Russian Airstrikes in Syria: October 27 - November 5, 2015

By: Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola 

Key Takeaway: Russian warplanes continued to target core ISIS-held terrain in Syria following regime anti-ISIS operations in Homs and Aleppo. Russian airstrikes targeted ISIS’s positions in ar-Raqqa, Homs, and reportedly Deir ez-Zour from November 4 - 5. Local sources reported that Russian airstrikes targeted the ISIS-held town of Albu Kamal near the Iraqi border in Deir ez-Zour Province on November 5, claiming that the strikes killed over 50 civilians. If confirmed, the airstrikes would be the farthest Russian warplanes have travelled to conduct strikes since the start of Russia’s air campaign in Syria on September 30. The majority of Russian strikes, however, targeted rebel-held areas in the provinces of Damascus, Idlib, Latakia, and Aleppo. Russian air operations continue to bolster the Syrian regime in its fight against the Syrian opposition rather than ISIS.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation. 

Russia Repositions Military Assets in Syria as ISIS Advances in Homs

by: Jennifer Cafarella and Kaitlynn Menoche

Russia shifted military assets into Eastern Homs Province in response to an ISIS offensive against pro-regime forces south of Homs City that began on November 1, 2015. Russia positioned at least five attack helicopters at the T4 (Tiyas) military airbase and additional rotary wing aircraft at the Shayrat military east of Homs City by November 4. Russia is also operating rotary wing aircraft out of the Hama military airport, while their fixed wing aircraft remain based at the Bassel al-Assad military airbase in Latakia. Russia has also deployed an additional 2,000 personnel to Syria since the start of  its air campaign on September 30, according to U.S. security officials, though it is unclear whether these personnel are located at these bases in Eastern Homs Province. Russia also maintains a military base at the Hama municipal stadium, which likely houses Russian military personnel. The Russians have spoken of the plus-up. Russian Air Force Commander Viktor Bondarev, in an interview on November 5, stated “we sent not just fighter planes, strike aircraft, and helicopters but also anti-aircraft rocket systems” because “we took into account every possible threat.” It is unclear whether Bondarev’s remarks indicate that Russia has deployed additional anti-aircraft Systems to Syria since the start of Russian airstrikes in Syria on September 30, 2015.

An ISIS offensive against pro-regime forces south of Homs City prompted some of the Russian deployment into Eastern Homs Province. ISIS captured the desert city of Palmyra in May 2015 and has been positioning itself for further offensives toward Homs. ISIS advanced westward from the town of Quryatayn in southeastern Homs Province on November 1. It seized the regime-held town of Mahin and attacked the neighboring town of Sadad, located less than 15 km. east of the M5 highway. ISIS likely seeks to seize portions of the M5 highway south of Homs City, possibly by seizing the town of Hasiya and the adjacent industrial city on the highway. Capturing the town would sever the regime’s ground line of communication (GLOC) from Homs City to Damascus, limiting the regime’s ability to move forces between fronts in southern and central Syria.

ISIS may be pursuing other operational level goals with the new offensive.  It could seek to fix regime forces away from the regime-held T4 (Tiyas) airbase east of Homs City. ISIS has launched periodic attacks against the airbase since the capture of Palmyra and has stated its intent to capture it.  ISIS could instead intend to seize the Shayrat military airbase, located less than 30 kilometers northwest of Mahin. ISIS will likely attack pro-regime forces on multiple axes in a future offensive against any of these regime-held positions and is .  positioned to conduct a pincer movement on any of the objectives listed here.  ISIS has a support zone in the northeastern corner of Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, bordering Syria, and could simultaneously attack Hezbollah forces concentrated south of Homs City from Lebanon in order to disrupt the ability of pro-regime forces to respond. ISW forecasted in mid-September that ISIS would most likely launch a multi-pronged offensive to seize either the T4 or Shayrat military airbases, and most dangerously attack south of Homs near Qusayr.

ISIS has been conducting mutually supporting operations to thwart the Russian-backed ground advance in several locations. ISIS had severed the regime’s ground line of communications (GLOC) from Hama to Aleppo City on October 23, before its assault south of Homs City, and had seized multiple checkpoints along the road between the towns of Ithriya and Khannaser. ISIS also attacked the regime’s command and control node in Safira, southeast of Aleppo City along the GLOC, on October 28. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members in Northern Syria appear to headquarter in Safira, as evidenced by the death of multiple IRGC officers in the area since 2012. Russian special forces are coordinating airstrikes on behalf of the regime in Syria, and could also be present in Safira. ISIS’s attack against Safira forced the regime to abandon an ongoing offensive to break ISIS’s siege on the Kuweiris airbase east of Aleppo City. Pro-regime forces repelled ISIS from Safira and regained control of the GLOC by November 4 with the support of Russian airstrikes in Aleppo.

