by ISW Iraq Team, Lauren Squires, Nichole Dicharry, and Jennifer Cafarella
Thursday, August 7, 2014
The Battle for Arsal
by Logan Brog
Key Takeaway: The current battle for Arsal represents the most significant spillover from the Syrian civil war into Lebanese territory and threatens to exacerbate Lebanon’s sectarian tensions. Although Syrian rebel operations in Arsal do not constitute an offensive by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the battle for Arsal demonstrates the potential for localized Syrian rebel groups to pledge support to ISIS in a bid for resources and notoriety, thereby expanding the reach of ISIS into Lebanon.
Battle for Arsal
For the first time, large-scale fighting from Syria has spilled into Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces is currently battling rebels affiliated with Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) in and around Arsal, a Lebanese town 13 km west of the Syrian border in which a massive influx of refugees and rebels has long made the area a lawless enclave in a relatively weak state. This post examines the origins, significant actions, and key players involved in the battle for Arsal as well as the broader implications for Lebanese security.
As a result of the Syrian regime’s offensive to clear rebel strongholds along the Lebanese border since 2013, Syrian rebels and refugees have amassed in the Lebanese town of Arsal. The Syrian regime’s strategy of clearing and holding rebel strongholds has failed to destroy rebels in Qalamoun and has instead displaced these rebels into Arsal and surrounding areas. Arsal has therefore emerged as an important support zone for rebels in Syria, providing access to resources, reinforcements, and sanctuary. Increasingly, Arsal has functioned as a primary staging zone for rebels conducting reprisal attacks against Hezbollah targets within Lebanese territory. Rebel activity in Arsal therefore provides a shared strategic threat for the Lebanese government, Hezbollah, and the Syrian regime.
On June 10, Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, fell to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Almost immediately, Iraqi Shi’a militiamen fighting alongside Hezbollah and the Syrian regime in Qalamoun returned to Iraq to secure Shi’a holy sites and Baghdad, requiring Hezbollah to deploy Lebanese fighters to fill their positions. As Hezbollah reinforcements trickled in, Syrian rebels revamped attacks against regime targets in the Qalamoun region in mid-June which had been largely uncontested in since April. The rebel offensive in Qalamoun has now spilled west of the porous Lebanon-Syria border, forcing the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to combat rebel groups which have pledged allegiance to ISIS as well as other Syrian rebels including Jabhat al-Nusra in Arsal.
In mid-July, the LAF announced the beginning of a “wide campaign” against militant activity in eastern Beqaa Governorate surrounding Arsal. On July 31, Hezbollah forces operating in the Qalamoun region closed the only major road connecting Arsal to Syria from the east, blocking the movement of people and goods between Arsal and Qalamoun. Meanwhile, the Syrian Air Force conducted airstrikes in Lebanese territory, targeting rebel positions in Wadi al-Ajram and az-Zamourani on July 31. Hezbollah also deployed troops to Shi’a towns west of Arsal, isolating rebels to a small area surrounded by Hezbollah fighters. This combination of movements by the LAF, Syrian regime, and Hezbollah forces suggests a coordinated, cross-border effort to isolate rebels in the town of Arsal. Coordination between the Lebanese Armed Forces and Hezbollah is also confirmed in a video showing a convoy of Hezbollah vehicles passing through a LAF checkpoint en route to Arsal without being stopped or searched.
The Battle for Arsal began on August 2, when the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) arrested Imad Ahmed Joumaa at a checkpoint east of Arsal. Joumaa is a commander of Liwa Fajr al-Islam, a small Syrian rebel group that recently pledged allegiance to ISIS. Shortly after, masked gunmen, likely led by Joumaa’s men, entered residential areas of Arsal. The rebels then captured soldiers, overtook government services and security buildings, and attempted to gain control of large parts of Arsal and the plains that surround it. While this is consistent with an attempt to emulate ISIS’ strategy for attacking urban areas throughout Syria and Iraq, the decision to seize territory in Arsal was likely an attempt to push back against restrictions on rebel freedom-of-movement rather than an ideologically-driven campaign. The LAF deployed additional troops to the area and quickly mounted a counteroffensive, retaking infrastructure, clearing territory, and targeting rebel positions. The Syrian Air Force also bombed fighters from aircraft flying over Lebanese territory.
As of the time of publication, efforts to halt fighting appear to have succeeded. During a prior cease-fire on August 6, Jabhat al-Nusra elements withdrew from Arsal. ISIS-affiliated militants withdrew from Arsal across the Syrian border on August 7 as part of a different cease-fire agreement. Arsal’s large refugee population and significant strategic value make future rebel operations likely.
The exact identity and group composition of rebels fighting in Arsal is not discernable from available information, but those fighting likely include rebels who were led by Imad Ahmed Joumaa, who pledged support to the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in a YouTube video posted on June 20. Jabhat al-Nusra is also involved in the fighting, initially claiming that it entered Arsal to give the population humanitarian support. Video evidence and local media reports, however, indicate that the group’s fighters are also involved in kinetic activity, including the kidnapping of Lebanese soldiers.
ISIS involvement in Arsal does not necessarily indicate a western expansion of ISIS territorial control or a decision from ISIS leadership to expand the Islamic State into Lebanese territory. There is no indication that ISIS leadership ordered, authorized, directly funded, or knew about plans to launch an offensive to take Arsal. ISIS elements in Qalamoun have had a cooperative relationship with local rebel groups in the past, many of which ISIS fights elsewhere in Syria. For example, despite a large scale offensive by Syrian rebel groups against ISIS fighters in northern Syria in early 2014, ISIS and other rebel groups continued to cooperate against regime forces in Qalamoun.
This dynamic likely extends to the Battle for Arsal. Local ISIS-identifying groups with decentralized decision-making may fight under the ISIS banner without coordinating with ISIS leadership in order to ride the tailwinds of recent ISIS victories and attract recruits and donors willing to fund expensive weapons purchases. Significantly, official ISIS twitter accounts have had limited coverage of the events in Arsal and have not claimed responsibility for the offensive.
