By: Sinan Adnan, Patrick Martin, and ISW Iraq Team
Monday, June 22, 2015
Friday, June 19, 2015
Wednesday, June 17, 2015
The YPG Campaign for Tel Abyad and Northern ar-Raqqa Province
by: Christopher Kozak and Genevieve Casagrande
Key Takeaway: YPG forces supported by FSA-affiliated rebel forces and U.S.-led coalition airstrikes seized the ISIS-held border crossing of Tel Abyad in northern ar-Raqqa Province on June 15, 2015, in a major victory for Syrian Kurds and the international anti-ISIS coalition. These gains successfully connect the Kurdish cantons of Kobani and Hasakah into one contiguous zone of YPG control along the Turkish border and optimally positioned joint YPG-FSA forces for an eventual advance south towards the ISIS stronghold of ar-Raqqa City. Kurdish forces cooperated with a coalition of Arab tribes, Assyrian paramilitary forces, and FSA-affiliated rebel factions to enable its rapid advance, although sustained accusations of ‘ethnic cleansing’ by the YPG of Arab civilians may disrupt wider coordination with the Syrian opposition. Recent YPG gains will also likely exacerbate tensions between Syrian Kurds, the Turkish government, and the Assad regime in a way which limits the options available to both the YPG and the U.S. in the fight against ISIS in northern and eastern Syria.
Syrian Kurdish YPG forces supported by FSA-affiliated rebel forces and U.S.-led international coalition airstrikes seized the ISIS-held border town of Tel Abyad in northern ar-Raqqa Province on June 15, 2015. This victory marks the culmination of a new YPG-led campaign to reverse ISIS’s gains against the three Kurdish cantons of northern Syria, including Hasakah, Kobani, and Afrin; to limit the flow of direct ISIS reinforcement through the Tel Abyad border crossing to ar-Raqqa City and eastern Syria; and to establish a contiguous Kurdish region stretching from Kobani to Hasakah Province. Tel Abyad is a border town on the Syrian-Turkish border between two Kurdish areas, Hasakah and Kobani that lies immediately north of ISIS-held Raqqa city. Tel Abyad and its surrounding villages represented a pocket of ISIS-held terrain which blocked transit between the Hasakah and Kobani cantons and simultaneously provided ISIS with direct supply lines for reinforcement and resupply between the Turkish border and the self-declared ISIS capital city of ar-Raqqa. Although ISIS steadily lost ground to joint Kurdish and rebel forces in eastern Aleppo Province in the immediate aftermath of the failure of its Kobani offensive in March 2015, ISIS forces managed to establish relatively stable defensive lines to protect Tel Abyad from the west. ISIS even achieved limited gains in Hasakah Province to the east, where Kurdish and regime forces maintain an informal alliance to cooperate in securing the province against ISIS advances.
The new YPG operation, announced on May 6 under the name Operation Martyr Rubar Qamishlo after a fallen YPG commander who died fighting ISIS, sought to reverse this dynamic and roll back the remaining ISIS presence in northern Syria. The operation began in Hasakah Province with a YPG push south from the Turkish border crossing at Ras al-Ayn east of Tel Abyad, directed tosecure numerous villages recently threatened by ISIS, including the crossroads town of Tel Tamir, the Assyrian villages of the Khabour River Valley, and the entirety of the Abdul Aziz mountain range west of Hasakah City. The YPG conducted this phase of the operation with the assistance of local Assyrian militia formations. Once the YPG had secured the western flank of Hasakah Province, YPG forces began the advance west towards Tel Abyad and seized the town of Mabrouka southwest of Ras al-Ayn on May 26 after receiving a “green light” from the U.S.-led air coalition to seize the entirely of the Kobani – Hasakah road along the Turkish border. This decision signaled U.S. support for some form of contiguous Kurdish autonomous region in northern Syria despite continuing Turkish reservations regarding the expansion of YPG influence on its southern border.