The Russian deployment to the T4 and Shayrat airbases positions Russia to blunt the ISIS advance using airpower. Russia has also increased the defensive fortifications of both bases, likely including heavy artillery. Russia conducted airstrikes against ISIS in Eastern Syria from November 2-3, including positions near Quryatayn and Palmyra. These strikes did not directly target the ISIS forces attacking Sadad and are not the first Russian airstrikes against ISIS in Eastern Syria. It is possible, however, that Russia will shift fixed wing aircraft to either the T4 or Shayrat military airbases in order to increase its air sorties against ISIS in Eastern Syria. The forward deployment of attack helicopters in Homs could also support a future regime offensive to retake the ISIS-held city of Palmyra, although such an offensive appears unlikely in the near term.

ISIS’s attacks in Aleppo and Homs Provinces demonstrate that ISIS remains capable of launching offensive operations in Western Syria in November 2015. ISIS attacked strategic regime terrain in both Northern and Central Syria in quick succession, forcing the regime and its Russian backers to alter their deployment. ISIS is likely setting conditions for a major offensive by stressing the regime’s ability to defend core terrain on numerous fronts. ISIS has thus far focused its major attacks on pro-regime forces but will likely attack rebel-held terrain in Western Syria if the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) successfully isolates ar-Raqqa City from the north. The current strategy of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition does not adequately account for this risk; the U.S. does not have sufficient ground partners in Western Syria to prevent further expansion by ISIS. The U.S. must develop an alternate strategy to prevent ISIS from expanding into Western Syria in order to preserve the impact of counter-ISIS operations in Northern Syria on ISIS's overall strength in Syria.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: October 25 - November 3, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola

 

Key Takeaway: Russian airstrikes largely shifted to target ISIS following new advances by the group in southern Homs Province. Russian warplanes targeted ISIS’s positions near Qaraytan and Palmyra in the eastern countryside of Homs as well as in ar-Raqqah City from November 2 - 3 approximately 24 hours after ISIS seized Maheen southeast of Homs City. Russia is therefore able to alter its Air Tasking Order (ATO) to designate new theater targets within 24 hours in Syria. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed to conduct airstrikes using precision weapons near Palmyra, southeastern Aleppo Province, and Deir ez-Zour in direct coordination with the Syrian opposition. These claims support Russia’s disingenuous attempt to pressure the U.S. to work together to protect moderate rebels. Russia reportedly deployed five attack helicopters to the T4 (Tiyas) Airbase in eastern Homs Province along the highway between Homs City and Palmyra, according to an anonymous U.S. military official on November 3. The unnamed official also stated that Russia deployed aircraft to the Shayrat Military Airbase less than 30 kilometers northwest of Maheen. Syrian activists previously reported on October 31 that the Syrian regime redeployed all of its aircraft from Shayrat Military Airbase to the T4 and Hama Military Airbases. Russian military presence in eastern Homs could provide aerial reconnaissance for Russian strikes in the area as an alternative or augmentation to Syrian rebel intelligence to guide Russian airstrikes.

 

ISIS maintains the ability to pressure regime-held terrain despite the shift in Russian airstrikes. ISIS continued to clash with regime forces in the town of Sadad northwest of Maheen on November 3. ISIS’s expansion threatens regime control of the strategic M5 Highway connecting Damascus to Homs City. Credible local sources also reported that Russian airstrikes continued to target rebel-held areas in the southern countryside of Aleppo, southern Idlib Province, and the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus from November 2 – 3 simultaneously. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation. 
 

Ukrainian Local Elections Leave Room for Russian Influence

By Daniel Pitcairn, Hugo Spaulding, and Daniel Urchick

Key Take-away: Ukraine’s local elections strengthened pro-Russian factions and local oligarchs in its southern and eastern regions, offering Moscow an opportunity for greater influence in the post-revolution political order.