The Battle for Arsal also demonstrates that even when operating without orders from ISIS command-and-control, armed groups fighting under the ISIS banner can have devastating consequences for states throughout the Middle East. ISIS may seek to capitalize on the future successes of small armed groups by directly governing the territories seized on its behalf, rewarding the small groups who fought with the black flag and encouraging others to do the same. This also indicates that areas not specifically targeted by ISIS could become new battlegrounds for the group. Recent events in eastern Beqaa Governorate underscore the shifting extremist landscape in which ISIS may have supplanted al-Qaeda as the most desirable extremist organization to be affiliated with for the first time in a decade. Such a shift would have significant consequences for al-Qaeda’s global network, how states respond to threats from non-state actors, and the manner in which armed groups plan and execute attacks throughout the Middle East and North Africa.
To prevent violence from spreading from Arsal to the rest of Lebanon, the LAF deployed troops to areas from which Sunni militant activity may originate. Abra, the Sidon neighborhood where Sheikh Ahmed al-Assir led his failed Islamist insurrection against the government in June 2013, is now completely sealed by the LAF. Additional checkpoints leading to Ain al-Hilweh and Miye wa Miye, Palestinian refugee camps off-limits to the Lebanese government, were set up. Tawari, a neighborhood of Ain al-Hilweh, is a center of radical Islamist activity and home to Ash-Shabab al-Muslim, an off-shoot of Jabhat al-Nusra that is composed of Fatah al-Islam and Jund ash-Sham.
Spillover from the Syrian Civil War is not new to Lebanon, but previous incidents were isolated and posed a limited threat to Lebanon’s capacity to maintain general stability and security throughout the state. Until the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed to Tripoli as part of a new security plan in April 2014, Alawite residents of the Jebel Mohsen neighborhood, which support Bashar al-Assad’s government, and Sunni residents of the Bab at-Tabbaneh neighborhood, which support the Syrian opposition, engaged in violent clashes. Even when clashes expanded beyond the neighborhoods’ borders, they never posed an existential threat to the Lebanese state. Similarly, while rocket attacks, bombings, assassinations, and clashes throughout Lebanon have shaken society and prompted many to question the state’s ability to endure such a hostile environment, no single incident has been as destabilizing or dangerous as the Battle for Arsal.
Until now, groups carrying out attacks in Lebanon have almost exclusively targeted Hezbollah interests. Recent attacks against the Lebanese Armed Forces in Tripoli, fallout from the Battle for Arsal, represent a potential step-change that could lead to the LAF being targeted for its perceived role in supporting Hezbollah. On August 3, the Lebanese Armed Forces clashed with armed rebels for five hours in Tripoli during an attempt to secure the city in anticipation of sectarian blowback from LAF operations in Arsal. On August 4, the Committee of Muslim Scholars organized a protest in Tripoli to rally against LAF attacks against rebels in Arsal. When the LAF moved to block protesters, gunmen fired at soldiers. Eight LAF soldiers were injured in a separate incident, when a bus transporting them was the target of gunfire in Tripoli. While Sunni political leadership is standing by the LAF’s counteroffensive in Arsal, some Sunni sheikhs in Tripoli are not. Lebanese security forces’ capacity to conduct law enforcement in Sunni areas may be compromised by the perceived sectarian nature of its operations in eastern Beqaa Governorate.
The Battle for Arsal represents the most significant spillover into Lebanese territory from the Syrian civil war thus far. It is therefore important to consider the possible implications for Lebanon as events unfold.
The most likely outcome of the Battle for Arsal is the long-term engagement of Lebanese security services along the Lebanese-Syrian border. The Lebanese Armed Forces is unlikely to be able to meaningfully end illegal cross-border traffic, but it can make operating in Arsal costly and less desirable as a fall-back position for Syrian rebels. In order for this to work, Hezbollah would need to maintain its siege on Arsal from the west, Lebanese air power would continue to bomb rebel positions east of Arsal, and the Syrian Air Force would continue to target rebels crossing the mountainous border into Lebanon, which is their only avenue of approach. No actions indicate that the nature of this cooperation will change in the near future.
The most dangerous situation that could result from the Battle for Arsal has Lebanese security forces in sustained engagement with rebels near Arsal. The Institute for the Study of War assesses that a large portion of the rank-and-file of the LAF are likely Sunni. Long-term fighting may lead to defections if Sunni LAF members are increasingly ordered to crack down on Sunni-dominant areas such as Arsal. This would sectarianize what are now seen as national institutions and jeopardize the state’s ability to defend itself from sectarian threats. The demographic reality makes working in Arsal extremely difficult. A failure to rapidly achieve mission success may result in a significantly handicapped national defense.
Sunni militant organizations operating in different geographic regions of Lebanon may unify in acting against the state if Hezbollah deploys additional troops to Arsal and its Sunni surroundings. Sunni extremist groups in Tripoli, Sidon, eastern Beqaa Governorate, and the Palestinian refugee camps have few links and are generally separated by differences in geography and leadership. A legitimate threat to Sunnis in eastern Beqaa Governorate may bring these groups together. It is unclear whether the Lebanese Armed Forces has the capacity or bandwidth to fight a multi-front Battle against a determined extremist population.
Even before the beginning of the Battle of Arsal, extremist Sunnis in Tripoli began mobilizing protests against perceived injustice toward their community in Tripoli and the continued detention of Islamist prisoners in Roumieh Prison. The arrest of leaders directing fighting in Bab at-Tabbaneh and the infrequency of clashes since April 2014 means that hundreds of men previously occupied by localized sectarian fighting are now ready and itching for a larger battle more directly linked to the Syrian conflict. The young, unemployed population in Palestinian refugee camps already has links to organizations like Jabhat al-Nusra, but the Lebanese Armed Forces can more easily restrict access into and out of these locations.
The Battle for Arsal underscores Lebanon’s vulnerability to spillover from Syria’s civil war and highlights how instability and extremism have metastasized across Iraq and the Levant since the fall of Mosul on June 10. Current events also presage the danger of small armed groups adopting ISIS’ ideology and flag while seeking to replicate its military successes beyond Iraq and Syria. The degree to which Lebanon is able to maintain security and stability will largely be determined by wars fought and decisions made beyond its borders. The response mounted by Lebanese security forces may temporarily eliminate the presence of Syrian rebels along one swath of the western side of the Lebanese-Syrian border, but Lebanon is unlikely to be able to insulate itself from regional dynamics, many of which are intensified by the sectarianism at the core of Lebanese society and politics.
