Warning Update: Pro-Regime Forces Continue Encirclement of Aleppo Despite Truce

By: Christopher Kozak

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his allies in Moscow and Tehran are continuing to complete the encirclement of Aleppo City despite an ostensible ‘cessation of hostilities’ that began on February 27, 2016. Russia resumed its air campaign against the opposition on February 28 following a one day hiatus, concentrating its strikes against the opposition-held northwestern suburbs of Aleppo City. Russia continued to target both Syrian Al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra and moderate opposition groups indiscriminately despite an international agreement prohibiting strikes on non-terrorist factions. At the same time, pro-regime forces and their local partners continued to mount attacks aimed at securing favorable terrain in advance of future operations in Aleppo Province as previously forecast by ISW. The siege of Aleppo City – Syria’s largest urban center and commercial capital – would solidify the favorable position currently held by President Assad while sparking a humanitarian crisis that forces regional backers of the opposition to consider intensified interventions in the conflict.

The regime and its allies have gained terrain around Aleppo City in recent weeks. The regime has leveraged a deepening partnership with the Syrian Kurdish YPG in order to pressure the only remaining ground line of communication (GLOC) to opposition-held Aleppo City. Pro-regime forces launched a failed attack from YPG-held territory against the villages of Shaykh Aqil and Qabtian al-Jabal northwest of Aleppo City on February 26, likely in an attempt to secure terrain that would form the outer cordon of an eventual encirclement of the city. The YPG later seized the Castillo Hill in the Sheikh Maqsoud District of Aleppo City on March 1 following clashes with Jabhat al Nusra and allied fighters, securing key high ground adjacent to the last remaining opposition supply route into the city. This advance suggests that the regime may intend to work with the YPG in order to close the four-kilometer-long gap required to isolate the opposition-held districts of Aleppo City. The Syrian Kurds previously engaged in similar battlefield coordination with pro-regime forces in early February in order to sever the primary opposition supply route between Aleppo City and Turkey. These gains will tend to drive the opposition closer to Jabhat al Nusra and other irreconcilable actors, further limiting the pool of local partners available to the U.S.

The regime and its allies have sought to portray their actions as legitimate due to the battlefield presence of Jabhat al Nusra in some of these regions. These acts of aggression nonetheless threaten the long-term survivability of the wider opposition in Aleppo City. Riyad Hijab – the head of the opposition High Negotiations Committee – warned on March 3 that the ceasefire stood on the verge of collapse, stressing that “the regime and its allies continue to violate the truce and launch operations to gain more ground” at the expense of the opposition. The regime and its allies ultimately remain willing to secure additional battlefield gains rather than demonstrate any signs of goodwill in advance of the Geneva Negotiations scheduled to resume on March 9. The current ‘cessation of hostilities’ thus stands to mark only a lull in the ongoing conflict that provides the regime and its allies with an opportunity to replenish and refit their forces ahead of a renewed offensive that besieges Aleppo City and decisively shatters the primary nexus of opposition strength in Northern Syria. 

ISIS Sanctuary: March 3, 2016

By: ISW Research Team

Since the publication of ISW’s last ISIS Sanctuary Map on January 16, 2016, ISIS lost a major resource hub in Shaddadi, northeastern Syria and was expelled from its remaining positions in Ramadi, western Iraq. ISIS responded by launching a campaign against Kurdish forces in Tel Abyad, northern Syria, and briefly seizing the city of Khanaser, southeast of Aleppo from Syrian regime forces. ISIS also launched a wave of explosive attacks across Iraq and Syria, beginning with six suicide attacks on Homs and Damascus on February 22. ISIS likely aims to increase overall disorder by attacking civilian and military targets linked to Shi’a governments in Damascus and Baghdad, thereby facilitating its defense and opening new opportunities for its expansion. This map also features an updated representation of ISIS’s zone of control in northern Aleppo province, which was previously represented as a sanctuary zone. 

