ISIS's Campaign in Libya: January 4 - February 19, 2016

By Claire Coyne, Emily Estelle, and Harleen Gambhir

Key Takeaway: ISIS is executing a sophisticated, multi-front campaign against Libya’s oil facilities, demonstrating the organization’s growing capability abroad. President Obama reportedly ruled out significant military intervention against the group as of February 18. The administration opted to continue intermittent strikes against ISIS leaders in Libya instead, such as the strike on an ISIS leader in western Libya on February 19. This surgical approach is unlikely to defeat the group, which maintains more than 5,000 fighters and is reinforced by leadership sent from Iraq and Syria. Libyan ground forces are also unlikely to expel ISIS from its areas of control. ISIS’s safe haven in Libya will allow it to survive even if it is defeated in Iraq and Syria.  ISIS will use its Libyan base to exacerbate regional disorder and likely to attack Europe.

ISIS has executed an aggressive campaign to take over territory in the midst of Libya’s post-revolution civil war. ISIS deployed a contingent of 300 Libyan ISIS militants from eastern Syria to spearhead the creation of a new ISIS affiliate in Libya in mid-2014 as part of a larger strategy to seize terrain and exacerbate disorder outside of Iraq and Syria. ISIS established this affiliate in Sirte, on the central Libyan coast, in early 2015 and has since advanced outward from the city, capturing population centers and establishing checkpoints to its east, west, and south. ISIS has exploited the seams between the participants in Libya’s civil war and established itself amidst the conflict’s frontlines, taking over territory when no local forces are positioned to defend it. This approach mirrors ISIS’s military expansion and development of safe havens in Syria and Yemen, demonstrating the threat posed by the regional adoption of ISIS’s way of war.  ISIS now possesses a contiguous zone of control that includes a more than 200 km stretch of Libya’s coast, which ISIS confirmed as part of its Caliphate in August 2015. ISIS maintains between 5,000 and 6,500 fighters in Libya, according to the Pentagon’s latest count. The group is now both defending its stronghold in Sirte and pushing outward, imposing its rule on the population as it grows by establishing governance structures and enforcing shari’a law. U.S. leaders including Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter have acknowledged that ISIS’s Libya affiliate is chief among the organization’s increasingly dangerous “metastases” abroad.

ISIS’s leadership is dedicating significant resources to Libya, as evidenced by its complex, multi-front campaign on the country’s oil production facilities. ISIS’s central leadership has deployed leaders from Iraq and Syria to Libya to strengthen governance, consolidate control, and develop operational design and capabilities. The group is currently conducting a campaign against Libya’s oil resources and security that aims to both perpetuate instability in the country and set conditions for ISIS to capture Libya’s oil wealth. ISIS likely seeks to gain access to oil revenue in Libya, as it has done in Iraq and Syria where revenue from black market oil trade is a significant source of funding for the group’s military and governance efforts. ISIS launched a campaign in early January 2016 on the oil fields east of its stronghold in Sirte in pursuit of this objective. ISIS’s ground forces took complete control of a village to the east of Sirte, where it had previously maintained a light presence, and used it to stage sustained attacks on oil export terminals at Ras Lanuf and al Sidra, as well as on inland oil infrastructure. The group executed coordinated attacks across multiple populated areas during the oil fields campaign, including a suicide truck bomb at a police training camp in Zliten that killed at least 60 and wounded at least 200. This bombing, along with several attempted follow-on attacks, targeted territory held by the Misrata-based militias that previously fought against ISIS’s takeover of Sirte and were likely intended to prevent attacks on Sirte as ISIS executed the oil campaign. ISIS also attacked oil infrastructure near Zueitina, far to the east of the al Sidra frontline, signaling coordination between militants based in both central and eastern Libya. ISIS has yet to take control of operational oil infrastructure in Libya. However, its January 2016 campaign successfully exercised the Libyan affiliate’s capability to design and execute a complex campaign and established support zones for future attacks on oil fields, making it the group’s largest and most successful ground operation outside of Iraq and Syria to date. This preparation, combined with ISIS’s recruitment of engineers to Libya, signals that the group will launch more operations aimed at controlling Libya’s oil infrastructure. 

No Libyan actors are poised to roll back ISIS’s territorial gains in Libya. Libya does not have a unified national army, and its highly factionalized armed groups remain locked in a multidimensional civil war. The transitional government that assumed power after the fall of longtime dictator Muammar al Qaddafi in 2011 failed to bridge the country’s political and tribal fault lines and ultimately broke down into two warring parliaments, each supported by loose coalitions of armed groups. The UN is struggling to bring the two parliaments together behind a unity government, but the ongoing stalemate and uncertain status of key powerbrokers in the future government are preventing majorities on both sides from agreeing, and thus the armed groups from uniting. ISIS’s rapid expansion in Libya has proved insufficient to force Libya’s political leaders to abandon their grievances. At the same time, no existing Libyan fighting force has demonstrated either the will or the capability to defeat ISIS in their country. The Libyan National Army (LNA), aligned with the House of Representatives based in the east, is embroiled in a stalemated fight against a plethora of Islamist groups in Benghazi, Derna, and Ajdabiya. The LNA has used its very limited air power to conduct sparse strikes on ISIS positions, but its forces are entrenched in their current fights and unable to launch a ground assault on ISIS in Sirte. Meanwhile, a coalition of Misratan militias from western Libya recently mobilized eastward toward Sirte, but these forces, combined with those already based closer to Sirte in Abugrein, likely number around half of the force that ISIS can muster to defend its stronghold. It is more likely that the Misratans, who have established checkpoints at key transport hubs and near ISIS positions west of Sirte, are attempting to contain ISIS’s westward expansion.

