Russian Airstrikes in Syria: December 13 - 21, 2015

By Christopher Kozak, Jodi Brignola, Genevieve Casagrande, and Jared Ferris

Key Takeaway: Russia continues to use its air campaign in Syria to bolster the position of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad despite an ongoing political process to end the Syrian Civil War. Russian warplanes concentrated airstrikes against rebel positions southwest of Aleppo City from December 18 to December 21, enabling pro-regime forces to seize the keytown of Khan Touman and several nearby villages on December 20. Russian airstrikes later shifted to target rebel forces along the strategic M5 Highway to Aleppo City in likely preparation for future offensive operations. Russia also continued to indiscriminately target rebel-held terrain throughout Northwestern Syria and Damascus in an effort to bolster ongoing regime offensives and weaken the resolve of the opposition. Russia conducted only a limited number of airstrikes against ISIS targets in Aleppo and Homs Provinces over the reporting period. 

Russia remains willing to conduct its air campaign in Syria without regard to civilian casualties or international law. Russian warplanes targeted residential neighborhoods in rebel-held Idlib City on December 20, killing or wounding over two hundred civilians. The heavy bombardment sparked renewed clashes near the besieged pro-regime enclaves of Fu’ah and Kefraya northeast of Idlib City, threatening to overturn a UN-sponsored local ceasefire that also includes the besieged rebel-held town of Zabadani near Damascus. Russia also targeted a relief organization and food distribution center in the besieged Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus on December 20, demonstrating calculated intent to target critical civilian infrastructure as a tactic of war. Meanwhile, Russia reportedly began dropping PFM-1 ‘Green Parrot’ cluster mines in Syria in a new demonstration of disregard for international norms. ‘Green Parrot’ mines generated high levels of child casualties during the Soviet War in Afghanistan due to their bright colors and harmless ‘toy-like’ appearance. Nonetheless, Russian President Vladimir Putin insisted that Russia could use even more of its military capabilities if necessary in order to achieve its goals in Syria. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike and cruise missile locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. 

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.
Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Iraq Situation Report: December 15 - 21, 2015

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

ISIS launched spoiling attacks across Iraq to relieve pressure by anti-ISIS forces on multiple fronts. ISIS’s attacks follow operations by the Coalition and ISF and Iraq and the Coalition-backed National Democratic Forces in Syria to constrain ISIS on both fronts. In a recent press conference, Operation Inherent Resolve spokesperson Col. Steve Warren cited ongoing anti-ISIS operations in Baiji, Makhoul, and Sinjar in northern Iraq as well as Hit and Ramadi in western Iraq, combined with operations in Shaddadi and Deir ez-Zour in southern Syria. ISIS responded with attacks involving a significant offensive east of Mosul, which was reportedly the largest ground attack since ISIS recaptured Ramadi in May 2015. ISIS also attempted to set back ISF efforts to prepare an assault on Ramadi. ISIS additionally attempted diversionary and probing attacks near Tikrit, Samarra and Fallujah, in order to forestall any upcoming anti-ISIS operations elsewhere in Iraq and force anti-ISIS forces shift resources to re-secure targeted areas ISIS remains on the defensive but maintains attack capabilities across northern and western Iraq. Meanwhile, heavy pressure on PM Abadi from pro-Iranian elements forced PM Abadi to reject Coalition support for the Ramadi operation. However, the Operation Inherent Resolve spokesperson stated that PM Abadi approved of a small U.S. SOF force to cut ISIS’s supply lines between Iraq and Syria. PM Abadi’s ability to accept increased Coalition support suffered further when a Coalition airstrike accidentally hit an Iraqi Army unit near Fallujah on December 18, causing an uproar among pro-Iranian and Iranian proxy actors.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: December 7 - 17, 2015

 By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola

 

Key Takeaway: Russia continues to use disinformation to present its air campaign as a constructive force in Syria ahead of the next wave of talks on the Syrian conflict. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed to provide air support to elements of the Free Syrian Army in an effort to “unite” the various efforts of regime and “other groups” in Syria on December 15. Alleged recipients of Russian air support include the “Desert Lions” and “the Democratic Forces,” likely a reference to the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) currently operating in Aleppo and Hasaka Provinces. The Russian MoD claimed its first airstrikes in Hasaka Province on December 16. However, local reporting has not yet substantiated these claims and, thus, ISW does not assess them at even a level of Low Confidence at this time. Russian warplanes meanwhile continued to indiscriminately target rebel-held areas in northwestern Syria, which are home to both hardline and “moderate” FSA-affiliated rebel factions from December 13-17. The Russian air campaign continued its efforts to weaken the Syrian opposition as airstrikes concentrated along rebel front lines with the regime, ISIS, and Kurdish YPG forces in Damascus, Hama, Latakia, and Aleppo Provinces. Russian warplanes also continued to conduct a limited number of strikes against ISIS targets west of the Euphrates as regime forces continued to clear ISIS-held terrain near the Kuweires Airbase east of Aleppo City. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike and cruise missile locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible. 

