Ukraine Warning Intelligence Update: Social Unrest Likely as Ukraine’s Ruling Coalition Breaks

By Hugo Spaulding

Key Takeaway: Ukraine’s post-revolution leadership faces an existential crisis on the second anniversary of the collapse of Russia’s client regime in Kyiv, which transpired on February 21, 2014. The pro-Western coalition lost its parliamentary majority at a moment of severe popular distrust of President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk. Without sustained efforts to support reform and combat corruption, Poroshenko faces the prospect of mounting social unrest and the resurgence of Ukraine’s political old guard.

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s party triggered the disintegration of the pro-Western four-party coalition by launching a failed vote of no confidence against Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk on February 16. Poroshenko called for Yatsenyuk’s resignation on the day of the vote after junior coalition parties announced their unwillingness to work with the prime minister, threatening to deadlock already stagnant efforts at economic and anti-corruption reform. The “Fatherland” party of former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko and the Western Ukraine-based “Self Help” party defected to the opposition in response to the failure of the no-confidence motion, which precludes another vote of no confidence until the next session of parliament begins in September. The withdrawal of the two junior parties deprives the “European Ukraine” coalition of its majority in parliament and takes it farther from the constitutional supermajority with which it began its mandate.

The collapse of the coalition is likely to ensure the continued stagnation of reforms necessary to maintain vital financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which signaled earlier this month that it would delay an assistance package worth $1.7 billion until the future of the cabinet became clear. Russia’s continued military operations in the southeastern Donbas region and economic pressure have also ensured that Ukraine’s pro-Western government remains frail. A protracted political struggle, worsening economic conditions, and the pro-reform elite and population’s hardening distrust of Ukraine’s leaders threaten to spiral into widespread social unrest.  Poroshenko may thus face a perfect storm on the anniversary of sniper attacks on protestors in the final days of the “Euromaidan” revolution.

President Poroshenko called for Yatsenyuk’s resignation in response to mounting domestic and Western pressure to kick-start Ukraine’s stalled anti-corruption and reform efforts. The failed no-confidence motion follows the February 3 resignation of Lithuanian-born Economy Minister Aivaras Abromavicius, who blamed pervasive corruption in the central government and singled out Poroshenko allies for his departure. The resignation of Abromavicius prompted new scrutiny over the fate of the cabinet, which is divided between other foreign-born technocrats and coalition party officials. Yatsenyuk in particular has faced heavy criticism for protecting the interests of oligarchs at the expense of the reforms required to maintain IMF assistance and avoid bankruptcy. On the day of the failed no-confidence vote, Poroshenko also called for the resignation of ally Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin, widely accused of corruption. Poroshenko finally caved to long-standing pressure to dismiss Shokin following the February 15 resignation of reformist Deputy Prosecutor General Vitaly Kasko, who accused Shokin of blocking judicial reforms. Like Poroshenko’s decision to push out Shokin from the judiciary, the president’s support for the no-confidence motion against Yatsenyuk was likely an effort to deflect criticism for failing to combat corruption and promote reform.

The manner in which the no-confidence motion failed raises doubts over the sincerity of Poroshenko’s intent to revise the political status quo, which is guided by oligarch consensus. The motion against the widely unpopular prime minister and his cabinet fell short of a parliamentary majority by 32 votes. Despite Poroshenko’s call for the resignation of the cabinet and the initiation of the motion by the president’s party, 39 MPs from his party were absent, abstained, or otherwise did not participate in the vote. The majority of the pro-Russian “Opposition Bloc,” the successor of the ousted Yanukovych regime’s “Party of Regions,” also walked out on the vote, depriving the no-confidence motion of as many as 33 votes. A total of 41 MPs from the two parties voted the same day to recognize the performance of the cabinet as unsatisfactory but stopped short of supporting the no-confidence motion. Mustafa Nayyem, a prominent reformist MP from Poroshenko’s party and an early supporter of the 2013-2014 “Euromaidan” revolution, accused the president of colluding with rival oligarchs who support the “Opposition Bloc” and Yatsenyuk to stage a failed no-confidence vote.