Wednesday, August 6, 2014
Iraq Situation Report: August 6, 2014
by ISW Iraq Team, Jessica D. Lewis, Lauren Squires, and Nichole Dicharry
Tuesday, August 5, 2014
Monday, August 4, 2014
Sunday, August 3, 2014
Saturday, August 2, 2014
Friday, August 1, 2014
Echoes of Syria: Hezbollah reemerges in Iraq
ISW's Alexander Orleans recently wrote an analysis on Hezbollah's response to the crisis in Iraq. Read this post on the Iraq blog here.
Echoes of Syria: Hezbollah reemerges in Iraq
By Alexander Orleans
Visibility on Lebanese Hezbollah’s current response to the crisis in Iraq has markedly increased, with reliable sources describing that military advisors are being deployed from Lebanon to assist Iraqi Shi’a militia forces. Nicholas Blanford, for example, has reported that sources close to Hezbollah have revealed that a 250-member advisory unit is being deployed to Iraq. The unit’s primary mission is to advise, train, and coordinate Iraqi Shi’a militias operating under the guidance of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The sources furthermore indicated that the advisory unit is also already engaged in conducting intelligence and reconnaissance operations against ISIS forces. This advisory mission echoes Hezbollah’s early primary role in Syria as advisers and trainers of pro-regime forces.
Operating in Iraq is nothing new to Hezbollah. In approximately 2005, Iran requested that Hezbollah stand up a group to support the training and operations of the Mahdi Army and the Special Groups in Iraq. The resulting organization was Hezbollah’s Unit 3800 (earlier known as Unit 2800), designed to supplant ongoing advisory efforts to Iraqi Shi’a militias being undertaken by Department 9000 of the IRGC-Qods Force’s (IRGC-QF) Ramazan Corps. Unit 3800 drew on expertise from Hezbollah’s Unit 1800, which provides support to Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas, as well as Hezbollah’s own special operations community.
According to a 2010 Defense Intelligence Agency report, Department 9000 and Unit 3800 were providing “the training, tactics, and technology to conduct kidnappings, small unit tactical operations, and employ sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs).” From 2003 to 2005, Hezbollah’s primary engagement was with the Mahdi Army; after the Special Groups emerged in 2006, they became the primary recipients of Unit 3800’s attention. In 2007, with rising tensions between local Iraqi Shi’a and Iranian trainers alongside marked Coalition pressure on IRGC activities in-country, Unit 3800 more and more became the Arab intermediary for Iranian support to Iraqi Shia militias. By 2008, it was reported that Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah was spending “several hours” a day on matters related to Iraq.
As described by Matthew Levitt of the Washington Institute of Near East Policy, Unit 3800 conducted training missions in Iraq, Lebanon, and Iran – while also supporting actual militia operations. Unit 3800 trainer and Hezbollah liaison to IRGC Ali Musa Daqduq, who was in custody from 2007 to 2012 before being released by Iraqi authorities, was tied to the January 20, 2007 attack on the Joint Coordination Center in Karbala, which resulted in the abduction and murder of four American soldiers. That attack was carried out by Qais al-Khazali’s Iranian-sponsored Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and later linked to Abdul Reza Shahlai, the Deputy Commander of IRGC-QF Special External Operations Unit. Evidence also exists that Hezbollah may have been conducting its own operations in Iraq as well. When conducting operations outside of Lebanon, Hezbollah has traditionally relied on its feared External Security Organization (ESO), which is responsible for both terror operations abroad and contributes to some intelligence and special operations. If Hezbollah was operating in Iraq beyond providing training, it is likely that ESO members were taking part.
Since the departure of Coalition forces from Iraq, Unit 3800 commander Khalil Harb has been spotted in Yemen in 2012 and then-U.S. Homeland Security Advisor John Brennan described Hezbollah as “training militants in Yemen.” Unit 3800’s presence was likely in support of ongoing Iranian assistance to Houthi rebels there. The training requirements of Houthi groups are more conventional than the special operations-oriented training provided to the Special Groups. Thus, between missions in Yemen and the ongoing training of Iraqi Shi’a militias for action in Syria, Unit 3800 has likely developed a more sophisticated and multifaceted training capacity by drawing on both Hezbollah’s more conventional infantry experts and special operators, such as those from the ESO.
Elite trainers from Hezbollah, such as those fielded by Unit 3800, have also played a major role in Iran’s assistance to the Syrian regime. While Hezbollah’s support to the Assad regime is clearly multifaceted, trainers in particular have played a major role in contributing to force integration between pro-Assad militias, Iraqi Shi’a militants in Syria, and the Syrian military. Hezbollah’s combat operations in Syria have also produced a new generation of experienced fighters on which it can draw. Hezbollah, alongside Iraqi Shi’a militias that have deployed to Syria, are components of an “Axis of Resistance” that have shown the ability to operate together in multiple theaters. It is telling that Muhammad Kawtharani, who as of 2013 was Hezbollah’s manager of all Iraqi operations, has assisted in coordinating the movement of Hezbollah fighters to support pro-regime forces in Syria. It would be unsurprising for Kawtharani to be involved in Hezbollah’s renewed deployment to Iraq.
On June 29, Brigadier General Massoud Jazayeri, deputy joint chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces and a senior IRGC officer, announced that “the same winning strategy used in Syria to put the terrorists on the defensive … is now taking shape in Iraq.” Given Hezbollah’s experience, it is quite possible that the new advisory unit in Iraq will play a similar force integration role in working to coordinate between the Iraqi military and Iraqi Shi’a militias.
From this context, a plausible sketch of the new advisory unit clearly emerges. Given the past experiences of Hezbollah trainers in Iraq, Yemen, and Syria, the advisors now in Iraq have developed a solid idea on how to train militias for more conventional fighting in a timely and effective manner and direct the integration of their efforts with those of other forces. In this case, they are also stepping into an existing militia infrastructure with which they have familiarity both in the camp and the field, which can streamline the process. The advisors are probably a mix of Unit 3800 personnel, ESO members, and experienced fighters and special operators previously deployed to Syria. Based on reports that the advisors are already engaged in intelligence operations against ISIS, it is more than likely that a particularly sizeable portion of the advisors are special operations and intelligence personnel, expected to fill capability gaps of Iraqi Shi’a militias.
