Iraq Update 2014 #6: Sunni Tribal Dynamics in Fallujah and Ramadi

By Ahmed Ali

               

Iraqi Sunni tribes in Anbar are key players in the current crisis in Fallujah. The Iraqi government will not succeed in defeating al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in Anbar without the full support of tribal leaders. Some of these tribes are part of what is known as the Sahwa or Awakening Councils and have sided with the government in its military operations in Anbar. Other tribes have decided to fight against the government and in some cases also against AQI by joining a new military council that is likely affiliated with the Ba’athist Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqah al-Naqshabandia (JRTN). Some are still deciding. As of now, it appears that Maliki has agreed to let the tribes of Fallujah clear AQI without the involvement of the Iraqi Army. This compliance, along with other conditions, will determine if the tribes of Fallujah will remain aligned with Iraqi Security Forces.

Pro-Government Tribes and Tribal Figures

There are currently a number of tribal figures supporting the government:

Ahmed Abu Risha: At the moment Abu Risha appears to be the main backer of the Iraqi government among tribal figures in Anbar. Abu Risha’s position with regards to the government has changed, becoming more accommodating in the wake of the provincial elections. He is the brother of one of the founders of the Awakening (Sahwa) Councils in 2006, Abdul Satar Abu Risha. Abdul Satar was killed by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in September 2007, and Ahmed Abu Risha became the leader of the Awakening Councils. Since then, he has been working totransform the Sahwas into a political power. As a respected Sunni leader that rejects AQI, he has become that group’s public enemy number one. A recent statement by an AQI spokesman placed a bountyon his head, calling him out by name.

Ahmed Abu Risha was influential in the appointment of the governor and local officials in the aftermath of the 2009 provincial elections. When the Iraqi Sunni anti-government protest movement began, Abu Risha became a criticof the government and was one of the speakers at the protest site. As a result, the Iraqi government officiallyreplaced him as the leader of the Sahwas in February of 2013. His successor, Wisam al-Hardan, is unlikely to have inherited all of Abu Risha’s supporters. However, since the end of the 2013 provincial elections, Abu Risha has been reengaging with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The rapprochement may have been the result of promises and financial support to Abu Risha by the Iraqi government and Maliki. Abu Risha calledon the people and tribes of Anbar on January 1, 2014 to fight AQI after AQI members emerged in the major cities of Ramadi and Fallujah. His governmental re-elevation to the position of Sahwa leader has caused disagreement among Sahwa forces, including with Wisam al-Hardan. The Abu Risha tribe, particularly Ahmed and his nephew Mohammed Khamis, are currently the target of tribal anger in Anbar because many view them as traitors to the protest movement. This pertains especially to Mohammed Khamis who was a leader in the protest movement and the subject of an arrest warrant. Anti-government Iraqi Sunni social media outlets published a photo of him wearing a mask while reportedly working with the commander of the Iraqi Special Forces Golden Division Commander, Fadhil Barwari. The veracity of the photo is unconfirmed, but after the photo appeared, however, reports emerged that Mohammed Khamis had turned himself in to the military and is currently cooperating with security forces. The emergence of the surrender report is an indicator that Mohammed Khamis may currently be working with the government.  

Hamid al-Hayes: Al-Hayes was also a cofounder of the Awakening Councils in 2006-2007 and became one of the government’s main backers and allies in Anbar in 2013. Since January 1, 2014, Hayes has called for the Sahwa to fight AQI and for the deploymentof the Iraqi military into the cities, a demand which the people of Fallujah have resisted. Hayes has also been critical of other tribal figures in Anbar including Ali Hatem al-Suleiman, whom he describedas a “rat” that has to be brought to justice. Additionally, Hayes’s brother, Mohammed, the leaderof the Sons of Iraq Foundational Council, also appears to be dominant among the pro-government tribal leaders. On December 27, Hayes metwith a number of tribes, indicating that he had the support of those tribes.

Governor Ahmed Khalaf al-Dulaimi: Dulaimi is the current governor of Anbar and supported the shutdown of the protest sites in the province. He has also been calling for the army to redeployto Fallujah. His tribe, the Albu Dhiab, is supporting the government likely due to their affiliation with Dulaimi and his position within the government. Prior to becoming governor, he was a protest backer and a respected figure among anti-government protesters. After his election, Dulaimi reversed his position and became more supportive of the government, evidence of the fluid nature of Anbari tribal politics. He may have switched sides because Ahmed Abu Risha did so. On January 6, Dulaimi denied that AQI had kidnapped him as indicatedby earlier media reports. The reports of his capture may have been intended to demoralize anti-AQI fighters, while the denial attempts to prevent AQI from achieving the psychological advantage of claiming that two significant government backers are in its custody. This episode is also evidence of the ongoing propaganda war between anti-government and pro-government forces.

The Albu Fahad tribe is also supportive of the government. Its leader, Rafi Abu Al-Naja, was targeted by a car bomb attackthat bears the signature of AQI on January 3. This targeting is likely due to his cooperation with the government.

The Albu Bali tribe which lives in an area of Ramadi that bears their name is also supportiveof the government and was able to retake a police station from AQI on behalf of the government on January 2. The Albu Bali tribe has been a long-standing supporter of the government including announcing the formationof a force to “eliminate” AQI from Anbar in April 2013. This means the tribe is considered an enemy of AQI. The Albu Bali area has witnessed continuousfighting and shelling likely due to attempts to attack the tribe either by AQI or by other rivaling tribal elements. It is likely that the Albu Bali is facing a great deal of pressure due to cooperating with the government and is demanding government support in light of recent attacks.