If Poroshenko did intend to use the failed vote to defuse pressure to overhaul the cabinet and cast himself as a champion of reform, this gamble appears to have backfired. Neither the no-confidence motion nor the dismissal of Shokin from the judiciary resolved the underlying driver of the political crisis. The failed vote of no confidence appears to have instead exacerbated the public and reformist political elite’s mistrust of Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk. Poroshenko, Yatsenyuk, and Ukraine’s other pro-Western leaders will need to make sustained efforts to crack down on corruption and support reform in order to restore this faith. The resignation of Yatsenyuk and a cabinet reshuffle that introduces new technocratic ministers is likely a prerequisite needed to prevent deepening political gridlock from devolving into a new wave of social unrest.

Ukraine’s latest political crisis may escalate in ways that place the survival of the current Western-backed government at risk. Several hundred protestors outside parliament called for Prime Minister Yatsenyuk’s resignation ahead of the failed no-confidence vote, an early warning of the potential for the political status quo to catalyze the population into demonstrations against the government. The demonstrators included supporters of the far-right “Freedom” party, which played a leading role in the August 31, 2015 riot that resulted in three killed and over 100 injured. More dangerously, former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko is poised to fuel the crisis to reassert herself as a significant powerbroker in Kyiv. Tymoshenko called for snap elections to be held as soon as possible during an early February visit to Washington, D.C., where she met with senior diplomats and congressional leaders. All other party leaders from the former five-party coalition have dismissed snap elections as only a course of last resort given their potential to trigger further instability. Tymoshenko, a historical opportunist with a mercurial relationship with the Kremlin, may find success at the ballots along with the pro-Russian “Opposition Bloc” in the vacuum created by popular dissatisfaction with Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk. A strengthened position in parliament for either Tymoshenko or the “Opposition Bloc” would further cement the already lingering heritage of oligarch-driven politics and restore levers of Russian influence in Kyiv.

Ukraine’s political crisis coincides with escalating offensive operations by Russian-backed separatist forces along the front line in the southeast. Ukraine has come under increasing pressure from its Western backers to fulfill its political concessions tied to the February 2015 “Minsk II” ceasefire agreement despite the continued presence of forward-deployed Russian forces, weaponry, and cyclically escalating indirect fire attacks on Ukrainian positions. These concessions include the constitutional recognition of the “special status” of the occupied southeastern territory, a proposed amendment that lacks support outside Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk’s parties and sparked the August 31 riot. Populist leader Oleh Lyashko, who participated in the riot and defected to the opposition days later, offered to restore the coalition’s majority on February 18. Lyashko conditioned his return to the coalition, however, on the rejection of the “special status” clause in “Minsk II,” a move that Russia would likely meet with further escalation. Russia has deliberately made the fulfillment of the concessions politically untenable for Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk by preserving its offensive posture in southeastern Ukraine. By demanding the concessions in exchange for potential peace, Russia has also led the West to continue prodding Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk into supporting the measures that isolate them from their former coalition allies.

Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk can prevent the political crisis from spilling onto the streets by showing genuine effort to move reforms forward and combat corruption, starting within their own circles. A cabinet reshuffle and a new coalition agreement will also be necessary but not likely sufficient to prevent reforms from stalling further. The preservation of Yatsenyuk as prime minister is likely to obstruct the return of Tymoshenko’s “Fatherland” and the “Self Help” party to the coalition unless they are given significantly expanded decision-making roles. Yatsenyuk would not likely need to resign to form a new coalition with Poroshenko’s party and Oleh Lyashko’s “Radical Party,” however, which have only demanded a cabinet reshuffle. Without the introduction of a truly technocratic cabinet out of Yatsenyuk’s control, such a coalition would nevertheless only harden public mistrust and political dividing lines until a new no-confidence measure can be launched in September.

Despite the collapse of the coalition, a majority of MPs from all three former coalition parties worked with Yatsenyuk and Poroshenko’s parties to pass a key set of anti-corruption bills prescribed by the EU and IMF on February 18. The passage of this legislation offers some hope that Ukraine’s pro-Western leaders can overcome factional divides to support reform, however, they will need to sustain these efforts to earn back the trust of the population. Emotions will be high as Ukraine remembers the roughly 100 killed on Kyiv’s Independence Square (“Maidan Nezalezhnosti”) in the final days before Yanukovych’s ousting on February 21, 2014. If post-revolution leaders in Kyiv fail to escape the pull of political recidivism and make persistent efforts to reform, Ukrainians may likewise slide back into a revolutionary mindset to protect the legacy of “Euromaidan.”

