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Thursday, December 31, 2015

U.N. Push for Ceasefires in Syria Achieves Results, but Empowers Regime

By: Jennifer Cafarella, Katie Menoche, Genevieve Casagrande, and the ISW Syria Team

A U.N.-led push for localized ceasefires between pro- and anti-regime forces in Syria has achieved notable results, but may not actually make a negotiated settlement in Syria more likely. Local deals in Idlib, Homs, and Damascus provinces have enabled both pro- and anti-regime fighters to withdraw from besieged towns, sometimes in return for the delivery of desperately needed humanitarian aid. The U.N. seeks to use these local deals to generate momentum toward a nation-wide ceasefire as a confidence building measure before negotiations between regime and opposition forces begin in Geneva on January 25, 2016. The success of these deals has largely been a product of crippling sieges and aerial bombardment of opposition-held areas by pro-regime forces that have forced local opposition fighters and civilian populations to submit to the ceasefire; as such, they may not actually foster opposition confidence at the negotiating table. ISW assesses that pro-regime forces seek to secure such ceasefires in three additional areas in Damascus and one area north of Homs City prior to the January negotiations. The regime frequently targets civilian populations in these areas with barrel bombs, heavy airstrikes, shelling, and allegedly chemical weapons, likely in order to force local surrenders by anti-regime forces and civilian populations. The following maps represent ISW’s assessment of the status of seven areas where ceasefires have been achieved or are being sought in the lead-up to Geneva, as of December 28, 2015. 



There are more areas in Syria already under local ceasefires with the Syrian regime that are not depicted in the maps above, particularly in Damascus.[1]  

The following sections detail relevant events and sets of negotiations in each of the ceasefire areas. This list is not comprehensive and does not include ISW’s mapped data on Russian airstrikes in Syria, which are available at ISW’s research blog, at: iswresearch.blogspot.com


The Damascus-Idlib Ceasefires and Evacuations

The ceasefire and evacuation deal between pro- and anti-regime forces in the besieged enclaves of Fu’ah and Kefraya as well as Zabadani was completed on December 29, 2015, after months of negotiation.

August 22, 2015: Opposition forces in Idlib targeted a regime enclave in retaliation for regime strikes in Damascus. Regime warplanes conducted airstrikes targeting the opposition stronghold of Douma in the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus, killing at least thirty civilians and wounding over 110 others. In response, hardline opposition group Ahrar al-Sham announced the start of operations to target the besieged Shi'a-majority towns of Fu’ahFu’ah and Kefraya northeast of Idlib City with 100 artillery shells per day. (SOHRSOHRAll4SyriaAll4SyriaStatement) [Analyst note: Opposition forces previously utilized pressure on Fu’ah and Kefraya as leverage in the Turkish- and Iranian-brokered negotiations surrounding the besieged opposition within Zabadani northwest of Damascus prior to the breakdown of negotiations between Ahrar al-Sham and Lebanese Hezbollah on August 15. The new linkage of the two towns to airstrikes on Eastern Ghouta may signal that opposition forces intend to apply similar leverage in order to achieve effects in the Syrian capital]

September 20, 2015: Pro- and anti-regime forces reached a temporary ceasefire in Damascus and Idlib Provinces. The Syrian regime, opposition forces, and Lebanese Hezbollah implemented a new ceasefire in the Shi'a-majority towns of Fu’ahFu’ah and Kefraya in Idlib Province as well as Zabadani and the neighboring town of Madaya in Damascus Province following negotiations between an Iranian delegation and hardline opposition group Ahrar al-Sham. The agreement is the third such ceasefire in the four towns over the previous two months, and followed a major opposition offensive against Fu’ah and Kefraya, which began on September 18. An anonymous Lebanese security source stated that the two sides negotiated terms for a six-month-long ceasefire in the besieged enclaves which would include a full evacuation of opposition fighters and any willing civilians from Zabadani to Idlib Province; the evacuation of wounded pro-regime fighters and up to 10,000 civilians from Fu’ah and Kefraya; and the release of five hundred prisoners by the Syrian regime. The agreement was to be overseen by a U.N. working group established to ensure its implementation. (Reuters, SOHR, Hurriyet, Al Jazeera, Daily Star[2], Daily Star[3]) [Analyst Note: Previous ceasefires in the two besieged enclaves broke down after several days amidst opposition concerns over forced population transfers. A long-term truce in Zabadani could enable Hezbollah and regime forces to redeploy to the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus to reverse an ongoing opposition offensive in the area which severed the strategic M5 Highway between Damascus and Homs City]

September 22, 2015: Pro- and anti-regime forces extended temporary ceasefires in Damascus and Idlib. Pro-Hezbollah media sources reported that opposition forces, Hezbollah, and the Syrian regime agreed to extend the ceasefire in Fu’ah and Kefraya as well as opposition in Zabadani and Madaya  until the conclusion of a wider six-month-long agreement which would include prisoner swaps and the evacuation of thousands of civilians.  (Reuters, Daily Star[4])

