The Resurgence of ISIS in Diyala and its Implications for Iranian Proxies

By Sinan Adnan and Jessica Lewis McFate

Key Take-away: ISIS is re-establishing its former strength in Diyala province, and security in the province is deteriorating. This resurgence is likely the result of security gaps left by the forward deployment of Diyala-based Iranian proxy groups, mostly the Badr Organization, and forces from the 5^th Iraqi Army division to areas in Salah ad-Din and Anbar. ISIS is likely exploiting this gap in order to compromise ISF and militia operations in Anbar province, diverting attention to Diyala and threats near the Iranian border. If the ISF and Shi’a militias cannot secure Diyala while maintaining their operations in Anbar, Iran may become more involved in Iraq to secure its own border.

ISIS has re-established itself in Diyala province causing a rapid deterioration in security and an increase in sectarian tension in the highly mixed province. The resurgence of ISIS in Diyala sheds light on security gaps caused by the deployment of Diyala-based Iraqi Security Force (ISF) units and Iranian proxy groups to Salah ad-Din and Anbar, other flashpoints along the frontline in the war against ISIS in Iraq. Recent calls from Diyala officials for the redeployment of Diyala’s security elements back to their home stations underscore competing requirements for the ISF across multiple fronts. It may additionally reveal inconsistencies in the campaign priorities of Iranian proxy groups and those of the ISF. Diyala province borders Iran, and a resurgence of ISIS in Diyala may cause Iranian proxy groups like the Badr Organization to shift resources back to Diyala from Anbar, the current campaign objective of both anti-ISIS contingents. The leader of the Badr Organization, Hadi al-Ameri, is publically recognized by the Diyala Provincial Council as the head of Diyala’s overall security, even though the Dijla Operations Command of the ISF is also based there. Diyala’s provincial government is also led by a Badr Organization member, increasing the likelihood that recent attacks by ISIS in Diyala will shift Badr’s attention to Diyala and away from Iraq’s national anti-ISIS campaign.

Background

The presence of ISIS in Diyala in 2015 is not a new phenomenon. The organization and its predecessor, -Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) were active in the province throughout the last decade. Former leader of AQI, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was personally based in Hib Hib, west of Baquba, suggesting that Diyala played a central rather than peripheral role in AQI’s national campaign. The footprint of AQI decreased following major operations of U.S. and Iraqi forces during the “Surge” between June and November 2007. During the resurgence of AQI in 2012, however, AQI’s signature VBIED attacks returned to Diyala, suggesting that AQI had reconstituted former support zones along the Hamrin Ridge and had become operational in the province once more. In November 2013, AQI, which had re-branded itself as ISIS, launched a complex attack involving three suicide bombers, two VBIEDs, and IEDs targeting the Police Headquarters in Baquba. This event indicated that ISIS had developed a more sophisticated attack capability, already witnessed elsewhere in Iraq with successful prison breaks in Abu Ghraib and Tikrit, and this capability was also present in Diyala.

Most indicators of ISIS’s activity in Diyala in 2012-2013 appeared concentrated north of the city of Muqdadiyah, a historic AQI support zone. In March 2014, however, ISIS launched an urban assault and briefly took control of central Buhriz, south of Baquba. The attack occurred two months after ISIS attacked Fallujah and Ramadi in Anbar province and three months before ISIS seized Mosul and many other northern cities, including cities in northern Diyala like Jalula and Sadia. This early attempt to capture urban terrain in Diyala’s heartland not only marked a shift in the operations of ISIS in Diyala from terrorist attacks to urban maneuvers, but it also shed light on a security gap in the province at the time. Of note, Badr forces that had been assisting the Assad regime in Syria in 2013 were absent from Diyala at the time. Badr’s veteran forces returned in June 2014 from Syria, where they had been augmenting the Assad regime along with a number of other Iranian proxy groups, reflecting a shift in Iran’s theater priorities from Syria to Iraq after the fall of Mosul. Diyala’s security in particular directly affects Iranian homeland security, as Diyala province shares a 197 km border with Iran.

The convergence of security forces upon Diyala after June 2014 created a unique security dynamic. The official military body responsible for security in the province is the Dijla Operations Command (DOC), comprised of the 5^th Iraqi Army (IA) division and local and Federal Iraqi Police. However, Diyala is also a home base of a prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militia, the Badr Organization, which has been operating as an Iranian proxy since the 1980s.The leader of the Badr Organization, Hadi al-Ameri is also a native of Diyala. Following the collapse of several ISF units in northern Iraq in June 2014, the power of DOC essentially transferred to Ameri personally following his official appointment by the local government as head of Diyala security in June 13, 2014. The appointment of another Badr leader as the governor of Diyala a year later in May 2015 would enforce the authority of Ameri over Diyala’s security forces, most evident in July 2015 after recent attacks by ISIS in Diyala.

Between June 2014 and January 2015, Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias such as Badr and Asai’b Ahl al-Haq (AAH), the ISF, and the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) carried out several operations in Diyala to block and clear ISIS. Initial operations were defensive and aimed to stop the advance of ISIS along the Baghdad-Kirkuk highway at al-Udhaim. These operations successfully concluded in August 2014. Additional joint operations with the PUK Peshmerga took place in northeastern Diyala, resulting in the recapture of Sadia and Jalula sub-districts in November 2014. Finally, Iranian proxies, ISF, and small contingents of Sunni fighters reclaimed the agricultural areas north of Muqdadiyah at the top of the Diyala River Valley in January 2015. The latter operation represented the recapture of the last ISIS stronghold in the province; however, all of these operations took place in northern Diyala. It is unclear whether Badr and the ISF secured southern Diyala fully at the time. Nevertheless, it was celebrated by the proxies and ISF as the “liberation of Diyala.” The Badr Organization played a major role in all operations launched against ISIS in Diyala during this period. After achieving success in Diyala, the Badr organization capitalized on momentum and deployed as a mobile force along with DOC to launch major operations around Dhulueya and Tikrit in nearby Salah ad Din province November 2014 and March 2015. The Badr Organization is still deployed forward in the desert area in southern Salah ad Din and around Fallujah in eastern Anbar as of July 2015.

These operations generated significant population displacement of Iraqi Sunnis in Diyala. The ISF with Iranian proxy groups drove Iraqi Sunni communities out of their homes and into IDP camps in the name of clearing ISIS’s safe havens. Most of the IDPs are yet to return to their homes, a result of rigid security procedures that aim, according to local officials, to prevent the return of ISIS’s sympathizers. Given the high influence of Badr in Diyala’s affairs, it is most likely that such measures are orchestrated by the Badr Organization to further sectarian aims. Diyala’s population is ethnically and religiously mixed, and the sectarian agenda of Iranian proxy groups has likely accumulated tension in Diyala province over the course of tactical successes against ISIS. If current IDP levels in Diyala persist through the provincial elections in 2017, it is unlikely that Iraqi Sunnis will be able to fill a similar number of seats on Diyala’s provincial council, which would ultimately undermine their influence in the government. Most importantly, this outcome would further marginalize Sunnis in Diyala and create conditions similar to those that allowed AQI and ISIS to flourish in Diyala and elsewhere in Iraq. It should be noted however, that the PUK Peshmerga also played a role in re-securing northern Diyala from ISIS, particularly in Jalula and Khanaqin near Iran’s northern border crossing. The Peshmerga also facilitated Iraqi Sunni population displacement in these areas.

