Russian Airstrikes in Syria: April 19 - May 12, 2016

By Genevieve Casagrande

Pro-regime forces supported by Russian airpower are continuing operations to encircle and besiege the Syrian opposition in Aleppo City following the expiration of a series of temporary ceasefires on May 12. Russian air operations in Aleppo from April 19 – May 12 demonstrate Russia’s continued prioritization of support to its client regime in Damascus. Russia has nonetheless continued to present itself as a constructive international arbiter to the Syrian conflict through a series of Russian- and U.S.-brokered partial ceasefire deals from May 4 – 11. Russia maintains a robust military presence in Syria and has continued its military campaign, following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of a partial withdrawal on March 14 and subsequent reports of continued Russian drawdown. Russia has rather begun to reshape its military deployment in Syria, withdrawing certain airframes from the Bassel al Assad airbase while deploying additional rotary wing aircraft, developing new basing near Palmyra, and maintaining “several thousand” Russian ground forces in the country. “Dozens” of Russia’s fixed wing aircraft reportedly remain at its airbase in Latakia and continue air operations against both the armed opposition and ISIS across Syria.

Russian air operations seek to preserve strategic regime-held terrain and Russia’s military basing in Syria. Russian airstrikes escalated against ISIS’s positions throughout Syria to include areas in Homs, Deir ez-Zour, and Raqqa, following ISIS’s resumption of large-scale operations against pro-regime forces in central Homs on May 3. These operations have been primarily focused on seizing strategic gas fields that serve as the regime’s primary source of natural gas for areas in western Syria. ISIS seized the Sha’er Gas Field from pro-regime forces on May 5 and subsequently severed the primary regime ground line of communication (GLOC) between Homs City and Palmyra on May 10, inhibiting the ability of pro-regime forces to redeploy to critical frontlines with ISIS in the area. Russian airstrikes responded to this threat, targeting ISIS’s positions in the Sha’er Gas Field and the nearby Mahr Gas Field. ISIS’s operations also pose a threat to Russian’s own military contingent in central Homs, which includes its newest military base near Palmyra as well as its reported rotary wing deployment in the regime’s T4 and Shayrat airbases. Western journalists brought to Palmyra by Russia as well as local activists reported that Russia established a new military base in Palmyra, following the regime’s recapture of the ancient city on March 27. The base reportedly facilitates Russian demining operations and is guarded by air defense systems and armored vehicles. Russian advisors are likely deployed near active frontlines, as indicated by the death of a Russian soldier in Homs Province on May 11 in addition to ISIS’s claims to kill at least five Russian Spetnaz personnel during regime operations to seize Palmyra in late March.

Russia is using the series of strained and intermittent ceasefires in Aleppo to reset its operations against opposition forces in the area. Russian air operations have continued in Aleppo, which was once the primary focus of Russia’s air campaign, albeit at decreased and sporadic rates. The Syrian regime has in turn barraged Aleppo with intense airstrikes beginning on April 22, making Russian airstrikes in the area difficult to discern. Regime and Russian strikes in Aleppo from April 22 – 30 killed and injured over 145, including a strike on a Doctors Without Borders hospital that killed over 60. ISW was not able to assess any Russian strikes with low confidence in Aleppo from April 30 – May 4, but airstrikes resumed targeting the Syrian opposition in the city on May 5. Russia has also reportedly begun to deploy additional assets to Aleppo, including ground forces to the Efrin Canton in northwestern Aleppo to support the Syrian Kurdish YPG and artillery units north of Aleppo City. The opposition meanwhile launched major operations against regime forces south of Aleppo City, securing the town of Al Eis on April 1 as well as Khan Touman on May 5 - 6. Delayed and limited Russian airpower was unable to reverse gains made during the opposition’s offensive against the town of Khan Touman south of Aleppo led by al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al Nusra and Salafi-Jihadist group Ahrar al Sham. The offensive was timed alongside a Russian-organized concert in the ancient ruins of Palmyra, which required a significant number of Russian attack helicopters and armored vehicles to secure the guests in attendance. Iranian forces, without the support of major Russian airstrikes, suffered heavy losses in the Khan Touman offensive. Pro-regime forces, however, resumed operations to encircle opposition forces in Aleppo City through its northern industrial outskirts on May 12 as the as the temporary 48-hour ceasefire expired. Opposition forces reportedly prevented pro-regime advances in the area despite Russian airstrikes. 

The following graphic depicts ISW's assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia's air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.  

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

ISIS's Explosive Attacks in the Greater Baghdad Area: April 4-May 11, 2016

By Sarah Crockett, Emily Anagnostos, and Caitlin Forrest

ISIS carried out explosive attacks in Baghdad and its environs to undermine an increasingly fragile Iraqi government through April and early May. The group exploited a security system both distracted by ongoing political upheaval caused by a stalled reform and burdened with protecting thousands of Shi’a pilgrims travelling to northern Baghdad for a major Shi’a holiday. ISIS has generally used suicide vests (SVEST) in 2016 due to the ISF’s increasing ability to spot and thwart its vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) and suicide VBIEDs (SVBIED).  ISIS last executed a VBIED attack on January 11. It since refrained from VBIED and SVBIED attacks in favor of SVESTs due to the ISF’s increasing ability to spot and destroy such attacks. The resurgence of successful VBIEDs and SVBIEDs attacks suggests the weakening ability of the ISF to adequately and consistently protect the greater Baghdad area. They also show ISIS reverting to its core expertise as a terrorist organization as it loses its capability to project force from its decreasing terrain. These explosive attacks will play a major factor in the ongoing political dynamics in Baghdad and aggravate already tense relations between the government and protesters if the government fails to guarantee basic security in the city.   

