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Tuesday, April 12, 2016

Afghanistan Partial Threat Assessment: April 12, 2016

By Caitlin Forrest with Harleen Gambhir

ISW last published its Afghanistan Threat Assessment on February 23, 2016.

The ANSF is unprepared to counter the Taliban militants’ summer campaign. Northern warlords will take advantage of Taliban militants’ gains to establish themselves as security providers and gain leverage against the fragile National Unity Government.

Readiness gaps challenge the assumptions behind the U.S.’s current plan to draw down from 9,800 to 5,500 troops by the end of January 2017. General John W. Nicholson took command of U.S. and NATO Forces in Afghanistan from General John Campbell on March 2. On April 4, GEN Nicholson stated the U.S. is behind schedule to train a self-sufficient Afghan security force. The ANSF will be particularly pressed as the Taliban intensify their operations under the banner of their summer campaign, “Operation Omari,” which they announced on April 12. Taliban militants seek to degrade the ANSF, discourage foreign presence, and demonstrate the weakness of the unity government during Operation Omari. They will achieve these objectives through increased insider attacks, assassination campaigns, and attacks against Western and diplomatic targets in Kabul City and beyond. Taliban militants also seek to gain control of additional territory, for which they have already set conditions over the winter.

The National Unity Government ordered the ANSF on April 6 to adopt a more offensive strategy by consolidating forces in strategic areas instead of defending static check posts, a shift supported by NATO forces. Preliminary applications of this strategy allowed Taliban militants to solidify control in the areas abandoned by the ANSF, specifically in Musa Qal’ah and Now Zad Districts in Helmand and Shahid-e Hassas District in Uruzgan in late February and early March. This consolidation will likely mitigate actual and potential manpower losses. It will not counter the Taliban militants’ summer offensive, as militants currently threaten Helmand’s provincial capital Lashkar Gah despite the ANSF’s attempts to reinforce the city in late February. 

Taliban militants are also consolidating power under leading Taliban commander Mullah Akhtar Mansour. He has reconciled with the late Taliban leader Mullah Omar’s brother and son, who originally challenged Akhtar Mansour’s claim to power. Haqqani Network leader and Mansour’s deputy emir Sirajuddin Haqqani allegedly brokered this mediation, indicating the Haqqani Network’s stake in a unified Taliban front. This reconciliation follows Pakistan’s rumored arrest of leading dissident Taliban commander Mullah Rasul Akhund on March 22. The mediation and possible arrest suggest that Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) aim to present a united Taliban militant force this summer.

Northern warlords and political opposition groups are increasing pressure on the fragile National Unity Government in the face of these security challenges, hindering the administration’s ability to respond to insurgent offensives. Northern warlords are taking advantage of this pressure to extract concessions. General Atta Noor and General Abdul Rashid Dostum preemptively activated their competing personal militias in Balkh, Faryab, and Jowzjan Provinces in late February and early March in order to counter the Taliban militants’ summer campaign. Atta and Dostum seek to establish themselves as leading security providers, challenging national institutions and one another. Political opposition groups like the Afghanistan Protection and Stability Council (APSC) and the newly formed National Solidarity parliamentary bloc continue to criticize the National Unity Government for its inability to provide security or enact electoral reforms, pressuring the Ghani-Abdullah administration. President Ashraf Ghani has responded to this criticism by dismissing several significant government officials in late March in a struggle over cabinet composition and electoral reform with CEO and rival Abdullah Abdullah. Atta is Abdullah Abdullah’s primary backer, and his saber rattling is aimed at President Ghani. Dostum, the sitting First Vice President, recently reconciled with Ashraf Ghani and returned to participating actively in government. He has mobilized to counter Atta, as well as the Taliban.



1. Militants attacked heavily fortified areas in Kabul City, launching four explosive attacks against security and diplomatic targets from March 25 to 29. ISIS Wilayat Khorasan militants also indicated intent to attack Kabul City by claiming two unconfirmed attacks in southern Kabul on April 6. These attacks will likely increase following the announcement of the Taliban militants’ summer offensive “Operation Omari” on April 12.
2. Clearing operations continued to displace ISIS Wilayat Khorasan militants from Nangarhar Province into other eastern provinces. ISIS’s militants reportedly moved to Sar Kani District, Kunar Province following ANSF clearing operations in Nangarhar Province in late March. ISIS militants also conducted their first attack in Ghazni Province north of Ghazni City on March 11 and reportedly continued recruiting in Ghazni and Zabul Provinces, including Gelan, Jaghuri, and Khak-e Afghan Districts in early April. Some ISIS militants remain in southern Nangarhar despite a significant increase in U.S. airstrikes and ANSF clearing operations, with some allegedly pledging allegiance to Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour on April 11.
3. ANSF retook Reg-e Khan Neshin District Center in Helmand Province with support from US airstrikes on March 28 after Taliban militants briefly captured it on March 15, demonstrating the effectiveness of ANSF operations combined with U.S. airstrikes. Taliban militants control seven districts in Helmand Province, however, and are contesting areas surrounding the provincial capital Lashkar Gah. ISW has updated this version of its Afghanistan map to reflect Taliban militants’ longstanding control of Baghran District Center in Helmand, which is now among ISW’s researched districts. The map now also reflects Taliban militants’ effective control of Kajaki District Center, as the ANSF is reportedly unable to maneuver beyond a fixed position at the nearby Kajaki dam.
4. Rival Taliban militant factions participated in large-scale clashes in Shindand District, Herat Province. Shindand District is a launching pad for militant operations in western Afghanistan. The district is currently a stronghold for leading dissident Taliban commander Mullah Rasul Akhund’s faction.
5. Rival Northern Warlords First Vice President General Abdul Rashid Dostum and Balkh Provincial Governor Mohammad Atta Noor conducted competing operations against Taliban militants in Faryab, Jowzjan and Balkh Provinces in late February and early March. Competition between the rival warlords intensified when Dostum and Atta’s supporters staged protests and counter-protests in Mazar-e Sharif and Maimanah Cities on March 22 and 23. Competition between these northern warlords reflects competition between President Ghani, linked with Ghani, and CEO Abdullah Abdullah, whom Atta backs, and challenges the legitimacy of the National Unity Government by strengthening militias conducting operations outside of government control.
6. Taliban militants recaptured Dand-e Ghori area, Pul-e Khumri DistrictBaghlan Province, returning to the area on March 24 after the ANSF conducted multiple clearing operations. Dand-e Ghori lies on the main road connecting northern Baghlan and Balkh provincial capitals Pul-e Khumri and Mazar-e Sharif and was originally captured by Taliban militants in last year’s spring offensive. Control of this area enables militants to attack Pul-e Khumri City and disrupt travel to Mazar-e Sharif. Taliban militants may have seized the area as a means of demonstrating Pashtun strength in response to protests and militia operations by Uzbek Dostum and Tajik Atta. The capture of Dand-e Ghori immediately followed protests in Mazar-e Sharif and Maimanah on March 22 and 23. Militants also attacked Dowlatabad City in late March in Faryab after Dostum’s operations in the province.


