by Ahmed Ali, ISW Iraq Team, and Aaron Reese
Ahmed Ali is the Iraq Team Lead and senior Iraq analyst at the Institute for the Study of War.
Tuesday, July 15, 2014
Resistance Emerges as ISIS Consolidates in Deir ez-Zour
by Jennifer Cafarella
Following the declaration of a caliphate by ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a cascade of surrenders by rebel and tribal brigades in Syria’s Deir ez-Zour province conferred large swaths of territorial control to ISIS. Beginning on July 2, these advances dramatically changed the balance of power within the province and provided ISIS the opportunity to achieve territorial continuity along the Euphrates River into Iraq’s al-Anbar. However, local resistance has since emerged to challenge full ISIS control within Syria’s Deir ez-Zour. While this resistance is currently too localized to meaningfully challenge the ISIS advance, it nonetheless highlights the existence of groups willing to serve as counter-ISIS forces within the ISIS Euphrates system. As ISIS continues to harden its defenses across its newly integrated Iraq and Syria theaters, the continued existence of local opposition will remain a crucial indicator of opportunities to disrupt ISIS control.
The surrender of a large number of local rebel and tribal brigades to ISIS in Syria’s Deir ez-Zour province was not a spontaneous event. Rather, it was the outcome of individual settlements between ISIS and local leaders regarding the terms of a peaceful ISIS occupation. Driven by apprehension in the wake of ISIS’s success in Iraq, a number of local leaders sought to avoid an armed takeover by reinvigorated ISIS forces and agreed to a set of ISIS-imposed conditions for the peaceful surrender of rebel forces. These terms included the repentance of residents and fighters, the relinquishment of personal weapons, and a full civilian evacuation of surrendered towns for a period of 10 days. While resulting in a temporary humanitarian crisis within the province due to the creation of tens of thousands of displaced persons, these agreements allowed ISIS to quickly and efficiently assert full control over a large swath of territory whose armed takeover would have otherwise required a significant and costly ISIS ground offensive. Critically, further surrenders have occurred as ISIS began to consolidate. In the border town of Abu Kamal, the small local FSA brigades Ahl al-Athar, Ibn al-Qa'im, and Aisha pledged allegiance to Baghdadi on July 7, solidifying ISIS control over the town and neighboring countryside. In Subaykhan and neighboring towns, twelve rebel and tribal brigades announced their surrender to ISIS on July 8 and pledged bay’ah to Baghdadi. From the town of al-Tiana, fighters from localized Ahrar al-Sham- and JN-affiliated brigades declared their allegiance to ISIS on July 10. Finally, the al-Mujahideen and Bani Zaid batallions are reported to have begun to deliver their weapons to ISIS in the first step of their full surrender. In addition to providing an additional windfall of small arms, these surrenders have expanded ISIS’s zones of control on the western bank of the Euphrates River and sustained the current ISIS momentum within the province.
ISIS mobilization to solidify control and institute governance in newly acquired territory is underway as ISIS negotiators pursue further surrenders. Using the operating space provided by the temporary evacuation of civilian populations, ISIS cleared and secured recently surrendered towns, removing symbols of past rebel control as it begins to impose its governance. Following the civilian evacuation from as-Shahil, ISIS destroyed the home of a leader of the local Liwa al-Taliban al-Islamiyya on July 5 and vacated homes of two JN commanders and a number of other houses in the town. Seven houses that had belonged to JN commanders were also destroyed in the village of al-Dahla. In consolidating its control over returning civilian populations, ISIS has instituted a central repentance office in the Islamic Court in the town of al-Mayadin and demanded that all fighters and civilians present themselves to the office with two forms of identification in order to formalize their repentance. This demand extends even to those who had repented to an ISIS authority in the past, who must now take their proof of repentance to the al-Mayadin Islamic Court for renewal. Internal policing has also begun, with ISIS executing three men on July 13 under the accusation that they had been creating counter-ISIS cells. In addition to raiding shops, homes, and vehicles for contraband, ISIS has begun to institute service provision by distributing gasoline to civilians under its control. After seizing control of nearly all Deir ez-Zour’s oil fields, ISIS distributed gasoline in its northeastern stronghold of as-Shaddadi, and reportedly intends to conduct such distributions in all areas under its control, from Abu Kamal on the Iraqi border to Northern Aleppo, as well as its tiny enclaves in the countryside of Hama and Homs. ISIS also significantly reduced the price of oil to civilians under its control and capped the maximum price traders can impose on other groups. These measures are the first stages of the full imposition of ISIS state governance, which will continue to unfold in secured territory according to the model visible in the ISIS capital of ar-Raqqa.
