An Excerpt from "Opposition Forces in Aleppo": Conclusion and Recommendations

By Jennifer Cafarella and Genevieve Casagrande

As talks of a ceasefire or "cessation of hostilities" take the headlines, Aleppo looms even larger as a key city in the 5-year Syrian civil war.  Aleppo is not covered by any agreement for a ceasefire and regime and Russian forces are intensifying their attacks on this city under the pretext that the opposition forces consist largely of al Qaeda's affiliate Jabhat al Nusra.  The fall of Aleppo would be a devastating defeat for opposition forces, but even a long siege would be detrimental to U.S. interests as opposition forces would become more radicalized and Jabhat al Nusra would further cement its leadership role in northern Syria, effectively removing options to achieve American goals in northern Syria.

Below is the Conclusion from ISW's recent paper "The Syrian Armed Opposition Forces in Aleppo." Read the full paper here. 

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The U.S. has a short time frame in Aleppo to prevent the upcoming humanitarian catastrophe and preserve opposition groups the U.S. needs in order to destroy ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra in the long term. The Aleppo-based opposition remains relatively independent and therefore offers the U.S. a promising source of ground forces against Jabhat al Nusra in Northern Syria. Opposition groups that receive covert U.S. support are still among Aleppo’s powerbrokers and potential powerbrokers. The regime’s advance in Aleppo poses an existential threat to these opposition forces, however. Jabhat al Nusra will use the defense of Aleppo as a vehicle to overwhelm opposition groups that are acceptable to the West and entrench itself within the civilian population. The collapse of the opposition in Aleppo, either in a surrender to the regime or in a merger with Jahbat al Nusra and Ahrar al Sham during a siege, would remove options to achieve American objectives in northern Syria.

Russia is using the cover of a potential “cessation of hostilities” to set conditions for the collapse of U.S.-backed groups in Aleppo. There is very little to indicate that Russia, Iran, or the Syrian regime have any intention of halting their military campaign in northern Syria, despite this diplomatic overture. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has explicitly noted that Russia does not intend to halt its air campaign against “terrorists” in Syria.69 Russia exploits the West’s lack of understanding of the Syrian armed opposition to justify targeting a broad swath of groups that include powerbrokers that receive covert U.S. support. Russia’s objective is to eliminate the opposition in Aleppo that poses the greatest threat to Assad and undermine Western support of these groups under the cover of targeting “terrorists.” As such, the February 11 “cessation of hostilities” agreement is not a solution to the challenges the U.S. faces in Syria; it is a submission to Russia’s agenda.70

Syrian armed opposition groups are unlikely to agree to a “cessation of hostilities” under these conditions. No armed opposition group participated in the initial discussions. Aleppo-based groups have consistently refused to agree to localized “freeze zones” in the past on the grounds that they do not trust the Syrian regime to adhere to one.71 The current deal legitimizes this argument, as the deal is very clearly on Russia’s terms. The U.S. risks jeopardizing the prospects of achieving a negotiated settlement in Syria in the long term if it does not abandon this cessation of hostilities initiative. Jabhat al Nusra and other hardline groups will use this initiative – and the regime’s almost certain violation of it – as proof that Syrians should permanently abandon the negotiating table. American submission to Russia’s agenda in Syria thus directly undermines the requirements for American national security.

The situation in Aleppo requires American leadership and action. U.S.-trained opposition forces in the Northern Aleppo countryside are not alone strong enough to secure Aleppo City, for they are unlikely able to break through the regime’s new forward line of troops (FLOT) in the northern countryside. The U.S. does not need to consider drastic measures such as ground forces in order to have a major impact in Aleppo, however. It is possible to change the outcome of the fight in Aleppo and assist the humanitarian crisis that is unfolding through a few limited yet crucial steps.

First, the U.S. could conduct humanitarian airdrops of supplies into opposition-held neighborhoods of the city in order to sustain both the opposition groups and the hundreds of thousands of civilians in opposition-held areas of Aleppo City to forestall a humanitarian catastrophe. Providing humanitarian aid to opposition groups in Aleppo increases their ability to endure the siege without submitting to Jabhat al Nusra’s leadership. The U.S. has the capability to do so from airbases in Turkey currently used for the antiISIS campaign. Turkey would support such operations and almost certainly grant the use of its bases for them to preserve opposition groups in Aleppo, including those that already receive Turkish aid, in order to pursue regime change in Syria. Jabhat al Nusra would be able to access some of this aid, but the U.S. should not let Jabhat al Nusra’s presence in the city condemn the civilian population and opposition groups at risk. Any American intervention in Aleppo, even an airdrop of humanitarian supplies, will risk provoking Russia. Russia is very unlikely willing to rise escalation over Aleppo, however, as it is not a core Russian strategic interest. U.S. policymakers are reportedly considering humanitarian airdrops, and should undertake them immediately.

Second, the U.S. should significantly increase the military and financial support to the non-Ahrar al Sham powerbrokers and potential powerbrokers examined in this report. The U.S. already provides aid on a limited scale to many of them. The U.S. should provide these groups with increased TOW anti-tank missile shipments in addition to increased shipments of light weapons, ammunition, and money to pay their fighters. The U.S. could do so from Turkey, where a covert U.S. program to provide small numbers of TOW anti-tank missiles to vetted opposition groups is already reportedly based.72 The U.S. can deliver these supplies quietly through the Bab al Hawa border crossing with Turkey west of Aleppo City. This is advantageous because air dropping the supplies is more vulnerable to Russian interdiction.

The provision of military supplies in addition to humanitarian aid would preserve the powerbroker status of four ideologically viable powerbrokers (al Jabhat al Shamiya, Jaysh al Mujahideen, Feilaq al Sham, and Fawj al Awal) and increase their relative strength vis-à-vis Ahrar al Sham. The increase in both military and humanitarian support could also transform all of the potential powerbrokers into powerbrokers by both providing them more access to resources than smaller Aleppo based groups have and closing the gap between powerbrokers and potential powerbrokers. It would also mitigate Jabhat al Nusra’s ability to coerce or exploit the weakness of potential powerbrokers in order to absorb or transform them. It could even be sufficient to coalesce smaller opposition groups in Aleppo under the leadership of powerbrokers that are potential U.S. allies as opposed to al Qaeda-allied Ahrar al Sham.

The U.S. should not make additional support contingent upon a refusal by opposition groups to coordinate with Jabhat al Nusra, because it is not a demand these groups can meet under current military conditions. The U.S. should instead adopt an approach to incentivize and enable these groups to retain freedom of action and to withstand Jabhat al Nusra coercion over the medium term while potentially growing stronger. The severity of the situation in Aleppo will likely prevent Jabhat al Nusra from attacking these groups directly because doing so would greatly harm the group’s image. The upcoming siege of Aleppo thus offers the U.S. the opportunity to build future partners against Jabhat al Nusra by exploiting conditions in which Jahbat al Nusra’s freedom of action against Western clients is limited.

Third, The U.S. could also support the establishment of a humanitarian safe zone along the Turkish border. Turkey may independently do so in order to address the flow of refugees that it cannot absorb. A safe zone north of Aleppo could also provide Turkey with basing it can use to deliver additional support to opposition forces in Aleppo City, such as indirect fire. The U.S. could support this course of action with aerial overflight to prevent the regime from attacking the safe zone, and could leverage U.S.-trained forces operating near the Turkish border to help secure the zone and pressure the regime’s forward line of troops (FLOT).