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Iraq Situation Report: December 8 - 14, 2015

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: The ISF accomplished major gains in Ramadi amid reports of an imminent increase of U.S. support, recapturing key areas north and south of the city and began advancing into the city’s southeastern neighborhoods. ISIS’s destruction of four bridges around Ramadi may slow the ISF’s advance, though ISF operations in southern Ramadi continued towards the city center on December 14. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter signaled willingness to provide additional assistance, including attack helicopters and additional advisers, but PM Abadi has yet to accept the assistance. PM Abadi is likely hesitating because of longstanding pressure from Iranian proxies, who threatened the possibility of a vote of no confidence on December 2 if PM Abadi accepted any more U.S. assistance. Pro-Iranian Shi’a politicians and proxy militias are using the controversy over Turkish troops near Mosul as an additional tactic to pressure PM Abadi to accept no additional foreign assistance other than from Iran and Russia.

Russian Strikes in Syria: December 3-12, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jared Ferris

Russia and the Syrian regime faced significant setbacks in Syria this week as ISIS recaptured the towns of Maheen and Hawareen in the southeastern countryside of Homs on December 9. ISIS successfully repelled attempts by regime forces to recapture these towns on December 10, despite a large concentration of Russian airstrikes in the area. The regime previously seized Maheen and Hawareen on November 23 as components of a larger offensive to retake Palmyra further east in Homs Province. The seizure of Palmyra would represent a significant victory for both Syrian President Basar al-Assad and Russia as Russia continues to present itself and the Assad regime as effective anti-ISIS actors in Syria. Following these setbacks, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed ISIS’s influence in Syria is increasing and that the militant group controls around 70% of Syria. 

Russian airstrikes in Syria, however, continue to be concentrated in rebel-held terrain in Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama Provinces, targeting positions across rebel front lines with the regime, ISIS, and Kurdish YPG forces. Russian airstrikes continued to target locations along the key rebel ground line of communication (GLOC) from northern Aleppo City to the Turkish border, coinciding with a recent ISIS offensive to sever the GLOC. Rebel forces, however, successfully slowed ISIS’s advance and recaptured the town of al-Hamzat in northern Aleppo from ISIS on December 11, despite the concentration of Russian strikes in the area. Russian airstrikes also targeted rebel front lines near the Kurdish Afrin canton in northwestern Aleppo, a site of recent clashes between rebel and Kurdish YPG forces.

The Russian air campaign continues to provide the regime with asymmetric capabilities against the armed Syrian opposition. A report published by the Syrian Network for Human Rights on December 8 illustrated that Russia’s concentrated air campaign in northern Syria has enabled the regime to direct the majority of its barrel bomb operations towards rebel-held Damascus suburbs and other areas of southern Syria. The use of barrels bombs by the regime and Russia’s continued punishment of local Syrian populations in rebel-held territory, such as the targeting of hospitals, bakeries, and markets, will only further exacerbate the humanitarian situation in Syria and increase refugees flows into Turkey and Europe.  

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike and cruise missile locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible. 

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation. 

Afghanistan Threat Assessment: The Taliban and ISIS

By Jessica Lewis McFate, Rob Denaburg, and Caitlin Forest

 

This map partially depicts areas of Taliban control and support and ISIS presence across Afghanistan as of December 10, 2015 as well as the status of district centers that have been attacked by Taliban militants in 2015. Some support zones depicted on the map exceed the bounds of the districts explicitly researched as part of this project. These low-confidence support zone assessments are based upon historical, terrain, and demographic analysis. High-confidence support zones are depicted in districts that were fully researched as part of this project. ISW analysts have assessed conditions in 200 of 409 districts. Taliban militants captured the district center of Reg-e Khan Neshin district, Helmand province on December 9 after prolonged clashes with police and ANSF, the last district center capture portrayed on this map. Taliban militants loyal to Mullah Akhtar Mansour attacked the joint U.S.-Afghan Kandahar Airfield near Kandahar City on December 8. This attack is not represented on the map because it does not constitute an attempt by Taliban militants to control a district center. ISW will update this map as ground conditions change and as analysts continue to assess support zones.

