Russian Strikes in Syria: November 6 - 17, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola

Key Takeaway: Russia announced a new phase of its air campaign in Syria on November 17 following a new directive from Russian President Vladimir Putin. This new directive comes as FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov confirmed the downing of Metrojet Flight 9268 to be “a terrorist act.” President Putin vowed to “punish” those responsible and stated that the Russian air campaign in Syria “must be intensified in such a way that the criminals understand that retribution is inevitable." The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that the new air operations plan will double the size of Russia’s strike force able to target positions inside of Syria to include 25 long-range strategic bombers, 8 SU-34s, and 4 SU-27s. These new warplanes will be based from the Mozdok airbase in Northern Ossetia along Russia’s southern border with Georgia and flown over Iranian and Iraqi airspace to launch operations inside Syria. The new phase will also include an increased number of combat sorties from the Bassel al-Assad International Airport in Latakia Province.
 
Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu reported during a briefing with President Putin that 12 long-range Tu-95 bombers carried out airstrikes against ISIS' positions in ar Raqqa and Deir ez-Zour on November 17. One Tu-160 and one Tu-95 fired 34 Kalibr cruise missiles at targets in Aleppo and Idlib Provinces on November 17. The U.S. was alerted of Russia’s intention to use sea-based cruise missiles in addition to long-range aircraft prior to these strikes according to an anonymous U.S. defense official. Multiple sources including the Russian MoD and the French MoD stated that Russia used cruise missiles to strike ISIS positions in Raqqa. French newspaper Le Monde reported that Russia launched cruise missiles from the Mediterranean, citing anonymous sources. The Kremlin did not confirm cruise missiles targeting ISIS in ar Raqqa. Local ground reporting only confirmed cruise missile strikes against rebel positions in Idlib and Aleppo Provinces with some local Syrian sources reporting that the missiles were fired from the direction of the Mediterranean. Notably, the majority of Russian airstrikes from November 16-17 targeted rebel positions, not ISIS.
 
Russia’s intensified air campaign may open the opportunity for Russia to continue its efforts to draw Western countries into a new counterterrorism coalition in the Middle East. French Defense Minister Jean Yves Le Drian stated that the cruise missile strikes near ar Raqqa may indicate “this grand coalition with Russia is possible.” Increased airstrikes by both France and Russia prelude further cooperation between the two countries. Russia will continue to present itself as an effective anti-ISIS actor in Syria to the international community, despite the continuous low number of Russian airstrikes targeting core ISIS terrain.
 
The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. The recent influx in Russian strikes throughout Syria caused a notable inflection in ground reporting as well as discrepancies within Western and Russian media sources. Those strikes that have been reported inconsistently from news sources deemed reliable within the past 48-hours are represented by an “Unknown Russian Strike” categorization. Instances of cruise missiles are only depicted if reliable picture or video documentation of the missile has been released.
 
High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.
 
Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation. 

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: November 4 - 15, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande

Key Takeaway: Russia continues to prioritize the preservation of the Assad regime rather than the defeat of ISIS through its air campaign in Syria. Russian airstrikes primarily supported regime ground operations against the Syrian armed opposition from November 13 – 15, concentrating in the southern countryside of Aleppo and the northern countryside of while pro-regime ground forces attempted to advance. ISW assessed Russian airstrikes against only one ISIS-held location with low-confidence during the reporting period. Meanwhile, the French Ministry of Defense announced French aircraft dropped 20 bombs against ISIS in ar Raqqa on November 15 in retaliation for the violent string of terrorist attacks carried out by ISIS in Paris on November 13. Russia will likely leverage the Paris attacks to drive its efforts to form a new counterterrorism coalition in the Middle East. Russia will continue to present itself as a decisive partner against ISIS in Syria to the international community, despite the relatively low number of Russian airstrikes targeting core ISIS terrain.

