Ukrainian Local Elections Leave Room for Russian Influence

By Daniel Pitcairn, Hugo Spaulding, and Daniel Urchick

Key Take-away: Ukraine’s local elections strengthened pro-Russian factions and local oligarchs in its southern and eastern regions, offering Moscow an opportunity for greater influence in the post-revolution political order.

Local elections on October 25 exposed cracks in post-revolution Ukraine that Russia may exploit.  Candidates linked to former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and prominent oligarchs that rival current President Petro Poroshenko earned more support than the president’s faction in the south and east of the country, areas that are vulnerable to Russian political destabilization. Former Yanukovych allies with ties to the Dnipropetrovsk-based owner of Ukraine’s largest bank Ihor Kolomoyskyi earned crucial victories in the Black Sea port city of Odesa and Ukraine’s second largest city of Kharkiv. Mafia-linked Hennadiy Trukhanov was reelected in Odesa, marking a setback for Poroshenko, who has tried to overhaul the region historically plagued by organized crime with the help of provincial governor and reformist former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Former Yanukovych ally Hennadiy Kernes was reelected in the key northeastern city of Kharkiv after allying with a Kolomoyskyi-backed party that reportedly earned a majority of seats in the city council. Two mayoral candidates from the pro-Russian “Opposition Bloc” and one candidate backed by Donetsk-based former Yanukovych ally and Ukraine’s richest man Rinat Akhmetov earned berths in runoff elections on November 15 in the provincial capitals of Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhia. The “Opposition Bloc” also earned victories inside government-held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, including in the two previously separatist-controlled cities of Sloviansk and Lysychansk. Government authorities postponed elections in the key port city of Mariupol following allegations of ballot fraud favoring pro-Russian candidates backed by Akhmetov. These results highlight the challenges faced by Poroshenko’s pro-Western government in asserting control outside the western and central regions of Ukraine, where it largely preserved its influence.

Ihor Kolomoyskyi’s stronghold of Dnipropetrovsk has become the epicenter of competition between Poroshenko and his rivals since the October 25 elections. Poroshenko’s government reportedly backed the “Opposition Bloc” candidate and former deputy prime minister under Viktor Yanukovych Oleksandr Vilkul over the Kolomoyskyi-backed candidate, who will contest a runoff election on November 15. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) launched a “large-scale special operation” to detain Hennadiy Korban, a close associate of Kolomoyskyi and the leader of the oligarch’s UKROP (Ukrainian Association of Patriots) party, and his associates linked to organized crime in the southeastern city of Dnipropetrovsk on October 31. Hundreds of demonstrators gathered in Dnipropetrovsk to protest the arrest while a smaller protest was held in Kyiv against Poroshenko’s Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin, who was involved in organizing the arrest and is seen as an impediment to anti-corruption efforts. The timing of the arrest may indicate the intent of Poroshenko’s government to influence the outcome of the run-off election.  Poroshenko’s rivalry with Kolomoyskyi previously escalated in March 2015, when Kolomoyskyi was deposed as Dnipropetrovsk governor along with his deputy, Hennadiy Korban.  Kolomoyskyi was widely credited with preventing a Russian-backed separatist movement from taking hold of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in March 2014. The efforts of Poroshenko’s government to root out his rival from the key region could directly lead to the expansion of a Russian influence.

The success of candidates receptive to Russia in southern and eastern Ukraine highlights the risk Poroshenko faces as he moves forward with the decentralization measures required by the “Minsk II” ceasefire agreement. If implemented, decentralization would offer greater authority to local officials, including those who oppose Poroshenko’s government in Kyiv and maintain ties with Moscow. Decentralization, in its proposed form, will grant broader fiscal powers to local governments rather than granting autonomy to Ukraine’s provinces, distinguishing it from the more debilitating federalization Russia initially pursued. Nevertheless, strengthened local governments in opposition to Poroshenko may present obstacles to his national reform agenda, which aims to root out corruption and overhaul Ukraine’s Russian and oligarch-controlled political economic order with the eventual objective of joining the European Union. The results of the October 25 elections reflect Russia’s ability to strengthen its political leverage over Ukraine without the need to escalate military operations in the southeast. Russia achieved political gains even as pro-Russian separatist forces continued to withdraw military equipment from the front lines in the southeastern Donbas region and remained largely compliant with a renewed ceasefire on September 1, 2015.

