The Baghdad Division: Iraqi Shi‘a Militia Elements to Form State-Backed Force

By Ahmed Ali

The Iraqi government plans to form a division comprised of Iraqi Shi’a militia members. This planned division will be deployed in Baghdad. This development is recognition by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki that current security measures are ineffective. While the formation of this division may appeal to the Iraqi Shi’a, it may lead to further discontent by the Iraqi Sunnis. Al-Qaeda in Iraq will capitalize on the formation of this division and seek new opportunities to escalate sectarian violence in Iraq. The formation of the division will damage Maliki’s credentials and likely lead to further instability.

The Plan to form the Baghdad Special Division 

On September 19, reports emerged that the Iraqi government is planningto form a “special division” in Baghdad comprised of Iraqi Shi’a militias. Ostensibly, the force will be tasked with defending Baghdad from al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) attacks and operations. The force will include members of three prominent Iraqi Shi’a militias, the Mahdi Army, Asai’b ahl al-Haq [AAH], and Katai’b Hezbollah [KH]. Other reportsindicate that the force will include members of the Badr organization. The same report added that the force will be commanded by a leading member of the Badr organization. However, a senior member of the Badr organization, Qassim al-Araji, deniedthat the government has approached the organization about joining such a force. Al-Araji emphasized that military orders should come from one command. This statement contradicts statements made by Badr leader and minister of transportation, Hadi al-Amiri, who in a speech in Dhi Qarcalled for allowing members of the Badr organization to be part of the security-providing effort due to their experience. 

In reacting to the news about the formation of this division, a member of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Alliance (SLA), Sadiq al-Laban, deniedthat the government has plans to form this division. He added that the Iraqi military has enough forces to provide security. While the formation of this force is not yet confirmed, the plan portends a number of negative consequences.   

This militia mobilization does not compare directly to existing Sahwa forces. The formation of forces drawn from community members has happened before, with the formationof the predominantly Iraqi Sunni Sahwa (awakening) councils In 2006. The formation of the Baghdad Special Division force may appear to be similar to the formation of Sahwas since both are ostensibly intended to counter the threat of AQI. However, the major difference is that the potential new Baghdad Special Division will be mostly manned by groups that were participants in the violence of 2006-2007. The Baghdad Special Division is therefore a re-arming of these militias. Additionally, these groups will operate in mixed areas, raising the potential for killings based on identity and targeting of political opponents. 

The plan to form a potential special Baghdad division demonstrates that security measures in Baghdad have failed and that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki lacks confidence in the Iraqi Security Forces. Moreover, the legitimization of the Shi’a militias in question by placing them on state salaries makes it possible for them to participate in politics, where militia groups legally cannot. Politically, the support that these groups would receive from the state will therefore make them competitive as the country gears up for the 2014 elections. 

        

Implications for the Iraqi Shi’a 

Increased attacks in predominately Iraqi Shi’a areas have caused the Iraqi Shi’a to lose patience. On September 21, anattack on a funeral in Sadr City resulted in the death of at least 67 people and the injury of at least 163 people. Days after the attack, residents of Sadr City protestedand attacked the municipal building, demanding the handover of suspects who had been arrested after the attack by members of the Mahdi Army. Furthermore, the Sadrist Mahdi Army reportedly warnedthe Sadr City-based 11^th Iraqi Army division either to hand over the suspects or depart Sadr City. Furthermore, reports indicate that members of the Mahdi Army deployednear the site of the bombing. This is the clearest indication of Mahdi Army members mobilizing since 2008. Given these attacks, the formation of this new defense force may play a role in assuaging the fears of the Iraqi Shi’a that they are without protection. 

Nonetheless, the formations of this new division will likely cause further violence among Iraqi Shi’a groups. For instance, the Sadrists and AAH,- which both claim to be the representatives of the legacy of Sadrist leader Moqtada al-Sadr’s father, Mohammed Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr,- have clashedas recently as June of this year, and their rivalries have only intensified since. On September 21, a Sadrist sourceannounced that 150 members of AAH have rejoined the Sadrist trend. The split was denied by AAH’s political bureau member, Amir al-Tai, whostated that the 150 individuals are not even members of AAH. Regardless, it is evident that both sides are already preparing for the next elections. This is especially true as AAH announcedon September 19 that it will participate in the 2014 national elections. This development followed the decisionby Moqtada al-Sadr to re-enter politics after his earlier decision to retire. AAH’s decision to enter the electoral competition means that both groups will vie for the same constituency and the availability and state-funding and support will provide greater financial leverage. Furthermore, the integration of AAH and the Sadrists within a government-backed militia will allow both groups to contend for terrain with state immunity and cause further tensions in already-unstable areas.            