Warning: Political Crisis in Iraq's Parliament as PM Abadi's Reforms Presented

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

The session of the Council of Representatives (CoR) to select a new cabinet for the government dissolved into chaos when political blocs could not reach an agreement over the cabinet’s final composition. The CoR members burst into an uproar when CoR Speaker Juburi announced the decision that followed a closed-door meeting of Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, CoR Speaker Juburi, and the heads of several political blocs during a recess of the CoR session. Reportedly over 100 members of the CoR began a sit-in in the CoR to protest the decision by CoR Speaker Salim al-Juburi to postpone the vote on the cabinet reshuffle until Thursday, April 14. The protesters’ demands include the removal of PM Abadi, President Fuad Masoum, and CoR Speaker Juburi, as well as the end to political quotas determining the composition of the cabinet. Several members also demanded that the CoR vote on PM Abadi’s original list of technocratic candidates presented on March 31, and not the April 12 list of candidates that constituted a compromise between technocrats and political appointees. An unconfirmed source stated that there are at least 114 signatures for their removal. The participants appear to be cross-sectarian; members of the Sunni Etihad bloc, the Shi’a State of Law Alliance, and the Sadrist Trend are participating, Members that have a strong dislike for one another are also participating; senior Sadrist Trend member Hakim al-Zamili, for example, is participating alongside Hassan Salam, a CoR member linked to the Iranian proxy militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.


[Above: CoR members stage a sit-in in the CoR to protest the postponement of the vote to select the new cabinet until April 14.]

Monday, April 11, 2016

Iraq Situation Report: April 5 - 11, 2016

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: Political blocs continue to jockey for influence over the final composition of the Council of Ministers (CoM) amid increased threats to Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi’s position. Reuters reported on April 6 that U.S. and Iranian officials intervened to “stave off” an initiative by Vice President Nouri al-Maliki to oust PM Abadi, with the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Quds Force, Qassim Suleimani, reportedly intervening in order to prevent any change in the Iraqi government. Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, speaking in Baghdad on April 8, reiterated that the U.S. administration had unequivocal support for PM Abadi. U.S., and notably Iranian, support for the notion of keeping PM Abadi in his position indicate that PM Abadi will likely remain Prime Minister, as political blocs will be hesitant to oppose U.S. and Iranian directives. However, it also looks increasingly likely that political blocs will determine the final composition of the cabinet and will not select technocrats for the ministerial positions or other senior government posts, as PM Abadi originally intended. The Council of Representatives (CoR) is slated to discuss the new cabinet on April 12, but the date could be further delayed or the session blocked by a lack of quorum if no agreement can be reached before the CoR session. It remains to be seen how the Kurdistan Alliance, the most vocal opponents of the cabinet reshuffle, and Muqtada al-Sadr, who has positioned himself as a leader of the reform process and the strongest supporter of the cabinet reshuffle, will react to the new cabinet changes. However, both have previously stated they will pursue a no-confidence vote or withdraw from government if their vision of the cabinet reshuffle are not met, courses of action that have the potential to seriously undermine the stability of the government. It thus looks increasingly likely that any substantial changes in government will be delayed, if they occur at all. Meanwhile, the U.S. is considering building additional firebases in northern Iraq to support operations to recapture Ninewa that have stalled due to stiff resistance from ISIS and manpower issues. The proposal would provide necessary assistance for the ground offensive while demonstrating U.S. support for the Iraqi Security Forces and the Iraqi government, though these additions may not be significant enough factors to make up for the limited number of ISF members currently engaged in operations.


Thursday, April 7, 2016

Aleppo Warning Update: April 7, 2016

By: Christopher Kozak


Key Takeaway: Aleppo Province stands to become the focal point of a new round of violence in the Syrian Civil War even as the Geneva III Talks to end the conflict are scheduled to resume on April 13. Continued violations of an ongoing ‘cessation of hostilities’ by both pro-regime and opposition factions have fueled the largest outbreak of violence in northern Syria since the agreement went into effect on February 27, threatening to drive a wider breakdown of the tenuous ceasefire. Additional violence can also be expected in northern Aleppo Province over the coming weeks as Turkey and the U.S. vie over the course and composition of coalition-led efforts to sever the ground lines of communication between Ar-Raqqa City and the Syrian-Turkish Border. Turkey has worked to empower opposition groups in Aleppo Province in order to foil the territorial gains made by the Syrian Kurdish YPG, which the U.S. relies upon in the counter-ISIS fight. The regime and its allies also retain positions at the Kuweires Airbase from which to contest ISIS-held portions of Aleppo Province. This local competition for control over Aleppo Province – and the larger geopolitical struggle between the U.S., Russia, Iran, and Turkey that it reflects – will reach a critical boiling point in the coming months.

1. Hostilities Resume in Southern Aleppo Province: Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra and a coalition of other opposition groups – including several U.S.-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA)-affiliated factions – seized the strategic town of Al-Eis in southern Aleppo Province on April 1 following clashes that involved at least three SVBIED detonations. The Syrian Arab Army released a statement condemning the offensive as a major violation of the ‘cessation of hostilities’ and vowing to recapture the town, while opposition groups presented the attack as a justified counterattack in response to persistent ceasefire violations by pro-regime forces throughout the country. Pro-regime forces have mobilized for a counteroffensive amidst reports that Russia resumed its air campaign in Aleppo Province. Iran also announced the deployment of ‘advisors’ from its conventional armed forces in a significant inflection of its own intervention in Syria. The mounting military escalation in southern Aleppo Province heightened further on April 5 after prominent Salafi-Jihadist group Ahrar al-Sham downed a regime warplane over Al-Eis. The incident comes amidst persistent rumors that Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other foreign actors may intend to provide the opposition with a small number of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) as a counter the air campaign being conducted by Russia in Syria.