Russia seeks to prevent Ukraine from becoming a fully-fledged member of the European Union by leveraging its military intervention in Donbas to undermine the post-revolution government in Kyiv. Moscow successfully applied military escalation in January and February 2015 to set the terms of the “Minsk II” ceasefire agreement, which locks Kyiv into making major political concessions, including decentralization and the provision of “special status” to separatist-held Donbas. The Kremlin now has the opportunity to cultivate ties with stronger pro-Russian factions and oligarchs in the south and east, preventing these historically pro-Russian regions from fully escaping its sphere of influence. Moscow may not be willing or able to reestablish a client government in Kyiv in the short-term but it will continue to exploit opportunities to prevent Ukraine from becoming a prosperous European nation unified against Russia.

Turkish Elections Empower Erdogan to Continue Support for Syrian Rebels

By Christopher Kozak and Katie Menoche 

Key Take-away: Turkish President Recep Erdogan reinforced his hold on political power with a key victory in early parliamentary elections held on November 1. The AKP’s dramatic victory likely reflects the Turkish electorate’s desire to return to political stability following several months of uncertainty and violence. The election of a stable AKP-led government will allow Erdogan to maintain and possibly intensify Turkey’s financial and military support to Syrian rebels fighting the Assad regime.

Turkish President Recep Erdogan reinforced his hold on political power with a key victory in early parliamentary elections held on November 1. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) won 316 out of 550 seats in the Turkish National Assembly and comfortably regained a majority after suffering significant losses in the June 2015 Turkish elections. The AKP’s gains came at the direct expense of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) and the right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Both parties lost seats previously gained in the June elections. The HDP barely surpassed the 10% electoral threshold required to win seats in the Turkish Parliament. The AKP did not win the 330 seats required to call a constitutional referendum to expand President Erdogan’s executive powers. Nevertheless, the AKP now holds a solid mandate to form a single-party government. This leeway will enable Erdogan to pursue his own foreign, domestic, and military agenda with minimal opposition.

The AKP’s dramatic victory likely reflects the Turkish electorate’s desire to return to political stability following several months of uncertainty and violence. The AKP lost its thirteen-year-long parliamentary majority in June. Subsequent negotiations to form a coalition government failed amidst political deadlock. Turkey also faced mounting domestic threats between June and November 2015. ISIS-linked militants conducted suicide attacks against pro-Kurdish rallies in the southern town of Suruc on July 20 and the Turkish capital of Ankara on October 10. ISIS also released a Turkish-language statement warning of a “penalty” for Turkish democracy immediately prior to the elections. Meanwhile, tensions between the Turkish government and the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) escalated into open conflict during July and August. The resumption of hostilities ended a two-year-long ceasefire and froze ongoing peace negotiations between the Turkish government and the PKK. The violence stemmed in part from allegations that Erdogan had allowed ISIS and other Salafi-jihadist groups to operate in Turkey in order to counteract Kurdish expansionism.

Erdogan leveraged – and by some accounts, exacerbated – these security threats in order to persuade Turkish voters that the AKP presented the only option for national stability. The AKP adopted an aggressive posture against both ISIS and the PKK in the aftermath of the bombing in Suruc. Turkey began an air campaign against PKK positions in northern Iraq on July 24. Turkey later opened the strategic Incirlik Airbase to the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition on July 29. Turkish security forces also detained hundreds of suspected ISIS and PKK affiliates in raids throughout the country between July and October. Erdogan and other senior AKP officials later intensified their rhetoric against the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) as the YPG gained ground against ISIS in northern Syria. Turkish warplanes most recently conducted at least two airstrikes against suspected YPG positions on October 24-25. Erdogan’s harsh stance against the PKK and other Kurdish militant groups attracted nationalist MHP voters towards the AKP. Renewed conflict with the PKK simultaneously undercut popular support for the pro-Kurdish HDP.

The election of a stable AKP-led government will allow Erdogan to maintain his current policies in support of Syrian rebels fighting the Assad regime. Several Turkish opposition parties had advocated for political talks with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The prospect of a coalition government thus opened space for a policy reversal that might have included cooperation with Russia on the terms of a political transition in Syria. The AKP’s decisive victory precludes this realignment and may allow Erdogan to increase support to select Syrian rebel factions in order to counteract Russia and Iran’s deepening intervention in Syria. Several prominent Syrian opposition groups congratulated the AKP on its success in a joint statement, highlighting the importance of Erdogan’s policies to the Syrian opposition.