However, while the ability of ISIS to negotiate the wholesale surrender of rebel and tribal forces within the province has been staggering, resistance has nonetheless emerged in a number of key areas. In immediate defiance of the caliphate, the FSA-affiliated Liwa Jund al-Rahman put out a statement rejecting ISIS and declaring its commitment to continue to fight. In the towns of Abu Hamam and al-Jorzi on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River, the local Ibn al-Qayyem Brigade and al-Hamza Battalion attacked the homes of ISIS fighters and other ISIS positions on July 5 and 6. Demonstrations also occurred in the towns of al-Qureyyi and al-Ashara, where an unknown explosion targeted the agricultural bank on July 7. Finally, the resistance of the Jafar al-Tiyar brigade has precluded full control over Deir ez-Zour’s oil wells by keeping the al-Ward oil field momentarily outside of ISIS control. In the stronghold of al-Mayadin, a suicide car bomb (SVBIED) targeted a public market on July 13, killing 13 including 5 non-Syrian ISIS fighters. The attack remains unclaimed. The defiance of these individual rebel brigades constitutes a critical resistance to ISIS within the province. However, in the absence of outside support it is one that is likely to succumb once ISIS completes its consolidation and reinitiates offensive operations. For this reason, these brigades may continue to resist only so long as the terms of the negotiated surrender remain as severe as those imposed on the initial wave of surrenders. Testament to this possibility, a temporary surge in resistance against ISIS forces in the town of Khosham emerged after initial negotiations with local brigades failed but immediately dissipated once a settlement was reached. Upon the breakdown of talks, fighters from the Abdullah ibn al-Zobayr battalion attacked ISIS positions within the town, killing three fighters and burning the house of a fighter from the town who had defected to ISIS. An agreement was reached on July 10 in which civilians that had fled the town would be allowed to return so long as each family repented and delivered a Kalashnikov to ISIS. While it remains unclear whether the terms of this agreement also mandated a demobilization of the ibn al-Zobayr battalion, attacks appear to have been discontinued. The ability of ISIS to negotiate a settlement within actively resisting localities is a critical indicator of its strength within the province and highlights the likely inability of local groups to maintain resistance even in the medium term.
Two additional sets of negotiations are ongoing, and their outcome is likely to have significant implications for the continued existence of a moderate Syrian opposition within Deir ez-Zour Province. On the eastern bank of the Euphrates, the al-She’tat tribe remains a primary source of resistance to ISIS. The towns of Granij, Abu Hamam, and Keshkeyyi all remain under the control of the tribe, with a total population reportedly near 83,000. Fighters and civilians from al-She’tat continue to resist through demonstrations against ISIS and participation in attacks alongside local rebel brigades, however the tribe’s leadership has nonetheless continued to negotiate with ISIS regarding the terms of its surrender. In addition, other remaining local rebel and tribal brigades in the western countryside of Deir ez-Zour are reportedly also engaged in ongoing negotiations with ISIS and have declared their own set of terms. These include the stipulations that ISIS: (1) enter their towns with only non-Syrian fighters, (2) refrain from carrying out arrests or weapons confiscations, (3) cooperate in fighting against regime forces within the province, and (4) establish a joint Sharia body consisting of both local leaders and ISIS religious officials. While it is unclear whether these terms are congruent with those demanded by the al-She’tat tribe, in both cases ISIS appears to be maintaining its demand for the handover of all rebel weapons as a prerequisite for surrender. As a result, negotiations remain in a stalemate. If ISIS submits to these demands in order to neutralize these remaining pockets of resistance, it will have obtained effective control over nearly the entirety of Deir ez-Zour province. It will also have engaged in a significant step change within its Syria theatre, as direct confrontation against the regime has not yet manifested to a meaningful degree. If such an agreement occurs, an attack on regime positions in Deir ez-Zour city is likely to follow, a departure from historic ISIS trajectory that would likely have repercussions in other provinces, as rebel brigades may recalculate their opposition to ISIS in favor of bringing its force to bear against the regime. However, the ability of JN to consolidate its own ranks will also be a significant factor influencing the strategic calculus of remaining rebel forces, and may encourage increased rebel participation on either side in a further entrenchment of the ongoing JN-ISIS feud. Thus both the ISIS expansion and a reactionary JN consolidation are equally grave for the moderate Syrian opposition, whose relative influence continues to dwindle proportionate to the growing strength of these Jihadi elements.