The Russian air campaign in Syria is accelerating the radicalization of the Syrian armed opposition. The brutality of the Assad regime against civilian populations throughout four years of armed conflict has driven rebels into partnerships with Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, a powerful anti-Assad ground force. Russia’s air campaign uses similarly indiscriminate tactics against civilians. U.S. officials have confirmed the Russian use of cluster munitionsagainst populated locations in Hama and Idlib Provinces. Open source reporting indicates the use of cluster munitions in Aleppo Province as well. Russian airstrikes have reportedly killed over 254 civilians from September 30 – October 26 alone, according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights. Russian airstrikes reportedly targeted at least 12 medical facilities throughout Syria, according to statements from Doctors Without Borders on October 29. Local sources also reported the use of white phosphorus during Russian airstrikes in Idlib Province on November 12. Russia’s violent intervention is already driving the unification of rebels under powerful jihadist and hardline elements of the armed opposition. Three rebel groups made up of foreign fighters pledged allegiance to Jabhat al-Nusra from September 23 to October 3, and three groups merged under hardline Islamist Ahrar al-Sham beginning in early September 2015 following reports of increased Russian presence in Syria.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. 

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible. 

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.    

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: November 2 - 12, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola

Key Takeaway: The Russian air campaign continued to support regime ground operations against the Syrian opposition in Aleppo, Latakia, Idlib, Hama, and Dera’a Provinces from November 11 - 12. Russian warplanes targeted rebel-held terrain in the southern Aleppo countryside, enabling pro-regime forces to seize the towns of al-Hader and al-Eis located southwest of Aleppo City on November 12. Russian warplanes began to bombard both of these towns on October 15 in conjunction with the start of the regime’s ground offensive against rebels in the area. These advances have brought the regime and its allies within sixteen miles of the two besieged Shi’a-majority towns of Fua’h and Kafraya in northeastern Idlib Province. Iraqi Shi’a militia Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba claimed that the group is preparing for operations to break the rebel siege on these two towns. Russian warplanes began targeting rebel-held towns surrounding Fu’ah and Kafraya on November 4. These reported airstrikes violate terms of a UN-implemented ceasefire established on September 24. Local sources also reported the use of white phosphorus during Russian airstrikes near the Jebel Zawiya mountain range in southern Idlib Province on November 12.

 

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the expansion of its air campaign into Dera’a Province. ISW assessed Russian airstrikes against one location in Dera’a Province with high-confidence and five others with low-confidence from November 11 – 12, the largest concentration of reported Russian strikes in Dera'a since the start of Russian airstrikes on September 30. Local sources began reporting instances of Russian airstrikes in Dera’a Province as early as October 28. The influx in reported strikes follows reports of regime mobilization for an upcoming offensive near the Golan Heights. Israeli warplanes later conducted at least one airstrike near the Damascus International Airport on November 11 targeting an alleged weapon shipment intended for Lebanese Hezbollah. Continued Israeli targeting of Iranian proxy forces in Syria could exert additional pressure on Russia’s relations with Iran and the Syrian regime, particularly if Russia received advance warning of the strike through the Russian-Israeli air coordination mechanism established on September 21. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.   
 
Approaching the besieged enclaves from the east provides a more accessible target than pushing from the south through core rebel-held terrain in Idlib Province.
 
**One Russian airstrike location from November 2 – 10 has been changed from low- to high-confidence as a result of additional reporting.

Operations to clear Sinjar of ISIS may sow the seeds of future Arab-Kurd conflict in Iraq and Syria.

By Christopher Kozak

 

From ISW's October 31, 2015 to November 8, 2015 Weekly Intelligence Summary:

Current dynamics in Iraq and Syria threaten to sow the seeds of future Arab-Kurd conflict. The U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition depends on Kurdish forces as a primary ground partner in both Iraq and Syria. Iraqi Kurdish forces will soon launch an offensive to retake the ISIS-held town of Sinjar in northwestern Iraq near the Syrian border with support from the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition. Kurds and Arabs have historically contested the town, which Kurds sometimes refer to as a land-bridge to Syria. Arab-Kurdish violence in Iraq could reignite even as ISIS loses terrain. Meanwhile, Syrian Arab fighters operating alongside Kurdish forces in northern Syria attacked the ISIS-held town of al-Hawl near the Iraqi border west of Sinjar. Syrian Kurdish forces have nonetheless faced persistent accusations of "ethnic cleansing" against Arab civilians during operations to clear ISIS-held areas in Northern Syria. Arab-Kurdish tensions in both countries will grow if Kurdish forces attempt to seize other disputed regions. Competition over territorial gains could fuel intra-Kurdish conflict, both between Iraqi and Syrian Kurds as well as within the divided Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Continued Kurdish expansion will also face strong opposition from Turkey. Turkish President Recep Erdogan pledged to take a harsh stance against the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) across the border in Iraq and Syria after successfully consolidating his political power in parliamentary elections. 

