Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 - October 20, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola

Key Takeaway: Russian airstrikes continue to bolster the Assad regime’s efforts to defeat the Syrian opposition. Russian airstrikes from October 19-20 primarily supported ongoing regime ground offensives in rebel-held areas in the southern countryside of Aleppo, the al-Ghab plain of northwestern Hama Province, and the Jebel al-Akrad mountain range in northeastern Latakia Province. The regime is launching probing attacks in Jebel al-Akrad and the al-Ghab plan, likely in order to fix rebel forces in Hama and Latakia Provinces. This effort will prevent rebel forces from reinforcing positions in Aleppo Province, where the regime and its allies have launched their main effort.

Russia’s air campaign continues to marginalize moderate elements of the Syrian opposition by targeting moderate, U.S.-backed TOW anti-tank missile recipients. Russian airstrikes killed the Chief of Staff of U.S.-backed TOW missile recipient First Coastal Division in the vicinity of Jebel al-Akrad on October 19. TOW missiles have slowed regime advances throughout northwestern Syria throughout the past two weeks, particularly as Russia increased its supply of armored vehicles to the Syrian regime. U.S.-backed rebels in Aleppo, for instance, reportedly have targeted over 11 of the regime's armored vehicles with TOW missiles since October 16. Russian warplanes have targeted several other U.S.-backed TOW missile recipients since the start of the Russian aerial campaign in Syria on September 30, including Liwa Suqour al-Jebel, Liwa Fursan al-Haqq, and Tajamu' al-Izza in the provinces of Idlib and Hama, as well as the Martyr Lieutenant Ahmed Abdou Battalion in Damascus. The moderate opposition and U.S.-backed rebel groups may change their behaviors and alignments as a result of Russia’s attacks. Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra may simultaneously expand its campaign against U.S.-backed rebels with the support of allies within the Islamist opposition. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation. 

Iraq Situation Report: October 16 - 20, 2015

By: Patrick Martin, Logan Brog, and ISW Iraq Team

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 - October 18, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande & Jodi Brignola

Key Takeaway: The Russian air campaign in Syria continues to bolster the Syrian regime’s fight against the opposition. Russian warplanes provided air support to regime ground offensives against rebels in Aleppo, Latakia, northern Hama, and Damascus Provinces from October 17-18. Russian airstrikes largely concentrated in the southern Aleppo countryside as regime forces, backed by Iranians, Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi’a militias, and other Iranian proxies, advanced south of Aleppo City. In addition, Russian warplanes heavily targeted rebel positions amidst ongoing regime ground offensives against the rebel-held pocket around the towns of Rastan and Talbiseh in the northern Homs countryside which has been besieged by regime forces since 2012, as well as against rebel forces in the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation. 

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 - October 16, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande, Kaitlynn Menoche, and Jodi Brignola

Key takeaway: The Syrian regime conducted multiple small-scale ground offensives with Russian air support across six Syrian provinces over the past 10 days, demonstrating a shift in regime campaign design that likely reflects both Russian and Iranian influence in operational planning. Regime probing attacks against rebel forces in northern Latakia, the al-Ghab Plain, northern Hama, southern Idlib, Homs, and Aleppo may serve to fix rebel forces along multiple fronts and obfuscate a major impending operation by pro-regime forces in Aleppo. Russian airstrikes continued to focus largely upon the same rebel-held areas, demonstrating Russian intent to bolster the Syrian regime in its fight against the opposition rather than to combat ISIS. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation. 

 

Iraq Situation Report: October 6 - 15, 2015

By: Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 - October 14

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola

Key Takeaway:  Russia’s involvement in Syria is facilitating ISIS’s territorial gains, while also strengthening Assad. Russia is supporting the Syrian regime’s offensives in Latakia, the al-Ghab Plain, and northern Hama. Russia also intensified strikes on rebel-held northwestern Aleppo, likely to set conditions for an imminent Russian-Iranian-Syrian regime offensive in the area. U.S. defense officials and local Syrian activists reported the arrival of hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-Quds Force fighters and other Iranian proxy forces in Aleppo over the past few days. Russian strikes largely concentrated along the rebel-held supply route leading to the besieged regime enclaves of Nubl and Zahraa northwest of Aleppo City. If the regime can link with these enclaves, they will successfully sever the rebel-held supply route from Aleppo City to the Turkish border. Simultaneous regime offensives in both Hama and Aleppo Provinces will likely fix rebel forces along multiple fronts and prevent them from reinforcing their positions across northwestern Syria, resulting in a loss of terrain for the Syrian opposition.

