Political Crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan Escalates into Violence

By: Patrick Martin

Key Take-Away: The political crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan caused by delayed Presidential elections descended into outright political violence on October 8. Regional President Masoud Barzani, the leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), has continued to hold office even though his term expired on August 19 and no elections have occurred. Other Iraqi Kurdish political parties, particularly Gorran (Change), the KDP’s main political rival, tried to contest the extension of Barzani’s term and leverage concessions in return for his continuation in office. Popular protests against the government turned violent on October 9 after multi-party talks collapsed the day before. On October 11, the KDP ordered the speaker and other members of the Kurdish parliament from Gorran to leave the regional capital of Arbil, declaring that Gorran was no longer a part of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Gunmen loyal to the KDP barred a Gorran convoy from entering Arbil. This dangerous maneuver by the KDP to solidify Barzani’s position as regional president has escalated tensions within the KRG and serious political violence may protract. Unless negotiations between the KDP and the opposition parties reaches a meaningful compromise in short order, the KRG could split or collapse as opposition leaders move their operations from the seat of government in Arbil to Suleimaniyah.

The Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Presidency Crisis: June 17 – August 19.

The crisis over the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Presidency (henceforth “Regional Presidency”) has been long in the making. Regional President and leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Masoud Barzani’s term expired on August 19. The Regional President is by far the most powerful government official in the KRG, and Barzani has held the position since June 2005. Other political parties, long unhappy with Barzani’s tenure,  have heatedly debated whether Barzani is permitted to hold office for another term, as he has technically served two-and-a-half terms and the legal debate over how many terms Barzani is permitted to serve is complex. The opposition, consisting of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Gorran (Change), the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), and the Islamic Group, attempted to leverage the expiration date to extract concessions from Barzani that would constrict Barzani’s powers and increase the powers of the regional parliament. In particular, the opposition sought to convert the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) system from a presidential system to a parliamentary one. This change would favor the opposition, which holds 58 seats out of 111 and a simple majority, whereas the KDP holds only 38 seats, bolstered by the 10 seats allotted to Turkmen and Christian parties who usually side with the KDP.

Barzani refused to relinquish power by making concessions. The head of the Kurdistan Independent High Electoral Commission (K-IHEC), KDP member Handrin Muhammad Saleh, announced on June 17 that the Iraqi Kurdistan region would not hold elections to select a new regional president, citing a lack of time to prepare and budgetary constraints. On the same day, Gorran presented a proposal to transform the government system, with the other opposition parties following suit on June 18. The opposition parties presented a series of compromises after August 4 and suggested that Barzani could hold office for an additional two years until the parliamentary elections in 2017 in exchange for converting to a parliamentary system and significantly reducing the regional presidency’s  powers, distributing some of them between deputy regional presidents and the parliament. Subsequent proposals by the opposition followed similar lines.

Discussions over how to address the crisis stalled. Barzani steadfastly refused to compromise, while the opposition refused to cave into Barzani. Mediation by Iranian officials, including the Assistant Secretary General of the Iranian National Security Council on July 29, made no impact. Even a visit by Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-Quds Force commander Qassim Suleimani on July 26 to the PUK, which has historically been close to Iran, did not sway the opposition, which insisted that the regional presidency crisis was a strictly Kurdish internal issue. Barzani leveraged  KDP control over the electoral commission to dissuade the opposition and gained a ruling in his favor from the KDP-dominated Shura Council, an advisory body within the Kurdish Justice Ministry tasked with resolving administrative disputes. The Shura Council stated on August 17 that Barzani should remain in office for two years while retaining his full powers. However, the Gorran speaker of parliament Yusuf Muhammad Sadiq promptly dismissed the decision, pointing out that the Shura Council’s ruling was not legally binding.

Mediation by the U.S. and British Ambassadors to Iraq and the UN Special Envoy to Iraq appeared to have laid the groundwork between the KDP and the four opposition parties to extend discussions beyond the August 19 expiration date. The parties also agreed to delay an emergency session of parliament scheduled for later that day to vote on an amendment to the law governing the powers of the regional presidency. However, Gorran calculated that it could use the opposition’s majority in the parliament to rush an amendment through the legislative process at the last minute. The Gorran speaker of parliament called the emergency session, citing that there had been no formal request to delay it. Gorran’s plan backfired badly, as the KDP boycotted the session and only 53 parliamentarians showed up for the vote, falling short of the 56 parliamentarians required for quorum; five members of the KIU refused to attend the session, with one member suspending his membership in parliament on the grounds that solving the crisis required a consensus agreement between all political parties, including the KDP.

The Crisis Turns Violent: October 8 – October 9.