2. Kurds and Opposition Skirmish in Aleppo City: The Syrian Democratic Forces – a coalition composed of the Syrian Kurdish YPG and allied opposition factions – clashed with Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra and other opposition groups in the Sheikh Maqsoud District of Aleppo City on April 5. Activist groups accused the Syrian Democratic Forces of cooperating with the regime in order to sever the key Castello Highway that supplies opposition-held Aleppo City. Long-standing tensions with the Syrian Kurds have flared into open violence in the past few months after the Syrian Democratic Forces assisted the regime in severing the primary ground line of communication between Aleppo City and Turkey in February 2016.

3. Turkish-Backed Opposition Advances on Syrian-Turkish Border: The Hawar Kilis Operations Room – a coalition of opposition groups backed by the U.S. and Turkey – seized the ISIS-held town of Al-Rai in northern Aleppo Province on April 7. Al-Rai serves as a key route for illegal cross-border smuggling of foreign fighters and supplies to ISIS in Syria. The advance comes as part of an ongoing offensive along the Syrian – Turkish Border that seized at least sixteen villages from ISIS since March 31. Turkey has intensified its provision of weapons, cross-border artillery fire, and other forms of support to opposition forces in northern Aleppo Province in recent months in a likely attempt to preclude further gains in the border region by the Syrian Kurdish YPG.

4. The U.S. and Turkey Spar Over Counter-ISIS Operations: The Syrian Democratic Forces – a coalition composed of the Syrian Kurdish YPG and allied opposition factions – announced preparations for an upcoming military operation to seize the ISIS-held city of Manbij in eastern Aleppo Province. Manbij is a major hub for foreign fighters and supplies transiting the Syrian-Turkish Border, thus representing a key objective for the U.S.-led coalition in its efforts to isolate Ar-Raqqa City. The operation nonetheless faces significant hurdles. Local Arab and Turkmen tribes have reportedly resisted overtures to participate in the operation due to the alleged mistreatment of civilians in regions previously-cleared by the Syrian Kurdish YPG. Meanwhile, Turkish President Recep Erdogan reportedly linked his support for the operation to demands for participating Sunni Arab factions to disavow their ties with the Syrian Democratic Forces as well as calls for the U.S. to provide additional air support to Turkish-backed opposition groups in northern Aleppo Province. The U.S. and Turkey held a technical meeting on April 4 in order to discuss the operation but the issue remains contentious given the links between the Syrian Kurdish YPG and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a designated terrorist group currently waging an active insurgency in southern Turkey.

Monday, April 4, 2016

Iraq Situation Report: March 29 - April 4, 2016

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: ISIS conducted a wave of explosive attacks across Iraq aimed at disrupting the forward operations of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Coalition-trained elements of the ISF, supported by local forces, converged on Hit District in western Anbar and the village of al-Nasr, west of Makhmur, conducting operations aimed at recapturing areas on key ground lines of communication. ISIS launched a responsive wave of suicide attacks in both Hit and Makhmur, as well as in the vicinity of Baghdad, primarily aimed at hard targets in order to arrest the ISF’s forward progress and to force a contraction of security forces towards Baghdad and central Iraq. The attacks included suicide attacks on April 4 in Basra and Dhi Qar Provinces, areas that have not seen spectacular attacks since October 2015 and June 2014, respectively. The attacks, combined with the spectacular attacks in Babil Province on March 6 and 25, indicate that ISIS is reconstituting capabilities in southern Iraq. Continued spectacular attacks and instability in the southern provinces would have the potential to seriously restrict the ability of the ISF and Popular Mobilization to conduct operations in northern and western Iraq, as forces would need to redeploy to southern Iraq, an area where few ISF formations are present, to re-establish security.


Monday, March 28, 2016

Iraq Situation Report: March 22 - 28, 2016

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: Pressure continues to mount on Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi to reshuffle the cabinet. Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr gave PM Abadi until March 26 to submit the list of nominations for the new cabinet to the Council of Representatives (CoR). However, discussions underway in the pan-Shi’a political body, the National Alliance, over what positions blocs will retain in the new government stalled the reshuffle process, and PM Abadi missed the deadline as a result. In response, Sadr initiated his own sit-in inside of a tent in the Green Zone on March 27 to pressure PM Abadi to conduct reforms, refusing to meet with politicians and government officials. Political blocs meanwhile have pressured PM Abadi to conduct reforms to their own preferences, seeking to preserve their positions and increase their representation within the cabinet. Groups like the Sunni Etihad and the Kurdistan Alliance refused to submit nominations for the new cabinet positions, citing concerns over the unclear selection process. Meanwhile, the National Alliance decided on March 27 to form a new sub-committee aimed at “advising” PM Abadi during the cabinet reshuffle process. However, the presence of Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri and Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman Faleh al-Fayadh on the committee indicate that Iranian proxies are attempting to direct the final outcome of the cabinet reshuffle, an outcome that would undermine the U.S.’s ability to continue its advise-and-assist mission in Iraq and effectively combat ISIS. PM Abadi is being pulled in multiple directions by Sadr, pro-Iranian elements, and non-Shi’a political blocs in a way that makes it impossible to satisfy all parties involved. It is a distinct possibility that multiple political blocs will reject PM Abadi’s cabinet submission on Thursday, or that he may not be able to submit it at all, given the disparate demands of the political blocs. PM Abadi may thus face the real possibility of a questioning session and a subsequent vote of no-confidence if the reform process continues to stall.


Sunday, March 27, 2016

Russian-Syrian-Iranian Coalition Seizes ISIS-Held Palmyra

By Christopher Kozak

Pro-regime forces seized Palmyra as well as the adjacent Palmyra Airbase in Eastern Homs Province on March 27 after ISIS withdrew from the city, completing an operation that began on March 7 with the aim of recapturing the strategic crossroads. The Syrian Arab Army and its auxiliary National Defense Forces conducted multiple offensives against ISIS in the western countryside of Palmyra in the eight months after its rapid fall to ISIS in May 2015, achieving limited tactical gains at a high cost in manpower and equipment. The latest offensive proceeded as a three-pronged frontal assault similar to previous regime-directed operations against Palmyra, displaying little-to-none of the sophisticated operational design that characterized the recent campaign in Aleppo Province. Instead, the regime relied upon large numbers of reinforcements from Russia, Iran, and other foreign backers as well as a lull in combat generated by a nationwide ‘cessation of hostilities’ that began on February 27 in order to generate sufficient combat power to overwhelm ISIS in Palmyra.