While significant extension into Iraq does pose a challenge for Hezbollah – which concurrently needs to maintain a strong presence in Lebanon, maintain the momentum of its operations in Syria, and increasingly fill the gap in Syria left by departing Iraqi Shi’a militias – there are reasons to believe that the number of advisors (250) should be considered a conservative estimate. Reports of younger Hezbollah fighters in Syria indicates that in its effort to reconfigure forces for operations in both Syria and extension into Iraq, Hezbollah is likely sending its more experienced fighters from Syria to support the vital force integration effort in Iraq and attempting to backfill the vacuum they have left in Syria with newer fighters.
On July 31, a Reuters report indicated that Ibrahim al-Hajj, a Hezbollah commander and technical specialist with ties to Hassan Nasrallah, was killed in Iraq on July 29. Initially, Lebanese news site Naharnet reported that al-Hajj had been killed in the Qalamoun region of Syria during a clash with rebel forces which left three other Hezbollah fighters dead. However, on next day – when al-Hajj was buried in his hometown of Qiyla in the Beqaa – an ISIS-supporter Twitter account claimed that al-Hajj had actually been killed in Samarra. The July 31 Reuters report, citing sources in Lebanon, claimed that al-Hajj had been acting as a trainer and was killed near Mosul. The AP has also reported that al-Hajj was part of the team which infiltrated Israel and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers in July 2006, triggering the 2006 Lebanon war. While the location of al-Hajj’s death remains unconfirmed, his public burial and the initial claim that he died fighting in Syria bears striking resemblance to the burials of early Hezbollah casualties in Syria. Those “martyrs” were supposedly killed doing their “jihadist duties,” which was intended to obscure the manner and location of their deaths; al-Hajj’s death has been described in the same terms by Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV station. In this case, claiming that al-Hajj died in Syria would provide a plausible narrative for his demise while also masking the possibility of his deployment to Iraq.
Ibrahim al-Hajj martyr poster
Both the supposed number of advisors and the murky circumstances surrounding the death of al-Hajj would fit a pattern of Hezbollah’s initial foray into a conflict being intentionally understated, as it was in Syria during 2011 and 2012.
While Hezbollah’s early public messaging on the crisis in Iraq was quite guarded, it eventually did progress to Hassan Nasrallah being quoted as saying on June 17 “We are ready to sacrifice martyrs in Iraq five times more than what we sacrificed in Syria, in order to protect shrines.” Also, in Nasrallah’s Quds [Jerusalem] Day address on July 25 he denounced ISIS saying “This is the most dangerous phase since the occupation of Palestine because there is a systematic destruction of countries, peoples, armies and societies … Iraq has entered into a dark tunnel in the name of Islam, unfortunately … Our duty as Muslims today is to condemn what Christians and Muslims are facing in Iraq.” It is reasonable to suspect that Hezbollah is already doing more rather than less in Iraq. Hezbollah activity in Iraq is likely to serve as a force multiplier for Iraqi Shi’a militias, making their activity more effective, but at the possible cost of galvanizing Iraqi Sunni resistance against the government. Furthermore, if Hezbollah’s commitment to Iraq truly is more than significant than advertised, the increasing attacks it is facing from Syrian rebels may begin to constitute a rising risk to the continued success of its operations in Syria. How these challenges are balanced, supported, and coordinated with other actors across multiple fronts will remain an area to watch.
Edited on August 21, 2014 to include information about Ibrahim al-Hajj.
Edited on August 21, 2014 to include information about Ibrahim al-Hajj.
Thursday, July 31, 2014
Rebel Operations in Idlib Province during the Spring of 2014
by Nate Petrocine
ISIS’s resurgence in Iraq has impacted the dynamics of the Syrian civil war, changing the strategic and operational calculus of regime, opposition, and ISIS forces fighting in Syria. In the late spring of 2014, regime forces concentrated efforts on Aleppo city and Deraa province leaving critical infrastructure in Idlib province unguarded and vulnerable. Rebel operations during this period demonstrate opposition forces’ ability to exploit regime weaknesses, and conduct coordinated offensives indicating organization above a tactical level. Opposition operations set a baseline for rebel activity against the regime. From this baseline, it will be important to assess how opposition groups in north-western Syria contend with the emerging three-front war in Syria.
In the spring and early summer of 2014, opposition forces targeted the regime’s logistics system and made significant advances in the province of Idlib. Rebel operations have continued to target the vital highways segmenting Idlib province, namely the M5 and the M4. The M5, which spans the wm5estern length of Syria from Damascus to Aleppo, is an essential supply route for both regime and opposition forces. Likewise the M4, which connects Aleppo and Idlib to the coast of Latakia, is indispensable for regime forces currently fighting in Aleppo City.
Shaping the assault on Khan Sheikhoun
Prior to the rebel offensive in Khan Sheikhoun, smaller shaping operations focused on liberating checkpoints along the M5 strip between Khan Sheikhoun and Ma’arat Nu’man. Checkpoints in the small town of Hesh and the Wadi al-Deif Military Complex in Ma’arat Nu’man remained obstacles to rebel operations. Seizing these key waypoints along the M5 strip allowed rebel forces significant freedom of movement along the route and prevented regime forces from reinforcing areas of Khan Sheikhoun.
On May 16, 2014, ten days before the final assault on Khan Sheikhoun, Suqour al-Sham and Sham Legion attacked the Wadi al-Deif military base located in the eastern outskirts of Ma’arat Nu’man with an impressive underground explosive. The tactic of using tunnels to emplace explosives under strategic regime positions has been utilized throughout the country to target hard-to-reach regime positions. On this occasion, fighters of Suquor al-Sham and Sham Legion dug an 850 meter tunnel leading to the western gate of the Wadi al-Deif military complex. Fighters then filled the cavern located under the base with what they claimed was 60 tons of homemade explosives. The successful detonation destroyed the western entrance of the base completely, and rebel fighters announced killing nearly one hundred regime soldiers.