September 24, 2015: Pro- and anti-regime forces formalized ceasefires in Damascus and Idlib Provinces. The Syrian regime, Lebanese Hezbollah, hardline opposition group Ahrar al-Sham, and other opposition forces reportedly reached a final agreement in Fu’ah and Kefraya opposition and Zabadani, following negotiations between an Iranian and Turkish delegation.  (SOHR, Daily Star[5]

October 2, 2015: U.N. announced a halt to humanitarian operations in three ceasefires. The office of UN Special Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura stated that the U.N. suspended planned humanitarian operations as part of the ceasefire agreement in Fu’ah and Kefraya as well opposition in Zabadani due to a surge of military activity in surrounding areas. The U.N. called on all parties to “fulfill their responsibilities” to protect civilians and “reach the necessary understandings” to implement the humanitarian aspects of the agreement as soon as possible. (AP, Reuters[6]

October 11, 2015: Regime forces withdrew equipment and personnel from Zabadani. Regime forces reportedly withdrew significant quantities of heavy equipment, artillery, and personnel from Zabadani following the conclusion of the ceasefire agreement. The reinforcements deployed towards the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus as well as Dera'a Province in southern Syria. Although the ceasefires in Zabadani as well as Fu’ah and Kefraya continued to hold, the agreement had been rendered increasingly irrelevant following the start of the Russian air campaign in Syria on September 30. Russian warplanes frequently targeted opposition positions included in the ceasefire. (SNN)

October 18, 2015: Humanitarian aid entered four besieged Syrian towns as part of a U.N.-mediated ceasefire agreement. Trucks carrying humanitarian aid entered the predominantly Shi’ite Fu’ah and Kefraya as well as besieged opposition in Zabadani and Madaya. (ICRC, Daily Star[7])

December 21, 2015: Alleged Russian airstrikes strained ceasefire in Idlib Province. Opposition forces shelled the towns of Fu’ah and Kefraya and began clashing with pro-regime forces in the area after alleged Russian warplanes conducted a series of deadly airstrikes in opposition-held Idlib City, killing at least 46 civilians and opposition fighters while wounding over 170 others. The clashes threatened to interrupt the UN-sponsored evacuation deal for Fu’ah and Kefraya as well as Zabdani and Mayada. (SOHRSOHRSOHRBBCReutersVoA

December 27, 2015: Evacuation of besieged enclaves in Northern Damascus and Idlib Provinces moved forward. The ceasefire and evacuation deal reached between pro- and anti-regime forces in the besieged enclaves of Fu’ah and Kefraya as well as Zabadani moved forward after months of delay. Buses and ambulances transported 300 pro-regime civilians and wounded fighters from Fu’ah and Kefraya into the Turkish City of Hatay, from which they would travel by plane to Beirut. In addition, more than 125 fighters were evacuated from Zabadani and proceeded en route to Beirut, from where they traveled by plane to Turkey. (Reuters)


December 29, 2015: U.N.-negotiated evacuation deal in Damascus and Idlib Provinces was completed. 300 pro-regime civilians and wounded fighters from Fu’ah and Kefraya arrived in Damascus after travelling from Idlib Province through Turkey and Lebanon. In addition, 125 opposition fighters from the opposition town of Zabdani arrived in Hatay, Turkey after travelling through Lebanon. 86 of these fighters crossed the border into Syria and were reportedly received by the Jabhat al-Nusra- and Ahrar al-Sham-led Jaysh al-Fatah Coalition in Idlib City. The remaining fighters were reportedly being treated in hospitals in Turkey. (AFP, SNN, Zaman al-Wasl, All4Syria)

Damascus

Eastern Ghouta 
Ceasefire failed in mid-November; regime demands surrender on December 25 after military gains and death of rebel commander.

August 15-16, 2015: Retaliatory regime strike on market in Douma, Damascus killed over 100. Damascus-based Salafist opposition group Jaysh al-Islam seized a major regime armored vehicle base near the town of Harasta in the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus on August 15 following heavy clashes. Regime airstrikes later struck a public market in the Jaysh al-Islam stronghold of Douma in likely retaliation for the opposition advance, killing over one hundred civilians and wounding over two hundred others. (All4SyriaAll4SyriaJaysh al-IslamAFPAll4SyriaAFP)

August 22, 2015: Regime airstrikes on Douma, Damascus killed 30 opposition forces; opposition retaliated in Idlib. Regime warplanes conducted airstrikes targeting the town of Douma, killing at least 30 civilians and wounding over 110 others. In response, hardline opposition group Ahrar al-Sham announced the start of operations to target the towns of Fu’ah and Kefraya with one hundred artillery shells per day. (SOHRSOHRAll4SyriaAll4SyriaStatement)

October 14, 2015: Regime renewed offensive operations in Damascus with Russian air support. The Syrian regime launched a new offensive with alleged Russian air support against opposition-held areas in the northern outskirts of the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus. The offensive largely targeted opposition positions in the neighborhoods of Jobar and Ayn Tarma in northeastern Damascus City, as well as areas along the strategic M5 Highway connecting Damascus to Homs City that were seized by opposition group Jaysh al-Islam in September 2015. This attack followed reports that the regime withdrew significant quantities of heavy equipment, artillery, and personnel from opposition and deployed the reinforcements to Eastern Ghouta and Dera'a Province on October 11. (SNNAll4Syria

October 30 – November 1, 2015: Regime shells killed over forty in Douma; opposition group retaliated. Regime forces shelled the opposition-held town of Douma in the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus killing at least 40 people and injuring at least 100 others. Salafist opposition group Jaysh al-Islam subsequently paraded cages containing regime soldiers and their families across Eastern Ghouta, reportedly in an attempt to discourage regime airstrikes and shelling.

