Iraq Update 2014 #1: Showdown in Anbar

by Jessica Lewis and the ISW Iraq Team

A Sunni insurgency in Anbar has begun. Prime Minister Maliki confronted Anbari tribal leaders at the Ramadi protest site on December 30 and forced its evacuation. Violent clashes occurred between Anbari tribal militias and Iraqi Security Forces in Ramadi and Fallujah as a result. On December 31, amidst the violence, Maliki promised to withdraw the Iraqi Army from the cities. On January 1, in the wake of the Army’s withdrawal, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) led an attack upon multiple police stations across Ramadi and Fallujah. In Ramadi, there are reports that tribal militias have combined with Local Police to retake the police stations from AQI. In Fallujah, there are reports that some tribal militias are cooperating with AQI. These events coincide with ongoing military operations to counter AQI in the desert, to which the US has provided military aid. As of January 2, the Iraqi Army is attempting to return to the cities, but is being blocked by unidentified gunmen at the periphery. A three-way contest for control of Anbar is underway between Iraqi federal forces, AQI, and tribal militias aligned with Iraqi police. Iraqi Federal Forces can become a flash point within urban areas as tribal militias or local forces mobilize. Iraq’s urban areas are highly vulnerable to escalation attempts by AQI.

Maliki claims that the Ramadi protest camp is an al-Qaeda Headquarters

Several events in late December precipitated a dramatic inflection in the stand-off between al-Qaeda in Iraq, Prime Minister Maliki and the Iraqi Army (IA), Sunni protest movement leaders, and tribal militias in Anbar. On December 21, 24 Iraqi Army officers including the 7^th IA Division commander were killed in an ambush at an AQI compound in western Anbar. On December 22, Maliki announced a new operation to counter AQI in the western desert. This incident might have galvanized tribal support for the government against al-Qaeda in Iraq, but instead Maliki turned his attention to the Ramadi protest camp. Maliki claimed in a speech on December 22 that the Ramadi protest camp was an al-Qaeda headquarters, and he ordered protesters to disband. The same day, Anbar Provincial Council Chairman Sabah Karhout said that Anbar would cooperate with the ISF against AQI.

Other tribal leaders in Anbar objected. Fallujah protest leader Sheikh Hamed al-Jumaili stated on December 22 that the people of Ramadi would carry arms against any force that approaches the site. Sheikh Ibrahim al-Dulaimi of the Ramadi camp also claimed that protesters would attack any militias that attempt to attack the sit-ins. Grand Mufti of Iraq Sheikh Rafi al-Rifai stated that the tribes would take a stand if the protesters were targeted. Anbar tribal leader Ali Hatem al-Suleiman further warned on December 23 that the tribes of Anbar will counter any attack against the protesters.

Government security around the Ramadi protest site increases

Meanwhile, indications that the ISF would move on the protest camp began to occur. On December 24, sources reported that security forces had cordoned off the sit-in sites in Anbar. The following day, acting Minister of Defense Sadoud al-Dulaimi assured the tribes that the government would not attack the protest sites. Nevertheless, on December 27, further reports indicated that the ISF had tightened security at the camp, searching individuals entering and leaving. The same day, a security source indicated that armed gunmen attacked IA vehicles near the Ramadi protest site, and that the IA returned fire. The MOI quickly released a statement that the action had been a response to an al-Qaeda attack, and not an attack upon the Ramadi protest site.

The same day, on December 27, Maliki issued a statement that Friday’s prayer would be the last at the Ramadi site. He demanded that the tribes pull the tents before they “burn.” Leader of the Sahwa [Awakening] Council Mohammed al-Hayes, a known Maliki ally, sided with Maliki on December 27 and echoed the description of the protest sites in Anbar as headquarters for al-Qaeda. He claimed to have support from multiple tribal leaders in Anbar for the ISF and condoned the removal of tents from the protest sites. The week prior, before Maliki’s statement about the Ramadi protest camp, Hayes stated that he had reached a deal with the governor of Anbar and other tribal leaders to shut down the protest camps.

Sheikh Mohammad al-Dulaimi and Sheikh Mohammed al-Bajari made strong statements in response, reiterating that moves against the camp would be met with armed resistance. Sheikh Dulaimi is quoted as saying, “let those who want their children to be orphans and their wives to be widows come close to the sites.” On December 27, Speaker for the Fallujah protest camp Sheikh Abd al-Munim al-Kubaisi called for Sunni religious leadership to unite in their stance against Maliki so that protesters could follow their lead either to remain peaceful or to take up arms, based upon Maliki’s next actions.

Maliki arrests Iraqiyya MP Ahmed al-Alwani

In the midst of this tension, Maliki’s next action was inflammatory. On December 28, Maliki arrested Iraqiyya MP Ahmed al-Alwani after a firefight at his residence in which his brother, reported to be the target, was killed. Alwani is influential within the Ramadi protest site, and the ISF imposed a curfew in Ramadi after the arrest. The same day, Council of Representatives (COR) Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi called for a fair investigation of the arrest of Alwani, meeting with other government officials to address the crisis in Anbar. He claimed officially that the arrest was illegal on account of the immunity granted  to MPs. The delegation he formed to investigate was reportedly blocked from entering Anbar by the Baghdad Operations Command. On December 29, leader of Iraqiyya Ayad Allawi proposed to work with the government to counter al-Qaeda in Iraq. The same day, Anbar Provincial Council chairman Falih al-Issawi submitted a proposal to close the protest camps in exchange for Alwani’s release and the withdrawal of all ISF in Anbar province. On December 30, according to BBC Radio, prominent sheikhs in Anbar gave Maliki a 12-hour ultimatum to release Alwani, or they would “take the disagreement with the government to the next stage.” He was not released. The same day, two elite battalions of the Iraqi Army stationed in Wasit arrived in Anbar province as reinforcements.

Maliki “empties” the Ramadi protest sit-in site

On December 30, the Ramadi protest camp was shut down. Reports about the nature of the confrontation at the Ramadi protest site vary. Iraqi media reports from an MOD source that a joint task force of IA and IP assaulted the camp after blocking internet and communications to Ramadi. Iraqi social media sources indicated that the Iraqi Security Forces moved on the protest camp in Ramadi and were repelled by heavy machine gun fire, in a gun battle that BBC Radio reported as lasting the night. Iraqi social media also indicated that the reinforcements from Wasit were involved in the assault on the protest site, and that tribal militias defeated them.