The U.S. and its allies lack both the partner and the will to carry out a campaign the scale needed to defeat ISIS in Libya. The absence of a unity government and a Libyan army hampers action against ISIS by denying the international community legitimate political and military partners for intervention. The U.S. has reportedly ruled out the possibility of intervening in Libya unilaterally, as U.S. defense officials claimed on February 18 that President Obama rejected a plan from U.S. Africa Command and Special Operations Command to launch airstrikes against ISIS’s resources in Libya and deploy Special Operations Forces to train a future Libyan national army. The U.S. reportedly will continue to strike ISIS’s high-level leadership in Libya instead. For example, the U.S. targeted a Tunisian ISIS operative in western Libya linked to major terror attacks in Tunisia on February 19. Such surgical, opportunistic targeting will not expel ISIS from populated areas or prevent the group from advancing further. Denying ISIS safe haven in Libya requires a ground partner capable and willing to clear and hold ISIS’s current areas of control. ISIS will continue to grow and strengthen in the absence of a determined response from both Libyans and the international community.

ISIS will use its enduring safe haven in Libya to endure and project disorder throughout North Africa and potentially into Europe.  A Libyan stronghold allows ISIS to survive in the event of defeat in Iraq and Syria by providing two key capabilities: a physical safe haven that can serve as a refuge for central leadership, and a safeguard for ISIS’s ideological legitimacy, which depends on the governance of a territorial Islamic state. ISIS has already used Libya as a support zone for devastating attacks on tourist sites in neighboring Tunisia, and its recent uptick in North Africa-focused propaganda indicates that the group is still focused on generating recruitment and attacks in the region. ISIS’s secure hold on terrain in Libya allows it to more easily develop networks and project attacks into neighboring Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt, as well as recruit throughout the Maghreb and Sahel regions. ISIS may ultimately use its safe haven within Libya to plan and launch attacks on nearby Europe, as it has already done with its safe havens in Iraq and Syria.

Iraq Situation Report: February 12 - 17, 2016

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Prime Minister Abadi is facing grave political challenges following his announcement of a cabinet reshuffle on February 9. Supporters of his past reform have stated that all positions should be open for consideration in a government, including that of the prime minister. In addition, Muqtada al-Sadr gave PM Abadi 45 days before he threatened to withdraw his support from PM Abadi’s government. Separately, PM Abadi stated that he was willing to resign as part of the reshuffle if necessary. The prime minister does not have the constitutional right or the power to undertake sweeping reforms of the government without support from the political blocs, which bodes ill for his ability to stay in office. PM Abadi’s removal would be highly problematic for the U.S.-led anti-ISIS Coalition, as he is a pro-Coalition figure that would likely be replaced by a leader far more willing to accept greater Iranian assistance. Meanwhile, the Popular Mobilization Commission stated that it had cut its ranks by 30 percent due to financial constraints, likely an attempt to access funding from the Iraqi government. Iranian proxy militias secure their funding from Iran and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), but a large number of other militia groups rely on funding from the Iraqi government, though they may also be competing for potential access to Iranian resources. If the announced cuts target Sunni tribal fighters in the Popular Mobilization and more nationalist groups not closely tied to Iran, it would make the Popular Mobilization even more difficult to include in future security operations due to their increasingly pro-Iranian slant.

Update on the Situation in Aleppo

By Jennifer Cafarella

The U.S. requires partnerships with Syrian armed opposition groups in order to destroy ISIS and al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra in the long term. Without local Sunni partners that hold the support of the population, the U.S. faces high costs to destroy ISIS and al Qaeda in Syria and risks failure. The U.S. still retains potential partners in the North to achieve this objective: ISW assesses that six of the powerbrokers or potential powerbrokers in Aleppo Province are eligible for this partnership.

Russian military support to the Assad regime's offensive in Aleppo is forcing U.S.-backed opposition groups to rely more heavily on support from Jabhat al Nusra and its Salafi jihadi allies in Syria. With the help of Russian airstrikes, the regime has continued to close in on the opposition and has nearly completed a full siege of the opposition-held parts of Aleppo City. The Salafi-jihadi opposition group Ahrar al Sham has begun to consolidate leadership over the Syrian armed opposition in Aleppo in order to coordinate the defense of the city more effectively. Ahrar al Sham plays a prominent role on the battlefield in Aleppo, as ISW assessed in a recent report. The group is assuming control of the Aleppo-based opposition as international support to those groups fails to materialize.