Local elections on October 25 exposed cracks in post-revolution Ukraine that Russia may exploit.  Candidates linked to former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and prominent oligarchs that rival current President Petro Poroshenko earned more support than the president’s faction in the south and east of the country, areas that are vulnerable to Russian political destabilization. Former Yanukovych allies with ties to the Dnipropetrovsk-based owner of Ukraine’s largest bank Ihor Kolomoyskyi earned crucial victories in the Black Sea port city of Odesa and Ukraine’s second largest city of Kharkiv. Mafia-linked Hennadiy Trukhanov was reelected in Odesa, marking a setback for Poroshenko, who has tried to overhaul the region historically plagued by organized crime with the help of provincial governor and reformist former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Former Yanukovych ally Hennadiy Kernes was reelected in the key northeastern city of Kharkiv after allying with a Kolomoyskyi-backed party that reportedly earned a majority of seats in the city council. Two mayoral candidates from the pro-Russian “Opposition Bloc” and one candidate backed by Donetsk-based former Yanukovych ally and Ukraine’s richest man Rinat Akhmetov earned berths in runoff elections on November 15 in the provincial capitals of Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhia. The “Opposition Bloc” also earned victories inside government-held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, including in the two previously separatist-controlled cities of Sloviansk and Lysychansk. Government authorities postponed elections in the key port city of Mariupol following allegations of ballot fraud favoring pro-Russian candidates backed by Akhmetov. These results highlight the challenges faced by Poroshenko’s pro-Western government in asserting control outside the western and central regions of Ukraine, where it largely preserved its influence.

Ihor Kolomoyskyi’s stronghold of Dnipropetrovsk has become the epicenter of competition between Poroshenko and his rivals since the October 25 elections. Poroshenko’s government reportedly backed the “Opposition Bloc” candidate and former deputy prime minister under Viktor Yanukovych Oleksandr Vilkul over the Kolomoyskyi-backed candidate, who will contest a runoff election on November 15. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) launched a “large-scale special operation” to detain Hennadiy Korban, a close associate of Kolomoyskyi and the leader of the oligarch’s UKROP (Ukrainian Association of Patriots) party, and his associates linked to organized crime in the southeastern city of Dnipropetrovsk on October 31. Hundreds of demonstrators gathered in Dnipropetrovsk to protest the arrest while a smaller protest was held in Kyiv against Poroshenko’s Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin, who was involved in organizing the arrest and is seen as an impediment to anti-corruption efforts. The timing of the arrest may indicate the intent of Poroshenko’s government to influence the outcome of the run-off election.  Poroshenko’s rivalry with Kolomoyskyi previously escalated in March 2015, when Kolomoyskyi was deposed as Dnipropetrovsk governor along with his deputy, Hennadiy Korban.  Kolomoyskyi was widely credited with preventing a Russian-backed separatist movement from taking hold of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in March 2014. The efforts of Poroshenko’s government to root out his rival from the key region could directly lead to the expansion of a Russian influence.

The success of candidates receptive to Russia in southern and eastern Ukraine highlights the risk Poroshenko faces as he moves forward with the decentralization measures required by the “Minsk II” ceasefire agreement. If implemented, decentralization would offer greater authority to local officials, including those who oppose Poroshenko’s government in Kyiv and maintain ties with Moscow. Decentralization, in its proposed form, will grant broader fiscal powers to local governments rather than granting autonomy to Ukraine’s provinces, distinguishing it from the more debilitating federalization Russia initially pursued. Nevertheless, strengthened local governments in opposition to Poroshenko may present obstacles to his national reform agenda, which aims to root out corruption and overhaul Ukraine’s Russian and oligarch-controlled political economic order with the eventual objective of joining the European Union. The results of the October 25 elections reflect Russia’s ability to strengthen its political leverage over Ukraine without the need to escalate military operations in the southeast. Russia achieved political gains even as pro-Russian separatist forces continued to withdraw military equipment from the front lines in the southeastern Donbas region and remained largely compliant with a renewed ceasefire on September 1, 2015.

Russia seeks to prevent Ukraine from becoming a fully-fledged member of the European Union by leveraging its military intervention in Donbas to undermine the post-revolution government in Kyiv. Moscow successfully applied military escalation in January and February 2015 to set the terms of the “Minsk II” ceasefire agreement, which locks Kyiv into making major political concessions, including decentralization and the provision of “special status” to separatist-held Donbas. The Kremlin now has the opportunity to cultivate ties with stronger pro-Russian factions and oligarchs in the south and east, preventing these historically pro-Russian regions from fully escaping its sphere of influence. Moscow may not be willing or able to reestablish a client government in Kyiv in the short-term but it will continue to exploit opportunities to prevent Ukraine from becoming a prosperous European nation unified against Russia.