 

 

Control Map of Ramadi: December 9, 2015

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) achieved major gains in Ramadi and recaptured key terrain in the city’s environs on December 8. The ISF spearheaded by the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) launched an operation on December 4 to recapture Ta’mim, an area composed of Ramadi’s southwestern neighborhoods which ISIS captured on June 27, 2014. As of December 8, the ISF claimed to have seized all of the neighborhoods in Ta’mim as well as several bridges leading into central Ramadi. Iraqi Army (IA) formations from the 8th and 16th Divisions have entered Ta’mim to secure it and the bridges alongside local tribal fighters, while the ISF have sent at least one Federal Police Emergency Battalion composed of former local police from Habaniya base, east of Ramadi, to Ta’mim to hold the area. If the ISF is able to fully clear and hold Ta’mim, it will have multiple access points into central Ramadi from the southwest. ISW is changing the status of Ta’mim and several of its bridges to “Contested with ISF / Tribal Fighters presence.” ISW is also upgrading the status of the Anbar University compound, where the CTS is headquartered near Ramadi, to “ISF control.”

The ISF also made symbolic gains on December 8 when an Anbar Operations Command (AOC) operation led by the 10th IA Division successfully cleared the AOC headquarters compound northwest of central Ramadi. The compound was captured by ISIS in May 2015 and overlooks the Warrar Dam, an important water infrastructure facility that controls water levels for the Euphrates River that doubles as a bridge into central Ramadi’s Warrar neighborhood. ISW is upgrading the status of the AOC HQ compound to “ISF control.” The ISF are still engaged in clearing operations in the northern neighborhoods of Albu Faraj, Albu Thiab, and Albu Aitha according to the AOC commander. These areas remain exposed to counterattacks by ISIS. 

The recapture of the Ta’mim area and the AOC HQ put the ISF in a position to begin preparations to recapture central Ramadi. The success of the Ramadi operation, which is led by the ISF and supported by the U.S-led Coalition, is critical for the Iraqi government and the ISF to exercise independence from Iranian influence. However, continued ISF success may lead to greater interference from Iranian proxy militias, some of which maintain a presence around the Habaniya base east of Ramadi but do not participate in Ramadi operations. Nujaba Movement, an Iranian proxy militia, claimed to have killed ISIS members during Ramadi operations, but there has been no indication of Nujaba Movement units are positioned near the front lines in Ramadi. Proxy militias will likely release similar disinformation in the future to discredit the ISF. PM Abadi is facing immense pressure from Iranian proxies to reject foreign support, particularly from the Coalition, in the wake of a unilateral deployment of Turkish troops to the outskirts of Mosul on December 4. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter’s December 9 proposal to deploy attack helicopters and “accompanying advisers” to assist the IA in recapturing Ramadi could offset this pressure by showing strong support for the ISF. U.S. support will also expedite the swift recapture of the city, underscoring the importance and effectiveness of the U.S. in the anti-ISIS fight.

ISIS's Regional Campaign: November 2015

By Harleen Gambhir

 

ISIS achieved significant successes in its global strategy to expand its caliphate in the Near Abroad and defeat the West in November 2015. ISIS’s directed and inspired attacks in Paris and San Bernardino demonstrated the organization’s reach in the Far Abroad. These attacks also stoked cultural polarization, another of ISIS's goals, as reflected in growing debates on refugee admission in the U.S and Europe. Meanwhile ISIS continued to expand the geographic boundaries of its Near Abroad campaign. ISIS likely plans to establish new regional affiliates in Bangladesh, Tunisia, and eventually Somalia due to its rhetorical emphasis on recruitment and attacks in those locations. ISIS will likely use its affiliates to launch additional attacks on the West. Destroying the threat posed by ISIS will become more difficult as the organization gains strategic resiliency through its regional affiliate and global radicalization campaigns.

 

 

 Read this update online

 

 

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: November 30 - December 6, 2015

 By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola

Key Takeaway: Russia resumed its air campaign in Southern Syria in support of regime ground operations against the FSA-affiliated Southern Front from December 3-6. Russia’s renewed effort follows a December 3 declaration by FSA-affiliated Southern Front factions, including tribal fighters who claim to receive funding from Jordan, of a new offensive to seize the regime-held Judayyah artillery battalion in the northwestern countryside of Dera’a province. Russian airstrikes targeted areas along the nearby frontline surrounding the battalion, an area primarily held by Southern Front-affiliated factions. The shift comes just two weeks after Russian President Vladimir Putin vowed to avoid hitting “healthy,” non-terrorist rebel groups in Syria and to focus air operations against ISIS. While talks between members of the Syrian opposition and the Syrian regime are tentatively scheduled for January 1, 2016, Russia’s continued aggression makes the prospects of a mutually agreeable political transition unlikely.