In response, ISIS launched an offensive against regime positions south of Hasakah City on May 30 in an apparent attempt to divert Kurdish resources and disrupt the ongoing YPG offensive. However, ISIS’s effort failed to draw significant numbers of Kurdish fighters towards Hasakah City, and YPG forces supported by FSA-affiliated rebels subsequently seized dozens of villages west and east of Tel Abyad in a consolidated effort to envelope the border city. These advances culminated in the seizure of the town of Suluk 20 kilometers southeast of Tel Abyad on June 14. The next day, YPG and FSA forces penetrated Tel Abyad from the southeast and quickly overwhelmed the small, unreinforced ISIS force that remained in the town, prompting them to surrender to Turkish forces at the border or flee south towards Ayn Issa and ar-Raqqa City. YPG and rebel commanders have since messaged that the next phase of anti-ISIS operations will involve a joint YPG-FSA offensive south from Tel Abyad to seize Ayn Issa, sever interior ISIS lines of communication, and threaten ar-Raqqa City. This operation could potentially enable anti-ISIS forces to penetrate into ISIS’s core stronghold in Syria in a development which may produce positive ramifications for other anti-ISIS operations across Iraq and Syria.
Who is Involved?The YPG leveraged a coalition of allied forces in order to buttress its offensives in northern Syria and promote its inclusiveness to non-Kurdish populations in the region. In Hasakah Province to the east, YPG forces resisting ISIS’s advances in Tel Tamir and the majority-Assyrian villages along the Khabour River Valley received assistance from a number of Assyrian paramilitary formations, including local residents enrolled in the ‘Khabour Guards’ as well as fighters from the greater Syriac Military Council (MFS). YPG units in Hasakah Province also cooperated closely with Jaysh al-Sanadid, an Arab tribal militia commanded by Sheikh Hamidi Daham al-Hadi of the historically pro-Kurdish Shammar tribe of northeastern Syria and northwestern Iraq. Although these groups remain driven largely by local concerns and have not played noticeable roles in the YPG offensive on Tel Abyad, their presence enables the YPG to deploy manpower towards offensive action without compromising security in its rear areas.
In Kobani canton to the west of Tel Abyad, the YPG operates alongside a number of FSA-aligned Syrian rebel factions organized under the umbrella of the Burkan al-Firat (Euphrates Volcano) Operations Room. The Euphrates Volcano Operations Room was founded on September 10, 2014, with the expressed intent of expelling ISIS from eastern Aleppo and ar-Raqqa Provinces. The majority of the groups participating in the operations room consist of local brigades seeking to reclaim their home regions following losses to ISIS which forced them to seek shelter in Kurdish-held areas. The presence of these rebel fighters thus provides YPG forces with added legitimacy in their efforts to seize and administer Tel Abyad and the surrounding villages of northern ar-Raqqa Province, which are populated primarily by Arab and Turkmen civilians sympathetic to ISIS.
Ethnic Cleansing?
Despite its inclusion of FSA-affiliated rebel factions and other local paramilitary forces, prominent opposition actors have accused YPG forces of perpetrating a number of abuses against Arab civilians during the advance into northern ar-Raqqa Province. These allegations largely center upon claimed YPG involvement in the forced displacement of Arab civilians and the burning of Arab homes in an “ethnic cleansing” campaign designed to lay the foundation for the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish region in northern Syria. On May 30, as YPG forces began the advance towards Tel Abyad, the exiled Syrian National Coalition (SNC) released a statement accusing the YPG of committing “violations” against the local civilian population in Hasakah Province which served to “encourage sectarian and ethnic extremism.” In early June, Syrian opposition figures reaffirmed their concern over reports of YPG civilian abuses against Arab and Turkmen populations in light of the imminent fall of Tel Abyad. Former Syrian Military Council (SMC) chief of staff Salim Idriss stated his concern regarding Kurdish abuses against civilians, while Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, and thirteen other prominent rebel brigades released a joint statement demanding that the YPG be listed as a “terrorist organization” due to its “ethnic cleansing” of Arab areas. Independent media organizations have also reported these allegations, although no clear evidence has yet been presented. These accusations may threaten to disrupt the current cooperation between Kurdish forces and the Syrian opposition amidst preparations for a FSA-led offensive towards ar-Raqqa City.