The continuity of the Turkish government also ensures the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition’s continued access to important military bases in southern Turkey. Deepening cooperation between the U.S. and Syrian Kurds as the primary ground partner in the anti-ISIS campaign will likely spur increased tension between the U.S. and Turkey. Erdogan may nonetheless seek to demonstrate progress on his election promises of security and stability by pursuing de-escalation with the Kurds. Turkey remains likely to enforce its pre-existing ‘red lines’ on YPG expansion in Syria while pressuring the U.S. to intensify its support for the Syrian opposition rather than the Kurds.

Iraq Situation Report: October 27 - November 2, 2015

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: PM Haidar al-Abadi suffered a serious blow in his bid to reform and lead the government on November 2 when the Council of Representatives (CoR) unanimously ruled to withdraw his ability to launch reform packages unilaterally. CoR members voiced support for the reforms, but worded the motion as enforcing the separation of powers and keeping legislative powers within the CoR. PM Abadi’s loss is Maliki’s gain, as Maliki has capitalized on resistance to PM Abadi’s reforms by openly speaking out against them and using his allies within the SLA to spearhead criticism of PM Abadi’s governing style. PM Abadi has lost the confidence of the political blocs who supported his reform packages with his unilateral approach to introducing reforms, and the outcome of the vote was a response to his most recent and controversial reforms. These included changes to the salary scale and the appointment of a new Council of Ministers (CoM) secretary who holds U.S. citizenship. PM Abadi previously had numerous supporters for his reform agenda. However, in response to the salary scale changes, these supporters, including Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the political opponents of Vice President Nouri al-Maliki, including ISCI and the Sadrist Trend, have since diminished their support for him in light of the salary scale change. Sistani disagreed with PM Abadi over the final form for the salary scale reform, and thus voiced his disapproval. Maliki has likely used this opportunity to test the waters for an eventual no-confidence vote against PM Abadi. Sistani likely remains supportive of PM Abadi – Maliki’s allies likely took advantage of Sistani’s denouncement of the salary scale change to attack PM Abadi. In addition, former supporters of the reform program most likely used the CoR vote to both protect themselves from backlash by their constituencies over unpopular reform packages and to prevent PM Abadi from exercising any powers without their consultation. 

ISF and tribal fighters reportedly crossed the Albu Faraj Bridge into central Ramadi. Significant action has not been reported in central Ramadi, indicating that the incursion does not constitute a meaningful tactical gain. However, the crossing is the first advance by the ISF into central Ramadi from the north since the city fell to ISIS on May 18. The ISF are also approaching the Anbar Operations Command headquarters building, but have not managed to capture it or the nearby Warrar Dam. The ISF have failed to make progress towards the city from the east and remain bogged down in fighting in villages between Ramadi and Habaniya. ISIS also attacked Peshmerga positions in Sinjar and Rabia districts in northwestern Ninewa province and continued pressuring ISF and “Popular Mobilization” fighters west if Samarra and north of Baiji, indicating a continued capacity to launch attacks across a wide territory. Meanwhile, President Barack Obama promised to “intensify” support to the ISF and would authorize a headquarters for U.S. special operator task force (SOTF) in Arbil. This follows a report that a similar SOTF headquarters had already been operational in Arbil for some time. The U.S. is thus taking steps to intensify its support under current advise and assist powers for the Peshmerga and the ISF against ISIS.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: October 23 - November 1, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola

Key Takeaway: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) discontinued the release of daily airstrike reports from October 28 – November 1 amidst multilateral talks on the Syrian Civil War held in Vienna on October 30 and continued reports of civilian casualties. Nevertheless, credible local sources continued to report airstrikes in Dera’a, Damascus, Homs, Hama, Idlib, and Aleppo from October 31 – November 1. Russian airstrikes predominantly targeted rebel-held areas in Aleppo Province in conjunction with regime ground offensives against ISIS in the southeastern countryside of Aleppo and rebel forces southwest of Aleppo City. Local activist reporting claimed that Russian airstrikes and regime forces killed 64, including 28 children in Aleppo on October 31 alone.
 