By contrast, Anbar Governor Ahmed al-Dulaimi stated emphatically on December 31 that the camp was only approached by local police and tribal elements. Furthermore, he reported that there were no casualties inside the camp, which he claims was empty at the time of the assault. On December 31, Maliki also made a statement, emphasizing zero casualties while the government “emptied” the camps. He described that the local, religious, and provincial leadership in Anbar called for the intervention of the federal government to close camps controlled by “terrorists,” and that the government merely cooperated. He also stated that the Iraqi Army would withdraw from the cities after this success, affirming their involvement. The Iraqi Police (IP) is the typical security force inside the cities, and is more palatable to locals because most are locally recruited.

Sunni Influencers’ Reaction

Multiple Sunni influencers, including moderate Sunni cleric Sheikh Abdul Malik al-Saadi and prominent digital influencers, called for Sunnis to take up arms against Maliki’s government as a result of the incident. The resonance of a particular incendiary social media page called Iraqi Revolution has skyrocketed from 148,000 to 158,000 followers after December 30. Jaysh al-Izza, the Pride and Dignity Army formed after the incident at the Hawija protest site in April, also issued its first statement calling the “sons of Anbar” and all Iraqis to carry arms and take a united stand.

Sheikh al-Saadi, who is a leader of the Ramadi protest movement, demanded in an inflammatory speech that the ISF pull out from the city, that members of the ISF disobey their chain of command, that Anbaris mobilize to prevent ISF reinforcements from reaching Ramadi, and that Members of Parliament resign and boycott the government.

Statement from Sheikh Abdul Malek al Saadi, translated and summarized by Omar Abdullah

Today’s ISF assault on the Izza wal Karama square is a good example of the government’s bad intentions. I demand that the government stop this war in which Iraqi citizens are fighting each other. Withdraw your troops to avoid war. I also ask ISF troops not to obey orders by their superiors when they send them to definite death. Otherwise, you will face fire in life and in after-death, because you are assaulting well defended citizens to satisfy unjust ruler. This ruler brought Iraq nothing but more war, more poverty, and more sectarianism. Oh people of Anbar, especially the sheikhs of Anbar, defend yourselves and your people. Stand against your vicious enemy. And if your enemy asks for a truce or reconciliation, do not refuse. This is what Islam taught us. Oh heroes of Fallujah and other towns. Cut the road and prevent Maliki’s troops from reaching your brothers in the heart of Anbar. Maliki wants to wipe out every one of the people he dislikes, using the anti-terrorism pretext again. He [Maliki] wants to gain more votes by committing such heinous crimes. Oh our brothers in the south of Iraq [Shi’a tribes] warn your sons and ask them not to take part in this heinous assault against your brothers in Anbar. Sunni ministers and Members of Parliament should resign immediately and boycott the political process in Iraq and stand at their peoples’ side, especially because their existing in this government doesn’t change any of the unfortunate realities in which we live.

Sheikh Rafi al-Rifai, Grand Mufti of Iraq, encouraged “Mujahideen” to carry arms against sectarian militias, for religious leaders to take a stand, and for rebels and civilians to cut the supply lines of the “rogue” forces, a reference to the Iraqi Security Forces.

Statement by Rafi al-Rifai, summarized and translated by Iraq Team

Rifai encouraged and supported the “Mujahedeen” who are currently carrying arms in their targeting of sectarian and hateful “militias.” The Mufti also called for the tribal leaders in southern Iraq not send their sons [members of the IA and Federal Police] to sacrifice themselves for such a “tyrant.” He also called for religious leaderships to announce their stance regarding the ongoing events. Regarding the local Iraqi Police, Rifai called for them to support “their people” and called for the tribal “rebels” not to attack members of the IP in their provinces. He called for residents of provinces witnessing the Sunni Opposition Movement [Hirak] to support “their brothers” in Anbar and perform their “military duties” and to cut the supply lines of the “rogue” forces. 

Clashes between Anbar tribal militias and the ISF in Ramadi and Fallujah

Violence in Anbar quickly escalated after the closure of the protest site. Clashes between armed gunmen and the Iraqi Security Forces continued on December 31 in Ramadi and Fallujah, according to mainstream Iraqi media. On December 31, clashes took place near the eastern entrance of Fallujah between gunmen and military units. The clashes followed similar events that took place in the preceding day. Additional reports indicate that the road between al-Baghdadi Military Base to Ramadi was closed to ISF convoys on December 31. Another report indicates that an Iraqi Army headquarters north of Ramadi was attacked with indirect fire reported to be Katyusha rockets. In these cases, the attackers were likely tribal militias, who assaulted federal security forces until they withdrew at Maliki’s command on December 31.

In conjunction with the Iraqi Army’s withdrawal, on December 31, reports indicated that gunmen took control of a police station in Ramadi. This may have been an isolated incident, to which the Iraqi Army reportedly responded by bombing the police station from the air; it may also have been the first attack in what appeared to be the first in a synchronized attack upon many police stations in Ramadi and Fallujah. On January 1, gunmen carrying AQI flags were reported to control most of the IP stations in Anbar. In Fallujah, an attack on the police directorate on January 1 resulted in the freeing of 100 prisoners. AQI likely carried out the attack, given its past attacks on prisons with the stated objective of freeing prisoners. Furthermore, the synchronized attack upon the local police stations is likely the work of AQI, because that organization has the capacity to conduct orchestrated campaigns. It is not possible, however, to determine with certainty whether the attackers in every event were members of tribal militias, al-Qaeda in Iraq, or a combination.

Tribal responses to AQI’s advance on Anbar’s cities

Anbar Provincial Council Chairman Falih al-Issawi made a statement on January 1 that indicated some tribes in Fallujah had reached a “deal” with AQI. However, all other indications of tribal militia activity since AQI attacked the police stations suggest that the tribes are mobilized against al-Qaeda in Iraq. Tribal elements from Anbar Province have begun to cooperate with local security forces, particularly the local Iraqi Police, in order to regain control in Ramadi and Fallujah. According to media and security sources, the cooperation between the tribal groups and local IP appears to have been instrumental in retaking a number of police stations that had been attacked and occupied by AQI and their supporters during the previous days. One example of this is demonstrated in the joint operation between the Abu Bali tribe and local IP forces which regained control of the al-Sediq police station, located in the al-Jazeera area on the outskirts of Ramadi. Another example is the Albo Ghanim tribe, which reportedly arrested three AQI members in Ramadi on January 2.