Implications
The YPG capture of Tel Abyad marks a major strategic victory for Kurdish forces and their efforts to form the governance structures of a self-declared Kurdish autonomous region in northern Syria termed ‘Rojava.’ Kurdish control over Tel Abyad and its countryside provided a physical link between the Cizire (Hasakah) and Kobani (Ayn al-Arab) cantons for the first time, bolstering the YPG’s value to the international anti-ISIS coalition as well as Kurdish claims to self-governance. However, these gains also escalate tensions with two prominent actors: Turkey and the Assad regime. The Turkish government has repeatedly condemned the YPG as a “terrorist” group due to its connections with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and Turkish President Recep Erdogan warned on June 14 that the YPG seizure of Tel Abyad “could lead to the creation of a structure [i.e. Rojava] that threatens our borders”. These concerns could ultimately drive the Turkish government to curtail or otherwise limit its participation in the international anti-ISIS coalition.
Meanwhile, the Assad regime maintains an uneasy balance with YPG forces in Hasakah Province, particularly in the cities of Hasakah and Qamishli, and remains unwilling to allow a Kurdish separation from Syria. Similarly, Syrian Kurds harbor no sympathy for the Assad regime following years of systemic repression and the removal of the remaining regime presence in Hasakah Province forms a necessary precondition for the formation of a truly autonomous Rojava, Although regime and YPG forces continue to informally cooperate in Hasakah Province, this engrained antipathy has resulted in numerous minor clashes between regime and YPG forces in northeastern Syria. In one recent incident, YPG forces refused to provide support to regime forces during an early June 2015 ISIS offensive against regime positions south of Hasakah City, prompting the state-owned Al-Watan newspaper to publish a critique of the “American project” to establish an independent Kurdish entity. One day after the fall of Tel Abyad, YPG and regime forces engaged in clashes throughout Qamishli which the YPG blamed on regime “provocations”. These tensions will likely intensify as the YPG continues to gain ground in northern Syria and the regime suffers additional losses in western Syria.
The YPG and its local allies retain an optimal position to threaten ISIS control over ar-Raqqa City and its surrounding countryside in the aftermath of the battle for Tel Abyad. Rebel fighters in the Euphrates Volcano Operations Room have identified ar-Raqqa City as their next objective and the YPG defense chief for Kobani canton confirmed that “Tel Abyad is only the end of a phase…we will pursue what remains of ISIS, no matter where.” ISIS appears to view a joint YPG-rebel advance on ar-Raqqa as a viable threat and reportedly directed residents of the city to stockpile food supplies in preparation for a potential siege. Any such offensive would require an attack by YPG and Euphrates Volcano fighters against the ISIS-held town of Ayn Issa and its associated Brigade 93 base, located south of Tel Abyad along the highway to ar-Raqqa City. However, the extent to which the YPG remains willing to advance outside of the Kurdish-majority regions of its envisioned Rojava remains unclear and Syrian Kurds may alternatively prioritize efforts against remaining direct threats to their own borders, such as the enduring ISIS presence in Sarrin southwest of Kobani or the regime remnants in Hasakah Province. Nevertheless, the ascendance of the YPG and the position it maintains between Syrian rebels and the regime will continue to form a key factor in dictating the options available to the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition in Syria.