ISIS maintains its ability to threaten both regime and rebel-held terrain, largely undeterred by Russian airstrikes. ISIS continues to contest the regime-held town of Safira in the southeastern countryside of Aleppo, threatening the regime’s primary ground line of communication to Aleppo City. Additionally, ISIS reportedly seized the town of Maheen in the southern countryside of Homs Province. This expansion threatens regime control of the strategic M5 Highway connecting Damascus to Homs City. Regime forces subsequently launched an intense shelling campaign on Maheen in response. ISIS’s seizure of the town may spark a response from Russian warplanes in the coming days.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation. 

 

Iraq's Oil-Driven Financial Crisis Exacerbates Conflict between Prime Minister Abadi and Maliki

By Patrick Martin

Key Take-away: PM Abadi faces resistance over how to address Iraq’s debilitating financial situation caused by a sharp drop in oil prices. The 2016 federal budget is a hotly-contested piece of legislation, as it allocates funding for government ministries. PM Abadi and the Council of Ministers (CoM) approved a draft budget on October 19 and submitted it to the Council of Representatives (CoR) for approval. The CoR will begin reading the budget after the CoR Finance Committee reviews it, a process that does not have a set timeline. PM Abadi and his opponents, including Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias, are at odds with how much of the budget should go to the militias within the “Popular Mobilization,” whose allocation decreased from the 2015 budget. Iranian proxy militias are thus demanding that PM Abadi increase the share for the “Popular Mobilization.” PM Abadi also introduced a new salary scale to reduce expenditures and increase the pay of the poorest government employees. This has led to a backlash against PM Abadi’s reform agenda, including from his most powerful supporter, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and from PM Abadi’s primary political opponent, Vice President Nouri al-Maliki. The final salary scale will likely be heavily modified from its current form and less effective in reducing expenditures.  PM Abadi’s opponents will use his unpopular measures to obstruct his reform agenda. Maliki in particular will exploit discontent among political blocs with the reform agenda in order to undermine PM Abadi’s authority and bolster his own prominence and profile, and has begun assembling a still-small coalition with potential to vote no-confidence in PM Abadi.

PM Abadi’s political opponents consider PM Abadi’s current strategy to address Iraq’s financial crisis unacceptable. Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias and supporters of Vice President Nouri al-Maliki oppose the proposed allocation of funding to the “Popular Mobilization” in the federal budget, whose full text has not been released. However, Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari stated that “20 percent” of the budget pertains to defense. This includes funding allocated to the both the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the militias in the “Popular Mobilization.” Early reports indicate that the budget allocates less funding to the “Popular Mobilization” than the 2015 budget. This number will be significantly less than what notable militia figures requested by up to a third. Kata’ib al-Imam Ali, a powerful Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militia, claimed that the budget allocated only 2.16 trillion. Iraqi dinars as opposed to the 6 trillion. Iraqi dinars in the 2015 budget, or more than 5bn. USD. The figures are likely incorrect, as more reliable reporting puts the “Popular Mobilization” budget allocation for 2015 at 1 billion. USD. Nevertheless, the complaint demonstrates the degree to which the proxy militias and the Iraqi government disagree over the appropriate size of the money allocated for the “Popular Mobilization.” In particular, prominent Iranian proxy militia leader and designated terrorist Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis openly criticized the budget and pinned the blame on PM Abadi. Muhandis insisted that he repeatedly told PM Abadi about the need to increase “Popular Mobilization” funding. An increase in “Popular Mobilization” funding would give the “Popular Mobilization” greater capabilities and heighten their profile at the expense of the ISF.

The decrease in funding for the “Popular Mobilization” comes as part of government-wide austerity measures stemming from Iraq’s acute financial crisis. The figures for the 2016 budget are based upon the price and production of oil, which the budget identifies as 45 USD per barrel. The budget also projects an increase in oil production from 3 million barrels per day (bpd) to 3.6 million bpd. The projected oil price is dramatically less than the basis figure for the 2015 budget, which assumed that the price of oil was 80 USD per barrel. This was unrealistic, as Brent crude prices dropped under 50 USD by the time the 2015 budget passed in January 2015. The smaller budget is technically inadequate, as there is still projected to be a deficit of 21 billion. and 25 billion. USD. The anti-ISIS fight demands so many resources that some ministries have lost significant funding. Muhammad Sahib al-Darraji, the Industry and Minerals minister, complained that his ministry did not receive any funding for 2016 and that he had abstained from the CoM vote on the budget. Al-Darraji is a member of al-Ahrar bloc, which supports PM Abadi’s reform agenda. Other al-Ahrar bloc members did not appear to have abstained from voting.