Control Map of Ramadi: November 11, 2015

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: Iraqi Security Forces have advanced towards and are proximate to infrastructure necessary for assault on downtown Ramadi. Encirclement of the city has been slow as the Iraqi Security Forces are still clearing the city’s environs, a necessary step before launching an offensive against the city.

ISW’s Control Map of Ramadi has changed to clarify the positions of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in Ramadi’s environs.

Changes to Map:

ISW has changed the control map of Ramadi from the previous iteration on November 2 to reflect a more refined assessment of where the ISF maintain presence. The ISF are launching efforts to recapture Ramadi from Habaniya base, east of Ramadi. It is likely that the ISF also maintain forward positions around Ramadi but do not have control over much of Ramadi’s outskirts in a doctrinal sense. Rather, they contest Ramadi’s suburbs and surrounding neighborhoods in the outskirts by attacking an area, along with tribal fighters, and then launching clearing operations in the same area. This disposition is more effective than previous tactics that involved the ISF shuttling back and forth between the front lines and its bases, especially if the ISF maintain a forward presence, in the manner of the successful clear and hold operations during the Surge. As these areas are still being cleared but have an ISF presence in them, the relevant areas on the map have been denoted as “Contested with ISF presence.”

Situation Report:

The ISF is approaching three important infrastructural facilities around Ramadi: the Ramadi Barrage, the Warrar Dam, and the Palestine Bridge. Control over these locations is necessary to cut off ISIS’s supply routes into the city as well as to prepare for future operation to recapture the downtown area.   The ISF are advancing towards the Palestine Bridge (2) that connects Albu Thiab area north of Ramadi with the city’s western environs. The ISF are likely advancing towards the bridge from both the east and the west, though this has not been confirmed.   Seizing the bridge is important in order to prevent ISIS from using the Euphrates River to resupply its positions in Ramadi, according to the U.S. military. The ISF are also advancing towards the former Anbar Operations Command (AOC) headquarters compound (8) north of Ramadi, likely from Albu Faraj area east of the compound. The AOC headquarters is a strategic position that overlooks the ISIS-controlled Warrar Dam (4), a key dam that controls Euphrates River water levels and acts as a bridge into Warrar neighborhood in central Ramadi. If the ISF secure the AOC headquarters and approaches the Dam, they will cut off ISIS’s ground access to Ramadi from the north and secure an important facility and access point into the center of the city. Security forces also continued operations to encircle Ramadi and the ISIS-held Ta’mim neighborhood area from the west. The ISF advanced into the Glass Factory area (9) on November 8. This area is adjacent to the Ramadi Barrage (3), a dam that controls water flow to Lake Habaniya, south of Ramadi, and acts as a bridge into the Warrar neighborhood.

If the ISF can hold the Glass Factory and approach the Ramadi Barrage, they would overlook multiple access points into central Ramadi: from the west over the Ramadi Barrage; from the north over Albu Faraj Bridge; and from the Anbar University area and the southern axis. ISW will monitor both whether the ISF around Ramadi ensure that cleared areas remain cleared and the capacity of forward-deployed ISF units to resist ISIS’s counter-attacks. The ISF’s seizure of key infrastructure around the city will set important conditions in the operation to recapture Ramadi from ISIS.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: October 31 - November 10, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola

Key Takeaway: Russian airstrikes continued to support regime ground operations in Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Idlib, and Dera’a from November 9 - 10. Pro-regime forces relieved several hundred regime soldiers besieged by ISIS in the Kuweires Airbase east of Aleppo City on November 10 with air support provided by Russian warplanes. Russian airstrikes began to target ISIS’s positions surrounding Kuweires Airbase on October 12, preceding the start of the regime’s ground campaign against Kuweires on October 15. The regime largely relied upon Russian air power as well as reinforcement from hundreds of Iranian-backed proxy forces. The breaking of the siege represents a significant psychological victory for the regime and its allies. Russia will likely use this victory to validate its intervention in Syria and portray itself and the regime as decisive forces against ISIS in Syria. Russian airstrikes also continued to target rebel-held terrain south of Aleppo City as pro-regime forces continue to push southwest towards the town of Hader.