ISIS's Campaign in Libya: January 4 - February 19, 2016

By Claire Coyne, Emily Estelle, and Harleen Gambhir

Key Takeaway: ISIS is executing a sophisticated, multi-front campaign against Libya’s oil facilities, demonstrating the organization’s growing capability abroad. President Obama reportedly ruled out significant military intervention against the group as of February 18. The administration opted to continue intermittent strikes against ISIS leaders in Libya instead, such as the strike on an ISIS leader in western Libya on February 19. This surgical approach is unlikely to defeat the group, which maintains more than 5,000 fighters and is reinforced by leadership sent from Iraq and Syria. Libyan ground forces are also unlikely to expel ISIS from its areas of control. ISIS’s safe haven in Libya will allow it to survive even if it is defeated in Iraq and Syria.  ISIS will use its Libyan base to exacerbate regional disorder and likely to attack Europe.

ISIS has executed an aggressive campaign to take over territory in the midst of Libya’s post-revolution civil war. ISIS deployed a contingent of 300 Libyan ISIS militants from eastern Syria to spearhead the creation of a new ISIS affiliate in Libya in mid-2014 as part of a larger strategy to seize terrain and exacerbate disorder outside of Iraq and Syria. ISIS established this affiliate in Sirte, on the central Libyan coast, in early 2015 and has since advanced outward from the city, capturing population centers and establishing checkpoints to its east, west, and south. ISIS has exploited the seams between the participants in Libya’s civil war and established itself amidst the conflict’s frontlines, taking over territory when no local forces are positioned to defend it. This approach mirrors ISIS’s military expansion and development of safe havens in Syria and Yemen, demonstrating the threat posed by the regional adoption of ISIS’s way of war.  ISIS now possesses a contiguous zone of control that includes a more than 200 km stretch of Libya’s coast, which ISIS confirmed as part of its Caliphate in August 2015. ISIS maintains between 5,000 and 6,500 fighters in Libya, according to the Pentagon’s latest count. The group is now both defending its stronghold in Sirte and pushing outward, imposing its rule on the population as it grows by establishing governance structures and enforcing shari’a law. U.S. leaders including Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter have acknowledged that ISIS’s Libya affiliate is chief among the organization’s increasingly dangerous “metastases” abroad.

ISIS’s leadership is dedicating significant resources to Libya, as evidenced by its complex, multi-front campaign on the country’s oil production facilities. ISIS’s central leadership has deployed leaders from Iraq and Syria to Libya to strengthen governance, consolidate control, and develop operational design and capabilities. The group is currently conducting a campaign against Libya’s oil resources and security that aims to both perpetuate instability in the country and set conditions for ISIS to capture Libya’s oil wealth. ISIS likely seeks to gain access to oil revenue in Libya, as it has done in Iraq and Syria where revenue from black market oil trade is a significant source of funding for the group’s military and governance efforts. ISIS launched a campaign in early January 2016 on the oil fields east of its stronghold in Sirte in pursuit of this objective. ISIS’s ground forces took complete control of a village to the east of Sirte, where it had previously maintained a light presence, and used it to stage sustained attacks on oil export terminals at Ras Lanuf and al Sidra, as well as on inland oil infrastructure. The group executed coordinated attacks across multiple populated areas during the oil fields campaign, including a suicide truck bomb at a police training camp in Zliten that killed at least 60 and wounded at least 200. This bombing, along with several attempted follow-on attacks, targeted territory held by the Misrata-based militias that previously fought against ISIS’s takeover of Sirte and were likely intended to prevent attacks on Sirte as ISIS executed the oil campaign. ISIS also attacked oil infrastructure near Zueitina, far to the east of the al Sidra frontline, signaling coordination between militants based in both central and eastern Libya. ISIS has yet to take control of operational oil infrastructure in Libya. However, its January 2016 campaign successfully exercised the Libyan affiliate’s capability to design and execute a complex campaign and established support zones for future attacks on oil fields, making it the group’s largest and most successful ground operation outside of Iraq and Syria to date. This preparation, combined with ISIS’s recruitment of engineers to Libya, signals that the group will launch more operations aimed at controlling Libya’s oil infrastructure. 