Iraq Situation Report: April 26 - May 10, 2016

By Patrick Martin, Hannah Werman, and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: Iraq’s political crisis has degenerated further as a majority of Iraqi parties, including the Kurdish parties and the Sunni Etihad bloc, have boycotted parliament sessions following the April 30 breach of the Green Zone by Sadrist demonstrators. Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi’s cabinet reshuffle process has not only resulted in a major disruption of government, but the Kurdish parties’ boycott has increased the stakes. A quorum is not attainable without the Kurds, who are leveraging the crisis by increasing their rhetoric regarding independence. The political crisis comes amid a series of ISIS spectacular attacks, particularly in Baghdad, during the Kadhimiyah pilgrimage. ISIS is also resurgent in the south, where it launched several spectacular attacks far from the front lines. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have, however, made significant gains in Anbar, recapturing the southern bank of the Euphrates River between Ramadi and Haditha and beginning clearing operations south of Fallujah. However, explosive attacks in Diyala, central Salah al-Din, and Baghdad – areas that are suffering from political crises or public instability – demonstrate that ISIS will attempt to use its attack capabilities to exacerbate the political situation. ISIS can also increase instability and provoke further political backlash by boosting its attack capabilities in southern Iraq, where the security forces are not present in large numbers. The political situation bodes ill for the stability of the country, especially as ISIS sees opportunities to further divide Iraq along sectarian lines through targeted violence and as it ramps up its capabilities in Iraq in preparation for a likely Ramadan campaign for June 2016.

Iraq Council of Representatives Graphic: May 9, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos

May 9 Update: Multiple political parties announced that they would boycott any upcoming session of the Council of Representatives (CoR). The Sunni Etihad bloc announced on May 9 that it would not attend any parliamentary session until those responsible for the April 30 protests were held accountable. A member of the Reform Front, the opposition bloc formed by rump CoR members, also reaffirmed that it would not attend any CoR session as long as Salim al-Juburi remained CoR Speaker. A member from the Islamic Dawa Party in Iraq, within the State of Law Alliance (SLA), revealed his participation in the Reform Front, further reducing the size of the SLA in the CoR. This graphic is updated from its May 6 version to reflect these additional boycotting parties and the new Reform Front member.

Speaker Juburi had set May 10 as the next CoR session when it last adjourned on April 30.  Currently, there are at least 209 members boycotting the session, making it impossible for the CoR to meet the 165 member requirement to reach quorum. The certainty of failure to convene likely encouraged Juburi to instead call for only CoR committees to meet on May 10, as opposed to a full CoR session. A date for a full CoR session has yet to be determined, which Juburi attributed to ongoing repairs to the parliamentary building. Several political figures and parties have called for a quick resumption of CoR sessions. However, political parties have each issued conditions for their return to Baghdad, making a continued political stalemate likely to drag on.

Iraq Council of Representatives Graphic May 6, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos

Iraq’s “rump” Council of Representatives (CoR) formed on April 14, 2016 when some members of Parliament staged a sit in after months of stalled reforms. The rump CoR, at its zenith, was supported by multiple prominent political parties, including the Sadrist al-Ahrar Bloc and the Badr Organization. These parties largely walked out of the rump CoR by April 20. The rump CoR could not reach a quorum as a result and failed to gain recognition as a legal entity.  Most of its members have refocused their efforts on forming a new opposition bloc, the “Reform Front,” first reported on April 27. The Reform Front claims to have at least 98 members, consisting of 42 pro-Maliki Dawa Party members, all of the members from Iyad Allawi’s Wataniya Bloc, and an unverifiable number of members who defected from their parties. If the claim is accurate, then the Reform Front will become the largest bloc in the CoR, surpassing the State of Law Alliance which stands to lose substantial numbers to the Front.

The Reform Front is likely steered by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, though several members have denied his involvement. Maliki has contested Abadi’s leadership of the Dawa Party since he lost the premiership in 2014 amidst growing domestic and international pressure for political change. The recent resignation of Hassan al-Sinid on April 28, the placeholder for Maliki’s seat in the CoR during his tenure as Vice President, could indicate that Maliki looks to resume his seat in the CoR.  [Note: In our May 6 post, we said that holding a seat in the CoR was a prerequisite for becoming Prime Minister.  It is not.]  Maliki has denied the rumors of his return.

The largest bloc in Iraq’s parliament constitutionally has the right to select the Prime Minister and form the Council of Ministers after general elections or after a no-confidence vote in the Prime Minister.  Maliki formed a government in 2010 even though he did not win the elections outright by creating a legal challenge about how to define the “largest bloc.”  The Front’s emergence could facilitate Maliki’s return as prime minister if the parliament ousts Abadi.