The Syrian Foreign Ministry accused the U.S.-led coalition of conducting an airstrike against a regime military position in the town of Ayyash in Deir ez-Zour province on December 6 killing four Syrian Arab Army (SAA) soldiers and wounding thirteen others. The ministry sent a letter to the U.N. Security Council in protest of “flagrant aggression by the U.S.-led coalition forces.” Operation Inherent Resolve Spokesman Colonel Steve Warren denied that the Coalition carried out the attack, stressing that the nearest coalition strikes targeted an ISIS-held oil field 35 miles away from the incident. Anonymous Pentagon officials stated that radar data indicated that the bombing had been a 'friendly fire' incident committed by a Russian bomber. Local sources have previously reported on alleged Russian strikes against regime positions along frontlines in both Homs and Latakia Provinces. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike and cruise missile locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible. 

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation. 

Iraq Situation Report: December 3 - 7, 2015

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: Turkey deployed “hundreds” of troops with armored vehicles northeast of Mosul on December 4, drawing outrage from the Iraqi government and Shi’a political parties. Turkey deployed forces near Mosul in a KDP-controlled area likely to ensure its immediate influence over anti-ISIS operations and thereby its long term influence within Mosul. The Turkish deployment coincided with high tension in Baghdad over the planned deployment of up to 200 U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to Iraq, announced on December 1, intended to target ISIS leaders directly. PM Abadi is facing intense pressure from other Shi’a political parties and Iranian-backed militias on account of both deployments. Some Shi’a parties asserted that the CoR, not the Prime Minister should approve foreign deployments. The Badr Organization raised the possibility of a no-confidence vote in PM Abadi. These measures will restrict PM Abadi’s ability to engage the U.S.-led coalition, the intended effect of Iranian-led forces in Iraq that seek to align Iraq with the Russian-Iranian coalition. Meanwhile, ISIS deployed mobile defenses against the ISF in Ramadi’s environs, demonstrating the continued ability to conduct attacks in the area despite recent gains by the ISF. A decisive ISF-led operation to clear Ramadi is essential for PM Abadi to exercise independence from Iran. ISIS’s resilience in Iraq remains a major obstacle.

Turkey Unilaterally Deploys a Battalion near Mosul

By Patrick Martin

Key Take-Away: Turkey deployed an armored battalion northeast of Mosul, ostensibly as part of a training mission for Kurdish Peshmerga and a local anti-ISIS militia. Turkey’s forces bolster Masoud Barzani and his Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), a primary rival to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) active in Syria, Turkey, and parts of Iraq. Turkey will also maintain influence over any future operation to recapture Mosul and Ninewa from ISIS. Turkish military forces have been present in northern Iraq since 1997, but the size and composition of the new force, reports that Barzani has granted the Turks a permanent base outside of Mosul, and the expected deployment of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to Iraq have made Iraqi politicians extremely sensitive to the arrival of any foreign forces. The deployment has sparked a rhetorical backlash from Iraqi politicians that will likely outweigh any impact the Turkish force will have on the battlefield. The Turkish deployment will generate greater resistance from Shi’a political parties against the involvement of any foreign military force in Iraq and will make it even harder for Iraq’s Prime Minister Abadi to publicly support any additional Coalition deployment, such as the U.S. Special Operations forces that Defense Secretary Ashton Carter announced on December 1. The Iranian-backed militias have already threatened the Abadi government with a no-confidence vote if he accepts U.S. forces. 

Turkey increased its influence over future developments in northern Iraq by deploying an armored battalion on December 4 to a camp in Mount Bashiqa, less than ten miles northeast of Mosul in Ninewa Province. Video footage showed Turkish forces transporting armored vehicles “towards Mosul.” Turkey’s announced that the force will replace a force that had been present at Mount Bashiqa in order to train Kurdish Peshmerga. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu denied that Turkey had any intention of seizing territory and asserted that Turkey would assist its “Iraqi brothers” in fighting both ISIS and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Kurdish terrorist group that has waged an on-and-off insurgency against the Turkish state since 1984. Turkey may nonetheless seek to establish a permanent military base in Bashiqa, according to Turkish media. The deployment grants Turkey continued leverage to ensure that pro-Turkish elements ultimately control Mosul and its environs following any operation to recapture the city from ISIS. 

The deployment of Turkish troops is not in itself a new development but rather is part of a longtime effort to secure Turkish influence in northern Iraq. Turkey has maintained a military presence in Dohuk Province along the Turkish border since 1997 as part of an agreement signed with Saddam Hussein in 1995 to monitor the outlawed PKK and prevent it from crossing into Turkey. This force remained in place throughout the U.S. occupation without any objections from former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The Turkish trainers in Bashiqa had been present in Iraq for “more than two years,” according to Turkish army sources, but the new force is likely larger than its predecessor, consisting of “hundreds” of Turkish troops and up to 30 tanks and armored vehicles. Turkey has also launched periodic ground and air assaults against PKK targets in northern Iraq, including major incursions in October 2011 and in September 2015. These cross-border raids involve hundreds of ground troops and airstrikes against PKK targets as far east as the Qandil Mountains on the Iran-Iraq border, where the PKK maintains its headquarters. 