  

Abu Risha (left) and governor Dulaimi (right) reportedly inspecting areas in Ramadi. Posted on Sahwa Twitter account, January 8.             

Anti-government Tribal Forces

Anti-government tribes have generally kept a lower profile than their pro-government counterparts. These tribes include the Albu Nimr, al-Jmelat, al-Halbsa, and Albu Issa. There are indications that the anti-government effort is centered on Fallujah, generally the most radicalized city in Anbar. As opposed to Ramadi, Fallujah is not dominated by the tribes that formed the Sahwa councils in in 2006-2007, and its tribes have always stood apart from government security to a greater degree. The anti-government tribes are currently reported to be in the city’s outskirts and are concentrated on disrupting supplies going into Ramadi from Baghdad. But they are also reportedly active in the cities and quickly took control of buildings in Fallujah over the weekend of January 4.  

 Video from YouTube alleging anti-government tribal figures taking over an abandoned military post.

On January 3, a video was posted on a YouTube channel that is affiliated with Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqah al-Naqshabandia (JRTN), a Ba’athist militant organization. The video alleged that Fallujah tribal elements attacked a military convoy on a highway. It is likely that JRTN is using the cover of tribal elements to conduct attacks and give the impression that tribes are engaged in the fight against the government to provide the effort more legitimacy and also to trigger more anti-government mobilization in other predominantly Iraqi Sunni areas. The video portrays clearly, however, tribal confrontation with the Iraqi government forces.  

Another video was posted allegedly showing tribal elements taking over an abandoned military post in Fallujah on January 2. The attackers are masked and do not appear militarily sophisticated or organized as AQI fighters traditionally are. In this case, the video is of tribal militias from Anbar.

According to reports, AQI has established checkpoints inside the city of Fallujah. However, at this point AQI has avoided confrontationswith the tribes in the city. This decision is intended to avoid repeating mistakes from 2004-2007 when AQI lost the support of the tribes because the organization imposed harsh measures.

AQI is dominant in Fallujah because it has re-established its support system in the area extending southeast to northern Babil. The city is also known to be a center for Salafist conservative and religious thought in Iraq. There were likely AQI “sleeper cells” and sympathizers in Fallujah prior to the takeover of the city by gunmen.

The tribes in Fallujah have broadcast the message that AQI is not in control in the city. They have instead emphasized that they control the city in the context of anti-government sentiment. A two part video postedon January 6 showed masked gunmen with old-style Iraqi flags to indicate that they are not AQI, as other Iraqi groups, including JRTN, use the old flag. The gunmen claimed that they are sending a message from “the rebels of the tribes in Fallujah.” The message was directed to Abu Risha and governor Dulaimi, both pro-government tribal leaders. The speaker criticized them for mobilizing the youth in the sit-in site for an entire year and then selling them out when the fight against the government became real. The speaker claimed that by forming the Sahwas these leaders demonstrate their desire to betray the people of the city and added that if the Sahwas entered Fallujah, none of them will return. He then called on the Sahwa to repent. This direct criticism of Abu Risha illustrates the complex tribal dynamics in Anbar and that he and Dulaimi, who were supporters of the protest movement, took advantage of the phenomenon for their own benefits.

The speaker in the video stated that they are defending themselves against a “Persian” attack. This is a reference to the Iraqi government, which many Iraqi Sunnis perceive as an Iranian-backed government. The speaker also denied that all residents of Fallujah are members of AQI, responding to Iraqi government claims that Fallujah is controlled by AQI.

The tribes in Fallujah have also recently been heavily engaged in the internal political affairs of the city with the formationof a tribal council that includes the notables of the community. The council is led by Abed al-Rahman al-Zobaie, and is attempting to project an image that the situation is normal in Fallujah. The tribes have also combined their effortswith the scholars of the community and called on government employees to return to their jobs on January 7. In the current unclear picture in Fallujah, multiple tribal and social groups are likely competing, but none of them is in fact in in control. These groupings are likely setting up to be future influencers in the local government and civil affairs. It appears that their main purpose is to avert a military operation in the city.  Questions remain about their future influence if Fallujah is peacefully re-controlled by the government.

Iraqi Sunni tribal mobilization in support of Anbari protesters has also spread to other provinces. On January 8, unidentified but unmasked tribal figures in Salah ad-Din gathered and sent a message to the Iraqi government and in solidarity with the protesters. In the statement, a tribal figure criticized the Iraqi government and ISF for attacking Anbar after it had protested peacefully for more than a year. He further criticized the government for working with the tribal leaders that it selected. The proliferation of this public mobilization in the future will be indicative of future anti-government sentiments.  

The Tribal Revolutionary Military Councils

A  fighter jacket emblazoned with JRTN logo. Photo from a Mosul TMC Facebook page.