The five parties, having failed to reach an agreement before the August 19 deadline, began a series of meetings to discuss how to resolve the regional presidency crisis. The ninth round of talks between the five parties broke down on October 8, prompting the PUK to call for the regional presidency crisis to be resolved in the parliament and not among the political parties, signaling the end of the opposition’s patience with negotiations.

The crisis escalated unexpectedly when a protest by teachers over delayed salaries and the ongoing political crisis turned violent in Qala Diza, in northern Suleimaniyah. On October 9, the demonstrators clashed with security forces, leaving two protesters dead and 18 wounded. Other towns in Suleimaniyah province, including Kalar, Halabja, Karmiyan, and Suleimaniyah city, as well as Koya in Arbil province, continued to witness large protests by teachers against delayed salaries.

Political Violence: October 9 – October 11.

Although most demonstrations have remained peaceful, some witnessed significant political violence. A series of attacks on political party interests across Iraqi Kurdistan demonstrate that the opposition has initiated violence itself or used party-affiliated thugs to coax peaceful demonstrators into initiating violence in order to escalate the crisis. Demonstrators in Sayid Sadiq in eastern Suleimaniyah province clashed with security forces on October 11, injuring an unknown number of demonstrators and KDP supporters. Demonstrators also attacked KDP headquarters buildings in Suleimaniyah. The KDP reported that two KDP members were killed and nine others wounded in the attack. KDP facilities in Kalar, Sharzur, Zarayin, Qala Diza, and Halabja were also attacked.

Both the KDP and the opposition have targeted media outlets in a bid to dominate the narrative of the demonstrations. Anonymous witnesses stated that an “armed group” first attacked the office of Rudaw network, a KDP-affiliated channel, in Suleimaniyah, firing on the office but causing no casualties. Unidentified assailants also severely beat journalists from at least five different media outlets covering the October 10 Suleimaniyah protests. The targeted violence indicates that opposition elements were present at the Suleimaniyah demonstration, hijacking the momentum of a largely-peaceful movement and attempting to maximize the chaos for political gain. KDP-dominated Asayish internal security forces closed the offices of the Gorran-affiliated KNN media outlet in Arbil, Soran, and Dohuk, and deported KNN and the independent NRT-TV media outlet employees to Suleimaniyah. NRT-TV claimed that security forces kidnapped its employees in Dohuk and Arbil, but they were later released, and its offices were reopened on October 12.

The KDP and Gorran have dramatically escalated their rhetorical attacks on each other. The outburst of violence and inter-party conflict prompted the PUK, the KIU, and Gorran to call for non-violence and for an emergency meeting of the political parties to prevent the situation from spiraling out of control. Although the KDP called for calm, it held Gorran leader Nechirvan Mustafa responsible for the unrest. The KDP also blamed the PUK for not protecting KDP headquarters sites, though the bulk of their ire has been directed at Gorran. The KDP stated that the demonstrations were not popular and spontaneous, and that attacks on its headquarters buildings “served the interests of the enemies of the Kurds.” Gorran in turn and accused the KDP of using “the language of the civil war years” and disrupting the work of the Kurdistan parliament. A Gorran Twitter account also stated that gunmen carrying KDP banners attacked the Gorran headquarters in Arbil with small arms and mortar fire. The Arbil police directorate denied the unconfirmed report and stated that the Gorran headquarters had never been attacked.

The KDP Kicks Gorran out of Government: October 11.

Amd numerous reports of attacks on KDP headquarters buildings, the KDP used its control over Arbil to oust Gorran physically from government. On October 11, the office of the speaker of parliament, a senior member of Gorran, announced that the five parties had agreed to suspend the October 12 parliamentary session scheduled to discuss the crisis. Shortly thereafter, Gorran stated that the political office of the KDP ordered Gorran parliamentarians, ministers and Gorran speaker Sadiq to leave Arbil and return to Suleimaniyah. Sadiq later claimed that a security force prevented Sadiq and Gorran parliamentarians from entering Arbil province at a checkpoint in Altun Kubri, a town on the border of Arbil and PUK-dominated Kirkuk provinces. A video from the encounter alleges that security forces loyal to the KDP harassed the Gorran convoy, breaking several windows of cars. The head of KDP External Relations and a member of the KDP leadership council, Hayman Hurami, also announced that Gorran ministers were no longer a part of the KRG.

The KDP’s expulsion of senior Gorran members from Arbil – a unilateral removal of the leadership of the KRG’s second largest electoral bloc –effectively removes the opposition’s ability to challenge the KDP in parliament by physically keeping the speaker of parliament out of the parliament building.  Gorran denounced the move as a coup and an attempt by the KDP to paralyze the work of the parliament; Gorran’s KIU allies denounced the move as a mistake that would cause “fear and chaos” while a senior PUK official mirrored Goran’s description of the move as a coup. At the time of writing, Sadiq, Gorran parliamentarians, and Gorran’s ministers were in Suleimaniyah.

