphrates River’s banks as well as the main ground line of communication between Ramadi and Haditha District, which relies on supplies delivered by air to the nearby Ain al-Asad Airbase. Its recapture will increase the capabilities of the ISF and tribal fighters in Haditha as well as humanitarian conditions in the besieged district by opening supply lines. Recapturing the Euphrates River Valley is a critical step in defeating ISIS, as opening fronts against ISIS in both western Anbar and in Ninewa Province will push ISIS further on the defensive. Reports indicate that “thousands” of civilians have fled north and south from Hit towards security forces, an indication of weakened ISIS social control over the town. ISIS’s force numbers in Hit remain unconfirmed, but the rapid advance of the ISF suggests either a low ISIS force presence or an intentional decision by ISIS not to defend villages south of Hit. Even if ISIS fighters do remain, which is a strong possibility, then there may not be enough for ISIS to hold civilians in the area to act as human shields for protection against airstrikes. ISIS had previously conducted a series of spectacular attacks across eastern Anbar, Baghdad, and Diyala between February 25 and February 29, likely to compel the ISF to delay operations in Hit and to exacerbate sectarian tensions that would have required security forces to redeploy away from front lines. ISIS likely calculated that Hit District was not defensible enough to resist a major ISF offensive. If true, the ceding of Hit District is an indicator that ISIS is on the defensive and withdrawing in order to defend higher priority areas or to muster the manpower for a major attack in either Iraq or Syria, where it has faced significant pressure particularly following the fall of Shaddadi, south of Hasakah City.

Iraq's Prime Minister Abadi Attempts to Reshuffle the Cabinet

By Patrick Martin with Emily Anagnostos

Key Take-Away: Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi’s cabinet reshuffle faces enormous pressure from competing blocs over the final composition of the cabinet. The State of Law Alliance (SLA) is attempting to preserve political party interests within the cabinet, a contradiction of PM Abadi’s and popular demonstrations’ demands for a full government overhaul. However, Muqtada al-Sadr, the charismatic leader of the Sadrist Trend, is demanding a comprehensive change in government, which would threaten political blocs’ access to sources of patronage by preventing party elements from controlling ministerial positions. Moreover, Sadr has threatened to withdraw confidence from PM Abadi if he does not pursue comprehensive reforms. PM Abadi thus has few options to achieve a cabinet reshuffle and preserve his position, as the SLA or the Sadrist Trend may seek to oust PM Abadi from his position if he does not acquiesce to their demands. PM Abadi’s removal would be detrimental to the stability of Iraq, as well as the U.S.’s ability to operate in Iraq in the fight against ISIS, as any candidate to replace him would most likely be more amenable to Iranian directives than PM Abadi. It is imperative that the U.S. support both PM Abadi and the Iraqi Security Forces in order to forestall any effort that would result in his departure from office.

Introduction

Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced a cabinet reshuffle on February 9, 2016 with the stated intention of forming a government of technocrats. The announcement came after months of failed reform attempts since August 2015, including unsuccessful efforts to oust Vice President Nouri al-Maliki, PM Abadi’s primary political rival and the leader of the State of Law Alliance (SLA), and to overhaul the cabinet. PM Abadi’s reform process quickly lost momentum, and popular demonstrations in favor of reforms that thronged the streets of Iraq’s southern provinces in August 2015 diminished over time. By February 2016, the reforms had all but ground to a halt, and PM Abadi’s most powerful supporter, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, ceased issuing weekly Friday sermons on political issues on February 5 out of frustration with the lack of progress towards reforming the Iraqi government.

February 9 – February 26: The Resurgence of Muqtada al-Sadr

PM Abadi likely announced the cabinet reshuffle on February 9 in order to rejuvenate popular support for a cabinet that was both more effective and more responsive to PM Abadi, as opposed to operating as a source of patronage for political blocs. However, PM Abadi lost what limited control he had over the reshuffle process early on, as political blocs proved predictably unwilling to lose control over their ministerial positions. Multiple parties thus attempted to hijack the process to both protect their own interests and to undermine their opponents within the cabinet.

