ISIS Works to Merge its Northern Front across Iraq and Syria

By Jennifer Cafarella

Recent ISIS operations in Hasaka and Ninewa provinces indicate that ISIS has begun to further merge its northern battlefronts across the Syrian-Iraq border. ISIS is eradicating pockets of resistance that fall within the territory ISIS seeks to claim for its Caliphate, including the Iraqi city of Sinjar near the border in Ninewa province. ISIS seized the city of Sinjar on August 3, 2014 despite the protection of the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces, roughly 100 km east of Hasaka city, the provincial capital of the adjacent Syrian province. ISIS operations in these Northern provinces are likely linked, and the recent ISIS offensive in northern Iraq must be evaluated through a cross-border lens. Since mid-July ISIS has seized control of the Regiment 121 Artillery Base in Hasaka Province in addition to the Division 17 and Brigade 93 Bases in ar-Raqqa Province. ISIS forces also appear to be mobilizing to seize the final base in ar-Raqqa, the Tabqa Military Airbase. Significantly, these operations have proceeded in tandem with a campaign to remove internal threats to the Caliphate posed by isolated Syrian regime bases in ar-Raqqa province, and it appears ISIS is quickly moving toward a successful consolidation and hardening of its exterior borders in Northern Syria.

Hasaka Province

Since ISIS seized control of Mosul on June 10, ISIS has successfully merged its southern Deir ez-Zour and Anbar systems. Syria’s northeastern Hasaka Province is becoming a primary battleground as ISIS continues to consolidate its gains in Iraq and Syria and begins to merge its Hasaka and Ninewa areas of operation. Hasaka hosts important logistical lines of communication that connect ISIS strongholds in ar-Raqqa to recent ISIS gains in Ninewa, making Hasaka a significant front for ISIS operational planning. The province is also home to a large portion of Syria’s oil fields, a valuable strategic asset that ISIS has fought to control elsewhere in Syria. The main body of the Syrian opposition is largely absent from the province, where a low regime footprint and a large Kurdish population render it an undesirable area for most counter-regime forces in the Syrian opposition.[1]While Syrian Kurds in northern Syria declared their independence from the central government in the fall of 2013, they nonetheless cooperate at local levels with regime forces for purposes of social control.

The military arm of the de-facto independent Kurdish PYD party, the YPG, is in control of much of the province’s countryside and capitalizes on local support from Christian and Arab tribal elements to defend against ISIS incursions. The Kurdish Asayish security forces in charge of maintaining control inside city centers also coordinate locally with the regime’s NDF militias, which include units of Arab tribesmen from the al-Sharabiyin and al-Tay tribes in addition to elements of Christian militias. At the time of the fall of Mosul, the Syrian regime maintained control of the Qamishli airport and three hardened military bases throughout the province in addition to maintaining internal control within the major cities of Hasaka and Qamishli. The provincial capital of Hasaka City has remained under joint control between Syrian regime and Kurdish forces, each of which maintain control over different neighborhoods with coordination to ensure service provision and quality of life within the city.

Rather than targeting these regime enclaves, ISIS operations within the province throughout June and early July were largely directed against YPG forces in the countryside surrounding the cities of Ras al-Ayn and Qamishli on the Turkish border. In these zones, small units of ISIS fighters operating in strategically located villages regularly contested terrain held by Kurdish YPG forces in the countryside and maintained limited pressure on regime and YPG resupply lines to Hasaka city. ISIS forces also leveraged support from local Arab tribal elements, including the Sharabia tribe, a local rival to the YPG-allied Shaamar tribe. The most significant ISIS stronghold in the province’s northern countryside is located at Tel Hamis deep within the countryside northeast of Hasaka City, which ISIS assumed firm control after successfully repulsing an attempt by the YPG to seize the village in early January 2014. South of the city, it is assessed that the ISIS stronghold at ash-Shaddadi continues to serve as a command headquarters for ISIS forces throughout eastern Syria in addition to facilitating cross-border lines of communication and transit into Iraq’s Ninewa province.

This ISIS activity in the Hasaka countryside focused on maintaining lines of communication that traverse the province in addition to creating sufficient operating room for ISIS forces to mobilize on other fronts. However, ISIS forces also conducted initial shaping operations to isolate Hasaka city from its flow of supplies from Qamishli to the north. ISIS targeted the areas surrounding Qamishli Airport with Grad rockets and conducted kidnappings of several bus passengers on the Hasaka-Qamishli road in late June. ISIS forces also continued to contest the towns of Tal Ma’arof, Kharab al-A’skar, and Tel Alo in the YPG-controlled countryside south of Qamishli throughout July. Interdicting a second major supply line to Hasaka City, ISIS has pressured YPG forces along the Ras al-Ayn – Hasaka road, targeting YPG forces in the vicinity of Tel Tamir, a town strategically located at the junction of two of the province’s major highways. An IED detonated in a car along the road between Hasaka City and Tel Tamir on July 3, killing a PYD council member and a member of the town’s Popular Council. In addition, an ISIS SVBIED reportedly disguised as a truck bringing supplies to the area targeted a YPG camp just northwest of Tel Tamir on the road to Ras al-Ayn on July 13, killing eight. While limited in scope, these attacks in the weeks prior to the attack on Sinjar demonstrate the ability of ISIS to penetrate deep into YPG-controlled territory in zones likely marked for future incorporation into the Islamic State.