Next Steps

If the political crisis protracts for much longer, it will exacerbate longstanding structural problems within the KRG. The Kurdish parliament has failed to pass reforms aimed at combating corruption and improving government performance, a priority for PM Haidar al-Abadi and the Council of Representatives (CoR). Falling oil prices and budget shortfalls are part of a larger state of economic malaise that will be harder to address without consensus in government, and the government employees who took to the streets on October 9 will continue demonstrating. With Gorran members physically barred from entering Arbil, an agreement has become increasingly unlikely.

There are several active drivers that could help push the KRG into returning to negotiations. For one, discontent with the Iraqi Kurdish political situation is widespread. Teachers, who are at the heart of the protest movement, have not been paid for three months, nor have many members of the Peshmerga and other government employees. While Suleimaniyah province is securely a PUK and Gorran electoral stronghold, demonstrators in Qala Diza, Rania, Binjawin, Kalar, Kifrin, and Halabja attacked party headquarters buildings for Gorran, the PUK, the KDP, the KIU, and the Kurdistan Communist Party, pelting the buildings with stones and forcing them to remove their party flags, hoisting the flag of the KRG instead. In addition, the Peshmerga have refused to partake in party conflict, as the Peshmerga Ministry called for calm and stated that it would not allow attacks on any party or government buildings. Finally, all parties have consistently urged demonstrators to avoid violence, while Gorran’s Suleimaniyah office director has suggested that it is still possible for Barzani and Gorran leader Mustafa to reach an agreement over their political differences.

Other parties that form a parliamentary majority have denounced the KDP’s move to exclude Gorran from the KRG. Yet it is not clear if the KDP will make any move to compromise over the regional presidency. Barzani will not allow the parliament speaker to return if he is convinced that the parliament will attempt to bypass his stalling tactics and pass legislation aimed at reducing the regional president’s powers. If every opposition parliamentarian shows up for the vote, then a boycott by the KDP and its allies would not prevent the law from passing. Sadiq has already suggested that the parliament can hold its session in any city to pass legislation.  However, the KDP is more likely to ignore the ruling and denounce it as illegitimate rather than obey the legislature’s ruling, considering that it has steadfastly refused to compromise on the regional presidency issue for months. The current political situation is untenable, with several opposition parties exasperated by the fractured nature of the KRG and the dominance of the KDP in particular. If the two sides fail to reach any sort of compromise, political unrest will continue, and the possibility of rival governments – the regional presidency based in Arbil and the parliament based in Suleimaniyah – will become increasingly likely.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 - October 9, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande

Key Takeaway: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian warplanes conducted 67 “combat missions” throughout Syria on October 9, marking the largest number of Russian airstrikes in Syria on a single day since September 30. Russian airstrikes continued to largely concentrate in rebel-held areas of northwestern Syria from October 8-9. In particular, Russian warplanes continued to conduct airstrikes in support of a large-scale regime offensive against rebel positions in the northern Hama countryside.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike and cruise missile strike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Russian Air and Missile Strikes in Syria: September 30 - October 7, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola

Key Takeaway:  The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that four Russian warships in the Caspian Sea fired twenty-six Kalibr-NK cruise missiles against alleged ISIS-held positions in Aleppo, Idlib, and ar-Raqqa Provinces on October 7. The Russian MoD released a video depicting the cruise missiles traveling over the airspace of Iraq and Iran in order to primarily strike targets in rebel-held areas of northwestern Syria. U.S. officials later reported that at least four of the cruise missiles had crash-landed in northwestern Iran, although both the Russian and Iranian Ministries of Defense denied these reports as “psychological warfare” by the West. The use of cruise missiles despite the presence of a functional Russian airbase in Latakia Province likely represents an overt show of force intended to project Russian military strength to both the Syrian opposition and members of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition.

Russian airstrikes entered a new phase of operations after the Syrian regime and allied proxy forces launched a large-scale ground offensive in northwestern Syria with Russian air support. The offensive targeted rebel positions in northern Hama and southern Idlib Provinces, highlighting Russian intent to bolster the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad rather than confront ISIS. In addition, Russian warplanes conducted airstrikes in the Qalamoun Mountains east of Damascus on October 6, targeting the headquarters of a Free Syrian Army (FSA)-affiliated rebel group that receives funding and lethal aid from the U.S. and other members of a covert joint military operations command (MOC) based in Jordan. The Russian MoD also claimed strikes in Idlib, Deir ez-Zour, and Latakia Provinces.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike and cruise missile strike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

**ISW was only able to assess four missile strikes with high confidence through photographic evidence and only one missile strike with low confidence due to a lack of distinction in reporting from local Syrian sources.