November 12 - 13, 2015: Regime forces penetrated opposition stronghold in Damascus. Pro-regime forces penetrated the opposition-held Marj al-Sultan Airbase in the southern outskirts of Eastern Ghouta. This regime advance follows weeks of low-level attacks against Eastern Ghouta's southern flank and threatens core opposition-held terrain in the Syrian capital. (SNNSNNSOHRSNNAll4SyriaSNNSOHRTwitter

November 18, 2015: Opposition forces reportedly agreed to fifteen-day ceasefire in Eastern Damascus suburbs. Syrian opposition factions reportedly agreed to a fifteen-day-long ceasefire in Eastern Ghouta following negotiations with the Syrian regime mediated by Russia. Salafist opposition group Jaysh al-Islam allegedly served as the primary representative of opposition forces in Damascus. (Daily Star[8])

November 19, 2015: Ceasefire in Damascus failed. Clashes, shelling, and regime airstrikes resumed in Eastern Ghouta after a breakdown in Russian-mediated negotiations to establish a fifteen-day-long ceasefire in the region. The breakdown reportedly followed disagreements regarding the amount of aid supplies allowed to enter Eastern Ghouta and the release of all Alawite prisoners held by opposition forces. The Syrian regime also insisted that the ceasefire only covered the towns of Douma and Harasta rather than all of Eastern Ghouta. A spokesperson for Salafist opposition group Jaysh al-Islam nonetheless stated that the group’s leadership council continued to study the proposal. (SOHRReutersSyria DirectAP)

December 14, 2015: Regime forces recaptured airbase in Damascus. Syrian armed forces backed by Hezbollah fighters and Russian air support captured the Marj al-Sultan airbase as well as the neighboring town of Marj al-Sultan. Salafist opposition group Jaysh al-Islam, Jabhat al-Nusra, and other major Islamist, Damascus-based opposition groups in Eastern Ghouta subsequently formed a coordinative operations room in order to facilitate anti-regime operations near Marj al-Sultan. Jaysh al-Islam denied reports that regime forces gained full control of the airbase, and announced that newly-formed operations room regained positions in Marj al-Sultan previously lost to regime forces. (AFP, All4Syria, Zaman al-Wasl)

December 25, 2015: Alleged Russian airstrike killed top Salafist opposition commander in Damascus. An alleged Russian airstrike killed Salafist opposition group Jaysh al-Islam leader Zahran Alloush near Marj al-Sultan. The Jaysh al-Islam deputy commander Abu Mahmoud Zeibaq and the Jaysh al-Islam spokesperson Hamza Barqadr were also wounded along with numerous other unidentified Jaysh al-Islam commanders. (SOHRVideoFaylaq al-Sham StatementAll4Syria,  Zaman al-WaslAl-JazeeraWSJLWJ)

December 25, 2015: Syrian regime called for opposition surrender in Eastern Ghouta, Damascus. The regime dropped pamphlets in Eastern Ghouta calling on opposition forces to surrender amidst heavy regime shelling. (All4Syria)

Moadamiya
Regime demands surrender of Moadamiya in December after alleged chemical weapons attack.

December 22 - 23, 2015: Syrian regime conducted alleged chemical weapons attack in Damascus. Activists accused the regime of firing missiles containing an unidentified “toxic gas” into the opposition-held town of Moadamiyeh in the Western Ghouta suburbs of Damascus amidst an ongoing offensive in the area, killing at least ten individuals and injuring several dozen others. Local hospitals reported that victims suffered from bloody noses, vomiting, and convulsions amidst conflicting reports regarding whether the symptoms had been caused by sarin nerve gas or another unknown chemical agent. Moadamiyeh had previously been one of the targets of the August 2013 chemical weapons attacks in Damascus, likely due to its strategic location adjacent to the Mezzeh Military Airport. (APAll4SyriaSNNZaman al-WaslAFPLCCSOHR)

December 26, 2015: Syrian regime demanded surrender of Moadamiya after alleged Sarin gas attack. Pro-regime forces reportedly blocked the only entrance to the town of al-Moadamiya in Western Ghouta and demanded the surrender of opposition forces in the area. Abu al-Khair al-Attar, a member of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) negotiating committee in the town, reportedly rejected the demand. (Al-Jazeera)

Southern Damascus
A U.N. brokered deal delayed

December 24, 2015: U.N. brokered evacuation deal between regime and jihadists in Southern Damascus. The regime reportedly concluded U.N.-brokered negotiations with ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra for the withdrawal of all fighters and their families from three besieged areas in Southern Damascus: the Yarmouk refugee camp and the neighborhoods of Hajar al-Aswad and al-Qadam. In return, the regime would allow humanitarian aid into the areas. The ISIS fighters and their families reportedly could relocate to Homs Province, ar-Raqqa Province, and/or Bir al-Qasseb in the Southern Damascus countryside. Unconfirmed and conflicting reports indicated the Jabhat al-Nusra members would relocate to Idlib Province or to Mare’a, north of Aleppo City. 18 busses reportedly entered al-Qadam on December 24 to evacuate 2,000 jihadist fighters from the neighborhood. (BBC, SOHRAFP)