Preventing the regime from recapturing Aleppo does not solve the many other challenges the U.S. faces in Syria; it merely buys some time and prevents a more dangerous future from emerging. Jabhat al Nusra and opposition forces it leads will still hold terrain in Idlib Province that is sustained by access to the Turkish border even if Aleppo falls. Pro-regime forces are unlikely to clear this terrain in the near term, particularly if Turkey sustains its support to Idlib-based groups. Jabhat al Nusra and many opposition forces in Aleppo will likely fall back into Idlib Province and launch a sustained insurgency from that terrain if they lose in Aleppo City. The U.S. therefore will have to develop options to eliminate Jabhat al Nusra in Idlib in the future regardless of the outcome in Aleppo. Preserving a core cadre of opposition fighters in Aleppo would create an option to use those forces for future operations.

Read the full paper here.

Iraq Prime Minister’s Cabinet Reshuffle May Lead to No-Confidence Vote

by Patrick Martin

Key Take-Away: Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced a major cabinet reshuffle on February 9 in an attempt to reform his government. Political blocs are unlikely to tolerate losing control over their ministries, however, and could unite to override the prime minster if he attempts to undercut them. Shi’a religious leader Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who formerly backed the prime minister’s reforms, has ceased to give political sermons, depriving PM Abadi of his public backing. Meanwhile, PM Abadi’s political opponents and Iranian proxy militias have escalated their efforts to restrict his powers over the past month. PM Abadi’s survival in office may be tenuous at best, and there is a possibility that the cabinet reshuffle could backfire against him, weakening him further or leading to his removal. Actors who previously supported PM Abadi’s reform programs may consider ousting him in the event of non-implementation of the reform agenda. Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr, who previously expressed strong support for PM Abadi’s reforms, gave him only 45 days to implement wide-ranging reforms, threatening to “withdraw confidence within the Council of Representatives” in the event of failure. PM Abadi’s weakening and possible removal would strike a serious blow to the U.S.’s ability to support the ISF in the fight against ISIS in Iraq, as it is likely that a pro-Iranian – and anti-Coalition – political figure would secure the premiership.

Context of the Cabinet Reshuffle Announcement

Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced in a televised speech on February 9 a “radical cabinet reshuffle” with the intent of replacing members of his Council of Minister (CoM) with technocrats and academics. He has announced no details of what the reshuffle will look like or to what extent the CoM will change. The Speaker of the Council of Representatives (CoR) and a senior member of the Sunni Etihad bloc, Salim al-Juburi, noted that any reshuffling of the CoM would have to be approved in the CoR in accord with the constitution. PM Abadi, when strong, has been able to make changes. He reduced the size of the CoM and reshuffled positions on August 9 and 16, 2015 during a brief period when his opponents were hesitant to openly oppose the reforms, particularly because he had the public backing of Shi’a religious authority Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. In theory, PM Abadi can accomplish major reforms and fundamentally change the composition of his government.

In practice, it will be nearly impossible for PM Abadi to replace senior leaders of political blocs with technocrats and maintain his seat as prime minister. PM Abadi does not command a strong majority in his own Dawa party, let alone the support of other political blocs participating in his tenuously balanced unity government. Political blocs covet control over ministries as sources of patronage and political influence, and divergent parties will likely set aside their political differences to block any attempt to deny them control over ministries. The move could therefore unite the political blocs against him and generate a meaningful threat of a no-confidence vote. An attempt by PM Abadi to change the composition of the government would thus be likely to fail and may constitute political suicide. 

Rumors first emerged of PM Abadi’s cabinet reshuffle on January 19, when anonymous sources claimed that PM Abadi would replace members of the CoM, most of whom are senior members of political blocs, with less senior members. He later confirmed that he was pursuing a cabinet reshuffle during a conversation with media on January 25 but offered no further details. Unconfirmed reports list six ministers as being targets for replacement. They include Education Minister Hussein al-Shahristani of the State of Law Alliance (SLA); Interior Minister Muhammad al-Ghabban of the Badr Organization; Bayan Jabr of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI); Electricity Minister Qasim al-Fahdawi of the Loyalty to Anbar bloc; Industry and Minerals Minister Muhammad al-Darraji of the Sadrist Trend; and Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). If true, these reports indicate that PM Abadi is not attempting to cut any one party out of the CoM or targeting any particular bloc. However, the inclusion of Ghabban is noteworthy, as he is a senior member of a proxy militia and subordinate to Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri, who rejected earlier reports of his rumored removal on January 20. The Badr Organization values its control over the Interior Ministry, as it provides Amiri and his Iranian backers with a large degree of control over the country’s police forces and a number of security agencies.

The other ministers on the list are also powerbrokers in their parties. Hussein al-Shahristani is the former Minister of Oil in the Maliki government and a relative of Ayatollah Jawad Shahristani, Sistani’s son-in-law and representative in Iran. Bayan Jabr was Maliki’s Minister of Finance and a prominent figure in the Badr Organization when it was still a subsidiary of ISCI. Qasim al-Fahdawi was the former governor of Anbar and is a prominent Sunni politician. Hoshyar Zebari served as Maliki’s Foreign Minister and has been the leading KDP official in Iraqi national politics. Muhammad al-Darraji was Maliki’s Housing Minister and remains a top Sadrist official. 

PM Abadi’s announcement came after a month of brazen impunity by PM Abadi’s primary opponent, the Iranian proxy militias, who demonstrated their intent to undermine Abadi’s rule through four major developments in 2016.

1) Iranian proxy militias openly rejected and expelled Iraqi Security Forces in the militia hub of Basra. Security in Basra had deteriorated precipitously due to the forward deployment of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) from the province to the front lines to fight ISIS and secure Baghdad. As a result, militias, often called “criminal gangs” in the Iraqi press, proliferated and violence between rival groups escalated. In response, PM Abadi sent an armored Iraqi Army (IA) brigade to Basra on January 13 to re-impose order and disarm the groups as well as warring tribes. However, a force from the armored brigade got into a confrontation with members of Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, (KSAS), an Iranian proxy militia, during which several KSAS members were injured. Proxy militias then made a joint statement on January 16 rejecting the presence of security forces from outside the province and demanding that it leave. The brigade withdrew from Basra on January 19, one week after it deployed. The successful expulsion of an IA brigade from Basra, Iraq’s main oil-producing province and a major historical hub of militia activity, demonstrated the weakness of PM Abadi’s authority and the willingness of Iranian proxies to openly defy his authority.

2) Iranian proxy militias have been openly maneuvering to undermine the ISF and the U.S.-led anti-ISIS Coalition in Iraq by positioning the Popular Mobilization at the forefront of security operations. Proxy militia leaders have been pressuring PM Abadi heavily to invite them to participate in operations to recapture Mosul while U.S. officials insist that Iranian proxy militias must not engage in any future operations. The participation of Iraqi Shi’a militias in a Mosul operation would enhance the narrative that the Popular Mobilization is the essential ally of the Iraqi government in the fight against ISIS, undercut U.S. influence and participation in a Mosul operation, undermine the legitimacy of the Iraqi Security Forces, and expose the predominantly Sunni province of Ninewa to sectarian abuses and violence. Proxy militia leaders have been meeting under the pretext of discussing the importance of the Popular Mobilization with some frequency since early January. These meetings included a January 14 visit by senior proxy militia leader and U.S.-designated terrorist Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis to the Ministry of Defense (MoD), as well as a meeting between Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri and the leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), Ammar al-Hakim, on January 20. Senior proxy leaders Amiri, former U.S. detainee Qais al-Khazali, and Abu Alaa met on February 8 and 9 to discuss Mosul in particular. These attempts to undermine the ISF and the Coalition reduces both PM Abadi’s freedom to operate independent of Iranian control and the ability of the U.S. to assist the ISF in recapturing territory from ISIS.