Iraqi Security Forces Launch New Offensive in Ramadi

by: Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

The ISF launched a major operation to encircle Ramadi city from the north and west on October 7. The objective was to cut ISIS's supply lines between Ramadi and Hit. The operation also positioned ISF units and tribal fighters for continued attacks on Ramadi, the main effort of the ISF since July. ISF and tribal fighters under the Anbar Operations Command assumed positions north of the city, while those under the Babil Operations Command took to the west. Coalition and Iraqi airstrikes are ongoing nearby, while clashes continue between ISIS and other ISF units in the Anbar University campus south of Ramadi.

 It is unclear if the ISF will be able to hold these areas, as previous attempts to encircle Ramadi failed after short term gains. The Olympic Stadium in 7 Kilo area west of Ramadi, cleared on October 4, had been cleared previously on July 13, indicating that ISIS returned in the interim. In addition, the ISF has been unable to approach Ramadi city from the east. Federal Police continue to clash with ISIS in the eastern Husayba area without signs of significant progress. These obstacles indicate the challenges ahead for the ISF in its largest urban operation since the ISF recaptured Tikrit on April 1, 2015.

The ability of the ISF to recapture Ramadi with US-led Coalition air support is necessary for PM Haidar al-Abadi to demonstrate his independence from Iranian proxy militias who seek to undermine the sovereignty of the Iraqi state. The proxy militias have thus far had no role in the Ramadi operations since they refocused their efforts from Ramadi to Salah al-Din on May 26, 2015 as part of their independent “Labayk Ya Hussein” operation. The success of the ISF operation to recapture Anbar’s provincial capital is also important for the U.S. to demonstrate why it is the essential partner to the Iraqi state. Russia is trying to usurp the US's role as the leading anti-ISIS partner in Iraq and elsewhere; Russia will share this status with Iran and curb PM Abadi's independence. A failure to secure Ramadi would undoubtedly increase the amount of pressure on PM Abadi to reduce his reliance on the U.S.-led Coalition in favor of Russia and Iran. 

Russian-backed Separatists Postpone Disputed Elections

By Daniel Pitcairn

Key takeaway: Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine have postponed unrecognized local elections from October and November 2015 to February 2016. The elections would have violated the “Minsk” peace process which requires the vote to proceed under Ukrainian law. The postponement will mitigate risks of armed conflict resuming in October but does not reflect a fundamental shift in Russia’s Ukraine strategy. Instead, it reflects Russia’s effort to balance this strategy with intervention in the Middle East and a desire to break out of international isolation and economic sanctions.

Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine announced on October 6 their decision to postpone upcoming local elections unrecognized by Kyiv until February 2016. They would otherwise have transpired in October and November. The announcement follows an October 2 meeting of the heads of state of Ukraine, Russia, Germany, and France, where Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly promised Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko that he would pressure Ukrainian separatists into cancelling the controversial elections. Kyiv, Paris and Berlin had decried the upcoming elections as a major violation of the February “Minsk II” ceasefire in Ukraine, because they would not have been held in accordance with Ukrainian law or in the presence of recognized international monitors. Although Moscow had originally defended the disputed elections, the decision to cancel them does not represent a fundamental shift in Russia’s strategy in Ukraine, which continues to rely on the threat and application of military force to pressure the Ukrainian government into making political concessions that allow Moscow to strongly influence Ukraine’s politics and policy. Instead, Russia is attempting to balance its strategy for Ukraine with intervention in the Middle East and to shed international economic sanctions.

The Minsk II agreement signed in February represents a concession to Russia because Ukraine had little choice but to consent to key Russian objectives, including decentralization and the assignment of “special status” to Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, amidst a major Russian-backed separatist offensive. Russia had thwarted its implementation by refusing to meet many of its provisions, including those pertaining to the elections and the withdrawal of heavy weaponry from the front lines. By pressuring the separatists to postpone their elections, Russia has shifted international and domestic pressure back onto to Kyiv to fulfill its side of the Minsk agreements and enact politically painful concessions. The separatists claim Kyiv must now “fulfill all obligations under the Minsk agreements” as a condition of election postponement. These include the provision of “special status” to Donbas, amnesty for militants in the region, and revising amendments to the constitution in agreement with the separatists.