On May 23, 2014, Sham Legion announced the “Battle of Trust in God” with the objective of liberating the town of Hesh and the sector of the M5 between Khan Sheikhoun and Ma’arat Nu’aman. Elements involved in the battle included the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood-linked Sham Legion, Suqour al-Ghab, the Islamic Front, the Syrian Revolutionaries’ Front (SRF), and a number of smaller local groups.
As a large waypoint along the M5 highway between northern Hama and southern Idlib, Khan Sheikhoun is of strategic importance for both regime and rebel forces. The town has been the site of fierce clashes since the regime first drove rebels out of the town in the summer of 2012. Seizing Khan Sheikhoun allows the rebels to control a greater stretch of the M5 highway, further choking the regime’s ability to use the road as a supply route. It would also pave the way for an offensive to seize the major regime base at Wadi al-Deif, near Ma’arat al-Nu’man.
Although the assault on Khan Sheikhoun only gained social media prominence as it approached its culmination, the offensive began mid-Spring. Beginning on April 3, 2014, ten rebel groups including al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), Islamic Front member Suqour al-Sham, Sham Legion, and a number of smaller Free Syrian Army (FSA)-aligned groups announced the “Echo of the Spoils of War Battle” in an effort to capture Khan Sheikhoun and the surrounding strip of the M5 highway. Like the rebel offensive in Hesh led by the Islamic Front and Sham Legion, the “Echo of the Spoils of War Battle” was in part led by the Islamic Front’s Suqour al-Sham, as well as Sham Legion. This indicates that the “Battle of Trust in God” was likely a coordinated shaping operation ahead of the Khan Sheikhoun offensive meant to prevent regime reinforcements from reaching the town from the north.
The offensive targeted the 21 checkpoints and military bases dispersed throughout Khan Sheikhoun, including the Khazanat Military Base, which served as a refueling depot for regime forces as well as a checkpoint protecting access to the city of Khan Sheikhoun. By April 15, 2014, the groups participating in the offensive announced they had seized al-Busaliya, al-Siad, and al-Misbah checkpoints, located in the southwestern sector of Khan Sheikhoun.
More than a month later, on May 25, 2014, a new operations room including JN as well as Western-backed groups Harakat Hazm and the Syrian Revolutionaries’ Front also announced a major assault on the Khazanat Military Base, an objective included in the “Echo of the Spoils of War Battle.” This assault on Khazanat Military Base was initiated at around 12:00 pm on May 25 by what participants named the “Mutual Consultation” operations room. According to a detailed statement of the raid released by JN, fighters advanced from the north and east, taking up positions in a number of buildings dispersed among orchards 1 kilometer north of the base, while fighters made their way along the base’s access road to flank it from the west. Later in the afternoon, JN fighters detonated two Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIEDs) that targeted regime positions around the perimeter of the base. Following the explosions, a raiding unit entered and eventually seized the base later that night. The following day, the “Echo of the Spoils of War Battle” achieved victory by seizing the large Salam Checkpoint, the last remaining regime position in the vicinity of Khan Sheikhoun city. Regime forces responded in the following days by dropping a number of barrel bombs on the Khazanat Military Base, as well as the Salam checkpoint. Activists on the ground believed a number of explosive barrels dropped on the area contained poisonous gas.
By the end of May 26, following the fall of both the Salam checkpoint and the Khazanat Military Base, Khan Sheikhoun was completely controlled by opposition groups, and activists uploaded multiple videos showing rebel convoys entering the city itself.
On May 25, the same day as the attack on Khan Sheikhoun, JN and Suqour al-Sham launched a two-pronged assault on the southern Ariha hills with the objective of seizing two military installations. The Fanar Restaurant Checkpoint and the Shami Military Installation sit atop two peaks in the area south of the town and control access to the southern neighborhoods of Ariha via two access roads. At 6 in the morning, JN with support from Suquor al-Sham detonated four SVBIEDs against regime infrastructure targets. All four SVBIEDs exploded in the Jabal al-Arbaeen area on the southern outskirts of Ariha. The first SVBIED, driven by Moner Mohammad Abu Salha, a 22-year-old American man from Florida, approached the Fanar Restaurant Checkpoint from the southwest along a dirt road. The 16 ton armored truck completely destroyed the checkpoint and caused it to crumble on itself, leaving only few survivors to defend it. Over the course of the battle, two more SVBIEDs exploded to the west of Fanar, targeting the Shami Military Complex. The first two SVBIEDs targeted the Commander’s building and Shami Checkpoint. One final VBIED targeted the Aram building, however the driver of the VBIED was able to park his vehicle and escape uninjured. The four explosions were followed by a barrage of artillery and gunfire. By the end of the day JN and Suquor al-Sham had seized both the Fanar and Shami Checkpoints in one of the largest coordinated SVBIED attacks since the beginning of 2014.
Rebels led by JN and Suquor al-Sham thus gained access to Ariha, a key town situated in the Jabal al-Arba’een region of Idlib which rebels briefly seized in the fall of 2013. The M4 passes through Ariha before connecting with the M5 in Saraqib. Controlling the section of the M4 in Ariha allows opposition forces to cut off regime ground supply leaving Latakia destined for Idlib or Aleppo cities. There is no clear evidence the two offensives were coordinated, however the presence of JN in both cases as well as the nearly simultaneous timing of the two operations strongly suggests a correlated effort.
The Battle Westward toward Jisr al-Shughour
Taking advantage of the recent momentum, JN, the Islamic Front, Sham Legion, and a number of local groups founded a new operations room on June 3, 2014, focusing on the area of Jisr al-Shughour. The operations room, formed to coordinate “The Battle to Respond to Injustices” also released a charter document containing a list of provisions to which all elements of the operations room were to adhere. Items include rules dictating the division of spoils through an Islamic court as well as strict guidelines for disseminating information about offensive. Despite the high profile of groups participating in the room and the existence of a charter document, as of mid-June little information had been disseminated about the group through its official Facebook page, either due to the strict operational security emphasized in the group’s charter, or simply due to their lack of engagement in operations.