Above: Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri (far left), Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais al-Khazali (second from left), and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada leader Abu Alaa (third from left) at a meeting on February 8 to discuss the Coalition’s insistence on preventing the Popular Mobilization from participating in Mosul operations.

3) PM Abadi’s reform agenda has ground to a halt. PM Abadi launched a major reform initiative in August 2015 following a fiery anti-corruption sermon by the representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the supreme religious authority and a key ally of PM Abadi. However, despite an initial flurry of successful reforms and unparalleled popular support for PM Abadi from thousands of civil demonstrators in Baghdad and southern Iraq, his political opponents have successfully blocked his reforms one month into his initiative. Vice President Nouri al-Maliki, in particular, the former PM whose removal was PM Abadi’s top priority in the August 2015 reforms, succeeded in keeping his position within government. Maliki has aligned himself with the Iranian-backed proxy militias for more than a year. He leverages them as a powerful force, and they leverage him as a powerful politician. Since then, political blocs have blocked the passage of all major reforms; an ill-fated attempt to change the salary scales for federal employees even faced resistance from Sistani himself. In addition, no major legislation other than the budget has been able to pass the CoR due to irreconcilable differences between Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurdish parties on the particulars of key laws, such as the National Guard Law, Federal Court Act, and the Justice and Accountability Law. Iranian proxy militias publicly rejected the National Guard Law in September 2015, after which discussions on the draft law withered away. Iranian proxies’ ability to stifle government legislation poses a serious threat to national reconciliation between Iraqi Sunnis and Shi’a, and highlight the weakness of PM Abadi, whose selection in September 2014 was based in part on promises to see that these laws passed.

4) Proxy militias targeted U.S. personnel in Baghdad. An unspecified Iranian proxy militia kidnapped three American contractors in southern Baghdad on January 15, just two days after U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) deployed to Iraq to begin operations as part of a specialized targeting force to target ISIS. It was the first kidnapping of U.S. personnel in Iraq since the U.S. withdrew forces from Iraq in December 2011. The U.S. and the Coalition are PM Abadi’s main allies in the fight against ISIS, but Iranian proxy militias, and Iran by consequence, aim to expel the U.S. and replace Coalition support with Iranian and/or Russian support. The kidnapping was an embarrassment for the Iraqi government and demonstrated the level of impunity that Iranian proxy militias have in Iraq, as well as the threat they pose to the U.S. and its efforts to assist the ISF fight ISIS.

Reasons for the Announcement

The timing of PM Abadi’s announcement was likely deliberate and a product of a combination of motivators. First, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has shifted away from his political outspokenness to return to the more quietist position he originally favored. The supreme religious authority had supported PM Abadi’s previous reform efforts in August, and his representatives have frequently given sermons on the necessity of passing government reforms and anti-corruption measures. However, he has more recently become frustrated with the government’s inability to combat corruption, calling for a technocratic government as Iraq’s budgetary crisis increased. Sistani’s representative announced on February 5 that his weekly political sermons were suspended unless demanded by new developments. The change may be leverage to prod Abadi into taking reform members, or it may result from Sistani’s declining health. Regardless, Sistani has called for government reforms vigorously between August 2015 and February 2016, making his opinions clear. PM Abadi likely would not even attempt the reshuffle without Sistani’s previous statements. Second, PM Abadi may have privately secured the support of key figures within the political blocs, including senior members of the State of Law Alliance (SLA) who do not support the Iranian proxies, as well as in ISCI and the Sadrist Trend, without necessarily notifying the whole group. Leaders within these groups supported PM Abadi’s previous reform efforts, primarily as a means of weakening their political opponents and increasing their relative power within the government. However, ISCI’s Ammar al-Hakim stated on January 27 that any move to reorganize government must be “justified and non-impulsive,” suggesting that he knew little about the specifics of the cabinet reshuffle. In addition, a member of the Dawa Party, of which PM Abadi is a member, stated that PM Abadi had not brought up the cabinet reshuffle in a recent party meeting. It thus remains unclear to what extent he consulted senior political leaders about the specifics of the cabinet reshuffle prior to its announcement.

PM Abadi may also have initiated the cabinet reshuffle after detecting a move against him by his opponents. An imminent threat to his political survival made by his political opponents and/or Iranian proxy militias might have forced the PM to make a gambit to increase his control over the government and improve its performance while protecting himself from a possible move to oust him. PM Abadi’s opponents have been laying the groundwork for months for PM Abadi’s eventual departure from power and replacement by a figure that is more supportive of Iranian-backed militias. Maliki himself has been attempting to increase his attractiveness as a successor candidate by openly siding with Iranian proxy militias and opposing PM Abadi. 

Reactions to the Announcement

Iraq’s political blocs almost unanimously voiced their approval for a cabinet reshuffle, as was the case with PM Abadi’s previous reforms. Some political leaders used the reform language to attack one other, indicating that they intend to use the reforms to increase their political position at the expense of their rivals. However, recent statements have been laced with threatening language that indicates a growing dissatisfaction with PM Abadi among the Shi’a parties that underscores his precarious position. 

ISCI was the most publicly supportive of PM Abadi’s reshuffle, issuing a statement calling for a government of technocrats. The ISCI Transport Minister, Bayan Jabr, stated his approval of the cabinet reshuffle. Ammar al-Hakim, the leader of ISCI and a supporter of PM Abadi’s prior reforms, voiced his approval for the reform process, adding that the party quota system, wherein ministries and key positions are determined based on party affiliation, needed to end. Hakim did meet however meet on February 14 with Badr Organization Hadi al-Amiri, an Iranian proxy leader, indicating that ISCI is coordinating a response to the reforms with PM Abadi’s opponents rather than fully endorsing PM Abadi’s reform package. Other parties, including the Kurdish Gorran party and the Sunni Etihad bloc, also issued statements of support for the cabinet reshuffle.

Other parties largely distanced themselves from the cabinet reshuffle debate. Iyad Allawi, the leader of the secular Wataniya bloc, expressed skepticism about the process, stating that the current CoM composition was already technocratic, as most of its members held advanced degrees. However, a Wataniya leader later stated that the bloc endorsed reform proposals by the Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr. Similarly, a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) stated that the reshuffling “does not concern the Kurds” who “paid the price” for putting their trust in the previous government reshuffling in August 2015 which removed Kurds from key positions within the security forces.