The recent deployment into northern Iraq differs from past deployments in three ways. First, Turkey does not appear to have undertaken the action in order to contain the PKK directly, as there is no significant PKK activity in or around Bashiqa. The base is also located too far from other priority territory for the PKK, including Sinjar west of Mosul, to be used as an effective staging point for future operations against the PKK. Second, the Turkish battalion, deployed to an area within the Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) – areas that have substantial Kurdish populations but remain outside of Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey likely intends to support Barzani and the KDP in securing control over the DIBs while also positioning its own forces to better influence what forces participate in the future operation to recapture Mosul, formerly an ethnically diverse city including Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen. Third, the Turkish deployment came only four days after Defense Secretary Ashton Carter announced that additional U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) would deploy to Iraq to conduct raids and intelligence-gathering in Iraq and Syria, an announcement that generated denunciations from the Shi’a political parties and threats of no-confidence votes against the Prime Minister, forcing PM Abadi to reject publicly the presence of foreign ground troops in Iraq. The Turkish troops thus deployed at a particularly sensitive time. 

Turkey also maintains close connections with key players in northern Iraq. Turkey has cooperated with Kurdistan Regional President Masoud Barzani since 2013, particularly over crude oil exports through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. Barzani and Turkey share a mutual distrust of the PKK, and the KDP currently competes with the PKK for control over Sinjar district. Turkey also possesses close relations with former Ninewa Province governor Atheel al-Nujaifi, who maintains a camp of former local police and Arab fighters in Bashiqa called the “National Mobilization.” Turkish support was essential for Atheel al-Nujaifi’s elevation to the Ninewa governorship in 2009. Finally, Turkey has close relations Osama al-Nujaifi, Atheel’s brother and the leader of the Sunni Etihad bloc in the Council of Representatives (CoR). Turkey will likely leverage these connections in order to secure greater control over what armed and political actors participate in operations to recapture Mosul. In particular, Turkey will likely support the Nujaifis over Sunni Arabs with whom Turkey has not cultivated relations.

Turkey’s deployment of troops sparked strong rejection from the full spectrum of Iraqi political actors. Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi and Iraqi President Fuad Masoum strongly condemned the deployment as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty and demanded that Turkey conduct an immediate withdrawal. All major Shi’a parties denounced the deployment as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty, with a leading Sadrist official calling for Iraqi airstrikes on the Turkish force if it did not depart the country. Another pro-Maliki CoR member suggesting that “a Russian force” could intervene to expel the Turkish battalion. The KDP’s primary political rival, Gorran, rejected the Turkish deployment as a violation of international law, though Gorran’s position more likely stems from its feud with Barzani over control of the KRG than any real concern for Iraqi sovereignty. A leading member of Sunni Etihad, Muhammad al-Karbouli, also rejected the Turkish deployment that came without an agreement with the Iraqi government. Etihad’s statement was nonetheless less vehement than any Shi’a political party’s rejection, and Karbouli also took the opportunity to denounce the corrosive effect of “outlaw militias” – referring to Iranian-backed proxy militias – on the ability of Iraq to resist foreign pressure.

Turkey remains unlikely to withdraw its forces from northern Iraq in the near-term, given the current lack of leverage its opponents currently possess to reverse its decision. Neither the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) nor the Iranian proxy militias realistically possess the ability to expel the Turkish force from Bashiqa. Both forces lack a meaningful presence in the region as well as the freedom of movement to deploy near Mosul. The Iraqi government thus remains limited to rhetorical condemnations and appeals to the U.S. to force a Turkish withdrawal. The U.S. will not likely press Turkey on the issue, as anonymous U.S. defense sources merely indicated that the U.S. was "aware" of Turkey’s intentions. Iranian proxy militias, however, could challenge Turkey elsewhere in the country. Iran likely ordered Iranian proxy militias to kidnap 18 Turkish construction workers on September 2 in order to pressure Turkey into ordering Turkish-backed rebels to cooperate with a ceasefire around the besieged Shi’a majority towns of Fu’ah and Kifriya in northern Syria. The kidnappings provided sufficient leverage against Turkey and the kidnapped workers were released after Syrian rebels enacted a local ceasefire. Iran could pursue similar actions against Turkish assets in Baghdad or in southern Iraq.

This situation may escalate further if Iran views the deployment as threatening its vital strategic objectives in Iraq or Syria. Iran rejects any foreign forces other than their own on Iraqi soil and backs the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Barzani’s rival in Iraqi Kurdish politics trying to contest his control over the Kurdistan regional presidency. Iranian proxies also recently sparred violently with the Peshmerga in Tuz Khurmato in eastern Salah al-Din proxies on November 12. Iran has also angered Turkey by repeating false Russian rhetoric that Turkey purchases oil from ISIS, part of a disinformation campaign that followed Turkey’s downing of a Russian plane over Turkish airspace on November 24, while Turkey and Iran remain in a proxy contest over control of Aleppo in Syria. Should Iran decide to resist Turkey’s escalation in ways that the Prime Minister will not or cannot, the Prime Minister Abadi may face a vote of no-confidence, which the Iranian-backed militias have already threatened.