Turkish Elections Empower Erdogan to Continue Support for Syrian Rebels

By Christopher Kozak and Katie Menoche 

Key Take-away: Turkish President Recep Erdogan reinforced his hold on political power with a key victory in early parliamentary elections held on November 1. The AKP’s dramatic victory likely reflects the Turkish electorate’s desire to return to political stability following several months of uncertainty and violence. The election of a stable AKP-led government will allow Erdogan to maintain and possibly intensify Turkey’s financial and military support to Syrian rebels fighting the Assad regime.

Turkish President Recep Erdogan reinforced his hold on political power with a key victory in early parliamentary elections held on November 1. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) won 316 out of 550 seats in the Turkish National Assembly and comfortably regained a majority after suffering significant losses in the June 2015 Turkish elections. The AKP’s gains came at the direct expense of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) and the right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Both parties lost seats previously gained in the June elections. The HDP barely surpassed the 10% electoral threshold required to win seats in the Turkish Parliament. The AKP did not win the 330 seats required to call a constitutional referendum to expand President Erdogan’s executive powers. Nevertheless, the AKP now holds a solid mandate to form a single-party government. This leeway will enable Erdogan to pursue his own foreign, domestic, and military agenda with minimal opposition.

The AKP’s dramatic victory likely reflects the Turkish electorate’s desire to return to political stability following several months of uncertainty and violence. The AKP lost its thirteen-year-long parliamentary majority in June. Subsequent negotiations to form a coalition government failed amidst political deadlock. Turkey also faced mounting domestic threats between June and November 2015. ISIS-linked militants conducted suicide attacks against pro-Kurdish rallies in the southern town of Suruc on July 20 and the Turkish capital of Ankara on October 10. ISIS also released a Turkish-language statement warning of a “penalty” for Turkish democracy immediately prior to the elections. Meanwhile, tensions between the Turkish government and the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) escalated into open conflict during July and August. The resumption of hostilities ended a two-year-long ceasefire and froze ongoing peace negotiations between the Turkish government and the PKK. The violence stemmed in part from allegations that Erdogan had allowed ISIS and other Salafi-jihadist groups to operate in Turkey in order to counteract Kurdish expansionism.

Erdogan leveraged – and by some accounts, exacerbated – these security threats in order to persuade Turkish voters that the AKP presented the only option for national stability. The AKP adopted an aggressive posture against both ISIS and the PKK in the aftermath of the bombing in Suruc. Turkey began an air campaign against PKK positions in northern Iraq on July 24. Turkey later opened the strategic Incirlik Airbase to the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition on July 29. Turkish security forces also detained hundreds of suspected ISIS and PKK affiliates in raids throughout the country between July and October. Erdogan and other senior AKP officials later intensified their rhetoric against the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) as the YPG gained ground against ISIS in northern Syria. Turkish warplanes most recently conducted at least two airstrikes against suspected YPG positions on October 24-25. Erdogan’s harsh stance against the PKK and other Kurdish militant groups attracted nationalist MHP voters towards the AKP. Renewed conflict with the PKK simultaneously undercut popular support for the pro-Kurdish HDP.

The election of a stable AKP-led government will allow Erdogan to maintain his current policies in support of Syrian rebels fighting the Assad regime. Several Turkish opposition parties had advocated for political talks with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The prospect of a coalition government thus opened space for a policy reversal that might have included cooperation with Russia on the terms of a political transition in Syria. The AKP’s decisive victory precludes this realignment and may allow Erdogan to increase support to select Syrian rebel factions in order to counteract Russia and Iran’s deepening intervention in Syria. Several prominent Syrian opposition groups congratulated the AKP on its success in a joint statement, highlighting the importance of Erdogan’s policies to the Syrian opposition.

The continuity of the Turkish government also ensures the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition’s continued access to important military bases in southern Turkey. Deepening cooperation between the U.S. and Syrian Kurds as the primary ground partner in the anti-ISIS campaign will likely spur increased tension between the U.S. and Turkey. Erdogan may nonetheless seek to demonstrate progress on his election promises of security and stability by pursuing de-escalation with the Kurds. Turkey remains likely to enforce its pre-existing ‘red lines’ on YPG expansion in Syria while pressuring the U.S. to intensify its support for the Syrian opposition rather than the Kurds.