The most significant tribal-military development to emerge from the recent tribal uprising in Anbar is the formation of the Tribal Military Councils (TMCs) in multiple Iraqi provinces. The group first emerged in Anbar under the name of the Military Council of the Anbar Tribal Revolutionaries in the beginning of January. On January 8, the Albu Nimr tribe joined a military council established in Fallujah, accordingto an Iraqi intelligence source. The Albu Nimr tribe resides on the outskirts of the city and if true, their step to join the TMCs indicates possible hardening of tribal defenses in the face of a possible military operation in Fallujah. Within days, Tribal Military Councils (TMCs) with similar names were announced in other provinces, all carrying the same logo in their release videos indicating their direct connection and common foundation. Thus far, there are at least seven councils in Anbar, Kirkuk, Baiji, Fallujah, Mosul, Baghdad, and Samarra. One of the first statements issued by the TMCs outlined the responsibilities and duties of the council. Below is a summary and translation of the Anbar TMC statement:

Authority

ANBAR TMC is the only authorized entity to issue statements, specify speakers, and make decisions.

On ISF

ANBAR TMC called for the ISF not to point their weapons at the people and to give their weapons and equipment to the rebels. In this case the rebels will not attack them. The rebels of the tribes warn them from deception and we remind them that they are the sons of Iraq not Maliki.

On Police

Anbar TMC called for the police not to roam using their vehicles so that all are safe.

On tribes in the south and other tribes

We call for tribes in the south and other areas to withdraw their sons from Anbar and the other areas to preserve Iraqi blood and unity. We will hit with an iron fist anybody who insists in being a servile follower to the government of the criminal Nouri al-Maliki

On Sahwas

We tell the Sahwas that they have a historic opportunity to return back to their tribes and to forget what the servants of Maliki who lead Maliki Sahwas have told them. Your continuation of killing your people in this dangerous condition will place you in the bracket of traitors, spies, and killers. If you abide by our call to serve your tribes and families then we promise you safety. Otherwise, you have been warned.

On SWAT, Army, and other forces currently in Anbar, and on their withdrawal from Anbar cities.

The governmental army and SWAT militias that were formed under illegitimate and unlawful conditions, and all the forces that Maliki brought to violate Anbar are to depart all of Anbar, not only to withdraw from the cities.

On politicians from Anbar

Anbari politicians are to withdraw from this criminal and evil political process. You know that you and your families gave Maliki permission to do his crimes, rape the women, torture, humiliate, and kill the men, old men, and children. Otherwise you will be severely punished. If you do withdraw, then your places among your people and families are preserved

On media coverage

All media outlets and reporters are to communicate with our authorized speakers. And we hope that caution is practiced by some of those who mean to fish in trouble waters and those who hate upon the revolution and the conspirators who may leak clips, pictures, and information that damages the revolution, its goals, and icons. We will provide all facilitations to professional media outlets with no exception

On general property

The council warns against assaulting general property and will hit with an iron fist anybody who attempts to assault the properties of the citizens. Let it be known that Maliki intelligence in cooperation with the local government were the ones who stole, burned, and violated some of the public properties.

The group established a Facebook page on January 2 that has 44,694 likes as of January 8. This rapid rate of growth suggests that the group had previously been organized and had an online presence. The group also has a YouTube channel. The rhetoric of the group is similar to JRTN’s rhetoric. The group also used the same name for Kirkuk as used by JRTN, Tamim. Furthermore, the group appeals to the same constituency as JRTN’s, and its current locations are areas where JRTN is prominent. In the announcements, the groups also demonstrate a level of professional military attire and organization that is not characteristic of tribal individuals. They show a great deal of respect to the former Iraqi military as is the standard for JRTN. Notably, the TMC’s Facebook in Mosul has a poster of a TMC member that is emblazoned with the JRTN logo. The TMCs also use the pre-2003 Iraqi flag that is used by JRTN. Their media production, however, is less sophisticated than JRTN’s and includes short videos normally filmed at night especially for their operations.

The TMCs are currently forming, and their real power has yet to be determined. They do not appear to have carried out major military operations yet. Anbari tribal leader, Ali Hatem al-Suleiman, announced a group with a similar name during a speech published on January 3 in which he threatened an uprising. If he is working with the TMCs, he is probably acting as a tribal figurehead rather than as a de facto leader or the group. Rather, the similarity of the TMCs’ rhetoric to JRTN’s suggests that JRTN is a major player, if not the biggest component of the group.

Conclusion

Sunni tribes have reacted to government actions in Anbar in widely different ways. Some have attempted to forge common cause in utilizing the Sahwa to clear AQI from the cities, and the government needs these forces to avoid a deployment of ISF into cities which could spark further bloodshed. Figures such as Abu Risha have popularity due to their previous support of the protest movement, but have drawn criticism for cooperating with the Maliki government. On the other hand, some tribes in Anbar and other provinces have begun to form Tribal Military Councils. These TMCs have made statements strongly similar to and indicating the presence of the Ba’athist militia JRTN, and they demand not just the withdrawal of ISF from the cities but from the entire province. These announcements will be provocative to the Iraqi government, but the present course is a fine line between accommodation and sparking an open uprising by anti-government tribes.

Ahmed Ali is a senior Iraq Research Analyst and the Iraq Team Lead at the Institute for the Study of War.                             