One alarming development following PM Abadi’s announcement was the resurgence of Muqtada al-Sadr, who personally re-inserted himself into the Iraqi political scene. Previously, Sadr directed the Sadrist Trend remotely from Najaf; although he did maintain a public presence, much of his activity aimed at influencing the direction of Iraqi politics was directed through the Sadrist Trend’s primary political bloc, al-Ahrar. Following PM Abadi’s announcements, Sadr threw the down the gauntlet and demanded PM Abadi undertake comprehensive reforms. On February 13, Sadr had given PM Abadi an ultimatum: conduct comprehensive reform of the government within 45 days, or the Sadrist Trend would withdraw confidence from the government. In particular, he issued a series of proposals aimed at reducing the power of pro-Iranian elements, including both the reform of the judiciary, headed by Medhat al-Mahmoud, a powerful ally of Maliki, and the curbing “undisciplined” elements of the Popular Mobilization, a clear reference to the Iranian proxy militias that are some of Sadr’s strongest opponents.

Sadr personally returned to Iraqi politics by calling for a mass demonstration in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square on February 26 in which he would make a rare public appearance to give a speech. Sadr’s timing for the speech, on a Friday amid the deliberations over the cabinet reshuffle, presented a clear attempt to capture the leadership of the Iraqi street and the popular demonstrations that since August 2015 have called for government reform and anti-corruption measures on a weekly basis. Sadr thus attempted to assume a role similar to Sistani’s prior to his suspension of political sermons on February 5. Although the Tahrir Square demonstration reportedly reached up to 100,000 participants, most reporting seemed to indicate that the demonstrations were largely composed of Sadr’s supporters, likely brought in from all across the country.



Above: Up to 100,000 supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr flocked to see him speak in Tahrir Square in central Baghdad on February 26, 2016.

Sadr likely sought to harness the popular demonstrations to forward his own vision of the cabinet reshuffle and use popular anger over poor government performance as leverage within negotiations over the final shape of the cabinet. The Sadrist Trend is dwarfed by his rival Maliki’s SLA bloc in government, possessing less than half of the seats that the SLA holds in the Council of Representatives (CoR) while holding only two ministerial positions to the SLA’s seven. Maliki expressed his discomfort over Sadr’s attempt to capture the power of the demonstrations by issuing a statement on March 5, denouncing the demonstrations’ infiltration by Baathists and calling them “chaotic.”

February 26 – March 5: Sadr and the SLA at Odds

Sadr’s direct challenge to the SLA received the support of multiple parties, including the Sunni Etihad bloc, and appeared to be aimed at reducing the SLA’s dominance within government. Meanwhile, al-Ahrar Bloc, Kurdish parties, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), and Etihad all denounced the practice of proxy appointments – temporary appointments by PM Abadi of important positions until the CoR selected a new candidate – as the practice favors the SLA, the bloc of which PM Abadi is a member. Sadr also initially received the support of ISCI leader Ammar al-Hakim when he visited the latter’s office on March 2. Hakim and Sadr were allies during the initial reform period in August 2015, and the two previously shared the objective of strengthening their own political parties at the expense of the SLA. 

Sadr’s attempts to dictate the process of selecting new ministers ran into the problem that his committee was at odds with the three-part committee set up by the SLA to evaluate current ministers and select new ones and reportedly run entirely by SLA members: PM Abadi, who is a member of the subsidiary Dawa Party; senior SLA member Ali al-Adeeb; and, most importantly, SLA leader Nouri al-Maliki, Sadr’s rival. Maliki’s presence as a leader of the SLA committee indicates that it is highly unlikely that the committee’s vision of a new cabinet will be fully representative and composed in a way that will satisfy minority blocs, as Maliki is a sectarian leader. The fact that the committee had three leaders, as opposed to PM Abadi alone, indicates that the SLA is driving the cabinet reshuffle process and is adamant about protecting and strengthening its presence in the cabinet. However, Sadr also formed his own independent committee to select new ministers on February 20, which Sadr subordinated to PM Abadi. Curiously, Sadr’s committee did not appear to be formed of Sadrist rank-and-file party members. Instead, the committee’s members appeared to be unusually diverse in their professional backgrounds, and may be more likely than the SLA committee to submit nominations for ministerial positions based on expertise rather than political connection. The different compositions of these separate committees – highly politicized on the side of the SLA and more technocratic on the side of Sadr – demonstrate the different approaches Maliki and Sadr have towards the cabinet reshuffle process, and the gulf that exists between their ultimate objectives.