 

ISIS is benefiting from Russia’s strikes on the Syrian opposition. On October 9, ISIS advanced 10 kilometers against rebels in northeastern Aleppo, the largest advance by ISIS in the province since August 2015. ISIS continued to conduct probing attacks against rebels northeast of Aleppo City from October 10-14. The Syrian regime and ISIS have historically leveraged one another’s offensives in order to advance against rebel forces in the northern Aleppo countryside. Both ISIS and the regime will likely capitalize on the effects of Russian airstrikes on rebels. Russian airstrikes have thus far failed to deter ISIS from launching new offensives and rather have facilitated ISIS’s seizure of new terrain. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Joint Syrian-Iranian-Russian Offensive Achieves Only Limited Initial Gains

by: Christopher Kozak

Key Takeaway: The Syrian regime has not gained much terrain in the first week of its large-scale ground offensive against rebel forces, despite support from intensified Russian airstrikes and hundreds of Iranian proxy reinforcements. Operations against the Syrian opposition will likely prove harder and slower than anticipated by either Russia or Iran, protracting the conflict and exacerbating extremism.

The Syrian regime achieved only limited tactical gains in the week after it announced the start of a “vast offensive” that aimed to “defeat terrorist groups and liberate areas and villages that have suffered from terrorism” in northwestern Syria. The offensive reportedly included reinforcements in the form of “hundreds” of Iranian troops and proxy fighters, including members of Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi’a militias. Unverified images on social media indicated that Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Quds Force commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani personally oversaw operations in Latakia Province along the Syrian Coast. Meanwhile, pro-regime forces also received direct assistance from Russia in the form of airstrikes “synchronized” with the ground operations as well as artillery support from howitzer and multiple rocket launch systems (MRLS) on the ground. Senior rebel sources also alleged that Russian personnel participated in the clashes and directly supervised the operation via a joint Russian-Iranian operations room. The location and targeting of these operations underscore that Russia and Iran intend to bolster the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad rather than defeat ISIS.

Nonetheless, the Syrian regime and its allies have thus far failed to achieve significant gains. They are fighting against rebel forces along the three primary fronts in northern Hama Province, the al-Ghab Plain, and northeastern Latakia Province, creating a front line roughly 120 kilometers long. Confirmed reports indicate that pro-regime fighters have seized only six villages and towns, while rebel forces repelled heavy attacks against several key positions. At the same time, regime forces suffered heavy losses in manpower and materiel in the face of heavy rebel resistance. Free Syrian Army (FSA)-affiliated rebels forces claimed to destroy at least twenty tanks and armored vehicles as well as a helicopter gunship in a “tank massacre” on the first day of the offensive.  Meanwhile, pro-regime ground forces suffered several high-profile casualties with the deaths of two Hezbollah commanders including senior leader Hassan Hossein al-Hajj as well two Iranian veterans who had formerly commanded IRGC brigades. Continued heavy casualties may leave pro-regime forces vulnerable to a counterattack by Syrian rebels; the Idlib-based Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room later released a statement on October 13 calling for a major rebel counteroffensive against Hama City.

Operations against the Syrian opposition will likely prove harder and slower than anticipated by either Russia or Iran. On October 2, head of the Russian Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee Alexei Pushkov predicted that Russian operations in Syria would only last "three or four months" although he noted that there is "always a risk of getting bogged down.” Russian President Vladimir Putin has also suggested that Russian air support will be sufficient to "stabilize the legitimate authorities and create conditions for finding a political compromise” in Syria. Meanwhile, Iranian National Security and Foreign Policy Committee chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi insisted during a visit to Damascus on October 14 that cooperation between Syria, Iraq, Iran and Russia has already been “positive and successful.” The stiff defense mounted by rebel forces thus far belies this wishful thinking. The foreign allies of the Syrian regime may be forced to expend further financial and military resources in order to preserve their initial gains. The expanded interventions of both Russia and Iran will likely incentivize the Syrian regime to prioritize a military solution to the Syrian Civil War, protracting the conflict and leading to further bloodshed rather than movement towards a political solution. The heightened pressure being brought to bear upon the Syrian opposition may also drive moderate rebel factions towards closer relationships with Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other malign Salafi-jihadist groups, further constraining U.S. policy options in the country.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 - October 12