Sources have reported that there had been a massive increase in the presence of tribal forces in the streets of Ramadi, and that they had fought alongside local IP forces in numerous violent clashes against AQI and their supporters. Although most of the information and media reports concerning tribal cooperation and joint operations has been confined to Ramadi, an anonymous security source stated that a meeting took place on January 2 between tribal elders, religious scholars, intellectuals, and notables to discuss the developing security situation and the intention to cooperate fully and actively with security forces to regain control of Fallujah. Tribes and notable figures in Fallujah also met on January 1 to declare committees to provide security. On January 2, a New York Times report indicated that tribal militias had reluctantly chosen to join with government forces to counter AQI in Fallujah. One tribal leader was quoted as saying, “we do not want to be like Syria.” Yet thus far all cooperation reported has been with between the tribes and Iraqi Police, not army units.

The ISF disposition in Anbar: IP Desertions and Federal Reinforcements

One YouTube video allegedly shows ISF officers hosted by tribal members and giving up their military uniforms on December 31. On January 1, signs of desertion in the ranks of the Iraqi police appeared, as members of the police abandoned their positions in Fallujah and the police stations subsequently fell under the control of gunmen. This desertion likely resulted from their realization that the police station was not defensible against an assault. It also suggests that other local security forces operating in the province may desert, units may dissolve, and individuals and units may join the tribal militias. Confirming the desertion of Iraqi police members, Anbar’s governor, Ahmed al-Dulaimi, stated that Iraqi police members gave their weapons to the attacking gunmen. Government loss of control is not limited to Ramadi and Fallujah, but has also included the areas of Khaldiyah, Hit, and Husseba.

Image from Twitter allegedly showing clothing left behind by defecting police

The disposition of federal security forces (these include the Iraqi Army, National Police, and specialized units such as SWAT and CT units) in Anbar is not clear at this time. Original reports indicate that the Iraqi Army forces in Ramadi withdrew to the west. Some reports suggest that the Iraqi Army never left the cities, though the assault upon the police stations on January 1-2 suggests that they were vulnerable. Others suggest that SWAT remains in the center of Ramadi, while new Iraqi Army elements, ordered into the cities from the east (the Baghdad side), are being repelled by unidentified gunmen at the checkpoints on the periphery of Fallujah. New reports indicate that seven Iraqi Army battalions are re-entering Ramadi with armored support, although photographs suggest these are armored personnel carriers or BMPs rather than tanks. Some sources reported previously that IA reinforcements from Basra, Maysan, Dhi Qar, and Taji are also gathered in Anbar province, potentially for desert or urban operations. These southern forces are likely loyal to Maliki.

This video reportedly shows Iraqi Army soldiers surrounded by tribal militia members in Fallujah

The presence of Iraqi Army reinforcements, particularly those from Shi’a areas, also escalates the grievance of the Anbari tribes against the security establishment. The ISF do not always behave intelligently or in a non-sectarian fashion; a pro-government Facebook page posted a video of an ISF member reproaching Alwani in captivity, which likely exacerbated the Sunni response to his arrest. Rumors are already thick regarding the sectarian character of ISF deployment – dubious photos spread widely on Twitter allegedly showing ISF vehicles “heading to Anbar” displaying Shi’a flags. Federal security force presence in the cities may still incite violent resistance from the tribal militias, as these militias are now caught in the middle trying to wrest control from AQI while still resisting further government intervention. This tension has the potential to fracture the ISF in Anbar.

National Sunni Political Response

The decisions of national Sunni politicians throughout this violent crisis in Anbar will be important to watch. On December 30, Osama al-Nujaifi announced that he had withdrawn from the Honor Document, a formal rapprochement with Maliki, and a contingent of 44 Mutahidun representatives have reportedly submitted their resignations. If their intentions are real, their resignation from parliament will likely generate a Sunni boycott of elections. If Nujaifi instead guides them to remain, they could be a source of renewed conciliation with Maliki. His leverage with Maliki will depend on the outcome of events.

Nujaifi’s behavior since December 30 suggests that reconciliation is his motivation, although he is making specific demands of Maliki. On December 31, Nujaifi stated that the Mutahidun parliamentary withdrawal was temporary, pending further developments in Anbar. On January 1, an Iraqiyya parliamentary delegation composed of MPs Khaled al-Alwani, Sumayya al-Qallab, and Hamid al-Zobaie met with MP Alwani, still in custody in Baghdad, after acting Defense Minister Sadoud al-Dulaimi and Iraqi Awakening Conference leader Ahmed Abu Risha visited Alwani on Tuesday. On January 2, Mutahidun released a statement repeating its demands for devolution of security control to local police forces and the immediate release of MP Alwani, along with the transfer of Alwani’s legal case to Anbar province. The statement also reiterated Mutahidun’s belief that Iraqi Army operations in Ramadi and Fallujah were unnecessary and overly damaging. They maintained that order had been restored by local forces without help from Baghdad, which they considered as carrying out politicized targeting by PM Maliki. Also of note on January 2 was Ninewa governor Athil al-Nujaifi’s announcement of his desire to maintain good relations with ISF in his province, stating that political disputes should remain separate from security issues, echoing Mutahidun’s earlier statement.

Also of note, Anbar tribal leader, Ahmed Abu Risha, issued a statement on January 1 calling on the people of Anbar to target AQI elements who have “abandoned the desert and headed to Anbar and Fallujah to spread among its people killing and corruption.” Abu Risha apparently realizes that if AQI is able to control Anbar, and specifically Ramadi, that he will be a target as the leader of the Awakening Movement. This fear may also explain his urgency to weigh in on Alwani’s arrest, as he was part of a delegation that visited Alwani in prison.   

AQI’s advances in Anbar and the subsequent reactions to them by Iraqi Sunni figures suggest that the tide may have shifted against AQI. Governor Nujaifi’s statement of cooperation with the ISF indicates that, as he stated, armed groups – likely AQI and Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqah al-Naqshabandiah (JRTN) – were preparing to attack Mosul. Similarly, Abu Risha’s statement calling on the people of Anbar to defend themselves indicates a fear of AQI’s overreach. Although Saadi maintained that the presence of federal forces will be an “occupation of the province,” he also issued a statement calling on the tribes in Anbar to defend the province from “outlaw elements,” referring to AQI. However, the ISF will need to have a conciliatory approach to the locals and a better relationship with the community if the central government wishes to turn the tide against AQI, as there are still reports that some armed tribal elements are negotiating with AQI to keep them away from the fight in Anbar so as not to attract a heavy ISF response.

Conclusion

Maliki’s Political Calculus

Maliki’s move against the Ramadi protest camp was politically motivated, and is the proximate cause of the current crisis. Maliki sought to dissolve the Anbari protest movement before upcoming national elections. He saw an occasion to do so as he massed ISF in the Anbar desert to avenge the death of those killed in the December 21 ambush. Maliki overreached and created a political and security crisis in Anbar in the process.