March 5 – March 6: Negotiations over Cabinet Reshuffle Intensify

PM Abadi, CoR Speaker Salim al-Juburi, and President Fuad Masoum met with leaders of major Kurdish, Sunni, Shi’a, and minority political blocs on March 5 to discuss the reform program. The meeting largely involved each of the leaders airing their complaints with the reform process, but it proved inconclusive as political bloc leaders could not agree on how to conduct the cabinet reshuffle. One day later, a far more intense meeting was held among the Shi’a National Alliance leadership and PM Abadi in Karbala, a predominantly Shi’a city with a major Shi’a shrine. There, PM Abadi met in a nondescript room in a hotel with National Alliance chairman Ibrahim al-Jaafari, Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr, and ISCI leader Ammar al-Hakim. Other participants included Khudair al-Khuzai, a Dawa Party member and former Vice President in Maliki’s government; senior SLA member Ali al-Alaq; Fadhila Secretary-General Hashem al-Hashemi; Education Minister and Mustaqilun Bloc leader Hussein al-Shahristani; and Badr Organization Deputy Secretary General Abdul-Karim al-Ansari. The three-hour meeting underscored the differences between the Shi’a parties; Sadr reportedly stormed out of the room in frustration, after which PM Abadi withdrew, concluding the meeting. Sadr’s made his anger more clear when he rejected the statement that the National Alliance released following the meeting, stating that it was unrepresentative and written when Sadr and Hakim were not present. He ordered al-Ahrar Bloc to suspend all participation in National Alliance meetings until further notice. Hakim, however, appeared to diverge from Sadr’s position, calling for a partial cabinet reshuffle as opposed to a complete overhaul.

Above: Leaders in the National Alliance meet in Karbala on March 6. From left: National Alliance Chairman and Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, ISCI leader Ammar al-Hakim, Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, and Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr.

While the Shi’a parties were locked in argumentation within the meeting rooms of the National Alliance, Sunni and Kurdish parties, as well as the secular Wataniyya bloc, appear to have largely been sidelined. Kurdish and Sunni representatives have adamantly stressed the need for a new and representative government. Senior Etihad members insist that the government be representative, but they will not support a reshuffle if the reform process does not first address “previous agreements,” a reference to legislation that Etihad members view as a priority but have been consistently blocked by Shi’a parties in the CoR. Members of the Kurdish Gorran party, the largest opposition party within the CoR, as well as the Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG), insisted that members of the new cabinet come from the same political blocs. They also insisted that Kurdish representation within government rise from 13 percent to 20 percent, which would substantially increase the ability of the Kurdistan Alliance to influence decision-making in Baghdad as opposed to Iraq’s Shi’a political elite. Although their support will be necessary to pass the final cabinet, Iraqi Kurds and Sunnis appear to be on the outside looking in.

March 7-10: Sadr and the SLA Release Information about Cabinet Reshuffle Preferences