Eight prominent Aleppo groups agreed to unite under the leadership of former Ahrar al Sham leader Hashim al Sheikh on February 15. These eight groups include four U.S.-backed groups, of which ISW has assessed that one is a powerbroker in Aleppo and two are potential powerbrokers. The agreement places Ahrar al Sham in operational control of much of the Aleppo opposition, but it is not a complete merger. It does not mean these groups will cease operating independently, nor that they will necessarily accept Ahrar al Sham's religious agenda. Instead, the deepened coordination with Ahrar al Sham will help these groups fight more effectively against the Assad regime. It is unclear whether al Sheikh will now assume control of the Jaysh Halab military coalition that fifteen opposition groups declared on February 6. The absence of two major Jaysh Halab component groups, Jaysh al Mujahideen and Jabhat al Shamiya, indicates that al Sheikh may lead an alternate alliance, or possibly a subcomponent within Jaysh Halab.  

The U.S. must act quickly to prevent Ahrar al Sham from translating operational leadership of U.S.-backed groups into their full merger under its command. Hashim al Sheikh will most likely try use his new leadership role to facilitate deepened cooperation between these eight groups and Jabhat al Nusra in defending opposition-held parts of Aleppo City. Over time, Ahrar al Sham will likely assist Jabhat al Nusra to create a new coalition in Aleppo under joint leadership, akin to the Jaysh al Fatah coalition they currently lead in Idlib Province.  

It remains possible for the U.S. to fragment Ahrar al Sham’s leadership of opposition groups in Aleppo, therein restoring their independence, by providing an alternate source of military support to defend against the Russian-supported regime offensive. ISW recommended steps to preserve the opposition groups in Aleppo that are potential U.S. allies on February 13 in a paper titled The Syrian Armed Opposition Forces in Aleppo. These recommendations remain valid, and acting on them is even more crucial following Ahrar al Sham’s rise to new leadership in the province. 

An Excerpt from "Opposition Forces in Aleppo": Conclusion and Recommendations

By Jennifer Cafarella and Genevieve Casagrande

As talks of a ceasefire or "cessation of hostilities" take the headlines, Aleppo looms even larger as a key city in the 5-year Syrian civil war.  Aleppo is not covered by any agreement for a ceasefire and regime and Russian forces are intensifying their attacks on this city under the pretext that the opposition forces consist largely of al Qaeda's affiliate Jabhat al Nusra.  The fall of Aleppo would be a devastating defeat for opposition forces, but even a long siege would be detrimental to U.S. interests as opposition forces would become more radicalized and Jabhat al Nusra would further cement its leadership role in northern Syria, effectively removing options to achieve American goals in northern Syria.

Below is the Conclusion from ISW's recent paper "The Syrian Armed Opposition Forces in Aleppo." Read the full paper here. 

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The U.S. has a short time frame in Aleppo to prevent the upcoming humanitarian catastrophe and preserve opposition groups the U.S. needs in order to destroy ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra in the long term. The Aleppo-based opposition remains relatively independent and therefore offers the U.S. a promising source of ground forces against Jabhat al Nusra in Northern Syria. Opposition groups that receive covert U.S. support are still among Aleppo’s powerbrokers and potential powerbrokers. The regime’s advance in Aleppo poses an existential threat to these opposition forces, however. Jabhat al Nusra will use the defense of Aleppo as a vehicle to overwhelm opposition groups that are acceptable to the West and entrench itself within the civilian population. The collapse of the opposition in Aleppo, either in a surrender to the regime or in a merger with Jahbat al Nusra and Ahrar al Sham during a siege, would remove options to achieve American objectives in northern Syria.

Russia is using the cover of a potential “cessation of hostilities” to set conditions for the collapse of U.S.-backed groups in Aleppo. There is very little to indicate that Russia, Iran, or the Syrian regime have any intention of halting their military campaign in northern Syria, despite this diplomatic overture. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has explicitly noted that Russia does not intend to halt its air campaign against “terrorists” in Syria.69 Russia exploits the West’s lack of understanding of the Syrian armed opposition to justify targeting a broad swath of groups that include powerbrokers that receive covert U.S. support. Russia’s objective is to eliminate the opposition in Aleppo that poses the greatest threat to Assad and undermine Western support of these groups under the cover of targeting “terrorists.” As such, the February 11 “cessation of hostilities” agreement is not a solution to the challenges the U.S. faces in Syria; it is a submission to Russia’s agenda.70

Syrian armed opposition groups are unlikely to agree to a “cessation of hostilities” under these conditions. No armed opposition group participated in the initial discussions. Aleppo-based groups have consistently refused to agree to localized “freeze zones” in the past on the grounds that they do not trust the Syrian regime to adhere to one.71 The current deal legitimizes this argument, as the deal is very clearly on Russia’s terms. The U.S. risks jeopardizing the prospects of achieving a negotiated settlement in Syria in the long term if it does not abandon this cessation of hostilities initiative. Jabhat al Nusra and other hardline groups will use this initiative – and the regime’s almost certain violation of it – as proof that Syrians should permanently abandon the negotiating table. American submission to Russia’s agenda in Syria thus directly undermines the requirements for American national security.