ISIS advances against critical regime installations

ISIS significantly escalated attacks against the Syrian regime throughout much of northeastern Syria beginning in mid-July. ISIS forces attacked regime positions in Deir ez-Zour city and launched a significant offensive against the al-Sha’er gas field in the Homs desert in central Syria on July 16. While the regime was ultimately able to recapture the gas field, the ISIS attack served to test regime responses and to force a regime deployment of significant reinforcements to an area highly isolated from other critical fronts. This feint by ISIS was likely calculated to soften regime targets elsewhere in Syria. Three days after the regime launched an offensive to regain control of the gas field, ISIS began a highly successful campaign against regime bases throughout Northern Syria. These include the Regiment 121 Artillery base in Hasaka Province in addition to the Division 17 and Brigade 93 bases in ar-Raqqa Province, with indicators of an upcoming ISIS attack to seize the Tabqa Military Airbase. The ISIS seizure of three regime military bases in Northern Syria serves to set the stage for ISIS forces in Hasaka and ar-Raqqa to achieve territorial continuity across northern Syria after the elimination of internal threats to the borders of the Caliphate.

ar-Raqqa

ISIS forces launched an attack to seize control of the Division 17 base just north of ar-Raqqa city on July 23. Two SVBIEDs were detonated at the entrance to the base, allowing ISIS fighters to advance into southern portions of the base. While there were reports that these VBIEDs detonated shy of their targets, the ISIS advance was nonetheless successful, and ISIS fighters immediately posted a video from inside the military housing facility inside the base. After the initial advance, ISIS beheaded six regime soldiers and displayed their severed heads near the al-Na’im roundabout within ar-Raqqa city. ISIS’s Wilayat ar-Raqqa account announced a curfew in ar-Raqqa on July 24, allegedly so that ISIS could hunt down regime forces who had escaped into the city. Regime forces immediately launched over 14 airstrikes against ar-Raqqa and Tabqa cities as helicopter gunships targeted ISIS positions, likely to provide cover for a large-scale regime withdrawal. Regime forces withdrew northward toward the al-Rayhat village, however ISIS ambushed a contingent of the withdrawing forces in the town of Abu Sharib, capturing and executing 50 regime soldiers on July 25. A total of 300 soldiers are reported to have successfully withdrawn to al-Rayhat, while additional hundreds relocated to the Division 93 base in Ayn Isa, roughly 40 km south of Tel Abyad on the Turkish border. “Tens” of soldiers are also reported to have reached the Tabqa military airbase southwest of ar-Raqqa city. The regime also launched two scud missiles against ISIS positions in ar-Raqqa from the Brigade 155 base in Qalamoun, and SOHR reported that a regime convoy supported by both fixed and rotary wing aircraft was deployed from al-Salamia to ar-Raqqa on July 25.

ISIS fighters seized the entirety of ar-Raqqa’s 17th Division Base on July 25 following the full withdrawal of the regime forces that had remained to provide cover. ISIS social media accounts in ar-Raqqa posted dozens of pictures of seized equipment as well as pictures of fighters sleeping and praying inside the base. 105 regime fighters, including at least 19 officers, were reportedly killed during the assault, while more than 140 soldiers are still missing. General Salim Hassoun and General Jihad Habib al-Qadda are rumored to be among those killed. Following a short period of consolidation in ar-Raqqa, ISIS forces launched an offensive to capture the Brigade 93 base north of ar-Raqqa city near the village of Ayn Issa. ISIS reportedly ordered the residents of villages surrounding the base to evacuate the area on July 29. A full ISIS offensive against the base was declared by the ISIS Wilayat ar-Raqqa on August 5, immediately followed by the detonation of three SVBIEDs against the base and a swift ISIS seizure of much of the base. SOHR reported that 15 ISIS fighters and 36 regime soldiers were killed, some of which were symbolically beheaded by ISIS after the attack. By August 8, ISIS forces gained full control of the base and regime forces were reported to have pulled back towart the Tabqa military airport in addition to villages west of the fallen Brigade 93 base. At the time of writing, ISIS forces appear to be mobilizing its forces and equipment to storm the Taqba base, the last regime stronghold in ar-Raqqa province.

Hasaka

In response to the initial ISIS escalation in Deir ez-Zour and the Homs Desert in mid-July, the Syrian regime increased its pressure against ISIS positions in Southern Hasaka Province, targeting areas controlled by ISIS south of Hasaka city, such as the al-Khair silos and the Karama village. Likely in retaliation for this increase in regime pressure on ISIS positions, two IEDs exploded in Hasaka City on July 22, one in a store near the al-Qahira Cinema and one targeting a store selling alcohol on al-Ahram street, killing a total of seven. These explosions were a notable departure from the city’s relative calm throughout the war and predicated a significant ISIS escalation against fortified regime infrastructure south of the city. Hours after launching a the offensive against the Division 17 military base north of ar-Raqqa City, ISIS fighters attacked the Regiment 121 artillery base in Malabiah south of Hasaka City. In response, the regime immediately closed all roads leading into the city, instituted a curfew, and conducted air raids around the base. However, regime forces were unable to repel the attacking ISIS forces, which received reinforcements on July 24.

Simultaneous attacks against other regime installations in the province neutralized the regime’s ability to reinforce the base and prevented an immediate counterattack against the ISIS rear. While also attacking the “Kawkab” military base east of the city, ISIS deployed three SVESTS against a military operations center within the city, reportedly by disguising the suicide bombers in NDF uniforms. A leading member of the Ba’ath party named Hanna Atalla was reportedly killed in the attack. Effectively severing the regime resupply line from Qamishli ISIS forces seized the town of Safiya, located 10 km north of Hasaka City at a critical juncture in the two Qamishli-Hasaka highways. Farther north, a number of explosions occurred in Qamishli city: first, a large explosion targeted the local headquarters of military intelligence on al-Wahda Street. Syrian state news outlet SANA also reported the detonation of second explosive device planted in the city’s southern al-Tay neighborhood, and ISIS reportedly targeted a bus transporting regime forces with a stun grenade.