Iraq Update 2014 #5: “The Time to Harvest is Coming” – ISIS Statement

Translation and summary by ISW Iraq Team

Takeaway: Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), called for Sunnis in Iraq not to drop their weapons even if Maliki tries to deescalate. ISIS expressed an interest in the death of Sahwa leader Ahmed Abu Risha and called for the Sahwas to repent. The speaker emphasized efforts to free ISIS captives from Iraqi prisons. On Syria, ISIS labeled opposition forces fighting ISIS as “Sahwas” and announced a chance for them to repent. Otherwise they will be targeted. ISIS declared members of I’tilaf, the National Council, the General Staff, and the Supreme Military Council in Syria as targets. The speaker called for ISIS members to kill them wherever they find them.

General Comparison:

Adnani compared the situation in Syria to Iraq, making the point that Jihad in Syria is undergoing the same hardships as the Jihad in Iraq. He stated that Jihad in Iraq has made great strides and that things are clearer. Syria remains in the beginning stages and things are rather messy.

On The US and the West:

“America and its allies won’t approve of an Islamic State and will do their best to prevent it. Therefore, the way to establishing one must be paved with skulls and blood.”

Adnani reminded the Muslim community (Ummah) of the original struggle,“the battle with the Jews and the crusaders. Whom we have to fight again directly. In order for us to do that, we need to overcome the two examples of state they propose. The first one is a civil democratic state in which people are dominated by tyrants. The second example is a national state with an Islamic title like the Kingdom of the Traitor of the Holy Sites [in reference to Saudi Arabia], in which Nusairiya [a derogatory term for Shi’a] and infidels are tolerated. For them, the first is more desired than the latter.”

On Shi’a and Sunnis in Iraq:

Adnani quoted Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi to build his case against the Shi’a. “Even though the US is dangerous, Rafidha [another derogatory term for Shi’a] are more dangerous on the Umma [the Islamic nation or Muslims around the world]. Rafidha are the most dangerous enemy that threatens Islam and Muslims. The Islamic State took it upon itself to fiercely fight Rafidha everywhere. We will completely destroy them even if it took the death of our last soldier. Our fight against them is a united fight in Iraq, Sham [Syria and Lebanon], Yemen, the rest of the peninsula, and Khurassan [Iran].”

“What did the Sunnis in Iraq gain from participating with the Rafidha in the political process? They filled the prisons with Sunnis and built a Rafidha army. You have already seen their true face in Sham, and it is starting to show in Iraq. Soon you will see the Savadi [Iranian] planes and tanks bombarding your neighborhoods and storming your houses. You will see Rafidhi militias looting your money, killing your sons, and raping your women in the roads of Saida, Beirurt, Diyala, and Baghdad. We warned you from this. Rae’d does not lie to his people. Damascus and Aleppo are good examples.”

This statement references the concept of a “Rae’d.” Arabs in the past moved around the desert depending on the availability of natural resources. When resources became scarce in an area, they sent a “Rae’d” to find another area with resources. Due to the critical nature of the task, the selected person must be very well trusted. The phrase “Rae’d does not lie to his people” is an Arabic proverb, Adnani used it to lead to points he made later in the statement. He wanted to portray ISIS/AQI as the “Rae’d” for Sunnis.

On the Sit-in Sites and the current situation in Anbar:

“You demonstrated for an entire year even though we told you that peace will not work with Rafidha. We swore to you that they will force you to carry arms, and Rae’d does not lie to his people. You picked up arms even though you insisted on peace and notwithstanding the misguiding Fatwas and calls directed to the sit-in sites.”

The fool, Nouri realized or will realize the grave repercussions he brought upon Rafidha and will work hard to deescalate. Never drop your weapons because if you do, the Rafidha will enslave you.”

On other areas:

“The Rafidha will want to preoccupy you in Anbar, Salah ad-Din and Ninewa so they can attack your brothers in Diyala, Tal Afar, Basra, and Baghdad.”

Adnani reiterated his previous statement regarding the return to areas the State withdrew from previously in addition taking more areas. Adnani named the areas this time to include Basra. He also had special emphasis on Fallujah; in a poem composed for Fallujah, Adnani said that “we will rule it with God’s law.”

On Sahwas:

“The remaining Sahwas were and still are the shield and tool of Rafidha and the crusaders. The plan of Rafidha today is to gather the Sahwas, police, and army to preoccupy the Sunnis in Anbar and Salah ad-Din to prevent them from marching to Baghdad. This way, the Rafidha will kill, imprison, and enslave the Sunnis in Baghdad. We therefore call for the Sahwas, Sunni politicians, police, and soldiers to repent and surrender their weapons and equipment to the Islamic State and we promise them safety. Otherwise, solders of the Islamic State are ordered to target them for death and chase them everywhere, in addition to destroying or burning their houses after evacuating their families.”

On Tribes:

“We call for all Sunni tribes to prevent their sons from being part of the army, the police, or Sahwas. And to disown those who insist. Targeting supporters of Rafidha is not targeting of the entire tribe. We call for the tribes to pledge allegiance for the Islamic State and to support its members. You will own the world if you do.”

On recruiting:

“The Islamic State in Iraq and Sham opens the door to induct any Muslim who desires Jihad, native and foreign. Especially those with skills and specifically the judges so they can serve in the courts of the Islamic State to bring back the rights and rule by God’s law. Necks and heads of the members of the State are the first to yield for the rulings of these courts.”

On Syria:

Adnani called for the Syrian people to deny any form of state that is not ruled by God’s law. He called for them to judge the Mujahideen by what they see instead of listening to the media. He added that Syria is witnessing the exact same “conspiracy scenario” witnessed in Iraq with the same names and supporters.