Furthermore, the success of Badr’s combat operations in Diyala nevertheless increased its popularity among civilian communities and its leverage in political and military circles. Key positions such as the governor have since witnessed intense political jockeying. Historically held by Iraqi Sunnis, the governor post is now held by a previous chairman of the council, who is also a senior figure of the Badr Organization, Muthana al-Timimi. The appointment of Timimi as governor was technically legitimate: on May 26, 2015, 16 out of the 29 members of the council voted for Timimi while 12 members of the Iraqi Sunni Iraqiyat Diyala bloc boycotted the session. The decision was later approved by the presidency on June 8, 2015. As evident by the boycott, which continues today, the election generated a major backlash from Iraqi Sunnis in the council who consider the governor’s post as their right. Badr’s role within Diyala’s provincial politics has likely increased with its rise to the national stage, as Badr played a lead role in operations against ISIS in other provinces, such as Babil, Salah ad Din and Anbar.

Recent Attacks by ISIS in July 2015

Badr’s operations outside of Diyala likely reflected its earlier assessment that Diyala is relatively secure, against ISIS and against sectarian backlash for its activities in 2014. Since July 17, however, ISIS launched attacks in Diyala that demonstrate its likely resurgence. ISIS detonated a massive VBIED on July 18 that resulted in the death of at least a 120 individuals and injury of 130 others in Khan Bani Saad, south of Baquba. This attack occurred during the Eid al-Fitr holiday at the end of Ramadan and constitutes one of the deadliest attacks ever perpetrated by ISIS or its predecessor. Like Buhriz the year before, this attack indicates that ISIS can reconstitute in southern Diyala as well as in the north. A southern attack zone implies that ISIS can get to Baquba and eastern Baghdad through remote areas that may not have been cleared by the Badr Organization and the ISF in 2014, such as Balad Ruz, Kanaan, and Nahrawan. It also suggests that ISIS may have greater presence in Tarmiyah than recent attack trends would independently indicate.

Underscoring the possibility of a remote ISIS support zone in eastern Diyala, another VBIED attack occurred on July 21 targeting the Jisr area, west of Mandali in eastern Diyala, killing five and injuring 12. Either in high volume or in combination with other attack types, VBIEDs generally indicate a threshold of capability above isolated terrorist attacks. Manufacturing and employing VBIEDs is a highly technical operation that requires specific precursors, indicating that ISIS possesses expertise and access to the province to the south and east. ISIS also launched mortars on July 20 targeting the area of Hadid west of Baquba, killing two individuals and injuring 20 others. ISIS has used VBIEDS and mortars to support attacks upon military positions in the past, and it is possible that ISIS’s individual weapons capabilities are coming on line across Diyala in a way that will heighten the overall threat of complex attacks. Therefore, seemingly isolated incidents in Diyala that are occurring in greater frequency in July 2015 likely indicate a step change in the organization’s capability and intent in Diyala. ISIS may not yet be able to execute the kind of complex attacks and urban maneuvers that it exercised in Diyala in late 2013 and early 2014, but there is again a security gap opening in Diyala, and ISIS is likely to exploit it.

Indicators of ISIS’s return to Diyala have actually been occurring for several months. On May 9, at least nine ISIS prisoners escaped from prison in Khalis, in western Diyala following clashes with guards. There were conflicting reports regarding the exact nature of the attack. Some sources reported that it was entirely done from inside the prison. Others reported VBIEDs targeting the prison as part of the attack. Either way, ISIS has likely been involved in orchestrating the escape which likely directly boosted ISIS’s combat power in the province. Several additional attacks indicated that ISIS had become active in eastern Diyala by the same time. Two VBIEDs detonated in Balad Ruz, in eastern Diyala in February and May 2015, respectively. On June 16, an IED detonated in the same area killing one individual and wounding another. On June 23, 2015 ISIS launched a suicide VBIED against a tribal gathering of Iraqi Sunnis in the Nida area of eastern Diyala killing 16 individuals and injuring 36 others. These attacks may indicate that ISIS had carved out a support zone by this time in eastern Diyala; it may also indicate an emerging threat stream against the Iranian border crossing, which may be a key ground line of communication connecting Iranian resources to its proxies in Iraq. Underscoring this idea, IEDs detonated on June 25 targeting power lines near the Iranian border that transits Iranian-generated electricity to Diyala.

Attacks by ISIS also began to occur elsewhere in Diyala province. On June 15, ISF clashed with and killed an unknown number of ISIS fighters near Qara Tapa, in northern Diyala. On July 1, Iraqi Sunni fighters aligned with Badr and the ISF repelled a small scale attack by ISIS targeting the agricultural area of Mansouriya, north if Muqdadiyah in central Diyala. Also, a VBIED detonated in Khalis, western Diyala on July 14, 2015, during Ramadan and shortly before the mass casualty VBIED attack on Khan Bani Saad on July 18. Mansouriya, Khalis, and Qara Tapa are located in disparate corners of Diyala province. As such, these separate incidents are indicative of the co-presence of multiple cells rather than one cell confined to one area. It is therefore not surprising that ISIS launched spectacular attacks in Diyala at the end of Ramadan. Both to mark the end of its annual campaign, and to divert attention from Anbar, ISIS elements in Diyala planned and executed the highly effective mass casualty attack in in Khan Bani Saad, indicating that they are fully operational. ISIS’s attacks in Diyala will now likely increase steadily unless increased security measures in the province prevent it.

Reaction by Diyala Political Officials

The recent attacks by ISIS in Diyala have prompted local officials to issue multiple calls for Diyala-based ISF and Shi’a militias to return to their home base and provide much needed security. On July 22, the provincial government convened to discuss Diyala’s security situation. Following the meeting, two officials stated that the council expressed the desire redeploy Diyala’s security forces. The acting chairman from the Iraqi Sunni from Iraqiyat Diyala bloc, Omar al-Korawi stated that the council “authorized” the governor to request from the Prime Minister a redeployment of Diyala forces. In addition, secretary of the council, a member of Mustaqilun bloc of the State of Law Alliance, Khdhayer al-Ubaidi stated that the council decided to redeploy Diyala’s forces, though it is unclear what provincial authorities exist for such a deployment. The response of the governor of Diyala, a Badr Organization member, did not align with the positions of the rest of the council as represented by these members. Instead, governor Timimi stressed that he will give no chance for “any politician from [Diyala’s government]” to cause stress and sedition, resisting the council’s pressure on him to make a decision to redeploy Diyala’s forces.