The State of Law Alliance (SLA), led by PM Abadi’s primary rival, Vice President (VP) Nouri al-Maliki, used more threatening language in its support for PM Abadi’s reforms. Although the SLA Education Minister, Hussein al-Shahristani, offered to present PM Abadi with his resignation in a show of support for the reshuffle, the move was largely symbolic and obscures the true position of pro-Maliki elements within the SLA. One State of Law Alliance member stated that there was a need to form a single parliamentary group out of multiple political blocs to assign PM Abadi “or someone else” with the formation of the new government, again, threatening no confidence. A large contingent of the SLA has openly discussed removing PM Abadi in the past, issuing a letter on October 27, 2015 threatening to “withdraw their mandate” from PM Abadi due to his lack of consultation with political blocs on his last major reform program regarding salary scales for government employees; at least one Maliki supporter openly speculated about the possibility of replacing PM Abadi. Maliki himself openly opposed PM Abadi’s reforms in October 29, 2015, insisting that PM Abadi’s decision to abolish the post of the Vice President in August was not constitutional and that political blocs could withdraw their “mandate” from PM Abadi. Maliki has been positioning himself to succeed PM Abadi in the event of his removal, and he has secured the support of Iran and its proxy militias. Previously, the pro-Maliki elements of the SLA have used the threat of a no-confidence vote to constrain PM Abadi’s freedom of action, but his most recent reform announcement could open the door the prospect of removing PM Abadi becoming a reality.

Above: VP Nouri al-Maliki (center) attends a memorial service on January 27, 2016, for a Popular Mobilization leader, seated between Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri (right) and Kata’ib Hezbollah leader and U.S.-designated terrorist Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (left). Maliki frequently meets with Popular Mobilization and Iranian proxy leaders and is likely Iran’s preferred candidate for the premiership in the event that PM Abadi be removed from office.

The most alarming reaction came from, Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Sadrist Trend, who called for a comprehensive reform program on February 13 but threatened to oust PM Abadi from office. Sadr insisted on wide-ranging reforms that included reform of financial institutions and the judiciary, the formation of a technocratic government, and comprehensive security sector reform that included parliamentary votes of approval on all division leaders and military staff. Sadr’s statement highlighted issues that demonstrated his desire to see the reform program undermine the position of the SLA, Sadr’s primary political rival within the Shi’a political establishment; his insistence on “purging” the judiciary is rooted in Sadr’s insistence that Medhat al-Mahmoud, the head of the judiciary and a long-time ally of SLA leader VP Nouri al-Maliki, must leave office. However, Sadr also stated his frustration with PM Abadi’s inability to pass reforms, and only gave PM Abadi 45 days to implement the reforms and provide a reform program for the upcoming year or he would “withdraw confidence from PM Abadi in the CoR.” The explicit wording strongly suggested that he would pursue either a no-confidence vote, but could be interpreted as a threat to withdraw the Sadrist Trend from the government. Shortly afterwards, leaders in the Sadrist Trend’s al-Ahrar Bloc stated that they would withdraw from the political process if Sadr’s 45-day deadline was not met.

With Sadr’s support, the threat of a no-confidence vote against PM Abadi becomes a genuine possibility. A vote of no-confidence requires a questioning session, a request for the no-confidence vote from at least 50 CoR members, and successful passage of the vote with an absolute majority in the CoR. Previously, it would have been extremely difficult for Maliki’s allies to engineer a successful no-confidence vote. Were the Sadrist Trend to withdraw from government, however, it would be more likely, though not given, that a no-confidence vote could succeed. 

Possible Courses of Action

With the threat of a no-confidence having become more realistic with Sadr’s statements, it is clear that PM Abadi is losing support. How the cabinet reshuffle process plays out could fundamentally change the composition of the government, or result in its collapse. This presents several steps that could be taken over the course of the cabinet reshuffle.

PM Abadi could attempt a genuine cabinet reshuffle that replaces ministers with genuine technocrats possessing few if any political ties. This course of action is highly unlikely; political blocs would immediately obstruct any attempt to oust their ministers from the CoM without their consultation. It would also likely rally numerous competing political blocs together to oust PM Abadi from his post to collapse the CoM. 

PM Abadi could oversee a partial cabinet reshuffle, with some ministers being replaced. Although it is possible that some of the new ministers could be true technocrats, the reality is that political blocs covet control over ministries far more than they value an accountable and functional government. It is far more likely that political blocs compete to oust one another from each other’s cabinet positions. In this case, as with the previous reforms in August 2015, the Sadrist Trend and ISCI would most likely attempt to displace SLA ministers from their positions in the CoM, and vice versa. 

More dangerously, the reshuffle could get bogged down in political competition and fail. If PM Abadi fails to succeed with a cabinet reshuffle, then he would be exposed to a vote of no-confidence, particularly if failure drives the Sadrist Trend from the government. This is a worst case scenario, particularly because if PM Abadi were to leave office, then his replacement would almost certainly be less accepting of the U.S. and the U.S.-led Coalition in the fight against ISIS. The nomination of Nouri al-Maliki as PM in particular would be a heavy blow to the U.S., as he has become vehemently anti-American and has transformed himself into an Iranian proxy actor. This would increase the ability of Iran to increase its involvement in Iraq and expel the U.S. from its leading role in the anti-ISIS fight as well as from the country itself. However, Maliki remains a highly controversial figure, detested by the Sunni and Kurdish blocs as well as the Sadrist Trend, and it is not at all a given that he could secure the nomination. 

The removal of PM Abadi would make it dramatically more difficult for the U.S. and the Coalition to conduct anti-ISIS operations; for Iraq to address its political and financial problems; and address political divides between competing parties, especially national reconciliation between Iraqi Sunnis and Shi’a. Coalition initiatives, such as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford’s proposal of the integration of U.S. advisers present at forward bases and with Iraqi military units in a future Mosul operation, would likely be blocked by a new government. Although announcement of the cabinet reshuffle appears bold, it indicates PM Abadi’s weak position and the threats he faces from his opponents. There is a high likelihood that the initiative backfires and fails to achieve any substantial reform, further weakening of PM Abadi’s powers and increasing the relative ability of his opponents to constrict his freedom of action. Failure could be the pretext of PM Abadi’s ouster, while even a stalled reshuffle could expose him to attack by his pro-Iranian opponents. The U.S. must quickly provide support to PM Abadi and his government, and above all financial support that helps to ease Iraq’s budgetary crisis, strengthens the Iraqi Security Forces, and creates leverage that the U.S. and Abadi can use to accelerate effective reforms.

The Russian Air Campaign in Aleppo

By Genevieve Casagrande

Key Takeaway: Russian air operations in Syria bolster the legitimacy and staying power of Syrian President Bashar al Assad. Russia seeks to preserve its client regime in Syria and thereby ensure its foothold in the Middle East in line with its strategic objectives. The vast majority of Russia’s air operations in Aleppo Province have targeted mainstream Aleppo-based opposition groups, despite Russia’s insistence that its intervention aims exclusively to eliminate ISIS, Syrian al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra (JN), and other “terrorist organizations.” The agreement on a “cessation of hostilities” announced by world powers on February 11 fails to restrict the military operations of Russia, Iran, or the regime in Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city. The regime and its foreign backers thus remain free to continue their efforts to besiege opposition forces in Aleppo City. They have captured additional terrain on February 12 and 13, showing their intent to continue exploiting their recent gains. The ground campaign and Russian airstrike patterns indicate that the pro-regime forces intend complete the encirclement in the outer cordon northwest of Aleppo.