The situation in Aleppo requires American leadership and action. U.S.-trained opposition forces in the Northern Aleppo countryside are not alone strong enough to secure Aleppo City, for they are unlikely able to break through the regime’s new forward line of troops (FLOT) in the northern countryside. The U.S. does not need to consider drastic measures such as ground forces in order to have a major impact in Aleppo, however. It is possible to change the outcome of the fight in Aleppo and assist the humanitarian crisis that is unfolding through a few limited yet crucial steps.

First, the U.S. could conduct humanitarian airdrops of supplies into opposition-held neighborhoods of the city in order to sustain both the opposition groups and the hundreds of thousands of civilians in opposition-held areas of Aleppo City to forestall a humanitarian catastrophe. Providing humanitarian aid to opposition groups in Aleppo increases their ability to endure the siege without submitting to Jabhat al Nusra’s leadership. The U.S. has the capability to do so from airbases in Turkey currently used for the antiISIS campaign. Turkey would support such operations and almost certainly grant the use of its bases for them to preserve opposition groups in Aleppo, including those that already receive Turkish aid, in order to pursue regime change in Syria. Jabhat al Nusra would be able to access some of this aid, but the U.S. should not let Jabhat al Nusra’s presence in the city condemn the civilian population and opposition groups at risk. Any American intervention in Aleppo, even an airdrop of humanitarian supplies, will risk provoking Russia. Russia is very unlikely willing to rise escalation over Aleppo, however, as it is not a core Russian strategic interest. U.S. policymakers are reportedly considering humanitarian airdrops, and should undertake them immediately.

Second, the U.S. should significantly increase the military and financial support to the non-Ahrar al Sham powerbrokers and potential powerbrokers examined in this report. The U.S. already provides aid on a limited scale to many of them. The U.S. should provide these groups with increased TOW anti-tank missile shipments in addition to increased shipments of light weapons, ammunition, and money to pay their fighters. The U.S. could do so from Turkey, where a covert U.S. program to provide small numbers of TOW anti-tank missiles to vetted opposition groups is already reportedly based.72 The U.S. can deliver these supplies quietly through the Bab al Hawa border crossing with Turkey west of Aleppo City. This is advantageous because air dropping the supplies is more vulnerable to Russian interdiction.

The provision of military supplies in addition to humanitarian aid would preserve the powerbroker status of four ideologically viable powerbrokers (al Jabhat al Shamiya, Jaysh al Mujahideen, Feilaq al Sham, and Fawj al Awal) and increase their relative strength vis-à-vis Ahrar al Sham. The increase in both military and humanitarian support could also transform all of the potential powerbrokers into powerbrokers by both providing them more access to resources than smaller Aleppo based groups have and closing the gap between powerbrokers and potential powerbrokers. It would also mitigate Jabhat al Nusra’s ability to coerce or exploit the weakness of potential powerbrokers in order to absorb or transform them. It could even be sufficient to coalesce smaller opposition groups in Aleppo under the leadership of powerbrokers that are potential U.S. allies as opposed to al Qaeda-allied Ahrar al Sham.

The U.S. should not make additional support contingent upon a refusal by opposition groups to coordinate with Jabhat al Nusra, because it is not a demand these groups can meet under current military conditions. The U.S. should instead adopt an approach to incentivize and enable these groups to retain freedom of action and to withstand Jabhat al Nusra coercion over the medium term while potentially growing stronger. The severity of the situation in Aleppo will likely prevent Jabhat al Nusra from attacking these groups directly because doing so would greatly harm the group’s image. The upcoming siege of Aleppo thus offers the U.S. the opportunity to build future partners against Jabhat al Nusra by exploiting conditions in which Jahbat al Nusra’s freedom of action against Western clients is limited.

Third, The U.S. could also support the establishment of a humanitarian safe zone along the Turkish border. Turkey may independently do so in order to address the flow of refugees that it cannot absorb. A safe zone north of Aleppo could also provide Turkey with basing it can use to deliver additional support to opposition forces in Aleppo City, such as indirect fire. The U.S. could support this course of action with aerial overflight to prevent the regime from attacking the safe zone, and could leverage U.S.-trained forces operating near the Turkish border to help secure the zone and pressure the regime’s forward line of troops (FLOT).

Preventing the regime from recapturing Aleppo does not solve the many other challenges the U.S. faces in Syria; it merely buys some time and prevents a more dangerous future from emerging. Jabhat al Nusra and opposition forces it leads will still hold terrain in Idlib Province that is sustained by access to the Turkish border even if Aleppo falls. Pro-regime forces are unlikely to clear this terrain in the near term, particularly if Turkey sustains its support to Idlib-based groups. Jabhat al Nusra and many opposition forces in Aleppo will likely fall back into Idlib Province and launch a sustained insurgency from that terrain if they lose in Aleppo City. The U.S. therefore will have to develop options to eliminate Jabhat al Nusra in Idlib in the future regardless of the outcome in Aleppo. Preserving a core cadre of opposition fighters in Aleppo would create an option to use those forces for future operations.