Russia played a major role in enabling the successful seizure of Palmyra following months of indecisive engagements. The Russian Armed Forces shifted the focus of its air campaign against Palmyra and its environs in March 2016 despite a drawdown announced by Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 14. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to conduct at least 41 sorties against 146 targets near Palmyra between March 22 and March 24 alone, while local activists reported that the constant aerial bombardment has destroyed up to fifty percent of the city. Russia paired its air campaign with a significant deployment of ground forces. ISIS claimed to kill up to five Russian Spetznaz personnel west of Palmyra on March 18 and posted images appearing to show one of the men standing in front of the symbol of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). Russia later confirmed that at least one special forces officer died near Palmyra while “directing airstrikes onto terrorist targets” near Palmyra.  Media reports also revealed the deployment of Russian TOS-1 and BM-30 ‘Smerch’ heavy multiple rocket launcher systems as well as Mi-24 ‘Hind’ helicopter gunships in support of operations to seize Palmyra.

The regime also received significant reinforcements on the ground in Eastern Homs Province in recent weeks, allegedly raising the total number of participants in the operation to over five thousand personnel. Activists noted that the offensive included hundreds of fighters from Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi’a Militias, and the Afghan Shi’a Liwa al-Fatimiyoun. The death of a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps near Palmyra on March 16 suggests that Iran also deployed its own ground forces in order to oversee its coalition of proxy forces in the operation. Meanwhile, the regime deployed a convoy of up to one thousand Syrian Marines and pro-regime militiamen from the Syrian Coast to Eastern Homs Province on March 18. These redeployments were enabled in part by the ongoing ‘cessation of hostilities’ which allowed the regime and its allies to withdraw troops from its frontlines with opposition groups in Latakia, Aleppo, and Quneitra Provinces without major risk.

The fall of Palmyra represents a major victory on the international stage for both Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The new gains allow the Russian-Iranian-Syrian coalition to claim a significant win in the fight against ISIS, bolstering its narrative as the ideal partner in the anti-ISIS campaign. This message may stand to gain additional traction within Europe in the aftermath of a major terrorist attack by ISIS in Brussels, Belgium on March that killed thirty-one civilians and wounded several hundred others. The advance also bolsters the current position of strength held by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad amidst the ongoing Geneva III Talks to end the Syrian Civil War. The seizure of Palmyra curtails the ability of ISIS to project force into Western Syria from its safe haven along the Euphrates River Valley and provides a much-needed buffer for several critical regime-held oil and natural gas fields that provide electricity to Western Syria. The regime and its allies will likely leverage Palmyra and its military facilities as an optimal forward position for follow-on operations against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa and Deir ez-Zour Cities, complicating the position of the U.S.-led coalition in the region.

Friday, March 25, 2016

ISIS’s Campaign in Europe: March 2016

By Harleen Gambhir with Claire Coyne and ISW’s Counterterrorism Team

ISIS is using its foreign fighters and safe haven in Iraq and Syria to execute a terror campaign within Europe. ISIS’s March 22 Brussels attacks support a larger strategy to punish, destabilize, and polarize the West. ISIS will likely continue to attempt attacks in France and Belgium in 2016, using its large Francophone foreign fighter population and local supporters. ISIS’s support networks in southern Europe may enable ISIS’s operatives to launch operations in other parts of the continent, including Austria, Germany, Spain, and Italy. ISIS may also increasingly target Westerners in Turkey in order to punish members of the anti-ISIS coalition and undermine the Turkish economy, as part of its stated objective to seize Constantinople. Current efforts to address these threats through law enforcement, surgical strikes on ISIS’s leadership, and linear attrition of ISIS’s terrain and resources are necessary but not sufficient to destroy the ISIS threat to Europe. The anti-ISIS coalition must deprive ISIS of its primary source of strength, its territorial control as a caliphate in Iraq, Syria, and now Libya.

ISIS’s suicide bombings in Brussels demonstrate that the jihadist threat to Europe is outpacing domestic and international law enforcement efforts. ISIS is successfully using its safe haven in Iraq and Syria to train as many as 600 foreign fighters for external attacks. ISIS’s fighters benefit from extensive support networks across the European continent. The logistical requirements for facilitating European foreign fighter travel into Iraq and Syria can also export those fighters from ISIS’s safe havens back to Europe. Reports following the November 2015 Paris attacks and the recent Brussels attacks indicate European governments have incomplete, fragmented intelligence on the identity and communications of ISIS’s members in Europe. ISIS likely retains attack cells and logistical networks within Europe that will enable it to launch additional spectacular attacks, with support from the organization’s leadership within Iraq and Syria.

ISW last published its ISIS’s Campaign in Europe map on December 2015. The graphic below updates that visualization to depict all attacks inspired or coordinated by ISIS in Europe from January 2014 to present. This group includes attempted and successful attacks in the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Turkey. The graphic also marks locations where ISIS-linked individuals have been arrested in that timeframe. Locations with more than two arrest events are depicted with opaque circles with varying sizes depending on the number of events. Events that occurred at an unspecified location within a country are marked on that country’s capitol. The graphic also highlights where ISIS has directed public threats or recruitment calls. Individuals inspired by and responsive to ISIS are active across Europe, particularly in France, Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom. ISIS-linked attacks and arrests in Europe are distinct from ISIS’s activity in Turkey, which reflects spillover from ISIS's campaigns in Iraq and Syria as well as ISIS's campaign to attack the West.



ISIS’s Objectives in Europe

The Brussels attacks are recent successes in ISIS’s long-standing strategy to punish, destabilize, and polarize the West. The Brussels attacks are recent successes in ISIS’s long-standing strategy to punish, destabilize, and polarize the West. ISIS’s leadership has encouraged supporters outside of Iraq and Syria to launch lone wolf attacks since September 2014. It has facilitated more sophisticated attacks by deploying foreign fighters to Europe since at least January 2015, when Belgian counterterrorism forces raided an ISIS attack cell in Molenbeek, Brussels. ISIS seeks to punish those attacking it in Iraq and Syria, as reflected in its post-Brussels statements criticizing “Crusader Belgium” and framing the attacks as a response to “aggression against the Islamic State.”

ISIS also aims to destabilize Europe more broadly through spectacular attacks. ISIS seeks to exacerbate tensions between European states, raise defensive requirements within those states, cause an environment of fear, and inflict additional economic damage on Europe. An official ISIS media outlet affirmed each of these operational objectives in a publication released January 2016. The graphic claimed the November 2015 Paris attacks “[weakened] European cohesion” and caused “demands to repeal the Schengen Agreement.” It also argued that the Paris attacks caused tension between France and Belgium over intelligence failures. It celebrated how the attacks created a “general state of unease” and predicted that decreased tourism revenues and increased security requirements would cost Europe “tens of billions of dollars.” ISIS’s directed and inspired attacks set conditions for the organization’s desired apocalyptic war by draining resources and exacerbating internal conflict in the West.