Monday, June 15, 2015
Friday, June 12, 2015
Likely Courses of Action in the Syrian Civil War: June - December 2015
by: Jennifer Cafarella with Christopher Kozak
The purpose of this intelligence forecast is to outline ISW’s assessment of the courses of action available to Syrian actors and their principal benefactors over the next six months. ISW assesses that the dynamic stalemate that has defined the Syrian civil war since 2013 may be broken in this timeframe. The expansion of ISIS’s maneuver campaign into Syria’s central corridor is one potential inflection that could change the course of the war by shattering the Assad regime’s area defense strategy in western Syria. Rebel groups and Jabhat al-Nusra are also positioned to escalate their offensives against the regime in southern and northern Syria, and their aggregate effect may force a contraction of the Syrian Arab Army in the mid-term. Alternately, the regime along with increasing Iranian support may alter its battlefield disposition to concentrate upon limited offensive operations against key rebel positions in pursuit of decisive effects, especially in Damascus. The range of actions that various actors in Syria may take generate a spectrum of possible outcomes for the Syrian war and its potential post-war environment, several of which are perilous to U.S. policy in the Middle East and current strategies to defeat ISIS in the coming year. This assessment will forecast the most likely and most dangerous contingencies that may transpire in Syria in the second half of 2015 from a U.S. policy perspective.
Read the entire forecast here
Wednesday, June 10, 2015
Monday, June 8, 2015
Friday, June 5, 2015
Wednesday, June 3, 2015
Tuesday, June 2, 2015
Monday, June 1, 2015
Friday, May 29, 2015
ISF Disposition in Anbar: May 15 - May 27, 2015
by: Theodore Bell and Patrick Martin
Key Takeaway: ISIS’s seizure of Ramadi city May 15-18 has altered disposition of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in Anbar province and challenges the Iraqi government’s ability to mount successful counteroffensives. The two primary military positions remaining in Anbar after Ramadi’s fall are Habaniya, east of Ramadi and al-Asad airbase, west of Hit. As of May 27 “thousands” of Shi’a militia members continue to arrive at the Habaniya base following the Iraqi Prime Minister’s call for the Popular Mobilization Commission to prepare for operations in Anbar. In contrast, the ISF in al-Asad airbase are supplemented by Sunni tribal fighters undergoing training by U.S. personnel. It remains to be seen how the Iraqi government will integrate the efforts of its forces at al-Asad and Habaniya bases to mutually beneficial effect, especially in light of the U.S. presence at al-Asad and the Iranian-backed militias' presence at Habaniya. On May 26 the Popular Mobilization Commission launched a joint operation with the ISF to recapture parts of Ramadi as well as northern and western Salah ad-Din. As of May 29 the ISF is contesting southern Ramadi and the ISF and the Popular Mobilization, including Iranian-backed Shi'a militias, have reported successes east of Fallujah, south of Samarra, and south of the Baiji Oil Refinery. The Iranian-backed Shi’a militias now play a prominent role in the province. These developments may also compromise the U.S. role in Anbar, a high risk given the presence of U.S. personnel at al-Asad airbase.
The coordinated ISIS attack on Ramadi city on May 15 followed a near 18-month effort by ISIS to capture the city from the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). At the time of the attack the ISF units that had held the city's defenses included Iraqi Army (IA) units, the IA 1stRapid Intervention Division forces, the Federal Police, the Iraqi Police(IP), the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), to include Emergency Response Brigade (ERB) forces, and were supported by local anti-ISIS Iraqi Sunni tribal fighters. The coordinated ISIS assault on downtown Ramadi initially targeted neighborhoods between Iraqi government and ISF locations in Ramadi city in an effort to disrupt ISF responses to the attack, which had proven successful at repelling ISIS many times in the past. On May 15 ISF forces at the Government Complex in central Ramadi withdrew to the Anbar Operations Command in the north of the city. ISIS managed to combine its coordinated assault on Ramadi city with operations elsewhere in Iraq on May 15, pressuring the ISF in multiple locations simultaneously. In Garma, northeast of Fallujah, ISIS also seized the Harairat factories area and also launched an attack on the IA 1stRapid Intervention Division HQ at Camp Mazraa, east of Fallujah. ISIS also launched an attack on Jubbavillage, north of Baghdadi sub-district from “all sides”, seizing vehicles and equipment. ISIS also managed to continue its siege of the residential complex in Baghdadi.