Many tribes view the federal security forces, namely the Iraqi Army and the Federal Police, as adversaries, particularly after the December 30 confrontation in Ramadi. Despite the threat to their homes, these tribal militias prefer the prospect of cooperating with the local police rather than working with federal security to counter AQI. Excessive reinforcement of Anbar by Iraqi Army and federal forces is therefore perilous.

Maliki may nevertheless make political gains despite his political overstepping. Sunni political leaders are weakened because AQI has seized the opportunity to move on the cities in the wake of ISF withdrawal, and because the local police force suffers desertions. The first indicator of Maliki’s strength relative to Sunni politicians may be that protest movement leaders accept his proposals to increase the presence of the ISF in Anbar without getting any real concessions.

Maliki’s targeting of al-Qaeda in Iraq in Anbar stems from both security and political concerns. The operations against AQI have symbolic value for Maliki in the political sphere, as he needed a successful and decisive operational victory ahead of elections to appear strong.

Maliki’s Security Calculus

AQI also presents a genuine security threat to Iraq. AQI’s operations in Anbar have clearly increased since al-Raqqa fell out of Syrian government control in March 2013. Although AQI’s control of western Anbar has become increasingly significant, this is not 2006 and Anbar is not the heart of AQI, which now possesses multiple centers of gravity in Iraq and Syria. Ground warfare to clear AQI in the desert is a waste of precious resources, given that AQI seeks control of cities. Maliki seems to have made an operational military mistake by focusing his main effort on striking AQI in the Anbari desert in the Horan Valley.

Vulnerability of Urban Areas and U.S. Policy

Reinforcement of Anbar by Iraqi Army from other provinces may also leave other critical areas such as Baghdad more vulnerable to AQI. Should AQI re-enter urban areas en masse, the ISF will not succeed in getting them out without escalating the situation. Local civilian populations may well see federal ground forces as targeting them instead of AQI. Because of the bad precedents set by Maliki’s actions against Iraqi Sunnis to date, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the security forces can succeed to penetrate urban areas accessible to AQI without incurring violent repulsion by Sunnis who are mobilized in self-defense.

The U.S. has supplied the Iraqi Security Forces with Hellfire missiles and aerial reconnaissance drones, according to Maliki’s media advisor. These tools are excellent means to disrupt remote AQI camps away from urban centers. The question now becomes whether the ISF will use them in the urban fight in close proximity to tribal militias. Furthermore, while the use of these tools in the Jazeera desert may cause AQI to be more cautious about cross-border operations, they will not succeed in dismantling the organization, whose leadership very likely now resides in Syria. Such weapons are therefore insufficient to accomplish American or Iraqi objectives to contain or disrupt AQI.

It could be coincidence that his media advisor leaked information about that military support on December 27, the day that Maliki issued his ultimatum to the Ramadi protest camp. It could also, however, have been a deliberate leak to indicate his position of strength. By offering unqualified support in the form of military assistance, the U.S. may have inadvertently empowered Maliki to act against the Ramadi protest camp by boosting his confidence in his military capabilities and his impunity.

U.S. military aid offered to Maliki without conditions generates the unfortunate impression among Sunnis in Iraq and the region that the U.S. has picked a side in a sectarian war. Whether or not these perceptions of American policy are correct, these perceptions along with Maliki’s ill-timed move against Sunni political opposition provides a huge boon to AQI as it poises itself to exploit the crisis in Anbar.

Jessica Lewis is Research Director at the Institute for the Study of War

Arsal: Lebanon’s Gateway to the Syrian Conflict

by Geoffrey Daniels

Following the victory of the Syrian regime and their Hezbollah counterparts at al-Qusayr in early June 2013, Sunni extremist groups began conducting escalatory reprisal attacks against Hezbollah in Lebanon. In the months since, the predominantly Sunni Lebanese border town of Arsal, located directly across the border from the Qalamoun area where most of the surviving rebel fighters from al-Qusayr fled, has functioned as the primary staging area and support zone for these attacks into Lebanon. As a result, nearby Hezbollah strongholds in the Bekaa Valley are on high alert for potential car bombs and cross-border rocket attacks originating from elements in Arsal, forcing Hezbollah on the defensive in Lebanon. The Lebanese Army, meanwhile, has taken concrete measures to mitigate the threat posed by Syria to Lebanon via Arsal.

Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict nearly three years ago, Lebanon’s Arsal, a lone enclave in the eastern Bekaa Valley for Sunnis sympathetic to the Syrian uprising, has served as a crucial logistical support network in the struggle against the Assad regime. Located in the northeastern corner of Lebanon on the border with Syria, the town lies nearly equidistant from Hezbollah’s Bekaa Valley strongholds of Baalbek and Hermel. In spite of its isolated position, the geostrategic relevance of Arsal lies in its close proximity across the border from the contested Qalamoun mountain range. Qalamoun is an opposition stronghold in western Syria between Homs and Damascus that is currently the site of an intense battle for control of key supply lines along the M5 highway.

Lebanese authorities have long neglected Arsal and the notoriously porous nature of the border region has made it a hub for smuggling people, weapons, and drugs across the border into Syria. The smuggling routes through the connecting mountains flow freely in both directions, as weapons and fighters flow from Arsal into Qalamoun while car bombs and refugees flow in the opposite direction. Since the start of the Syrian conflict, Arsal’s pre-war population of 40,000 has more than doubled as 60,000 Syrian refugees have fled to the town due to the nearby fighting, according to municipality figures.

In the past year, Arsal has become the primary staging area and support zone for Sunni extremist groups projecting violence into Lebanon.  Left in its current state, Arsal threatens the interests of Hezbollah, the Assad regime, and the Lebanese government. The primary, short-term interests of these three parties align, as Hezbollah and the Lebanese government are keen on shutting down the flow of weapons and explosives through the border, while the Syrian regime looks to control the strategic central supply routes that dissect the country. Therefore, each group has a vested stake in disrupting the networks that run through Arsal.

The Aftermath of al-Qusayr

In the beginning of June, the Syrian regime achieved a decisive military victory following a 17-day siege of and clearing operation in al-Qusayr. Al-Qusayr is an important town in Homs province located adjacent to the Lebanese border, not far from the route that connects Damascus to Homs, which in turn links the Syrian capital to the Alawite heartlands along the coast. Many of the surviving rebel fighters from the assault fled south to the nearby Qalamoun region. This important regime victory six months ago was made possible by the large-scale involvement of Hezbollah fighters, whose overt presence in Syria prompted a series of reprisal attacks in Lebanon during the summer months that were likely linked to the logistical support hub of Arsal.