Timimi’s reaction indicates just how entrenched the Badr Organization is within Diyala’s politics and security as of July 2015, such that Timimi likely did not wish to speak without consulting Hadi al-Ameri, the leader of the Badr Organization. Timimi made a more explicit response in a TV interview on July 22 in which he alluded to the overall authority of Hadi al-Ameri over him as a governor: “Haj Hadi al-Ameri is my direct security supervisor… he [Ameri] also supervises the operations command [Dijla Operations Command] and the division [5^thIA Division] in the province… the government has officially assigned him supervision over security in the province.” This statement indicates that Timimi does not intend to answer to Diyala’s provincial council and will instead defer to Badr leadership. Disagreements about Diyala internal security will further complicate the political dynamics within the local government, especially if it generates tension among the various Shi’a blocs in the council, including Badr, the Sadrist Trend, and the various components of the State of Law Alliance. This may indicate that intra-Shi’a competition and sectarian tension may threaten Diyala’s stability in the near term in addition to the threat of ISIS.

Conclusion                                                                                            

The recent deterioration of security in Diyala generated competing requirements for the proxies shortly after the Badr Organization and other Iranian proxy groups expanded their operations into Anbar. The expansion alone in pursuit of objectives independent of the Iraqi government speaks to their previous successes and high influence, resulting in a degree of impunity. Nevertheless, the exposure of Badr’s home base in Diyala to new security threats from ISIS and political rivals does not bode well for Badr’s ability to maintain its current offensive posture near Fallujah, let alone to continue expanding. Badr will most likely act to address the situation in Diyala. However, it is unlikely that Badr and the Diyala-based 5^th IA Division can redeploy forces to the province without negatively affecting their offensive operations or exposing recaptured areas to the threat of a counterattack by ISIS. The threat posed by ISIS against Diyala is not the exclusive concern of Badr and Diyala-based ISF. The concern is most likely shared by the Iranian government given the extensive border Iran shares with the province. It is likely that Iran desires to utilize Badr or other proxy groups to fill security gaps in Diyala for its direct security interests as well as its other strategic objectives in Iraq, such as increased political influence on a national stage. However, Iran also likely desires to continue the expansion of militia operations that challenge the dominance of the ISF and the influence of the U.S., and therefore withdrawing forces from Anbar would also constitute a loss for Iran. Iran may therefore increase its involvement in Diyala’s security if other mitigation measures do not materialize.

Options of Badr, although limited, are not confined to the departure of Anbar or exposing Diyala to more security threats. The Badr Organization will likely work to mobilize more recruits within Diyala to provide security in areas witnessing security breaches. Although less likely, Iraq’s interior minister, himself a senior figure in Badr, may use his influence to draw ISF elements from southern provinces to cover down in Diyala. Deployment of provincial Federal Police units from the south took place on several occasions in support of anti-ISIS operations in previous instances, particularly after the initial fall of Fallujah to ISIS in January 2014. However, such a move would likely generate push back since most south-based Iraqi Army units are already deployed forward along other front lines and away from their provinces. Indicative of this dynamic, on July 15, 2015, the local government of Babil requested that the interior minister exclude a Babil-based ISF battalion from deploying to Ramadi, citing provincial security concerns.

The implications of deteriorating security in Diyala therefore rather rise to the national level. A shift of Badr Organization forces and other proxies back to Diyala will directly affect other multiple anti-ISIS fronts in Iraq. On the one hand, a reduction in force levels combatting ISIS on fronts such as Anbar will undermine the fight on other fronts. In Anbar, the ongoing militia-led operations around Fallujah and ISF-led operations around Ramadi are complementary, in that they prevent ISIS from reinforcing one city from the other. Although Iranian proxies are not responding to ISF leadership in Anbar, their operations remain relevant. On the other hand, however, a withdrawal of the proxy groups from Anbar may also clear the way for the ISF and U.S.-led coalition to orchestrate its own successful campaign in both Fallujah and Ramadi, if they have enough capacity. Like Tikrit, Ramadi and Fallujah can be a front on with the ISF with U.S. support demonstrates its superior performance in Sunni cities long held by ISIS relative to that of the Iranian proxies. The ISF also must balance its offensive campaign against the necessary defense of the capital and Diyala, however, and ISIS will likely aim to increase attacks in Diyala and Baghdad in order to relieve pressure on Fallujah and Ramadi. It is important to watch for counter-attacks at this time by ISIS in recently cleared cities on other fronts, such as Tikrit, Sadia, and northern Muqdadiyah to generate a higher sense of urgency for the ISF and proxies as the Ramadi assault approaches.

Iraq Situation Report: July 21 - 23, 2015

By: Sinan Adnan and ISW Iraq Team

Iraq Situation Report: July 18 - 20, 2015

By: Theodore Bell and ISW Iraq Team

Control of Terrain in Iraq: July 20, 2015

By: Sinan Adnan

Iraq Situation Report: July 14 - 16, 2015

Theodore Bell, and ISW Iraq Team

Iraq Situation Report: July 11 - 13, 2015

Sinan Adnan, Patrick Martin, and ISW Iraq Team

Iraq Situation Report: July 09 - 10, 2015

Theodore Bell, Patrick Martin, and ISW Iraq Team

Significant Offensives in Syria: June 6 - July 9, 2015

by: Christopher Kozak and Genevieve Casagrande

Download the full-sized version of this post as a PDF file here.

REBEL:

1. June 5 - 17: The JN-led Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room launched an offensive on June 5 which successfully seized the town of Mahambel and seven other villages along the Latakia – Idlib Highway, largely eliminating the remaining regime-held salient in Idlib Province. Rebel forces with the Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room have since experienced difficulty in seizing remaining regime positions south of Jisr al-Shughour in southwestern Idlib Province or along the al-Ghab Plain in northwestern Hama Province. 

2. June 9 - 12: A number of FSA-affiliated and Islamist rebel factions announced the “Battle of Retribution for the Martyrs” on June 9 and seized the regime-held Brigade 52 base in eastern Dera’a Province following heavy clashes with regime forces. The same rebel forces later announced the “Battle of Crush the Tyrants” targeting the Tha’lah Airbase in western Suwayda Province, making initial gains before being repulsed following the arrival of Druze reinforcements.

3. June 16 - 29: Four separate rebel coalitions, including the newly-formed JN-led Jaysh al-Fatah al-Mintaqa al-Janoubiyah and two distinct operations rooms led by elements of the FSA-affiliated Southern Front, launched offensives targeting regime military positions in northern Quneitra Province in the vicinity of Druze-inhabited Mount Hermon. The stated goals of the offensives included a desire to open supply lines leading to rebel forces in the Western Ghouta suburbs of Damascus. Nonetheless, the offensives ultimately achieved only limited gains in the area as rebel forces came under pressure from clashes against alleged ISIS-affiliated rebels in western Dera’a Province, the joint Hezbollah-regime offensive on Zabadani northwest of Damascus, and Israeli warnings of a possible military intervention in the event of an attack against the pro-regime Druze of Mount Hermon.