Russia’s air campaign in Syria has brought Syrian President Bashar al Assad within five kilometers of achieving his long-standing strategic objective to encircle and besiege Aleppo City, Syria’s largest urban center and a key opposition stronghold since 2012. Pro-regime forces supported by Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) fighters and Iranian proxy forces severed the primary opposition held-supply line to Aleppo City on February 3 during operations to relieve the partially-besieged regime-held towns of Nubl and Zahraa. Pro-regime forces subsequently began to expand territorial control north of Aleppo, clearing at least two additional opposition-held villages on February 5 – 6. Russia directly enabled these gains through a heavy campaign of airstrikes and likely through the assistance of Russian Special Forces reported to be operating in the province.

Pro-regime forces can sever the last remaining opposition supply line into the city at two discrete locations: an inner cordon which regime forces are 5 km away from completing, and an outer cordon which regime forces are over 10 km away from completing. Russia has concentrated strikes in the outer cordon northwest of the city, indicating that this is where regime forces will likely complete the siege. This outer cordon is rural terrain and therefore more easily cleared than the dense urban terrain inside the city or the industrial sector in the northern city limits. The rural area northwest of Aleppo is a key transit zone for supplies to reach opposition forces inside the city from their last remaining supply line running eastwards from the Turkish border. A review of Russia’s airstrikes from October 2015 – February 2016 displays Russia’s consistent targeting of the outer cordon, and its territorial gains on February 12 – 13 confirm their intent to complete the cordon here.

Russian Airstrikes Set Conditions for Encirclement of Aleppo

Russia began setting conditions for this encirclement of Aleppo in mid-October 2015, just two weeks after beginning its air campaign in Syria. The city has evidently been an enduring campaign priority, but required multiple simultaneous and successive operations, as Soviet doctrine would recommend. Russian airstrikes heavily targeted the southern Aleppo countryside from October – December, drawing opposition forces away from critical frontlines inside the city and northern countryside. The pro-regime forces had as their first operational objective reaching the M5 highway that links Aleppo and Damascus in order to set conditions for future operations west into Idlib Province. The airstrikes indeed facilitated significant gains by pro-regime forces in the southern countryside. They achieved the operational objective by seizing the opposition-held town of Khan Touman on December 20.  Their second operational objective was to encircle ISIS positions east of Aleppo City that threaten the regime’s stronghold of Safira, a key area of interest to both the regime and Iran.  To that end, Russian airstrikes since October also targeted ISIS in the eastern Aleppo countryside in order to enable pro-regime ground forces to push westward from the Kuweires Airbase. The campaign to complete the encirclement of the terrain between Safira and Kuweiris remains ongoing as of February 13. Russia nevertheless largely stopped air operations to the south of Aleppo City by January 12 as it began to dedicate a significant amount of its air power to opposition positions north of the city in preparation for the upcoming regime offensive there.

Airstrikes Support Kurds after Turkey Downed a Russian Warplane

Russian airstrike patterns changed after a Turkish jet downed a Russian warplane on November 24, after Russia violated Turkish airspace. Russian warplanes immediately began conducting airstrikes that assisted Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) operations against the opposition in Northern Aleppo Province near the Turkish border. Russian warplanes also increased the volume of strikes against the supply lines that sustain Syrian armed opposition forces in Aleppo Province. The targeting of these supply lines undermined the ability of opposition forces backed by Turkey to defend against regime and YPG forces simultaneously, and ultimately overwhelmed opposition defenses. 

Russia’s sustained bombardment of the opposition’s supply line from the Turkish border north of Aleppo city enabled Kurdish forces to advance within meters of the key border town of Azaz. Syrian Kurdish YPG and allied opposition elements seized the opposition-held Menagh Airbase, south of Azaz, and five nearby villages by February 10. This advance capitalized on the disposition of opposition forces further south against the regime to penetrate a previously strong defensive line.

Russian pressure on opposition forces in Aleppo and facilitation of Kurdish gains accomplishes numerous strategic objectives. Russia is simultaneously portraying Turkey as a regional aggressor through a sophisticated information campaign in order to deter any decisive action by Turkey to assert its strategic interests in Syria. Russia seeks deliberately to exploit and expand disagreements between the U.S. and Turkey about Kurdish issues. Turkey opposes American support to the YPG, and the controversy over this support limits the effectiveness of the anti-ISIS coalition by creating a sustained rift between the two countries about their respective goals in Syria. The advance by YPG forces north of Aleppo City on terrain critical to Turkey heightens Turkish-American tensions by emboldening the YPG. Russia is concentrating airstrikes along the highway through Azaz to cut off Turkish supplies to Aleppo, claiming that the Turks are facilitating ISIS. Reports of Turkish shelling on YPG positions near Azaz on February 13 demonstrate the risk that the Turks will escalate in response to YPG gains and Russian airstrikes along its border. Russia is thereby also challenging NATO by provoking Turkey and trying to show the limitations of the principle of collective defense.

Conclusion

Russia obscures its true intentions in Syria through an active disinformation campaign. Its primary objective in Syria is to maintain an air and naval base on the Mediterranean by ensuring the preservation of the Assad regime. The distribution of Russian airstrikes in Aleppo Province demonstrates that its air campaign is primarily directed at weakening the armed Syrian opposition generally, not ISIS or al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. The “cessation of hostilities” agreed upon the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) on February 11 will likely only further the regime’s campaign to complete the siege of Aleppo, which Russia has been setting conditions for since October 2015.

The U.S. must seek solutions to the violence in Aleppo in ways that recognize that Russia, Iran, and the regime are belligerents to the conflict. Ceasefire agreements that do not police the actions of these three actors will likely result in increased violence and preclude any future political process that is agreed upon by legitimate representatives of the armed opposition. Russia, Iran, and the regime may soon besiege opposition forces and an estimated 300,000 civilians in Aleppo City. At the same time, the Russian air campaign has deliberately targeted hospitals, markets, water treatment stations, and other civilian targets in Aleppo Province in order to punish and depopulate opposition-held terrain. The U.S. must therefore mitigate the humanitarian disaster and prevent the collapse of the opposition in the province. U.S. policymakers should demand that Russia cease all airstrikes in Syria as part of any “cessation of hostilities” or nationwide ceasefire. The U.S. should also authorize humanitarian aid drops in Aleppo City and increase military support to U.S.-backed opposition groups in Aleppo. The U.S. should consider establishing a humanitarian safe zone north of Aleppo City in partnership with Turkey in order to forestall a Turkish intervention against the YPG in Syria and ameliorate the refugee crisis along the Syrian-Turkish border. A safe zone north of Aleppo City could also help opposition forces facing encirclement survive by placing pressure on the regime’s northern flank and positioning Turkey to provide artillery support to the opposition inside Aleppo City. 

