Russian-backed Separatists Postpone Disputed Elections

By Daniel Pitcairn

Key takeaway: Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine have postponed unrecognized local elections from October and November 2015 to February 2016. The elections would have violated the “Minsk” peace process which requires the vote to proceed under Ukrainian law. The postponement will mitigate risks of armed conflict resuming in October but does not reflect a fundamental shift in Russia’s Ukraine strategy. Instead, it reflects Russia’s effort to balance this strategy with intervention in the Middle East and a desire to break out of international isolation and economic sanctions.

Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine announced on October 6 their decision to postpone upcoming local elections unrecognized by Kyiv until February 2016. They would otherwise have transpired in October and November. The announcement follows an October 2 meeting of the heads of state of Ukraine, Russia, Germany, and France, where Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly promised Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko that he would pressure Ukrainian separatists into cancelling the controversial elections. Kyiv, Paris and Berlin had decried the upcoming elections as a major violation of the February “Minsk II” ceasefire in Ukraine, because they would not have been held in accordance with Ukrainian law or in the presence of recognized international monitors. Although Moscow had originally defended the disputed elections, the decision to cancel them does not represent a fundamental shift in Russia’s strategy in Ukraine, which continues to rely on the threat and application of military force to pressure the Ukrainian government into making political concessions that allow Moscow to strongly influence Ukraine’s politics and policy. Instead, Russia is attempting to balance its strategy for Ukraine with intervention in the Middle East and to shed international economic sanctions.

The Minsk II agreement signed in February represents a concession to Russia because Ukraine had little choice but to consent to key Russian objectives, including decentralization and the assignment of “special status” to Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, amidst a major Russian-backed separatist offensive. Russia had thwarted its implementation by refusing to meet many of its provisions, including those pertaining to the elections and the withdrawal of heavy weaponry from the front lines. By pressuring the separatists to postpone their elections, Russia has shifted international and domestic pressure back onto to Kyiv to fulfill its side of the Minsk agreements and enact politically painful concessions. The separatists claim Kyiv must now “fulfill all obligations under the Minsk agreements” as a condition of election postponement. These include the provision of “special status” to Donbas, amnesty for militants in the region, and revising amendments to the constitution in agreement with the separatists.

The decision to delay elections all but guarantees that implementation of the Minsk II agreement will extend into 2016 and prolongs Moscow’s ability to exert pressure on the pro-Western government in Kyiv. This delay favors Moscow. Poroshenko had previously insisted that implementation of the agreement must be completed by the end of this year, whereas Moscow has indicated its willingness to extend it into 2016. By averting the agreement’s likely collapse over separatist elections and prolonging the implementation process, Russia has preserved the mechanism through it which it can most effectively convert its threats of military force into political concessions by Kyiv. Poroshenko knows that the Minsk II agreement traps him into choosing between military escalation in Donbas and a high probability of significant domestic political fracturing. A deadly riot by far-right groups in front of the Ukrainian parliament on August 31 highlighted this domestic political challenge. The riot came in response to initial approval of draft amendments extending special status to Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

Meanwhile, Moscow is keen to maintain the veneer of progress in Ukraine while expanding its military intervention in Syria and trying to escape international sanctions brought on by its war in Ukraine. Five days after Russia began airstrikes in Syria on September 30, Russian-backed separatists in Ukraine announced they would postpone their disputed elections, leading the EU, among others, to express “renewed hope for a sustainable political settlement.” An unnamed German government source even credited Russia directly for the progress, commenting, “Moscow has finally delivered.” In presenting itself as constructive actor in Ukraine, Russia also seeks to weaken political will within the EU to extend sanctions beyond their expiration in January 2016. French President Francois Hollande has already said that he “will ask for sanctions [on Russia] to be lifted” if progress toward the implementation of the Minsk agreements continues.

Although the postponement of disputed separatist elections to next year has been met with significant international approval for averting a breakdown of the Minsk II peace process in the short term, it does not presage a strategic reversal by Russia in Ukraine. Instead it reflects an effort to balance new geopolitical priorities, particularly in the Middle East, with a continuation of its destabilizing strategy in Ukraine over a longer term.

Read this update online here.