4. June 25 - 30: Rebel forces with the FSA-affiliated Southern Front announced the "Battle of Southern Storm" on June 25 directed at seizing Dera'a City as the next phase of an effort to consolidate control over southern Syria and set conditions for an eventual assault against the Syrian capital of Damascus. Although rebel forces initially made limited tactical gains within Dera'a City, the offensive largely quieted by June 30 due to a rumored operational reassessment following high casualties and poor coordination between rebel forces. Rebel commanders nonetheless continue to insist that the “Battle of Southern Storm” will not be called off. 

5. July 2 – 8: The Fatah Halab Operations Room announced the start of the “Battle of Fatah Halab” on July 2 to seize full control over regime-held portions of Aleppo City. Combined moderate and Islamist rebel forces later seized control of the regime-held Scientific Research Center on the western outskirts of Aleppo City on July 3 amidst ongoing clashes as rebels attempted to break into the New Aleppo and az-Zahraa neighborhoods of northwestern Aleppo City. Meanwhile, JN and a number of Salafi-jihadist rebel factions also announced the formation of the Ansar al-Sharia Operations Room on July 2 and launched a parallel offensive against regime positions in the az-Zahraa district which has included at least one JN suicide attack against regime forces.

REGIME:

6. June 20 - 23: The regime reportedly deployed reinforcements including the elite ‘Tiger Forces’ Special Forces unit to the western countryside of Palmyra, sparking clashes with ISIS west of the city as well as in the nearby Sha’er and Jazal Gas Fields. Although regime officials have messaged an intent to recapture the city of Palmyra from ISIS forces, no notable offensive action has yet occurred. 

7. July 2 - 7: Lebanese Hezbollah and Syrian regime forces announced the start of an offensive to seize the rebel-held town of Zabadani northwest of Damascus near the  Lebanese border on July 2. Zabadani occupies a key position near supply routes connecting Damascus to Hezbollah positions in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley. Clashes are currently ongoing as Hezbollah and regime forces attempt to enter the town from the west amidst clashes with JN, Ahrar al-Sham, and other rebel factions.  

YPG (KURDS):

8. June 6 - 23: Kurdish YPG forces supported by FSA-affiliated rebel factions and U.S.-led coalition airstrikes continued offensive operations to seize ISIS territory in northern Syria, seizing the ISIS-held border crossing of Tel Abyad on June 15 before moving south to capture the town of Ayn Issa and its associated Brigade 93 military base on June 22-23. These gains provided a ground link between the Kurdish Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) and Hasaka Province (Cizire) cantons while placing joint YPG-FSA forces thirty miles north of the ISIS stronghold of ar-Raqqa City. Nonetheless, the YPG advance also elevated tensions with Turkey, which deployed military forces to its border amidst heightened concerns over “border security”. 

ISIS:

9. June 24 – July 7: ISIS launched a major offensive against regime positions in Hasaka City on June 24, seizing several of the city’s southern districts after heavy clashes which included a series of SVBIED attacks against both regime and Kurdish security installations. Regime forces reportedly began to reverse ISIS gains by the end of June following the deployment of Republican Guard reinforcements from Deir ez-Zour City, the arrival of SAA and NDF reinforcements from Qamishli, and the limited assistance provided by YPG forces in the eastern neighborhoods of the city. Nonetheless, local reports indicate that ISIS has secured additional advances against the regime in southern Hasaka City following a renewed wave of SVBIED and VBIED attacks beginning on July 1.

10. June 25 - July 6: ISIS launched a number of counterattacks against Kurdish-held terrain following the YPG successes at Tel Abyad and Ayn Issa in early June. A group of ISIS infiltrators equipped with at least two SVBIEDs entered the town of Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) on June 25, sparking two days of clashes which left over two hundred civilians dead. ISIS militants launched similar infiltrator attacks against two towns on the east bank of the Euphrates River on June 26 and against the recently-seized town of Tel Abyad on June 30. ISIS later launched a counterattack against joint YPG-FSA forces in Ayn Issa north of ar-Raqqa City on July 5 which included at least two SVBIED detonations; clashes are ongoing. 

KEY TAKEAWAY: Syrian rebel factions have launched long-awaited offensives against the isolated provincial capitals of Dera’a and Aleppo Cities, located in southern and northern Syria respectively. These two cities represent key lynchpins in the regime's ‘army in all corners’ strategy which allows Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to claim control over all of Syria. The fall of either city to rebel forces including Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra would overturn the stalemate that has long characterized the Syrian Civil War, opening the door to further offensives against core regime terrain in Damascus and the Syrian Coast. Rebel forces have thus far achieved limited success in both cities, however, amidst reports of high casualties and poor coordination between rebel factions – in part due to friction between moderate Free Syrian Army (FSA)-affiliated rebel factions and more extreme groups led by Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). If the rebel campaigns to seize Aleppo and Dera’a Cities stall over the coming weeks, JN and other Salafi-jihadist groups could seize the opportunity to expand their leadership role within the Syrian opposition by emphasizing the gains previously achieved in Idlib Province when rebel factions united under JN’s leadership. Rebel efforts in Aleppo and Dera’a Provinces have also been handicapped by the need to respond to the threat posed by ISIS and ISIS-sympathetic rebel brigades, which have encroached upon opposition-held terrain in both the northern countryside of Aleppo City and the southwestern countryside of Dera’a Province.

The regime’s successful defense of Aleppo and Dera’a Cities thus far belies that fact that the continued dedication of valuable combat resources to outlying “corners” of Syria risks overextending the defensive capabilities of regime forces. The regime appears particularly vulnerable to an offensive by ISIS against the Syrian central corridor while regime forces are fixed in northern and southern Syria. Although ISIS has directed its main effort in Syria over the past month against Kurdish YPG forces in northern Syria in a likely effort to protect ar-Raqqa City, ISIS remains a critical threat to both the regime’s core territory and its remaining remote outposts in eastern Syria. ISIS continued to launch probing attacks against rebel forces in the Eastern Qalamoun Mountains and regime positions in eastern Hama and Homs Provinces in a likely bid to seek opportunities for further territorial advancement in the vicinity of against Homs, Hama, and Damascus Cities meant to balance losses in northern Syria and Iraq. Meanwhile, a major offensive by ISIS against Hasaka City in northeastern Syria forced the regime to deploy valuable elite Republican Guard units away from Deir ez-Zour City in a move possibly designed to weaken the regime's defenses there. The combined effects of these pressures taken in conjunction with ongoing rebel offensives could ultimately force the Syrian regime into an unwilling contraction, generating additional opportunities for ISIS to expand. 