The withdrawal of confidence from Abadi is also not likely imminent over the next few weeks barring an unexpected event that creates a further state of emergency. Many of Iraq’s political leaders are engaged in intense behind the scenes meetings to help break the deadlock without a vote of no-confidence. There is no clear coalition emerging within the CoR that can achieve an absolute majority of 165 members to vote no-confidence or select a successor. Anti-Maliki sentiment remains strong among elite politicians, undercutting the likelihood that he will be able to generate sufficient support for a no-confidence vote and government formation himself. The Reform Front’s tenuous position as a coalition of convenience may collapse. Both Maliki and Allawi seek power, and they cannot both have it.

Maliki, therefore, is most likely to try to ride the political wave by positioning himself as a potential unifier who can bridge the gap between the Reform Front and other blocs – a gap that he has helped create and maintain.  He issued a statement on May 6 calling for all CoR blocs to reconvene a session to find a solution to the political crisis.  He is likely to try to rally Abadi’s Dawa Party supporters to his side along with other consensus-minded political blocs while aligning temporarily with Allawi, his rival for the premiership in 2010, with the ultimate intent of acquiring the 165 votes necessary to achieve an absolute majority in the CoR. It is not even clear whether the CoR will even be able to resume sessions soon. It is next scheduled to meet on May 10, and it can only make decisions if a quorum of 165 members is reached. The 34 members of the Sadrist al-Ahrar Bloc, however, withdrew from the CoR on April 30 and at least 60 members of the Kurdistan Alliance agreed on May 6 to not return to the CoR. The absence of as many as 94 members will make it more difficult for Speaker Salim al-Juburi to achieve quorum. The Kurds have likely presented a set of political demands regarding the cabinet reshuffle and the size of their representation in government to other Shi’a parties as a condition for their return and may return to the CoR before the Sadrists if the other blocs agree to their demands. Other political blocs may also boycott the CoR, less ostentatiously, as the cabinet reshuffle drags on. Political impasse will therefore likely persist.

This graphic is an approximate depiction of the current state of the Council of Representatives. It shows the number and party affiliation of CoR members who have boycotted future parliamentary sessions. It also shows the number and party affiliation of CoR members whom ISW assesses may be part of the Reform Front based on the Reform Front's unconfirmed claim that it is at least 98-members strong. The graphic demonstrates the tumultuous current state of the CoR and the difficulty for a session to achieve quorum.

Sadr Attempts a De-facto Coup in Iraq

By Patrick Martin, Emily Anagnostos, and Rachel Bessette

Key Take-Away: Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr is attempting to launch a de-facto coup against Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi. The Sadrist Trend’s protests in the Green Zone constitute an attempt to seize control of the government process and limit the ability of the government to physically access the Green Zone. Supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr have stormed the Green Zone and the parliament building and they are refusing to leave. Some members are setting up tents, indicating that Sadrists will attempt a sit-in in the Green Zone itself. The Sadrists have not mobilized formal military forces. They have, however, prevented Iraqi leaders from accessing government buildings and forced members of the Council of Representatives (CoR) to leave the Green Zone, attacking several of them as they left. Sadrist demonstrators in the predominantly Shi’a southern provinces have also stormed offices of the rival Dawa Party, to which PM Abadi and former PM Nouri al-Maliki belong. There is potential for intra-Shi’a violence; security forces and Iranian proxy militias, rivals to the Sadrist Trend, deployed to Baghdad’s southern belts to secure the area during the commemoration of the death of the Imam al-Kadhim, a major Shi’a holiday. Meanwhile, security forces could clash with demonstrators or attempt to forcibly evict them from public spaces. This could also lead to further instability, while the possibility of an attempted ISIS attack against either pilgrims or demonstrators remains high.

ISW has tracked developments leading up to this state of affairs. Additional source materials can be accessed here.

[Above: Supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr clamber over and collapse blast walls around the Green Zone on April 30 during the Sadrist riot.]

The April 30 CoR Session Fails to Reach Quorum

The Council of Representatives (CoR) was scheduled to convene on April 30 in the presence of PM Abadi in order to continue voting on candidates for the cabinet reshuffle. A CoR member from the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq’s (ISCI) political party, Mowatin, stated that PM Abadi would announce the change of five more ministers in the session for the Ministries of Oil, Trade, Industry, Transportation, and Construction. However, the session failed to meet quorum. The Sadrist Trend-affiliated Ahrar Bloc and the Kurdistan Alliance blocs did not attend the session, nor did any of the members of the rump parliament, the opposition bloc within the CoR dominated by supporters of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, PM Abadi’s rival, and the leader of the Wataniya Bloc, Iyad Allawi. The Sadrist Al-Ahrar Bloc boycotted the session, claiming that the cabinet reforms were being pursued along partisan quota lines. Meanwhile, the Kurdish parties claimed that they supported the reforms but rejected the change of any Kurdish ministers in the Cabinet, as they have demanded throughout the reform process. When the session failed to make quorum, CoR Speaker Salim al-Juburi initially postponed the session for two hours to allow CoR members to arrive. Juburi soon announced that the session would be postponed until May 10, attributing the lack of quorum to the closure of roads in Baghdad due to security protocol surrounding the commemoration of the Imam al-Kadhim, a major Shi’a holiday, in Baghdad.