December 25, 2015: Damascus evacuation deal delayed following death of Zahran Alloush. The deal for the withdrawal of ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra members from Southern Damascus was delayed for “logistical reasons” following the death of Salafist opposition group Jaysh al-Islam’s commander, Zahran Alloush. The busses transporting the fighters needed to pass through terrain controlled by Jaysh al-Islam, according to Hezbollah media. It is unclear which side initiated the delay. (ReutersBBCWSJ)

Homs

Rastan & Telbisa
Pro-regime forces sustain pressure on rebel pocket in Rastan and Telbisa, north of Homs City. ISW assesses regime intent to neutralize the pocket, possibly through a ceasefire. 

October 31, 2015: Regime allegedly shelled Northern Homs with toxic gas. Regime forces reportedly attacked the opposition-held town of Telbisa, north of Homs City, with a toxic gas, according to local activists. Russian airstrikes regularly target this area, which is a target for pro-regime clearing operations. Pro-regime forces have thus far failed to advance. (All4SyriaZaman al-WaslSNN)

*Russia conducts airstrikes and rotary wing strikes in support of pro-regime forces on this front line. For more see ISW’s Russian Airstrikes in Syria maps, available at: iswresearch.blogpsot.com

Wa’er District
Ongoing evacuation from the last opposition-held area of Homs prompts spectacular attacks by al Qaeda and ISIS.

November 8, 2015: Jabhat al-Nusra Claimed Explosions in Homs City.  Jabhat al-Nusra claimed responsibility for detonating 2 VBIEDs and 1 motorcycle-borne IED in the Alawite-majority neighborhoods of Ekrima and Wadi al- Zahab in Homs City, wounding 15. Jabhat al-Nusra also claimed to have detonated a fourth IED on the pro-regime Ba'ath Party Security Committee's Headquarters in Homs City. (SOHRSOHRAll4SyriaSNNTwitter)

December 1, 2015: Opposition forces and regime forces finalized deal to evacuate last opposition-held district in Homs City: The governor of Homs City announced the finalization of a deal negotiating the evacuation of opposition fighters and their families from the besieged  Wa’er District in Northwestern Homs city. The agreement called for a two-month withdrawal of opposition forces from the area beginning on December 5, the submission of heavy and medium weapons to Syrian authorities, and the release of hostages on both sides. In return, the regime would lift the siege on the neighborhood and cease military operations against the area. Regime police would assume control of the Wa'er neighborhood following the withdrawal of opposition forces. (AFPAgenciesSNNAll4Syria) [Analyst note: The Wa'er neighborhood was the last opposition-held section of the city following the evacuation of opposition fighters from the Old City of Homs in May 2014 under terms similar to this deal.]

December 5, 2015: Humanitarian aid deliveries began in last opposition-held district of Homs City: Humanitarian assistance entered the Wa'er District as part of the U.N.-supervised deal to evacuate all remaining opposition fighters from the district. Homs Province governor Talal Barazi stated that up to 2,000 opposition fighters would depart Wa'er District in several stages over the next two months. An initial group of opposition fighters primarily-affiliated with ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra would reportedly depart for Idlib and Hama Provinces on December 8 followed by the evacuation of remaining opposition forces to northern Homs Province in batches. Regime officials in turn agreed to release detainees and end the regime-imposed siege of the district. (ReutersSyria DirectSOHRSOHRAll4SyriaAP, AFP[9])

December 9, 2015: Over 700 evacuated from last opposition-held district of Homs City. Approximately 750 individuals evacuated the Wa'er District of Homs City to opposition-held northwestern Syria as part of the U.N.-sponsored local ceasefire. The evacuees included roughly 300 opposition fighters including members of ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, along with their family members and other wounded civilians. The remaining opposition fighters would reportedly be allowed to keep their light weapons until the Syrian regime fulfilled other conditions, including the release of over 5,000 detainees from the Homs Central Prison. The spokesperson for U.N. Special Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura stated that the deal demonstrated that a proposed “nationwide ceasefire” in Syria could be viable. (NYTimesReutersSOHRSOHRSNNZaman al-WaslAll4Syria)

December 12, 2015: ISIS conducted VBIED and SVEST attack in Homs City. ISIS Wilayat Homs claimed a dual VBIED and SVEST attack against the Alawite-majority al-Zahraa neighborhood in Homs City, killing at least 16 people and wounding over 50. ISIS claimed the individual responsible for the attack parked the VBIED and detonated it remotely prior to detonating his own SVEST. Residents of the neighborhood reportedly held a mass demonstration following the incident demanding the resignation of the governor of Homs. (All4Syria, Statement, Reuters[10])