Finally, as fighting in the Regiment 121 base continued, an ISIS SVBIED detonated at the Panorama checkpoint at the southern entrance to Hasaka city on July 26 amidst clashes in the area between ISIS and YPG fighters. The SVBIED is likely to have hindered the regime’s ability to reinforce the Regiment 121 base, and the ISIS Wilayat Baraka (Hasaka) twitter account subsequently claimed to have successfully halted a regime military convoy at the checkpoint. After three days of clashes, ISIS seized full control of the base on July 27. A prominent NDF commander named Abdul-Samad al-Nazzal was reportedly killed during the fighting in addition to General Miziad Salameh, the commander of Regiment 121. Following the full seizure of the base, ISIS released pictures purporting to document a large quantity of heavy weaponry seized from within the base, including at least four howitzers. ISIS social media accounts also released a video tour of the base and the captured military equipment.

While rumors initially emerged that regime forces withdrew from the city itself in order to reinforce key remaining military bases elsewhere in the province, it appears the regime instead consolidated control of its own critical  infrastructure within the city, such as water pumping stations and jails, with the help of security forces and the NDF, while possibly transferring further control of certain neighborhoods to Kurdish forces. An official PYD account reassured civilians that Kurdish forces maintained full control over the administration of Kurdish areas of the city, and the YPG conducted a military parade in the Salhiya neighborhood in a show of strength on July 31. While fighting in the city’s southern countryside initially continued, regime forces claim to have consolidated control of the southern outskirts of the city amidst a reported ISIS withdrawal into its own territory deeper south of the city. Clashes between regime forces and ISIS in the village of Sabe Sekor southeast of the city on July 31 indicate that the ISIS forces that attacked the Kawkab military base likely withdrew southeast toward the Iraqi border. A primary transit route for ISIS fighters between Iraq and Syria, this zone is likely a staging area for ISIS forces operating in the Jazeera desert, and could have been the area from which ISIS forces mobilized in the August 3 attack on Sinjar.

In addition, some ISIS forces withdrew west of the city, forcing a civilian relocation from the western al-Neshwa area of the city due to heavy ISIS bombardment to cover its retreating forces. Further clashes erupted on August 5 between gunmen and YPG fighters near al-Bairuti Bridge at the northern entrance to the southern Gweran neighborhood of Hasaka city after a military convoy of YPG fighters attempted to enter the neighborhood  and make arrests. It is possible this altercation was the result of the distribution of an August 4 ISIS statement that called for residents in Syria’s northeast region to halt their support for the YPG and foreshadowed an impending ISIS assault upon Hasaka city. Reports have emerged that the regime is considering relocating the official administration of Hasaka province to the city of Qamishli amidst fears of a full ISIS offensive against the city, and negotiations are reportedly ongoing over the formation of a joint Governing Council for the city that could facilitate a regime drawdown.

The ISIS main effort against the Regiment 121 Artillery Base is likely to have deployed from the ISIS stronghold of al-Shadadi in southern Hasaka Province, however the supporting efforts in the cities of Hasaka and Qamishli were likely staged from elsewhere within the province, possibly the ISIS stronghold in Tel Hamis. Pro-ISIS activists posted on Twitter that the combined offensives in ar-Raqqa and Hasaka involved a total of 1,400 fighters: 600 in ar-Raqqa and 800 in Hasaka, although this is impossible to verify. An ISIS mobilization near Ras al-Ayn was reported by SOHR on July 17, and it is possible that these forces were integrated into the offensive against Hasaka City. The requirements for consolidating control in Deir ez-Zour in addition to the simultaneous escalation in ar-Raqqa province makes it unlikely that the ISIS force in Hasaka drew manpower from elsewhere within Syria. It is equally unlikely that ISIS forces were reallocated from Iraq, due to the requirements to mount the significant escalation against the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga on August 3. Therefore, it is assessed that ISIS did not relieve other positions within either theatre in order to conduct this operation.

The seizure of these three regime bases removed obstacles for ISIS freedom of movement within the areas of operation south of Hasaka city and north of ar-Raqqa city. ISIS will likely attempt to seize the city of Hasaka itself in order to successfully link these two systems, as the major highways that allow for transit northwest into ar-Raqqa province pass through the city’s outskirts.  While ISIS will likely continue to pressure regime and YPG supply lines through Qamishli, an attack against the city itself is unlikely in the near term. The city’s distance from current ISIS lines of communication makes it an less likely objective, and its importance to both the YPG and the regime will ensure stiff resistance and provide a strong deterrence against an ISIS attack. 

Sinjar

While shifting to a consolidation phase in Hasaka, ISIS forces in Iraq’s Ninewa province attacked the isolated Kurdish stronghold of Sinjar on August 3, successfully forcing a tactical retreat by Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces. The assault appears to have been conducted by the ISIS Wilayat Ninewa force, likely the same force that seized the city of Mosul on June 10. However, testament to the cross-border nature of the full ISIS force in this area, ISIS’s Syrian Wilayat al-Baraka (Hasaka) claimed to have sent fighters to participate in a subsequent attack against the village of Khan Suwwar north of the Sinjar mountains. The seizure of Sinjar represents a linked effort to neutralize threats to the ISIS interior, successfully removing a key obstacle to the territorial integrity linking its Hasaka and Ninewa Wilayats. If ISIS continues to expand in northern Iraq, ISIS forces may turn northward to the oil fields in Syria’s Hasaka province after securing and hardening the current borders of its Caliphate. The fields remain under YPG control, and are likely to be heavily defended by both YPG and local tribal elements. ISIS forces to date have largely refrained from mounting a meaningful challenge to this control, as the fields present a hardened target with less immediate implications for the consolidation of the Caliphate. However, a two-front offensive against Hasaka’s northeast launched from the ISIS stronghold of Tel Hamis in Hasaka and ISIS positions within Ninewa province may have sufficient momentum to meaningfully challenge the YPG for control of the oil infrastructure. As such, a campaign into northeastern Hasaka is a possible future course of action if ISIS is able to secure and harden the current borders of its Caliphate.