European unity is already threatened by financial pressures, debates over refugee policy, and Russian-funded far-right parties. ISIS’s successful attacks in Paris strengthened the position of European anti-immigrant parties, shown by support for France’s National Front (FN) party in first-round regional elections in December 2015 and the victories of Germany’s Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD) party in state elections in March 2016. The Brussels attacks may strengthen organizations calling for Britain’s exit from the European Union, as indicated by U.K. Independence Party defense spokesman Mike Hookem’s March 23 claim that the attacks proved “Schengen free movement and lax border controls are a threat to our security.”

ISIS’s attacks and resultant European disunity will undermine efforts to address the regional refugee crisis, as demonstrated by Poland’s decision on March 23 to renege on a plan to settle 7,000 refugees from Syria and Eritrea. The crisis will likely intensify over the next year.  Refugee inflow on the Mediterranean from January to March 2016 increased more than sevenfold as compared to the same period in 2015. Russia may also be encouraging migration to Europe to exacerbate this problem, according to NATO Supreme Commander General Philip Breedlove and Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves. Increasing pressure on European security and cohesion will open opportunities for both Russia and ISIS to expand influence.

ISIS particularly aims to destabilize Europe through polarization, which it calls “destroying the grayzone.” ISIS hopes attacks in its name will provoke state and social backlash against Europe’s Muslim communities, encouraging radicalization and jihadist recruitment. Such reactions have already surfaced from the Brussels attacks, as Dutch far-right leader Geert Wilders called to “de-Islamize the West” and as American presidential candidates suggested patrolling Muslim neighborhoods and banning Muslims from entering the U.S. ISIS will likely exploit these actions in order to claim it is the defender of Muslims in a broader cultural war.

ISIS is best positioned to launch attacks within France and Belgium due to in part to its large Francophone foreign fighter population. An estimated 1700 French citizens and 470 Belgian citizens are fighting in Syria, with the latter representing the largest per capita amount of any Western nation. ISIS’s Francophone fighters reportedly formed cohesive fighting units with Syria, likely forming the basis of attack cells deployed back to Europe. These operatives recruit and gain logistical support from their home networks in France and Belgium.

Emerging trends in 2016

Authorities have thwarted several attack plots linked to or inspired by ISIS in France and Belgium since December 2015, reflecting an enduring jihadist support base within those countries. The ISIS network responsible for the Paris and Brussels attacks demonstrated resiliency and adaptiveness over past months through the ability of Paris attacker Salah Abdeslam to go undetected and the progression to the group’s first large explosive attack in Brussels on March 22. ISIS likely maintains attack cells within France and Belgium and will continue to attempt spectacular attacks on soft targets in those countries over coming months in order to replicate the success of its previous attacks. European authorities may locate and detain some of this network through intelligence gained from Salah Abdeslam, but ISIS will likely balance this loss with new European recruits.

ISIS also retains pre-existing recruitment networks in Spain, Italy and the Balkans, as demonstrated by arrest patterns in 2016. This group will likely continue to provide financial and logistical support to individuals seeking to join ISIS in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. ISIS’s recruitment networks in Spain may increasingly orient towards Libya, where ISIS’s affiliate controls terrain and operates training camps. This affiliate could attempt to strike Europe, possibly exploiting migrant flow to Europe to do so. ISIS’s networks in Italy and the Balkans could aid this effort, as those countries host major migrant entry points. German and Austrian authorities arrested alleged ISIS operatives in refugee shelters since December 2015, confirming that ISIS members are intentionally using refugee transit to enter Europe. ISIS likely does so in order to strengthen xenophobic organizations and rhetoric in Europe, thereby fueling anti-Muslim sentiment and encouraging cultural polarization.  

ISIS shifted its attack campaign in Turkey in 2016, possibly in order to discourage Turkish efforts to curb ISIS’s foreign fighter flows. ISIS already faces potential disruption of its primary supply route to Turkey due to U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Kurdish PYD gains in northern Syria. ISIS may intend to incite broader conflict within Turkey in order to forestall this development. ISIS has increasingly struck foreign, tourism-related targets in Turkey, a shift from its attacks against political and military targets from July to December 2015. An alleged ISIS operative launched a suicide attack near Istanbul’s Blue Mosque on January 12, killing twelve German and one Peruvian tourists. An ISIS-linked individual launched another suicide attack on a popular shopping area of Istanbul on March 19, killing one Iranian and three Israeli citizens.



Strengthening European law enforcement and intelligence capabilities will only address one element of the ISIS threat to Europe. Programs to counter ISIS’s message, its finances, and other capabilities will assist, but will not suffice.  ISIS’s safe haven within Iraq, Syria, and now Libya will continue to provide the logistical infrastructure necessary to train, resource, and direct attack cells in Europe. The anti-ISIS coalition must deprive ISIS of its territorial control as a caliphate, which is its primary source of strength, in order to destroy the ISIS threat to Europe.



Warning: Iraq’s Shi’a Parties Split Over Cabinet Reshuffle Amidst Protests

By Patrick Martin with Emily Anagnostos, Rachel Bessette, and Hannah Werman

Key Take-away: Political violence may erupt in Iraq as supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr continue large-scale protests to pressure the current government to reshuffle the cabinet fundamentally. Sadr had threatened on February 26 to withdraw his support from Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi if such an overhaul did not occur by March 29, 2016. The Sadrists began a large sit-in at the entrance to the Green Zone on March 18 and are harnessing the power of street demonstrations to either compel PM Abadi to comply or make it possible for him to do so. Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his supporters within the State of Law Alliance (SLA), rather than Abadi, seem to be the chief obstacle to a cabinet reshuffle. Other political blocs seek to neutralize this faction while retaining their current representation in cabinet. Meanwhile, some political blocs, including the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and the Sadrist Trend, are in the process of attempting to create a new political alliance that could challenge Maliki’s State of Law Alliance (SLA) as the dominant political bloc. It would need to overcome a plethora of obstacles to succeed, but could be the basis for a cabinet reshuffle process aimed at weakening the SLA and its dominant leader, Nouri al-Maliki. ISCI and the Sadrists may throw a lifeline to Abadi, or he may be political collateral damage in their play to counter Maliki. It is unclear what Sadr will do if there is no cabinet reshuffle by March 29 that meets his standards. He may compromise, as he might sacrifice some of his reform demands in order to strengthen himself or weaken Maliki and his Dawa Party. Alternatively, the Sadrists may continue the sit-in and pull out of the government, as Sadr threatened to do on February 13. The prospect for violence – initiated either by the demonstrators or by the security forces to break up the sit-in – remains a possibility that could destabilize or even collapse the already precarious Abadi government, and it is far from certain that PM Abadi will be able to retain his position if a new government is eventually formed.