In July and August, for example, Hezbollah’s Beirut stronghold of Dahiyeh came under attack on two separate occasions. The first, a car bombing in the Bir al-Abed area, injured at least 53. Caretaker Defense Minister Fayez Ghosn tied the attack to Arsal residents. The second incident, another car bombing, occurred in the Ruweiss district of Beirut, not far from Bir al-Abed, killing at least 25 while injuring over 200. Lebanese authorities linked this attack to many of the same suspects based in Arsal. Similarly, Ghosn attributed a spate of roadside bombings in June and July that targeted Hezbollah convoys en route to Damascus to elements in Arsal.

Escalatory Trends

As the summer months concluded, there was an escalation in two distinct trends of confrontation in Arsal, and neither shows signs of abating. First, the Syrian regime carried out a series of high-profile attacks against opposition targets inside Lebanese territory. On August 3^rd, a Syrian regime airstrike killed nine, and injured nine more, including women and children, in Khirbet Daoud, just east of Arsal. Two months later, on October 7^th, Syrian warplanes targeted an ambulance in the Wadi Hamid area of Arsal that was presumably transporting a wounded rebel fighter seeking refuge in Lebanon. Just a few days later, Omar al-Atrash, an Arsal resident and the suspected head of Jabhat al-Nusra’s Lebanese faction, was alleged to have been killed in a Syrian airstrike along with several others in Nehmat, near Arsal on October 11^th. Al-Atrash was reportedly responsible for the August 15^th Dahiyeh bombing.

On November 15^th, the Syrian regime, along with its Hezbollah counterparts, launched an operation aimed at retaking the Qalamoun area. As the tempo of the Syrian regime offensive on the rebels in Qalamoun continues to increase, so do the cross-border incidents. In mid-November, two Syrian gunships carried out a series of raids targeting the outskirts of Arsal in Wadi Atta and Hay al-Shamis striking several houses purported to be inhabited by opposition militants. In the following week, three more attacks targeted Arsal in a span of just ten days.

In a rare responsive measure, the Lebanese Army fired anti-aircraft missiles at Syrian planes flying over Arsal on December 30^th, reportedly responding to orders from the Lebanese Army Command to “fire on any warplane that violates Lebanese airspace.” These orders signify a departure from previous incidents, in which President Michel Suleiman condemned the violations but refrained from overt action to halt them. The reasoning behind the change in policy is unclear, but the timing of a change in the strategic perspective of the Lebanese government regarding Syrian airspace violations suggests that the Lebanese Armed Forces felt the need to display a more muscular response to a serious threat in the Bekaa Valley.

The other noticeably intensifying trend occurring in Arsal is the number of confrontations between the Lebanese Army and Syrian rebels smuggling arms and explosives. On September 29^th, the Army confiscated a truck from Arsal heading to Syria that contained two hundred 80mm mortar shells and an estimated 7,000 rounds of ammunition, which Lebanese officials ultimately determined was expired.

Two weeks later, on October 14^th, Lebanese Armed Forces defused a car bomb rigged with 50-kilograms of explosives in Beirut’s al-Maamoura district of the Hezbollah-controlled southern suburbs. Thirteen individuals, the majority of whom were from Arsal, were indicted for the plot and allegedly confessed to being a part of Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). The following week, a leaked security memo from the Beirut Airport alleged that JN rigged four vehicles with explosives and sent them through Arsal with forged documents, prepared for operations against Hezbollah strongholds.

In perhaps the most high-profile attempt to smuggle explosives into Lebanon to date, on November 22^nd, Lebanese Independence Day, security forces dismantled a car near Hezbollah’s Bekaa Valley stronghold Baalbek carrying 400-kilograms of explosives. For comparison’s sake, the explosives were nearly eight times heavier than the ones used in the Iranian Embassy suicide blasts in Beirut on November 19^th that killed over 20 and injured more than 150. Authorities were alerted to the vehicle after reports of a shootout, and found the car with its front windows smashed and tires burst. Reports indicate that Hezbollah had monitored the car upon its entry into Arsal before confronting it and apprehending the passengers when it reached an isolated stretch of road just north of Baalbek, allegedly aware of its presence through the use of Iranian-made UAVs. If true, this would illustrate the substantial length to which Hezbollah is prepared to go to mitigate the threat posed by Sunni extremists in Arsal.

Most recently, on December 17^th, Hezbollah fighters intercepted an explosives-laden vehicle heading for one of its military bases outside of Labweh, a town just 10 kilometers from Arsal. The targeted base in the town of Sbouba is reportedly a station used by the organization for rotating its fighters in Syria. It is clear that Hezbollah military assets in the Bekaa Valley are on high alert, and in this vein, the organization has increased security measures in Hermel to protect its interests against further attacks.

Notably, the U.S. and the U.K. have recognized the hazards posed by the porous, mountainous border with Syria, providing four-wheel drive vehicles with off-road capabilities and border-observation equipment and technology to the LAF. Similarly, the Lebanese Army itself has begun to take concrete measures to prevent the smuggling of weapons and explosives across the border. Army bulldozers constructed a 2.5-meter high, 25-kilometer long roadblock that stretches from Arsal to Ras Baalbek amidst reports of additional rockets and car bombs heading for Lebanese territory.

Looking Forward

Only a handful of Syrian rebel groups have used vehicle-borne IEDs, operate out of the Qalamoun region, and have the strategic resources and training to employ these devices. The recent announcement, therefore, from JN leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani about the formal presence of his organization in Lebanon, in conjunction with a Hezbollah ambush that killed 32 JN fighters near the outskirts of Nahle, just 30-kilometers away from Arsal, suggests that JN is the primary Syrian rebel group staging attacks from Arsal and its outskirts. Similarly, in mid-December, the organization jointly claimed rocket attacks on Hermel with the previously unknown Marwan Hadid Brigades. 

In retaliation for the increasingly public involvement of Hezbollah in the fighting in Syria, specifically right across the border in Qalamoun, it would not be out of the question to expect more frequent car bombings and cross-border rocket attacks against the organization’s interests in Lebanon, mirroring the trend witnessed after al-Qusayr. The southern suburbs of Beirut, Baalbek and Hermel in the Bekaa Valley, and towns in southern Lebanon like Nabi Sheet and Bint Jbeil are particularly vulnerable targets.

With refugees fleeing Syria to enter Lebanon’s Arsal at an unprecedented rate due to the intensity of fighting in nearby Qalamoun, the aforementioned trends, confrontations between the Lebanese Army and Syrian fighters smuggling weapons and explosives, in addition to airstrikes against Syrian opposition fighters in Lebanon and potential responses from the LAF, will continue, and likely occur at an accelerated pace. Over 200,000 people live in the Qalamoun area, and as fighting spreads to the towns of Nabak and Yabrud, further displacement is expected.