 

Russian airstrikes targeted Syrian opposition forces in Hama and Idlib Provinces from November 9 - 10 as rebels continued to make gains against regime forces following rebels’ seizure of the town of Morek in northern Hama Province on November 4. Regime forces have in fact lost terrain in Hama Province since the start of Russian airstrikes in Syria on September 30. U.S. support to Syrian rebels has also largely assisted rebel advances in Hama Province. The U.S. provided increased shipments of TOW anti-tank missiles to “moderate” Syrian opposition groups following Russia’s intervention. U.S.-backed rebels launched a total of 115 TOW missiles in the month of October alone.

 

Russian warplanes allegedly targeted the city of Inkhel 50 km north of Dera’a city amidst reports of a buildup of regime military forces in northwestern Dera’a Province. Pro-regime military buildup in southern Syria may indicate the regime’s intent to launch a future offensive to retake the town of Tel Harra in northwest Dera’a, which housed a joint Syrian-Russian signals intelligence (SIGINT) base before rebels seized Tel Harra in October 2014. These reports raise the question of future Russian support towards an Iranian backed regime offensive near the Golan Heights in Southern Syria, particularly in light of recent Russian agreements with Syria’s southern neighbors Israel and Jordan.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.   

 

Pro-Regime Forces Relieve Besieged Airbase in Symbolic Victory

By Christopher Kozak

The Syrian regime and its allies reestablished a ground line of communication (GLOC) to the hitherto-besieged Kuweires Airbase east of Aleppo City in their first significant victory since the start of the Russian air campaign in Syria on September 30. Activist sources and Syrian state television reported that an advance party of regime forces established contact with several hundred Syrian Army soldiers besieged by ISIS in Kuweires Airbase on November 10 after seizing the adjacent village of Kuweires al-Sharqi. Clashes are reportedly ongoing as newly-arrived regime reinforcements attempt to expand the base’s defensive perimeter. The advance marks the culmination of one component of a multi-pronged offensive which began on October 15. The success of the operation relied heavily upon Russian air support as well as reinforcement from hundreds of Iranian-backed proxy fighters. U.S. officials previously reported in mid-October that up to 2,000 Iranian, Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shi’a militia fighters had massed southeast of Aleppo City in order to participate in ongoing offensives targeting Kuweires Airbase as well as rebel-held terrain in the southern Aleppo countryside.

The successful relief of the regime forces trapped in Kuweires Airbase will provide a powerful morale boost to the military forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The operation constitutes a much-needed symbolic victory for the Syrian regime following major territorial losses in the first half of 2015 as well as an initial lack of significant progress following the Russian intervention. The rescue of several hundred Syrian Army soldiers who have been besieged since December 2012 will tamper simmering discontent regarding his conduct of the Syrian Civil War. Alawite populations along the Syrian Coast – a core base of popular support for the Syrian regime – organized several protests this summer criticizing the government for failing to relieve Kuweires Airbase and other besieged pro-regime enclaves in northern Syria.

The Syrian regime’s operational intent following the offensive to secure Kuweires Airbase remains unclear. Kuweires Airbase provides no tangible benefit to the Syrian Air Force, which maintains a well-defended and functional airfield at the Aleppo International Airport thirty kilometers to the west. The position of the base itself, however, provides a potential staging ground for regime forces to conduct follow-on operations that challenge ISIS’s presence in eastern Aleppo Province. A continued presence in Kuweires Airbase could allow the Syrian regime to contest ISIS-held terrain on the eastern outskirts of Aleppo City as well as critical ISIS supply lines connecting ar-Raqqa City to the Turkish border. Claims that the elite Syrian Army ‘Tiger Forces’ will soon redeploy from Kuweires to Hama Province nevertheless suggest that the Syrian regime does not intend to use the airfield as a launch pad for major offensive operations in the near-future. The base also remains vulnerable to an ISIS counterattack unless regime forces can seize additional terrain to provide their salient with defense-in-depth. Alternatively, the Syrian regime may intend to withdraw from Kuweires Airbase after securing safe passage for the exfiltration of the base’s garrison. A withdrawal from the airfield would free significant amounts of manpower, equipment, and aerial resupply assets for use on other fronts.