Above: Tens of thousands of supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr demonstrated in front of the gates to the Green Zone in Baghdad on March 18 before beginning the sit-in. 

Sadr Pressures the Government

Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced a cabinet reshuffle on February 9, intending to form a government of technocrats. Most other political blocs predictably attempted to use the cabinet reshuffle to forward their own political goals and preserve their positions within the cabinet, and ISW previously assessed that a protracted cabinet reshuffle process could lead to street violence or even PM Abadi’s resignation if political blocs could find a consensus candidate. However, Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr, having moved to position himself as the leader of popular demonstrations against corruption and poor government performance, has organized and attempted to harness street demonstrations to force PM Abadi and the political blocs to enact broader reforms. Sadr gave the government a 45-day deadline on February 13 to conduct comprehensive reforms. He later escalated his pressure on PM Abadi by speaking at a large demonstration in Tahrir Square on February 26 before announcing a sit-in on March 12, calling on his supporters to assemble at the entrance to the Green Zone on March 18. 

PM Abadi and the leaders of political blocs expressed concern over the sit-in, which the Council of Ministers (CoM) and the Interior Ministry rejected on March 16 and 18, respectively, due to security concerns and their legality. Sadr responded with his own rejection of the possibility of shutting down the sit-in. Security forces deployed across Baghdad prior to the start date to prevent demonstrators from accessing the sit-in site, blocking off key roads with concrete barriers and closing off the Republican and Sinak Bridges. The heavy security presence may have led to violence between security forces and thousands of Sadrist supporters converging on the Green Zone; at least one confrontation was recorded in Baghdad, when riot police used water cannons against Sadrist supporters near the Republican Bridge, ostensibly to protect Baghdad Governor Ali al-Tamimi, who was nearby. However, the Baghdad Operations Commander, Abdul-Amir al-Shammari, ordered security forces to re-open entrances into the city and lift the barriers on the Republican and Sinak Bridges. Shammari’s actions reduced the possibility of confrontation but infuriated PM Abadi, who shortly thereafter, marched to the Joint Operations Command (JOC) and announced that the JOC, not Baghdad Operations Command, would thereafter have responsibility for Baghdad’s security file.


Above: Sadrist supporters approach a line of security forces on the Republican Bridge, northeast of the Green Zone, on March 18. Security forces withdrew from the barriers later in the video, allowing the demonstrators to pour through and over the bridge towards the Green Zone. 

Sadr’s Sit-in

The Sadrist Trend’s management of the sit-in process has been highly disciplined and organized. Notably, Sadr charged Ibrahim al-Jabiri, the leader of the Baghdad branch of Sadr’s charitable foundation, the Office of the Martyr al-Sadr, with overseeing the sit-in and forming a management committee. The day after the announcement, the committee began erecting tents and opening up to 93 centers across Iraq to register volunteers who wished to participate in the sit-in. 

Sadr stressed the importance of non-violence and discipline among the demonstrators, ordering sit-in participants to bring no weapons, initiate no violence, cooperate with the security forces, and obey the sit-in coordinators. He also insisted on maintaining a disciplined and national public image, calling on demonstrators to avoid blocking roads, keep the sit-in site clean, and not to create excessive noise that disturbs local residents. The sit-in’s organizing committee maintains close control over the sit-in participants’ activity, assigning them tents, requiring them to wear an identification badge, and encouraging them to don uniforms bearing the Iraqi flag. The Office of the Martyr al-Sadr has not only supplied tents and food to the demonstrators, but organized events as well, with Jabri leading regular prayer sessions, overseeing a pop-up art and book market, and attending poetry readings while conducting meetings with security forces officials to facilitate stability and coordination. Jabri’s attendance of a wide variety of events and the high level of central organization indicates little chance of the sit-in dispersing due to logistical shortcomings. 


Above: Head of the Baghdad branch of the Office of the Martyr al-Sadr, Ibrahim al-Jabri (bottom center in front of crowd) leads an evening prayer session in the Green Zone sit-in site. Several demonstrators are wearing Iraqi flag shirts, as encouraged by the Sadrist organizing committee. Others can be seen wearing identification cards on lanyards. 

The sit-in has continued since March 18, and Sadr has shown no willingness to back down. Instead, Sadr has taken the initiative and is attempting to force PM Abadi and other political blocs to concede to his reform agenda. The approaching end of Sadr’s 45-day deadline and the sit-in has set political blocs scrambling to come to an agreement over the cabinet reshuffle, but it appears that the only thing blocs can agree on remains their refusal to lose positions within the cabinet. PM Abadi publicly aired his frustration with the political blocs, blaming unspecified ministers for blocking the cabinet reshuffle process in order to keep their positions and privileges. 

The increased pressure has also revealed the divergent opinions of the political blocs on the cabinet reshuffle. Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Alliance (SLA), Ammar al-Hakim’s Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), the Kurdistan Alliance, and the Sunni Etihad Bloc, favor either a partial cabinet reshuffle or measures to preserve their parties’ representation within the cabinet. They are therefore in multi-party negotiations. PM Abadi, President Fuad Masoum, and Council of Representatives (CoR) Speaker Salim al-Juburi hosted senior political bloc leaders at the Presidential Peace Palace to reach an agreement over the cabinet reshuffle on March 19. The parties agreed to the formation of three additional committees to address different aspects of government reform, but they reached no agreement over the cabinet’s final composition. The committee formed to assist PM Abadi with selecting new ministers has not even met. A member of the State of Law Alliance (SLA), the primary political rival of the Sadrist Trend led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, called the meeting “useless,” while an ISCI member noted that the results of the meeting were “not encouraging.” 