Following the fall of Sinjar, Syrian Kurdish YPG forces moved in to control the Iraqi side of the Yarubiya border crossing and to counter an ISIS advance against the nearby Iraqi town of Rabia. According to a statement released by the YPG General Command, 700 Peshmerga fighters initially retreated into Syrian territory following the ISIS assault on Sinjar, where some are reported to have received medical treatment by Kurdish doctors. In the statement the YPG also committed to cooperating at the “highest levels” with the Peshmerga in order to counter the ISIS assault. In addition, YPG forces have opened routes into Kurdish territory in Hasaka Province for refugees fleeingfrom Sinjar. Co-chairman of the PYD Salih Muslim confirmed YPG involvement in Iraq, stating during a telephone interview that the forced withdrawal of the Peshmerga from Sinjar prompted the YPG to cross the border “to support and assist” the Peshmerga forces. He also stated that YPG forces crossed the border from several locations, likely in the effort to manage the flow of refugees. On August 4, a redeployment of Peshmerga forces to the border allowed the combined Kurdish forces to successfully regain control of the border crossing after clashes with ISIS. In addition, YPG and Peshmerga forces continue to contest ISIS positions on the nearby outskirts of Rabia. According to the head of the YPG’s information center, YPG forces have conducted five successful operations against ISIS forces in Ninewa province and participated in attacks by the Peshmerga against ISIS forces in Zumar and Kaskie in addition to Rabia.

The YPG defense of Iraqi Kurds and Yezidis against ISIS is the first case of YPG deployment outside of Syrian territory. The Syrian PYD had previously attempted and failed to reach an agreement with the Iraqi Kurdish National Council (KNC) to create joint de-facto administrations in northern Syria that could have provided for military cooperation between the two bodies. Without the support of the president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq Mahmoud Barzani, the PYD was forced to negotiate local settlements with Christian and Arab groups in order to secure its territory. This balancing within northern Syria is unlikely to change in the wake of the fall of Sinjar and the deployment of the YPG into Iraqi territory. While local support to the Peshmerga near the Syrian-Iraqi border to deter further ISIS advances in this zone is in the interest of the YPG, Syria will undoubtedly remain its primary focus.

Further, sources of local support to the YPG within Syria will prove increasingly crucial if ISIS continues to advance within Hasaka province. Testament to the importance of local relationships for continued YPG control in the province, in late July the PYD appointed Humaydi Dahmam al-Assi al Jarba, a member of the Shammar tribe and a cousin of former Syrian Coalition chief Ahmad Jarba, as co-governor of Hasaka Province. The Shammar tribe has historically facilitated YPG operations against ISIS, and was instrumental in the YPG’s ability to reinforce the Yarubiya border crossing and to secure YPG control of Hasaka’s oil fields after the fall of Mosul. The deepening of these ties is an indicator of the continued importance of local Syrian alliances within the Kurdish war effort against ISIS. As ISIS continues to push forward with its campaign in Northern Iraq and Syria, the continued ability of the YPG and the Peshmerga to continue mount successful resistance will be a limiting factor in the ISIS advance.

Conclusion

Through a significant escalation against the Syrian regime and the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga beginning in mid-July, ISIS forces have made large advances in a campaign to consolidate internal control within the Caliphate. The Syrian regime’s Regiment 121, Division 17, and Brigade 93 military bases have fallen to ISIS, and indicators have emerged of an upcoming ISIS attack against the Tabqa military airbase southwest of ar-Raqqa City. ISIS has also seized the Peshmerga stronghold at Sinjar in the west of Iraq’s Ninewa Province, successfully consolidating its internal line of control across the Jazeera desert into Syria. The breath of these linked offensives across Iraq and Syria illustrate the ISIS priority objective of establishing territorial integrity for the Caliphate, and are evidence of the large military capacity ISIS still possesses nearly two months after the fall of Mosul.

In order to achieve its goal of establishing a functional, viable state ISIS must continue to leverage its military capabilities to consolidate its interior lines across Iraq and Syria and form a set of identifiable and defensible borders. Eliminating interior vulnerabilities is a key component of this effort and is likely to remain a primary objective for the ISIS military campaign in ensuing weeks. The victories in ar-Raqqa, Hasaka, and Ninewa suggests that ISIS operational objectives prioritize setting the stage for the consolidation of control over logistical lines of communication from the Iraqi border and the current operational zone in southern Hasaka to strongholds in ar-Raqqa province in order to secure freedom of movement between currently separate systems. As continued military successes from increasingly unified theatres of operation fuel the ISIS war machine, a hardened ISIS exterior line is likely to allow ISIS forces to pursue further expansion.

---

[1] An initial Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and Ahrar al-Sham (HASI) footprint in villages near the Syrian-Iraqi border challenged the YPG within the Hasaka countryside, but was largely replaced in early 2014 by an ISIS threat as the JN-ISIS schism took hold and prompted a JN and HASI withdrawal to the west.

Iraq Situation Report: August 7, 2014

by ISW Iraq Team, Lauren Squires, Nichole Dicharry, and Jennifer Cafarella

Control of Terrain in Iraq: August 7, 2014

by ISW Iraq Team and Nichole Dicharry

Syria Update: July 26-August 7, 2014

by Carlo Darouni, Dana Hadra, and Joseph Sax



The Battle for Arsal

by Logan Brog

Key Takeaway: The current battle for Arsal represents the most significant spillover from the Syrian civil war into Lebanese territory and threatens to exacerbate Lebanon’s sectarian tensions. Although Syrian rebel operations in Arsal do not constitute an offensive by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the battle for Arsal demonstrates the potential for localized Syrian rebel groups to pledge support to ISIS in a bid for resources and notoriety, thereby expanding the reach of ISIS into Lebanon. 