A potentially dangerous impact of Arsal’s refugee influx is implicit in Oxfam’s November 2013 report, Survey on the Livelihoods of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon. A prominent majority of the Syrian refugee population in Lebanon is under 30, living in squalid conditions while struggling to survive amidst harsh economic circumstances. Similar to the case of Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps, Arsal could become a major recruiting ground for Sunni extremists, if it has not already.

Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict remains undeterred in spite of incurring increasing casualties, including high-profile battlefield commanders. The uptick in attacks against Hezbollah in Lebanon facilitated via Sunni extremists in Arsal is undoubtedly directly linked to the overt, and increased, presence of Hezbollah fighters across the border. But, in the face of a greater perceived threat from Arsal, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah highlights the necessity for increased Hezbollah presence in Syria to mitigate the danger posed to Lebanon. 

With the Syrian war showing no signs of slowing and Hezbollah showing no sign of withdrawal, Arsal remains the primary staging and support zone through which JN and its allies will conduct attacks against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Should the Assad regime and Hezbollah’s operation in Qalamoun be successful, Arsal will effectively be cut off from its support line, leaving the some 60,000 Syrian refugees in the town surrounded by Hezbollah and regime soldiers. Whether the offensive is successful or not, given the demographic composition of Arsal, the town will continue to threaten the interests of the Syrian regime, Hezbollah, and the Lebanese government.     

Hezbollah And The Fight For Control in Qalamoun

by Isabel Nassief

Fighting between pro-regime and rebel forces has begun to concentrate on the Damascus-Homs supply route through the Qalamoun Mountains, which saw sporadic violence throughout the summer of 2013. This battle – which is crucial for both regime and rebel resupply – will focus on contested sections of the M5 highway.

Hezbollah will also focus on cutting off logistical connections between Arsal, Lebanon, and rebels in Qalamoun. Although Hezbollah and the regime share a common goal of the regime’s survival in Syria, the battle for Qalamoun illustrates the potential for disparity in their strategic priorities.

For more, see here.

Rise in Targeting of Iraqi Sunni Tribal Leaders in Southern Iraq: Iraq Update #40

By Ahmed Ali

On November 25, the bodies of Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders Adnan al-Ghanim and Kadhim al-Juburi were discovered in al-Tannumah, Basra. According to reports, the two tribal leaders were shot in the head and chest and their bodies were disfigured. Furthermore, al-Ghanim was beheaded while one of al-Juburi’s legs was cut off. The discovery of their bodies follows their kidnapping on October 26, when al-Ghanim and al-Juburi were picked up in central Basra city by individuals in military uniforms. The family of al-Ghanim immediately described the operation as a “kidnapping” and al-Ghanim’s brother, Mohyi, added that it is intended to “displace the sons of the tribe.” Local authorities denied any involvement of security forces in the operation, and Basra’s police formed a special unit to search for and find al-Ghanim and al-Juburi.

Adnan al-Ghanim was a significant personality in Basra. He was the leader of the al-Ghanim tribe in that area and was considered a prominent social and tribal leader in the south. His family resides in the Abu al-Khasib area in southern Basra. Abu al-Khasib has a sizable Iraqi Sunni population. In 2010, al-Ghanim was arrested by security forces on charges of supporting “terrorism.” He was subsequently released in 2012 after he was cleared of the charges. More recently, his house was targeted by a hand grenade attack on July 23. This history suggests that al-Ghanim has been a consistent target of attacks either due to his sectarian background or his social prominence.        

These events represent a renewal of sectarian targeting of Iraqi Sunnis in southern Iraq that culminated in September with the closure announcement of Sunni mosques in Basra by the Sunni endowment. The closure of the mosques coincided with the displacement of 150 families of the predominately Iraqi Sunni al-Sadun tribe in Dhi Qar.

Basra is not the only location in southern Iraq that is witnessing attacks against tribal leaders. In Dhi Qar, the leader of the Rfei tribe, Jamal Mohsen al-Faris, was killed by unidentified gunmen in al-Fajr sub-district on November 25. Al-Faris is also an Iraqi Sunni tribal leader and former Iraqi parliamentarian, and his assassination demonstrates that the targeting of Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders in Iraq’s southern provinces is not an isolated phenomenon.      

Implications

Al-Ghanim and al-Juburi were likely kidnapped and killed by Iraqi Shi’a militias as part of a continued and renewed campaign of sectarian reprisal attacks. However, the allegations that they were kidnapped by individuals in military uniforms and with apparent impunity will make the local security forces appear complicit in the attacks. This perception will foster an image that the Iraqi Security Forces in Basra are targeting Iraqi Sunnis. Consequently, it is likely that members of the al-Ghanim tribe and other Iraqi Sunni tribes will be more concerned about their personal safety now and will consider leaving Basra and southern Iraq to safer places in Iraq. The killing of al-Ghanim and al-Juburi could also elicit sectarian reactions in the form of tribal retribution attacks by members of the al-Ghanim tribe and a push by al-Qaeda in Iraq to paint the killing as further evidence of targeting of the Iraqi Sunnis. For Basra, these high-profile killings also represent a possible turning point. The area where the bodies were found is known to have a militia presence. Therefore, the discovery of the bodies is a new signal that militias are able to operate with increased impunity in Basra. Given the high potential for the fallout scenarios described above, Iraqi Security Forces in southern Iraq have to pursue a strategy aimed at curtailing the activities of Iraqi Shi’a militias and providing visible, concrete steps for the protection of the Iraqi Sunnis.         

Ahmed Ali is a senior Iraq Research Analyst and the Iraq Team Lead at the Institute for the Study of War. 

A Power Move by Syria's Rebel Forces

by Valerie Szybala

Earlier today, a new merger of rebel forces was announced in Syria. While the seemingly endless string of mergers and splits among the Syrian rebels can be difficult to follow, this particular announcement is significant. The new Islamic Front has the potential to finally be the unified fighting force that the Syrian rebels have been waiting for.

The Brigades

The seven rebel brigades that form the founding members of the Islamic Front include some of the country’s strongest groups. Ideologically they span the Islamist spectrum from those who have called for a modern, moderate state with a foundation of Islamic law, to those who have called for a state with strict interpretation of Sharia law and have at times appeared to have more in common with the al-Qaeda affiliates than with their fellow Syrian rebels.