Former PM and current Vice President Nouri al-Maliki is steering the cabinet reshuffle process in a manner that is preventing the political blocs from agreeing on the cabinet’s final composition. Maliki is technically a member of Abadi’s own political party, Dawa, a component of the SLA. He and his backers form an important source of parliamentary support for Abadi and his premiership. Maliki, however, is actually Abadi’s primary political rival, because he seeks to regain the premiership and could withdraw his support from Abadi in a manner that collapses his government. Abadi had tried unsuccessfully to force Maliki’s resignation in August 2015 by abolishing the position of the vice presidency, but the effort failed, and Maliki thus retained his position within government. 

Maliki therefore has likely commandeered Abadi’s efforts and holds the keys to the latter’s continued premiership. He is playing to win a greater share of power and patronage, if not the premiership itself, prior to next year’s provincial elections. A senior member of the SLA who is no longer an ardent Maliki supporter, Ali al-Adeeb, complained that the Dawa Party, along with the pro-Iranian Badr Organization and Mustaqilun Bloc, were more concerned with protecting their positions than pursuing genuine reform. This obstructionism has alienated ISCI. One ISCI party member, Muhammad al-Likash stated that ISCI insisted on ensuring the government’s independence from political interests, which could be guaranteed by either a fully independent selection of ministers, PM Abadi’s resignation from the Dawa Party, or his resignation from the premiership. If these options were not possible, then ISCI’s Mowatin Bloc would withdraw from government, as it had no interest in being party of a “Dawa Party government.” 

Sadr stated on March 21 that PM Abadi, Masoum, Juburi, and political bloc leaders displayed “ignorance” over the well-being of citizens and repeated calls for comprehensive government change. More worryingly, a senior al-Ahrar Bloc member, the main political party of the Sadrist Trend, dismissed the results of the meeting and warned that demonstrators could “storm the Green Zone” if reforms did not materialize by the March 29 deadline. Sadr had vaguely alluded to this possibility on February 26, when he stated that “we are on the walls of the Green Zone, and tomorrow, the people will be in it,” though a senior Sadrist official later insisted that demonstrations would remain peaceful. In addition, on March 22, Sadr announced that a committee he had formed on February 20 to nominate technocrats for the new cabinet had completed its work, producing a 90-name list for government nominations to be passed to PM Abadi. An al-Ahrar Bloc member insisted the list be reviewed and voted on in the CoR, lest al-Ahrar withdraw confidence from PM Abadi. By referencing the deadline, providing nominations, threatening a withdrawal of confidence, and continuing the sit-in, Sadr is escalating pressure on PM Abadi and other political blocs to support a comprehensive overhaul of government. 

The Cross-Sectarian Bloc and the Anti-Dawa Party Movement


On March 24, three notable events occurred that indicated that ISCI was challenging PM Abadi and the SLA. First, one of the most senior members of ISCI, Oil Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi, resigned from his post and stated that he would no longer attend cabinet meetings. Although many ministers have offered their resignations in the past to indicate their support for reforms, Abdul-Mahdi appears to have actually resigned with the intention of vacating his position. It is unclear if he did so on Hakim’s order and if he is still receiving his salary. Second, ISCI leader Ammar al-Hakim met with Muqtada al-Sadr in Najaf to discuss the ongoing reforms as Abadi met with the pan-Shia National Alliance in Baghdad. The National Alliance is an umbrella group for all major Shi'a political parties, including the SLA, ISCI, the Sadrist Trend, Fadhila Bloc, and the National Reform Trend. The National Alliance’s role is to unite and coordinate Shi'a political activity in Iraq, but it has largely been unable to overcome existing differences between political blocs. Third, Hakim also met with Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri to discuss reforms. The Badr Organization is an Iranian-supported proxy militia that fractured from ISCI in 2012. Maliki has lately cultivated its support, as he has with other Iranian proxy militias, since he otherwise lacks a powerful military organization. The meetings indicate that Hakim has been attempting to form agreements with senior political and military leaders regarding next steps in the cabinet reshuffle process. 

Finally, on March 24, Fail al-Shammari, a member of the Mowatin Bloc, which is a component of ISCI, stated that ISCI was in the process of forming a “cross-sectarian” bloc with a unified vision regarding the reforms. The statement reveals that efforts persist to form a new political alliance composed of members of multiple blocs. PM Abadi had called for such a bloc on February 27 to support national reform efforts. Sadr and Hakim met on March 2 and jointly expressed support for the creation of the bloc, which also received support from individual members of various Sunni, Kurdish, and Shi’a parties, including Dawa Party, Mustaqilun, Etihad, the Sadrist Trend, and ISCI’s Mowatin Bloc. The bloc aimed to produce a majority in the CoR in order to allow PM Abadi to pass reforms and legislation. Members of other parties, including the secular Wataniya Alliance and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, are also reportedly interested in supporting Hakim’s effort to build the alliance. However, an SLA member, Rasul Abu Hasna, dismissed talk of the new bloc as “rosy dreams,” suggesting that the bloc faces opposition from within the SLA. It is important to note that Shammari’s account was not fully accurate – he also announced that all three ISCI members had withdrawn from government, which an ISCI spokesperson swiftly denied. However, the statement did indicate that backroom discussions over the cross-sectarian bloc were still in progress. 

Hakim’s pursuit of the cross-sectarian bloc – and the dismissal of it by an SLA member – makes sense in that he has been attempting to position himself as a powerful political figure for some time but has been consistently blocked by the SLA. Hakim had tried to secure the leadership of the National Alliance in January and February of 2015 with the support of Sadr, but never managed to obtain it, as the SLA – nearly three times the size of ISCI within the CoR – insisted that senior SLA member Ali al-Adeeb chair the National Alliance and blocked Hakim’s efforts. Unable to come to an agreement, the National Alliance political blocs reached a stalemate, and previous chairman and current Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari simply stayed on in his position. Hakim’s effort to build a new bloc could thus be a way for Hakim, who does not hold political office within the government, to increase his political power at the expense of Maliki and the SLA. By cutting out the senior SLA leadership – namely, pro-Maliki Dawa Party members – from the new alliance, ISCI would neuter the ability of the SLA to influence decision-making and increase ISCI’s influence, but would consequentially fracture the pan-Shi’a National Alliance. 

A new cross-sectarian alliance would also benefit other political blocs as it would level the playing field between them and the SLA. Members of minority groups, such as Sunni blocs and the Kurdistan Alliance, would benefit from any weakening of Maliki, who is a sectarian actor. The Sadrist Trend would benefit in that it could weaken Maliki, Sadr’s primary opponent, and strengthen the Sadrist Trend as a political force at the expense of the SLA. Pro-Maliki members of the SLA, such as components of the Dawa Party and the Badr Organization, however, are motivated to keep the National Alliance intact, as they are the dominant force within the National Alliance. The SLA is likely preoccupied with preserving its power within the cabinet – Adeeb’s statement on March 12 complaining about the SLA’s intransigence is a major indicator of this trend. 