Deir ez-Zour City
The ISIS momentum in the province has also translated into an ISIS foothold deep within Deir ez-Zour city. While not directly attributed to ISIS, pressure has increased on rebels within the city: an unknown explosion occurred in al-Jebelia neighborhood on July 11 and an IED detonated inside a JN HQ on the Fo’ad cinema street on July 12 alongside another IED detonation in the area. Combined with the strain of the ongoing siege, this pressure prompted JN and Ahrar al-Sham to abandon their headquarters inside the city on July 13 after a failed attempt to negotiate with ISIS. Following this withdrawal, ISIS fighters entered the city and seized control of a number of neighborhoods and the Sharia court while maintaining firm control of the al-Siyasa bridge. It is unclear how the JN and Ahrar al-Sham retreat was conducted, however it is likely these forces executed a tactical withdrawal from a number of locations in order to fortify their presence deeper within the city. There has been no indication that ISIS allowed rebel forces to withdraw across the al-Siyasa bridge, and it is equally unlikely these forces were allowed to exit the city through regime territory. According to official ISIS social media, JN emir Abu Hazem attempted to escape the city across the bridge and was shot at an ISIS checkpoint as he attempted to detonate a suicide belt following the discovery of his identity at the checkpoint. Within the city, ISIS arrested fighters from JN who reportedly hid inside a house as ISIS moved in to consolidate control, indicating that the tactical withdrawal may not have been fully disclosed or executed across rebel ranks. In response to the ISIS advance, a demonstration occurred in the remaining rebel-held areas in which demonstrators rejected an allegiance with ISIS. However, following the loss of territory within the city the now-isolated pockets of rebel fighters remain under a two-front siege by the regime and ISIS, and it is unlikely they will be able to mount a significant counterattack against ISIS within the city.
ISIS has not yet launched an assault against regime positions in or near Deir ez-Zour city. However, in addition to achieving a new proximity to regime forces within the city’s contested neighborhoods, ISIS is now in control of positions that may enable it to directly assault the Deir ez-Zour military airport from two fronts. Prior to the incursion into the city, ISIS fighters seized the town of al-Mar’iya directly to the east of the airport on July 7. While rumors immediately surfaced that the Syrian regime began to withdraw from the Deir ez-Zour military airport, this appears to have been small tactical withdrawal of non-critical elements rather than a full retreat. Regime forces were subsequently videotaped establishing barricades on the mountain overlooking the city and have since mobilized on the western side of the al-Hawiqa neighborhood in the north western corner of the city. Following the ISIS incursion, regime forces reinforced their checkpoints and set up new barriers within their areas of control and are likely to continue their holding pattern in the absence of a significant ISIS offensive operation against the military airbase or the remaining regime-held neighborhoods.
If ISIS is able to finish its consolidation along the Euphrates and to secure and expand its foothold within Deir ez-Zour city it will have obtained a strategic depth across the Jazeera desert that is likely to render a successful routing of its presence from Iraq’s Anbar both a pitched fight and a necessary but insufficient measure in order to secure the control and integrity of Iraq’s sovereign borders. Its implications for the Syrian civil war are equally severe, as a consolidated ISIS in Deir ez-Zour is unlikely to be unseated by existing rebel forces. While the opportunity exists to subvert ISIS control by strengthening local rebel and tribal groups that have or would be willing to resist, this window of opportunity as ISIS remains in its consolidation phase is likely to be fleeting. A rebel alignment with JN as a bulwark against increasingly strong ISIS forces should be viewed as a dangerous course of action, yet it becomes increasingly likely as ISIS expansion continues to go unchecked.
Monday, July 14, 2014
Sunday, July 13, 2014
Saturday, July 12, 2014
Friday, July 11, 2014
Thursday, July 10, 2014
Iraq Situation Report: July 10, 2014
by Ahmed Ali, ISW Iraq Team, and Heather L. Pickerell
Wednesday, July 9, 2014
Iraq Situation Report: July 9, 2014
by Ahmed Ali, ISW Iraq Team, and Aaron Reese
Control of Terrain in Iraq: July 9, 2014
by Ahmed Ali, Iraq Team, and Nichole Dicharry
Tuesday, July 8, 2014
Iraq Situation Report: July 8, 2014
by Ahmed Ali, ISW Iraq Team, and Heather L. Pickerell
Ahmed Ali is the Iraq Team Lead and senior Iraq analyst at the Institute for the study of war.