ISIS in Southeast Asia: January 1-March 2, 2016

by Molly Simio, Harleen Gambhir, and the ISW Counterterrorism Team

ISIS is using its safe haven and foreign fighter population in Iraq and Syria to expand influence in Southeast Asia, in pursuit of its grand strategic objective to rule all Muslim lands. ISIS’s Syria-based Southeast Asian fighters are resourcing and directing local networks to launch attacks. Competition between militant elements vying to lead the Southeast Asian pro-ISIS movement will likely encourage increased jihadist attacks in the short term, threatening urban areas and Western interests in the region. Support from ISIS’s safe haven may also facilitate the creation of an active, trans-national ISIS affiliate in Southeast Asia in the medium term.

The U.S. has the opportunity to counter ISIS’s network in Southeast Asia before it develops further. ISIS claimed it first attack in the region on January 14 in Jakarta, an act that belied ISIS’s ambitions but reflected relatively low military capability. Southeast Asian jihadist groups are fragmented and face pressure from domestic counterterrorism operations. ISIS's campaign in Southeast Asia is at an early stage, so the group currently poses a lower threat to security there than it does in Libya, Egypt, and Afghanistan, where its affiliates enjoy sanctuary, and in Yemen, where its affiliate is prolonging a civil war. Early action against ISIS’s Southeast Asian supporters can limit ISIS’s ability to develop an affiliate in the area, particularly as those supporters face resistance from locally-focused and al Qaeda-associated groups. 

Iraq Euphrates River Valley Activity: December 22, 2015 - March 2, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos, Rachel Bessette, and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) launched operations to retake Ramadi from ISIS on December 22 and established control of the city on February 9. The ISF will need to target remaining ISIS safe havens in the Euphrates River Valley, including Hit and Fallujah, in order to consolidate these gains. These subsequent operations will strengthen the ISF’s long-term operational abilities in Anbar while undermining ISIS’s control along a key line of communication between Iraq and Syria. The ISF will nevertheless face various challenges to clearing and controlling ISIS safe havens in western Anbar. ISIS has already responded by launching counter-attacks against the ISF’s thinly spread forces. These have included coordinated ground attacks and spectacular attacks in Anbar and Baghdad. Tying up the ISF in dispersed engagements could allow ISIS to maintain key territory, vital access points, and lines of communication while undermining the ISF’s ability to focus on counter-offensive rather than defensive operations. Second, political pressures in Baghdad and shortages of manpower will also likely precipitate the direct participation of predominantly Shi’a Popular Mobilization fighters in ongoing operations, causing real risks of sectarian violence in majority Sunni areas. Finally, ISIS retains Fallujah as a heavily fortified stronghold on the Euphrates near Baghdad and from it can launch deadly attacks into ISF-secured areas. Popular Mobilization forces, including Iranian-backed proxy groups, have spearheaded operations to encircle Fallujah, but they are aiming to isolate and besiege the city rather than recapture it. The ISF is therefore not likely to regain Fallujah in 2016. 

The ISF is also preparing for the recapture of Mosul and has generated forces for that fight. Opening fronts in Anbar and Ninewah simultaneously will likely force ISIS to adopt a defensive posture, as it did in the first quarter of 2015. Ongoing ISIS counterattacks and the scope of subsequent operations in Anbar will likely challenge the ISF and delay the decisive phase of a Mosul operation.

ISIS's Regional Campaign: February 2016

by Claire Coyne with Harleen Gambhir

ISIS continued to develop its regional presence despite setbacks in Iraq and Syria in February. The organization launched spectacular attacks to weaken security in Iraq and Syria as it faces territorial losses, declining revenue, and decreased foreign fighter inflows in both countries. ISIS meanwhile strengthened its presence in Libya, launching large-scale attacks and defending its stronghold of Sirte despite ground opposition from rival militant groups and airstrikes by the U.S. and other actors. ISIS also maintained operational capability in other regions, as demonstrated by its attacks in the Gulf, Maghreb, and the Caucasus. ISIS’s military campaigns and safe haven outside of Iraq and Syria give it strategic resiliency that will ensure its longevity despite pressure on its Caliphate. 