Iraq after Russian Intervention in Syria

by: Patrick Martin

Key-Takeaway: The Russian formation of a coordination cell in Baghdad is an inflection point aimed at undercutting U.S. influence over the direction of the anti-ISIS efforts in Iraq and Syria. However, the Russian footprint in Iraq is much smaller than in Syria, while U.S. influence over the ISF and Iraqi state are much greater than U.S. influence in Syria. The U.S. and the U.S.-led Coalition can maintain its position as Iraq’s essential ally in the anti-ISIS fight by increasing advisory, materiel, and aerial support to the Iraqi state, without substantially increasing its ground presence. Such changes must prepare Iraq to recapture territory from ISIS quickly in order to demonstrate the value of cooperation with the U.S.  

Read more online at: http://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraq-after-russian-intervention-syria

Syrian Regime Launches Ground Offensive with Russian Air Support

By: Christopher Kozak

The Syrian regime reportedly began a ground offensive in northwestern Syria with support from Russian airstrikes, marking the first overt example of coordination between Russian and Syrian military forces since the start of the Russian air campaign in Syria on September 30. Accounts from Syrian officials and activists indicated that Syrian Army units backed by allied militiamen and Hezbollah reinforcements launched coordinated attacks against rebel positions along the border between northern Hama Province and southern Idlib Province amidst an intense Russian aerial bombardment of the surrounding area. The attacks centered upon the rebel-held towns of Latmin, Tel al-Sayyad, and Khan Sheikhoun, which are all located on or along the strategic M5 Highway connecting Hama City to Aleppo City. Although there have been no reports of Russian ground forces participating in the fighting, the clashes follow indications that Iran deployed hundreds of additional Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members and mobilized hundreds of other fighters from its local and regional proxy forces in order to participate in a major offensive in northwestern Syria. The start of the offensive also coincided with the announcement that four Russian warships in the Caspian Sea fired at least twenty-six cruise missiles against alleged “ISIS targets” in Syria.  Thus far, no major advances for regime forces have been reported.

The location and targets of this escalation provide further evidence that the Russian air campaign in Syria intends to bolster regime forces in pursuing the objectives of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad rather than defeat ISIS. The terrain contested by the offensive has no notable ISIS presence and is instead held by a mix of rebel factions ranging from Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra to U.S.-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) affiliates such as Tajamu al-Izza. These groups previously staged a major offensive in 2014 which directly threatened regime control of the Hama Military Airport and they retain the ability to challenge the regime in its core terrain throughout the Hama countryside. A successful offensive to drive rebel forces from this region would alleviate this threat and divert Syrian rebels from further assaults on regime positions defending the Alawite heartland of Latakia Province to the west. Over the long-term, advances by pro-regime forces could also provide an avenue for the Syrian regime and its allies to conduct further operations along the M5 Highway and reestablish a presence in rebel-held Idlib Province after being largely driven from the region over the past six months.

Syrian Opposition Guide: October 7, 2015

By Jennifer Cafarella and Genevieve Casagrande

Read this update online here.

This reference guide provides a baseline for identifying Syrian opposition groups. The guide aims to permit researchers to track how groups realign as the Russians commence operations. It seeks to inform the development of policies that aim to protect Syrian rebels willing to cooperate with the U.S. in order to defeat ISIS and marginalize al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra.

The chart characterizes each group’s relative strength, its areas of operation, its participation in multi-group operations, and its sources of external financing (derived from other experts’ studies). The document carefully identifies those groups that are separable from Jabhat al-Nusra, drawing a sharp distinction between the al-Qaeda affiliate’s subcomponents and those groups that have a more transactional relationship. Whereas the Russian military actions will likely drive these groups together, diminishing the influence of al-Qaeda actually requires breaking the groups apart. Targeting rebel groups writ large through military strikes is therefore counterproductive and will lead to entrenchment of al-Qaeda in Syria. 

Russia's Impact on the Opposition

Russian air operations in Syria impose new pressures on Syrian rebel groups on the ground. Although the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian airstrikes focused on ISIS, local reports and the U.S. official statement indicate that the strikes have primarily targeted Syrian opposition groups in areas far from core ISIS-held terrain. Free Syrian Army (FSA)-affiliated rebel groups that receive support from the U.S. are among those that Russian warplanes have hit.

As Russian airstrikes intensify, Syrian opposition factions will likely seek the protection of a strong partner in the fight against the regime and its allies. The majority of the groups that may seek protection already cooperate militarily with Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra out of necessity, and this trend is likely to increase as rebels come under greater duress. The pressure of a reinvigorated air campaign in support of the Syrian regime may drive these groups closer to Jabhat al-Nusra and potentially hardline Islamist Ahrar al-Sham in the absence of alternative sources of robust military assistance from countries opposed to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In fact, between October 2 and October 4, two rebel groups merged separately under Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham in Hama and Aleppo provinces respectively. This trend damages not only the U.S. anti-ISIS mission, but also the implicit mission to counter al-Qaeda’s influence in Syria. It is therefore vital to observe changes in the behaviors and affiliations of Syrian rebels in response to ground events. 