If successful, the new cross-sectarian bloc would thus serve to unite a number of political blocs that are opposed to Maliki creating what is essentially an anti-Dawa Party alternative to the National Alliance. However, opposition to Maliki may not be sufficient to create a functioning alternative, as the new bloc would still have to overcome a bevy of other differences that exist between blocs. Etihad and ISCI, for example, differ greatly in their position towards Iran, with Etihad being generally opposed to Iranian activity in Iraq, and ISCI being amenable towards it. They also differ in what they view to be the ideal outcome of the cabinet reshuffle. Hakim, for example, supports a partial cabinet reshuffle, while Sadr is a vocal advocate of a complete overhaul of the government and replacing sitting ministers with technocrats. This sort of alliance could be viable in the short-term to disempower the SLA, but it is far from clear if it would be sustainable in the long-term, as the inability of Kurdish, Sunni, and Shi’a parties to come to agreements on important legislation has prevented major laws, such as the Federal Judiciary Act, the National Guard Law, and the Justice and Accountability Law from passing in the CoR.





Courses of Action

PM Abadi is in an extremely difficult situation. Many political blocs do not want him to overhaul the government, despite their public insistence that this is the case. Most of the major political blocs have not even submitted nominations for cabinet positions, indicating that they are still attempting to negotiate what the final composition of the cabinet will be amongst themselves. The only exception has been the Sadrist Trend’s 90-name list, which may not even be considered, because the list’s technocratic nature threatens to remove political party members from senior governmental positions. Yet many blocs, aside from pro-Maliki components of the SLA and affiliated parties, are opposed to Maliki and could form a united front against the Dawa Party-dominated SLA in order to promote their interests. This may be sufficient grounds for disparate parties to form a compromise over the final cabinet composition. 

There are several courses of action the cabinet reshuffle process may take, all of which can be problematic for U.S. interests. If PM Abadi attempts to initiate reforms along the lines of Sadr’s proposals, political blocs could obstruct their passing, as Sadr’s reforms would replace senior political bloc members with technocrats. If ISCI decides to form an agreement with the SLA and abandons talk of the cross-sectarian bloc and support for Sadr to protect its positions within the cabinet, then Sadr would react poorly, escalating his supporters’ street activity and potentially even leading to violence. Clashes between Sadrist supporters and the security forces would severely undermine the stability of the government and intensify the political crisis. Alternatively, security forces and even members of Iraqi Shi’a militias opposed to Sadr might attempt to break up the sit-in or keep demonstrators from reaching the Green Zone during the regular demonstration time on Friday, March 25, which might also lead to violence and instability. 

Alternatively, Sadr, ISCI, and other political blocs could successfully form a united anti-Dawa Party front through the new cross-sectarian bloc that sees Maliki’s power reduced. This would be contingent upon Sadr sacrificing some of his demands, as no other political party seriously wants their ministers removed from the cabinet. However, Sadr could be placated and could call off his sit-in if there is progress towards forming the new cross-sectarian bloc and loosening Maliki’s dominance over the government. Yet it is not clear if PM Abadi would be able to survive as the premier in this scenario, as PM Abadi, a Dawa Party member, may not be able to unshackle himself from the SLA. Both Sadr and members of ISCI have mused on the possibility of life after PM Abadi, however, and they may be comfortable attempting to identify a consensus candidate from within their own ranks if they cannot pry PM Abadi out of Maliki’s grip. It is also not clear if the new bloc can even function, as it must overcome myriad differences to achieve anything. 

How Sadr responds to the ongoing cabinet reshuffle, however, remains the major question regarding how the cabinet reshuffle process will play out. Sadr’s position differs from the other political blocs in that his motivations are not purely based on increasing his political power within the government through the accumulation of ministerial or senior government positions. He has been pursuing other paths to influence, including attempting to take the role of the leader of popular street demonstrations, a role that Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani played prior to February 2016, when he ceased giving political sermons. He also appears to be attempting to reassert control over his own movement, including al-Ahrar Bloc; his public distancing from the bloc, the referral of the bloc’s two ministers to the Integrity Commission for corruption investigation, and the “detention” of former Deputy Prime Minister Bahaa al-Araji may indicate that he is distancing himself from the bloc’s behavior while attempting to reestablish control over its members. In addition, Sadr’s nominations for cabinet positions is more technocratic than representative of the Sadrist Trend, indicating that he may be willing to cede power within the cabinet in exchange for maintaining his role as a leader of the anti-corruption movement and bolstering his personal role in Iraqi politics. 

Sadr thus has several options. If the government undergoes a partial cabinet reshuffle, then he could incite his supporters to engage in further street demonstrations and possible political violence. Sadr may also resort to less extreme options. He might, for example, withdraw the al-Ahrar Bloc from the government and opt to continue the sit-in while preserving his position as the leader of popular demonstrations against corruption. Considering the historical lack of discipline of Sadr’s supporters, an extended sit-in and repeated demonstrations could also lead to instability and political violence; the fact that Sadr’s supporters reportedly almost attacked the Baghdad Governor is a poor indicator for the sit-in movement’s long-term discipline and adherence to non-violent behavior. Sadr might alternatively accept an increased number of Sadrists within the government – in effect, abandoning the idea of a comprehensive cabinet reshuffle for increased cabinet representation. This would however require Sadr to sacrifice much of his legitimacy as a leader of the anti-corruption performance, which is highly unlikely. 

Stuck amidst the realignment of interests within the Iraqi Shi’a political scene remains PM Abadi, who is tethered to Maliki through his membership to the Dawa Party but genuinely appears to want to undertake reform. Hakim and Sadr may be willing to keep PM Abadi in his position if they can accumulate enough collective power to form an anti-Dawa Party movement, but are likely equally willing to pursue deposing him if PM Abadi is unable to separate himself from Maliki. Similarly, the SLA may be willing to force PM Abadi to resign if he is unable to conduct reforms to their liking, and could attempt to pursue other Shi’a blocs of forming a new government with a new prime minister, such as current National Alliance chairman Ibrahim al-Jaafari. PM Abadi thus appears to be stuck between the Shi’a political blocs, and may not survive as premier no matter which direction he decides to take the reforms.