No Libyan actors are poised to roll back ISIS’s territorial gains in Libya. Libya does not have a unified national army, and its highly factionalized armed groups remain locked in a multidimensional civil war. The transitional government that assumed power after the fall of longtime dictator Muammar al Qaddafi in 2011 failed to bridge the country’s political and tribal fault lines and ultimately broke down into two warring parliaments, each supported by loose coalitions of armed groups. The UN is struggling to bring the two parliaments together behind a unity government, but the ongoing stalemate and uncertain status of key powerbrokers in the future government are preventing majorities on both sides from agreeing, and thus the armed groups from uniting. ISIS’s rapid expansion in Libya has proved insufficient to force Libya’s political leaders to abandon their grievances. At the same time, no existing Libyan fighting force has demonstrated either the will or the capability to defeat ISIS in their country. The Libyan National Army (LNA), aligned with the House of Representatives based in the east, is embroiled in a stalemated fight against a plethora of Islamist groups in Benghazi, Derna, and Ajdabiya. The LNA has used its very limited air power to conduct sparse strikes on ISIS positions, but its forces are entrenched in their current fights and unable to launch a ground assault on ISIS in Sirte. Meanwhile, a coalition of Misratan militias from western Libya recently mobilized eastward toward Sirte, but these forces, combined with those already based closer to Sirte in Abugrein, likely number around half of the force that ISIS can muster to defend its stronghold. It is more likely that the Misratans, who have established checkpoints at key transport hubs and near ISIS positions west of Sirte, are attempting to contain ISIS’s westward expansion.

The U.S. and its allies lack both the partner and the will to carry out a campaign the scale needed to defeat ISIS in Libya. The absence of a unity government and a Libyan army hampers action against ISIS by denying the international community legitimate political and military partners for intervention. The U.S. has reportedly ruled out the possibility of intervening in Libya unilaterally, as U.S. defense officials claimed on February 18 that President Obama rejected a plan from U.S. Africa Command and Special Operations Command to launch airstrikes against ISIS’s resources in Libya and deploy Special Operations Forces to train a future Libyan national army. The U.S. reportedly will continue to strike ISIS’s high-level leadership in Libya instead. For example, the U.S. targeted a Tunisian ISIS operative in western Libya linked to major terror attacks in Tunisia on February 19. Such surgical, opportunistic targeting will not expel ISIS from populated areas or prevent the group from advancing further. Denying ISIS safe haven in Libya requires a ground partner capable and willing to clear and hold ISIS’s current areas of control. ISIS will continue to grow and strengthen in the absence of a determined response from both Libyans and the international community.

ISIS will use its enduring safe haven in Libya to endure and project disorder throughout North Africa and potentially into Europe.  A Libyan stronghold allows ISIS to survive in the event of defeat in Iraq and Syria by providing two key capabilities: a physical safe haven that can serve as a refuge for central leadership, and a safeguard for ISIS’s ideological legitimacy, which depends on the governance of a territorial Islamic state. ISIS has already used Libya as a support zone for devastating attacks on tourist sites in neighboring Tunisia, and its recent uptick in North Africa-focused propaganda indicates that the group is still focused on generating recruitment and attacks in the region. ISIS’s secure hold on terrain in Libya allows it to more easily develop networks and project attacks into neighboring Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt, as well as recruit throughout the Maghreb and Sahel regions. ISIS may ultimately use its safe haven within Libya to plan and launch attacks on nearby Europe, as it has already done with its safe havens in Iraq and Syria.