The decision to delay elections all but guarantees that implementation of the Minsk II agreement will extend into 2016 and prolongs Moscow’s ability to exert pressure on the pro-Western government in Kyiv. This delay favors Moscow. Poroshenko had previously insisted that implementation of the agreement must be completed by the end of this year, whereas Moscow has indicated its willingness to extend it into 2016. By averting the agreement’s likely collapse over separatist elections and prolonging the implementation process, Russia has preserved the mechanism through it which it can most effectively convert its threats of military force into political concessions by Kyiv. Poroshenko knows that the Minsk II agreement traps him into choosing between military escalation in Donbas and a high probability of significant domestic political fracturing. A deadly riot by far-right groups in front of the Ukrainian parliament on August 31 highlighted this domestic political challenge. The riot came in response to initial approval of draft amendments extending special status to Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

Meanwhile, Moscow is keen to maintain the veneer of progress in Ukraine while expanding its military intervention in Syria and trying to escape international sanctions brought on by its war in Ukraine. Five days after Russia began airstrikes in Syria on September 30, Russian-backed separatists in Ukraine announced they would postpone their disputed elections, leading the EU, among others, to express “renewed hope for a sustainable political settlement.” An unnamed German government source even credited Russia directly for the progress, commenting, “Moscow has finally delivered.” In presenting itself as constructive actor in Ukraine, Russia also seeks to weaken political will within the EU to extend sanctions beyond their expiration in January 2016. French President Francois Hollande has already said that he “will ask for sanctions [on Russia] to be lifted” if progress toward the implementation of the Minsk agreements continues.

Although the postponement of disputed separatist elections to next year has been met with significant international approval for averting a breakdown of the Minsk II peace process in the short term, it does not presage a strategic reversal by Russia in Ukraine. Instead it reflects an effort to balance new geopolitical priorities, particularly in the Middle East, with a continuation of its destabilizing strategy in Ukraine over a longer term.

Read this update online here.

Iraq after Russian Intervention in Syria

by: Patrick Martin

Key-Takeaway: The Russian formation of a coordination cell in Baghdad is an inflection point aimed at undercutting U.S. influence over the direction of the anti-ISIS efforts in Iraq and Syria. However, the Russian footprint in Iraq is much smaller than in Syria, while U.S. influence over the ISF and Iraqi state are much greater than U.S. influence in Syria. The U.S. and the U.S.-led Coalition can maintain its position as Iraq’s essential ally in the anti-ISIS fight by increasing advisory, materiel, and aerial support to the Iraqi state, without substantially increasing its ground presence. Such changes must prepare Iraq to recapture territory from ISIS quickly in order to demonstrate the value of cooperation with the U.S.  

Read more online at: http://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraq-after-russian-intervention-syria

Syrian Regime Launches Ground Offensive with Russian Air Support

By: Christopher Kozak

The Syrian regime reportedly began a ground offensive in northwestern Syria with support from Russian airstrikes, marking the first overt example of coordination between Russian and Syrian military forces since the start of the Russian air campaign in Syria on September 30. Accounts from Syrian officials and activists indicated that Syrian Army units backed by allied militiamen and Hezbollah reinforcements launched coordinated attacks against rebel positions along the border between northern Hama Province and southern Idlib Province amidst an intense Russian aerial bombardment of the surrounding area. The attacks centered upon the rebel-held towns of Latmin, Tel al-Sayyad, and Khan Sheikhoun, which are all located on or along the strategic M5 Highway connecting Hama City to Aleppo City. Although there have been no reports of Russian ground forces participating in the fighting, the clashes follow indications that Iran deployed hundreds of additional Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members and mobilized hundreds of other fighters from its local and regional proxy forces in order to participate in a major offensive in northwestern Syria. The start of the offensive also coincided with the announcement that four Russian warships in the Caspian Sea fired at least twenty-six cruise missiles against alleged “ISIS targets” in Syria.  Thus far, no major advances for regime forces have been reported.

The location and targets of this escalation provide further evidence that the Russian air campaign in Syria intends to bolster regime forces in pursuing the objectives of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad rather than defeat ISIS. The terrain contested by the offensive has no notable ISIS presence and is instead held by a mix of rebel factions ranging from Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra to U.S.-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) affiliates such as Tajamu al-Izza. These groups previously staged a major offensive in 2014 which directly threatened regime control of the Hama Military Airport and they retain the ability to challenge the regime in its core terrain throughout the Hama countryside. A successful offensive to drive rebel forces from this region would alleviate this threat and divert Syrian rebels from further assaults on regime positions defending the Alawite heartland of Latakia Province to the west. Over the long-term, advances by pro-regime forces could also provide an avenue for the Syrian regime and its allies to conduct further operations along the M5 Highway and reestablish a presence in rebel-held Idlib Province after being largely driven from the region over the past six months.

Syrian Opposition Guide: October 7, 2015

By Jennifer Cafarella and Genevieve Casagrande

Read this update online here.

This reference guide provides a baseline for identifying Syrian opposition groups. The guide aims to permit researchers to track how groups realign as the Russians commence operations. It seeks to inform the development of policies that aim to protect Syrian rebels willing to cooperate with the U.S. in order to defeat ISIS and marginalize al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra.