In response, Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr announced that he and the Sadrist Trend would suspend participating in political action for two months. Sadr has been supportive of PM Abadi’s reforms in the past. Specifically, Sadr and PM Abadi have supported the creation of a technocratic government. PM Abadi has submitted on multiple occasions a list of technocrats as nominations for the new cabinet. Only five out of 22 were selected during the April 26 CoR session.

Sadrists Storm the Green Zone and the CoR Building

Sadr has since raised the stakes. He stated in a televised speech that he was “waiting for the great popular uprising and the major revolution to stop the march of the corrupt.” His followers stormed the Green Zone, prompted by his statement. Shortly before the start of the rioting, Sadr reportedly met with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the supreme religious authority in Iraq. The details of the meeting are not clear, but Sistani may have sought to restrain Sadr and forestall any outsized response. Alternatively, Sadr may have informed the Najaf religious establishment of his plans. In either case, the meeting, if it did take place, was important, but Sadr likely did not coordinate the Green Zone storming with the religious establishment.

The Sadrist riot devolved into violence. Sadrists stormed the Green Zone and later the parliament building and damaged the main CoR assembly hall. They did not appear to clash with the Kurdish force assigned to protect the CoR. Sadrist demonstrators also attacked the head of the Fadhila Bloc, Ammar Tuamah, as he exited the area, along with Aram Sheikh Muhammad, the Kurdish Deputy CoR Speaker. Kurdish media reported that Kurdish CoR members Ila Talabani, Erez Abdullah, Ribawar Taha, Rankin Abdullah, and two others were trapped inside CoR building by rioters, but were evacuated by senior Sadrist Trend member Hakim al-Zamili, though his presence did not stop Sadrists from assaulting Ila Talabani’s vehicle. CoR Speaker Juburi strongly denounced attacks on CoR members. The violence forced PM Abadi and Speaker Juburi to evacuate temporarily. However, PM Abadi later returned under the heavy protection of his security detail and the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) to inspect the damage the rioters caused to the CoR building. 

[Above: Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi inspects damage done by rioting Sadrists to the Council of Representatives main room on April 30.]

Sadr likely intended for the demonstrators to storm the Green Zone and the CoR building. He had stated this intent in a speech on February 26 in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, warning that the Iraqi people would storm the Green Zone if reforms failed. On April 29, Kadhim al-Issawi, Sadr’s security chief, ominously warned that “They continue to impose on your will. Tomorrow is the date. If they do not respond, then destiny is in your hands. (Approximate translation)” Pro-Sadr social media also warned on April 29 that they were “off to the Green [Zone], we will depart shortly.” An aspect of the April 30 riot was therefore planned.  

Security Forces Respond

Security forces have made no move to evict the demonstrators. In fact, a source in Sadr’s office stated that Sadr’s militia forces were coordinating with the security forces to control the demonstrations. Although the joint Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Sadrist force began moving protesters out of the CoR building, they have not evicted them from the Green Zone. Sadr also appears to be keeping his hundreds of supporters in the Green Zone, where they have amassed in force, particularly around the Grand Celebration Square. Sadr’s supporters also freely collapsed blast walls around the Green Zone as part of the riot. Previously, Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) forces neglected to control Sadrist demonstrators on March 18, allowing large numbers of them to approach the Green Zone for the beginning of the first sit-in in front of the Green Zone gates.

The crisis has sparked panic among the government and political blocs outside of the Sadrist Trend. President Fuad Masoum called for an emergency meeting of the three presidencies – Masoum, Speaker Juburi, and PM Abadi – on May 1 along with the leaders of political blocs to find a solution to the crisis. The leaders of the pan-Shi’a political formation of the National Alliance, meanwhile, met at the home of National Alliance chairman Ibrahim al-Jaafari, a pro-Iranian figure who is a possible candidate for the premiership, to discuss solutions to the crisis. Speaker Juburi has reportedly contacted the heads of political blocs to find a solution. PM Abadi strongly demanded that demonstrators not encroach on public or private property or on the grounds of state institutions, but reaffirmed the right of peaceful demonstrations. He also reassured Iraq that the situation was under the control of the security forces.

Sadrists Riot in the Green Zone

Over the course of Saturday evening, the security forces have attempted to control the situation with mixed success. Prior to the storming of the Green Zone, the security forces closed the entrances to the city and declared a state of emergency. They did not move against the demonstrators. Later in the evening, the situation changed. Security forces completely closed al-Hasnein Square and al-Hasnein Bridge south of the Green Zone in the upscale Jadiriyah neighborhood. Reports also emerged that security forces used tear gas and “heavy gunfire” at demonstrators near the July 14 Suspension Bridge south of the Green Zone. BOC spokesperson Brig. Gen. Saad Maan stated that security forces are authorized to use force to deter attacks on property and civilians.

The Sadrist demonstrators stated a variety of demands consistent with their nationalist platform. Some were expectedly anti-American. There were isolated incidents of damaging American flags. Sadr himself called Vice President Joe Biden’s visit on April 28 “suspicious” and requested that the government avoid receiving any similar visits. In addition, many demonstrators called for expelling Iran, chanting “Iran, out, out!” as well as denunciations of Qassim Suleimani, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Quds Force and Iran’s foremost powerbroker in the region. Other chants attacked Iranian proxy leader Qais al-Khazali, one of Muqtada’s rivals; former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki; and Hanan al-Fatlawi, one of Maliki’s most vocal allies within the CoR and a prominent leader of the rump parliament movement. These calls indicate frustration with pro-Iranian elements in the government and a rejection of Iranian attempts to mediate a solution. 