       

The Entry of Katai’b Hezbollah 

The integration of Katai’b Hezbollah (KH) in the new force would add another layer of concern. KH as a military organization has not been involved in internal Iraqi political affairs. Its missions in the past have includedattacking U.S. military targets and, since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, the organization has deployedits members in Syria to fight alongside governmental forces within the Abu al-Fadel al-Abbas Brigade (AFAB). The organization is knownto be an extension of the Iranian Quds Force. Therefore, its potential inclusion in the force will signify a problematic trend. It will allow an Iranian-controlled group the opportunity to control terrain in Baghdad and it is unlikely that control will diminish even if the stabilization of Baghdad is accomplished. Similarly, AAH’s formalized control of terrain would allow greater influence of Iranian-backed militias in Baghdad. 

Families of killed individuals and residents protest in Sadr City on 9/25

 

http://khabaar.net/index.php/permalink/13640.html

Implications for the Iraqi Sunnis 

The formation of this force will further antagonize the Iraqi Sunnis. The ISF “Revenge of the Martyrs” campaign which was launchedin August included arrests of Iraqi Sunnis in various areas of the country. That is despite the fact that the operation was carried out by the Iraqi military. Therefore, the potential presence of a predominately Iraqi Shi’a militia will not be perceived as a security measure by the Iraqi Sunnis in Baghdad. It will likely be perceived as an attempt to marginalize them. Iraqiyyah member of the Council of Representatives, Suhad al-Obaidi, anticipatedthat the formation of the force will “lead to [an] increase in sectarian violence since the government will appear as supporting the militias’ work.”  

The Iraqi Sunnis fears are also likely motivated by the remobilizationof militias that took place in May and June of this year in Baghdad. Moreover, there have been recent indications that the militias have been active in Baghdad as evidencedby the discovery of 10 bodies that were hand-cuffed and blind-folded in an area close to Sadr City last week in addition to targeting of Iraqi Sunnis in Dhi Qar and Basra.  

If the force is formed and deployed to mixed areas in Baghdad, the Iraqi Sunnis in those areas will perceive it as a direct threat, and it will become more so if the Division carries out operations that are geared towards making financial gains or displacing the Iraqi Sunnis. This will allow AQI to widen the gap between the Shi’a and Sunni populations in Baghdad and increase the threat of sectarian violence in response to the formation of the force.   

Maliki’s Calculation 

There have not been official and on-the-record statements to confirm or deny the news that a new force has been formed. However, reportsindicate that the idea originated from Prime Minister Maliki’s office. Given the deteriorating security conditions, it is likely Maliki decided to divert attention from the Iraqi Security Forces’ inability to provide protection by ‘outsourcing’ security provision to the militias. As the elections approach, the formation of the force will allow Maliki to distance himself from security failures in addition to burnishing his credentials as a protector of the Iraqi Shi’a.   

In the short-term, the formation of an all Iraqi-Shi’a force may benefit Maliki. In the long-term, however, reliance on the militias will cost him. The population’s anger may be absorbed since they would depend on the community members for protection, but the expected lack of discipline of the militias will damage Maliki’s credibility as commander-in-chief. Furthermore, the formation of this force will render Maliki dependent on Iranian-backed militias and for now this will become magnified in light of the recent conclusionof a defense agreement between Iraq and Iran. This prospect will be costly to Maliki him given the negative views the Iraqi public holdtowards the Iranian government. 

Khazali receives gun at AAH function from AAH military member.

 

http://www.altahreernews.com/inp/view.asp?ID=15614

Conclusion 

Operationally, the Special Baghdad Division would have to deal with the sophisticated organizational capabilities of AQI. The ISF, despite years of training, availability of equipment, and extensive presence in Baghdad has not been able to curtail AQI’s wavesof car bomb attacks. It is, therefore, not clear if the division would be able to achieve its stated objectives.

For AQI, the formation of the division is an ideal scenario. AQI will be able to portray the division as an anti-Iraqi Sunni force that is intended to marginalize the Iraqi Sunnis. It is important to watch whether AQI will launch preemptive operations in areas where the division may be deployed, such Baghdad’s southern suburbs of Mahmudiyah and Latifiyah.

Moving forward, it is critical for Maliki and Iraqi politicians to resort to politics as well security measures to manage the country’s crisis. Maliki recently criticizedthose who lambast the “biggest Iraqi component [Iraqi Shi’a]” which is a possible reference to controversialstatements made by Iraqi Sunni politician, Ahmed al-Alawni, with regards to attacking the Iraqi Shi’a. Maliki further added that there is a “sea of blood” between those figures and “us.” It is, unclear, if the “us” refers to the state or the Iraqi Shi’a. At any rate, this rhetoric may appeal to the Iraqi Shi’a, but it will increase sectarian tensions,  further antagonize the Iraqi Sunnis, and increase the appeal of an insurgency.     