Relationship to Jabhat al-Nusra

This guide also provides an assessment of rebel groups’ relationship to Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. Groups that conduct military operations with Jabhat al-Nusra do not necessarily share its vision, end-state, or values. Many rebel groups cooperate out of military necessity, because Jabhat al-Nusra one of the most capable groups on the battlefield. The relationship between each group and Jabhat al-Nusra has been designated through the following definitions:

Component of Jabhat al-Nusra: Groups that have merged under Jabhat al-Nusra, or groups that ISW assesses to be a sub-unit of Jabhat al-Nusra

Allied: Rebel groups that share interim objectives with Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria in the near term; groups that are close ideological allies to Jabhat al-Nusra; and groups that are ideologically opposed to the Western countries’ influence in Syria or to the vision of Western secularism

Separable from Jabhat al-Nusra: Rebel groups that formally coordinate military operations with Jabhat al-Nusra among many other groups through joint military commands, largely out of military necessity. This also includes groups that participate in governance structures that also contain elements of Jabhat al-Nusra.

Independent: These rebel groups currently do not share interim or long term objectives and do not formally coordinate military operations with Jabhat al-Nusra through joint military commands.

Identifying Outside Funding

The following charts also reflect assessments of the sources of outside funding for each group as provided by the Carter Center and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace from September 2014 – February 2015.  There are three major sources of funding:

Joint Military Operations Command (MOC)

Two covert joint military operations commands (MOC) based in Turkey and Jordan reportedly provide funding and lethal aid to moderate and nationalist Islamist groups in northern and southern Syria. Members of both the Northern and Southern MOCs reportedly provide military assistance including TOW anti-tank missiles to a select set of Syrian rebel groups.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia provides direct support to Salafist and Islamist groups across all of Western Syria.

Turkey and Qatar

Turkey and Qatar support nationalist Syrian rebel groups, including Salafist and Islamist groups. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, currently based in Turkey, facilitates the provision of money and weapons provided by Turkey and Qatar to Syrian armed opposition groups based in northern Syria.

Identifying Powerbrokers

The following charts indicates assessed powerbrokers in Syria in addition to groups that could become powerbrokers in the near term upon the receipt of sufficient outside support. These groups could provide a counter-weight to Jabhat al-Nusra, although the Russian military operations reduce the likelihood that they will be willing or able to split from the al-Qaeda affiliate.

Powerbroker: a group that disproportionately determines the success of military operations against either the Syrian regime or ISIS; is strategically located; and/or plays a leading role in governance.

Potential Powerbroker: a group that could achieve significant battlefield effects against Jabhat al-Nusra and/or ISIS in western Syria upon receipt of increased outside support, including securing direct military gains and cohering other smaller brigades into new coalitions.

Operations Rooms

The following charts organize opposition groups by their participation in operations rooms, in order to achieve particular, defined objectives. Operation rooms are joint structures limited to a particular geographical area, but they do not maintain a physical headquarters. Syrian opposition groups join “operations rooms” in order to coordinate their military campaigns jointly in an area without merging, thus preserving their status as separate fighting forces.  Each operations room is typically launched with an announcement conveying a specific, stated objective and a list of groups that have joined. 

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 - October 5, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande

Key Takeaway:  Russian airstrikes continue to primarily target Syrian opposition groups throughout northwestern Syria, including areas along the Turkish border in northern Latakia Province. Russian warplanes violated Turkish airspace and harassed Turkish F-16s in at least two separate incidents over Hatay Province of southern Turkey on October 3 and 4, prompting an emergency NATO meeting on October 5. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed airstrikes targeting ISIS-held positions northeast of Palmyra. The Russian MoD later clarified that the airstrikes did not hit positions within the city of Palmyra itself following contrary reports in Syrian state media. In addition, the Russian MoD claimed its first airstrikes in Damascus Province on October 5. However, local reporting has not yet substantiated these claims and, thus, ISW does not assess them at even a level of Low Confidence at this time.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Iraq Situation Report: October 2 - 5, 2015

By: Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 - October 3, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande

Key Takeaway: Russian airstrikes continue to primarily target Syrian opposition groups in areas far from ISIS's core terrain. These strikes are concentrated in northwestern Syria, particularly in rebel-held areas of Idlib Province and the northern countryside of Hama Province. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed only three airstrikes targeting positions in known ISIS-held terrain between October 1 and October 3. However, local reporting only confirmed two of these strikes. The Russian air campaign in Syria appears to be largely focused on supporting the Syrian regime and its fight against the Syrian opposition, rather than combatting ISIS.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

 

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

 

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Russian Disinformation on Airstrikes in Syria

by Genevieve Casagrande

The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed on October 3 that Russian Su-34s conducted airstrikes targeting an ISIS-held “command center” near Raqqah city, northern Syria. However, local Syrian reporting did not substantiate this claim. In fact, Syrian activists released comparisons of the airstrike footage, revealing that the strike targeted the rebel-held town of Al Latamneh in Hama Province, western Syria. Syrian state-run news agency SANA also released footage of the same airstrike; however, SANA claimed the airstrike targeted the town of Jisr al-Shughour. As the Russian Ministry of Defense continues to claim airstrikes against ISIS, particularly in core ISIS-held terrain, it will remain important to distinguish the true targets and intentions of Russian military action in Syria amidst Russian disinformation.

The Russian Ministry of Defense released airstrike footage of an alleged strike against ISIS positions in Raqqah. 

Syrian state-run news agency SANA released footage of the same strike, claiming it targeted Jisr al-Shughour in Idlib Province.

Activist Eliot Higgins released evidence revealing that the airstrike targeted the rebel-held town of Al Latamneh in Hama Province. 

Confirmed Iranian Personnel Sightings in Iraq: October 2014 - October 2015

by: Andrew Haddad and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-away: This map depicts confirmed locations of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders in Iraq between October 2014 and October 2015. Orange markers indicate where IRGC personnel were spotted in an area witnessing active military operations. Grey markers indicate where the personnel were spotted in non-military settings, such as meetings. It is likely that IRGC personnel were likely present in areas witnessing military operations by Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias in advisory capacities at a minimum.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 - October 1

By Genevieve Casagrande

Key Takeaway: Russia conducted a second round of airstrikes in Syria on October 1, targeting rebel-held positions in the provinces of Homs, Idlib, and Aleppo. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has repeatedly claimed that the airstrikes are targeting ISIS positions in these rebel-held areas. However, Russian targets included the training camp of an FSA-affiliated, Western-backed TOW anti-tank missile recipient Liwa Suqour al-Jebel near the town of Maaret al-Nouman in Idlib Province, in addition to other rebel-held targets. The Russian MoD also claimed two airstrikes in Raqqah Province, targeting an ISIS-held training camp and “command post”. These airstrikes are the first Russian strikes confirmed by the Russian MoD that have targeted positions in ISIS-held terrain.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Anonymous U.S. officials reported by secondary sources stated that Russian aircraft conducted strikes in Talbisah in northern Homs Province and the Ghab Plain in Idlib Province. The Russian Ministry of Defense stated that airstrikes struck targets in Al Latamneh, Jisr al-Shughour, Ar Raqqa, Darat Izza, and Ma’arat al-Numan. All of these airstrikes have been corroborated through local reporting. ISW assesses with high confidence Russian aircraft conducted strikes in the following: Talbisah, Al Latamneh, Khirbet Has, the Ghab Plain, Jisr al-Shughour, Darat Izza, and two locations in Raqqa.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Local sources have attributed Russian airstrikes to multiple locations in northwestern Syria, including Ghanto, Rastan, and al-Zafarnah in northern Homs Province; Kafr Zita in northern Hama Province; and several locations in the northeastern countryside of Latakia Province. Syrian state-run media also stated that Russian airstrikes occurred in the eastern countryside of Salamiyah in Hama Province. ISW assess with low confidence Russian aircraft conducted strikes in the following: Ghanto, Rastan, Al Zafarnah, the Salamiyah countryside, and the Latakia countryside.

Warning Update: Taliban Northern Offensive Expands

by Saagar Enjeti

Nine districts in four Northern provinces have reportedly been contested by the Taliban over the last eight days from September 23 to October 1 in conjunction with the recent Taliban offensive to seize Kunduz city. Among these nine districts, four district centers have fallen to the Taliban in neighboring Takhar province. These attacks appear to be a united offensive Mullah Akhtar Mansour, the leader of one prominent Taliban faction and self-proclaimed leader of the Taliban following the announcement of the death of Mullah Omar. The coordinated attacks throughout northern Afghanistan indicate a high level of operational capability and sophistication. A prolonged offensive and consolidation of Taliban control in northern Afghanistan could position elements loyal to Mullah Akhatar Mansour for follow-on assaults on several provincial capitals at once and provide Taliban elements with a staging area close to Kabul.