[Above: Sadrists mass in the Green Zone’s Grand Celebration Square on the evening of April 30.]

Sadrists Riot in the Southern Provinces

Meanwhile, Sadr’s supporters in smaller numbers began rioting across the southern provinces, specifically targeting the Dawa Party of Nouri al-Maliki. The governor of Karbala, a Dawa Party member, reportedly fled the area following Sadrist demonstrators’ storming of the Karbala government building. Other reports claimed that Sadrists stormed the headquarters of the Dawa Party in al-Nasiriyah in Dhi Qar Province and al-Diwaniyah in al-Qadisiyah Province, removing and smashing pictures of Maliki. Sadrists also stormed the headquarters of the Fadhila Bloc in Diwaniyah and the Diwaniyah government building before heading to the ISCI headquarters. Security forces in Muthanna and Maysan Provinces, meanwhile, went into high alert and emphasized the protection of party facilities. Instability in the south, an area that does not have a strong ISF presence, will stretch the security forces even thinner and provide additional opportunities for instability and violence.

[Above: Sadrist demonstrators attack a Dawa Party headquarters in Diwaniyah and tear down a poster of Dawa Party leader and former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on April 30.]

Security Threats

The security situation in Baghdad could deteriorate further if the demonstrations do not de-escalate, as many Popular Mobilization members were withdrawing to Baghdad to conduct clearing operations in the southern Baghdad Belts area to address a growing ISIS threat in the area. The Defense Ministry had announced, with very poor timing, the start of clearing operations against ISIS cells in areas south of Baghdad led by the 17th Iraqi Army (IA) Division, a formation currently tasked with providing security in Baghdad and the surrounding belts area, with the participation of Popular Mobilization fighters. These areas south of Baghdad, including northern Babil Province, have recently experienced a deteriorated security situation due to ISIS attacks, particularly following the detonation of a massive Vehicle-borne Improvises Explosive Device (VBIED) on March 6 that killed at least 60 people and wounded at least 70 others, and several attempted attacks over the past week. Several Iranian proxy militias, including the Badr Organization and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, deployed to the southern Baghdad Belts area for the operation, though Badr Organization political bloc leader Qassim al-Araji stated that the forces were only for the clearing operation and would not enter Baghdad, collide with demonstrators, or involve themselves in intra-Shi’a fighting. However, one unconfirmed report posted pictures and suggested that Federal Police, the Golden Division, and Iranian proxy militia Kata’ib Hezbollah were in the area “in case of an emergency.”

Meanwhile, there is a risk of an ISIS attack on Sadrist demonstrators. Thousands of Shi’a pilgrims have been entering Baghdad to commemorate the death of the Imam al-Kadhim, a major Shi’a holiday falling on May 3. This had already prompted the security forces to restrict access in many areas of Baghdad. ISIS had already taken advantage of the situation by launching a VBIED attack in the predominantly Shi’a Nahrawan area, southeast of Baghdad, on April 30 prior to the start of the demonstrations, killing at least 23 people and wounding at least 48 others. Other attacks included IED attacks on April 29 targeting pilgrims at a railway station south of Baghdad, though the attack was foiled. If security continues to deteriorate, then the demonstrations could stretch the security forces thin and expose the civilian population to an ISIS spectacular attack.

The security operation south of Baghdad appeared to be targeted at clearing ISIS from the area in order to protect pilgrims. However, the concentration of militia and security forces coincides dangerously with the start of the Sadrist demonstrations. The presence of Iraqi Shi’a militias, specifically Iranian proxy rivals of Sadr, in the Baghdad area is extremely dangerous. There is a high potential for violence between Iranian-backed militias and Sadrist security details and protesters if they encounter one another. Iran will likely order its proxies to avoid engaging with Sadrist elements in order to prevent a further escalation of the situation, but violence remains a possibility. Violence could also occur between the Sadrists and party elements, security forces, or militias in the southern provinces if demonstrators continue to attack party facilities and government buildings.

Implications

While the Sadrists dispersed to some extent as the night wore on, some set up tents in the Green Zone, signaling a likely sit-in at Grand Celebration Square. Sadr’s office stated that demonstrations would “wash away” the political quotas system and corruption from the government, and his call for a “popular uprising” is threatening to Iraq’s stability. Sadr could keep his supporters in the Green Zone and further compromise the area’s security while pressuring the political blocs to bend to his will and vote in a technocratic cabinet. However, the political blocs’ resistance to abandoning their control of their cabinet seats is making the political situation untenable. Sadr may continue to obstruct the work of the government until he can secure a full cabinet reshuffle. However, the other political blocs, and Maliki in particular, may try and retaliate. They may try and convince PM Abadi to unleash the security forces on the Sadrist demonstrators in order to re-establish order, a scenario that could see Sadrists clashing violently with the ISF. Worse, party-linked or Iranian proxy militias could begin clashing with Sadrists, particularly if the demonstrators continue to try and attack party headquarters in the southern provinces.