He made a call for rapprochement to those known as Jaysh al-Mujahideen and Jabhat Thuwar Syria or Syrian Revolutionaries Front and those who “supported or fought with them or overlooked them even from the factions who carry Islamic banners.” He asked “them who deceived them” and implicated them in “fighting the Mujahideen and killing the Muhajireen [foreign fighters] who left everything and came to Syria to defend and sacrifice.” He asked them “how they will stand before God after killing the Mujahideen.” He told them to “learn from those who stood against the Mujahideen in Iraq. They are either under the ground, enslaved by the Rafidha, or on the run. You stabbed us from the back while our positions were occupied by few guards. You should have warned us if you were brave, but this is the Sahwas’ way.”

“If you repent we promise you safety, otherwise, know that we have armies in Iraq and an army in Sham composed of hungry lions. Their drink is blood and their favorite companions are dismembered body parts. They never tasted a drink more delicious than the blood of the Sahwas.  We swear to God, we will bring a thousand then a thousand then another. None of you will remain and we will make you an example.”

For members of the battalions who desire to implement God’s Law: [Jihadis who are not members of ISIS]

“This is the battle of the Umma and you already know the conspiracy. Take a clear stance and attack the oppressor so the ship won’t sink.

Damn the factions, groups, and positions if they divide us and make us forget our brotherhood in faith. Damn it and damn us if we let the Umma down in its battle.”

For ISIS Soldiers:

Iraq:

• You have planted for so long and the time to harvest is coming. Victory is in the horizon. Inflame it; protect the women, and relief the repressed.
• The prisons, the prisons, the prisons, the prisons. Never save efforts in saving the captives.
• Accept repents from the Sahwas. Then clean it up. And know that the State will award who takes the head of the traitor, Ahmed Abu Risha.
• If you enter areas, pardon, forgive, and be gentle because the people do not know [the people are not on the right path and are not well informed].

Syria:

• Jihad taught us that crises turn to advantages and they make the Mujahid stronger and more resilient.
• I swear that what you are witnessing are the Sahwas. We had no doubt that they would appear but we did not expect them to appear this fast. They surprised us. Never be gentle with them.
• Attack the “Sahwas” hard and crush them hard and kill the conspiracy in its cradle.
• Your State will come out of this war stronger and purer.
• I’tilaf, the National Council, the General Staff, and the Supreme Military Council represent apostasy and Kufr [disbelief] who declared war on the State. Therefore, we regard their members as targets unless they publically denounce it. For the soldiers of ISIS, know that we have designated awards for those who take their heads and the heads of their leaders. Kill them wherever you find them.
• We alert the Sheikhs of tribes and notables of cities, towns, and areas and all the factions and battalions not to host or protect them. We will not regard any promise of safety given to them. We will target them wherever we find them.
• Also, accept the repentance of those who repent before you reach them. 

Iraq Update 2014 #4: Anbaris Weigh Negotiations with Maliki

By Ahmed Ali

National repercussions from the Anbar events continue. In a startling development Wasit police commander General Raed Shakir Jawdat announced on January 4 that 9,000 people have volunteeredto fight in Anbar against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). This number is very high and unlikely to be completely accurate. However, the effort to sign up people is another expression of Iraqi Shi’a unity at a time when sectarian tension across Iraq is running high.

In another key development, a group namedthe Military Council of Anbar Revolutionaries emerged as of January 5. It appears to be taking the lead as a tribal force in Anbar that is both anti-government and anti-AQI. The group’s rhetoric is similar to Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqah al-Naqshabandia’s (JRTN), a Ba‘athist militant organization suspected to be active in northern Iraq. Such a force may channel the energies of the Anbari tribes and generate a Sunni national defense force.   

Meanwhile, new political motions to express specific demands of the Iraqi government emerged. Anbar’s provincial council met and stated that there are five conditions for decreasing tensions with the government of Iraq, including the releaseof detained member of the Council of Representative Ahmed al-Alwani. Osama al-Nujaifi also proposed a political summit to ease tensions in Ramadi and Fallujah after meeting with UN representative in Iraq Nicolai Mladenov. Their position is still not unanimous. Iraqiyya leader Ayad Allawi called for all of the ministers in the government except for PM Maliki’s State of Law Alliance to withdrawif conditions in Anbar continue. Allawi does not exert direct control over any political office, but his call may still lead to an emerging front to boycott the political process.

The security situation in Fallujah has also changed as of January 6. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki called on tribes and the people of Fallujah to expel “terrorists” from the cities in order to avert an attack. In Fallujah, reports indicatethat the Iraqi Army had withdrawn from the city’s eastern limits after an agreement was reached between the military and the Anbar provincial council on January 6. There are alsoreportedly negotiations between local government officials and tribes in Fallujah to negotiate a solution to the city’s crisis. These efforts likely indicate the desire of the tribes to seek the military’s withdrawal, though they leave uncertain whether AQI has actually been cleared from Fallujah. There are also reportsof clashes between an Iraqi Army convoy and tribal forces on the Fallujah highway the same day, demonstrating that anti-government sentiment is still high.