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) retook key elements of Kunduz city on October 1, but heavy fighting continues between ANSF and Taliban militants. The attacks throughout northern Afghanistan indicate that Taliban militants are executing a broader northern offensive in Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar, and Badakhshan provinces. The northern offensive is supported by Taliban activity along major resupply routes to Kunduz city via Baghlan province, where militants were able to stymie nearly one thousand ANSF reinforcements bound for Kunduz. This lightning offensive is likely designed to reinforce Taliban gains in Kunduz city while the ANSF counter-offensive is underway, but it is also gaining momentum faster than the ANSF is reclaiming territory. The loss of broad swaths of strategically important territory underscores growing ANSF inability to control and hold areas without the intervention of Afghan and NATO Special Forces. 

Updated 10/2/2015 10:31am (EDT): Mullah Akhtar Mansour emphasized the “symbolic victory” of the Taliban’s capture of Kunduz in his first interview with an international media outlet as the claimed leader of the Taliban. Mansour stated that the victory should silence dissidents doubting the ability of his forces, thus conflating the capture of Kunduz with Mansour’s own legitimacy. This interview confirms that Mansour launched the northern offensive in part to demonstrate his power and suppress opposition. Ongoing leadership disputes within the Taliban likely will fuel continued offensives in Takhar and Baghlan Provinces. 

Warning Update: Iran and Iraqi Shi'a Militias Deploy Ground Forces to Syria

by Chris Kozak and Sinan Adnan

Iran reportedly deployed hundreds of soldiers to Syria starting on September 21 in order to participate in a major ground offensive in northwestern Syria backed by Russian airstrikes. Anonymous U.S. defense sources confirmed that several hundred Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) fighters led by IRGC-Quds Force commander Major General Qassem Suleimani arrived in Syria to conduct an operation alongside forces from the Syrian regime and Lebanese Hezbollah. Lebanese sources quoted by Reuters asserted that the Iranian troops were not advisors but combat troops and suggested that the coming offensive may be focused in the countryside of Idlib and Hama Provinces. The alleged operating areas for the operation suggests that this effort will be directed towards bolstering Syrian President Bashar al-Assad by seizing areas of northwestern Hama Province and southwestern Idlib Province – including the al-Ghab Plain and the city of Jisr al-Shughour - that have been captured by rebel forces led by Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) over recent months. These positions would remove the direct threat that recent rebel advances posed to the regime heartland of Latakia Province and provide a buffer zone against future attacks. If confirmed, this development marks a major step change in the Syrian Civil War and highlights the deepening rapprochement between Iran and Russia after their announcement of a “united front” in Syria.

Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a proxy forces may constitute part of the Iranian ground force in question. A prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militia Katai’b al-Imam Ali posted videos of its fighters in a garrison environment in Syria on September 21 and 28, naming one of its leaders as the commander of the group’s operations in Syria. Katai’b al-Imam Ali also claimed it deployed forces to Syria on August 5, 2015. The group is affiliated with Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, an advisor to MG Suleimani who was designated by the U.S. Treasury Department as a leader of a terrorist organization in July 2009. In Iraq, Katai’b al-Imam Ali is mostly active in northern Salah ad-Din province where it has been fighting ISIS at least since August 2014. Together with MG Suleimani and the IRGC, Kata’ib al-Imam Ali’s involvement in ground operations in Syria demonstrates that designated terrorist organizations and entities are likely conducting the ground offensives in Syria supporting Russia's airstrikes.

Iraq Situation Report: September 26 - October 1, 2015

by: Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Iraq Situation Report: September 22-25, 2015

by: Patrick Martin, Logan Brog, and ISW Iraq Team

Warning Update: Russia Expanding Facilities at Tartus Naval Base

By Christopher Kozak with Hugo Spaulding and Daniel Urchick

Recent indicators suggest that Russia intends to upgrade its naval facility in the Port of Tartus along the Syrian Coast in tandem with its ongoing air operations based out of Bassel al-Assad International Airport in neighboring Latakia Province.  On September 28, Russian media sources reported the deployment of at least two repair and supply vessels to Tartus with an onboard escort of “anti-terror group” Naval Infantry personnel. The deployment of these vessels comes in ostensible support of recently-announced naval exercises in the eastern Mediterranean Sea involving several warships from the Russian Black Sea Fleet, including the guided missile cruiser Moskva, the destroyer Smetlivy, and the tank landing ship Saratov. Nonetheless, the two repair vessels are designed to equip military ports by installing mooring buoys, breakwaters, and floating landing stages or docks – making them valuable assets in efforts to modernize the base at Tartus.