Shi’a parties will use the episode to pressure PM Abadi to strongly reject foreign intervention, particularly if reports that Turkey and Barzani signed an agreement to establish a permanent Turkish base in Bashiqa are correct. These calls could complicate U.S. plans to additional Special Operations Forces (SOF) to Iraq to as a “specialized expeditionary targeting force” that will conduct raids and intelligence-gathering in Iraq and Syria. The timing of the Turkish deployment will make it even harder for PM Abadi to approve of the U.S. SOF deployment announced on December 1. PM Abadi could also face further pressure to accept Russian assistance, an outcome that has become popular among Iranian proxies and the Sadrist Trend since Russia began launching airstrikes in Syria on September 30. Russian airstrikes would run counter to U.S. regional interests and interfere with the Coalition’s ability to conduct its own airstrikes as well as advise and assist operations in Iraq.

San Bernardino Shooting a Terrorist Attack with al-Qaeda and ISIS Footprints

By Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, Katherine Zimmerman, Harleen Gambhir, with the CTP and ISW Teams

Key Take-away: The San Bernardino shooting of December 2, 2015 was a terrorist attack conducted by perpetrators inspired by the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and possibly linked with and inspired by al Qaeda. The attack displays some of the sophistication and signatures of past al Qaeda attacks. Drawing a sharp dividing line between al Qaeda and ISIS threat groups when it comes to attacks on the homeland is difficult despite differences between them in the Middle East. The U.S. must expect that both groups will devote even greater resources to encouraging and supporting such attacks here and in Europe now that their feasibility has been demonstrated in both regions. American and Western efforts against al Qaeda and ISIS globally are failing and require fundamental reassessment. 

                                                        

View this timeline online here.

Individuals inspired by the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and with links to al Qaeda conducted the terrorist attack in San Bernardino on December 2. This attack was the first al Qaeda- or ISIS-related in the U.S. by a skilled shooter team using both guns and explosives, a technique that both groups used in the attacks in Mumbai of November 2008; on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya in September 2013; on the Paris offices of Charlie Hebdo in January 2015; and on several targets in Paris on November 13, 2015. It marks a step-change in the threat that both al Qaeda and ISIS pose to the security of the American homeland.

Key facts that crystallized ISW and CTP’s original assessment of a link to al Qaeda or ISIS include reports that Tashfeen Malik had pledged allegiance to ISIS; the preparations for and character of the attack itself; the travel patterns of her husband and co-perpetrator Syed Rizwan Farook; and reports of contacts with individuals associated with al Qaeda affiliates al Shabaab and Jabhat al Nusra. It is not yet clear whether Farook or Malik was the primary instigator, nor whether any al Qaeda group or ISIS specifically instructed them to conduct the attack.  There are as yet no indications that this attack was part of a larger plot or prepared campaign within the United States.

The nature of the attack itself heightens concern about the ability of very small cells of terrorist-linked individuals to cause mass casualty events without the kind of footprint that would raise obvious red flags for law enforcement or the intelligence community. The acquisition of multiple weapons and large amounts of ammunition is not, by itself, indicative of any particular skill or terrorist intent. Setting aside the political debate about the ready availability of guns and ammunition in America today, it is important to note that the couple also had bomb-making know-how, the ability to acquire the necessary materials without detection and to assemble multiple such devices, and the theoretical knowledge of how to build remote-control detonators to operate on a number of explosives chained together. Their technical skills were, fortunately, insufficient to make the remote-control detonator function, a fact that no doubt saved many lives.

Coordinating the acquisition of all of these materials without detection, the assembling of explosive devices, coupled with some minimal training to enable team members to quickly collect their gear, move to the target, place the explosives, fire many rounds without hitting each other, move back to their vehicle, and drive off are marks of an advanced capability. Both al Qaeda and ISIS have developed and perfected these techniques and have been making them available to suitable individuals and groups in order to conduct attacks like those in Paris and San Bernardino. The U.S. must expect that these groups will devote even greater resources to encouraging and supporting such attacks here and in Europe now that their feasibility has been demonstrated in both regions.

This attack seems likely to be the result of cultivation, inspiration, and possibly planning initially begun by al Qaeda-affiliated groups or individuals, and then either coopted by or simply dedicated to ISIS. Farook’s travels and itinerary suggest that the start of his radicalization may have predated the re-emergence of ISIS as a major player in June 2014. His connections, as noted in the graphic, ran to al Qaeda affiliates al Shabaab and Jabhat al Nusra rather than to ISIS. Yet Malik pledged to ISIS before or during the attack, and ISIS followers have been cheering the attack and calling them both “lions of the caliphate.” It is nevertheless an interesting coincidence that the attack followed by a day the release of a statement by al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri calling for precisely such attacks against the West.