Read the full paper here.

Iraq Prime Minister’s Cabinet Reshuffle May Lead to No-Confidence Vote

by Patrick Martin

Key Take-Away: Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced a major cabinet reshuffle on February 9 in an attempt to reform his government. Political blocs are unlikely to tolerate losing control over their ministries, however, and could unite to override the prime minster if he attempts to undercut them. Shi’a religious leader Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who formerly backed the prime minister’s reforms, has ceased to give political sermons, depriving PM Abadi of his public backing. Meanwhile, PM Abadi’s political opponents and Iranian proxy militias have escalated their efforts to restrict his powers over the past month. PM Abadi’s survival in office may be tenuous at best, and there is a possibility that the cabinet reshuffle could backfire against him, weakening him further or leading to his removal. Actors who previously supported PM Abadi’s reform programs may consider ousting him in the event of non-implementation of the reform agenda. Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr, who previously expressed strong support for PM Abadi’s reforms, gave him only 45 days to implement wide-ranging reforms, threatening to “withdraw confidence within the Council of Representatives” in the event of failure. PM Abadi’s weakening and possible removal would strike a serious blow to the U.S.’s ability to support the ISF in the fight against ISIS in Iraq, as it is likely that a pro-Iranian – and anti-Coalition – political figure would secure the premiership.

Context of the Cabinet Reshuffle Announcement

Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced in a televised speech on February 9 a “radical cabinet reshuffle” with the intent of replacing members of his Council of Minister (CoM) with technocrats and academics. He has announced no details of what the reshuffle will look like or to what extent the CoM will change. The Speaker of the Council of Representatives (CoR) and a senior member of the Sunni Etihad bloc, Salim al-Juburi, noted that any reshuffling of the CoM would have to be approved in the CoR in accord with the constitution. PM Abadi, when strong, has been able to make changes. He reduced the size of the CoM and reshuffled positions on August 9 and 16, 2015 during a brief period when his opponents were hesitant to openly oppose the reforms, particularly because he had the public backing of Shi’a religious authority Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. In theory, PM Abadi can accomplish major reforms and fundamentally change the composition of his government.

In practice, it will be nearly impossible for PM Abadi to replace senior leaders of political blocs with technocrats and maintain his seat as prime minister. PM Abadi does not command a strong majority in his own Dawa party, let alone the support of other political blocs participating in his tenuously balanced unity government. Political blocs covet control over ministries as sources of patronage and political influence, and divergent parties will likely set aside their political differences to block any attempt to deny them control over ministries. The move could therefore unite the political blocs against him and generate a meaningful threat of a no-confidence vote. An attempt by PM Abadi to change the composition of the government would thus be likely to fail and may constitute political suicide. 

Rumors first emerged of PM Abadi’s cabinet reshuffle on January 19, when anonymous sources claimed that PM Abadi would replace members of the CoM, most of whom are senior members of political blocs, with less senior members. He later confirmed that he was pursuing a cabinet reshuffle during a conversation with media on January 25 but offered no further details. Unconfirmed reports list six ministers as being targets for replacement. They include Education Minister Hussein al-Shahristani of the State of Law Alliance (SLA); Interior Minister Muhammad al-Ghabban of the Badr Organization; Bayan Jabr of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI); Electricity Minister Qasim al-Fahdawi of the Loyalty to Anbar bloc; Industry and Minerals Minister Muhammad al-Darraji of the Sadrist Trend; and Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). If true, these reports indicate that PM Abadi is not attempting to cut any one party out of the CoM or targeting any particular bloc. However, the inclusion of Ghabban is noteworthy, as he is a senior member of a proxy militia and subordinate to Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri, who rejected earlier reports of his rumored removal on January 20. The Badr Organization values its control over the Interior Ministry, as it provides Amiri and his Iranian backers with a large degree of control over the country’s police forces and a number of security agencies.

The other ministers on the list are also powerbrokers in their parties. Hussein al-Shahristani is the former Minister of Oil in the Maliki government and a relative of Ayatollah Jawad Shahristani, Sistani’s son-in-law and representative in Iran. Bayan Jabr was Maliki’s Minister of Finance and a prominent figure in the Badr Organization when it was still a subsidiary of ISCI. Qasim al-Fahdawi was the former governor of Anbar and is a prominent Sunni politician. Hoshyar Zebari served as Maliki’s Foreign Minister and has been the leading KDP official in Iraqi national politics. Muhammad al-Darraji was Maliki’s Housing Minister and remains a top Sadrist official. 

PM Abadi’s announcement came after a month of brazen impunity by PM Abadi’s primary opponent, the Iranian proxy militias, who demonstrated their intent to undermine Abadi’s rule through four major developments in 2016.