The initiatives undertaken by the Syrian regime and its foreign backers during this reporting period suggest that the regime may be preparing for such an outcome. Regime forces have reportedly begun large-scale fortification efforts along the approaches to Damascus and Latakia in order to protect the regime’s core terrain in western Syria. Meanwhile, Hezbollah and regime forces have directed offensive operations to clear the remaining rebel presence in the Qalamoun Mountains along the Lebanese border – a necessary precondition for the formation of a loyalist rump state with connectivity to Hezbollah-dominated regions of Lebanon.  In light of these observations, the deployment of elite regime combat units to regions west of Palmyra in central Syria may also constitute a defensive maneuver to buffer the Syrian central corridor against further ISIS advances rather than a decisive effort to recapture the city as hinted by senior regime officials.  Overall, the limited offensive maneuvers conducted by the Syrian regime in recent months suggest that the regime’s capacity to set the terms of battle and dictate the trajectory of the Syrian Civil War may have been significantly degraded by the concurrent pressures of rebel and ISIS offensives.

Iraq Situation Report: July 07 - 08, 2015

Sinan Adnan, Theodore Bell, Patrick Martin, and ISW Iraq Team

Iraq Situation Report: July 02 - 06, 2015

Sinan Adnan, Theodore Bell, Patrick Martin, and ISW Iraq Team

Rebels Launch New Offensive in Southern Syria

by: Jennifer Cafarella

Rebel forces in Southern Syria have mobilized for what they hope will be the final phase of a major campaign to force the regime to withdraw from Southern Syria.  Should they succeed, they may achieve enough momentum to advance to Damascus and may force the Assad regime to contract from outlying areas, including southern, eastern, and northern Syria where the regime is also challenged. A successful operation by rebels in Southern Syria could therefore alter the stalemate of the Syrian war even though rebels across northern and southern Syria are not coordinated. Rebels in Southern Syria represent a strong potential partner for the U.S. not only to end the Syrian war, but also to limit the expansion of ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria. The moderate rebel Southern Front coalition has played a leading role in Southern Syria since the summer of 2014, a distinction from other fronts on which moderate rebels play a minimal role. Islamists brigades have fought alongside them, however, and Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) has supported their effort, indicating that the influence of moderate rebels in Southern Syria is vulnerable. While their tactical cooperation may improve their chances of driving pro-regime forces from southern Dera’a province, it may also limit future opportunities for the U.S. to capitalize upon their success if moderate rebels are not empowered to remain in the lead through increased international support.

Syrian rebel forces in the moderate Southern Front Coalition declared“Battle of Southern Storm” in Dera’a Province on June 24, 2015. The objective of the Battle of Southern Storm appears to be to oust the regime from of Dera’a Province and to set conditions for an eventual assault on Damascus. After allowing one day for civilians to evacuate the city, rebels launched a “large scale” attack against pro-regime forces in Dera’a City on June 25. Rebels made initial advances, seizingthe Dera'a National Hospital and a regime-held checkpoint near the Bassel al-Assad Stadium in northern Dera'a City, significant because Dera’a city has not been an active frontline over the past year. Regime forces responded with a major increase in aerial bombardment including over 60 barrel bombs in Dera’a City and its outskirts on June 25 alone. Clashes remain ongoing as of July 2 with the participation of Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other hardline Islamist brigades, although it is unclear which side is currently gaining momentum. The initial JN and rebel gains in Dera’a City are a notable escalation, though they do not yet constitute a sufficient challenge to pro-regime forces in the city to prompt a regime withdrawal. The “Battle of Southern Storm” however will likely not be restricted to Dera’a city, but rather target the breadth of regime outposts remaining in Dera’a province.   

Primarily moderate rebel forces supported by JN and other Islamist rebels set the conditions for this offensive through a yearlong campaign to eliminate major regime-held military bases in the Dera’a and Quneitra countryside. This preparation of the battlefield reflects a long-term campaign design, of which the latest battle for Dera’a City is a recent component. Beginning in June 2014, combined anti-Assad forces successfully restricted the regime to an isolated salient that connects Damascus to Dera’a City. The spokesperson for the Battle of Southern Storm on June 24, 2015 designatedthis entire stretch of regime-held terrain as a military zone, indicating that the battle is not limited to Dera’a City, but rather is intended to “liberate” the entirety of Dera’a Province. The initial goal of the offensive is to force the regime to fall back to the regime stronghold of Izra’a, north of Dera’a City, according to the deputy commander of a prominent moderate brigade participating in the operation named the Yarmouk Army. If successful, this offensive could allow rebel forces to consolidate in southern Dera’a Province before advancing northward toward Damascus.

Moderate and Islamist Rebels Establish New Command-and-Control Structures

The list of participating rebel brigades in the Battle of Southern Storm is currently unclear. It is possible that negotiations are still ongoing between the Southern Front, JN, and Islamist brigades, which could account for the slow start to the offensive. According to a Southern Front representative, the offensive is coordinated through a “higher central operations room,” which appears to be a new structure established for the purposes of this offensive beginning in June 2015. According to the Yarmouk Army deputy commander, the Battle of Southern Storm involves seven geographically based operations rooms, the term that opposition forces use for headquarters that ensure unity of effort across different groups on the battlefield. The commander did not disclose the composition or location of these operations rooms, which likely include both moderate and Islamist brigades across multiple front lines in southern Syria.

Prior to the declaration of the Battle of Southern Storm, the Southern Front created a new coordinative body in an attempt to formalize its command and control of the more than 40 brigades within the Southern Front. The relationship between this new body and the Battle of Southern Storm operations room is unclear. The role of the Southern Front coalition in rebel military campaigns was previously limited to unifying the political programs and social media efforts of numerous brigades, many of which receive support from regional and Western backers through a Military Operations Command (MOC) center in Amman, Jordan. The Southern Front announced the establishment of a new Joint Military Command on May 15, 2015 under the leadership of Abu Osama al-Joulani from the First Army, a prominent rebel coalition folded under the umbrella of the Southern Front. The new joint command is intended to function as a formal military headquarters with support staff to coordinate the operations of the Southern Front’s component brigades. The command includes five subsidiary offices for operations, armament, logistics, relief, and management. It is unclear whether this joint military command will succeed in increasing the effectiveness of moderate rebel operations against the regime, and some Southern Front commanders have continued to report inefficiencies in the organization’s operations. Its formation is nonetheless a notable step forward that could increase the effectiveness of moderate rebel forces within the Battle of Southern Storm, and it may signal an increase in support provided to the Southern Front by outside backers in the MOC.