The confusion about the links between these two individuals and al Qaeda and ISIS may clear up as more information emerges, but one thing is already clear—it would be a mistake for Americans to imagine that we can draw a sharp dividing line between al Qaeda and ISIS threat groups when it comes to attacks on our homeland.  Americans must also recognize that these groups can now conduct more sophisticated and deadly attacks than the single-shooter attack at Fort Hood in 2009.

It is far too soon to articulate appropriate responses to this particular attack. Sober assessments of the performance of the U.S. intelligence community and federal and local law enforcement will reveal whether there were any failures and what can be done to improve the likelihood of detecting and disrupting such attacks in the future.  The attack strongly suggests, however, that American and Western efforts against al Qaeda and ISIS globally are not succeeding and must be fundamentally re-assessed.  

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: November 25 - December 2, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola

Key Takeaway: Russian air operations in Syria continue to pursue the preservation of the Assad regime. Spokesman for Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve Colonel Steve Warren commented on Russia’s most recent statements regarding its operations in Syria, stating that “Everything they are doing is to support Assad, to keep Assad in power… Every time the Russians conduct an operation that extends or helps extend Assad's hold on power is yet another day that Syrian civilians will suffer under the boot of Bashar al-Assad.”

Russian airstrikes largely targeted rebel-held terrain in Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama Provinces from November 30 to December 2. Russian warplanes concentrated in the northern Aleppo countryside, primarily striking targets along a key rebel-held ground line of communication (GLOC) necessary for the delivery of Turkish support into Aleppo City. This rebel supply line remains highly vulnerable as ISIS continues to advance in the area, capitalizing on the intensity of the Russian strikes. ISIS seized at least four villages east of the strategic border town of Azaz on December 2, bringing ISIS within six miles of the supply route. Meanwhile, regime forces supported by Iranian-backed proxy forces and Russian airstrikes continue to fix Syrian opposition fighters south of Aleppo City, likely hindering large-scale reinforcements from bolstering the northern rebel frontline against ISIS. The Syrian regime and ISIS have historically leveraged each other’s offensives in order to advance against rebel forces in the north of Aleppo City. Russian airstrikes, regime ground operations, and the most recent ISIS offensive threaten to incur major losses for rebel forces in Aleppo.

Russian airstrikes continue to punish local Syrian populations through the targeting of key civilian infrastructure in rebel-held territory. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) released a video claiming to strike an “oil storage” facility on December 2. However, analysis by investigative journalists confirmed that the strike had in fact hit a water treatment facility located in eastern Aleppo. The strike reportedly produced significant damage to the facility and more than 1.4 million people in rural Aleppo suffered interruptions in their water supply as a result. Further analysis of Russian MoD strike footage as well as local activists reporting revealed that Russian airstrikes also targeted grain silos in the countryside of Idlib and Aleppo.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike and cruise missile locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible. 

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation. 

ISIS in Afghanistan: December 3, 2015

By Harleen Gambhir

 

The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)’s affiliate in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region is effective, operational, and positioned to expand. The affiliate, Wilayat Khorasan, controls populated areas in Afghanistan’s eastern Nangarhar Province and has launched attacks on Jalalabad and Kabul.  Afghanistan’s security is deteriorating and will likely worsen. Taliban infighting has intensified after the official announcement in July 2015 that Mullah Omar, the movement’s founder, had died several years ago. These violent conditions will likely facilitate Wilayat Khorasan’s recruitment, attacks, and territorial expansion. Afghanistan’s precarious unity government has not maintained effective security as international forces have drawn down. Wilayat Khorasan’s growth gives ISIS additional strategic resiliency outside of Iraq and Syria and will intensify the global competition between ISIS and al-Qaeda (AQ), which is also present in the area. The United States and its NATO allies must respond more aggressively to this threat. 

 

 Read this update online here.

 

 

 



Control Map of Ramadi: December 3, 2015

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) recaptured the Palestine Bridge that spans the Euphrates River northwest of Ramadi on November 25. Operation Inherent Resolve spokesperson Col. Steve Warren highlighted the Palestine Bridge as critical for cutting the water supply route to Ramadi on November 5. With the capture of the bridge, ISF have made progress in encircling Ramadi, but they are not yet in a position to launch an operation to recapture the city center. The U.S.-led anti-ISIS Coalition has significantly increased the number of airstrikes targeting ISIS in and around Ramadi over the past two weeks, but operations to recapture the city, which have been underway since ISIS captured the city on May 18, continue to achieve slow progress. The recapture of Ramadi remains critical for the ISF and PM Haidar al-Abadi in order to maintain independence from Iranian proxy militias. Heavy Coalition support for the ISF offensive will be essential in order to both recapture urban terrain from ISIS as well as to demonstrate support for the ISF and for PM Abadi as he faces immense pressure from Iranian proxies to reject Coalition assistance.