1) Iranian proxy militias openly rejected and expelled Iraqi Security Forces in the militia hub of Basra. Security in Basra had deteriorated precipitously due to the forward deployment of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) from the province to the front lines to fight ISIS and secure Baghdad. As a result, militias, often called “criminal gangs” in the Iraqi press, proliferated and violence between rival groups escalated. In response, PM Abadi sent an armored Iraqi Army (IA) brigade to Basra on January 13 to re-impose order and disarm the groups as well as warring tribes. However, a force from the armored brigade got into a confrontation with members of Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, (KSAS), an Iranian proxy militia, during which several KSAS members were injured. Proxy militias then made a joint statement on January 16 rejecting the presence of security forces from outside the province and demanding that it leave. The brigade withdrew from Basra on January 19, one week after it deployed. The successful expulsion of an IA brigade from Basra, Iraq’s main oil-producing province and a major historical hub of militia activity, demonstrated the weakness of PM Abadi’s authority and the willingness of Iranian proxies to openly defy his authority.

2) Iranian proxy militias have been openly maneuvering to undermine the ISF and the U.S.-led anti-ISIS Coalition in Iraq by positioning the Popular Mobilization at the forefront of security operations. Proxy militia leaders have been pressuring PM Abadi heavily to invite them to participate in operations to recapture Mosul while U.S. officials insist that Iranian proxy militias must not engage in any future operations. The participation of Iraqi Shi’a militias in a Mosul operation would enhance the narrative that the Popular Mobilization is the essential ally of the Iraqi government in the fight against ISIS, undercut U.S. influence and participation in a Mosul operation, undermine the legitimacy of the Iraqi Security Forces, and expose the predominantly Sunni province of Ninewa to sectarian abuses and violence. Proxy militia leaders have been meeting under the pretext of discussing the importance of the Popular Mobilization with some frequency since early January. These meetings included a January 14 visit by senior proxy militia leader and U.S.-designated terrorist Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis to the Ministry of Defense (MoD), as well as a meeting between Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri and the leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), Ammar al-Hakim, on January 20. Senior proxy leaders Amiri, former U.S. detainee Qais al-Khazali, and Abu Alaa met on February 8 and 9 to discuss Mosul in particular. These attempts to undermine the ISF and the Coalition reduces both PM Abadi’s freedom to operate independent of Iranian control and the ability of the U.S. to assist the ISF in recapturing territory from ISIS.

Above: Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri (far left), Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais al-Khazali (second from left), and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada leader Abu Alaa (third from left) at a meeting on February 8 to discuss the Coalition’s insistence on preventing the Popular Mobilization from participating in Mosul operations.

3) PM Abadi’s reform agenda has ground to a halt. PM Abadi launched a major reform initiative in August 2015 following a fiery anti-corruption sermon by the representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the supreme religious authority and a key ally of PM Abadi. However, despite an initial flurry of successful reforms and unparalleled popular support for PM Abadi from thousands of civil demonstrators in Baghdad and southern Iraq, his political opponents have successfully blocked his reforms one month into his initiative. Vice President Nouri al-Maliki, in particular, the former PM whose removal was PM Abadi’s top priority in the August 2015 reforms, succeeded in keeping his position within government. Maliki has aligned himself with the Iranian-backed proxy militias for more than a year. He leverages them as a powerful force, and they leverage him as a powerful politician. Since then, political blocs have blocked the passage of all major reforms; an ill-fated attempt to change the salary scales for federal employees even faced resistance from Sistani himself. In addition, no major legislation other than the budget has been able to pass the CoR due to irreconcilable differences between Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurdish parties on the particulars of key laws, such as the National Guard Law, Federal Court Act, and the Justice and Accountability Law. Iranian proxy militias publicly rejected the National Guard Law in September 2015, after which discussions on the draft law withered away. Iranian proxies’ ability to stifle government legislation poses a serious threat to national reconciliation between Iraqi Sunnis and Shi’a, and highlight the weakness of PM Abadi, whose selection in September 2014 was based in part on promises to see that these laws passed.

4) Proxy militias targeted U.S. personnel in Baghdad. An unspecified Iranian proxy militia kidnapped three American contractors in southern Baghdad on January 15, just two days after U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) deployed to Iraq to begin operations as part of a specialized targeting force to target ISIS. It was the first kidnapping of U.S. personnel in Iraq since the U.S. withdrew forces from Iraq in December 2011. The U.S. and the Coalition are PM Abadi’s main allies in the fight against ISIS, but Iranian proxy militias, and Iran by consequence, aim to expel the U.S. and replace Coalition support with Iranian and/or Russian support. The kidnapping was an embarrassment for the Iraqi government and demonstrated the level of impunity that Iranian proxy militias have in Iraq, as well as the threat they pose to the U.S. and its efforts to assist the ISF fight ISIS.