Battle for Arsal

For the first time, large-scale fighting from Syria has spilled into Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces is currently battling rebels affiliated with Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) in and around Arsal, a Lebanese town 13 km west of the Syrian border in which a massive influx of refugees and rebels has long made the area a lawless enclave in a relatively weak state. This post examines the origins, significant actions, and key players involved in the battle for Arsal as well as the broader implications for Lebanese security.

As a result of the Syrian regime’s offensive to clear rebel strongholds along the Lebanese border since 2013, Syrian rebels and refugees have amassed in the Lebanese town of Arsal. The Syrian regime’s strategy of clearing and holding rebel strongholds has failed to destroy rebels in Qalamoun and has instead displaced these rebels into Arsal and surrounding areas. Arsal has therefore emerged as an important support zone for rebels in Syria, providing access to resources, reinforcements, and sanctuary. Increasingly, Arsal has functioned as a primary staging zone for rebels conducting reprisal attacks against Hezbollah targets within Lebanese territory. Rebel activity in Arsal therefore provides a shared strategic threat for the Lebanese government, Hezbollah, and the Syrian regime.

On June 10, Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, fell to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Almost immediately, Iraqi Shi’a militiamen fighting alongside Hezbollah and the Syrian regime in Qalamoun returned to Iraq to secure Shi’a holy sites and Baghdad, requiring Hezbollah to deploy Lebanese fighters to fill their positions. As Hezbollah reinforcements trickled in, Syrian rebels revamped attacks against regime targets in the Qalamoun region in mid-June which had been largely uncontested in since April. The rebel offensive in Qalamoun has now spilled west of the porous Lebanon-Syria border, forcing the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to combat rebel groups which have pledged allegiance to ISIS as well as other Syrian rebels including Jabhat al-Nusra in Arsal.

In mid-July, the LAF announced the beginning of a “wide campaign” against militant activity in eastern Beqaa Governorate surrounding Arsal. On July 31, Hezbollah forces operating in the Qalamoun region closed the only major road connecting Arsal to Syria from the east, blocking the movement of people and goods between Arsal and Qalamoun. Meanwhile, the Syrian Air Force conducted airstrikes in Lebanese territory, targeting rebel positions in Wadi al-Ajram and az-Zamourani on July 31. Hezbollah also deployed troops to Shi’a towns west of Arsal, isolating rebels to a small area surrounded by Hezbollah fighters. This combination of movements by the LAF, Syrian regime, and Hezbollah forces suggests a coordinated, cross-border effort to isolate rebels in the town of Arsal. Coordination between the Lebanese Armed Forces and Hezbollah is also confirmed in a video showing a convoy of Hezbollah vehicles passing through a LAF checkpoint en route to Arsal without being stopped or searched.

The Battle for Arsal began on August 2, when the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) arrested Imad Ahmed Joumaa at a checkpoint east of Arsal. Joumaa is a commander of Liwa Fajr al-Islam, a small Syrian rebel group that recently pledged allegiance to ISIS. Shortly after, masked gunmen, likely led by Joumaa’s men, entered residential areas of Arsal. The rebels then captured soldiers, overtook government services and security buildings, and attempted to gain control of large parts of Arsal and the plains that surround it. While this is consistent with an attempt to emulate ISIS’ strategy for attacking urban areas throughout Syria and Iraq, the decision to seize territory in Arsal was likely an attempt to push back against restrictions on rebel freedom-of-movement rather than an ideologically-driven campaign. The LAF deployed additional troops to the area and quickly mounted a counteroffensive, retaking infrastructure, clearing territory, and targeting rebel positions. The Syrian Air Force also bombed fighters from aircraft flying over Lebanese territory.

As of the time of publication, efforts to halt fighting appear to have succeeded. During a prior cease-fire on August 6, Jabhat al-Nusra elements withdrew from Arsal. ISIS-affiliated militants withdrew from Arsal across the Syrian border on August 7 as part of a different cease-fire agreement. Arsal’s large refugee population and significant strategic value make future rebel operations likely.

Syrian Rebel Groups in Lebanon

The exact identity and group composition of rebels fighting in Arsal is not discernable from available information, but those fighting likely include rebels who were led by Imad Ahmed Joumaa, who pledged support to the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in a YouTube video posted on June 20. Jabhat al-Nusra is also involved in the fighting, initially claiming that it entered Arsal to give the population humanitarian support. Video evidence and local media reports, however, indicate that the group’s fighters are also involved in kinetic activity, including the kidnapping of Lebanese soldiers. 

ISIS involvement in Arsal does not necessarily indicate a western expansion of ISIS territorial control or a decision from ISIS leadership to expand the Islamic State into Lebanese territory. There is no indication that ISIS leadership ordered, authorized, directly funded, or knew about plans to launch an offensive to take Arsal. ISIS elements in Qalamoun have had a cooperative relationship with local rebel groups in the past, many of which ISIS fights elsewhere in Syria. For example, despite a large scale offensive by Syrian rebel groups against ISIS fighters in northern Syria in early 2014, ISIS and other rebel groups continued to cooperate against regime forces in Qalamoun.

This dynamic likely extends to the Battle for Arsal. Local ISIS-identifying groups with decentralized decision-making may fight under the ISIS banner without coordinating with ISIS leadership in order to ride the tailwinds of recent ISIS victories and attract recruits and donors willing to fund expensive weapons purchases. Significantly, official ISIS twitter accounts have had limited coverage of the events in Arsal and have not claimed responsibility for the offensive.