The regime’s seizure of the Kassab border crossing in the end of April, a move that effectively ended the rebels’ offensive on the Latakia coast, appears to have also reversed rebel momentum around Jisr al-Shughour and the M4. On June 15, a statement purportedly from JN said that JN fighters would have to withdraw from the operations room entirely because they needed to allocate fighters to other higher priority areas. Moreover, due to alleged civilians casualties caused by rebel shelling, activists in Idlib have called on opposition fighters to end the Passageway offensive being waged by the SRF and Jabhat al-Izz.
After a brief respite of intense clashes surrounding Ma’arat Nu’man, rebel progression in Idilb continued in early July focusing on the area surrounding the Hamidiyah Army Base, southwest of Ma’arat Nu’man. Tha Hamidiyah Army Base is located along the M5 highway, limiting access to and from Ma’arat Nu’man from southern Khan Sheikhoun. Immediately west of the army base are four checkpoints: Hanajak, Tafar, Dahman, and al-Midajin Checkpoints form an arc, insulating Hamadiyah Army Base from the west to the north.
On July 7, Islamic Front forces, supported by an SRF-aligned rebel group named Liwa al-Maghawir raided the Taraf Checkpoint southwest of the Hamadiyah Army Base as part of an operation entitled “The Battle of One Army.” After targeting a number of regime tanks with TOW missiles, opposition forces approached the checkpoint using the surrounding orchards to cover their advance. After navigating through minefields surrounding the checkpoints, fighters reached the checkpoint’s earthen walls. Following clashes with regime forces, fighters entered the position and seized a number of T-55 tanks. After seizing the checkpoint, opposition forces used it as a staging point to continue their offensive northwest toward the Dahman checkpoint, before completely razing the buildings within to prevent the regime from reoccupying them. Days after the fall of the checkpoint, opposition forces continued to target regime armor in the vicinity with TOW missiles.
Opposition forces continued 600 meters north towards the Dahman checkpoint located northwest of the Hamadiyah Army Base. Clashes between IF, Filq al-Sham, and other SRF-aligned brigades led to opposition fighters seizing the Dahman checkpoint from regime forces. After capturing the checkpoint and a quantity of supplies inside, fighters destroyed buildings inside, again in an attempt to prevent regime forces from reoccupying the position.
On July 16, JN, Filq al-Sham, as well as smaller SRF groups attacked the al-Midajin Checkpoint located north of the Hamadiyah Army Base and the smaller, Hanajak checkpoint located immediately west of the Hamadiyah Army Base. JN published an image showing the al-Midajin and Hanajak Checkpoints along the front lines of opposition force’s advance towards the Hamadiyah Army Base. Hanajak fell to opposition forces with little resistance. Clashes continue between opposition and regime forces as rebels attempt to continue their advance towards the Hamidiyah Army Base.
The late spring and early summer rebel advances in Idlib province indicate that opposition forces have the ability to coordinate large scale offenses over relatively large swaths of territory. The initial Idlib offensive on the M5 around Khan Sheikhoun began with a combined assault over a distance of 45km on a single day. Such an operational range demonstrates that opposition forces are able to coordinate effectively at above a tactical level.
In mid-July regime forces clashed violently with rebel groups in the town of Morek, located in northern Hama province, in an attempt to seize the town from rebel forces. Regime soldiers stormed the town under the cover of airstrikes and clashed violently with members of the Islamic Front, local opposition brigades, and Jabhat al-Nusra. The regime offensive is likely a move to reinforce strategic locations along the strip of highway that passes through Idilb province. As regime forces attempt to advance northward, rebels will also have to contend with the threat of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, bearing down on them from parts of Aleppo province.
Wednesday, July 30, 2014
Tuesday, July 29, 2014
Monday, July 28, 2014
Life Under ISIS in Mosul
by Jenna Lefler
Introduction:
Over a month has passed since ISIS launched an operation that resulted in its seizure of Iraq’s northern capital of Mosul. In the wake of the offensive that led to the fall of Mosul and several other northern Iraqi cities, ISIS announced a new Islamic caliphate led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – styled as “Caliph Ibrahim.” Baghdadi later delivered a sermon in one of his first public appearances at Mosul’s Nur ad-Din al-Zengi Mosque. Although ISIS only recently exerted full control over the city of Mosul, the militant organization has had a palpable and steadily increasing presence in the city since its regeneration in 2010. Now operating as the legal, security, and judicial authority in one of Iraq’s largest cities, ISIS has begun imposing a particularly strict version of Shari’a law and crafting a society in Mosul modeled after the version of Islam that it envisions for its Islamic state. At the same time, it has been working to carry out basic government functions, such as collecting taxes, imposing security measures, and providing water, electricity, and social welfare services. However, ISIS is not operating in Mosul without opposition. Processes aimed at eliminating potential resistance movements in Ninewa have taken shape and they closely resemble ISIS activities in its neighboring Syria stronghold, ar-Raqqa. Recent developments in Mosul allow one to extract a picture of how life has changed or remained constant in Mosul under ISIS rule and to draw conclusions regarding ISIS’s plan to maintain control and crush its remaining opposition.
Background:
Previous presence in Mosul
Since August of 2013, ISIS has carried out precisely targeted assassinations in Mosul against government employees, particularly Sunnis, members of the Iraqi Army (IA), Iraqi Police (IP), and Sahwa (“Awakening” members that work with the government), as well as against tribal leaders and religious figures. ISIS also launched small-scale attacks on civilians using Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and small-to-medium arms during the same time period. The strategy at this point was for ISIS to conduct enough attacks to generate fear and undermine public confidence in Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) ability to provide security. ISIS simultaneously worked to cut off Mosul from Baghdad by targeting ISF along the northern portion of the Mosul-Baghdad highway in Sharqat, Shura, and Qayara in early August 2013. The fighting force that was present in Mosul prior to June 10th was also responsible for the extortion of businessmen and others who appeared to be wealthy enough to pay for “protection money.” Before ISIS took full control of Mosul, the commander of Ninewa Operations Command (NOC), Lieutenant General Mahdi Gharrawi, said that the Second Infantry Division arrested eighteen “terror” suspects some of whom belong to ISIS and were responsible for collecting “royalties” from Mosul residents. During this time period ISIS effectively drove a wedge between the ISF and Mosul’s inhabitants.