The three presidencies – PM Abadi, Speaker Juburi, and President Masoum – are slated to meet on May 1 with political bloc leaders to find a solution to the crisis. It is unclear if the Sadrist Trend will join, but Sadr is likely to try and use the force of the demonstrations to muscle concessions out of PM Abadi and the political blocs. Sadr will likely call off his supporters for another CoR session at some point, but he is unlikely to withdraw his supporters from the Green Zone without concrete concessions. The political crisis is likely to continue, and security threats remain potent. Meanwhile, the Sadrist opposition to U.S., as well as Iranian, participation in any attempt to mediate the political crisis will limit the U.S.’s ability to influence events, as the Sadrists could become even more agitated if the U.S. conducts high profile outreach against their wishes. Meanwhile, the Sadrists’ fierce opposition to Maliki and the Dawa Party threatens to further undermine the country’s stability; Maliki is unlikely to back down from the challenge that Sadr has issued and may find a way to retaliate, possibly through force or by massing his own, admittedly smaller, cadre of supporters in counter-protests.

It is unclear if Maliki will be able to use a judicial ruling to his advantage; although Maliki has been able to force the judiciary to rule in his favor during crises, it has remained distant during recent events. Notably, the judiciary issued a statement on April 18 that it would not rule on the events of the CoR, including on the constitutionality of CoR sessions. This indicates that it was not willing to expose itself with a controversial statement in favor of Maliki’s supporters within the rump parliament movement. A judicial ruling thus remains a diminished, though still possible, method of retaliation by Maliki against Sadr.

The situation is unstable enough to put the U.S. Embassy on alert, and the U.S. must prepare a contingency plan in case the situation spirals out of control. Iraq’s political crisis has reached dangerous new heights that pose a serious threat to the stability of the government, and in the worst case scenario could also threaten U.S. forces. Negotiations will continue among political leaders and the current unrest is likely to reduce as the initial rioting burns out. Nevertheless, if the political blocs cannot come to an agreement, or if violence or an ISIS spectacular attack against the demonstrators occurs, the situation could collapse even further. The U.S. must be prepared for the worst case scenario that sees the political crisis leading to violence in Baghdad and the potential collapse of PM Abadi’s government and deploy diplomatic or military assets in order to mitigate the possibility of an even more disastrous state of affairs.

Warning: Sadrists Storm the Green Zone

By Patrick Martin

Key Take-Away: Iraq’s political crisis has intensified. Hundreds of supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr stormed the Green Zone on April 30 and entered the Council of Representatives (CoR) building. Sadr and Sadrist Trend leaders have urged for a peaceful demonstration but have not ordered the demonstrators to leave the area, indicating that the Green Zone may see an extended sit-in. Violence is a possibility as the security forces attempt to secure Baghdad, particularly as they are already stretched thin protecting thousands of Shi’a pilgrims descending on Kadhimiyah neighborhood for the commemoration of the death of the Imam al-Kadhim, a major Shi’a holiday. ISIS will likely attempt to take advantage of the security breach by launching spectacular attacks against demonstrators and pilgrims. There is a potential threat to U.S. bases and infrastructure, though Sadr has ordered his followers not to approach any embassies. Iraq’s government is now at its most unstable, as the CoR is physically inaccessible to many members of government amid reports that Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi and CoR Speaker Salim al-Juburi were evacuated from the Green Zone. 

[Above: Demonstrators flood the Constitution Hall room in the CoR building on April 30.]

The political crisis in Iraq is intensifying. Hundreds of supporters of Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr stormed the gates of the Green Zone. They forced their way into the Council of Representatives (CoR) building following the end of the scheduled CoR session. U.S. and international facilities in Baghdad are at some increasing risk, and should the situation escalate further the deteriorating security may ultimately affect some U.S. forces and basing. The UN has closed its building in the Green Zone while the Baghdad Operations Command and the U.S. Embassy have gone on alert. The safety of Iraq’s political leadership is at risk. Security forces have also evacuated Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi and CoR Speaker Salim al-Juburi from the Green Zone, though the location to which they were evacuated is unclear. The Sadrists have begun a sit-in within the parliament and are damaging the building’s interior. At least one CoR member, Fadhila Bloc leader Ammar Tuamah, has been assaulted by Sadrist demonstrators as he attempted to leave the area.

This is not the first time that Sadrist protesters have physically challenged security forces near the Green Zone.  On March 18, Sadrist protesters charged Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) at the Republican Bridge en route the Green Zone, and the ISF removed the barrier to allow them to advance apparently under the order of the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC). The protesters did not, however, enter the Green Zone itself. Sadr himself conducted a sit-in himself thereafter in a tent in the Green Zone on March 27 as a continuation of the protest movement to pressure the government to conduct a cabinet reshuffle, though he ordered his supporters to remain outside of the Green Zone.

The April 30th riot and assault of the CoR building appears to have been organic rather than planned. The Sadrist Trend’s leadership initially demanded that all demonstrators immediately vacate the CoR building, though they apparently later decided simply to order the sit-in in the CoR building to be conducted in a peaceful manner, a sign that the leadership may exploit the crisis. The supervisor of the Sadrist sit-in movement had coordinated with security forces for a peaceful demonstration the night before and was physically overseeing the sit-in site in front of the Green Zone when the demonstrators began storming it, suggesting but not proving that Sadrist Trend leaders did not plan to enter the Green Zone.