Despite the reported arrival of Golden Division, SWAT, and IA reinforcements in the vicinity of Ramadi late on May 15, ISIS continued to consolidate control over the city on May 16-17. On May 16, ISF in the 8th Brigade Headquarters held a defensive posture as ISIS attacked their positions in northwest Ramadi while forces at the Justice Palace and at Anbar Terrorism Directorate in the center of the city remained under siege. On May 17, ISIS took control of the AOC HQ while ISF withdrew to the “7km” area west of Ramadi. In the east, the ISF blocked the road between Habaniya base and Ramadi to prevent an attack by ISIS on the base while ISIS launched indirect fire on the nearby Khaldiya sub-district. Confronted with deteriorating security, the Prime Minister directed the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) to prepare for an operation in Anbar. Meanwhile, the Joint Operations Command (JOC) stated that the Prime Minister directed the “Popular Mobilization” and “all Jihadi factions” in a likely reference to the various factions of Shi’a militias, to prepare to enter Ramadi. Militias such as Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) and the Nujaba Movement (NM) ordered their members to be on alert and for those on leave to return to duty in preparation for an operation in Anbar. Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri and Federal Police (FP) commander Raid Shaker Jawdat reportedly arrived the Habaniya base to oversee operations. On May 19, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense circulated a video of ISF helicopters evacuating besieged ISF members from the Malab suburb of Ramadi.
By May 18 “thousands” of Shi’a militia members had arrived at the Habaniya base alongside the ISF. On May 21 Minister of Defense Khalid al-Obeidi and senior Ministry of Defense (MoD) officials visited the Habaniya base and met with ISF and “Popular Mobilization” leaders, speaking to the high-level interest in and visibility of the fight for Anbar. On May 23 the ISF, "Popular Mobilization" forces, and anti-ISIS Iraqi Sunni tribal fighters launched an offensive against the Husayba area east of Ramadi. The "Popular Mobilization" reportedly including Iranian-backed Shi'a militias, deployed in substantial numbers to prevent ISIS from entering Habaniya, Husayba, and Khalidiya areas, east of Ramadi. On May 23, five Emergency Response Brigade (ERB) battalions arrived at the Habaniya base and proceededwith “Popular Mobilization” forces to Khalidiya as further “Popular Mobilization” and FP reinforcements arrived in Khalidiya. The ISF, including the Iraqi Police (IP), the Iraqi Army (IA), and the ERBs, together with tribal fighters and the “Popular Mobilization,” recaptured Husayba, Madiq, al-Kisara, and Sheikh Masoud areas east of Ramadi. On May 24, the Khalidiya local chairman statedthat the ISF controlled Khalidiya and Habaniya sub-district and called on internally displaced persons (IDPs) from those areas to return to their homes. The IA and the “Popular Mobilization” also recaptured al-Ankur area, south of Ramadi and the ISF and the “Popular Mobilization” also advanced towardSura, al-Sufiya, and al-Zaraa areas east of Ramadi, recapturing a hospital in al-Sijariya, area east of Ramadi.
On May 26 the Popular Mobilization Commission announced the start of the “Labaik Ya Hussein” (“We Are Here for You, Hussein”) operation, which aims to liberate “northern Salah ad-Din and southeast of Tikrit, extending to northeast of Ramadi.” The the operation was renamed“Labaik ya Iraq” (“We Are Here for You, Iraq”) the following day after the previous name was widely criticized as sectarian, since it refers to a historically important Shi’a religious figure. Iraqi state TV statedthat the IA and “Popular Mobilization” forces had started moving toward Ramadi city (on May 27). Separately, Anbar police commander Maj. Gen. Hadi Razij statedthat the ISF, and the “Popular Mobilization”, and tribal fighters would participate in the operation to liberate Ramadi and that it will launch on three axes: from Madiq area in the east, from the Kilo 135 Area in the west, and from Albu Faraj, Albu Jalib, and Jazeerat Anbar areas in the north. Anbar provincial council member Athal al-Fahdawi stated that the ISF had cut off ISIS supply lines “south of Ramadi” and Maj. Gen. Razij later stated that the IA, IP, and “Popular Mobilization” had surroundedRamadi and were advancing from the east and the south.