Suqur al-Sham – Suqur al-Sham was founded in 2011 and is based in Idlib province. It was a member of the moderate Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF), which came under the umbrella of the western-back Supreme Military Council (SMC). The group’s leader, Ahmad Eissa, was named as the head of the new Islamic Front. Eissa has previously called for a moderate Islamic state that is not imposed on society. Though its forces are formidable, Suqur al-Sham is by no means the strongest brigade in this alliance, making the choice of Eissa as leader notable. The group has had recent trouble with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).


Liwa al-Tawhid – Liwa al-Tawhid is by most accounts the strongest group in Aleppo, estimated to have around 11,000 fighters. It was formed in July 2012 as a merger of smaller militias in the area. Although they have cooperated with the more extremist groups in battle, they have espoused a moderate Islamic ideology and were respected by other rebel groups. This was demonstrated in September when they were called in to mediate fighting between ISIS and an FSA-linked brigade in the northern city of Azaz. Their former military commander Abdel Qader Saleh had previously stated that he wants a modern Islamic state with a basis in Sharia law, but with civilian rule, elections, and minority protection.


Jaysh al-Islam – Jaysh al-Islam, based in the Damascus area, was created in late September 2013 when Liwa al-Islam consolidated its power by subsuming dozens of other brigades. Liwa al-Islam had previously been a member of the SILF and therefore had fallen under the SMC’s umbrella, but made it clear that it was breaking completely with the SMC in its new incarnation. In recent weeks it has received criticism from ISIS for pulling out of several battles, pushing Jaysh al-Islam to make a public rebuttal.


Ahrar al-Sham – Ahrar al-Sham was the leading member of the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF), an umbrella coalition of more hardline Islamic groups, unaffiliated with the SMC. Though it is still widely referred to as Ahrar al-Sham, the full name for the group is Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya, which it took on in January of this year when Ahrar al-Sham consolidated several groups into one. Ahrar al-Sham is one of the more extreme Syrian rebel groups, and has a Salafi jihadist ideology. Its leader, Hassan Aboud has stated that democracy is a tool of the west and Sharia is the only acceptable option. This group frequently fights in close cooperation with both of the al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria, and has also been one of the few rebel groups to regularly hold al-Qaeda style advocacy tents, trying to win over the Syrian people to their philosophy. Ahrar al-Sham is also one of the few groups that operates on a national level and is strong on several different fronts.


Ansar al-Sham – Ansar al-Sham was also a member of the SIF, and operates mainly in Latakia. It has not been as public with statements of its ideology as some of the other brigades, leading to speculation that it may not have a solid command and control structure among its various units. If its ideology can be gleaned from the founding charter of the SIF, it wants to topple the regime and create an Islamic state based on Sharia law. Notably, the charter does clearly state that the SIF's approach “is one of centrism and moderation. It is far from religious fanaticism and its resulting deviation of creed and action;” and makes specific mention of women’s rights. Although it is difficult to know how much of these words are aspirational rather than reflective of reality. Like Ahrar al-Sham, Ansar al-Sham has put some effort towards prosthelytizing and civil works.


Liwa al-Haq – Liwa al-Haq formed in August 2012 as a merger of other rebel brigades in Homs, and was also a member of SIF. Its founders have claimed that is not a Salafi jihadist group, and its members have a range of ideologies (which is probably true for all of the brigades in Syria). It is one of the smaller groups in this alliance.


Kurdish Islamic Front – By most accounts this is a very small fighting force, numbering less than 1,000 fighters. The Kurdish Islamic Front has fought with the al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria against the Kurdish YPG fighting forces. Coming on the heels of the recent announcement by the YPG of an interim Kurdish government in Hasaka – a move which was widely condemned by other rebels as an attempt to break up the country – the Kurdish Islamic Front’s inclusion in this new alliance is most likely a message to the YPG not to get too comfortable.


Admittedly, Syria’s armed opposition has faced challenges in unifying in the past. The atomized nature of the rebel forces is a product of the organic roots of the Syrian uprising. But changes in the conflict have forced the rebels to evolve in order to survive. One result of this evolution has been the increasing drive for unification among the internal fighting forces, independent of the political leadership-in-exile which has failed to provide the amount of support that the fighting groups have so desperately needed. The increase in foreign elements in the conflict, on both sides, has accelerated this evolution. Smaller, scattered, local rebel brigades have been unable to compete with the al-Qaeda affiliates – particularly the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham – which have demonstrated the ability to operate at a national level. On the other side, this year has seen a tremendous influx of pro-regime foreign fighters in the form of Hezbollah members, Iraqi Shi’ite militias, and Iranian trainers and strategists. These forces have significantly boosted the strength and fighting capabilities of the regime, which was operating with greatly diminished strength as of the end of 2012.


There have been a number of notable mergers among the rebel groups this year, particularly in the months since the August 21st chemical weapons attack. Some of those attempts have been successful, like Jaysh al-Islam, while others, like the September 24th Islamic Alliance, have fallen apart quickly. But with every attempt the rebel brigades have been learning important lessons about what they need to do to succeed in forming a larger rebel army, and the Islamic Front announced earlier today demonstrates this clearly. Notably, this group does not include either of the al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria. Also, in the announcement they were clear state that this was intended to be a full merger and not just another coordinating body. Both of these moves were intended to avoid the pitfalls that plagued previous mergers.


After the creation of Jaysh al-Islam under Zahran Alloush on September 29th, it was clear that the western-backed Supreme Military Council (SMC) was in trouble. General Salim Idris reportedly cut short a trip to France to rush back to Turkey to try to salvage the SMC with a reorganization that would be more inclusive of local leaders and give Zahran Alloush a seat at the table. But eventually this initiative died out, and shortly afterwards the social media chatter about an imminent rebel alliance of the country’s strongest brigades began. Then came the death of Liwa al-Tawhid’s military commander, Abdel Qader al-Saleh, in a regime airstrike near Aleppo over the weekend. Al-Saleh was a well-respected, charismatic leader, and it was rumored that he would be named as the leader of the new alliance. The loss of Abdel Qader al-Saleh is doubtless a blow to this unification, but despite this setback it seems that the groundwork had been fully laid and with some reorganization behind the scenes, the brigades went ahead with their announcement and subsequent interview live on Al Jazeera.

Implications

The creation of the new Islamic Front is a double-edged sword:


On one hand, this may be the nail in the coffin of the SMC. The western-backed umbrella group was wobbly enough after the resignation of a leading northern commander and the failed negotiations to bring Jaysh al-Islam back into the fold. With the additional losses of Suqur al-Sham and Liwa al-Tawhid it is hard to imagine that the SMC can now survive with any semblance of legitimacy or power on the ground. Additionally, the fact that it is an “Islamic” alliance and includes some of Syria’s truly hardline elements is worrisome, since it could mean that this new union will push the more moderate groups in that direction.