Iraq Situation Report: February 12 - 17, 2016

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Prime Minister Abadi is facing grave political challenges following his announcement of a cabinet reshuffle on February 9. Supporters of his past reform have stated that all positions should be open for consideration in a government, including that of the prime minister. In addition, Muqtada al-Sadr gave PM Abadi 45 days before he threatened to withdraw his support from PM Abadi’s government. Separately, PM Abadi stated that he was willing to resign as part of the reshuffle if necessary. The prime minister does not have the constitutional right or the power to undertake sweeping reforms of the government without support from the political blocs, which bodes ill for his ability to stay in office. PM Abadi’s removal would be highly problematic for the U.S.-led anti-ISIS Coalition, as he is a pro-Coalition figure that would likely be replaced by a leader far more willing to accept greater Iranian assistance. Meanwhile, the Popular Mobilization Commission stated that it had cut its ranks by 30 percent due to financial constraints, likely an attempt to access funding from the Iraqi government. Iranian proxy militias secure their funding from Iran and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), but a large number of other militia groups rely on funding from the Iraqi government, though they may also be competing for potential access to Iranian resources. If the announced cuts target Sunni tribal fighters in the Popular Mobilization and more nationalist groups not closely tied to Iran, it would make the Popular Mobilization even more difficult to include in future security operations due to their increasingly pro-Iranian slant.

Update on the Situation in Aleppo

By Jennifer Cafarella

The U.S. requires partnerships with Syrian armed opposition groups in order to destroy ISIS and al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra in the long term. Without local Sunni partners that hold the support of the population, the U.S. faces high costs to destroy ISIS and al Qaeda in Syria and risks failure. The U.S. still retains potential partners in the North to achieve this objective: ISW assesses that six of the powerbrokers or potential powerbrokers in Aleppo Province are eligible for this partnership.

Russian military support to the Assad regime's offensive in Aleppo is forcing U.S.-backed opposition groups to rely more heavily on support from Jabhat al Nusra and its Salafi jihadi allies in Syria. With the help of Russian airstrikes, the regime has continued to close in on the opposition and has nearly completed a full siege of the opposition-held parts of Aleppo City. The Salafi-jihadi opposition group Ahrar al Sham has begun to consolidate leadership over the Syrian armed opposition in Aleppo in order to coordinate the defense of the city more effectively. Ahrar al Sham plays a prominent role on the battlefield in Aleppo, as ISW assessed in a recent report. The group is assuming control of the Aleppo-based opposition as international support to those groups fails to materialize.

Eight prominent Aleppo groups agreed to unite under the leadership of former Ahrar al Sham leader Hashim al Sheikh on February 15. These eight groups include four U.S.-backed groups, of which ISW has assessed that one is a powerbroker in Aleppo and two are potential powerbrokers. The agreement places Ahrar al Sham in operational control of much of the Aleppo opposition, but it is not a complete merger. It does not mean these groups will cease operating independently, nor that they will necessarily accept Ahrar al Sham's religious agenda. Instead, the deepened coordination with Ahrar al Sham will help these groups fight more effectively against the Assad regime. It is unclear whether al Sheikh will now assume control of the Jaysh Halab military coalition that fifteen opposition groups declared on February 6. The absence of two major Jaysh Halab component groups, Jaysh al Mujahideen and Jabhat al Shamiya, indicates that al Sheikh may lead an alternate alliance, or possibly a subcomponent within Jaysh Halab.  

The U.S. must act quickly to prevent Ahrar al Sham from translating operational leadership of U.S.-backed groups into their full merger under its command. Hashim al Sheikh will most likely try use his new leadership role to facilitate deepened cooperation between these eight groups and Jabhat al Nusra in defending opposition-held parts of Aleppo City. Over time, Ahrar al Sham will likely assist Jabhat al Nusra to create a new coalition in Aleppo under joint leadership, akin to the Jaysh al Fatah coalition they currently lead in Idlib Province.  

It remains possible for the U.S. to fragment Ahrar al Sham’s leadership of opposition groups in Aleppo, therein restoring their independence, by providing an alternate source of military support to defend against the Russian-supported regime offensive. ISW recommended steps to preserve the opposition groups in Aleppo that are potential U.S. allies on February 13 in a paper titled The Syrian Armed Opposition Forces in Aleppo. These recommendations remain valid, and acting on them is even more crucial following Ahrar al Sham’s rise to new leadership in the province. 