ISW Warning Intelligence Update: Regime Offensive in Aleppo
by ISW Syria Team
Regime operations escalate in Aleppo city:
- On July 3, regime forces seized large swaths of the Sheikh Najjar industrial complex in northern Aleppo city after conducting 20 air raids in 24 hours.
- On July 4, regime forces seized the villages of Kafr Saghir and Moqbila near the Sheikh Najjar industrial area north-east of Aleppo city in an attempt to cut rebel supply routes between northern Aleppo countryside and Aleppo city.
- On July 7, the regime conducted operations to seize the Infantry School on the northwestern edge of Sheikh Najjar, on the outskirts of Aleppo city. The school serves as a major rebel base and was the location of former Tawheed brigade leader Abdul Qader Saleh’s assassination in November, 2013. According to al-Akhbar, the regime has reinforced the area with Republican Guard units which have begun integrating with NDF forces in the city.
- On July 8, clashes continue between regime and rebel forces near Sheikh Najjar as we as around the Air force Intelligence building in western Aleppo city.
Rebel Responses:
- On July 2, head of the Ahl al-Sham Operations Room Hussein Assaf issued an alert and called for reinforcements from other fronts.
- On July 7, the head of Aleppo’s Provincial Council, Abdul Rahman Dadam, issued a warning of the “imminent encirclement” of Aleppo city following regime advances in the city.
- On July 8, Idlib-based rebel groups formed a “quick response unit” of 600 fighters pledging to support rebels in fighting the regime and ISIS in Aleppo. The groups include the Syrian Revolutionaries’ Front, Jabhat al-Nusra, Sham Legion, Suqour al-Sham, Harakat Hazm, FSA 13th Division, Fursan al-Haq, and Jabhat Thuwar Saraqib.
- On July 8, Liwa Dawud, a prominent rebel group operating in Idlib province defected to ISIS. According to pro-opposition news site Aks al-Ser, Liwa Dawud was en route from Idlib to Aleppo in a convoy of 130 vehicles to reinforce rebel positions when it changed course and headed to ar-Raqqa.
- On July 8, Jabhat Thuwar Saraqib issued a statement of general alarm after a rebel faction abandoned the front lines. Although the statement does not name the rebel faction by name, it is likely in reference to Liwa Dawud’s defection to ISIS.
After exploiting intense fighting between rebel forces and ISIS in early 2014, the regime was on the offensive in Aleppo city and posturing to besiege rebel-held neighborhoods in the eastern part of the city. In April, rebel forces launched a diversionary offensive in Latakia which diverted pro-regime forces from other fronts, ultimately stalling regime gains in Aleppo city. Following a series of operations to seize the Sheikh Najjar industrial area, the regime appears poised to reinvigorate its offensive in order to implement its ‘siege and starve’ tactics against rebel positions in Aleppo city.
Following ISIS resurgence in Iraq, the group has begun to reestablish its presence in northern Aleppo province along the Turkish border, amidst clashes with rebel groups in the area. Should the regime’s offensive to besiege Aleppo city continue, it is likely that ISIS will capitalize on clashes between regime and rebel forces to further expand its areas of control in north and north-western areas of the Syrian countryside. Significantly, rebel responses to a potential regime offensive demonstrate awareness of a need to reinforce Aleppo against both regime and ISIS forces.