The violence erupted after the Council of Representatives (CoR) met on April 30 to select new ministers as part of the cabinet reshuffle process. Although the CoR had successfully voted in five new technocratic cabinet ministers during the April 26 session, but the remainder of Abadi’s list has met resistance. Political blocs, including the Sunni Etihad bloc and the Kurdistan Alliance, clearly did not want to cede control over certain cabinet seats, causing deadlock in the CoR session. This prompted the members of al-Ahrar Bloc, the political wing of the Sadrist Trend, to withdraw from the session. Sadr announced a freeze of all of the Sadrist Trend’s political activity for two months, warning of the possibility of a government collapse if quotas and corruption persisted.

Indicators that the immediate crisis will de-escalate include:

- Protesters cease destroying property

- Sadr orders protesters to depart the CoR or Green Zone

- Protesters depart the CoR building

- Protesters disperse ISF regains control over the Green Zone

If these conditions are not met, the likelihood of immediate violence will continue.  Indicators of further escalation will include not only failure to meet those conditions, but also:

- Sadr encouraging further protests;

- The reinforcement of Baghdad by security forces or militias from outside;

- Further violence against the compounds of other political leaders or the leaders themselves;

Violence against U.S. or international installations in Baghdad.

If these conditions are not met, the  violence and mass street demonstrations will likely continue. 

Sadr could attempt to leverage the physical presence of demonstrators in the Green Zone for concessions from other political blocs and the government – he could, for example, try and start a sit-in in the Green Zone itself. His most recent orders to the demonstrators called for respecting public property and not approaching embassies in the Green Zone, but did not include an order to leave the area, indicating that Sadr may attempt to keep his followers in the area to pressure PM Abadi and the government to pass a fully technocratic cabinet reshuffle. A public sit-in in the CoR building is thus possible, which places the security forces responsible for protecting the CoR building at risk of either escalating or being over-run. While an extended Sadrist sit-in would be an escalation, attempts by the security forces to evict or shut off supplies and access to the demonstrators could spark further violence in the Green Zone that would cause security in Baghdad deteriorate to untenable levels.

Even the current escalation of the crisis will likely spark intensive meetings between political bloc leaders to resume in order to find a solution to the cabinet reshuffle. The U.S. and Iran will likely intensify efforts to pressure political leaders into achieving stability. Sadr will likely participate in negotiations in some capacity but continue the suspension of the Sadrist Trend’s participation in CoR sessions, effectively suspending the CoR until further notice.

The demonstration comes at an extremely dangerous time – thousands of Shi’a pilgrims are descending on Kadhimiyah in northwestern Baghdad from across Iraq for the commemoration of the Imam al-Kadhim on May 3, an event that has already prompted the security forces to shut many of Baghdad’s streets. ISIS has already launched an explosive attack southeast of Baghdad in the predominantly Shi’a al-Nahrawan area with a Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) that reportedly killed at least 23 people and wounded 48 others. ISIS also attempted IED attacks on April 29 targeted pilgrims at a railway station but were foiled by the security forces. The demonstrations thus threaten to expose civilians to ISIS attacks and will tax the security forces to their limits.

[Above: Sadrist demonstrators mass in the main entrance hall of the CoR building on April 30.]

Iraq Situation Report: April 12 - 25, 2016

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: The U.S. announced additional “accelerants” in the fight against ISIS, reporting on April 18 that it would deploy 217 additional train-and-advise personnel to embed at the brigade and battalion levels with attack helicopters and an additional High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). The limited increase in U.S. military support came in conjunction with an increased number of high-level U.S. military and diplomatic visits between April 8 and April 21 with Iraqi officials during its major political crisis. The Council of Representatives (CoR) split into two parallel parliaments on April 12 over a disagreement regarding Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi’s cabinet reshuffle. Rebelling CoR members in the illegal rump parliament have attempted to oust CoR Speaker Salim al-Juburi as well as PM Abadi and President Fuad Masoum in a series of illegal CoR sessions over the past two weeks, unsuccessfully courting the Shi’a religious authorities to back them in effectively collapsing the government. However, the illegitimate parliament, which at its height reached around 150 CoR members, has suffered from defections, notably from members of the Sadrist Trend, and the rebelling CoR members have failed to reach quorum of 165 CoR members. The larger legitimate CoR, which will attempt to meet on April 26 without the members of the rump parliament, will struggle to accomplish much beyond renewing confidence in Speaker Juburi. The CoR remains divided on numerous political issues, including the cabinet reshuffle that sparked the crisis in the first place. 

Meanwhile, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) recaptured Hit District, marking an important victory and clearing a major urban center of ISIS fighters, though the town likely remains laced with a large number of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The success was dampened by a spike in ISIS spectacular attacks both north of and in Baghdad during the lead-up to the commemoration of the death of Imam Musa al-Kadhim, the 7th Shi’a Imam, during which thousands of Shi’a pilgrims visit his shrine in Kadhimiyah in northwestern Baghdad. The attacks indicate that ISIS will likely continue targeting hard and soft targets in the vicinity of Baghdad with explosive attacks during religious holidays, likely foreshadowing its intentions to spike up attacks before and during Ramadan, which begins in June 2016. 