Response of Mosul Citizenry
Mosul’s populace is exceptionally wary of Iraqi Security Forces. This is because many of Mosul’s majority Sunni population sees the IA as a sectarian force representing Nouri al-Maliki’s Shia led government in Baghdad. After clashes in Mosul turned into full ISIS control of the city, residents reported that ISIS has created a semblance of security and some even indicated that they would rather live under ISIS and Shari’a law than under the IA. Photos even show Mosul residence showing up to watch ISIS parades celebrating their military victory in Mosul. In fact, ISIS-linked Twitter accounts published photos of scores of men lining up to turn over weapons and offer repentances to ISIS, who appeared to be documenting the identities and confiscating the weapons of those repenting. ISIS has also attempted to forge hospitable relations with local clans in Ninewa province. For instance, on July 1st, ISIS published images on the photo sharing site JustPaste.it of them serving lunch to tribal elements. The Governor of Ninewa, Atheel Nujaifi, also estimated that 2,000 residents of Ninewa have joined ISIS since the fall of Mosul. Moreover, on July 20th, ISIS posted images on JustPaste.it of a militant training camp. Interestingly, these photos clearly show the participation of children in the training exercise, representing ISIS’ first publicized event to reach out to children in Mosul.
Meanwhile, over three hundred thousand residents of Mosul and the surrounding area, most of whom are non-Sunni, have fled since the ISIS offensive. However, there has been a limited amount of anti-ISIS activity, including the formation of the Revolutionaries for the Liberation of Mosul Brigade though this group’s reported activity is limited to an operation in which they killed “terrorist” Bashar Aqidi, also known as Abu Ahmed on the west side of Mosul and is insufficient to pose a formidable threat to ISIS control. However, ISIS’s recent targeting of former Ba’athist leaders indicates that they are countering any potential resistance that may arise from these groups.
General Governance and Government Functions and Services:
Crafting an Islamic State
ISIS has tried to shape Mosul in accordance with its Caliphate vision. A major step for establishing this type of society in Mosul was the implementation of the Madina Document on June 12th, which calls for the strict implementation of Shari’a law.
On June 18th several sources inside of Mosul reported that ISIS repealed the document for the city because it angered local residents. These reports were likely inaccurate, as evidenced by a subsequent ISIS crackdown on cafes and casinos, forbidding gambling, dominoes, board games, playing cards, non-Islamic music, movies and cartoons, and the use of tobacco and hookah products. ISIS also published images on July 2nd of Mosul residence lining up to offer repentances to ISIS. On July 19th, ISIS again stepped up its efforts at exerting full societal control, forbidding marriages outside of its courts, and prohibiting clothing stores from selling women’s gowns that are “tight, transparent or embroidered.”
ISIS has also established Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the religious authority for its new Islamic caliphate. ISIS released a video in which Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi delivers a sermon at the al-Nouri mosque in Mosul in which he spoke about general religious topics including the importance of Ramadan, Tawhid (monotheism), Jihad, and Shari’a. ISIS also published images of religious study sessions during Ramadan in Mosul as part of its religious outreach strategy.
Government Functions
Aside from constructing a society in accordance with strict Shari’a law, ISIS must carry out basic government functions ranging from tax collection to street cleaning if it wishes to appear as a viable alternative to the government in Baghdad. Some of the government services that ISIS has made a concerted effort to establish in Mosul include taxation, provision of medical services, electricity, security, and relief aid.
During the contest for Mosul, medical services were the first of the aid components to be established, which occurred almost immediately. On June 9th, a day before ISIS established full control of Mosul, ISIS converted a house to a hospital west of Mosul in Meshirifa when a medical complex in western Mosul was evacuated because of the security situation. ISIS made an announcement to residents that the new “hospital” was providing medical services. However, ISIS experienced more of a struggle establishing water, electric, and internet services, with one source reporting that those services had been out of commission for 72 hours on June 17th and that the cost of fuel and food had skyrocketed. However, on July 14th sources claimed that ISIS has allegedly been buying gas from Turkey to supply Mosul with oil.
Enforcing security in Mosul has been a challenge for ISIS. On July 3rd, a human rights activist in Mosul reported that many members of wealthy families are being kidnapped in Mosul due to a financial crisis occurring in the city since government employees in Mosul are not receiving their salaries. This may also be a revenue source for militant groups who can no longer extort businessmen due to the economic stagnation occurring because of the current crisis. The source also stated that insurgents are posted throughout the city, but that citizens feel as though there is a large security vacuum. However, on July 12th Shafaq News reported that ISIS opened a police department in the city of Mosul and is now accepting volunteers to the department, known as the “Islamic Police.” The reports added that ISIS is offering a monthly salary to its new police force estimated at over 400 USD. The new police force also came at a time when locals were frustrated with high unemployment and Baghdad’s withholding of salaries for government employees in Mosul after its fall to ISIS. ISIS has similarly established Shari’a courts in Mosul. On July 15th, a security source reported that ISIS had opened two Shari’a courts, one in the east in the Mosul municipal building and the other in the west, in the Ninewa governor’s guesthouse.
One method that ISIS uses to try and win over the “hearts and minds” of its subjects is through distribution of relief aid. These activities are highly publicized on ISIS twitter pages and ISIS has consistently distributed aid to the people of Ninewa. For example, on July 8th ISIS tweeted a link of pictures of them distributing meat to the poor during Ramadan. A similar batch of aid distribution photos were also posted on July 15th. On July 19th, ISIS religious and judicial bodies also reportedly cut rents to approximately 85 USD in Mosul city, though the economic justification behind this decision was not articulated beyond the reasoning that it was dictated by the Quran. However, not all ethno-religious groups are eligible to receive ISIS aid. Also on July 15th, a Shabak activist in Ninewa province stated that employees of the Ministry of Commerce in Mosul told residents that food rations will not be distributed to Christian, Shabak, and Yezidi religious minorities. The source added that gunmen told the employees not to deliver the aid and the “Ministry of Supply of the Islamic State.” Furthermore, a report stated that health care personnel of Iraqi Christian and Shabak backgrounds were told not to report to work because their services are no longer needed.