December 18, 2015: Jabhat al-Nusra claimed dual IED attack in Homs City.  Jabhat al-Nusra claimed a dual IED attack near the Alawite-majority neighborhood of Nizha in Homs City. JN vowed to conduct future attacks against regime-held areas in a statement claiming the attack. (Twitter, Twitter, Twitter, SOHR, All4Syria, SNN)

December 28, 2015: VBIED and SVEST targeted Alawite neighborhood in Homs City. ISIS claimed responsibility for a dual VBIED and SVEST attack in the Zahra neighborhood in Homs City, killing over 30 and wounding 90. (SOHR, SOHR, AP, SNN)



[1] For more see ISW’s report: Christopher Kozak, “An Army in All Corners,” Institute for the Study of War, April 2015. http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/An%20Army%20in%20All%20Corners%20by%20Chris%20Kozak%201.pdf.
[2] https://www(.)dailystar(.)com(.)lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Sep-20/315935-rivals-agree-to-new-truce-in-zabadani-idlib.ashx
[3] http://www(.)dailystar(.)com(.)lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Sep-21/316022-guns-fall-silent-in-zabadani-for-truce-talks.ashx
[4] http://www(.)dailystar(.)com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Sep-22/316220-hezbollah-syria-rebels-extend-truce-in-zabadani-idlib-towns-until-agreement-reached-al-manar.ashx
[5] https://www(.)dailystar(.)com(.)lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Sep-24/316543-hezbollah-syria-army-reach-deal-with-rebels-on-fate-of-zabadani-idlib-towns-sources.ashx
[6] http://www(.)dailystar(.)com(.)lb/News/Middle-East/2015/Oct-02/317424-un-forced-to-halt-planned-humanitarian-work-under-syria-ceasefire-deal.ashx
[7] https://www(.)dailystar(.)com(.)lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Oct-19/319333-humanitarian-aid-reaches-zabadani-kufreya-and-al-foua.ashx
[8] http://www(.)dailystar(.)com(.)lb/News/Middle-East/2015/Nov-18/323617-local-15-day-truce-between-rebels-govt-forces-near-damascus-expected-to-be-announced-within-hours.ashx
[9] http://www(.)dailystar(.)com(.)lb/News/Middle-East/2015/Dec-05/326105-aid-delivered-to-rebel-held-area-of-syrian-city-governor.ashx
[10] http://www(.)dailystar(.)com(.)lb/News/Middle-East/2015/Dec-12/327115-blast-in-syrias-homs-city-kills-8-wounds-dozens.ashx

The Military Situation in Syria’s Aleppo Province

December 30, 2015
By: Jennifer Cafarella, Genevieve Casagrande, and Jodi Brignola

Capturing Aleppo City remains a primary objective for both pro- and anti-regime military forces in Syria. While no key terrain in Aleppo changed hands in 2015, the aggregation of numerous pressures on rebel defensive lines could enable Syrian regime forces to finish the encirclement of Aleppo City in 2016. Pro-regime forces supported by Russian airstrikes have made important gains south of the city, but have failed to advance on key front lines to its north. Pro-regime forces have also advanced against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) east of the city, notably securing the besieged Kuweiris military airbase on November 10, but largely remain focused on Syrian rebels despite Russian propaganda to the contrary.

Russian and ISIS military actions against rebels in the northern Aleppo countryside are nevertheless compounding pressures that threaten to undermine the rebel defense of the city itself. Russia increased its aerial bombardment of rebel-held areas in Aleppo following the downing of a Russian jet by Turkey on November 24, and continues to target rebel supply lines and key infrastructure necessary to support the continued defense of Aleppo City. ISIS continues to attack rebel forces supported by Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) in an effort to seize control of the border town of Azaz and the adjacent Bab al-Salam border crossing. Frequent skirmishes between Syrian rebels and JN against the Syrian Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG) in northwestern Aleppo Province further draw resources away from crucial front lines. This delicate military balance is unlikely to hold under current conditions, which could enable either or both the Syrian regime and ISIS to advance.

The following maps depict regime gains facilitated by Russian airstrikes in Northern Syria and the combination of military pressures that threaten to overwhelm rebel defenses in Aleppo City. 

This map shows gains made by pro-regime forces on two key front lines since Russian airstrikes began: Southern Aleppo Province and Northeastern Latakia Province. The map also depicts one rebel advance north of Hama City. Gains by pro-regime forces in Damascus and Dera’a Provinces are not depicted here, but are similar in scale.

This map depicts the military objectives of the Syrian regime and ISIS, areas frequently targeted by Russian airstrikes, and the key towns and military infrastructure in Aleppo Province in order to show the aggregation of pressures on Syrian rebel forces in Aleppo. 
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) released its own map of Aleppo Province in an effort to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Russian air campaign in bolstering regime operations. The maps contain disinformation that exaggerates the progress made by pro-regime forces with Russian support. The map appears to claim that the regime secured its positions in the southeastern countryside of Aleppo with Russian air support, although these areas have been held by the regime since November 2013. Furthermore, regime control lines in Eastern Aleppo, as portrayed by the Russian map below, are notably exaggerated as the regime has yet to clear the entirety of the supply route running from Aleppo City to Kuweires Airbase. Although the pressures on the opposition have increased, it is important not to overstate the territorial gains that pro-regime forces have made. The regime and Russia seek to undermine rebel will to continue to fight in order to achieve greater leverage at upcoming negotiations between the regime and select opposition members in Geneva on January 25.