Besieged and Hard-to-Reach Regions of Syria: February 12, 2016

By Christopher Kozak

The International Syria Support Group (ISSG) – a group of world powers that includes the U.S., Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey – reached an agreement to implement a nationwide "cessation of hostilities" in Syria during their most recent meeting in Munich, Germany on February 11, 2016. The “cessation of hostilities” will face significant hurdles, including the lack of a clear enforcement mechanism and the prospect of continued attacks by ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), and other irreconcilable groups. The ISSG also agreed to secure immediate humanitarian access to six besieged locations in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2254. The demands for renewed deliveries of humanitarian supplies nonetheless include only a fraction of the civilian populations across Syria in need of assistance. This map overlays current zones of control in Syria with publicly-available data on besieged and hard-to-reach populations as released by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

The Syrian Ceasefire Is a Big Win for Russia, Assad, and Iran

By Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan

The Syrian ceasefire agreement of February 11 is a big win for the Russians and the Syrian regime.  Russia, Iran, and Syria are in the midst of a major military offensive that has allowed them to besiege Aleppo and has them poised to make gains across the battlefield. This so-called “cessation of hostilities” agreement allows them to consolidate and prepare for further advances while preventing the opposition that the U.S. ostensibly supports from attempting to undo any of their gains. It does not require the Assad coalition to allow humanitarian access to the hundreds of thousands they have just trapped in and around Aleppo itself, and it leaves them fully in control of what humanitarian aid goes to the other areas they themselves are besieging and deliberately starving. It was concluded without the participation of the opposition, and is thus an imposition of a truce on the fighters the U.S. is theoretically supporting at a moment when they have lost vital ground.

 

The Russians, moreover, define all of the opposition groups in northern Syria as either ISIS or Jabhat al Nusra.  Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said today, “if liberation of the city that has been taken by illegal armed groups can be qualified as aggression, then, well, yeah, probably. But to attack those who have taken your land is necessary – is a necessary thing. First of all, this has been done by Jabhat al-Nusra, and also the western suburbs of Aleppo are still being controlled together with Jabhat al-Nusra by Jaysh al-Islam and Ahrar al-Sham.”  The Russians will read this agreement to let them continue operations against all opposition groups in Aleppo and to continue their encirclement, siege, and targeting of that city.  They will therefore continue to weaken the non-Jabhat al Nusra, non-ISIS opposition now concentrated in Aleppo and likely strengthen the hands of the terrorist organizations they purport to be attacking.

 

This “cessation of hostilities” also continues the policy of requiring the opposition to make concessions in order to get the regime temporarily to stop committing what the UN has called crimes against humanity.

 

This agreement is a ceasefire in the manner of the Minsk agreements that have shaped the supposed ceasefires in Ukraine--ceasefires that have been nominally in effect throughout all of the major Russian and separatist military offensives since February 2015. The Russians posed as a neutral third party when in fact they are a belligerent in the conflict, and have continued to escalate and de-escalate military operations in Ukraine in order to extract concessions from the Ukrainian government.  Not only will this Syrian “cessation of hostilities” also fail, but it will fail in a way that further alienates the non-ISIS, non-al Qaeda Sunni opposition groups and populations on which any meaningful political settlement of the conflict in accord with America's vital national security interests must rely. 

Iraq Situation Report: February 2 - 11, 2016

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency Chief, Vincent Stewart, noted that a Mosul operation was unlikely to occur in 2016, underscoring that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have far to go before being ready to recapture the city. Coalition airstrikes have been successful in assisting the ISF recapture territory from ISIS, who were largely pushed out of Ramadi’s eastern suburbs on February 9. Coalition-trained forces also opened a new front against ISIS south of Mosul. Members of the Coalition-trained 91st Iraqi Army (IA) Brigade, along with tribal fighters from Ninewa and Peshmerga forces, conducted operations southwest of Makhmur district towards Qayarrah to recapture villages from ISIS. The limited operation marks the first real operation under Ninewa Operations Command, the branch of the Defense Ministry responsible for recapturing Ninewa from ISIS. Additional Coalition-trained forces from the 15th and 16th IA Divisions are also being deployed to the area and away from other operations, indicating that the ISF has begun shifting a significant number of forces to the southern Mosul axis. However, any operation to recapture Mosul remains a long way off and will require intense Coalition assistance to recapture territory. Meanwhile, Iraqi Kurdistan is witnessing a large number of protests against reduced or undelivered salaries and the weak state of the economy, a situation that is exacerbating political differences between Kurdish political parties, while weekly demonstrations against corruption and for government reform continued across southern Iraq. In addition, PM Abadi announced a cabinet reshuffle on February 9, but such an initiative will depend on the support of political blocs to have any hope of succeeding. A unilateral attempt to remove ministers without the support of political blocs could increase support for a no-confidence vote against him, as major parties will not accept PM Abadi removing their senior members from the government. Ongoing political difficulties underscore the need to strengthen Iraq’s central government and financial situation as part of any campaign to recapture territory from ISIS, as the Iraqi state and the Kurdistan Regional Government require increase Coalition and U.S. support to prevent from weakening further and fracturing.

Iraq Control of Terrain Map: February 9, 2016

By Patrick Martin, Emily Anagnostos, Rachel Bessette, and ISW Iraq Team

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Sunni Arab tribal fighters backed by Coalition air support recaptured central Ramadi on January 9, the completion of a six-month operation. Iraqi Security Forces entered the city center on December 22, rapidly pushing ISIS eastward as tribal fighters deployed to hold recaptured terrain in the city’s environs. The ISF announced on February 9 that it cleared ISIS from Ramadi’s eastern suburbs and reopened the road between Baghdad and Ramadi, though Inherent Resolve spokesperson Colonel Steve Warren cautioned that the area may remain exposed to attacks and will need to be cleared of IEDs. Anbar Operations Command called for the provincial government to return to Ramadi on January 26, coinciding with the drawdown of the ISF from the Ramadi area. ISW is thus changing downtown Ramadi and its eastern environs from ISIS-held to ISF-held territory. 

Peshmerga and Sunni Arab tribal fighters recaptured several villages west of Makhmur district. The U.S.-trained 1st Battalion of the 91st Brigade of the 16th Iraqi Army Division participated in operations with Peshmerga and tribal fighters from the Jubur, Lahib, and Sabawin tribes to recapture villages west of Makhmur. Up to 4,500 ISF members will reportedly deploy to the area, and the ISF are leading the operation. However, multiple reports indicate that Peshmerga and the ISF compose the forces in the area but do not mention tribal fighters, indicating that the role of tribal fighters in the operations may be limited to assist with holding territory after it has already been cleared. ISW is thus changing the area extending west of Makhmur towards Qayyarah to populated areas under ISF control with KDP Peshmerga and Sunni tribal fighters.

Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization continue to clash with ISIS between Samarra and Lake Thar Thar despite previous control over the areas west of Samarra. ISIS has repeatedly attacked Popular Mobilization and the ISF west of Samarra, particularly in Khat al-Layn and the Jazeera desert. ISW has changed the area from an ISF and militia control zone to contested territory. 

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: January 29 - February 7, 2016

by: ISW Syria Team

Russia’s four month long air campaign has set conditions for the encirclement of Aleppo.  Pro-regime forces backed by heavy Russian airstrikes severed one of two opposition supply lines into Aleppo City from the Turkish border on February 3 when they pushed northwest of the city to reestablish a regime supply line to the besieged regime towns of Nubl and Zahra’a. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps fighters and Iranian-backed Shi’a militia forces played a prominent role in the offensive, demonstrating the lethality of combined Russian air and Iranian ground operations against the opposition in Syria. Reports of Russian Spetnaz activity at unspecified locations in Aleppo Province likely indicate the involvement of these forces in the operation. The gains position pro-regime forces to encircle opposition-held portions of Aleppo City by severing the last remaining opposition supply line that runs east from the Turkish border into the city. The regime can sever this final supply line at two locations: an outer location northwest of Aleppo City on the road to the Turkish border that passes through the towns of Huraytan and Kafr Hamra, or an inner location in the city’s eastern sector controlled by the armed opposition, such as the Hanano District. Russia’s air campaign has consistently targeted the outer location for the past three months, indicating that this is where pro-regime forces intend to complete the encirclement. This section of the supply line runs through rural terrain that Russian airpower can easily target and Iranian-backed ground forces can ultimately seize, whereas the inner location is more difficult as the terrain includes both topographic and urban barriers to rapid ground offensives. Pro-regime forces are meanwhile taking steps to buffer their forward line of troops (FLOT) to the north of Aleppo to make it possible to sustain the encirclement. Pro-regime forces will likely complete the encirclement of Aleppo in coming weeks and besiege the opposition inside the city in order to force Turkey and Saudi Arabia to concede to a negotiated settlement or ceasefire.