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola

Key Takeaway: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continued to ramp up its aerial campaign in Syria, claiming to conduct 250 “combat sorties” from October 9-12. This spike in Russian military activity is a notable escalation compared to the 20 “combat sorties” flown on October 8. Most Russian airstrikes continued to concentrate in northwestern Hama province in support of a large-scale regime offensive in the area. In addition, Russian warplanes conducted numerous airstrikes in the western countryside of Aleppo against rebel and Jabhat al-Nusra positions. These airstrikes coincided with ISIS’s largest advance against rebels in northern Aleppo since August 2015, indicating that Russian airstrikes are not deterring ISIS from launching new offensives. Instead, rebels in Aleppo province are currently facing escalated threats from pro-regime airstrikes and ISIS simultaneously. The Russian MoD also claimed airstrikes in the vicinity of Kuweires Airbase east of Aleppo City, likely targeting ISIS, alongside Syrian regime operations near the airbase that led to the death of IRGC Brigadier General Hossein Hamedani on October 8. Kuweiris has been under siege by ISIS, such that providing relief to pro-regime ground forces there requires engaging ISIS directly. The Russian MoD also claimed airstrikes in ar-Raqqah, Homs, and Damascus, which would suggest additional strikes targeted a combination of ISIS and rebel positions; however, credible local reporting did not validate these claims.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

 

Political Crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan Escalates into Violence

By: Patrick Martin

Key Take-Away: The political crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan caused by delayed Presidential elections descended into outright political violence on October 8. Regional President Masoud Barzani, the leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), has continued to hold office even though his term expired on August 19 and no elections have occurred. Other Iraqi Kurdish political parties, particularly Gorran (Change), the KDP’s main political rival, tried to contest the extension of Barzani’s term and leverage concessions in return for his continuation in office. Popular protests against the government turned violent on October 9 after multi-party talks collapsed the day before. On October 11, the KDP ordered the speaker and other members of the Kurdish parliament from Gorran to leave the regional capital of Arbil, declaring that Gorran was no longer a part of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Gunmen loyal to the KDP barred a Gorran convoy from entering Arbil. This dangerous maneuver by the KDP to solidify Barzani’s position as regional president has escalated tensions within the KRG and serious political violence may protract. Unless negotiations between the KDP and the opposition parties reaches a meaningful compromise in short order, the KRG could split or collapse as opposition leaders move their operations from the seat of government in Arbil to Suleimaniyah.

The Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Presidency Crisis: June 17 – August 19.

The crisis over the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Presidency (henceforth “Regional Presidency”) has been long in the making. Regional President and leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Masoud Barzani’s term expired on August 19. The Regional President is by far the most powerful government official in the KRG, and Barzani has held the position since June 2005. Other political parties, long unhappy with Barzani’s tenure,  have heatedly debated whether Barzani is permitted to hold office for another term, as he has technically served two-and-a-half terms and the legal debate over how many terms Barzani is permitted to serve is complex. The opposition, consisting of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Gorran (Change), the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), and the Islamic Group, attempted to leverage the expiration date to extract concessions from Barzani that would constrict Barzani’s powers and increase the powers of the regional parliament. In particular, the opposition sought to convert the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) system from a presidential system to a parliamentary one. This change would favor the opposition, which holds 58 seats out of 111 and a simple majority, whereas the KDP holds only 38 seats, bolstered by the 10 seats allotted to Turkmen and Christian parties who usually side with the KDP.

Barzani refused to relinquish power by making concessions. The head of the Kurdistan Independent High Electoral Commission (K-IHEC), KDP member Handrin Muhammad Saleh, announced on June 17 that the Iraqi Kurdistan region would not hold elections to select a new regional president, citing a lack of time to prepare and budgetary constraints. On the same day, Gorran presented a proposal to transform the government system, with the other opposition parties following suit on June 18. The opposition parties presented a series of compromises after August 4 and suggested that Barzani could hold office for an additional two years until the parliamentary elections in 2017 in exchange for converting to a parliamentary system and significantly reducing the regional presidency’s  powers, distributing some of them between deputy regional presidents and the parliament. Subsequent proposals by the opposition followed similar lines.