Iraq Situation Report: February 23 - 29, 2016

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: ISIS conducted a large-scale campaign against civilian and military targets across Iraq between February 25 and February 29. Two ISIS attackers detonated their Suicide Vests (SVESTs) at a mosque in Shuala in northwestern Baghdad on February 25, setting off a series of SVEST attacks across Iraq. Deadly SVEST attacks targeted Sadr City on February 27 and the Abu Ghraib area west of Baghdad on February 28, as well as Haditha in western Anbar and Muqdadiyah in central Diyala Province on February 29. The series constitutes the deadliest wave of ISIS attacks in 2016. The large increase in the use of SVESTs as opposed to the Suicide Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED), a signature ISIS attack type, may be in response to the Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) increased ability to counter SVBIEDs using Russian Kornet and American AT4 anti-tank rockets; deliveries of these weapons began in early June 2015 and were followed by an increase in the number of failed SVBIED attacks on security forces in Iraq. The attacks may come in response to recent forward deployments by the ISF to prepare for operations to recapture Hit District, west of Ramadi, and areas of Ninewa Province. Deadly attacks may force the ISF to focus on securing ISF-held areas instead of on recapturing areas from ISIS; the attack on Haditha may have been an attempt to shift forces who are preparing for an assault on Hit District northwards to defend Haditha. The attacks also likely intend to stoke sectarian violence, similar to how a VBIED and SVEST attack in Muqdadiyah on January 11, 2015 led Iraqi Shi’a militias to rampage in the predominantly Sunni district and destroy six mosques. Sectarian backlash will be particularly damaging at a time when PM Abadi’s government is unstable and going through a cabinet reshuffle. Iraqi Shi’a militias are likely to retaliate against Sunni civilians, particularly since several leaders among Popular Mobilization groups, reportedly including the Iranian proxy militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, were among the casualties in the February 29 attack in Muqdadiyah. Significant violence or unrest may compromise the ability of PM Abadi and conciliatory political blocs to compose a new cabinet as part of ongoing reforms, and sufficiently destabilize the political situation to delay or collapse efforts to complete the reform process.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria from February 17 - 28, 2016: Pre and Post Cessation of Hostilities

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola 

Key Takeaway: Russia has continued its air campaign in support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, despite the ongoing cessation of hostilities agreement that began on February 27. Russian airstrikes concentrated in opposition-held areas of northwestern Syria on February 28, following a lull in Russian airstrikes on February 27. The ceasefire, however, is largely holding, despite accusations from both pro- and anti-regime elements of violations of the agreement. The Russian MoD reported nine violations of the ceasefire by “terrorist” groups, “moderate” opposition factions, and Turkey. Head of the opposition High Negotiations Committee (HNC) Riad Hijab accused Russian warplanes of conducting 26 airstrikes on February 28 targeting opposition factions that have announced their commitment to the truce. Hijab stressed that “negotiations will be unfeasible” amidst continued Russian use of cluster munitions and persistent violations of the ceasefire by the Syrian regime and its allies resulting in civilian casualties. Russian airstrikes have reportedly targeted the headquarters of U.S.-backed TOW anti-tank missile recipient Firqat al-Wasta in northern Hama Province on February 29. The likely continuation of Russian and regime air operations against mainstream elements of the opposition throughout western Syria under the guise of fighting terrorism will ultimately threaten the stability of any sustainable ceasefire agreement.

Note: ISW did not assess any strike locations with high confidence from February 17-18, 2016

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.  

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Russian airstrikes intensified significantly in the hours before the ceasefire went into effect on February 27, with local reports claiming that as many as 100 Russian strikes targeted areas in northern Aleppo Province, alone. Russian strikes were concentrated in western Aleppo Province, northern Homs Province, and in the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus in the ten days leading up to the ceasefire. Russia nonetheless restarted its air operations against the Syrian opposition in areas of northwestern Syria on February 28, following a 24-hour lull in strikes.

The “cessation of hostiles” agreement as defined by Russia is far from a nationwide ceasefire. The Russian Ministry of Defense released the above map on February 27, stating that Russian air operations have “completely stopped” in areas highlighted in green. Russia continues to inaccurately portray the majority of opposition-held Syria as Jabhat al Nusra-controlled, represented in blue in the map above. The likely continuation of Russian air operations against mainstream elements of the opposition throughout western Syria under the guise of fighting terrorism will ultimately threaten the stability of any sustainable ceasefire agreement.