Islamist forces supported by JN also created new formal military alliances in the lead-up to the declaration of the Battle of Southern Storm.  JN, the Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement (HASI), and eight primarily Islamist brigades announced the formation of the Harmoun Army in northern Quneitra Province on June 16. Then, on June 20, JN, HASI, and seven other Islamist rebel groups announced the formation of the Jaysh al-Fatah [“Army of Conquest”] “southern sector” in order “to unify rebel ranks” to combat both “domestic and foreign challenges,” a likely reference to outside funding and military support  received by many Southern Front rebel brigades. Jaysh al-Fatah includes relatively small brigades that are loosely associated with the Southern Front in addition to the primarily Islamist Fatah al-Sham operations room. The exact relationship between the Harmoun Army and Jaysh al-Fatah is unclear, but the participation of JN and HASI in both structures indicates that there is likely substantial coordination between the two. Both groups also operate in close proximity to the moderate A'sifa al-Haqq Operations Room based in northwestern Dera’a Province and led by the moderate Southern Front’s First Army. The Harmoun Army, Jaysh al-Fatah, and A’sifa al-Haqq constitute lower echelon military structures that each coordinates the activities of numerous rebel brigades, and in the case of the Harmoun Army and Jaysh al-Fatah, their operations extend farther into southern Syria. Where their operations are co-located southwest of Damascus, it is possible these three smaller coalitions will achieve unity of effort against the regime through one local operations room within the Battle for Southern Storm despite their ideological differences. The question of JN’s increased influence or dominance over moderate rebel structures remains a concern given this potential development.

Rebel Attempts to Limit al-Qaeda Affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra

There are other causes of concern. The Jaysh al-Fatah southern sector is a repeat of a successful model for military operations established by JN and Islamist forces in Idlib Province. The creation of the original Jaysh al-Fatah operations room in Idlib Province enabled JN and Islamist forces to seize control of a majority of Idlib Province from pro-regime forces beginning in March 2015. JN established a second version of the Jaysh al-Fatah model in the Qalamoun region of the Damascus Countryside in April 2015, and has since called for the establishment of a Jaysh al-Fatah version in the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus. JN’s ability to export this model indicates its growing momentum in Syria and its continued significance as a military power in the fight against Assad. JN’s intent to leverage its influence within these structures to shape rebel governance structures and religious activity appears to have prompted some Islamist groups to pressure JN quietly to relinquish its al-Qaeda affiliation. JN’s leader Abu Mohammed al-Joulani rejected this proposal in a two-part interview with al-Jazeera in May and June through which he firmly reasserted JN’s allegiance to al-Qaeda. Islamist forces are likely to continue to accommodate JN’s al-Qaeda character as long as combined JN-Islamist operations against the regime continue to achieve success.

Moderate rebel forces seek to limit JN’s influence in a future post-Assad Syrian state. JN’s deepening role within Islamist structures counters this effort by ensuring JN’s staying power within the province. The Southern Front increased its rhetoric against JN in early 2015, likely prompted by JN’s increasingly overt links to al-Qaeda in public statements. In early April 2015, six rebel brigades released statements condemning JN’s transnational agenda. After the formation of Jaysh al-Fatah, the Southern Front released a statement distancing itself from the new operations room, accusing Jaysh al-Fatah of imposing its own “unnationalistic” agenda against the will of the Syrian people. A number of Southern Front affiliates also released independent statements confirming their refusal to cooperate with Jaysh al-Fatah, including the First Army, Seif al-Sham Brigades, and the 24^th Infantry Division. These statements reaffirm the commitment of Southern-Front affiliated brigades to establishing a secular and democratic post-Assad Syrian state in the face of growing JN prominence, possibly in order to satisfy outside supporters. The statements are likely also an attempt to encourage rebel brigades to refrain from deepening their cooperation with JN in Southern Syria by placing a stigma on military structures with overt JN participation.

There is nonetheless little indication that the Southern Front will actually terminate its military cooperation with JN in the near term. Statements by moderate rebel brigades have not resulted in observable changes on the battlefield, where JN, Islamist, and moderate rebel forces continue to operate in close proximity. The Jaysh al-Fatah operations room and the Southern front reportedly confirmed their cooperation prior to the declaration of the Battle of Southern Storm and may have actually formalized their relationship. The participation of JN and Islamist rebels in clashes in Dera’a City, as well as the inclusion of Southern Front-affiliated brigades in the Jaysh al-Fatah coalition, furthermore indicates that segregation between moderates and JN-allied Islamists is unlikely to emerge in Southern Syria. In fact, according to “informed” pro-rebel sources cited by the Syrian activist network Zaman al-Wasl, efforts are underway to “enhance” the coordination between the Southern Front, JN, and Islamist rebels. A rebel source claimed that there are 40 suicide bombers ready for deployment in the Battle of Southern Storm, likely confirming that JN will contribute directly to offensives led by primarily moderate brigades.

The trend in Southern Syria points toward deeper cross-spectrum integration of anti-Assad actors in the absence of direct outside intervention. Additional success against Assad will therefore likely come at the cost of the continued rise to influence of JN and its Islamist allies. Public statements by moderate rebel commanders reflect this reality. In interviews with Syrian activist networks, moderate rebel commanders have consistently deflected questions regarding how to navigate differences between Islamists and moderates in a post-Assad environment. While moderate rebels have become more willing to criticize JN’s vision, they continue to refrain from condemning the Islamist agenda held by other rebel groups such as HASI in favor of remaining united in the fight against Assad. This overall prioritization of the fall of the Assad regime above other long-term questions is a characteristic of Syrian rebel brigades across front lines from northern to southern Syria. Recognizing this reality is a necessary precondition of fruitful engagement with Syrian rebel forces in an effort to accelerate an end to the Syrian war.

Effect on the Regime

The Battle of Southern Storm nevertheless threatens the Assad regime at a particularly vulnerable time. The regime is facing challenges to its remaining outposts on multiple fronts, including Deir ez Zour and Hasaka in the east, Idlib and Hama in the north, and Homs and Qalamoun in central Syria. The seizure of Dera’a City by anti-Assad forces could be a sufficient turning point in the Syrian war to prompt a regime contraction out of Southern Syria toward the Syrian capital, despite the fact that anti-Assad actors in northern, eastern, and southern Syria are not coordinated. Alternately, it is possible that remaining pro-regime forces in Dera’a City are sufficiently capable to resist combined anti-Assad forces. There is reportedly a regime special operations headquarters at the Dera’a City municipal stadium that includes Iranian-sponsored forces. Iran may choose to increase its direct support to Assad in order to forestall regime defeat at Dera’a City. The defeat of the stronghold of Iranian-sponsored paramilitary forces in Busra al-Sham by combined JN, Islamist, and moderate rebels on March 24th indicates, however, that even additional Iranian support may be insufficient to retain Dera’a City.

The regime has substantial military fortifications north of Dera’a City on the Damascus-Dera’a Highway that it could choose to reinforce in the event of a loss at Dera’a City in order to blunt further rebel advances toward the capital. The regime likely does not possess sufficient manpower reserves, however, to do so, especially under growing strain from ISIS in Eastern Homs, Deir ez-Zour, and Hasaka Provinces. The regime is therefore unlikely to succeed in holding an interim defensive line near Izra’a and could choose to withdraw to a more defensible perimeter around Damascus if rebel forces begin to seize greater terrain. This would likely involve a full withdrawal from Dera’a and Suwayda Provinces, and possibly from remaining regime strongholds in northern Quneitra Province, or conversely a surge of pro-regime activity in Quneitra province, strategically positioned next to the Golan Heights. Such a contraction would cause a major shift in the Syrian war, likely requiring Assad to abandon his current strategic objective to maintain his claim to the entirety of Syria.