Discussions over how to address the crisis stalled. Barzani steadfastly refused to compromise, while the opposition refused to cave into Barzani. Mediation by Iranian officials, including the Assistant Secretary General of the Iranian National Security Council on July 29, made no impact. Even a visit by Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-Quds Force commander Qassim Suleimani on July 26 to the PUK, which has historically been close to Iran, did not sway the opposition, which insisted that the regional presidency crisis was a strictly Kurdish internal issue. Barzani leveraged  KDP control over the electoral commission to dissuade the opposition and gained a ruling in his favor from the KDP-dominated Shura Council, an advisory body within the Kurdish Justice Ministry tasked with resolving administrative disputes. The Shura Council stated on August 17 that Barzani should remain in office for two years while retaining his full powers. However, the Gorran speaker of parliament Yusuf Muhammad Sadiq promptly dismissed the decision, pointing out that the Shura Council’s ruling was not legally binding.

Mediation by the U.S. and British Ambassadors to Iraq and the UN Special Envoy to Iraq appeared to have laid the groundwork between the KDP and the four opposition parties to extend discussions beyond the August 19 expiration date. The parties also agreed to delay an emergency session of parliament scheduled for later that day to vote on an amendment to the law governing the powers of the regional presidency. However, Gorran calculated that it could use the opposition’s majority in the parliament to rush an amendment through the legislative process at the last minute. The Gorran speaker of parliament called the emergency session, citing that there had been no formal request to delay it. Gorran’s plan backfired badly, as the KDP boycotted the session and only 53 parliamentarians showed up for the vote, falling short of the 56 parliamentarians required for quorum; five members of the KIU refused to attend the session, with one member suspending his membership in parliament on the grounds that solving the crisis required a consensus agreement between all political parties, including the KDP.

The Crisis Turns Violent: October 8 – October 9.

The five parties, having failed to reach an agreement before the August 19 deadline, began a series of meetings to discuss how to resolve the regional presidency crisis. The ninth round of talks between the five parties broke down on October 8, prompting the PUK to call for the regional presidency crisis to be resolved in the parliament and not among the political parties, signaling the end of the opposition’s patience with negotiations.

The crisis escalated unexpectedly when a protest by teachers over delayed salaries and the ongoing political crisis turned violent in Qala Diza, in northern Suleimaniyah. On October 9, the demonstrators clashed with security forces, leaving two protesters dead and 18 wounded. Other towns in Suleimaniyah province, including Kalar, Halabja, Karmiyan, and Suleimaniyah city, as well as Koya in Arbil province, continued to witness large protests by teachers against delayed salaries.

Political Violence: October 9 – October 11.

Although most demonstrations have remained peaceful, some witnessed significant political violence. A series of attacks on political party interests across Iraqi Kurdistan demonstrate that the opposition has initiated violence itself or used party-affiliated thugs to coax peaceful demonstrators into initiating violence in order to escalate the crisis. Demonstrators in Sayid Sadiq in eastern Suleimaniyah province clashed with security forces on October 11, injuring an unknown number of demonstrators and KDP supporters. Demonstrators also attacked KDP headquarters buildings in Suleimaniyah. The KDP reported that two KDP members were killed and nine others wounded in the attack. KDP facilities in Kalar, Sharzur, Zarayin, Qala Diza, and Halabja were also attacked.

Both the KDP and the opposition have targeted media outlets in a bid to dominate the narrative of the demonstrations. Anonymous witnesses stated that an “armed group” first attacked the office of Rudaw network, a KDP-affiliated channel, in Suleimaniyah, firing on the office but causing no casualties. Unidentified assailants also severely beat journalists from at least five different media outlets covering the October 10 Suleimaniyah protests. The targeted violence indicates that opposition elements were present at the Suleimaniyah demonstration, hijacking the momentum of a largely-peaceful movement and attempting to maximize the chaos for political gain. KDP-dominated Asayish internal security forces closed the offices of the Gorran-affiliated KNN media outlet in Arbil, Soran, and Dohuk, and deported KNN and the independent NRT-TV media outlet employees to Suleimaniyah. NRT-TV claimed that security forces kidnapped its employees in Dohuk and Arbil, but they were later released, and its offices were reopened on October 12.