The timing of this mobilization coincides with a report in the leading Russian business newspaper Kommersant on September 21 reporting that the naval installation at Tartus currently hosts 1700 Russian military “specialists” and security personnel working to “equip and secure” the base and “rebuild the dock.” If confirmed, these numbers would reflect a major increase in activity at the facility after it had reportedly been largely abandoned by Russian forces in 2013. A source from the Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed ongoing work to modernize the Russian facility in order to hold destroyers and large landing ships but claimed that this effort had no connection to a “prepared military intervention” in Syria. However, the start of Russian air operations in northwestern Syria on September 30 belies this statement as likely disinformation. The naval facility at Tartus has served as a historic logistical hub for Russian military equipment and personnel entering Syria, and received several tank landing ships and cargo vessels over the past month transporting vehicles and supplies destined for the Bassel al-Assad International Airport.

The expansion of the naval facility at Tartus bears several implications for future Russian military activity in Syria. The base constitutes the only Russian naval base outside of the former Soviet Union and provides Russia with strategic access to the Mediterranean, although its capacity to host large, modern vessels remains limited. Russian officials have discussed potential upgrades to the base for several years without significant action, although Syrian President Bashar al-Assad stated in March 2015 that Syria would welcome “any widening of the Russian presence” in Tartus. The decision to undertake this modernization program at this time suggests a decision by Russian leadership to prepare for further support over the long-term to the Syrian regime by allowing the provision of further military equipment or the deployment of a full contingent of troops by sea. The expansion of the naval facility at Tartus also reflects Russian intent to secure permanent strategic basing in Syria in line with its establishment of an airbase at Bassel al-Assad International Airport. At minimum, recent Russian activity in Tartus indicates that Russia views its military intervention in Syria as a long-term commitment rather than a short-term limited operation.

Additional background on the Russian naval facility in Tartus from ISW senior naval analyst Christopher Harmer can be found here.

Sources consulted include: Western news outlets including AP and Reuters as well as Russian news agencies such as TASS, Interfax, Lenta, and Kommersant.

International Community's Opinions on Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad

By ISW Research Team 

These charts contrast international leaders’ positions on Assad before and after mainstream media coverage of Russia’s deployment of aircraft to Syria, marked here as September 4, 2015. Several leaders softened their stance on the Syrian leader following Russian intervention, undermining the United States’ stated goal of achieving a negotiated political solution in which Assad is not in power. One example is below.

Read the full report here.

Russia's First Reported Air Strikes in Syria Assist Regime with Targeting Broader Opposition

by ISW Research Team

Updated 10/02/2015 3:57pm (EDT): Updated airstrikes map covering September 30-October 1, 2015 can be found here.

Updated 9/30/2015 8:25pm (EDT): 

First Russian strikes in Syria: Russian warplanes conducted 20 airstrikes on the rebel-held towns of Rastan and Talbisah north of Homs City, as well as on the towns of Al Latamneh and Kafr Zeita in Hama Province. In addition, Russia “aided” regime airstrikes in the northwestern countryside of Latakia Province, according to an anonymous regime security source. The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that the airstrikes targeted eight Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) positions in total. The Syrian regime also released statements confirming Russian airstrikes in Homs and Hama, claiming that the airstrikes targeted both ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliated militants, likely referring to Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. However, local Syrian sources claim the airstrikes exclusively targeted rebel positions, including the headquarters of Free Syrian Army-affiliated, Western-backed TOW anti-tank missile recipient al-Izza Gathering in the town of Al Latamneh, rather than ISIS-held positions. Syrian Civil Defense Forces, a volunteer emergency responder organization, reported 36 civilian casualties from the Russian airstrike in Talbisah in northern Homs, in addition to several civilian casualties in Hama. Although there are small ISIS “sympathetic” cells in the rebel-held pockets of northern Homs, the Russian decision to target terrain that is held by the Syrian opposition and not ISIS signals Russia’s intent to assist the Assad regime’s war effort at large, beyond anti-ISIS operations.