Iraq Control of Terrain Map: April 21, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and tribal fighters with Coalition air support recaptured Hit District on April 14 as part of an ongoing operation to remove ISIS from the Euphrates River Valley. Security forces began operations to connect Ramadi to Hit District on March 12 and quickly recaptured Kubaisah, west of Hit, on March 25. From there, the ISF attacked Hit from the north and west, breaching the center of Hit on April 7 and securing the district on April 14. The ISF will now work to connect Hit with al-Baghdadi Sub-District, north of Hit, along the Euphrates River by securing control over the remainder of the Haditha-Baghdad highway. Doing so will grant the ISF control over the Euphrates River Valley from Haditha to Ramadi. ISW is thus changing the Hit District and the terrain between Hit and Ramadi from ISIS control to ISF control. 

The Joint Operations Command, largely driven by Iranian proxy militias, launched a three-day offensive on March 1 to clear the Samarra desert from as far south as Lake Thar Thar and north towards Tikrit. The offensive concluded on March 3. Despite the difficulty of controlling desert terrain, the area has not witnessed ISIS attacks since the offensive. As such, ISW is changing key roadways from contested to ISF- and militia-controlled terrain, though ISW cannot assess with confidence if villages in the Jazeera Desert west of Samarra are under ISF and militia control. These areas thus remain contested.

Popular Mobilization forces continue to clash with ISIS in the Makhoul Mountains, north of Baiji. Popular Mobilization efforts have effectively cost ISIS its unilateral control in the area, though Iraqi Shi’a militias have not succeeded in securing uncontested control over any territory north of Baiji. Therefore, ISW is changing the area from ISIS-held to contested terrain.

Russian Military Activity in Syria: March 15 – April 18, 2016

By Jodi Brignola and Genevieve Casagrande

Russia remains a decisive actor in Syria despite announcing its limited drawdown on March 14. It has since reshaped the nature of its deployment and military operations in ways that continue to bolster the Assad regime’s position on the ground as well as at the negotiating table, while allowing Russia to maintain its strategic military foothold along the Eastern Mediterranean. Russian military contributions continue to shape the battlefield momentum of pro-regime operations through the deployment of alternative assets to theater such as advanced rotary wing attack aircraft. Russia retains the capacity to escalate its fixed-wing strikes to support pro-regime operations, as shown in operations against ISIS in Palmyra in late March and more recently against armed opposition forces in Aleppo.

Russian air operations pivoted once again to Aleppo as of April 6, following weeks of strikes primarily carried out in support of pro-regime ground operations against ISIS in central Homs Province. Pro-regime forces supported by Russian and regime airstrikes have resumed operations to encircle and besiege armed opposition forces in Aleppo City. Russian air operations have regularly targeted opposition-held terrain in Aleppo province throughout its air campaign in Syria, beginning condition-setting efforts for pro-regime operations to encircle and besiege Aleppo City as early as October 2015. Russian air support has been a pivotal component of pro-regime operations to encircle Aleppo City, bringing regime forces within five kilometers of besieging opposition forces inside the city as of February 2016.

Russian airstrikes have both repelled opposition efforts to reverse gains made by regime forces south of the city and propelled regime advances in the city’s northern industrial outskirts. Russia resumed regular strikes in the vicinity of Aleppo City on April 6 in response to an opposition offensive. This new wave of strikes in Aleppo, although not yet at the levels seen in the first five months of the Russian air campaign, ultimately places the already tenuous “cessation of hostilities” agreement at risk of collapse. The escalation of both Russian airstrikes and pro-regime operations appears to be driving additional upticks of violence elsewhere in northwestern Syria, particularly on key regime frontlines in northeastern Latakia and northwestern Hama Provinces on April 18. Renewed opposition operations in this area apply additional pressure to the regime’s heartland on the Syrian coast.

Russia has changed the shape of its deployment to meet the needs of the Syrian regime rather than scaling back its operations in theater. Russia has deployed additional installments of advanced attack helicopters in the past month, allowing Russia to carry out dynamic strikes and provide close air support in accordance with ongoing pro-regime ground operations. Activist sources reported that Russia has deployed additional rotary-wing attack aircraft to Bassel al-Assad International Airport in Latakia as well as the Shayrat, and T4 Airbases in central Homs, including installments of advanced Mi-28N ‘Havoc’ Helicopters. Advanced helicopters like the Mi-28N, which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed on April 4 was in use in Syria, would be especially useful in clearing operations against the remaining ISIS-held areas of eastern Homs. Russia prioritized the regime’s front with ISIS in central Homs in March 2016, as demonstrated by the presence of Russian military advisers on the ground and the eventual deployment of de-mining personnel to clear Palmyra. While the operation achieved pro-regime objectives in securing terrain lost to ISIS in May 2015, it also allowed Russia to forward the narrative that it acts as a constructive international arbiter to the Syrian conflict and is an effective partner in the fight against terrorism while it continues to target moderate elements of the opposition on other fronts. 

The following graphic depicts ISW's assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia's air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.  

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.