This map, released by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), exaggerates the gains made by pro-regime forces with Russian assistance in Aleppo Province. ISW added the yellow ovals and call out boxes to highlight the Russian overstatements. The other symbols and captions appeared on the MoD map. A zoomed out version of this map released by the Russian MoD map dates the interior control line as September 30, 2015, the start of the Russian aerial campaign in Syria. ISW reproduced the dates for the control lines on this map.

Tuesday, December 29, 2015

The Syrian Opposition’s Political Demands

By Genevieve Casagrande with Jennifer Cafarella

Key Takeaway: The ongoing Vienna process will likely fail to end the Syrian Civil War because it does not provide adequate incentives to Syria’s powerful armed opposition factions to lay down arms. The Vienna process relies on agreements made between international powerbrokers independent from the demands of both pro- and anti-regime Syrian factions. No single Syrian opposition group is able to speak for a majority of the Syrian armed opposition, and powerbrokers have the potential to spoil the Vienna process. This chart highlights the political demands made by the various elements of the Syrian opposition in order to show the kinds of endstates they seek, the frictions that will emerge should they or others negotiate within the Vienna framework, and the range of issues that effective negotiations must ultimately address.  

Read the full report here.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: December 18 - 27, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande

Russian airstrikes continue to weaken the position of the Syrian armed opposition ahead of negotiations between pro- and anti-regime forces scheduled for January 25. An alleged Russian airstrike in Eastern Ghouta on December 25 killed leading Salafist rebel commander Zahran Alloush, the commander of prominent Damascus-based group Jaysh al-Islam. Alloush’s death could result in further instability inside rebel-held areas of the capital, threatening the success of a local U.N.-brokered evacuation deal between rebels and the Syrian regime in Southern Damascus as well as the upcoming January 25 negotiations. Jaysh al-Islam was the largest armed opposition group to sign the Riyadh opposition conference outcome document on December 10 and it remains unclear if Jaysh al-Islam will retain its support of the document following Alloush’s death. Russian airstrikes also concentrated across rebel frontlines with ISIS in Northern Aleppo Province, compounding pressure on Aleppo-based rebel factions. The majority of strikes targeted rebel positions from December 22 - 27, although Russian warplanes conducted a limited number of airstrikes in support the regime’s anti-ISIS operations in Homs, Aleppo, and Deir ez-Zour Provinces. 

The Russian air campaign continues to target local populations within rebel-held terrain in order to weaken the resolve of the Syrian opposition amidst renewed efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement to the Syrian Civil War. Amnesty International accused Russia of deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure and killing over 200 civilians since the start of its air campaign, asserting that these incidents constitute “violations of international humanitarian law.” The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) subsequently denied the allegations.Local activist sources continued to report Russia’s targeting of civilian infrastructure in rebel-held terrain, accusing Russian warplanes of killing as many as 14 in strikes against hospitals in Azaz in the northern countryside of Aleppo on December 25. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. 

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible. 

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.




Monday, December 28, 2015

Iraqi Security Forces Clear Ramadi’s Government Center

by Patrick Martin

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) reportedly recaptured the government complex in central Ramadi on December 28 after clearing ISIS-held areas south of the complex on December 26 and 27. The ISF also reported that the 10th Iraqi Army Division and units attached to it recaptured the Ramadi Barrage in western Ramadi on December 26. ISW is thus changing the status of these areas to “Contested.” ISIS likely can no longer field a cohesive military defense in Ramadi and its main elements have likely retreated to the ISIS-held eastern suburbs of the city, such as the areas of al-Sufiyah and al-Sijariyah.

The ISF has not yet cleared Ramadi of ISIS, however. The ISF has not yet reported entering, contesting, or clearing certain structures such as the Justice Palace and the Grand Mosque, and ISW has therefore left some areas in downtown Ramadi marked as “ISIS controlled.”  The ISF likewise have not entered a number of neighborhoods in northern Ramadi, IEDs remain emplaced throughout the city, and there are possibly pockets of resistance from remaining ISIS fighters. Clearing operations are still required both in the city center and in Ramadi’s environs. The ISF continue to conduct clearing operations in areas north of the city center, while operations are still required to clear ISIS pockets from the areas between Ramadi and the Habaniya base, east of Ramadi. ISW therefore assesses that Ramadi remains contested, though with a heavy ISF presence that has the initiative and momentum.  Defense Secretary Ashton Carter’s congratulation to Iraq on recapturing the city, however, indicates that the full clearance of the city is within the ISF’s grasp.

Iraq’s Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared that the ISF’s next objective will be recapturing Mosul. It will be extremely difficult for the ISF to clear Mosul successfully in the near future, however. The Mosul counteroffensive requires large forces to succeed. It  also requires adjudication among the competing interests of the Iraqi government, the Peshmerga, Sunni politicians, and Iranian proxy groups, all of whom have interests in the composition of the forces that recapture Mosul. ISF deployment away from Ramadi in order to set conditions for Mosul operations would likely reduce the forces available to secure Ramadi and its environs, creating opportunities for ISIS. ISIS will continue launching attacks both on Ramadi and along the Euphrates River Valley, while also conducting spectacular and localized attacks along the Tigris River and in Diyala Province in order to divert the ISF’s resources and attention.