Details of Sadr’s cabinet reshuffle committee results leaked on March 7. The committee did not complete its work by that time, as it struggled to identify independent candidates for foreign, interior, and defense ministerial positions. Selected candidates, however, appeared to be relatively independent of the Sadrist Trend. Several of the nominations are academics and topic experts, such as the committee’s nominations for the Water Resources Ministry and the Industry and Minerals Ministry, though one candidate has a history of being critical of Sadr’s primary rival, Nouri al-Maliki. Candidates with political party connections were also unusual in that they were not necessarily Sadrist; one of the committee’s candidates for the Justice Minister is an SLA CoR member. The lack of nominations for security positions is noteworthy, as a Sadrist committee would be expected to nominate a senior Sadrist official, such as current CoR Security and Defense Committee Chairman Hakim al-Zamili, to critical security positions. It may also indicate that Sadr has grown frustrated with his own al-Ahrar Bloc, from which he has publicly distanced himself, as he insisted during the February 26 demonstration that there was no political group that represented him. Sadr personally referred the two current ministers from al-Ahrar Bloc to the Integrity Commission for investigation on February 28 and detained former Deputy Prime Minister Bahaa al-Araji on corruption charges on March 5. These may also be part of Sadr’s continued effort to assume Sistani’s previous role as a voice of the popular demonstrations and widespread frustration with corruption and poor government performance. Sadr may have calculated that pursuing a technocratic government and becoming the standard bearer of the anti-corruption movement are worth the cost of losing access to sources of patronage within the ministries.

In contrast to the Sadrist committee’s cabinet reshuffle proposals, the SLA-backed committee suggested that senior political party members continue to hold positions within the cabinet. SLA leader Jassim Muhammad Jaafar announced on March 9 that the SLA-backed committee had completed its list of proposed ministers for the reshuffle and that it would be submitted to the National Alliance for discussion and then implementation. Following that announcement, an unconfirmed source disclosed portions of the nominated list. The choices are dangerous to U.S.-Iraq relations. The nominees include a number of ministers historically close to Iran, whose installation in the cabinet would cripple the U.S.’s ability to operate with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Iraqi government. It could also lead to PM Abadi’s removal, as the anonymous source stated that there was an agreement in the SLA that PM Abadi should resign if his reform agenda fails. PM Abadi’s removal or the nomination of pro-Iranian elements to key positions could cripple the U.S.’s ability to operate with Iraqi forces and in Iraq itself via the installation of ministers historically close to Iran such as Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri or pro-Iranian members of the SLA.

The SLA committee also reportedly decided that the crucial position of Minister of Defense is slated to change, though there have been no indications as to who will replace current Defense Minister and senior Etihad member Khalid al-Obeidi. Of most importance is the future of the Ministry of Interior (MOI), which maintains the Federal Police units and is currently run by Badr Organization member Muhammad al-Ghabban. The Badr Organization is an Iranian-backed Shi’a militia that receives funding and direction from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and works closely with the Popular Mobilization.

The leaked SLA list suggests that Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al-Amiri is a front-runner for Minister of Interior, though this datum remains unconfirmed. If true, then Amiri’s control over both the Badr Organization and the Ministry of Interior would make it nearly impossible for the U.S. to coordinate with the Federal Police and other Interior Ministry units. Under current Interior Minister Ghabban, Badr members have occupied top leadership positions in the Federal Police, often at the expense of Sunni interests and security. In the past year, the Interior Ministry has attempted to place Badr Organization members in police chief postings in several provinces, including Basra and Diyala, causing controversy among other Shi’a parties that had previously dominated in the province or among Sunni residents who felt that the Badr police chiefs would fail to protect them. Hadi al-Amiri maintains significant leverage over PM Abadi because of his prominent standing in the Popular Mobilization and Shi’a community in Iraq as well as his strong backing by Iran. Were PM Abadi to oust Badr Organization from the Interior Ministry, Iranian proxy militias would likely react in a hostile manner that could cost him his mandate. Amiri had previous been suggested as a candidate for the Minister of Interior in 2014 during the creation of the Abadi government, but the possibility was taken off the table likely due to U.S. objections. Amiri as Minister of Interior would consolidate Iranian control over the Federal Police and ensure that it is composed of and interoperable with the Popular Mobilization. This full capture of the ministry could make it extremely difficult for the U.S. to support Federal Police or other Interior Ministry operations without consequently supporting militia operations. Alternatively, it may give the Interior Ministry the capacity to reject American assistance.