The KDP and Gorran have dramatically escalated their rhetorical attacks on each other. The outburst of violence and inter-party conflict prompted the PUK, the KIU, and Gorran to call for non-violence and for an emergency meeting of the political parties to prevent the situation from spiraling out of control. Although the KDP called for calm, it held Gorran leader Nechirvan Mustafa responsible for the unrest. The KDP also blamed the PUK for not protecting KDP headquarters sites, though the bulk of their ire has been directed at Gorran. The KDP stated that the demonstrations were not popular and spontaneous, and that attacks on its headquarters buildings “served the interests of the enemies of the Kurds.” Gorran in turn and accused the KDP of using “the language of the civil war years” and disrupting the work of the Kurdistan parliament. A Gorran Twitter account also stated that gunmen carrying KDP banners attacked the Gorran headquarters in Arbil with small arms and mortar fire. The Arbil police directorate denied the unconfirmed report and stated that the Gorran headquarters had never been attacked.

The KDP Kicks Gorran out of Government: October 11.

Amd numerous reports of attacks on KDP headquarters buildings, the KDP used its control over Arbil to oust Gorran physically from government. On October 11, the office of the speaker of parliament, a senior member of Gorran, announced that the five parties had agreed to suspend the October 12 parliamentary session scheduled to discuss the crisis. Shortly thereafter, Gorran stated that the political office of the KDP ordered Gorran parliamentarians, ministers and Gorran speaker Sadiq to leave Arbil and return to Suleimaniyah. Sadiq later claimed that a security force prevented Sadiq and Gorran parliamentarians from entering Arbil province at a checkpoint in Altun Kubri, a town on the border of Arbil and PUK-dominated Kirkuk provinces. A video from the encounter alleges that security forces loyal to the KDP harassed the Gorran convoy, breaking several windows of cars. The head of KDP External Relations and a member of the KDP leadership council, Hayman Hurami, also announced that Gorran ministers were no longer a part of the KRG.

The KDP’s expulsion of senior Gorran members from Arbil – a unilateral removal of the leadership of the KRG’s second largest electoral bloc –effectively removes the opposition’s ability to challenge the KDP in parliament by physically keeping the speaker of parliament out of the parliament building.  Gorran denounced the move as a coup and an attempt by the KDP to paralyze the work of the parliament; Gorran’s KIU allies denounced the move as a mistake that would cause “fear and chaos” while a senior PUK official mirrored Goran’s description of the move as a coup. At the time of writing, Sadiq, Gorran parliamentarians, and Gorran’s ministers were in Suleimaniyah.

Next Steps

If the political crisis protracts for much longer, it will exacerbate longstanding structural problems within the KRG. The Kurdish parliament has failed to pass reforms aimed at combating corruption and improving government performance, a priority for PM Haidar al-Abadi and the Council of Representatives (CoR). Falling oil prices and budget shortfalls are part of a larger state of economic malaise that will be harder to address without consensus in government, and the government employees who took to the streets on October 9 will continue demonstrating. With Gorran members physically barred from entering Arbil, an agreement has become increasingly unlikely.

There are several active drivers that could help push the KRG into returning to negotiations. For one, discontent with the Iraqi Kurdish political situation is widespread. Teachers, who are at the heart of the protest movement, have not been paid for three months, nor have many members of the Peshmerga and other government employees. While Suleimaniyah province is securely a PUK and Gorran electoral stronghold, demonstrators in Qala Diza, Rania, Binjawin, Kalar, Kifrin, and Halabja attacked party headquarters buildings for Gorran, the PUK, the KDP, the KIU, and the Kurdistan Communist Party, pelting the buildings with stones and forcing them to remove their party flags, hoisting the flag of the KRG instead. In addition, the Peshmerga have refused to partake in party conflict, as the Peshmerga Ministry called for calm and stated that it would not allow attacks on any party or government buildings. Finally, all parties have consistently urged demonstrators to avoid violence, while Gorran’s Suleimaniyah office director has suggested that it is still possible for Barzani and Gorran leader Mustafa to reach an agreement over their political differences.

Other parties that form a parliamentary majority have denounced the KDP’s move to exclude Gorran from the KRG. Yet it is not clear if the KDP will make any move to compromise over the regional presidency. Barzani will not allow the parliament speaker to return if he is convinced that the parliament will attempt to bypass his stalling tactics and pass legislation aimed at reducing the regional president’s powers. If every opposition parliamentarian shows up for the vote, then a boycott by the KDP and its allies would not prevent the law from passing. Sadiq has already suggested that the parliament can hold its session in any city to pass legislation.  However, the KDP is more likely to ignore the ruling and denounce it as illegitimate rather than obey the legislature’s ruling, considering that it has steadfastly refused to compromise on the regional presidency issue for months. The current political situation is untenable, with several opposition parties exasperated by the fractured nature of the KRG and the dominance of the KDP in particular. If the two sides fail to reach any sort of compromise, political unrest will continue, and the possibility of rival governments – the regional presidency based in Arbil and the parliament based in Suleimaniyah – will become increasingly likely.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 - October 9, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande

Key Takeaway: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian warplanes conducted 67 “combat missions” throughout Syria on October 9, marking the largest number of Russian airstrikes in Syria on a single day since September 30. Russian airstrikes continued to largely concentrate in rebel-held areas of northwestern Syria from October 8-9. In particular, Russian warplanes continued to conduct airstrikes in support of a large-scale regime offensive against rebel positions in the northern Hama countryside.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike and cruise missile strike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Russian Air and Missile Strikes in Syria: September 30 - October 7, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola

Key Takeaway:  The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that four Russian warships in the Caspian Sea fired twenty-six Kalibr-NK cruise missiles against alleged ISIS-held positions in Aleppo, Idlib, and ar-Raqqa Provinces on October 7. The Russian MoD released a video depicting the cruise missiles traveling over the airspace of Iraq and Iran in order to primarily strike targets in rebel-held areas of northwestern Syria. U.S. officials later reported that at least four of the cruise missiles had crash-landed in northwestern Iran, although both the Russian and Iranian Ministries of Defense denied these reports as “psychological warfare” by the West. The use of cruise missiles despite the presence of a functional Russian airbase in Latakia Province likely represents an overt show of force intended to project Russian military strength to both the Syrian opposition and members of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition.

Russian airstrikes entered a new phase of operations after the Syrian regime and allied proxy forces launched a large-scale ground offensive in northwestern Syria with Russian air support. The offensive targeted rebel positions in northern Hama and southern Idlib Provinces, highlighting Russian intent to bolster the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad rather than confront ISIS. In addition, Russian warplanes conducted airstrikes in the Qalamoun Mountains east of Damascus on October 6, targeting the headquarters of a Free Syrian Army (FSA)-affiliated rebel group that receives funding and lethal aid from the U.S. and other members of a covert joint military operations command (MOC) based in Jordan. The Russian MoD also claimed strikes in Idlib, Deir ez-Zour, and Latakia Provinces.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike and cruise missile strike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

**ISW was only able to assess four missile strikes with high confidence through photographic evidence and only one missile strike with low confidence due to a lack of distinction in reporting from local Syrian sources.

Iraqi Security Forces Launch New Offensive in Ramadi

by: Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

The ISF launched a major operation to encircle Ramadi city from the north and west on October 7. The objective was to cut ISIS's supply lines between Ramadi and Hit. The operation also positioned ISF units and tribal fighters for continued attacks on Ramadi, the main effort of the ISF since July. ISF and tribal fighters under the Anbar Operations Command assumed positions north of the city, while those under the Babil Operations Command took to the west. Coalition and Iraqi airstrikes are ongoing nearby, while clashes continue between ISIS and other ISF units in the Anbar University campus south of Ramadi.

 It is unclear if the ISF will be able to hold these areas, as previous attempts to encircle Ramadi failed after short term gains. The Olympic Stadium in 7 Kilo area west of Ramadi, cleared on October 4, had been cleared previously on July 13, indicating that ISIS returned in the interim. In addition, the ISF has been unable to approach Ramadi city from the east. Federal Police continue to clash with ISIS in the eastern Husayba area without signs of significant progress. These obstacles indicate the challenges ahead for the ISF in its largest urban operation since the ISF recaptured Tikrit on April 1, 2015.

The ability of the ISF to recapture Ramadi with US-led Coalition air support is necessary for PM Haidar al-Abadi to demonstrate his independence from Iranian proxy militias who seek to undermine the sovereignty of the Iraqi state. The proxy militias have thus far had no role in the Ramadi operations since they refocused their efforts from Ramadi to Salah al-Din on May 26, 2015 as part of their independent “Labayk Ya Hussein” operation. The success of the ISF operation to recapture Anbar’s provincial capital is also important for the U.S. to demonstrate why it is the essential partner to the Iraqi state. Russia is trying to usurp the US's role as the leading anti-ISIS partner in Iraq and elsewhere; Russia will share this status with Iran and curb PM Abadi's independence. A failure to secure Ramadi would undoubtedly increase the amount of pressure on PM Abadi to reduce his reliance on the U.S.-led Coalition in favor of Russia and Iran.