Reasons for the Announcement

The timing of PM Abadi’s announcement was likely deliberate and a product of a combination of motivators. First, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has shifted away from his political outspokenness to return to the more quietist position he originally favored. The supreme religious authority had supported PM Abadi’s previous reform efforts in August, and his representatives have frequently given sermons on the necessity of passing government reforms and anti-corruption measures. However, he has more recently become frustrated with the government’s inability to combat corruption, calling for a technocratic government as Iraq’s budgetary crisis increased. Sistani’s representative announced on February 5 that his weekly political sermons were suspended unless demanded by new developments. The change may be leverage to prod Abadi into taking reform members, or it may result from Sistani’s declining health. Regardless, Sistani has called for government reforms vigorously between August 2015 and February 2016, making his opinions clear. PM Abadi likely would not even attempt the reshuffle without Sistani’s previous statements. Second, PM Abadi may have privately secured the support of key figures within the political blocs, including senior members of the State of Law Alliance (SLA) who do not support the Iranian proxies, as well as in ISCI and the Sadrist Trend, without necessarily notifying the whole group. Leaders within these groups supported PM Abadi’s previous reform efforts, primarily as a means of weakening their political opponents and increasing their relative power within the government. However, ISCI’s Ammar al-Hakim stated on January 27 that any move to reorganize government must be “justified and non-impulsive,” suggesting that he knew little about the specifics of the cabinet reshuffle. In addition, a member of the Dawa Party, of which PM Abadi is a member, stated that PM Abadi had not brought up the cabinet reshuffle in a recent party meeting. It thus remains unclear to what extent he consulted senior political leaders about the specifics of the cabinet reshuffle prior to its announcement.

PM Abadi may also have initiated the cabinet reshuffle after detecting a move against him by his opponents. An imminent threat to his political survival made by his political opponents and/or Iranian proxy militias might have forced the PM to make a gambit to increase his control over the government and improve its performance while protecting himself from a possible move to oust him. PM Abadi’s opponents have been laying the groundwork for months for PM Abadi’s eventual departure from power and replacement by a figure that is more supportive of Iranian-backed militias. Maliki himself has been attempting to increase his attractiveness as a successor candidate by openly siding with Iranian proxy militias and opposing PM Abadi. 

Reactions to the Announcement

Iraq’s political blocs almost unanimously voiced their approval for a cabinet reshuffle, as was the case with PM Abadi’s previous reforms. Some political leaders used the reform language to attack one other, indicating that they intend to use the reforms to increase their political position at the expense of their rivals. However, recent statements have been laced with threatening language that indicates a growing dissatisfaction with PM Abadi among the Shi’a parties that underscores his precarious position. 

ISCI was the most publicly supportive of PM Abadi’s reshuffle, issuing a statement calling for a government of technocrats. The ISCI Transport Minister, Bayan Jabr, stated his approval of the cabinet reshuffle. Ammar al-Hakim, the leader of ISCI and a supporter of PM Abadi’s prior reforms, voiced his approval for the reform process, adding that the party quota system, wherein ministries and key positions are determined based on party affiliation, needed to end. Hakim did meet however meet on February 14 with Badr Organization Hadi al-Amiri, an Iranian proxy leader, indicating that ISCI is coordinating a response to the reforms with PM Abadi’s opponents rather than fully endorsing PM Abadi’s reform package. Other parties, including the Kurdish Gorran party and the Sunni Etihad bloc, also issued statements of support for the cabinet reshuffle.

Other parties largely distanced themselves from the cabinet reshuffle debate. Iyad Allawi, the leader of the secular Wataniya bloc, expressed skepticism about the process, stating that the current CoM composition was already technocratic, as most of its members held advanced degrees. However, a Wataniya leader later stated that the bloc endorsed reform proposals by the Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr. Similarly, a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) stated that the reshuffling “does not concern the Kurds” who “paid the price” for putting their trust in the previous government reshuffling in August 2015 which removed Kurds from key positions within the security forces.

The State of Law Alliance (SLA), led by PM Abadi’s primary rival, Vice President (VP) Nouri al-Maliki, used more threatening language in its support for PM Abadi’s reforms. Although the SLA Education Minister, Hussein al-Shahristani, offered to present PM Abadi with his resignation in a show of support for the reshuffle, the move was largely symbolic and obscures the true position of pro-Maliki elements within the SLA. One State of Law Alliance member stated that there was a need to form a single parliamentary group out of multiple political blocs to assign PM Abadi “or someone else” with the formation of the new government, again, threatening no confidence. A large contingent of the SLA has openly discussed removing PM Abadi in the past, issuing a letter on October 27, 2015 threatening to “withdraw their mandate” from PM Abadi due to his lack of consultation with political blocs on his last major reform program regarding salary scales for government employees; at least one Maliki supporter openly speculated about the possibility of replacing PM Abadi. Maliki himself openly opposed PM Abadi’s reforms in October 29, 2015, insisting that PM Abadi’s decision to abolish the post of the Vice President in August was not constitutional and that political blocs could withdraw their “mandate” from PM Abadi. Maliki has been positioning himself to succeed PM Abadi in the event of his removal, and he has secured the support of Iran and its proxy militias. Previously, the pro-Maliki elements of the SLA have used the threat of a no-confidence vote to constrain PM Abadi’s freedom of action, but his most recent reform announcement could open the door the prospect of removing PM Abadi becoming a reality.