Assad Regime Gains in Aleppo Alter Balance of Power in Northern Syria

By: Christopher Kozak

Battlefield realities rather than great power politics will determine the ultimate terms of a settlement to end the Syrian Civil War. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his allies in Russia and Iran have internalized this basic principle even as Washington and other Western capitals pinned their hopes upon UN-sponsored Geneva Talks, which faltered only two days after they began on February 1, 2016. Russian airpower and Iranian manpower have brought President Assad within five miles of completing the encirclement of Aleppo City, the largest urban center in Syria and an opposition stronghold since 2012. The current campaign has already surpassed the high-water mark set by the regime’s previous failed attempt to besiege Aleppo City in early 2015. The full encirclement of Aleppo City would fuel a humanitarian catastrophe, shatter opposition morale, fundamentally challenge Turkish strategic ambitions, and deny the opposition its most valuable bargaining chip before the international community.

The campaign against Aleppo City began in October 2015 and proceeded in several phases. Regime forces enabled by Russia and Iran initially mounted probing attacks along multiple fronts in Aleppo and Idlib Provinces as part of a larger campaign designed to confuse and overextend the opposition. They conducted shaping operations in the southern, eastern, and northern countryside of Aleppo City in order to draw opposition forces out of urban terrain, relieve long-besieged pockets of regime forces, and set conditions for a future decisive operation to besiege the city, as ISW warned on December 30, 2015. They also secured core regime terrain along the Syrian Coast against further opposition attacks through a series of rapid offensives in Latakia Province. These gains marked a fundamental shift in battlefield momentum following dramatic losses experienced by the regime in the first half of 2015.

President Assad has used unconventional shaping operations to complement these ground offensives and further strengthen his bargaining position. The regime intensified its campaign of sieges and aerial bombardment against opposition-held pockets in Homs and Damascus Provinces in order to impose one-sided local ceasefires that would allow it to consolidate control in these two vital cities. These operations in some cases included the use of chlorine gas and other unidentified chemical weapons in violation of international prohibitions. The regime also escalated a campaign of targeted assassinations against key opposition commanders - most notably the Saudi-backed Damascus powerbroker Zahran Alloush - in order to weaken the political influence of its opponents. These gains strengthen the hand held by President Assad at the negotiating table and incentivize further violence among all sides in an attempt to secure additional concessions during an eventual settlement. The mounting pressure will tend to drive the opposition towards militarily reliable but politically irreconcilable Salafi-jihadist groups such as Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. Conditions on the ground remain unsuitable for the achievement of any meaningful peace in Syria.

Aleppo Province

The regime and its allies have waged a multi-pronged campaign in Aleppo Province over the past four months to set conditions for an offensive to isolate and ultimately seize Aleppo City. The opposition is uniquely vulnerable in Aleppo City due to its position along a lengthy salient that relies upon one primary ground line of communication (GLOC) that faces compounding pressures from the regime, ISIS, and the Syrian Kurdish YPG. The return of the largest urban center in Syria to government control would represent a major victory for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad that would bolster his leverage in current or future political negotiations. A successful campaign for Aleppo City would also constitute a serious blow to the morale of opposition groups that have contested the city since mid-2012.

The operations in Aleppo Province have hinged upon heavy military support from both Russian warplanes and Iranian proxy fighters. Russia concentrated a significant portion of its air campaign against opposition forward positions and supply lines in Aleppo Province. Meanwhile, U.S. officials estimated in October 2015 that up to 2,000 Hezbollah, Afghan, and Iraqi Shi’a militia fighters led by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Quds Force commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani currently operated in Aleppo Province. U.S. officials also stated that Russian Spetsnaz special operations forces recently began operating in conjunction with pro-regime forces near Aleppo City. The regime has become increasingly dependent on this foreign support in order to conduct successful maneuver warfare.

Southern Aleppo Province

The regime and its allies launched the first shaping operations of their reinvigorated campaign in Aleppo Province on October 15, 2015. Regime forces supported by heavy Russian air cover and Iraqi Shi’a militiamen mounted an offensive against the sparsely-populated opposition-held villages in the southern countryside of Aleppo City. The regime secured steady advances against opposition forces over subsequent weeks despite opposition attempts to reinforce the front with hundreds of fighters drawn from Aleppo City and northern Aleppo Province. Several Western-backed opposition factions also deployed multiple TOW anti-tank missiles systems to the region. An opportunistic attack by ISIS in late October 2015 managed to disrupt the ongoing operation temporarily by seizing several positions along the regime’s primary ground line of communication (GLOC) to Aleppo City. Pro-regime forces nonetheless seized the opposition-held towns of Hadher and Al-Eis on November 12, securing the only prominent population centers in southern Aleppo Province.

The opposition responded to the advances by deploying valuable reinforcements to the region. Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other key opposition groups reinforced the southern countryside of Aleppo City from Idlib Province. Prominent Salafi-jihadist group Ahrar al-Sham (HASI) issued a general call for mobilization to southern Aleppo Province on November 13, 2015. The arrival of fresh opposition reinforcements managed to blunt and in some cases reverse regime gains on a tactical level. These minor reversals also corresponded with an apparent operational pause by pro-regime forces to consolidate their new holdings and receive additional reinforcement, including several advanced T-90 main battle tanks provided by Russia. The regime mounted a renewed offensive in early December and seized the opposition-held town of Khan Touman directly southwest of Aleppo City by December 20. The regime and its allies have used these new gains to contest the strategic M5 Highway and the opposition-held southwestern suburbs of Aleppo City.

The regime designed its operational maneuvers in southern Aleppo Province to set conditions for the upcoming offensive to isolate opposition forces in Aleppo City. The offensive drew opposition reinforcements out of Aleppo City and fixed them in a battle of open terrain that allowed the regime to fully-utilize its advantages in armor, airpower, and artillery. The loss of this pool of combat reserves will weaken opposition defenses against future operations by the regime and its allies to isolate Aleppo City. The gains also position the regime to threaten the eastern flank of core opposition-held terrain in Idlib Province. Iranian-backed proxies have repeatedly asserted that the operation in southern Aleppo Province ultimately aims to relieve the besieged pro-regime towns of Fu’ah and Kefraya near Idlib City. The need to defend against this threat further constrains the flexibility and freedom of action available to opposition commanders in northwestern Syria.