Ahmed Aliis senior Iraq research analyst and the Iraq Team lead at the Institute for the Study of War.

The wal-‘Adiyat Dabha Offensive in Southern Aleppo

by Charlie Caris and Isabel Nassief

A group of rebel brigades, led by Ahrar al-Sham and Liwa al-Tawheed, have launched an offensive called wal-‘Adiyat Dabha against regime-held towns south of Aleppo city. The offensive comes after several rebel gains in Aleppo over the last two months. Of the brigades involved, five are signatories to the recent Islamic alliance announced by the leader of Liwa al-Tawhid on September 24th.


This area of southern Aleppo was the site of a government offensive focused on securing airbases and supply lines while clearing surrounding towns. In late June, however, the regime was quickly forced to abandon its offensive and return troops to Homs, where rebels had been able to take advantage of the regime’s vulnerability. Since then rebels have made significant gains in Aleppo province, taking control of Khan al-Assal, a town on the western outskirts of Aleppo city, in July. On August 5th, rebel forces led by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham captured Menagh airbase, and later that month rebels also took control of the town of Khanassir, which sits on a critical government supply route between Homs and Aleppo city.


The current rebel offensive was announced on September 20th with the stated objective of “seizing control of the major and secondary supply routes” in the countryside south of Aleppo. The operation, entitled wal-‘Adiyat Dabha (a Quranic phrase roughly translated as “The Panting Chargers”) was advertised as a milestone in cooperation between various rebel battalions in and around Aleppo.


As rebel battalions began their assault last week, the operation gained traction on social media, and Youtube videos appeared bearing a distinct logo specifically designed for wal-‘Adiyat Dabha. The following day Ahrar al-Sham, one of the most prominent partners in the operation, circulated a map showing villages south of Aleppo that the rebels wanted to wrest from regime control. The operational plan, as shown on the map, depicts rebel forces advancing from the west, south, and east, near a regime defense factory, and continuing on towards southern Aleppo city and Nayrab military air base. In the six days since the operation began, rebel forces appear to have stayed true to the map, and claim to have liberated at least 25 villages south of Aleppo city. The newly-liberated villages are: Kafr Hout, al-Zara’a, Kafr Kar, Banan al-Has, Sarj Far’a, Balouza, Burj A’zawi, Madrasa village, Im Jaran, Qanatrat, Samaria, Maghriyat al-Shebli, al-Mayan, al-Manatir, Rasm al-Safa, Rasm Humud, Mazra’a Ali Hussein, Diyman, Sada’aya, Rasm al-Shih, Mazra’a al-Ayoub, Rasm al-Hilwa, Tayeba, Rasm ‘Akirish, and al-Safira.






Pro-Assad forces have responded to the rebel offensive by reinforcing regime strongholds near the airport, shelling contested areas such as as-Safira village, and deploying troops from Nayrab airbase to engage rebels directly in the contested villages. New reports show rebel-fired Grad rockets striking Aleppo International Airport on September 25th, and videos indicate that rebel forces continued to shore up liberated villages including the heavily-contested Madajin area, on September 26th.


Of the rebel battalions we have documented taking part in wal-‘Adiyat Dabha, Ahrar al-Sham, Liwa al-Tawhid, Liwa al-Ansar, Kata’ib Nour al-Din al-Zenki, and al-Furqa 19 (aka Liwa Amjad al-Islam) are all signatories to the recent “Islamic alliance.” Other participants include Jabhat al-Na’im al-Islami, Liwa Halab al-Madina al-Islami, Liwa Ahrar Souria, Kata’ib Abu Amara, and al-Furqa 9 Special Forces, although this list may not be exhaustive.


Since the timing and location of this offensive coincide with the newly-announced Islamic alliance and its membership significantly overlaps with the offensive participants, wal-‘Adiyat Dabha might in some respects be viewed as a showcase of the strength of the Islamic alliance signatories. Their capacity to successfully launch operations and gain territory in Aleppo may give the Islamic alliance members additional leverage in talks with General Salim Idris, Chief of Staff of the FSA’s Supreme Military Council (SMC), who has cut his trip to France short in order to meet with alliance members. It might also strengthen the position of alliance members in Aleppo ahead of an impending battle with ISIS, which has taken the border town of Azaz and may be blocking rebel re-supply from that route.


Heavy fighting was ongoing as of the time of writing, and we expect to see additional development as rebel and regime forces continue to maneuver for control of key supply routes throughout Aleppo province. For those who wish to follow reports of this battle on social media sites, “ضبحا العاديات” is the name of the offensive in Arabic. We are also looking for indicators that additional rebel battalions have signed on to the Islamic alliance. A likely candidate for admission is Liwa Ahrar Souria, whose official Facebook page recently removed the FSA symbol from their logo.