The Battle for Arsal also demonstrates that even when operating without orders from ISIS command-and-control, armed groups fighting under the ISIS banner can have devastating consequences for states throughout the Middle East. ISIS may seek to capitalize on the future successes of small armed groups by directly governing the territories seized on its behalf, rewarding the small groups who fought with the black flag and encouraging others to do the same. This also indicates that areas not specifically targeted by ISIS could become new battlegrounds for the group. Recent events in eastern Beqaa Governorate underscore the shifting extremist landscape in which ISIS may have supplanted al-Qaeda as the most desirable extremist organization to be affiliated with for the first time in a decade. Such a shift would have significant consequences for al-Qaeda’s global network, how states respond to threats from non-state actors, and the manner in which armed groups plan and execute attacks throughout the Middle East and North Africa.

Escalation in Syrian Spillover

To prevent violence from spreading from Arsal to the rest of Lebanon, the LAF deployed troops to areas from which Sunni militant activity may originate. Abra, the Sidon neighborhood where Sheikh Ahmed al-Assir led his failed Islamist insurrection against the government in June 2013, is now completely sealed by the LAF. Additional checkpoints leading to Ain al-Hilweh and Miye wa Miye, Palestinian refugee camps off-limits to the Lebanese government, were set up. Tawari, a neighborhood of Ain al-Hilweh, is a center of radical Islamist activity and home to Ash-Shabab al-Muslim, an off-shoot of Jabhat al-Nusra that is composed of Fatah al-Islam and Jund ash-Sham.

Spillover from the Syrian Civil War is not new to Lebanon, but previous incidents were isolated and posed a limited threat to Lebanon’s capacity to maintain general stability and security throughout the state. Until the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed to Tripoli as part of a new security plan in April 2014, Alawite residents of the Jebel Mohsen neighborhood, which support Bashar al-Assad’s government, and Sunni residents of the Bab at-Tabbaneh neighborhood, which support the Syrian opposition, engaged in violent clashes. Even when clashes expanded beyond the neighborhoods’ borders, they never posed an existential threat to the Lebanese state. Similarly, while rocket attacks, bombings, assassinations, and clashes throughout Lebanon have shaken society and prompted many to question the state’s ability to endure such a hostile environment, no single incident has been as destabilizing or dangerous as the Battle for Arsal.

Until now, groups carrying out attacks in Lebanon have almost exclusively targeted Hezbollah interests. Recent attacks against the Lebanese Armed Forces in Tripoli, fallout from the Battle for Arsal, represent a potential step-change that could lead to the LAF being targeted for its perceived role in supporting Hezbollah. On August 3, the Lebanese Armed Forces clashed with armed rebels for five hours in Tripoli during an attempt to secure the city in anticipation of sectarian blowback from LAF operations in Arsal. On August 4, the Committee of Muslim Scholars organized a protest in Tripoli to rally against LAF attacks against rebels in Arsal. When the LAF moved to block protesters, gunmen fired at soldiers. Eight LAF soldiers were injured in a separate incident, when a bus transporting them was the target of gunfire in Tripoli. While Sunni political leadership is standing by the LAF’s counteroffensive in Arsal, some Sunni sheikhs in Tripoli are not. Lebanese security forces’ capacity to conduct law enforcement in Sunni areas may be compromised by the perceived sectarian nature of its operations in eastern Beqaa Governorate.

Most Likely and Most Dangerous Outcomes

The Battle for Arsal represents the most significant spillover into Lebanese territory from the Syrian civil war thus far. It is therefore important to consider the possible implications for Lebanon as events unfold. 

The most likely outcome of the Battle for Arsal is the long-term engagement of Lebanese security services along the Lebanese-Syrian border. The Lebanese Armed Forces is unlikely to be able to meaningfully end illegal cross-border traffic, but it can make operating in Arsal costly and less desirable as a fall-back position for Syrian rebels. In order for this to work, Hezbollah would need to maintain its siege on Arsal from the west, Lebanese air power would continue to bomb rebel positions east of Arsal, and the Syrian Air Force would continue to target rebels crossing the mountainous border into Lebanon, which is their only avenue of approach. No actions indicate that the nature of this cooperation will change in the near future.

The most dangerous situation that could result from the Battle for Arsal has Lebanese security forces in sustained engagement with rebels near Arsal. The Institute for the Study of War assesses that a large portion of the rank-and-file of the LAF are likely Sunni. Long-term fighting may lead to defections if Sunni LAF members are increasingly ordered to crack down on Sunni-dominant areas such as Arsal. This would sectarianize what are now seen as national institutions and jeopardize the state’s ability to defend itself from sectarian threats. The demographic reality makes working in Arsal extremely difficult. A failure to rapidly achieve mission success may result in a significantly handicapped national defense.

Sunni militant organizations operating in different geographic regions of Lebanon may unify in acting against the state if Hezbollah deploys additional troops to Arsal and its Sunni surroundings. Sunni extremist groups in Tripoli, Sidon, eastern Beqaa Governorate, and the Palestinian refugee camps have few links and are generally separated by differences in geography and leadership. A legitimate threat to Sunnis in eastern Beqaa Governorate may bring these groups together. It is unclear whether the Lebanese Armed Forces has the capacity or bandwidth to fight a multi-front Battle against a determined extremist population. 