The advances east of Aleppo City nonetheless do little to change the immediate strategic outlook for President Assad. Pro-regime forces have thus far achieved only tactical gains throughout other parts of northwestern Syria despite expanded support from Russia and Iran. Meanwhile, rebel forces seized the operationally-significant town of Morek along the strategic M5 Highway on November 5 as part of a new offensive threatening regime-held Hama City. ISIS also continues to pressure key supply lines for the Syrian regime in both Homs and Aleppo Provinces. Activists reported that ISIS deployed a convoy of at least forty vehicles from ar-Raqqa City to eastern Aleppo Province on November 9 in a likely response to the imminent fall of Kuweires Airbase. These challenges suggest that the Syrian regime and its allies will struggle to translate symbolic gains into enduring operational success.

UPDATE: Posture of Syrian Regime and Allies: November 9, 2015

By Christopher Kozak

For additional information on Russian military activity in Syria, see: 

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: October 29 - November 8, 2015

Iraq Situation Report: November 3 - 9, 2015

by Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: October 29 - November 8, 2015

  By Jodi Brignola and Jennifer Cafarella

 

Key Takeaway: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed airstrikes in Aleppo, Damascus, Idlib, Lattakia, Homs, Hama, and Raqqa from November 6 – November 8. Credible local sources substantiated strike claims in Aleppo, Damascus, Idlib, Homs, and Hama during this time period, but failed to verify reports of Russian airstrikes in Raqqa province. Russian airstrikes continued to support regime ground operations with limited effect. Russian warplanes targeted rebel-held territory in Aleppo city and in the southwestern Aleppo countryside amidst ongoing clashes between pro-regime and rebel forces in the area. Pro-regime forces have failed numerous attempts to advance on the ground. Russian airstrikes also targeted rebel-held territory in Idlib and Hama countrysides, likely in response to continued rebel advances in Northern Hama. Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and rebel forces seized the strategic town of Morek, north of Hama City on November 4 and continued to make tactical gains in the surrounding villages including Ashtan and Um Hartayn on November 6. Rebel advances in Hama indicate that the Russian air campaign is insufficient to prevent rebel gains in the area amidst increased shipments of U.S. TOW anti-tank missiles to moderate rebels. It is possible that rebel forces are taking advantage of a decrease in Russian rotary wing air support following the deployment of Russian helicopters to the T4 (Tiyas) and Sharyat airbases in Homs on November 4.

 

Russian airstrikes also targeted ISIS-held territory in Aleppo and Homs Provinces from November 6 to November 8. Russian warplanes targeted ISIS-held towns of al-Bab in Northeastern Aleppo and Palmyra and Maheen in Eastern Homs. Russian strikes near the Kuweires airbase east of Aleppo city, besieged by ISIS set conditions for a renewed regime advance toward the base after regime forces regained control of the Khanaser-Ithraya highway from ISIS on November 4. Re-establishing control of the highway allowed the regime to reinforce Kuweires and seize the village of Sheikh Ahmad, three kilometers south of the airbase on November 9. Coalition warplanes also targeted ISIS-held territory from November 6 to November 8, conducting strikes in Hasakah, Deir ez-Zour, and northern Aleppo. Both Russian and coalition airstrikes are therefore occurring in northern Aleppo and possibly Deir ez Zour and Raqqa against ISIS, exercising de-confliction and raising questions of varying effects upon ground conditions. Coalition airstrikes are precise, whereas Russian airstrikes continued to target civilian populations despite Russian claims to the contrary. Russian strikes on Douma in the Eastern Ghouta suburb of Damascus killed at least 23 civilians, including women and children on November 7. The strike follows recent regime aerial attacks in Douma, the stronghold of prominent Islamist group Jaysh al-Islam. The regime and Russia likely seek to disrupt an ongoing offensive by Jaysh al-Islam against pro-regime forces south of Douma near regime-held neighborhoods in Damascus.  