On the other hand, this new Islamic Front does not include either of the al-Qaeda affiliated groups in Syria. And as the Islamic Front has now set itself up as the most powerful rebel group in the country, it seems that they may attempt to sideline al-Qaeda and reclaim the Syrian insurgency. Around the same time of the merger announcement, Liwa al-Haq published a statement to clarify its views that seems to support this possibility. In the statement they say that while they appreciate ISIS for its support in fighting against the regime, they do not acknowledge the ISIS brothers as legitimate leaders for Syria. Additionally, the fact that Ahmad Eissa of Suqur al-Sham was named as the leader of the Islamic Front over commanders from more powerful brigades may be a sign that the Islamic Front will attempt to stay on the more moderate end of the spectrum.


This new group will be built gradually over the next three months as the brigades work towards integrating their organizational structures. We can also expect to see more rebel units joining the Islamic Front in the coming days, as they have indicated that they are current reviewing requests from prospective members. If they start to announce the addition of other power players like the Farouq Brigades, the Furqan Brigades, and the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Battalions, it will be a good indication that the Islamic Front is here to stay. Even as it stands with the current members, the new group will have an estimated 45,000 fighters, and span critical battlefronts that including Damascus, Homs, Idlib, Latakia, and Aleppo.


Another thing to watch for will be the response of the SMC leadership. FSA spokesman Louay Meqdad has already reached out an olive branch, saying that: “the alliance is welcomed because it represents a combined set of interests of the Syrian people. The SMC is not opposed to alliances that draw people together under the hope for a protective and democratic future Syria. They [the SMC] do not wish to discount such alliances that are not in nature harmful to those values.”

The Serekeniye Martyr's Offensive: Kurds Consolidate Control in Hasaka

by Eric Bernstein

On November 3^rd, the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) launched an offensive to consolidate its control of the Hasaka province by pushing al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) out of the area surrounding the Turkish border city of Ras al-Ayn. The move came a week after the YPG, which serves as the armed wing of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the unofficial Kurdish security force, captured the city of Yarubiya on Hasaka’s border with Iraq. Hasaka, home to the majority of Syria’s oil reserves as well as a 70% Kurdish population, serves as the primary support base for the PYD. As a buffer against ISIS positions further west, Ras al-Ayn is essential to the PYD’s efforts to create a zone of peaceful Kurdish provincial autonomy amid Syria’s ongoing civil war.

The YPG’s operation, dubbed the “Serekeniye Martyr’s Offensive,” was a quick success that resulted in the capture of 38 small villages and military positions in a 15 kilometer radius south and west of Ras al-Ayn. Assuming that the YPG fortifies these newly acquired positions, as it has dutifully done with other acquisitions throughout the conflict, these territorial gains will greatly enlarge the geographic barrier protecting against attacks from ISIS positions around Tal Abyad, in northern ar-Raqqa province.

The offensive, currently in its third phase, has targeted ISIS and JN positions that previously served as launching points for shelling campaigns and raids on YPG patrols and checkpoints in Ras al-Ayn. The first phase of the offensive, which began November 3^rd and ended November 4^th, was a push southeast along Highway 716 towards Hasaka city. The second, which began November 4^th and ended November 5^th, focused on a push west along Highway 712, in the direction of Tal Abyad. The captured positions range from neighborhood-sized suburbs to outposts consisting of a few residential buildings on strategic roads or intersections. No information has yet been released on the objectives or status of the third phase.

Serekeniye Martyr’s Offensive Phases 1 and 2

The success of the Serekeniye Martyr’s Offensive is indicative of the strength, discipline, and organization that armed Kurdish groups have exhibited throughout their clashes with al-Qaeda affiliates over the last six months. In July the YPG’s general command announce a change of military posture from “defense and protection” into combat mode, yet until the Serekeniye Martyr’s Offensive, the YPG had maintained a mostly cautious posture – repelling attacks, advancing conservatively, and holding new territory firmly. It is unclear whether this offensive was an isolated YPG surge aimed solely at consolidating control of Ras al-Ayn, or if it represents a broad shift to a more aggressive and expansionary YPG strategy.                

If the YPG is indeed changing its strategy, advances into Tal Abyad and further west will signal the shift. Comments by YPG spokesman Redur Xelil show that the militia plans to advance at least as far as the city outskirts. Any push further, into Tal Abyad proper, will indicate that the YPG in northeastern Syria intends to unite with its counterparts in the Aleppo border towns of Azaz and Jarablus. These cities further west are home to considerable minority Kurdish populations, but are predominantly Arab and currently controlled by ISIS and other opposition groups. Capturing and securing them would require a military operation of a scale that the YPG has not yet carried out.

Another possibility is that the success and magnitude of the offensive was exaggerated by a coinciding strategic withdrawal on the part of ISIS and JN. Facing fierce YPG resistance, a decrease in Turkish support, and the loss of access to the Iraqi border crossing at Yarubiya, the al-Qaeda affiliates may have pulled back from Hasaka in order to reinforce against the ongoing regime offensive in Aleppo and bolster other strongholds in ar-Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor provinces. Although Xelil denied any such retreat, the fact that the YPG’s recent gains around Ras al-Ayn came so rapidly and with so few casualtieson either side, suggests some degree of surrender on the part of ISIS and JN, which are renowned for their fighting ability and unlikely to have been routed so abruptly. Given the al-Qaeda-affiliates’ apparent disadvantage in Hasaka – evidenced by their loss of Ras al-Ayncity and positionsnear Yarubiya as early as this summer – abandoning the province for more promising fronts would make strategic sense. The retreat hypothesis also comports with SOHR reports, as well as various social and mainstream media statements.

Less than a week after the completion of the offensive’s second phase, on November 12^th, the PYD announced the formation of an interim government in Hasaka. Initial reactions to this announcement from the Syrian opposition, Iraqi Kurds, and Turkey were overwhelmingly negative.  Rebels, who have long accused the Kurds of collaborating with Assad, renewed their allegations of PYD betrayal, while foreign governments insistedthat the PYD could not unilaterally establish autonomy within a sovereign nation. Even other Kurdish groups – concerned over the concentration of power in the hands of the PYD – objected on the grounds that the announcement ran counter to Kurdish ambitions of a unified state that would comprise territories of Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran. The PYD denies any relationship with the Assad regime and insists it supports the revolution and that its interim government would function as a regional body, operating parallel to a post-Assad Syrian government, and nothing more.

For the moment, it seems that this debate will remain ancillary, as no acting parties appear to possess the energy, resources, and will necessary to challenge the YPG’s eminence in Hasaka.