One of PM Abadi’s mechanisms for reducing expenditures has been the second point of contention, and has drawn the ire of the Iraqi street. The CoM passed a comprehensive reduction in salaries for government employees in order to reduce expenses as a reform package separate from the federal budget on October 13. The reductions affect a large number of Iraqis, as 40 percent of available jobs are provided by the government. This sparked a large backlash from government employees across the country. Those employees at the higher end of the salary scale, such as university professors and employees holding higher degrees, viewed the cuts as unfair.  Some of these higher-earning employees saw their salaries reduced by nearly 20 percent. University professors and employees subsequently staged protests or in some cases gone on strike in Basra, Diwaniya, Muthanna, and Baghdad.

The ensuing backlash is indicative of the first real loss of support from the Iraqi street for PM Abadi. His reform program had otherwise enjoyed widespread support, despite its vastly diminished momentum. Protests against the salary scale have been sporadic and involved few participants thus far, in particular because government employees with the smallest salaries actually received slight pay increases. Salary reductions had also been under discussion for months. The CoM reduced CoM salaries, including PM Abadi’s pay, in July 2015. CoR members later followed suit with a 45 percent reduction in August 2015. PM Abadi first announced the discussions of the new changes to the salary scale on October 5. The discussions involved consultations with the members of the CoM. PM Abadi pointed out that the CoM passed the salary scale changes. The major political parties have representation within the CoM, and thus had prior knowledge and input regarding the shape of the salary scale changes.

PM Abadi’s allies also rejected the salary scale changes. PM Abadi’s reform agenda has benefited from the support of the SLA’s two main political rivals within the Shi’a political sphere: the Islamic Supreme Council (ISCI) of Ammar al-Hakim and Muqtada al-Sadr’s al-Ahrar bloc. ISCI has supported PM Abadi’s reform agenda since August 7, and al-Ahrar since August 9. Their support was largely aimed at undermining the SLA and Maliki in order to improve their own influence within Baghdad and southern provincial governments.  An ISCI member stated on October 28 that ISCI did not support questioning PM Abadi or ending his premiership. However, an al-Ahrar bloc member criticized the salary scale changes as a “red line” and PM Abadi’s reforms as too slow. The Sunni Etihad bloc also rejected the salary scale and PM Abadi’s lack of consultation regarding the reforms, as did the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Major Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish parties likely rejected the salary scale to protect themselves from public backlash after initially agreeing to the changes. After all, the CoM has senior representatives from the major political blocs, whose votes were necessary for the reform package’s approval.

More troublingly, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s representative, Abdul-Mahdi al-Karbala’i, rejected the salary scale changes on October 23 in a Friday sermon, calling reductions in the salaries of university professors and educated employees “unfair.” Evidently, Sistani and PM Abadi have not been in lockstep over the required changes to the salary scale. The disagreement is curious as Karbala’i advocated a change to the salary scale in September. Sistani’s support is essential for PM Abadi’s political survival, and the disagreement robs PM Abadi of any realistic chance to see the salary scale changes approved in the CoR in their current form. If the Shi’a religious establishment weakens its support for Abadi, his Shi’a political rivals will sense the opportunity to compete with him for power and influence.

PM Abadi’s political opponents have used the most recent reform package to attack PM Abadi for what they view as his unilateral and non-consultative approach to reforming government. Many of PM Abadi’s opponents had already rejected PM Abadi’s October 20 decision to dismiss CoM Secretary Mahdi al-Alaq, a Dawa Party member of the SLA and an acting appointee who had only held the position for two months. Iranian proxy groups like Badr Organization and Kata’ib Hezbollah, as well as prominent Maliki allies like CoR member Hanan al-Fatlawi, were outraged when PM Abadi replaced Alaq on October 20 with a candidate who holds American citizenship who had previously had disagreements with pro-Maliki Dawa Party members.