The regime has reportedly begun to increase its fortification of Damascus, potentially signaling that it intends to harden the capital against future rebel assault as a defensive priority. Existing military fortifications on the high ground on the southern outskirts of the capital, originally intended to blunt an Israeli armored advance from the Golan Heights, provide an existing line of defense that the regime could sufficiently consolidate by withdrawing forces from Dera’a. Regime forces began constructing nearly two kilometers of earthen berms along the Old Dera'a Highway and the Hawsh Belas Industrial Complex south of Damascus on June 23 in an effort to fortify the southern and southwestern entrances to the capital. In a worst-case scenario, the regime may even calculate that chemical weapons will be necessary to halt rebel gains or screen a withdrawal from southern Syria. A report citing U.S. intelligence officials, released on June 28, warned that the regime’s situation may be growing sufficiently dire to prompt the regime to use remaining vestiges of the its chemical weapons stockpile, which experts think Assad may possess.

There have been multiple indicators of the regime’s unease over its disposition in southern Syria. At least two separate groups of pro-regime soldiers have defected to rebel ranks since the beginning of 2015, highlighting declining morale. Iranian officers reportedly executedregime officers in the Dera’a City Municipal Stadium, likely in an attempt to deter further defections or punish perceived failings on the battlefield. Meanwhile, the regime continues to struggle to rally the minority Druze population of neighboring Suwayda Province to replenish pro-regime ranks. Druze residents have actively resisted attempts to implement forced conscription campaigns in Suwayda Province and Druze elders have articulated a policy of restrained self-defense and neutrality in the fighting between regime and rebel forces. Roughly 100 newly enlisted Druze soldiers fled their posts in Eastern Suwayda Province on June 24, allegedly in response to the regime’s intent to deploy them into Eastern Dera’a Province. If the regime contemplates a partition, it is likely that the Druze will prevent the regime from withdrawing its armor from Suwayda Province and opt for allegiance with Syrian rebels. Druze fighters have intervened twice since the beginning of 2015 to prevent the regime from deploying armored columns out of Suwayda Province, likely in order to ensure the Druze population has sufficient military resources to ensure its own protection.

Setting the Conditions for Damascus?

The desire to advance against Damascus in the long-term is a common objective that will likely continue to unite moderate, JN, and Islamist forces on an operational level. The Southern Front in particular has consistently messaged its operations in Dera’a and Quneitra Provinces as condition-setting efforts for a drive to Damascus. The inclusion of prominent Damascus-based rebel commanders into the Southern Front joint command could also indicate the active preparation for a future Damascus offensive. In addition to its five offices, the joint command includes a delegate from the Qalamoun region of the northern Damascus countryside, Bakkour al-Salim, the former leader of the FSA-affiliated Damascus Military Council. The Southern Front has historically included Qalamoun in its claimed area of operations, so the inclusion of Salim into the Southern Front joint command is not necessarily a departure that signals near-term intent to conduct major operations in Damascus. Nonetheless, the inclusion of prominent Damascus-based rebel commanders in the Southern Front joint command indicates that the Southern Front retains a strategic vision that involves leveraging advances in southern Syria into eventual gains in the Syrian capital.

More notable are reports of increasing negotiation between the Southern Front and prominent Islamist brigades based in Damascus. These talks with actors not historically associated with the Southern Front could indicate active efforts to cultivate a new Damascus front as a follow-on operation to the Battle of Southern Storm. Prominent Damascus based Islamist commander Zahran Alloush, the leader of Jaysh al-Islam, has allegedly decreased his direct oversight of rebel operations in the capital in order to participate in a series of meetings with regional actors. Abu Mohammad al-Fateh, the leader of another Damascus based Islamist group named the Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union, has reportedly filled in as the leader of the Damascus rebel coalition the Eastern Ghouta Unified Command in Alloush’s absence. Alloush reportedly arrived in Turkey on April 17 for a series of undisclosed talks, including a meeting with members of HASI leadership. Then, on June 6, unconfirmed reports indicated that Alloush traveled to Amman, Jordan, in order to meet with foreign intelligence officials and Syrian rebel commanders. According to one report, this meeting focused on discussing options to counter both ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria. Rumors circulating on Twitter meanwhile alleged that the intelligence officials asked Alloush to coordinate with the Southern Front against ISIS and JN in both Dera'a and Quneitra Provinces, and discussed the potential for replacing Jaysh al-Islam’s flag with the Syrian Revolutionary flag. Alloush has also begun to step back from his previously sectarian rhetoric, most notably during an interview with McClatchy DC in which Alloush referred to the Alawite sect as “part of the Syrian people”. This appears to confirm that outside supporters of Alloush, namely Saudi Arabia, and of the Southern Front broadly are actively exploring options to achieve unity of effort across previously disparate moderate and Islamist rebel ranks.

Implications for U.S. Policy

The emerging situation in Southern Syria provides a new opportunity for the U.S. to engage in Syria. The aggregate effects of the rebel campaign in Southern Syria, recent JN and rebel victories in Idlib Province, and continued pressure by ISIS on the Assad regime across multiple fronts may sufficiently disrupt the regime to render a feasible end to the Syrian war. A reevaluation of the scope of the U.S. train and assist program can generate meaningful ground partnerships if it accommodates a wider mission in Syria, namely helping rather than discouraging rebels from their primary effort to overthrow Assad. Especially given the recently confirmed defection of another vetted unit of Syrian rebels from the program, the program as it stands currently is not poised to have a positive impact upon either the Syrian war or the war against ISIS. The moderate rebel Southern Front on the other hand offers a compelling option for direct U.S. engagement under an altered policy framework. The Southern Front does not, however, present a full solution.

The U.S. could consider the possibility of leveraging select Islamist rebels as allies alongside the Southern Front. Even strong moderate rebels in Southern Syria are insufficient to defeat Assad or to ensure the establishment of a stable post-Assad Syrian state capable of addressing the threats of al-Qaeda and ISIS. The involvement of powerful Islamist rebel groups that are not committed to JN may therefore be critical for achieving success in Syria. A spectrum of Islamist brigades exists in Syria, ranging from hardline groups with close ideological affiliation with JN to more mainstream groups with a desire for Shari’a law to inform a post-Assad Syrian state. The U.S. has the option to engage with the latter category, namely mainstream independent Islamist groups that are fighting alongside moderate forces. Attempts by the moderate Southern Front to negotiate constructive relationships with Islamist brigades, possibly including some Damascus-based Islamists, signal an opportunity for the U.S. and regional partners to capitalize on existing options for cross-spectrum rebel coordination that does not cater directly to al-Qaeda’s interests. This engagement must extend to northern Syria, where moderates and Islamists continue to work in close coordination against the regime, but also where moderates are operating at a relative disadvantage.