Outside of Fallujah, Iraqi Army Aviation is reported to have targeteda column of AQI fighters in the Garma area north of Fallujah. Garma has witnessed continuous clashes and shelling due to the presence of armed gunmen, possibly AQI. Meanwhile, security forces have launcheda campaign against AQI in Northern Babil’s Jurf al-Sakhr area, southeast of Fallujah, which ISW has assessed as a possible emerging zone of control by AQI. The ISF approached the area on October 8 and became engaged in a prolonged gun battle with 300 gunmen. This is likely an area from which AQI’s assaults upon Fallujah and Abu Ghraib are launched. Another indicator of AQI activities is a mortar attackon January 6 against a police station in Jurf al-Sakhr that resulted in civilian casualties who live to the station. For today, it appears that violence in Fallujah has paused, while violence in these outlying areas has increased. For de-escalation in Anbar to take place, and in order to avert high Sunni civilian casualties, a negotiated solution for Fallujah must succeed.

Iraq Update 2014 #3: Update on Situation in Fallujah

by Ahmed Ali

ISW will continue to provide updates on the situation in Iraq as it unfolds.

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have announced preparations to retake Fallujah city. The Iraqi Army, SWAT, and the Iraqi Special Forces will likely participate in the operation. The operation calls for the evacuation of the city's population ahead of an assault scheduled to last a number of days. Since clashes in Anbar started, there has been a flight by the city’s residents to Ramadi, Baghdad, and Karbala. Evacuation measures by the ISF are unlikely to be effective, because an assault upon Fallujah by Shi'a-dominated security forces is itself a threat to the city's Sunni residents. The ISF operation in Fallujah will therefore result in civilian casualties and possibly invoke other violent tribal responses. It is too early to tell how effective the ISF will be against AQI in Fallujah, or what resources will be expended. Meanwhile, AQI may be well-positioned to attack in other provinces, such as Ninewa and Salah ad-Din.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry voiced support for the Iraqi government in countering AQI, but stated that this is Iraq's fight. Prime Minister Maliki has vowed to eliminate AQI from the province. While Maliki is likely aiming to achieve a significant military victory ahead of elections, it is important to recognize that AQI cannot be decisively defeated in Anbar. The ISF presence in Anbar is therefore likely to be long-term, which increases the opportunities for AQI to exert control elsewhere in Iraq, and also increases the threat of a Sunni backlash against the ISF. It also increases the likelihood that elections will not be held on time in April.

Meanwhile, clashes in Ramadi continue as tribal forces and Iraqi Army along with aerial support by Iraqi Army Aviation reportedly engaged AQI members in eastern Ramadi. According to reports, AQI members are reported to be positioned in southern Ramadi as well. The ISF based in eastern Fallujah can push to the city from the Baghdad flank, and there have been attacks to regain Fallujah from the direction of Ramadi to the west. If a new attack to retake Fallujah commences, it will likely follow the blueprint of such earlier attempts.

The government’s effort to counter AQI in Anbar is facing a further obstacle. Tribal divisions are beginning to emerge among prominent pro-government figures such as Sahwa Council (Awakening) leaders Ahmed Abu Risha and Wisam al-Hardan. Their recent disagreement resulted in suspending the tribal and local police fight against AQI in northern Ramadi. Due to personal differences, Hardan does not want to work with Abu Risha, who recently reengaged with the Iraqi government. As the preparations for the Fallujah battle continue, this potential rift will serve as an indicator of tribal reactions to the ISF operations. The ISF will not succeed in driving AQI out of Anbar province without the mobilization of the tribes against AQI.

It is imperative to watch for AQI attacks in other provinces, such as Ninewa and Salah ad-Din, while the ISF is concentrated in Anbar. It is also critical to watch the actions of other Iraqi insurgent groups that can attack the ISF. In Ninewa for example, the ISF arrested 12 individuals who called for jihad and attacks against the ISF using mosques’ loudspeakers on January 5 in Mosul. It is unclear if these 12 are members of AQI or other armed groups. Either way, these indicators point to a possible simultaneous front opening for the ISF in Ninewa. 

Syrian Rebels Attack ISIS

 by Valerie Szybala

The situation is changing rapidly in northern Syria as rebel fighters have launched widespread attacks against the al-Qaeda affiliated Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in dozens of locations in Idlib and Aleppo provinces. The situation began on the night of Thursday January 2^nd, when ISIS tried to storm the town of Atareb in Aleppo. Friday saw widespread protests across Syria against ISIS, even in locations in the south such as Damascus and Deraa, which is unusual. Concurrently, violent clashes broke out across northeastern Syria as rebel forces attacked ISIS fighters.

In addition to the ISIS incursion into Atareb, citizens and rebel fighters have been increasingly upset over ISIS persecution in northern Syria. One of the most recent incidents includes the abduction, torture, and killing of the Ahrar al-Sham member Dr. Hussein al-Suleiman (aka Abu Rayyan), whose mutilated body was found on Wednesday, January 1. Many of the protests on Friday included slogans such as “We are all the shaheed Abu Rayyan,” which alluded to the anger over his death. In at least one village, ISIS opened fireon unarmed protestors. ISIS also recently attacked media activists in the village of Kafrnabel, the “voice of the uprising,” which has become a symbol of the Syrian revolution for its stream of witty slogans and caricatures. There have also been violent confrontations between Ahrar al-Sham and ISIS in Maskanah, Aleppo in recent weeks.