Kuweires Airbase and Al-Bab

The regime and its allies began a second simultaneous shaping operation in eastern Aleppo Province on October 15, 2015 in order to relieve the besieged Kuweires Airbase. The base faced repeated challenges from ISIS that threatened to overrun the facility, fueling simmering discontent within the regime’s base of popular support along the Syrian Coast. Elite regime light infantry units supported by Russian aircraft and reinforcements from Lebanese Hezbollah conducted a slow battle of penetration along a narrow front in the face of heavy ISIS resistance. Pro-regime forces successfully established a ground line of communications (GLOC) to the Kuweires Airbase on November 10 in a major symbolic victory for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The operation revitalized the morale of regime loyalists and demonstrated the first tangible battlefield achievement for the regime since the Russian intervention on September 30.

The regime has since leveraged its forward position at the Kuweires Airbase as a staging ground to conduct follow-on operations against ISIS in eastern Aleppo Province. Pro-regime forces expanded the defensive perimeter of the Kuweires Airbase throughout late November 2015, enabling the regime to resume both fixed-wing and rotary-wing flights out of the airbase by December 15. Regime forces later conducted several advances west of Kuweires Airbase in an offensive aimed at encircling an ISIS pocket that threaten the key regime-held logistical hub of Al-Safira and the adjacent supply route to Aleppo City. This offensive sets the stage for a classic ‘cauldron battle’ drawn from Soviet military doctrine, illustrating the degree to which Russian advisors likely play a role in operational planning. The regime also advanced north from the Kuweires Airbase in January 2016, seizing several villages less than five miles from the major ISIS-held urban center of Al-Bab. Regime forces currently hold optimal positions to mount a potential operation to seize Al-Bab and secure additional legitimacy before the international community as a partner against ISIS. Russia reportedly deployed two hundred personnel and several air defense systems to Kuweires Airbase in February 2016 in likely preparation for such an operation. The regime may intend to use future anti-ISIS operations by the U.S.-led coalition in eastern Aleppo Province as an opportunity to secure its own gains near Aleppo City.

Northern Aleppo Province

The regime mounted its most significant shaping operation in Aleppo Province in February 2016 with a renewed attempt to complete the encirclement of Aleppo City. Pro-regime forces lifted the siege of the pro-regime towns of Nubl and Zahraa in northern Aleppo Province on February 3, linking regime forces in an arc of control that dominates almost all opposition supply lines between Turkey and Aleppo City. The regime previously failed to capitalize upon a similar offensive over the same terrain in February 2015. The opposition nonetheless faces a severe challenge in mobilizing sufficient forces to reverse this new attack given the conditions set by the regime and its allies in Aleppo Province over the past four months. The regime and its allies will likely attempt to complete the encirclement of Aleppo City in coming weeks by seizing its opposition-held northwestern suburbs. The end result of this operation could be a protracted siege of Aleppo City that bolsters the political leverage exerted by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad while subjecting the remaining civilian population in opposition-held districts to a punishing campaign of starvation and aerial bombardment.

Latakia Province

The regime and its allies simultaneously conducted major operations to expel opposition forces from core regime terrain along the Syrian Coast. Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other armed factions have occupied the Jabal al-Turkman and Jabal al-Akrad regions of northern Latakia Province since 2012, providing the opposition with a safe haven from which to threaten the Alawite population that constitute the popular base of support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. This threat reached unprecedented heights after opposition forces secured control over almost all of Idlib Province in mid-2015 and began posturing for an offensive into Latakia Province. The stabilization of this front thus constituted an immediate priority for the regime and its foreign backers. Russia provided extensive military support with the provision of technical advisors, armored vehicles, rocket artillery, and a heavy campaign of aerial bombardment based from its nearby airfield at Bassel al-Assad International Airport near Latakia City. Iran also committed significant numbers of proxy forces to enable the mobilization of local pro-regime militias. These deployments produced a significant reversal in the balance of forces in Latakia Province over recent the past three months.

Pro-regime forces launched an offensive against opposition forces in Jabal al-Turkman on November 19, 2015 in an attempt to deny opposition forces access to supply routes across the Turkish border. The regime seized multiple villages and hilltops in the mountainous region within several days with the support of heavy Russian airstrikes. The offensive drew immediate condemnation from Turkey as thousands of ethnic Turkmen refugees fled across the border ahead of regime forces. Two Turkish fighter jets later shot down a Russian warplane on November 24 after the aircraft violated the border while conducting operations against the opposition. The escalation in geopolitical tensions nonetheless failed to prevent continued tactical advances by the regime and its allies in both Jabal al-Turkman and Jabal al-Akrad.

The regime secured major breakthroughs in its operations to clear Latakia Province in January 2016. Regime forces seized the opposition stronghold of Salma in Jabal al-Akrad on January 12 after successfully surrounding the town from three sides over the preceding weeks. Salma occupied a dominant high ground and served as the anchor for the opposition frontline in northern Latakia Province. The regime and its allies exploited the collapse of the front in order to secure rapid advances deep into opposition-held terrain. Pro-regime forces later successfully encircled and seized the town of Rabi’ah on January 24, securing the primary command-and-control node for the opposition in Jabal al-Turkman. These gains threaten to expel all overt opposition presence from Latakia Province over the next few months. The regime and its allies likely intend to ultimately seize the opposition-held city of Jisr al-Shughour in western Idlib Province in order to anchor their advance and secure a buffer against future counterattacks.

Strategic Effects

The direct threat posed by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to core opposition terrain in Aleppo City and other parts of Northern Syria will present a critical challenge for U.S. strategic interests. The realities on the ground currently being set by the regime will entrench the position of President Assad and his foreign backers, preserving Syria as a regional base of operations for both Iran and Russia. The renewed pressure being placed upon the opposition also risks driving opposition groups to deepen their coordination with Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other Salafi-jihadist factions. Major opposition factions in the Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room based in Idlib Province reportedly came close to signing a unification agreement supported by Jabhat al-Nusra emir Abu Muhammed al-Joulani. The incentives to solidify this cooperation will only grow in the face of further regime gains. The current violence thus stands to solidify Syria as an arena for U.S. adversaries over the coming months.

The willingness of parties on both sides to pursue further conflict will only serve to prolong the bloodshed of the Syrian Civil War and exacerbate the humanitarian consequences of the conflict. UN officials reported that nearly 40,000 civilians fled the southern countryside of Aleppo City amidst regime operations in October 2015, while at least 70,000 civilians have fled the latest round of violence in northern Aleppo Province. The regime has also conducted a series of engagements in in Central and Southern Syria meant to increase the pressure brought to bear upon remaining opposition pockets, particularly through the use of sieges and starvation as weapons of war. The flows of displaced persons generated by this campaign will place additional strain upon regional U.S. allies while fueling further resentment and radicalization among the refugee population.

The looming siege of Aleppo City poses a strategic dilemma for Turkey. Turkish President Recep Erdogan provided weapons, supplies, and safe haven to opposition forces in order to advance Turkey’s strategic objectives, including the formation of a Sunni Islamist government to replace Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The mounting opposition losses in Aleppo Province directly undermine these core strategic interests and bring Russian military personnel to vital positions within forty miles of the Syrian-Turkish border. Turkey will likely respond to these inflections through military force. President Erdogan may even consider a range of high-risk military options to reassert his control over the conflict that could include providing the opposition with man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) or mounting a cross-border intervention into Northern Syria. These operations risk fueling an intensified regional proxy war or even a direct confrontation between Turkey and Russia. The current campaign undertaken by President Assad and his allies in Moscow and Tehran will be a driver of long-term disorder in Syria and the wider Middle East.