An Excerpt from "Opposition Forces in Aleppo": Conclusion and Recommendations

By Jennifer Cafarella and Genevieve Casagrande

As talks of a ceasefire or "cessation of hostilities" take the headlines, Aleppo looms even larger as a key city in the 5-year Syrian civil war.  Aleppo is not covered by any agreement for a ceasefire and regime and Russian forces are intensifying their attacks on this city under the pretext that the opposition forces consist largely of al Qaeda's affiliate Jabhat al Nusra.  The fall of Aleppo would be a devastating defeat for opposition forces, but even a long siege would be detrimental to U.S. interests as opposition forces would become more radicalized and Jabhat al Nusra would further cement its leadership role in northern Syria, effectively removing options to achieve American goals in northern Syria.

Below is the Conclusion from ISW's recent paper "The Syrian Armed Opposition Forces in Aleppo." Read the full paper here. 

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The U.S. has a short time frame in Aleppo to prevent the upcoming humanitarian catastrophe and preserve opposition groups the U.S. needs in order to destroy ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra in the long term. The Aleppo-based opposition remains relatively independent and therefore offers the U.S. a promising source of ground forces against Jabhat al Nusra in Northern Syria. Opposition groups that receive covert U.S. support are still among Aleppo’s powerbrokers and potential powerbrokers. The regime’s advance in Aleppo poses an existential threat to these opposition forces, however. Jabhat al Nusra will use the defense of Aleppo as a vehicle to overwhelm opposition groups that are acceptable to the West and entrench itself within the civilian population. The collapse of the opposition in Aleppo, either in a surrender to the regime or in a merger with Jahbat al Nusra and Ahrar al Sham during a siege, would remove options to achieve American objectives in northern Syria.

Russia is using the cover of a potential “cessation of hostilities” to set conditions for the collapse of U.S.-backed groups in Aleppo. There is very little to indicate that Russia, Iran, or the Syrian regime have any intention of halting their military campaign in northern Syria, despite this diplomatic overture. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has explicitly noted that Russia does not intend to halt its air campaign against “terrorists” in Syria.69 Russia exploits the West’s lack of understanding of the Syrian armed opposition to justify targeting a broad swath of groups that include powerbrokers that receive covert U.S. support. Russia’s objective is to eliminate the opposition in Aleppo that poses the greatest threat to Assad and undermine Western support of these groups under the cover of targeting “terrorists.” As such, the February 11 “cessation of hostilities” agreement is not a solution to the challenges the U.S. faces in Syria; it is a submission to Russia’s agenda.70

Syrian armed opposition groups are unlikely to agree to a “cessation of hostilities” under these conditions. No armed opposition group participated in the initial discussions. Aleppo-based groups have consistently refused to agree to localized “freeze zones” in the past on the grounds that they do not trust the Syrian regime to adhere to one.71 The current deal legitimizes this argument, as the deal is very clearly on Russia’s terms. The U.S. risks jeopardizing the prospects of achieving a negotiated settlement in Syria in the long term if it does not abandon this cessation of hostilities initiative. Jabhat al Nusra and other hardline groups will use this initiative – and the regime’s almost certain violation of it – as proof that Syrians should permanently abandon the negotiating table. American submission to Russia’s agenda in Syria thus directly undermines the requirements for American national security.

The situation in Aleppo requires American leadership and action. U.S.-trained opposition forces in the Northern Aleppo countryside are not alone strong enough to secure Aleppo City, for they are unlikely able to break through the regime’s new forward line of troops (FLOT) in the northern countryside. The U.S. does not need to consider drastic measures such as ground forces in order to have a major impact in Aleppo, however. It is possible to change the outcome of the fight in Aleppo and assist the humanitarian crisis that is unfolding through a few limited yet crucial steps.