According to the SLA committee, of the current 22 ministers, only five would remain involved in some capacity, according to the SLA committee. Current Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari (KDP) will replace current Minister of Foreign Affairs Ibrahim al-Jaafari (National Reform Trend) while current Oil Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi (ISCI) will take Zebari’s place as Finance Minister. Unconfirmed sources also stated that ISCI was hesitant to support PM Abadi’s agenda, but was convinced when PM Abadi offered to keep Abdul-Mahdi in the cabinet along with preserving two ministerial positions for ISCI. Education Minister Muhammad Iqbal (Iraqiyya), Labor and Social Affairs Minister Muhammad Shia’a al-Sudani (Dawa Party), and Planning Salman al-Jumaili (Mutahidun) would also retain their positions.

The leaked document also suggests that the SLA agreed that PM Abadi will resign his position in the event that the reshuffle does not succeed. This possible course of action is even more dangerous to U.S. interests and operations in Iraq as the installation of Hadi al-Amiri as Interior Minister. PM Abadi previously offered to resign from his position on February 16 as part of the cabinet reshuffle, and the reiteration of this proposal continues to risk future relations between the U.S. and Iraqi government. PM Abadi has maintained an open relationship with the U.S. and the Coalition despite significant political pressures from Shi’a political blocs, including his own, and the Popular Mobilization. Should PM Abadi be forced from his position, the SLA, which holds the majority in the CoR, would attempt to select a new prime minister more aligned with Iranian interests than supportive of the U.S. role in the anti-ISIS fight. Moreover, a pro-Iran prime minister could additionally seek support from other countries with divergent interests from the U.S., such as Russia. This possible change in the prime minister’s office in the midst of major ongoing military operations in Ramadi and Mosul could undermine the potential success of those operations and drive out the U.S. from the country. A new prime minister would be more likely to invite increased Russian and Iranian support in the fight against ISIS, as well as be far more willing to deploy Iraqi Shi’a militias in forward operations, a course of action that would increase sectarian tensions during operations in predominantly Sunni areas.

March 11 – Courses of Action

The end result of the cabinet reshuffle could have severe consequences for Iraq’s stability. PM Abadi faces no good courses of action. It is likely that he does not possess political strength to form an independent commission to screen nominations for ministerial positions, as outlined in a document release on March 11, due to the importance of political blocs in holding ministries for patronage. But even if PM Abadi manages to collate a list of candidates for the ministries, he will face extreme resistance. If PM Abadi attempts to appease everyone with half-measures without appeasing anyone’s interests, the SLA or Sadr could push for him to resign. If he attempts to install a fully technocratic government, as Sadr has been advocating for, then political blocs, including the SLA as well as Sunni and Kurdish blocs, will resist in order to protect their interests. Senior SLA member Ali al-Adeeb admitted as much on March 12, when he complained that the Badr Organization, Mustaqilun Bloc, and Dawa Party – all components of the SLA – were more concerned with protecting their positions within the cabinet than pursuing real reforms, but hoped that public pressure could change their positions. If PM Abadi submits a cabinet reshuffle platform that replaces current ministers with political bloc appointees, there is a possibility that Sadr will refuse to accept the outcome. This is particularly dangerous as Sadr could, as a final attempt to acquire leverage over the government, do something rash. Sadr called for a mass sit-in in front of the entrance to the Green Zone in Baghdad until the end of the 45-day deadline on March 29, which is just over two weeks away, in order to pressure the government to fight corruption. More Sadrist protests could spark violence or could even attempt to enter the Green Zone, a daunting prospect considering the historical lack of discipline of Sadrist followers. The consequences of a security breach or violence in or near the Green Zone could be dramatic and suck PM Abadi further into the SLA’s orbit.

The cabinet reshuffle may also compromise the U.S.’s ability to operate freely in Iraq. If the cabinet reshuffle fails, and the SLA forces PM Abadi to resign, then the government could collapse, leaving questions about how the U.S. will continue to operate in the country. Furthermore, it could pave the way for a premier who is far more amenable to Iranian directives than PM Abadi to assume the position. Even if merely temporary, such a replacement would restrict the U.S.’s freedom of operations in the country. PM Abadi’s sole advantage remains the lack of a consensus candidate among the Shi’a parties to replace him at the moment, but even this may change. National Alliance chairman and current Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, a pro-Iranian former Prime Minister himself, could be a candidate, particularly as he was reportedly running the National Alliance meetings during the cabinet reshuffle process, even with the reigning prime minister present. It is imperative for the U.S. to exert what diplomatic pressures it can to ensure that the new government forms smoothly with PM Abadi at its helm, as the alternative would gravely jeopardize U.S. interests. 