The chart characterizes each group’s relative strength, its areas of operation, its participation in multi-group operations, and its sources of external financing (derived from other experts’ studies). The document carefully identifies those groups that are separable from Jabhat al-Nusra, drawing a sharp distinction between the al-Qaeda affiliate’s subcomponents and those groups that have a more transactional relationship. Whereas the Russian military actions will likely drive these groups together, diminishing the influence of al-Qaeda actually requires breaking the groups apart. Targeting rebel groups writ large through military strikes is therefore counterproductive and will lead to entrenchment of al-Qaeda in Syria. 

Russia's Impact on the Opposition

Russian air operations in Syria impose new pressures on Syrian rebel groups on the ground. Although the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian airstrikes focused on ISIS, local reports and the U.S. official statement indicate that the strikes have primarily targeted Syrian opposition groups in areas far from core ISIS-held terrain. Free Syrian Army (FSA)-affiliated rebel groups that receive support from the U.S. are among those that Russian warplanes have hit.

As Russian airstrikes intensify, Syrian opposition factions will likely seek the protection of a strong partner in the fight against the regime and its allies. The majority of the groups that may seek protection already cooperate militarily with Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra out of necessity, and this trend is likely to increase as rebels come under greater duress. The pressure of a reinvigorated air campaign in support of the Syrian regime may drive these groups closer to Jabhat al-Nusra and potentially hardline Islamist Ahrar al-Sham in the absence of alternative sources of robust military assistance from countries opposed to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In fact, between October 2 and October 4, two rebel groups merged separately under Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham in Hama and Aleppo provinces respectively. This trend damages not only the U.S. anti-ISIS mission, but also the implicit mission to counter al-Qaeda’s influence in Syria. It is therefore vital to observe changes in the behaviors and affiliations of Syrian rebels in response to ground events. 

Relationship to Jabhat al-Nusra

This guide also provides an assessment of rebel groups’ relationship to Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. Groups that conduct military operations with Jabhat al-Nusra do not necessarily share its vision, end-state, or values. Many rebel groups cooperate out of military necessity, because Jabhat al-Nusra one of the most capable groups on the battlefield. The relationship between each group and Jabhat al-Nusra has been designated through the following definitions:

Component of Jabhat al-Nusra: Groups that have merged under Jabhat al-Nusra, or groups that ISW assesses to be a sub-unit of Jabhat al-Nusra

Allied: Rebel groups that share interim objectives with Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria in the near term; groups that are close ideological allies to Jabhat al-Nusra; and groups that are ideologically opposed to the Western countries’ influence in Syria or to the vision of Western secularism

Separable from Jabhat al-Nusra: Rebel groups that formally coordinate military operations with Jabhat al-Nusra among many other groups through joint military commands, largely out of military necessity. This also includes groups that participate in governance structures that also contain elements of Jabhat al-Nusra.

Independent: These rebel groups currently do not share interim or long term objectives and do not formally coordinate military operations with Jabhat al-Nusra through joint military commands.

Identifying Outside Funding

The following charts also reflect assessments of the sources of outside funding for each group as provided by the Carter Center and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace from September 2014 – February 2015.  There are three major sources of funding:

Joint Military Operations Command (MOC)

Two covert joint military operations commands (MOC) based in Turkey and Jordan reportedly provide funding and lethal aid to moderate and nationalist Islamist groups in northern and southern Syria. Members of both the Northern and Southern MOCs reportedly provide military assistance including TOW anti-tank missiles to a select set of Syrian rebel groups.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia provides direct support to Salafist and Islamist groups across all of Western Syria.

Turkey and Qatar

Turkey and Qatar support nationalist Syrian rebel groups, including Salafist and Islamist groups. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, currently based in Turkey, facilitates the provision of money and weapons provided by Turkey and Qatar to Syrian armed opposition groups based in northern Syria.

Identifying Powerbrokers

The following charts indicates assessed powerbrokers in Syria in addition to groups that could become powerbrokers in the near term upon the receipt of sufficient outside support. These groups could provide a counter-weight to Jabhat al-Nusra, although the Russian military operations reduce the likelihood that they will be willing or able to split from the al-Qaeda affiliate.

Powerbroker: a group that disproportionately determines the success of military operations against either the Syrian regime or ISIS; is strategically located; and/or plays a leading role in governance.

Potential Powerbroker: a group that could achieve significant battlefield effects against Jabhat al-Nusra and/or ISIS in western Syria upon receipt of increased outside support, including securing direct military gains and cohering other smaller brigades into new coalitions.

Operations Rooms

The following charts organize opposition groups by their participation in operations rooms, in order to achieve particular, defined objectives. Operation rooms are joint structures limited to a particular geographical area, but they do not maintain a physical headquarters. Syrian opposition groups join “operations rooms” in order to coordinate their military campaigns jointly in an area without merging, thus preserving their status as separate fighting forces.  Each operations room is typically launched with an announcement conveying a specific, stated objective and a list of groups that have joined. 