Control of Terrain in Iraq: July 8, 2014
by Ahmed Ali, Iraq Team, and Nichole Dicharry
Monday, July 7, 2014
Control of Terrain in Iraq: July 7, 2014
by Ahmed Ali, Iraq Team, and Nichole Dicharry
Saturday, July 5, 2014
ISIS Advances in Deir ez-Zour
by Jennifer Cafarella
The ISIS tactics that have achieved devastating success in Iraq continue to be employed on the Syrian front. In Deir ez-Zour province, ISIS has consistently leveraged carefully targeted suicide operations alongside tactical shaping operations tailored to create conditions of battle conducive to an ISIS advance. These preparatory efforts have focused primarily on weakening or neutralizing rebel commanders and key infrastructure, in addition to coercing local armed groups into submission. Using small contingents of fighters, ISIS has steadily advanced onto key towns and terrain within Syria’s oil-rich Deir ez-Zour province, increasingly leveraging local rebel groups as force multipliers and capitalizing on local submission in order to establish zones of control from which to advance on its primary objectives. On the heels of a number of significant ISIS gains in the province, as well as in Iraq, the declaration of a so-called “Islamic Caliphate” on June 30 has seen ISIS control quickly expand over nearly the entire southern countryside of the province as a cascade of rebel groups have folded under ISIS pressure and pledged bay’ah [allegiance] to the leader of the newly-established caliphate or simply “Islamic State.” The strategy of subsuming local and tribal elements into ISIS command is one that has been leveraged consistently throughout its Iraq and Syria campaigns, and has conferred effective territorial control over the majority of the key supply routes and oil fields in southern Deir ez-Zour province.
Reports of defections to ISIS in Deir ez-Zour increased in the wake of the successful ISIS campaign in Iraq. ISIS encouraged such defections by distributing statements in the Deir ez-Zour countryside that rejected the accusation that ISIS fighters are “kharijites,” or extremists, and reassured rebels that they would not be unjustly labeled “infidels.” In addition, ISIS released a statement on June 26 specifically calling for the repentance of rebels in the JN stronghold of al-Mayadin. The combination of these overtures and increased ISIS strength conferred by its windfall weapons seizures in Iraq resulted in a number of small defections to ISIS in the province, most notably in the border town of Abu Kamal. The effect of the ISIS Iraq campaign on the Syrian battlefront was alone insufficient to prompt a game-changing shift in the provincial balance of power in Deir ez-Zour. With the establishment of a “caliphate” on June 30 and the call for hijra [migration] into the Islamic State by ISIS leader and self-declared Caliph Ibrahim (ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi), however, ISIS shaping operations have yielded successive surrenders of local forces, who have pledged bay’ah to al-Baghdadi and surrendered their towns to ISIS. While the Mujahideen Shura Council and a number of prominent rebel religious committees immediately rejected the legitimacy of the caliphate, the declaration and events surrounding it have nonetheless significantly influenced the resolve of local and tribal rebel groups and has fundamentally altered the state of play in the province.
ISIS Advances in Deir ez-Zour Province Prior to the Declaration of the Caliphate
ISIS forces made a number of significant territorial gains in the weeks prior to the declaration of a caliphate. Beginning in mid-June, ISIS expanded its attack zone outside the focus of its April-May campaign in the Deir ez-Zour–al-Basira–as-Suwar triangle. While maintaining pressure on the heavily contested city of al-Basira, ISIS forces launched a concerted effort to seize towns along the Euphrates River south of Deir ez-Zour city and along the Khabur River south of as-Suwar. After meeting stiff MSC resistance in the village of Khosham, ISIS initially pursued a cease-fire with the MSC mediated by the local Abdullah ibn al-Zobayr batallion. However, the cease-fire quickly broke down and ISIS successfully ousted MSC forces from Khosham on June 9. In the neighboring town of Hatla, ISIS carried out night raids within the city and burned down houses of fighters from JN and allied rebel battalions prior to seizing the town. Such preparatory efforts have been used consistently by ISIS in order to create conditions of battle conducive to an ISIS attack, and are likely to continue in remaining battlefronts.
After securing its hold on these towns, ISIS launched attacks against the towns of Mohassan, al-Bu Amr and al-Bu Layl on the western bank of the Euphrates, seizing all three on June 19. In Mohassan, an ISIS-allied battalion with presence in the town kidnapped the deputy of the military council leader and two commanders from the local al-Haq brigade. Their bodies were later found on the banks of the al-Furat river as ISIS seized control of the town. ISIS also appears to have leveraged a prominent defection in its advance on Mohassan; former commander Abu Haroun was captured executed by the MSC after defecting to ISIS in the town. The seizure of these three towns has conferred onto ISIS a significant foothold on the road leading to the Deir ez-Zour military airport, and was met with a significant increase in regime airstrikes against ISIS locations throughout the province.