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: February 27 - March 7, 2016

By Genevieve Casagrande

Russian airstrikes continue to target mainstream elements of the Syrian armed opposition, despite the ongoing cessation of hostilities agreement. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that the level of violence in the country has decreased by ninety percent since the onset of the agreement on February 27. Pro-regime forces supported by Russian airstrikes nevertheless continued operations to clear opposition-held terrain in Latakia Province in an effort to buffer the regime’s coastal stronghold. Jaysh al-Nasr, a coalition of FSA-affiliated opposition factions that includes prominent U.S.-backed TOW anti-tank missile recipients, reported Russian airstrikes near the opposition’s frontlines with the regime in the al-Ghab Plain, which lies on Latakia’s eastern border. Russian warplanes also conducted limited strikes against the armed opposition in other areas of western Syria from February 29 - March 7, including the first reported Russian airstrikes in Damascus Province since the cessation of hostilities agreement began. The likely continuation of limited Russian airstrikes against mainstream elements of the opposition ultimately threatens the sustainability of any ceasefire agreement and the outcome of upcoming negotiations between the regime and the opposition in Geneva, currently scheduled to resume on March 14. The opposition High Negotiations Committee (HNC) continues to report Russian and regime violations of the cessation of hostilities agreement, which included a total of 90 airstrikes carried out by Russian and regime warplanes as of March 4. The HNC has yet to make a decision regarding its attendance of the talks. Prominent HNC member Riad Nassan Agha stated on March 8 that their “inclination is to go,” but remains dependent upon the degree to which the regime and its allies maintain the cessation of hostilities.  

Russia’s decrease in airstrikes against the armed opposition in western Syria has likely allowed Russian air operations to increase support to the regime’s limited operations against ISIS. Russian air operations have notably decreased in areas such as Aleppo, where heavy strikes have been maintained for the first five months of Russia’s air campaign. Russian airstrikes concentrated against ISIS’s positions in and around Palmyra in central Homs Province amidst a concerted regime effort to breach the town on March 7. Regime ground operations in Palmyra were ultimately unsuccessful, highlighting the regime’s continued limitations in combating ISIS as the regime and its allies remain preoccupied with the defeat of the Syrian armed opposition.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.  

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Iraq Situation Report: March 1 - 7, 2016

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias spearheaded major operations to recapture desert terrain west of Samarra and Tikrit in Salah al-Din Province. The operation, announced and initiated by the Joint Operations Command on March 4, involves the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Popular Mobilization, and aims to secure the Jazeera desert area northwest of Baghdad and prevent its use by ISIS as a support zone. ISIS has freedom of access and attack in these areas which it uses to target Baghdad, areas west of Samarra, and Baiji. The Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) also announced the operation, and the PMC deputy chairman, U.S.-designated terrorist Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, played a leading role in coordinating the operation. Major Iranian proxy militias, including Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, deployed forces as part of the operation, and the PMC spokesperson denied that Coalition airstrikes played any role; the Coalition reported no airstrikes in Salah al-Din during the two-day operation. The Popular Mobilization and security forces lack the capacity to hold desert terrain and prevent ISIS from freely accessing the area, however. The Popular Mobilization and security forces have struggled to secure the Thar Thar desert area north of Fallujah, and multiple militia-led clearing operations have failed to secure these areas since June 2015. The high-profile militia operation bolsters the Iranian proxy narrative that the Popular Mobilization is the essential ally of the Iraqi government in the fight against ISIS. It also underscores the need for the U.S. and the Coalition to increase its support for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in order for the ISF to successfully recapture and secure territory from ISIS as a means of undermining the militia narrative. Meanwhile, an ISIS attacker detonated an explosives-laden fuel tanker at a checkpoint north of Hillah in Babil Province on March 6, killing more than 60 people and wounding more than 70 others. It was the first successful spectacular attack in Babil since 2013, and a provincial security official called it the largest attack in Babil to date. ISIS last detonated a VBIED in Babil in August 2015 in a failed attack that caused minimal casualties. The attack demonstrates that ISIS has the logistical capacity to launch spectacular attacks in Babil, a province that ISIS has not controlled terrain in since October 2014. The March 6 attack is likely a continuation of a series of suicide vest attacks between February 25 and February 29 intended to incite sectarian tensions and force the Popular Mobilization and ISF to redeploy for defensive measures away from forward operations.