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 - October 5, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande

Key Takeaway:  Russian airstrikes continue to primarily target Syrian opposition groups throughout northwestern Syria, including areas along the Turkish border in northern Latakia Province. Russian warplanes violated Turkish airspace and harassed Turkish F-16s in at least two separate incidents over Hatay Province of southern Turkey on October 3 and 4, prompting an emergency NATO meeting on October 5. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed airstrikes targeting ISIS-held positions northeast of Palmyra. The Russian MoD later clarified that the airstrikes did not hit positions within the city of Palmyra itself following contrary reports in Syrian state media. In addition, the Russian MoD claimed its first airstrikes in Damascus Province on October 5. However, local reporting has not yet substantiated these claims and, thus, ISW does not assess them at even a level of Low Confidence at this time.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Iraq Situation Report: October 2 - 5, 2015

By: Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 - October 3, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande

Key Takeaway: Russian airstrikes continue to primarily target Syrian opposition groups in areas far from ISIS's core terrain. These strikes are concentrated in northwestern Syria, particularly in rebel-held areas of Idlib Province and the northern countryside of Hama Province. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed only three airstrikes targeting positions in known ISIS-held terrain between October 1 and October 3. However, local reporting only confirmed two of these strikes. The Russian air campaign in Syria appears to be largely focused on supporting the Syrian regime and its fight against the Syrian opposition, rather than combatting ISIS.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

 

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

 

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Russian Disinformation on Airstrikes in Syria

by Genevieve Casagrande

The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed on October 3 that Russian Su-34s conducted airstrikes targeting an ISIS-held “command center” near Raqqah city, northern Syria. However, local Syrian reporting did not substantiate this claim. In fact, Syrian activists released comparisons of the airstrike footage, revealing that the strike targeted the rebel-held town of Al Latamneh in Hama Province, western Syria. Syrian state-run news agency SANA also released footage of the same airstrike; however, SANA claimed the airstrike targeted the town of Jisr al-Shughour. As the Russian Ministry of Defense continues to claim airstrikes against ISIS, particularly in core ISIS-held terrain, it will remain important to distinguish the true targets and intentions of Russian military action in Syria amidst Russian disinformation.

The Russian Ministry of Defense released airstrike footage of an alleged strike against ISIS positions in Raqqah. 

Syrian state-run news agency SANA released footage of the same strike, claiming it targeted Jisr al-Shughour in Idlib Province.

Activist Eliot Higgins released evidence revealing that the airstrike targeted the rebel-held town of Al Latamneh in Hama Province. 

Confirmed Iranian Personnel Sightings in Iraq: October 2014 - October 2015

by: Andrew Haddad and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-away: This map depicts confirmed locations of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders in Iraq between October 2014 and October 2015. Orange markers indicate where IRGC personnel were spotted in an area witnessing active military operations. Grey markers indicate where the personnel were spotted in non-military settings, such as meetings. It is likely that IRGC personnel were likely present in areas witnessing military operations by Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias in advisory capacities at a minimum.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 - October 1

By Genevieve Casagrande

Key Takeaway: Russia conducted a second round of airstrikes in Syria on October 1, targeting rebel-held positions in the provinces of Homs, Idlib, and Aleppo. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has repeatedly claimed that the airstrikes are targeting ISIS positions in these rebel-held areas. However, Russian targets included the training camp of an FSA-affiliated, Western-backed TOW anti-tank missile recipient Liwa Suqour al-Jebel near the town of Maaret al-Nouman in Idlib Province, in addition to other rebel-held targets. The Russian MoD also claimed two airstrikes in Raqqah Province, targeting an ISIS-held training camp and “command post”. These airstrikes are the first Russian strikes confirmed by the Russian MoD that have targeted positions in ISIS-held terrain.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Anonymous U.S. officials reported by secondary sources stated that Russian aircraft conducted strikes in Talbisah in northern Homs Province and the Ghab Plain in Idlib Province. The Russian Ministry of Defense stated that airstrikes struck targets in Al Latamneh, Jisr al-Shughour, Ar Raqqa, Darat Izza, and Ma’arat al-Numan. All of these airstrikes have been corroborated through local reporting. ISW assesses with high confidence Russian aircraft conducted strikes in the following: Talbisah, Al Latamneh, Khirbet Has, the Ghab Plain, Jisr al-Shughour, Darat Izza, and two locations in Raqqa.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Local sources have attributed Russian airstrikes to multiple locations in northwestern Syria, including Ghanto, Rastan, and al-Zafarnah in northern Homs Province; Kafr Zita in northern Hama Province; and several locations in the northeastern countryside of Latakia Province. Syrian state-run media also stated that Russian airstrikes occurred in the eastern countryside of Salamiyah in Hama Province. ISW assess with low confidence Russian aircraft conducted strikes in the following: Ghanto, Rastan, Al Zafarnah, the Salamiyah countryside, and the Latakia countryside.