Even before the beginning of the Battle of Arsal, extremist Sunnis in Tripoli began mobilizing protests against perceived injustice toward their community in Tripoli and the continued detention of Islamist prisoners in Roumieh Prison. The arrest of leaders directing fighting in Bab at-Tabbaneh and the infrequency of clashes since April 2014 means that hundreds of men previously occupied by localized sectarian fighting are now ready and itching for a larger battle more directly linked to the Syrian conflict. The young, unemployed population in Palestinian refugee camps already has links to organizations like Jabhat al-Nusra, but the Lebanese Armed Forces can more easily restrict access into and out of these locations.

Conclusion

The Battle for Arsal underscores Lebanon’s vulnerability to spillover from Syria’s civil war and highlights how instability and extremism have metastasized across Iraq and the Levant since the fall of Mosul on June 10. Current events also presage the danger of small armed groups adopting ISIS’ ideology and flag while seeking to replicate its military successes beyond Iraq and Syria. The degree to which Lebanon is able to maintain security and stability will largely be determined by wars fought and decisions made beyond its borders. The response mounted by Lebanese security forces may temporarily eliminate the presence of Syrian rebels along one swath of the western side of the Lebanese-Syrian border, but Lebanon is unlikely to be able to insulate itself from regional dynamics, many of which are intensified by the sectarianism at the core of Lebanese society and politics.

Iraq Situation Report: August 6, 2014

by ISW Iraq Team, Jessica D. Lewis, Lauren Squires, and Nichole Dicharry

Iraq Situation Report: August 5, 2014

by ISW Iraq Team, Lauren Squires, and Nichole Dicharry

Iraq Situation Report: August 4, 2014

by ISW Iraq Team and Nichole Dicharry

Control of Terrain in Iraq: August 4, 2014

by The ISW Iraq Team, and Nichole Dicharry

Iraq Situation Report: August 3, 2014

by ISW Iraq Team and Jessica D. Lewis



Iraq Situation Report: August 2, 2014

by ISW Iraq Team and Aaron Reese

Iraq Situation Report: August 1, 2014

by Lauren Squires & Nichole Dicharry

Echoes of Syria: Hezbollah reemerges in Iraq

ISW's Alexander Orleans recently wrote an analysis on Hezbollah's response to the crisis in Iraq. Read this post on the Iraq blog here.

Echoes of Syria: Hezbollah reemerges in Iraq

By Alexander Orleans

Visibility on Lebanese Hezbollah’s current response to the crisis in Iraq has markedly increased, with reliable sources describing that military advisors are being deployed from Lebanon to assist Iraqi Shi’a militia forces. Nicholas Blanford, for example, has reported that sources close to Hezbollah have revealed that a 250-member advisory unit is being deployed to Iraq. The unit’s primary mission is to advise, train, and coordinate Iraqi Shi’a militias operating under the guidance of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The sources furthermore indicated that the advisory unit is also already engaged in conducting intelligence and reconnaissance operations against ISIS forces. This advisory mission echoes Hezbollah’s early primary role in Syria as advisers and trainers of pro-regime forces. 

Operating in Iraq is nothing new to Hezbollah. In approximately 2005, Iran requested that Hezbollah stand up a group to support the training and operations of the Mahdi Army and the Special Groups in Iraq. The resulting organization was Hezbollah’s Unit 3800 (earlier known as Unit 2800), designed to supplant ongoing advisory efforts to Iraqi Shi’a militias being undertaken by Department 9000 of the IRGC-Qods Force’s (IRGC-QF) Ramazan Corps. Unit 3800 drew on expertise from Hezbollah’s Unit 1800, which provides support to Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas, as well as Hezbollah’s own special operations community.

According to a 2010 Defense Intelligence Agency report, Department 9000 and Unit 3800 were providing “the training, tactics, and technology to conduct kidnappings, small unit tactical operations, and employ sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs).” From 2003 to 2005, Hezbollah’s primary engagement was with the Mahdi Army; after the Special Groups emerged in 2006, they became the primary recipients of Unit 3800’s attention. In 2007, with rising tensions between local Iraqi Shi’a and Iranian trainers alongside marked Coalition pressure on IRGC activities in-country, Unit 3800 more and more became the Arab intermediary for Iranian support to Iraqi Shia militias. By 2008, it was reported that Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah was spending “several hours” a day on matters related to Iraq.

As described by Matthew Levitt of the Washington Institute of Near East Policy, Unit 3800 conducted training missions in Iraq, Lebanon, and Iran – while also supporting actual militia operations. Unit 3800 trainer and Hezbollah liaison to IRGC Ali Musa Daqduq, who was in custody from 2007 to 2012 before being released by Iraqi authorities, was tied to the January 20, 2007 attack on the Joint Coordination Center in Karbala, which resulted in the abduction and murder of four American soldiers. That attack was carried out by Qais al-Khazali’s Iranian-sponsored Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and later linked to Abdul Reza Shahlai, the Deputy Commander of IRGC-QF Special External Operations Unit. Evidence also exists that Hezbollah may have been conducting its own operations in Iraq as well. When conducting operations outside of Lebanon, Hezbollah has traditionally relied on its feared External Security Organization (ESO), which is responsible for both terror operations abroad and contributes to some intelligence and special operations. If Hezbollah was operating in Iraq beyond providing training, it is likely that ESO members were taking part. 

Since the departure of Coalition forces from Iraq, Unit 3800 commander Khalil Harb has been spotted in Yemen in 2012 and then-U.S. Homeland Security Advisor John Brennan described Hezbollah as “training militants in Yemen.” Unit 3800’s presence was likely in support of ongoing Iranian assistance to Houthi rebels there. The training requirements of Houthi groups are more conventional than the special operations-oriented training provided to the Special Groups. Thus, between missions in Yemen and the ongoing training of Iraqi Shi’a militias for action in Syria, Unit 3800 has likely developed a more sophisticated and multifaceted training capacity by drawing on both Hezbollah’s more conventional infantry experts and special operators, such as those from the ESO. 