Warning Update: Pro-Regime Forces Continue Encirclement of Aleppo Despite Truce

By: Christopher Kozak

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his allies in Moscow and Tehran are continuing to complete the encirclement of Aleppo City despite an ostensible ‘cessation of hostilities’ that began on February 27, 2016. Russia resumed its air campaign against the opposition on February 28 following a one day hiatus, concentrating its strikes against the opposition-held northwestern suburbs of Aleppo City. Russia continued to target both Syrian Al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra and moderate opposition groups indiscriminately despite an international agreement prohibiting strikes on non-terrorist factions. At the same time, pro-regime forces and their local partners continued to mount attacks aimed at securing favorable terrain in advance of future operations in Aleppo Province as previously forecast by ISW. The siege of Aleppo City – Syria’s largest urban center and commercial capital – would solidify the favorable position currently held by President Assad while sparking a humanitarian crisis that forces regional backers of the opposition to consider intensified interventions in the conflict.

The regime and its allies have gained terrain around Aleppo City in recent weeks. The regime has leveraged a deepening partnership with the Syrian Kurdish YPG in order to pressure the only remaining ground line of communication (GLOC) to opposition-held Aleppo City. Pro-regime forces launched a failed attack from YPG-held territory against the villages of Shaykh Aqil and Qabtian al-Jabal northwest of Aleppo City on February 26, likely in an attempt to secure terrain that would form the outer cordon of an eventual encirclement of the city. The YPG later seized the Castillo Hill in the Sheikh Maqsoud District of Aleppo City on March 1 following clashes with Jabhat al Nusra and allied fighters, securing key high ground adjacent to the last remaining opposition supply route into the city. This advance suggests that the regime may intend to work with the YPG in order to close the four-kilometer-long gap required to isolate the opposition-held districts of Aleppo City. The Syrian Kurds previously engaged in similar battlefield coordination with pro-regime forces in early February in order to sever the primary opposition supply route between Aleppo City and Turkey. These gains will tend to drive the opposition closer to Jabhat al Nusra and other irreconcilable actors, further limiting the pool of local partners available to the U.S.

The regime and its allies have sought to portray their actions as legitimate due to the battlefield presence of Jabhat al Nusra in some of these regions. These acts of aggression nonetheless threaten the long-term survivability of the wider opposition in Aleppo City. Riyad Hijab – the head of the opposition High Negotiations Committee – warned on March 3 that the ceasefire stood on the verge of collapse, stressing that “the regime and its allies continue to violate the truce and launch operations to gain more ground” at the expense of the opposition. The regime and its allies ultimately remain willing to secure additional battlefield gains rather than demonstrate any signs of goodwill in advance of the Geneva Negotiations scheduled to resume on March 9. The current ‘cessation of hostilities’ thus stands to mark only a lull in the ongoing conflict that provides the regime and its allies with an opportunity to replenish and refit their forces ahead of a renewed offensive that besieges Aleppo City and decisively shatters the primary nexus of opposition strength in Northern Syria. 