Iraq Situation Report: November 20 - December 2, 2015

by Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

The U.S. intensified its activities in Iraq and Syria by deploying additional Special Forces to Iraq. The deployment of reportedly up to 200 Special Operations Forces (SOF) with authority to engage in raids in both Iraq and across the border in Syria follows an intensification in U.S. activity under advise and assist in support of the Peshmerga in Iraq, including U.S. SOF accompanying Kurdish Special Forces on a raid on an ISIS prison near Hawija in Kirkuk province on October 22 and U.S. advisers assisting Kurdish forces recapture Sinjar, west of Mosul, from ISIS on November 12 and 13. The modest increase in U.S. activity comes as the ISF lay the groundwork for an eventual assault on Ramadi city. ISF recaptured the Palestine Bridge northwest of Ramadi, cutting off ISIS’s supply routes over the Euphrates River amid an increase in Coalition airstrikes. ISF also secured areas near major bridges and called on civilians to flee the city. These moves indicate that the Iraqi government is still intent on recapturing Ramadi and is resisting pressure from Iranian proxy actors to delay such operations. PM Abadi is under significant pressure from Iranian proxy militias on several fronts, including amending the 2016 federal budget in order to increase the budget allocations to the “Popular Mobilization.” However, the ISF has thus far prevented proxy militias from participating in the Ramadi operation. Meanwhile, Iranian proxy militias have deployed significant assets to Aleppo in Syria, and Iranian proxy operations in Iraq have slowed following the recapture of Baiji on October 23, indicating a shift in Iranian priorities.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: November 11 - 29, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola

Russia shifted its airstrikes in Syria to concentrate along the Turkish border following the downing of a Russian jet by Turkish warplanes on November 24 in an effort to reassert its freedom of action inside Syria. Russian airstrikes focused on the rebel-held Bab al-Hawa and Bab al-Salam border crossings as well as the ISIS-held Jarablus border crossing from November 25 - 29. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the arrival of its advanced S-400 long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system at the Bassel al-Assad International Airport in Latakia on November 26 in an effort to deter Turkey from conducting future attacks on Russian warplanes. Additionally, the Russian MoD announced that Russian Su-34 bombers are newly equipped with air-to-air missiles “for providing security of the aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces.” Russo-Turkish relations have deteriorated considerably since the incident as Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev approved an official list of economic sanctions against Turkey on December 1. Turkish officials maintain that Turkey will not offer an apology, asserting that the Turkish Armed Forces took “defensive action” and responded appropriately to the unwarranted Russian airspace violations. Both Russian and Syrian presidents have openly accused Turkey of supporting terrorism in Syria in the wake of the incident. Russian President Vladimir Putin went as far as accusing Turkey of downing the Russian warplane in order to “defend its supplies” of oil from ISIS-held territory in Syria.

The Russian air campaign in Syria otherwise continues to prioritize the preservation of the Assad regime. Russian strikes engaged several civilian targets from November 25 to November 29, emulating the regime’s use of its air power to punish civilian populations. Russia’s strikes along the Turkish border notably struck civilian targets, accomplishing multiple Russian objectives. Russian warplanes conducted at least six rounds of airstrikes targeting convoys of humanitarian aid trucks entering Syria from Turkey in the border town of Azaz in northern Aleppo Province on November 25 and another convoy in the vicinity of the Bab al-Hawa border crossing in northern Idlib on November 28. Local sources claimed that Russian airstrikes also targeted a bakery in Idlib province on November 29, which was reportedly responsible for the distribution of bread to over 45,000 IDPs.

Russia continues to present itself as a decisive actor against ISIS to the international community despite the relative low number of Russian airstrikes targeting ISIS in Syria. Russian airstrikes targeted ISIS-held oil infrastructure in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zour in addition to targeting core ISIS terrain in the northern Aleppo countryside and eastern Homs. Putin asserted that Russia remains “ready to cooperate” with the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition on intelligence-sharing measures and other battlefield cooperation in Syria. Putin stated that France and Russia agreed upon bilateral measures to coordinate battlefield activities and share intelligence regarding legitimate targets for airstrikes in Syria following a meeting with French President Francois Hollande on November 26. Putin reportedly requested a map of “forces that are not terrorists and fighting ISIS” during the meeting and pledged to avoid targeting these groups. Such a map would enable Russia to better target the Syrian opposition to the ultimate benefit of the Assad regime. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.