Over May 26-27 the ISF and “Popular Mobilization” forces launchedindirect fire on Ramadi city began contesting Anbar University and the al-Tash and Humeira areas south of Ramadi, clashing with ISIS fighters who detonated SVESTs. The elite Golden Division (GD) reportedly clashed with ISIS at Anbar University, killing seven ISIS members wearing SVESTs. The Anbar police chief stated that the ISF also launched operations to recapture Ta’mim, north of Anbar University and arrested “tens” of non-Iraqi ISIS members.
The anti-ISIS fight has been augmented by the introduction of the “Popular Mobilization” and Shi’a militias into Ramadi’s security plan, but it may also be fundamentally undermined by their arrival. These forces now play dominant roles in anti-ISIS operations in Garma, northeast of Fallujah and in south of Fallujah, positions protecting Baghdad from ISIS in Anbar. They are also now present in large numbers at Habaniya base, and they are conducting joint offensives with the ISF that are credited with early successes. This posture largely reverses the gains that the ISF experienced after the fall of Tikrit in reasserting their dominance over the militias. Meanwhile ISF units supported by the U.S. remain in control of Haditha, al-Asad airbase, and Baghdadi in western Anbar, positions that used to constitute the strategic reinforcement to Ramadi from the west when ISIS previously attacked the city. ISIS has pre-empted their eastward assault by launching coordinated and persistent attacks on the two locations between May 17 and May 26. The arrival of the militias further complicates ISF-driven operations supported by U.S. airstrikes from western Anbar to help retake Ramadi. The next steps in the Iraqi government’s anti-ISIS fight must therefore be understood in the context of the new ISF disposition in Anbar, in which Ramadi-based units have withdrawn to Habaniya and are guarding the road to Baghdad with tribal fighters and “Popular Mobilization” elements, including lethal Iranian-backed Shi’a militias that are not commanded and controlled by the Prime Minister.
Graphical Note: The yellow coloring on the May 15, 17, and 24 maps is meant to highlight the most notweorthy element of the ISF deployment for the viewer.
ISIS Control and Expected Offensives in Central Syria: May 29, 2015
by: Christopher Kozak and Jennifer Cafarella
The Jabhat al-Nusra and Rebel Campaign for Idlib Province
by: Jennifer Cafarella
Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) seized control of Ariha, the final regime stronghold in Idlib Province, alongside allied Islamist rebels on May 28, 2015. This victory secures effective control over Idlib Province to JN and rebel forces, the second Syrian province to fall out of Assad’s control after ISIS-held Raqqa. A number of isolated and besieged regime positions remain in Idlib, including the Abu ad-Duhor military airbase that has been under JN siege since December 2014. Regime forces have reportedly begun to withdraw from villages along the Ariha- Jisr al-Shughour road as they absorb the loss of Ariha, indicating that JN and rebel forces are unlikely to face considerable resistance as they move to consolidate control over remaining pockets of regime-held terrain. Moderate rebel forces in the province played relatively marginal roles in the recent advances, often limited to providing artillery and other support to hardline Islamist and jihadist groups allied to JN. As a result, JN and its allies are likely to acquire a high level of influence in the governance and security structures that emerge in the newly-“liberated” province as a consequence of their significant military contributions to anti-Assad victories. This is a major strategic setback for the U.S. in Syria, as it cements JN gains in northern Syria to date, validates its methodology, and provides considerable momentum to its carefully tailored effort to mold rebel-held Syria into a post-Assad state that is governed by Shari’a law and ultimately a component of al-Qaeda’s envisioned global Caliphate. The regime continues to respond to military defeats with the indiscriminate use of airpower, barrel bombs, and weaponized chlorine gas attacks, and can be expected to maintain its effort to punish civilian populations in Idlib as anti-Assad forces formalize their control.
For more on JN strategy and intent in Syria, see: "Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria: an Islamic Emirate for al-Qaeda," Jennifer Cafarella, Institute for the Study of War, December 2014
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