Official Syrian regime request: Damascus confirmed that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad requested military assistance from Russia in a letter to President Vladimir Putin prior to the launch of Russian airstrikes in Syria. The Kremlin’s chief of staff Serge Ivanov confirmed Assad “appealed to the leadership of [Russia] with a request for military aid.”

Russian effort to edge out U.S.-led coalition: U.S. State Department spokesman John Kirby stated that a Russian official informed the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad about the airstrikes and requested that American military aircraft avoid Syrian airspace during Russian operations. An anonymous U.S. official reported that the U.S.-led coalition warplanes continued to conduct airstrikes against ISIS militants in Syria. Senior Israeli officials also announced that Russia informed Israel about an hour before it conducted airstrikes in Syria. Russian government officials made contact with Israeli National Security Adviser, Yossi Cohen, as well as other senior officials in the Israeli defense establishment. The notice was designed to avoid any confrontation between Israeli and Russian planes. 

By Genevieve Casagrande and Christopher Kozak

Sources consulted include: Social media accounts of local Syrian activists, local Syrian news affiliates, international news agencies, and Russian news agencies.

Updated 9/30/2015 1:25pm (EDT):  Syrian Civil Defense Forces reported 33 civilian casualties from the Russian airstrike in Talbisah in northern Homs. According to local sources, these Russian airstrikes have expanded into the provinces of Hama and Latakia, as well as other rebel-held areas in the northern countryside of Homs. These airstrikes continue to target areas held by Syrian rebels, including Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, hardline Islamist Ahrar al-Sham, Western-backed TOW anti-tank missile recipients, and a number of other local rebel groups. Notably, the nearest positions held by ISIS are over 55 km from the areas targeted by the Russian airstrikes. No Russian airstrikes have yet been reported against ISIS’s positions in Syria.

Russia’s foreign ministry accused international media of conducting information warfare by reporting civilian casualties from Russian airstrikes in Syria. As Russian involvement in Syria continues to expand, Russian disinformation will come in direct conflict with the situation reported by ground forces inside Syria. In this instance, despite claims by Syrian sources that Russian airstrikes are exclusively targeting Jabhat al-Nusra and rebel locations, Russian officials claim that the airstrikes are only targeting ISIS in Syria.

After a vote in Russia’s upper house of parliament unanimously authorized President Vladimir Putin to conduct military operations in Syria, the head of President Putin’s administration stated that the military objective of the operation was “exclusively” to provide air support to the Syrian government forces in combatting ISIS. Shortly after the vote, Russia’s Ministry of Defense also acknowledged the start the Russian air campaign, which it claimed involved “precision airstrikes on Islamic State land-based targets in Syria.” Russia’s defense minister Sergey Shoygu also told members of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) alliance that the air campaign would consist of Russian air strikes against ISIS’s military equipment, lines of communication, vehicles, weapons caches, and oil infrastructure in Syria.  Genevieve Casagrande and Hugo Spaulding
Sources consulted include: social media accounts of local Syrian activists and Russian news agencies such as TASS, Sputnik, Interfax, and RIA Novosti. 

Updated 9/30/2015 12:30pm (EDT): Russian Airstrikes in Syria Map

Posted 9/30/2015 8:52am (EDT): An alleged Russian airstrike hit the rebel-held town of Talbisah north of Homs City. Talbisah is home to Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, hardline Islamist Ahrar al-Sham, and a number of other local rebel groups, all of which are active in local governance efforts in the area. Both Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) have claimed a number of vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) in Homs City, located only 12 kilometers south of Talbisah. Following reports of U.S. and Turkish efforts to establish an ISIS "free zone" in the northern Aleppo countryside, JN withdrew from the border and reportedly reinforced positions in this rebel-held pocket north of Homs city. Notably, the airstrike did not hit ISIS militants and rather resulted in 33 civilian casualties. If confirmed, the airstrike would signal Russian intent to assist in the Syrian regime's war effort at large, rather than securing the regime's coastal heartland of Latakia and Tartous.  Genevieve Casagrande