Additionally, many Syrians hold the suspicion that ISIS is actually working with the regime, claiming that the Syrian military does not attack ISIS-held positions. These rumors have been flying wildly around socialmedia sitesin recent days as anti-ISIS sentiment bubbled to the surface, along with politicalcartoons and hashtags.

Actions taken against ISIS include the arrest of its fighters and commanders, negotiationsfor ISIS to leave certain areas, and violent confrontations. In many areas fierce battles between ISIS and rebel groups are still ongoing, and ISIS has begun using car bombs against rebel fighters. Chaos has reportedly engulfed Jarablus, which is the town which ISIS possibly had the strongest control over, with everyone including the Kurds rebelling against ISIS fighters who have started actingerratically according to sources in the area.

The three major rebel coalitions involved in the attacks on ISIS, the: Islamic Front, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, and the Syrian Revolutionaries Front, have all issued statements detailing their grievances with ISIS and making demands for ISIS to withdraw. These groups include Islamic factions, FSA-affiliated groups, and there are even indications that Jabhat al-Nusra is involved.

In response ISIS has reportedly pulled out of several towns that it controlled - including Atmeh and ad-Dana – without a fight, and is bringing in reinforcementsfrom western provinces. This indicates that a large counteroffensive is imminent and the rebels of northern Syria may not have long to revel in their victories before ISIS hits back hard.

This fighting in Syria comes at the same time when ISIS has gone on the offensive across the region. In Iraq they have launchedoffensivesto take urban centers. ISIS has also released a statement claiming responsbility for a deadly suicide bombing targeting Hezbollah in southern Beirut on January 2^nd.

Although there have been clashes and disputes between ISIS and other rebel groups before in Syria, the scale of what is happening right now is unprecedented. This situation is still incredibly fluid and volatile. Further updates will be posted as the details become clearer.

Iraq Update 2014 #2: Al-Qaeda in Iraq Patrols Fallujah; Aims for Ramadi, Mosul, Baghdad

by Ahmed Ali

Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) announced an Islamic state in Fallujah and detained 75 members of the Iraqi Army on Friday, January 3, 2014. Clashes continue in Ramadi between tribal militias working with Iraqi Security Forces and AQI. However, AQI is increasing its presence in Fallujah while the Iraqi Army calls up reinforcements outside the city and begin a bombardment of suspected enemy positions. The contest for control of Fallujah will almost certainly be a violent struggle. These events have produced a humanitarian crisis in Fallujah with at least hundreds of families fleeing the city. Meanwhile, a political standoff has renewed between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and speaker of the Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR), Osama al-Nujaifi.

AQI Patrols Fallujah; Tribal and Police Counterattack Fails

On January 3, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) announced its presence in Fallujah during the major Friday prayers in the city. Reportedly, an AQI commander addressed the crowd and announced that the group is in Fallujah to “to defend Sunnis from the government.” On the same day, individuals in a “stolen” police vehicle roamed the city and used speakers to convey the same message to the population. A local government official, Dhari al-Rishawi, confirmed AQI’s presence and stated that the group is in control of the city. As a response, the Iraqi Security Forces shelled eastern Fallujah with mortar rounds. Three people were killed as a result of the shelling and 28 others were injured. Meanwhile, tribal forces along with Iraqi Police reportedly entered Fallujah from the western side and regained control of some police stations previously seized by AQI. However, the counter-attack by police and government-allied tribal elements attack in Fallujah was not fully successful.  

Locally, a statement was disseminated through a mosque loudspeaker claiming that the Fallujah’s notables, tribes, and religious scholars supported the effort of the police to enforce security in Fallujah. The statement makes clear that Iraqi Army deployment to Fallujah is not acceptable and calls on the people of Fallujah not to depart the city. This statement is indicative of the response by some segments of the population to AQI’s presence in the city as well as to the Iraqi Army’s artillery bombardment.

Tribal Militiamen on a highway in Fallujah after allegedly repelling an Iraqi military convoy and capturing a vehicle

On January 4, the situation in Fallujah worsened.  A security official stated that Fallujah had fallen under AQI control. Other media reports indicated that “AQI is in complete control of Fallujah after the withdrawal of security forces.” The same reports added that AQI members are patrolling in the city. Deputy Chairman of the Anbar provincial council, Falih al-Issawi also stated that AQI is in control of Fallujah. An unnamed source stated that AQI captured 75 members of the 53^rd Brigade, 7^th IA division who are stationed near Fallujah. The source added that AQI has taken them into the city, implying that AQI has established control there.

Additionally, tribal elements are reported to have seized control of the Mazra military camp in eastern Fallujah after the withdrawal of besieged members of the Iraqi military in the camp. Furthermore, an anonymous source from the Iraqi Police in Anbar stated that unidentified gunmen attacked an Iraqi Army convoy on the International Highway, east of Fallujah. Gunmen allegedly burned four fuel tanks and seized a number of military vehicles that were loaded with supplies for the IA in addition to soldier transport vehicles. The convoy was on its way to Ramadi and the gunmen let the soldiers go after seizing their weapons and materiel. Given that the soldiers were let go, it is likely that the attackers were tribal militias rather than AQI.

The IA reportedly used helicopters to target AQI members in western Fallujah with missiles as an unnamed Iraqi intelligence source stated that hundreds of Arab fighters have entered Anbar in the last two days through the western border. If this is true, the fighters would have likely come from Syria.