The next significant ISIS advance occurred farther south in the border town of Abu Kamal. On June 24 the local JN affiliate, the Jund al-Haq Brigade, switched sides to ISIS, prompting a flurry of confusion amongst rebel ranks in the area as ISIS moved into the town. An ISIS contingent under the command of former FSA commander Saddam al-Jamal is reported to have crossed into the Iraqi border town of al-Qai’m from the al-Kom area in the outskirts of Abu Kamal on June 25, and is the likely force to have entered Abu Kamal. As ISIS consolidated its foothold, the MSC began to reallocate its forces within the province in order to fortify its own key terrain. It withdrew forces from the banks of the Khabur River toward the al-Omar oil field and the MSC stronghold of as-Shahil, allowing ISIS to seize control of the villages of of Hariji and Tel-Duman on June 25. The MSC also sent a significant convoy of reinforcements to as-Shahil on June 28, posting a video claiming to show a 100-vehicle convoy transporting 1,000 fighters. On the same day, the MSC sent reinforcements to bolster rebel forces within Abu Kamal as ISIS continued to advance within the town. However, ISIS seized effective control over the town on July 2 after receiving reinforcements from al-Qa’im and the T-2 oil station near the Iraqi border, as it simultaneously seized the town of al-Zir to the north.
ISIS gains in Deir ez-Zour Province
Critical Defections Prompt a JN Withdrawal
The surrender of local and tribal rebel forces throughout Deir ez-Zour province following the declaration of the Islamic State is a critical inflection that has dramatically altered the scope of ISIS control within the province and has prompted a strategic withdrawal and recalculation by remaining MSC forces. Prominent rebel surrenders to ISIS occurred in the previous MSC strongholds in as-Shahil, al-Mayadin, al-Quriyah, and al-Ashara in addition to smaller villages including Dhiban, Swedan, al-Jazira, Sedan Shameyyi, and Darnej. While some of these groups stopped short of pledging full allegiance to the caliphate, their decision not to fight ISIS illustrates the influence of ISIS’s increased strength. In addition to the discord created by the caliphate, rebel forces were coerced into surrendering by consistent targeting by ISIS in recent weeks; As-Shahil has witnessed regular ISIS pressure through bombardment and clashes in the outskirts of the city. Al-Mayadin has been the target of a number of VBIEDs and unknown explosions amidst increased pressure from ISIS in the surrounding countryside. The nearby village of al-Quriyah was the target of a number of IEDs in the last two weeks in addition to an ISIS ambush that targeted a rebel battalion in the area on June 18.
Following these defections, JN forces withdrew from their positions in as-Shahil, al-Maydin, and the al-Omar oil field, allowing ISIS to enter these towns without a fight and granting it control of one of Syria’s largest oil fields. With these unprecedented developments, ISIS’s force posture in the province will dramatically shift as it moves in to consolidate control and establish command throughout its new territory. Capitalizing on its growing momentum, ISIS is likely to escalate against other attack zones northwest of Deir ez-Zour city in order to link up its zones of control and connect its Raqqa strongholds to its critical supply lines in Deir ez-Zour province. ISIS has maintained pressure on rebel groups by targeting both military headquarters and the homes of rebel commanders in the primary attack zones of al-Tarif and al-Shamitiya, and it is likely that these towns will be the next target of the ISIS offensive in the province.
Deir ez-Zour City
While Deir ez-Zour province has suffered significant upheaval, the city of Deir ez-Zour remains in a stalemate. The regime controls of three of the four entrances to the city and two neighborhoods within the northwest sector, in addition to its strongholds in the southern countryside at the Brigade 137 Base and the Deir ez-Zour military airport. Clashes between the MSC and regime forces within the city are ongoing, amidst continual regime bombardment of rebel-held neighborhoods. The final entrance to the city is under the control of ISIS, rendering the rebel elements within the city completely besieged. The combined pressure of the ISIS and regime blockades has placed a heavy burden on the population as well as the rebel fighters, and fears of starvation are high. In response to the growing humanitarian disaster, a truce was signed between ISIS and JN on June 18 in which ISIS agreed to deliver humanitarian aid into the city in return for a JN withdrawal from its al-Jesr checkpoint on the internal side of the al-Siyasa Bridge. ISIS delivered a second batch of provisions to the city on the first day of Ramadan on June 29, this time advertising it had also delivered ammunition to rebel brigades. No such deals have been made by the regime, and as a result ISIS remains the primary source of humanitarian supplies to the city.
Map of control within Deir ez-Zour city
Friday, July 4, 2014
Iraq Situation Report: July 4, 2014
by Ahmed Ali, ISW Iraq Team, and Aaron Reese
Ahmed Ali is the Iraq Team Lead and Senior Iraq Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War.
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