Wednesday, December 23, 2015

Control of Terrain in Syria: December 23, 2015

By: ISW Syria Team


The direct intervention of Russia into the Syrian Civil War has shifted battlefield momentum in favor of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since ISW published its last Control of Terrain in Syria Map in mid-September. Russia began its air campaign in Syria on September 30, enabling the regime to mount renewed offensives against opposition-held terrain throughout Western Syria. In Aleppo Province, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and associated proxy forces launched a multipronged offensive on October 15 that has seized large swaths of rebel-held terrain in the southern countryside of Aleppo City, threatening to sever the strategic M5 Highway. Meanwhile, pro-regime forces relieved the besieged Kuweires Airbase in Eastern Aleppo Province on November 10 in a key symbolic victory that positioned the regime to exploit future U.S.-led coalition operations against ISIS along the Syrian-Turkish border. The regime also achieved tactical gains against the opposition in Northeastern Latakia Province and parts of Northern Hama Province as well as the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus.

The regime nonetheless suffers from chronic shortages of manpower that render it unable to fully capitalize upon the expanded support provided by Russia and Iran. Rebel factions seized the town of Morek in Northern Hama Province on November 5, securing a strategic position directly north of Hama City. Regime forces have also struggled to repel repeated incursions by ISIS into Central Syria despite the presence of Russian airpower. ISIS temporarily severed the vulnerable regime ground line of communication to Aleppo City in October, disrupting ongoing operations in Southern Aleppo Province. ISIS also engaged in back-and-forth battles over the town of Mahin in the Eastern Qalamoun Mountains over the past two months, threatening to disrupt the M5 Highway between Damascus and Homs City. ISIS currently retains its position in Mahin despite the deployment of Russian helicopter gunships to the region.

Meanwhile, the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition continued to enable further gains against ISIS in Northeastern Syria. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – a U.S.-backed force composed primarily of Syrian Kurds – seized control over Al-Hawl along the Syrian-Iraqi border on November 13. The operation occurred on the same day as the seizure of Sinjar in Northern Iraq, restricting ISIS’s freedom of movement between Mosul and ar-Raqqa City. The SDF are currently advancing towards the key ISIS-held crossroads town of Shaddadi in Southern Hasaka Province. Initial mobilizations have also been reported for future operations to seize the ISIS-controlled Tishreen Dam along the Euphrates River as well as the northern outskirts of ar-Raqqa City.

ISW also modified this map in order to highlight a new zone of control for ISIS in Southwestern Dera’a Province reflecting new confidence in reports that Liwa Shuhada al-Yarmouk constitutes an unofficial ISIS affiliate in Southern Syria. ISW also instituted minor changes to the zones of control along the M20 Highway between Palmyra and Deir ez-Zour City after assessing that ISIS previously seized several regime checkpoints in the region. Finally, ISW adjusted the borders of the Afrin Canton in Northwestern Aleppo Province in order to more accurately depict the territory controlled by the Syrian Kurdish YPG and its allies.

Tuesday, December 22, 2015

Control Map of Ramadi: December 22, 2015

By Patrick Martin

The ISF began a major operation to penetrate central Ramadi on December 22, 2015. An element lead by the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) entered Ramadi from al-Humaira area south of Ramadi into the city’s southern neighborhoods. A separate CTS force entered from Ta’mim area southwest of Ramadi into al-Haouz neighborhood in southern Ramadi using a pontoon bridge, as all of Ramadi’s bridges have been heavily damaged. ISW has confirmed that formations from the 8th Iraqi Army (IA) Division, local police, and Anbar tribal fighters have also entered the city. ISW was not able to confirm or deny the participation of elements of the 16th IA Division, a formation that was trained and armed by the Coalition. At the time of publication, ISW confirmed the presence of the ISF in al-Haouz, al-Dhubbat, al-Bakir, and al-Aramil neighborhoods in southern Ramadi, with possible but unconfirmed operations in al-Malab and al-Andalus neighborhoods.

The ISF appear to have consolidated control over areas additional areas southwest of Ramadi, including the 8th Brigade Base (also known as Camp Warrar) west of Ramadi and the neighborhoods of 5 Kilo and Ta’mim, as these areas have witnessed no significant kinetic activity for weeks. ISW is changing the status of these areas to “ISF / Tribal Fighter control.” The operation to fully clear the city of ISIS still faces significant obstacles. ISIS’s manpower within the city is vastly diminished – Operation Inherent Resolve spokesperson Steve Warren estimated on December 22 that ISIS only had 250 to 350 fighters left in the city. Nevertheless, the ISF continue to encounter resistance in the form of IEDs, tunnel networks, and suicide bombings. At least one attacker with an SVEST or SVBIED attempted to target security forces in southern Ramadi on December 22 following previous SVBIED and direct fire attacks to the north on December 15 and east of Ramadi on December 16. The ISF are still in the process of clearing the northern areas of Juraishi, Albu Thiab, and Albu Faraj. Neighborhoods outside of central Ramadi to the north and south thus remain contested, though the ISF maintain a heavy presence.