Iraq Situation Report: October 27 - November 2, 2015

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: PM Haidar al-Abadi suffered a serious blow in his bid to reform and lead the government on November 2 when the Council of Representatives (CoR) unanimously ruled to withdraw his ability to launch reform packages unilaterally. CoR members voiced support for the reforms, but worded the motion as enforcing the separation of powers and keeping legislative powers within the CoR. PM Abadi’s loss is Maliki’s gain, as Maliki has capitalized on resistance to PM Abadi’s reforms by openly speaking out against them and using his allies within the SLA to spearhead criticism of PM Abadi’s governing style. PM Abadi has lost the confidence of the political blocs who supported his reform packages with his unilateral approach to introducing reforms, and the outcome of the vote was a response to his most recent and controversial reforms. These included changes to the salary scale and the appointment of a new Council of Ministers (CoM) secretary who holds U.S. citizenship. PM Abadi previously had numerous supporters for his reform agenda. However, in response to the salary scale changes, these supporters, including Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the political opponents of Vice President Nouri al-Maliki, including ISCI and the Sadrist Trend, have since diminished their support for him in light of the salary scale change. Sistani disagreed with PM Abadi over the final form for the salary scale reform, and thus voiced his disapproval. Maliki has likely used this opportunity to test the waters for an eventual no-confidence vote against PM Abadi. Sistani likely remains supportive of PM Abadi – Maliki’s allies likely took advantage of Sistani’s denouncement of the salary scale change to attack PM Abadi. In addition, former supporters of the reform program most likely used the CoR vote to both protect themselves from backlash by their constituencies over unpopular reform packages and to prevent PM Abadi from exercising any powers without their consultation. 

ISF and tribal fighters reportedly crossed the Albu Faraj Bridge into central Ramadi. Significant action has not been reported in central Ramadi, indicating that the incursion does not constitute a meaningful tactical gain. However, the crossing is the first advance by the ISF into central Ramadi from the north since the city fell to ISIS on May 18. The ISF are also approaching the Anbar Operations Command headquarters building, but have not managed to capture it or the nearby Warrar Dam. The ISF have failed to make progress towards the city from the east and remain bogged down in fighting in villages between Ramadi and Habaniya. ISIS also attacked Peshmerga positions in Sinjar and Rabia districts in northwestern Ninewa province and continued pressuring ISF and “Popular Mobilization” fighters west if Samarra and north of Baiji, indicating a continued capacity to launch attacks across a wide territory. Meanwhile, President Barack Obama promised to “intensify” support to the ISF and would authorize a headquarters for U.S. special operator task force (SOTF) in Arbil. This follows a report that a similar SOTF headquarters had already been operational in Arbil for some time. The U.S. is thus taking steps to intensify its support under current advise and assist powers for the Peshmerga and the ISF against ISIS.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: October 23 - November 1, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola

Key Takeaway: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) discontinued the release of daily airstrike reports from October 28 – November 1 amidst multilateral talks on the Syrian Civil War held in Vienna on October 30 and continued reports of civilian casualties. Nevertheless, credible local sources continued to report airstrikes in Dera’a, Damascus, Homs, Hama, Idlib, and Aleppo from October 31 – November 1. Russian airstrikes predominantly targeted rebel-held areas in Aleppo Province in conjunction with regime ground offensives against ISIS in the southeastern countryside of Aleppo and rebel forces southwest of Aleppo City. Local activist reporting claimed that Russian airstrikes and regime forces killed 64, including 28 children in Aleppo on October 31 alone.
 
ISIS maintains its ability to threaten both regime and rebel-held terrain, largely undeterred by Russian airstrikes. ISIS continues to contest the regime-held town of Safira in the southeastern countryside of Aleppo, threatening the regime’s primary ground line of communication to Aleppo City. Additionally, ISIS reportedly seized the town of Maheen in the southern countryside of Homs Province. This expansion threatens regime control of the strategic M5 Highway connecting Damascus to Homs City. Regime forces subsequently launched an intense shelling campaign on Maheen in response. ISIS’s seizure of the town may spark a response from Russian warplanes in the coming days.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.