Warning Update: Taliban Northern Offensive Expands

by Saagar Enjeti

Nine districts in four Northern provinces have reportedly been contested by the Taliban over the last eight days from September 23 to October 1 in conjunction with the recent Taliban offensive to seize Kunduz city. Among these nine districts, four district centers have fallen to the Taliban in neighboring Takhar province. These attacks appear to be a united offensive Mullah Akhtar Mansour, the leader of one prominent Taliban faction and self-proclaimed leader of the Taliban following the announcement of the death of Mullah Omar. The coordinated attacks throughout northern Afghanistan indicate a high level of operational capability and sophistication. A prolonged offensive and consolidation of Taliban control in northern Afghanistan could position elements loyal to Mullah Akhatar Mansour for follow-on assaults on several provincial capitals at once and provide Taliban elements with a staging area close to Kabul.

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) retook key elements of Kunduz city on October 1, but heavy fighting continues between ANSF and Taliban militants. The attacks throughout northern Afghanistan indicate that Taliban militants are executing a broader northern offensive in Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar, and Badakhshan provinces. The northern offensive is supported by Taliban activity along major resupply routes to Kunduz city via Baghlan province, where militants were able to stymie nearly one thousand ANSF reinforcements bound for Kunduz. This lightning offensive is likely designed to reinforce Taliban gains in Kunduz city while the ANSF counter-offensive is underway, but it is also gaining momentum faster than the ANSF is reclaiming territory. The loss of broad swaths of strategically important territory underscores growing ANSF inability to control and hold areas without the intervention of Afghan and NATO Special Forces. 

Updated 10/2/2015 10:31am (EDT): Mullah Akhtar Mansour emphasized the “symbolic victory” of the Taliban’s capture of Kunduz in his first interview with an international media outlet as the claimed leader of the Taliban. Mansour stated that the victory should silence dissidents doubting the ability of his forces, thus conflating the capture of Kunduz with Mansour’s own legitimacy. This interview confirms that Mansour launched the northern offensive in part to demonstrate his power and suppress opposition. Ongoing leadership disputes within the Taliban likely will fuel continued offensives in Takhar and Baghlan Provinces. 

Warning Update: Iran and Iraqi Shi'a Militias Deploy Ground Forces to Syria

by Chris Kozak and Sinan Adnan

Iran reportedly deployed hundreds of soldiers to Syria starting on September 21 in order to participate in a major ground offensive in northwestern Syria backed by Russian airstrikes. Anonymous U.S. defense sources confirmed that several hundred Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) fighters led by IRGC-Quds Force commander Major General Qassem Suleimani arrived in Syria to conduct an operation alongside forces from the Syrian regime and Lebanese Hezbollah. Lebanese sources quoted by Reuters asserted that the Iranian troops were not advisors but combat troops and suggested that the coming offensive may be focused in the countryside of Idlib and Hama Provinces. The alleged operating areas for the operation suggests that this effort will be directed towards bolstering Syrian President Bashar al-Assad by seizing areas of northwestern Hama Province and southwestern Idlib Province – including the al-Ghab Plain and the city of Jisr al-Shughour - that have been captured by rebel forces led by Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) over recent months. These positions would remove the direct threat that recent rebel advances posed to the regime heartland of Latakia Province and provide a buffer zone against future attacks. If confirmed, this development marks a major step change in the Syrian Civil War and highlights the deepening rapprochement between Iran and Russia after their announcement of a “united front” in Syria.

Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a proxy forces may constitute part of the Iranian ground force in question. A prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militia Katai’b al-Imam Ali posted videos of its fighters in a garrison environment in Syria on September 21 and 28, naming one of its leaders as the commander of the group’s operations in Syria. Katai’b al-Imam Ali also claimed it deployed forces to Syria on August 5, 2015. The group is affiliated with Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, an advisor to MG Suleimani who was designated by the U.S. Treasury Department as a leader of a terrorist organization in July 2009. In Iraq, Katai’b al-Imam Ali is mostly active in northern Salah ad-Din province where it has been fighting ISIS at least since August 2014. Together with MG Suleimani and the IRGC, Kata’ib al-Imam Ali’s involvement in ground operations in Syria demonstrates that designated terrorist organizations and entities are likely conducting the ground offensives in Syria supporting Russia's airstrikes.

Iraq Situation Report: September 26 - October 1, 2015

by: Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Iraq Situation Report: September 22-25, 2015

by: Patrick Martin, Logan Brog, and ISW Iraq Team