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.  

 

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: October 27 - November 5, 2015

By: Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola 

Key Takeaway: Russian warplanes continued to target core ISIS-held terrain in Syria following regime anti-ISIS operations in Homs and Aleppo. Russian airstrikes targeted ISIS’s positions in ar-Raqqa, Homs, and reportedly Deir ez-Zour from November 4 - 5. Local sources reported that Russian airstrikes targeted the ISIS-held town of Albu Kamal near the Iraqi border in Deir ez-Zour Province on November 5, claiming that the strikes killed over 50 civilians. If confirmed, the airstrikes would be the farthest Russian warplanes have travelled to conduct strikes since the start of Russia’s air campaign in Syria on September 30. The majority of Russian strikes, however, targeted rebel-held areas in the provinces of Damascus, Idlib, Latakia, and Aleppo. Russian air operations continue to bolster the Syrian regime in its fight against the Syrian opposition rather than ISIS.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation. 

Russia Repositions Military Assets in Syria as ISIS Advances in Homs

by: Jennifer Cafarella and Kaitlynn Menoche

Russia shifted military assets into Eastern Homs Province in response to an ISIS offensive against pro-regime forces south of Homs City that began on November 1, 2015. Russia positioned at least five attack helicopters at the T4 (Tiyas) military airbase and additional rotary wing aircraft at the Shayrat military east of Homs City by November 4. Russia is also operating rotary wing aircraft out of the Hama military airport, while their fixed wing aircraft remain based at the Bassel al-Assad military airbase in Latakia. Russia has also deployed an additional 2,000 personnel to Syria since the start of  its air campaign on September 30, according to U.S. security officials, though it is unclear whether these personnel are located at these bases in Eastern Homs Province. Russia also maintains a military base at the Hama municipal stadium, which likely houses Russian military personnel. The Russians have spoken of the plus-up. Russian Air Force Commander Viktor Bondarev, in an interview on November 5, stated “we sent not just fighter planes, strike aircraft, and helicopters but also anti-aircraft rocket systems” because “we took into account every possible threat.” It is unclear whether Bondarev’s remarks indicate that Russia has deployed additional anti-aircraft Systems to Syria since the start of Russian airstrikes in Syria on September 30, 2015.

An ISIS offensive against pro-regime forces south of Homs City prompted some of the Russian deployment into Eastern Homs Province. ISIS captured the desert city of Palmyra in May 2015 and has been positioning itself for further offensives toward Homs. ISIS advanced westward from the town of Quryatayn in southeastern Homs Province on November 1. It seized the regime-held town of Mahin and attacked the neighboring town of Sadad, located less than 15 km. east of the M5 highway. ISIS likely seeks to seize portions of the M5 highway south of Homs City, possibly by seizing the town of Hasiya and the adjacent industrial city on the highway. Capturing the town would sever the regime’s ground line of communication (GLOC) from Homs City to Damascus, limiting the regime’s ability to move forces between fronts in southern and central Syria.

ISIS may be pursuing other operational level goals with the new offensive.  It could seek to fix regime forces away from the regime-held T4 (Tiyas) airbase east of Homs City. ISIS has launched periodic attacks against the airbase since the capture of Palmyra and has stated its intent to capture it.  ISIS could instead intend to seize the Shayrat military airbase, located less than 30 kilometers northwest of Mahin. ISIS will likely attack pro-regime forces on multiple axes in a future offensive against any of these regime-held positions and is .  positioned to conduct a pincer movement on any of the objectives listed here.  ISIS has a support zone in the northeastern corner of Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, bordering Syria, and could simultaneously attack Hezbollah forces concentrated south of Homs City from Lebanon in order to disrupt the ability of pro-regime forces to respond. ISW forecasted in mid-September that ISIS would most likely launch a multi-pronged offensive to seize either the T4 or Shayrat military airbases, and most dangerously attack south of Homs near Qusayr.