Reports further indicate that families have been displaced as a result of the violence in Fallujah. On January 4, an Iraqi newspaper reporter stated that “hundreds” of families departed the city of Fallujah to areas in western Anbar and Baghdad due the shelling that targeted number of residential areas. The report added that the road that connects Baghdad to Fallujah was cut which prevented food supplies from reaching the city. The source added that the IA targeted Fallujah with “random” mortar attacks. On January 3, the medical office in Anbar reported that mortars targeted the areas of Asakri, Jughaifi, Mualmeen, and Dhubat in Fallujah, resulting in the death of six individuals and 87 other casualties.

Tribes and Security Forces Cooperate to Defend Ramadi

Overall, there are important differences between the situation in Fallujah and Ramadi. In Ramadi, it appears that the tribes are working more closely with the government while the dynamic in Fallujah suggests that AQI is more dominant; as a result, there is less tribal-governmental cooperation. In Ramadi, an anonymous security source stated that clashes took place between security forces along with tribal gunmen and members of AQI. The source added that the clashes took place in central Ramadi. According to the source, Iraqi Army Aviation participated in the clashes. Sources also stated that people were advised to evacuate certain areas in Ramadi as an attack by ISF and tribal gunmen became imminent. The clashes are reported to have resulted in the deaths of thirty members of AQI.

AQI Threats to Baghdad and Ninewa

Closer to Baghdad, on January 3 an Iraqi Police source stated that AQI members were present in several areas of Abu Ghraib. According to the source, those areas constitute 45% of the district. The source adds that the AQI members are attempting to control Iraqi Army outposts and positions. This development signifies AQI’s intention to push into Baghdad and block Iraqi military reinforcement from southern Iraq and Baghdad.

Elsewhere in Iraq, Ninewa’s governor Atheel al-Nujaifi announced the foiling of a plan by AQI to control the Shura sub-district in southern Mosul. According to Nujaifi, the plan included attacking checkpoints and planting explosive devices. Nujaifi noted the role of local police, but also praised the role of Federal Police in the process. AQI is capable of attacking urban centers in several provinces, including Baghdad. While the Iraqi Army focuses on Fallujah, it will be critical to watch for AQI launching such attacks in other cities. Likewise, it is critical to watch for the response of the Iraqi Sunni tribes in Salah ad-Din and Ninewa to the shelling and aerial bombardment of Fallujah by the Iraqi Army. These threats draw attention to the Iraqi Sunni political apparatus and its response to Maliki’s decisions in Anbar.

Political Response

On the political front, the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) blocked speaker Osama al-Nujaifi’s convoy from reaching the Abu Hanifa mosque on January 3. Nujaifi, who is the leader of the primarily Sunni Mutahidun party, called for an investigation of the BOC after this event. The BOC commander Abed al-Amir al-Shamarri stated that he is willing to answer any questions arising from this incident. This issue indicates a stand-off between Nujaifi and Maliki at a critical time.  Nujaifi likely intended to preserve the political engagement of Iraq’s Arab Sunnis while the Iraqi Army shells Fallujah. It is unclear if Nujaifi’s previous rapprochement will hold. Another significant development took place when Maliki ally Yasin Majid criticized Mutahidun’s stance with regards to events in Anbar. Majid’s statements were provocative, as he wondered whether there is cooperation between the Mutahidun Alliance and AQI. These statements can be viewed alongside statements from PM Maliki on January 4 that AQI was three weeks away from announcing a state in Anbar before the shutdown of the protest site in Ramadi.  These statements were meant to justify the advance of the Iraqi Army into Anbar as well as the closure of the Ramadi protest site, which had initially produced a violent tribal response to the Iraqi Army. It is important to watch for indications from Maliki that he will use this security crisis to delay the April 30 national elections.

Conclusion

Reports and statements conflict over who is now in control in Fallujah. It is clear that AQI has visible freedom of movement in the city and may be holding 75 Iraqi soldiers prisoner there. Moreover, it is likely that AQI’s control is accelerating in the city. If reports are true that AQI fighters have arrived in Anbar, it indicates that AQI plans to augment its forces in the province and engage in a sustained military effort around the cities. It will be a major victory for AQI if it truly captured 75 soldiers, and the ISF will be in a very difficult situation if the main government camp in Fallujah is now controlled by armed gunmen. There are still conflicting reports about the camp, but it is clear that armed groups are attacking ISF infrastructure.

The Iraqi Army will likely continue its aggressive attack on Fallujah in order to wrest control from AQI. It has already begun to do so through artillery and missile strikes. The Iraqi Army lacks the precision intelligence, targeting, and weaponry that would be required to clear the city without re-leveling it. The threat of civilian casualties or population displacement are high. The resonance among Iraq’s Arab Sunnis of the Iraqi Army fighting in the streets of Fallujah may trigger violent uprising against the government in other provinces. It is unclear how Iraqi Sunni politicians will handle the double-edged sword of working with Maliki to counter AQI. De-escalation is primarily in Prime Minister Maliki’s hands. He and his allies have to refrain from provocative statements and behavior in order to ensure that Iraq AQI’s immediate threat is dealt a significant blow.

Ahmed Ali is a senior Iraq Research Analyst and the Iraq Team Lead at the Institute for the Study of War