Above: VP Nouri al-Maliki (center) attends a memorial service on January 27, 2016, for a Popular Mobilization leader, seated between Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri (right) and Kata’ib Hezbollah leader and U.S.-designated terrorist Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (left). Maliki frequently meets with Popular Mobilization and Iranian proxy leaders and is likely Iran’s preferred candidate for the premiership in the event that PM Abadi be removed from office.

The most alarming reaction came from, Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Sadrist Trend, who called for a comprehensive reform program on February 13 but threatened to oust PM Abadi from office. Sadr insisted on wide-ranging reforms that included reform of financial institutions and the judiciary, the formation of a technocratic government, and comprehensive security sector reform that included parliamentary votes of approval on all division leaders and military staff. Sadr’s statement highlighted issues that demonstrated his desire to see the reform program undermine the position of the SLA, Sadr’s primary political rival within the Shi’a political establishment; his insistence on “purging” the judiciary is rooted in Sadr’s insistence that Medhat al-Mahmoud, the head of the judiciary and a long-time ally of SLA leader VP Nouri al-Maliki, must leave office. However, Sadr also stated his frustration with PM Abadi’s inability to pass reforms, and only gave PM Abadi 45 days to implement the reforms and provide a reform program for the upcoming year or he would “withdraw confidence from PM Abadi in the CoR.” The explicit wording strongly suggested that he would pursue either a no-confidence vote, but could be interpreted as a threat to withdraw the Sadrist Trend from the government. Shortly afterwards, leaders in the Sadrist Trend’s al-Ahrar Bloc stated that they would withdraw from the political process if Sadr’s 45-day deadline was not met.

With Sadr’s support, the threat of a no-confidence vote against PM Abadi becomes a genuine possibility. A vote of no-confidence requires a questioning session, a request for the no-confidence vote from at least 50 CoR members, and successful passage of the vote with an absolute majority in the CoR. Previously, it would have been extremely difficult for Maliki’s allies to engineer a successful no-confidence vote. Were the Sadrist Trend to withdraw from government, however, it would be more likely, though not given, that a no-confidence vote could succeed. 

Possible Courses of Action

With the threat of a no-confidence having become more realistic with Sadr’s statements, it is clear that PM Abadi is losing support. How the cabinet reshuffle process plays out could fundamentally change the composition of the government, or result in its collapse. This presents several steps that could be taken over the course of the cabinet reshuffle.

PM Abadi could attempt a genuine cabinet reshuffle that replaces ministers with genuine technocrats possessing few if any political ties. This course of action is highly unlikely; political blocs would immediately obstruct any attempt to oust their ministers from the CoM without their consultation. It would also likely rally numerous competing political blocs together to oust PM Abadi from his post to collapse the CoM. 

PM Abadi could oversee a partial cabinet reshuffle, with some ministers being replaced. Although it is possible that some of the new ministers could be true technocrats, the reality is that political blocs covet control over ministries far more than they value an accountable and functional government. It is far more likely that political blocs compete to oust one another from each other’s cabinet positions. In this case, as with the previous reforms in August 2015, the Sadrist Trend and ISCI would most likely attempt to displace SLA ministers from their positions in the CoM, and vice versa. 

More dangerously, the reshuffle could get bogged down in political competition and fail. If PM Abadi fails to succeed with a cabinet reshuffle, then he would be exposed to a vote of no-confidence, particularly if failure drives the Sadrist Trend from the government. This is a worst case scenario, particularly because if PM Abadi were to leave office, then his replacement would almost certainly be less accepting of the U.S. and the U.S.-led Coalition in the fight against ISIS. The nomination of Nouri al-Maliki as PM in particular would be a heavy blow to the U.S., as he has become vehemently anti-American and has transformed himself into an Iranian proxy actor. This would increase the ability of Iran to increase its involvement in Iraq and expel the U.S. from its leading role in the anti-ISIS fight as well as from the country itself. However, Maliki remains a highly controversial figure, detested by the Sunni and Kurdish blocs as well as the Sadrist Trend, and it is not at all a given that he could secure the nomination. 

The removal of PM Abadi would make it dramatically more difficult for the U.S. and the Coalition to conduct anti-ISIS operations; for Iraq to address its political and financial problems; and address political divides between competing parties, especially national reconciliation between Iraqi Sunnis and Shi’a. Coalition initiatives, such as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford’s proposal of the integration of U.S. advisers present at forward bases and with Iraqi military units in a future Mosul operation, would likely be blocked by a new government. Although announcement of the cabinet reshuffle appears bold, it indicates PM Abadi’s weak position and the threats he faces from his opponents. There is a high likelihood that the initiative backfires and fails to achieve any substantial reform, further weakening of PM Abadi’s powers and increasing the relative ability of his opponents to constrict his freedom of action. Failure could be the pretext of PM Abadi’s ouster, while even a stalled reshuffle could expose him to attack by his pro-Iranian opponents. The U.S. must quickly provide support to PM Abadi and his government, and above all financial support that helps to ease Iraq’s budgetary crisis, strengthens the Iraqi Security Forces, and creates leverage that the U.S. and Abadi can use to accelerate effective reforms.