ISIS has been conducting mutually supporting operations to thwart the Russian-backed ground advance in several locations. ISIS had severed the regime’s ground line of communications (GLOC) from Hama to Aleppo City on October 23, before its assault south of Homs City, and had seized multiple checkpoints along the road between the towns of Ithriya and Khannaser. ISIS also attacked the regime’s command and control node in Safira, southeast of Aleppo City along the GLOC, on October 28. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members in Northern Syria appear to headquarter in Safira, as evidenced by the death of multiple IRGC officers in the area since 2012. Russian special forces are coordinating airstrikes on behalf of the regime in Syria, and could also be present in Safira. ISIS’s attack against Safira forced the regime to abandon an ongoing offensive to break ISIS’s siege on the Kuweiris airbase east of Aleppo City. Pro-regime forces repelled ISIS from Safira and regained control of the GLOC by November 4 with the support of Russian airstrikes in Aleppo.

The Russian deployment to the T4 and Shayrat airbases positions Russia to blunt the ISIS advance using airpower. Russia has also increased the defensive fortifications of both bases, likely including heavy artillery. Russia conducted airstrikes against ISIS in Eastern Syria from November 2-3, including positions near Quryatayn and Palmyra. These strikes did not directly target the ISIS forces attacking Sadad and are not the first Russian airstrikes against ISIS in Eastern Syria. It is possible, however, that Russia will shift fixed wing aircraft to either the T4 or Shayrat military airbases in order to increase its air sorties against ISIS in Eastern Syria. The forward deployment of attack helicopters in Homs could also support a future regime offensive to retake the ISIS-held city of Palmyra, although such an offensive appears unlikely in the near term.

ISIS’s attacks in Aleppo and Homs Provinces demonstrate that ISIS remains capable of launching offensive operations in Western Syria in November 2015. ISIS attacked strategic regime terrain in both Northern and Central Syria in quick succession, forcing the regime and its Russian backers to alter their deployment. ISIS is likely setting conditions for a major offensive by stressing the regime’s ability to defend core terrain on numerous fronts. ISIS has thus far focused its major attacks on pro-regime forces but will likely attack rebel-held terrain in Western Syria if the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) successfully isolates ar-Raqqa City from the north. The current strategy of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition does not adequately account for this risk; the U.S. does not have sufficient ground partners in Western Syria to prevent further expansion by ISIS. The U.S. must develop an alternate strategy to prevent ISIS from expanding into Western Syria in order to preserve the impact of counter-ISIS operations in Northern Syria on ISIS's overall strength in Syria.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: October 25 - November 3, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola

 

Key Takeaway: Russian airstrikes largely shifted to target ISIS following new advances by the group in southern Homs Province. Russian warplanes targeted ISIS’s positions near Qaraytan and Palmyra in the eastern countryside of Homs as well as in ar-Raqqah City from November 2 - 3 approximately 24 hours after ISIS seized Maheen southeast of Homs City. Russia is therefore able to alter its Air Tasking Order (ATO) to designate new theater targets within 24 hours in Syria. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed to conduct airstrikes using precision weapons near Palmyra, southeastern Aleppo Province, and Deir ez-Zour in direct coordination with the Syrian opposition. These claims support Russia’s disingenuous attempt to pressure the U.S. to work together to protect moderate rebels. Russia reportedly deployed five attack helicopters to the T4 (Tiyas) Airbase in eastern Homs Province along the highway between Homs City and Palmyra, according to an anonymous U.S. military official on November 3. The unnamed official also stated that Russia deployed aircraft to the Shayrat Military Airbase less than 30 kilometers northwest of Maheen. Syrian activists previously reported on October 31 that the Syrian regime redeployed all of its aircraft from Shayrat Military Airbase to the T4 and Hama Military Airbases. Russian military presence in eastern Homs could provide aerial reconnaissance for Russian strikes in the area as an alternative or augmentation to Syrian rebel intelligence to guide Russian airstrikes.

 

ISIS maintains the ability to pressure regime-held terrain despite the shift in Russian airstrikes. ISIS continued to clash with regime forces in the town of Sadad northwest of Maheen on November 3. ISIS’s expansion threatens regime control of the strategic M5 Highway connecting Damascus to Homs City. Credible local sources also reported that Russian airstrikes continued to target rebel-held areas in the southern countryside of Aleppo, southern Idlib Province, and the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus from November 2 – 3 simultaneously. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.