ISIS Sanctuary: March 3, 2016

By: ISW Research Team

Since the publication of ISW’s last ISIS Sanctuary Map on January 16, 2016, ISIS lost a major resource hub in Shaddadi, northeastern Syria and was expelled from its remaining positions in Ramadi, western Iraq. ISIS responded by launching a campaign against Kurdish forces in Tel Abyad, northern Syria, and briefly seizing the city of Khanaser, southeast of Aleppo from Syrian regime forces. ISIS also launched a wave of explosive attacks across Iraq and Syria, beginning with six suicide attacks on Homs and Damascus on February 22. ISIS likely aims to increase overall disorder by attacking civilian and military targets linked to Shi’a governments in Damascus and Baghdad, thereby facilitating its defense and opening new opportunities for its expansion. This map also features an updated representation of ISIS’s zone of control in northern Aleppo province, which was previously represented as a sanctuary zone. 

ISIS in Southeast Asia: January 1-March 2, 2016

by Molly Simio, Harleen Gambhir, and the ISW Counterterrorism Team

ISIS is using its safe haven and foreign fighter population in Iraq and Syria to expand influence in Southeast Asia, in pursuit of its grand strategic objective to rule all Muslim lands. ISIS’s Syria-based Southeast Asian fighters are resourcing and directing local networks to launch attacks. Competition between militant elements vying to lead the Southeast Asian pro-ISIS movement will likely encourage increased jihadist attacks in the short term, threatening urban areas and Western interests in the region. Support from ISIS’s safe haven may also facilitate the creation of an active, trans-national ISIS affiliate in Southeast Asia in the medium term.

The U.S. has the opportunity to counter ISIS’s network in Southeast Asia before it develops further. ISIS claimed it first attack in the region on January 14 in Jakarta, an act that belied ISIS’s ambitions but reflected relatively low military capability. Southeast Asian jihadist groups are fragmented and face pressure from domestic counterterrorism operations. ISIS's campaign in Southeast Asia is at an early stage, so the group currently poses a lower threat to security there than it does in Libya, Egypt, and Afghanistan, where its affiliates enjoy sanctuary, and in Yemen, where its affiliate is prolonging a civil war. Early action against ISIS’s Southeast Asian supporters can limit ISIS’s ability to develop an affiliate in the area, particularly as those supporters face resistance from locally-focused and al Qaeda-associated groups. 

Iraq Euphrates River Valley Activity: December 22, 2015 - March 2, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos, Rachel Bessette, and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) launched operations to retake Ramadi from ISIS on December 22 and established control of the city on February 9. The ISF will need to target remaining ISIS safe havens in the Euphrates River Valley, including Hit and Fallujah, in order to consolidate these gains. These subsequent operations will strengthen the ISF’s long-term operational abilities in Anbar while undermining ISIS’s control along a key line of communication between Iraq and Syria. The ISF will nevertheless face various challenges to clearing and controlling ISIS safe havens in western Anbar. ISIS has already responded by launching counter-attacks against the ISF’s thinly spread forces. These have included coordinated ground attacks and spectacular attacks in Anbar and Baghdad. Tying up the ISF in dispersed engagements could allow ISIS to maintain key territory, vital access points, and lines of communication while undermining the ISF’s ability to focus on counter-offensive rather than defensive operations. Second, political pressures in Baghdad and shortages of manpower will also likely precipitate the direct participation of predominantly Shi’a Popular Mobilization fighters in ongoing operations, causing real risks of sectarian violence in majority Sunni areas. Finally, ISIS retains Fallujah as a heavily fortified stronghold on the Euphrates near Baghdad and from it can launch deadly attacks into ISF-secured areas. Popular Mobilization forces, including Iranian-backed proxy groups, have spearheaded operations to encircle Fallujah, but they are aiming to isolate and besiege the city rather than recapture it. The ISF is therefore not likely to regain Fallujah in 2016. 

The ISF is also preparing for the recapture of Mosul and has generated forces for that fight. Opening fronts in Anbar and Ninewah simultaneously will likely force ISIS to adopt a defensive posture, as it did in the first quarter of 2015. Ongoing ISIS counterattacks and the scope of subsequent operations in Anbar will likely challenge the ISF and delay the decisive phase of a Mosul operation.