First, the U.S. could conduct humanitarian airdrops of supplies into opposition-held neighborhoods of the city in order to sustain both the opposition groups and the hundreds of thousands of civilians in opposition-held areas of Aleppo City to forestall a humanitarian catastrophe. Providing humanitarian aid to opposition groups in Aleppo increases their ability to endure the siege without submitting to Jabhat al Nusra’s leadership. The U.S. has the capability to do so from airbases in Turkey currently used for the antiISIS campaign. Turkey would support such operations and almost certainly grant the use of its bases for them to preserve opposition groups in Aleppo, including those that already receive Turkish aid, in order to pursue regime change in Syria. Jabhat al Nusra would be able to access some of this aid, but the U.S. should not let Jabhat al Nusra’s presence in the city condemn the civilian population and opposition groups at risk. Any American intervention in Aleppo, even an airdrop of humanitarian supplies, will risk provoking Russia. Russia is very unlikely willing to rise escalation over Aleppo, however, as it is not a core Russian strategic interest. U.S. policymakers are reportedly considering humanitarian airdrops, and should undertake them immediately.

Second, the U.S. should significantly increase the military and financial support to the non-Ahrar al Sham powerbrokers and potential powerbrokers examined in this report. The U.S. already provides aid on a limited scale to many of them. The U.S. should provide these groups with increased TOW anti-tank missile shipments in addition to increased shipments of light weapons, ammunition, and money to pay their fighters. The U.S. could do so from Turkey, where a covert U.S. program to provide small numbers of TOW anti-tank missiles to vetted opposition groups is already reportedly based.72 The U.S. can deliver these supplies quietly through the Bab al Hawa border crossing with Turkey west of Aleppo City. This is advantageous because air dropping the supplies is more vulnerable to Russian interdiction.

The provision of military supplies in addition to humanitarian aid would preserve the powerbroker status of four ideologically viable powerbrokers (al Jabhat al Shamiya, Jaysh al Mujahideen, Feilaq al Sham, and Fawj al Awal) and increase their relative strength vis-à-vis Ahrar al Sham. The increase in both military and humanitarian support could also transform all of the potential powerbrokers into powerbrokers by both providing them more access to resources than smaller Aleppo based groups have and closing the gap between powerbrokers and potential powerbrokers. It would also mitigate Jabhat al Nusra’s ability to coerce or exploit the weakness of potential powerbrokers in order to absorb or transform them. It could even be sufficient to coalesce smaller opposition groups in Aleppo under the leadership of powerbrokers that are potential U.S. allies as opposed to al Qaeda-allied Ahrar al Sham.

The U.S. should not make additional support contingent upon a refusal by opposition groups to coordinate with Jabhat al Nusra, because it is not a demand these groups can meet under current military conditions. The U.S. should instead adopt an approach to incentivize and enable these groups to retain freedom of action and to withstand Jabhat al Nusra coercion over the medium term while potentially growing stronger. The severity of the situation in Aleppo will likely prevent Jabhat al Nusra from attacking these groups directly because doing so would greatly harm the group’s image. The upcoming siege of Aleppo thus offers the U.S. the opportunity to build future partners against Jabhat al Nusra by exploiting conditions in which Jahbat al Nusra’s freedom of action against Western clients is limited.

Third, The U.S. could also support the establishment of a humanitarian safe zone along the Turkish border. Turkey may independently do so in order to address the flow of refugees that it cannot absorb. A safe zone north of Aleppo could also provide Turkey with basing it can use to deliver additional support to opposition forces in Aleppo City, such as indirect fire. The U.S. could support this course of action with aerial overflight to prevent the regime from attacking the safe zone, and could leverage U.S.-trained forces operating near the Turkish border to help secure the zone and pressure the regime’s forward line of troops (FLOT).

Preventing the regime from recapturing Aleppo does not solve the many other challenges the U.S. faces in Syria; it merely buys some time and prevents a more dangerous future from emerging. Jabhat al Nusra and opposition forces it leads will still hold terrain in Idlib Province that is sustained by access to the Turkish border even if Aleppo falls. Pro-regime forces are unlikely to clear this terrain in the near term, particularly if Turkey sustains its support to Idlib-based groups. Jabhat al Nusra and many opposition forces in Aleppo will likely fall back into Idlib Province and launch a sustained insurgency from that terrain if they lose in Aleppo City. The U.S. therefore will have to develop options to eliminate Jabhat al Nusra in Idlib in the future regardless of the outcome in Aleppo. Preserving a core cadre of opposition fighters in Aleppo would create an option to use those forces for future operations.

Read the full paper here.