Eliminating Opposition
ISIS has taken careful measures to target possible sources of rebellion and opposition. While ISIS will frequently form alliances with other militant or tribal groups to accomplish a military objective, to negotiate entry into an area, or gain legitimacy with local populations, these allies are often subsequently threatened into submission once ISIS is able to consolidate power and begins to see the allied group as a potential source of opposition. This phenomenon has been clearly demonstrated in Mosul. On June 18th, ISIS warned allied groups not to declare control over areas in Mosul and said that defiance would result in death for such groups. ISIS allows activity by other groups only after they have sworn allegiance to ISIS and that the group turns over its weapons to ISIS. Reports also began to emerge on July 7th of ISIS rounding up former military officers from Saddam’s army in Mosul, indicating a rift in the Sunni alliance that participated in the seizure of Mosul. The militant organization Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqah al-Naqshbandia (JRTN) is very closely affiliated with the former Ba’athist party and assisted ISIS as it seized northern Iraqi cities in the June offensive. A leading Shi’a member of the Council of Representatives, Haidar Abadi, claimed that Ba’athists helped ISIS when they were asked to do so, but now those who refuse to swear allegiance will be executed. Another source in Ninewa province reported that ISIS detained 30 senior officers from around Mosul on July 10th. These officers are likely former Ba’athists as well.
Beyond managing and dominating strategic alliances, ISIS also uses intimidation tactics to scare former government forces and non-Sunni groups into compliance. For instance, on July 11th ISIS militants demolished ten homes belonging to IP members in Hammam al-Alil, south of Mosul, after they refused to repent. ISIS has also worked to minimize or eliminate non-Sunni influences in and around Mosul through fear and intimidation. The most obvious example can be seen on ISIS’s Ninewa twitter page showing the demolition of a large number of Shi’a mosques and shrines in Ninewa province.
ISIS has scared, threatened, and marginalized non-Sunni ethno-religious groups in and around Mosul, leading to the groups’ rapid exodus to other parts of Iraq and neighboring countries. In addition to the destruction of Shi’a, Turkmen, and Christian religious sites, reports indicate that the lives, homes, and property of Shabak Shi’a, Christians, and Turkmen have been threatened or destroyed as well. Initial targeting of these groups had economic objectives. On June 20th, an anonymous source stated that ISIS imposed the jizya (taxes on non-Muslims) on Christians ranging from $250 to “large sums.” ISIS threatened to kill Christians or seize their property if they fail to comply with the newly imposed fee. As of July 14th, local Christians reported that ISIS began marking Christian homes with the letter “N,” to denote a piece of property belonging to a “Nasrani,” or “Nazarene,” a derogatory Arabic word for Christian. ISIS also painted the words “Properties of the Islamic State” on the properties. The letter “R” for “Rafidah” was similarly marked on Shi’a Turkmen and Shabak homes. ISIS later forbade Christians from receiving food rations in Mosul. However, ISIS recently increased its efforts to rid Mosul of these distinct ethnic groups when on July 18th, ISIS told Iraqi Christian families that they have until noon on July 20 to leave the city or face “an unknown fate.” This announcement prompted a flood of Christian Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) fleeing Mosul. ISIS reportedly told Iraqi Christians in Mosul that their property now belonged to the “state.” Additional sources say that ISIS threatened death for Christians who declined to leave Mosul. Also on July 18th, a representative in the State of Law Alliance (SLA), Hanin Qadu, said that ISIS arrested 107 Shabak Shias from the village of Bazwaya, located near Mosul. Qadu added that ISIS stole the possessions of those who were arrested. Unconfirmed reports indicate that ISIS intends to move 500 families of “terrorists” and foreign nationals who fought in Syria into the homes of minority families who fled Mosul, demonstrating ISIS’ pursuit of population control Mosul’s.
The Raqqa Comparison
As the most developed region under ISIS control, the ar-Raqqa province of Syria offers a model for what to expect for newly acquired ISIS territories. Like in Mosul, ISIS’s establishment of full control of Raqqa was also not a sudden occurrence, but rather was the culmination of a months-long process to systematically intimidate and marginalize rival groups. Many similarities in governance and control have been visible in Mosul. As was seen in Raqqa, religious outreach was among ISIS’s first objectives following the Mosul takeover. Specifically during Ramadan, ISIS conducted what it called missionary lectures in Mosul. In Syria, da‘wa events generally involve the provision of food and drink to the local population, similar to the lunch shared with local tribes from Ninewa province.
ISIS also quickly started targeting any potential opposition in Raqqa through raids, arrests, and executions. Execution of those who refuse to pledge allegiance to ISIS has been common across Iraq and Syria. The isolation of non-Sunni religious groups and a jizya tax on Christians is also a common feature of ISIS rule in both locations.
There have not yet been reports of ISIS proselytizing their Islamic beliefs by setting up religious schools, as is seen in areas of Syria where ISIS has invested in establishing Quranic schools for children and adults. Something else yet to be seen in Mosul is the formation of a religious police force. In Syria two distinct police forces exist; one for security and another to impose Sharia law. However, the security focused police force regularly patrols inside towns, as was reported in Mosul as of July 15th. The establishment of both religious schools and a police force to impose Shari’a law are two governance structures to look out for as ISIS continues to rapidly expand its governance activities. ISW will describe ISIS governance structures as they appear in Syria in a forthcoming report.
Conclusion:
The story of ISIS governance that has unfolded in Mosul since June 10th shows a militant organization that is also capable of implementing basic government functions but does not yet demonstrate how durable that governance structure is. Alongside ISIS’s implementation of Shari’a law, ISIS provides food rations and a form of rent control to try and appease residents; while Christians, Shabak, Shi’a and Turkmen flee Mosul under fear of execution, other residents feel that ISIS has implemented a semblance of security that they say was lacking in Mosul under the ISF. These harsh measures towards minorities may be an attempt by ISIS to rid themselves of residents that may be more difficult for them to govern – in a sense, selecting their own population to rule. However, as electricity and fuel shortages continue and the economy stagnates without government salaries, the Mosul merchant class will likely become increasingly frustrated with daily life. While distributing food aid and providing basic economic subsidies, ISIS in Mosul has not demonstrated that it is capable of sustaining a local economy beyond the short term. Further, the level of Shari’a law under which Mosul’s populace is willing to live remains unclear. However, it is evident that the more time that ISIS has to consolidate its governance and military gains in places like Mosul, the more unlikely it becomes that they can be dislodged from their territories.
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