Members of the SLA aligned with VP Maliki wrote a letter to PM Abadi on October 27, criticizing his lack of consultation with political parties on the reforms and his “overriding” of the constitution. The complaints over constitutionality were directed at his attempts to eliminate the VP position that requires a constitutional amendment, which ISW documented in August 2015. The members collectively criticized the salary scale changes and PM Abadi’s reform movement on a whole, and stated that they “withdrew their mandate” from PM Abadi and that they were “no longer responsible” for PM Abadi’s actions. This does not mean that Maliki’s allies are intending to attempt to withdraw confidence from PM Abadi. An SLA member denied that the SLA sought to withdraw confidence from PM Abadi, though prominent SLA members have openly speculated about doing so. The Dawa Party political leadership also reaffirmed support for PM Abadi and the reform agenda on October 30. It would be extremely difficult for Maliki to muster the support within the CoR to even attempt a no-confidence vote. However, Maliki and his allies do not actually intend to pursue this course of action right now. Instead, public threats of withdrawing mandates and speculating about withdrawing confidence are threats aiming to discourage PM Abadi from pursuing any additional reforms without including the SLA in the decision-making process.

The SLA letter was the strongest open criticism of the reform movement since PM Abadi launched his first package on August 9. Maliki later openly opposed PM Abadi in a television interview on October 30. Maliki did not specifically mention the salary scale, but he stated that PM Abadi’s reform packages had “no legal force.” He also insisted that the Vice Presidency had not been abolished and that any move to do so would be unconstitutional. The interview was a departure from Maliki’s prior methods of attacking PM Abadi, which largely involved voicing discontent through his allies in the SLA or through coordinated pro-Maliki social media. Maliki will use the rise in vocal opposition to the salary scales to heighten his profile and undermine PM Abadi’s ability to operate independent of Iranian influence and the SLA leadership’s direction.

It is highly unlikely that the salary scale will pass a vote in the CoR in its current form considering the opposition from Sistani as well as both PM Abadi’s supporters and opponents. The salary scale will most likely be modified, but pay cuts in some form across the board may be unavoidable as Iraq’s economy continues to falter. Nevertheless, PM Abadi’s opponents will use the highly unpopular salary scale change as ammunition against him and his performance. In particular, Maliki’s cohorts will continue attacking PM Abadi and obstructing his reforms in the CoR. Their obstinacy forms only one component of a larger trend involving Maliki’s attempts to undermine PM Abadi’s power and set conditions for Maliki’s eventual return to power. This trend will intensify as Maliki attempts to use opposition to the salary scale changes against PM Abadi. It is unlikely that the CoR will attempt a no-confidence vote at this time. Nevertheless, Maliki may be able to exploit the current resistance to PM Abadi’s reforms to solidify opposition to additional reforms in the future. This may force PM Abadi to consult with the SLA before submitting any additional proposals.

It will be equally interesting to see what results from the 2016 federal budget. Iranian proxy militias and their supporters within the CoR consistently advocate for a massive increase in the budget share for the “Popular Mobilization.” Realistically, any increase for the “Popular Mobilization” will require a reduction in the budget allocations for the legitimate security institutions within the ISF. This will result in friction between PM Abadi and his opponents over access to resources. Reallocating resources from the ISF to the “Popular Mobilization” will directly affect PM Abadi’s ability to exercise independent command and control over the security forces by reducing the capacity of the ISF and increasing that of the “Popular Mobilization.” This course of action would result in increased capabilities for militias that are susceptible to Iranian influence. PM Abadi and his opponents competing over access to resources indicate that the budget will not pass the CoR in quick fashion.

The Iraqi state and government faces a grave challenge. The budget crisis makes the status quo intractable, but Abadi is not sufficiently powerful to force changes of this magnitude. In fact, the greatest challenges to his premiership come from within his own political bloc. 

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 - October 30, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande with Jodi Brignola

Key Takeaway: The Russian air campaign in Syria reportedly expanded into the southern province of Dera’a one month after Russian airstrikes in Syria commenced. Credible local sources reported that Russian warplanes conducted overnight strikes near Tel al-Harra and other nearby villages east of the Golan Heights in Dera’a Province on October 28. Tel al-Harra is the location of a Russian signals intelligence facility, which was seized by rebels in October 2014. These airstrikes follow reports that the Syrian regime and Hezbollah reinforcements arrived in northwestern Dera’a Province on October 27. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) did not release official airstrike reports for October 29-30. However, credible local activist sources continued to report instances of Russian airstrikes throughout Dera’a, Damascus, Homs, Idlib, and Aleppo. Russian airstrikes largely concentrated around rebel-held areas in the northern Homs countryside and within Aleppo City.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.