 

A carefully tailored engagement with some Syrian Islamist groups could enable the U.S to take action to contain and diminish JN’s influence in Syria. It is critical that the U.S. take action to reverse the formalized coordination between JN and Islamist forces that translated into joint JN and Islamist governance structures within Idlib City after seizing the City in March 2015. A similar development in Southern Syria may become likely if the Battle of Southern Storm succeeds, in which the Southern Front is compelled to accept the involvement of JN and Islamist actors in post-Assad institutions. Over the long term, this embedded JN presence is a strategic threat for the U.S. because of the staying power and access to resources it provides to al-Qaeda in Syria. The U.S. could leverage increased support to both moderate and select Islamist forces to appeal to more hardline Islamist groups such as HASI to abandon their allegiance to JN. HASI’s participation in cross-spectrum rebel efforts to establish a united political program, notably through the Syrian Revolutionary Command Council based in Turkey, indicates that the U.S. could likely succeed in this effort. The U.S. should nonetheless be prepared for JN to attempt to rally its rebel allies to resist the U.S. and fight U.S.-supported rebels. With sufficient U.S. commitment, however, JN will be unable to sustain this narrative in the long term.

A defeat of the regime in southern Syria will likely produce escalating violence in the absence of intervention to mitigate potential risks. Rebel advances will likely provoke the regime to resort to desperate tactics such as the use of residual chemical weapons capability in order to forestall defeat in Southern Syria or facilitate a regime contraction. In the absence of overt support by the U.S. or regional actors to Syrian rebels, the regime may calculate that it can act with impunity and continue its escalation against civilians. Further atrocity by the Syrian regime could prompt retributive attacks by Syrian rebel groups against pro-regime populations, such as those in remaining besieged enclaves north of Aleppo City and northeast of Idlib City. JN will likely capitalize on escalating violence in order to propagate its sectarian narrative, and possibly generate support for a campaign against the coastal Alawite heartland. This increased destabilization within the Syrian Civil War will provide opportunities for ISIS to expand, potentially encouraging ISIS to launch a major spectacular attack against a major regime target such as Homs City.

Furthermore, the narrow focus of the U.S. on a counter-ISIS mission despite these realities risks encouraging regional actors to undertake unilateral action, which could actually provoke further instability and spillover of the Syrian war. Unconfirmed reports have emerged that indicate Turkey, Israel, and Jordan are independently contemplating the establishment of no-fly zones or humanitarian corridors along their respective borders. For Turkey, the focus is negating the ability of Syrian Kurds to declare an independent state along the Turkish border, in addition to likely Turkish desire to resettle Syrian refugees on the Syrian side of the border. For Israel, the calculation appears to focus on the security of the Golan Heights border. For Jordan, the consideration of a humanitarian corridor appears to reflect a desire to prevent JN from ascending further, as it did in Idlib Province. The vocal reports of the consideration of unilateral measures by these governments likely signals increasing pressure on the U.S. to intervene in Syria. If the U.S. continues to ignore their calls for American leadership, it is a dangerous but likely scenario that the U.S. will ultimately have to provide that leadership in the future under worse circumstances.

The U.S. must therefore carefully consider the options for intervention in Syria while recognizing the likely cost of refraining to act. In mid-2015, a large and sustained engagement with a spectrum of Syrian rebels as a component of a comprehensive strategy to end the Syrian war offers the opportunity for the U.S. to accomplish three strategic objectives in the region: to mitigate the humanitarian disaster in Syria, to contain and diminish al-Qaeda’s influence, and to set the conditions to defeat ISIS. Conversely, limited means of intervention, such as no fly zones, train and assistance only of vetted rebels, or targeted airstrikes against ISIS and al-Qaeda, incur greater risk of atrocity and violent extremism if they are not pursued as components of a strategy to the Syrian war. The forms of limited intervention proposed by neighboring states meanwhile leave the growing strength of JN in Syria entirely untouched, presenting a long term and strategic threat in the form of a highly capable and resilient al-Qaeda affiliate. While the realistic options for successful intervention are costly, they must nonetheless be considered in accordance with the likely outcomes of the Syrian Civil War in order to ensure U.S. national security and stability in the region.

Iraq Situation Report: June 30 - July 01, 2015

Sinan Adnan, Theodore Bell, Patrick Martin, and ISW Iraq Team

Iraq Situation Report: June 27 - 29, 2015

Sinan Adnan, Theodore Bell, Patrick Martin, and ISW Iraq Team

Iraq Situation Report: June 25 - 26, 2015

Sinan Adnan, Patrick Martin, and ISW Iraq Team

ISIS Counterattacks in Northern Syria

by: Christopher Kozak with Jennifer Cafarella

ISIS launched a series of spectacular counterattacks on June 24-25 in a two-pronged line of effort targeting Kurdish and regime forces in northern Syria. ISIS conducteda wave of suicide attacks in Hasaka City in northeastern Syria on June 24, detonatingtwo SVBIEDs as well as three or four SVESTs targeting Kurdish internal security and regime-held checkpoints in a move likely intended to soften the city’s defenses. ISIS later launchedan offensive against Hasaka City on June 25, detonating at least one VBIED and seizingthe regime-held southwestern neighborhoods of the city. ISIS’s advance allegedly received supportfrom tribal fighters previously aligned with the Assad regime. Simultaneously, approximately thirty to forty ISIS fighters disguisedin Kurdish YPG and Free Syrian Army (FSA) rebel uniforms infiltratedthe Kurdish border town of Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) on June 25, detonating twoSVBIEDsat the border crossing to Turkey and clashing with YPG forces.

ISIS’s synchronized attacks in northern Syria likely represent part of an overarching campaign to contain its opponents in the area and set conditions for further advances in Syria. The attacks in Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) and Hasaka City appear designed to disrupt ongoing YPG-led anti-ISIS operations in northern ar-Raqqa Province in order to divert pressure away from core ISIS terrain in ar-Raqqa City. The scale of the ISIS offensive against Hasaka City also suggests that ISIS may intend to seize the city to offset recent losses to Kurdish and rebel forces along the Syrian-Turkish border at the border crossing of Tel Abyad as well as the town of Ayn Issa and its associated Brigade 93 base further south. At minimum, ISIS’s attacks in Ayn al-Arab and Hasaka City demonstrate that ISIS possesses sufficient resiliency to absorb losses in northern Syria without losing the capability to conduct military operations. Alternately, reports indicating that ISIS did not mount fierce resistance in either Tel Abyad or Ayn Issa suggest that ISIS may have accepted a degree of calculated risk north of ar-Raqqa City in order to conserve resources for new lines of effort targeting Hasaka City, central Syria, or other regions of the country.