Perspectives on the Syrian Civil War: September 27, 2015

by: Genevieve Casagrande 

The following three viewsheds provide unique perspectives into how the Syrian regime, the U.S. and Turkey, and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) perceive the battlefield. The regime viewpoint, shown from Damascus looking northward toward Turkey, shows the recent Russian military buildup in Syria. As the Syrian opposition encroaches further on the coastal heartland of Latakia and Tartous, this Russian buildup bolsters the regime’s remaining defensive line. In sharp contrast, Russian positions in northern Latakia are a cause for concern for Turkey, whose border is a mere 45 kilometers away from the Bassel al-Assad Airport. Russia’s increased involvement in Syria presents a new threat to Turkey’s southern border, which is currently adjacent to both ISIS and Kurdish-controlled areas. The U.S. largely shares Turkey’s viewpoint, as it uses Turkish bases and stages out of Gazientep, the perspective that is shown. Finally, ISIS’s main effort in the past has been in Iraq, and the viewshed illustrating the ISIS perspective looks east towards Iraq from its headquarters in Raqqa, Syria. ISW has forecasted that ISIS will most likely turn its offensive efforts toward Syria’s central corridor around Homs, Hama, and Idlib in the next quarter, while nevertheless maintaining pressure on cities in Iraq. However, the confirmation of a “coordination cell” between Russia, Syria, Iran and Iraq in Baghdad highlights the potential for future Russian military expansion into Iraq. ISW assesses that ISIS is most vulnerable if it is pressured at both Raqqa and Deir ez-Zour, and ISIS reinforced this latter location during the third week of September. The final graphic shows Russian military positions across Syria, juxtaposed with the terrain controlled by actors in the Syrian Civil War. 

Iraq Situation Report: September 18 - 21, 2015

by: Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

ISIS's Global Strategy: September 2015

By Harleen Gambhir

ISIS is executing a global strategy to defend and expand its territory within Iraq and Syria; to foster affiliates and exacerbate disorder in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia; and to inspire and resource polarizing terror attacks in the wider world. The map depicts the geographic areas of those parallel campaigns, labeled the Interior, Near Abroad, and Far Abroad rings, respectively. The map also marks the areas where ISIS has declared one or more “wilayats,” or governorates in the Near Abroad. ISIS maintains active affiliates in each of its governorates, which provide the organization with strategic resiliency outside of Iraq and Syria. 

See map on our website here.

Syria 90 - Day Strategic Forecast: Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham

By Jennifer Cafarella, Christopher Kozak, and Genevieve Casagrande

Grand Strategic Objectives:
• Rule all Muslims under an Islamic Caliphate
• Provoke and win an apocalyptic war with the West
Strategic Objectives in Syria:
• Preserve and expand territorial control in Syria
• Implement governance guided by Shari’a law and subjugate minorities within the caliphate
• Seize a historic caliphate capital and eliminate the Alawite regime
• Neutralize or absorb the Syrian armed opposition
• Neutralize or absorb Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN or JAN)
• Stoke regional disorder through sectarian or religious conflict in Syria

Read the full report here.

Syria 90 - Day Forecast: Jabhat Al- Nusra (JN)

By ISW Syria Team

Grand strategic objective:

• Establish an Islamic Emirate in Syria that is a future component of the envisioned al-Qaeda Caliphate
• Unify the global jihadist movement

Strategic objectives:
• Destroy the Assad regime
• Transform Syrian society from secular nationalism to an Islamic theocracy
• Establish locally-accepted governance as a precursor to an eventual Islamic Emirate
• Build an army to protect the Islamic Emirate by partnering with Syrian rebel groups
• Resolve the fitna, or schism, with ISIS
• Counter U.S. influence in Syria

Read the full report here.

Syria 90 - Day Strategic Forecast: The Regime and Allies

By Christopher Kozak

Grand Strategic Objectives: 

• [Syrian Regime] Preserve the rule of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in a post-war Syria encompassing the entire pre-war Syrian state
• [Iran] Preserve a viable Syrian regime led by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as a key member of the ‘Axis of Resistance’; achieve strategic positioning against Israel
• [Russia] Preserve the Syrian state – not necessarily Syrian President Bashar al-Assad – as a key foothold in the Middle East and an ally against terrorism
• [Hezbollah] Prevent the spread of the Syrian Civil War into Lebanese core terrain

Strategic Objectives:
• [Syrian Regime] Maintain Syrian territorial integrity through an ‘army in all corners’; consolidate Syrian civilian population in regime-held areas; bolster international and domestic legitimacy as ruler of Syria.
• [Iran] Position against Israel in southern Syria along the Golan Heights; preserve access to supply lines from Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon; develop network of Syrian proxies to maintain Iranian influence if regime falls
• [Iran/Russia] Enable Syrian regime to defend core terrain along Syrian central corridor
• [Hezbollah] Secure Lebanese border region against incursion by militant groups

Read the full report here.

Iraq Situation Report: September 15 - 17, 2015

by:  ISW Iraq Team