Elite trainers from Hezbollah, such as those fielded by Unit 3800, have also played a major role in Iran’s assistance to the Syrian regime. While Hezbollah’s support to the Assad regime is clearly multifaceted, trainers in particular have played a major role in contributing to force integration between pro-Assad militias, Iraqi Shi’a militants in Syria, and the Syrian military. Hezbollah’s combat operations in Syria have also produced a new generation of experienced fighters on which it can draw. Hezbollah, alongside Iraqi Shi’a militias that have deployed to Syria, are components of an “Axis of Resistance” that have shown the ability to operate together in multiple theaters. It is telling that Muhammad Kawtharani, who as of 2013 was Hezbollah’s manager of all Iraqi operations, has assisted in coordinating the movement of Hezbollah fighters to support pro-regime forces in Syria. It would be unsurprising for Kawtharani to be involved in Hezbollah’s renewed deployment to Iraq.

Lebanese Hezbollah Iraq infrastructure 

On June 29, Brigadier General Massoud Jazayeri, deputy joint chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces and a senior IRGC officer, announced that “the same winning strategy used in Syria to put the terrorists on the defensive … is now taking shape in Iraq.” Given Hezbollah’s experience, it is quite possible that the new advisory unit in Iraq will play a similar force integration role in working to coordinate between the Iraqi military and Iraqi Shi’a militias. 

From this context, a plausible sketch of the new advisory unit clearly emerges. Given the past experiences of Hezbollah trainers in Iraq, Yemen, and Syria, the advisors now in Iraq have developed a solid idea on how to train militias for more conventional fighting in a timely and effective manner and direct the integration of their efforts with those of other forces. In this case, they are also stepping into an existing militia infrastructure with which they have familiarity both in the camp and the field, which can streamline the process. The advisors are probably a mix of Unit 3800 personnel, ESO members, and experienced fighters and special operators previously deployed to Syria. Based on reports that the advisors are already engaged in intelligence operations against ISIS, it is more than likely that a particularly sizeable portion of the advisors are special operations and intelligence personnel, expected to fill capability gaps of Iraqi Shi’a militias. 

While significant extension into Iraq does pose a challenge for Hezbollah – which concurrently needs to maintain a strong presence in Lebanon, maintain the momentum of its operations in Syria, and increasingly fill the gap in Syria left by departing Iraqi Shi’a militias – there are reasons to believe that the number of advisors (250) should be considered a conservative estimate. Reports of younger Hezbollah fighters in Syria indicates that in its effort to reconfigure forces for operations in both Syria and extension into Iraq, Hezbollah is likely sending its more experienced fighters from Syria to support the vital force integration effort in Iraq and attempting to backfill the vacuum they have left in Syria with newer fighters. 

On July 31, a Reuters report indicated that Ibrahim al-Hajj, a Hezbollah commander and technical specialist with ties to Hassan Nasrallah, was killed in Iraq on July 29. Initially, Lebanese news site Naharnet reported that al-Hajj had been killed in the Qalamoun region of Syria during a clash with rebel forces which left three other Hezbollah fighters dead. However, on next day – when al-Hajj was buried in his hometown of Qiyla in the Beqaa – an ISIS-supporter Twitter account claimed that al-Hajj had actually been killed in Samarra. The July 31 Reuters report, citing sources in Lebanon, claimed that al-Hajj had been acting as a trainer and was killed near Mosul. The AP has also reported that al-Hajj was part of the team which infiltrated Israel and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers in July 2006, triggering the 2006 Lebanon war. While the location of al-Hajj’s death remains unconfirmed, his public burial and the initial claim that he died fighting in Syria bears striking resemblance to the burials of early Hezbollah casualties in Syria. Those “martyrs” were supposedly killed doing their “jihadist duties,” which was intended to obscure the manner and location of their deaths; al-Hajj’s death has been described in the same terms by Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV station. In this case, claiming that al-Hajj died in Syria would provide a plausible narrative for his demise while also masking the possibility of his deployment to Iraq. 

Ibrahim al-Hajj martyr poster

Both the supposed number of advisors and the murky circumstances surrounding the death of al-Hajj would fit a pattern of Hezbollah’s initial foray into a conflict being intentionally understated, as it was in Syria during 2011 and 2012. 

While Hezbollah’s early public messaging on the crisis in Iraq was quite guarded, it eventually did progress to Hassan Nasrallah being quoted as saying on June 17 “We are ready to sacrifice martyrs in Iraq five times more than what we sacrificed in Syria, in order to protect shrines.” Also, in Nasrallah’s Quds [Jerusalem] Day address on July 25 he denounced ISIS saying “This is the most dangerous phase since the occupation of Palestine because there is a systematic destruction of countries, peoples, armies and societies … Iraq has entered into a dark tunnel in the name of Islam, unfortunately … Our duty as Muslims today is to condemn what Christians and Muslims are facing in Iraq.” It is reasonable to suspect that Hezbollah is already doing more rather than less in Iraq. Hezbollah activity in Iraq is likely to serve as a force multiplier for Iraqi Shi’a militias, making their activity more effective, but at the possible cost of galvanizing Iraqi Sunni resistance against the government. Furthermore, if Hezbollah’s commitment to Iraq truly is more than significant than advertised, the increasing attacks it is facing from Syrian rebels may begin to constitute a rising risk to the continued success of its operations in Syria. How these challenges are balanced, supported, and coordinated with other actors across multiple fronts will remain an area to watch.

Edited on August 21, 2014 to include information about Ibrahim al-Hajj.

Iraq Situation Report: July 31, 2014

by ISW Iraq Team, Nichole Dicharry, and Isabel Nassief