Recapturing the city will be a major victory for the ISF and PM Abadi, but significant challenges lie ahead. For one, Ramadi will remain exposed to counter-attacks by ISIS, particularly from the north from ISIS-held Hit district, if the ISF shifts forces away from Ramadi to focus on other operations. Large sections of the city suffered heavy damage during the operation, and resettling internally-displaced persons (IDPs) may prove to be both a logistical and a security challenge. Finally, it is unclear who will ultimately hold and secure Ramadi against counter-attacks by ISIS. The ISF have stated that local tribal forces and local police would secure recaptured areas, but ISF formations will also be required to hold the area. It remains uncertain whether those formations are responsive to the Iraqi government or consist of forces loyal to Iranian proxy militias. Iranian proxy militias and the Federal Police, which have close ties with Iranian proxy militias, are positioned to the east of the city near Habaniya base. These forces may advance into Ramadi’s eastern suburbs and towards the city center in order to claim credit from the ISF for participation and obtain leverage over the final composition of the security forces in the city. Iranian proxy militias made a similar move in Tikrit in April 2015, positioning themselves around some of Tikrit’s entrances in order to control who could enter and exit the city. Intervention by Iranian proxy militias in Ramadi would undermine ISF operations and the overall security of the area by inflaming sectarian tensions.





Russian Airstrikes in Syria: December 13 - 21, 2015

By Christopher Kozak, Jodi Brignola, Genevieve Casagrande, and Jared Ferris

Key Takeaway: Russia continues to use its air campaign in Syria to bolster the position of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad despite an ongoing political process to end the Syrian Civil War. Russian warplanes concentrated airstrikes against rebel positions southwest of Aleppo City from December 18 to December 21, enabling pro-regime forces to seize the keytown of Khan Touman and several nearby villages on December 20. Russian airstrikes later shifted to target rebel forces along the strategic M5 Highway to Aleppo City in likely preparation for future offensive operations. Russia also continued to indiscriminately target rebel-held terrain throughout Northwestern Syria and Damascus in an effort to bolster ongoing regime offensives and weaken the resolve of the opposition. Russia conducted only a limited number of airstrikes against ISIS targets in Aleppo and Homs Provinces over the reporting period. 

Russia remains willing to conduct its air campaign in Syria without regard to civilian casualties or international law. Russian warplanes targeted residential neighborhoods in rebel-held Idlib City on December 20, killing or wounding over two hundred civilians. The heavy bombardment sparked renewed clashes near the besieged pro-regime enclaves of Fu’ah and Kefraya northeast of Idlib City, threatening to overturn a UN-sponsored local ceasefire that also includes the besieged rebel-held town of Zabadani near Damascus. Russia also targeted a relief organization and food distribution center in the besieged Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus on December 20, demonstrating calculated intent to target critical civilian infrastructure as a tactic of war. Meanwhile, Russia reportedly began dropping PFM-1 ‘Green Parrot’ cluster mines in Syria in a new demonstration of disregard for international norms. ‘Green Parrot’ mines generated high levels of child casualties during the Soviet War in Afghanistan due to their bright colors and harmless ‘toy-like’ appearance. Nonetheless, Russian President Vladimir Putin insisted that Russia could use even more of its military capabilities if necessary in order to achieve its goals in Syria. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike and cruise missile locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. 


High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.
Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.






Monday, December 21, 2015

Iraq Situation Report: December 15 - 21, 2015

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

ISIS launched spoiling attacks across Iraq to relieve pressure by anti-ISIS forces on multiple fronts. ISIS’s attacks follow operations by the Coalition and ISF and Iraq and the Coalition-backed National Democratic Forces in Syria to constrain ISIS on both fronts. In a recent press conference, Operation Inherent Resolve spokesperson Col. Steve Warren cited ongoing anti-ISIS operations in Baiji, Makhoul, and Sinjar in northern Iraq as well as Hit and Ramadi in western Iraq, combined with operations in Shaddadi and Deir ez-Zour in southern Syria. ISIS responded with attacks involving a significant offensive east of Mosul, which was reportedly the largest ground attack since ISIS recaptured Ramadi in May 2015. ISIS also attempted to set back ISF efforts to prepare an assault on Ramadi. ISIS additionally attempted diversionary and probing attacks near Tikrit, Samarra and Fallujah, in order to forestall any upcoming anti-ISIS operations elsewhere in Iraq and force anti-ISIS forces shift resources to re-secure targeted areas ISIS remains on the defensive but maintains attack capabilities across northern and western Iraq. Meanwhile, heavy pressure on PM Abadi from pro-Iranian elements forced PM Abadi to reject Coalition support for the Ramadi operation. However, the Operation Inherent Resolve spokesperson stated that PM Abadi approved of a small U.S. SOF force to cut ISIS’s supply lines between Iraq and Syria. PM Abadi’s ability to accept increased Coalition support suffered further when a Coalition airstrike accidentally hit an Iraqi Army unit near Fallujah on December 18, causing an uproar among pro-Iranian and Iranian proxy actors.