Syrian National Coalition Reaction to Formation of an Islamic Alliance

by Charlie Caris

Today the Syrian National Coalition posted a statement on their arabic-language website that contains an initial response to the Islamic alliance, which was announced yesterday in Aleppo and includes a number of FSA brigades as well as an al-Qaeda affiliate.

Below are some key takeaways, and a translation of this statement:

Key takeaways:

• The alliance that was announced is not representative of the Free Syrian Army
• The future of Syria will be decided at the ballot box by the Syrian people
• This alliance announcement was poorly timed due to the SNC’s upcoming UN visit, and will cause dangerous schisms in the opposition forces
• Al-Qaeda has an “un-Syrian” agenda and Jabhat al-Nusra should not have been included in this alliance. The governing body of Syria should maintain dialogue with all of the signatories to the document except for Jabhat al-Nusra
• The coalition’s interim government is critical for Syria’s future, and the leader of the SNC is connected to the people on the inside of the country

“Statement from Anas al-Abdeh, a member of the Political Committee for the Syrian National Coalition -

The timing of the statement that the Islamic battalions released yesterday was not appropriate at all, and these signs raise a question regarding the soldiers of this statement, especially because it coincides with a visit by the SNC high council to the United Nations with the goal of gaining new friends for the Syrian case. The battalions that agreed to the statement do not represent the most important of the FSA battalions on the ground, as there are large battalions that did not agree to this statement. There must be information for all that the nature of the future state in Syria is the choice of the Syrian people through ballot boxes and elections, and no one has the right to impose his custodianship on the Syrian people and impose a version of the ruling state or the laws that will govern it. And of course, It is possible for holders of grievances to persuade the people at some stage after the revolution, but not right now. Throwing around such topics and the imposition of a particular variety of the nature of governance at the current time causes the splitting between rebels and generates dangerous clashes for the force of the revolution inside and outside Syria. It is necessary for the alliance to be based on dialogue with these battalions - with the exception of Jabhat al-Nusra - and to attempt to understand the points and take them into consideration. It was an error for Jabhat al-Nusra to be added to the statement because any project connected with al-Qaeda -which has an un-Syrian agenda - does not unite us in Syria and is an anti-national project. An interim government is an urgent demand to serve the Syrian people in the warring areas and the person who runs it [the interim government] is a warrior from inside [Syria] and conducts consultations with the battalions and the revolutionary forces to choose the members of the government. And the 13 groups of battalions of Islamic revolutionaries in Aleppo were called on Tuesday evening to unification within a clear Islamic framework stemming from the capability of Islam, and these battalions announced that they do not recognize any opposition "formations" from the outside. And these organizations said, and most prominent among them Jabhat al-Nusra and Liwa al-Tawhid and Liwa al-Islam, in the statement spread over the internet that, "All that proceeds in the way of formations from the outside without returning to the inside, does not represent us and is not recognized by us."

Islamic Alliance Signatories

by Isabel Nassief

The graph below, made with Palantir, represents the eleven rebel brigades that signed the Islamic alliance document released September 24 near Aleppo. It also shows their existing alliances, including all of the major blocs in Syria (the FSA, the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF), and the al-Qaeda affiliates). At this time it remains unclear whether the FSA brigades that signed on to this alliance intend to maintain their FSA ties or break with the coalition completely.

The Islamic Alliance Emerges

by Valerie Szybala

(Note: post updated 9/26/13)

A new coalition has formed among eleven Syrian rebel organizations, according to a statement that Liwa al-Tawhid released late on September 24. Liwa al-Tawhid has hitherto fallen under the umbrella of the Syrian Military Council. The new Islamic alliance – which includes some of the most powerful factions from the FSA, the Syrian Islamic Front, and also Jabhat al-Nusra –aims to fight to establish an Islamic state under Shari’a law in Syria. It also rejects the Syrian National Coalition and the leadership of Ahmad Tohme – recently elected as the head of the Syrian opposition’s interim government – by name. The signatories to the document claim to represent the following organizations:

Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, Liwa al-Tawhid, Suqor al-Sham, Liwa al-Islam, Harakat Fajr al-Sham al-Islamiya, Harakat al-Noor al-Islamiya, Kataib Nour al-Din al-Zinki, Liwa al-Ansar, Tajamu Fastaqm Kamr Umrat & Al-Forqat al-Tisaa Ashr

Initial reports on this event (and some still circulating) indicated that there were 13 brigades who signed on to the document instead of 11. The reason for this discrepancy is that the original text version of the brigade list posted on Liwa al-Tawhid’s website listed two additional brigades, although these brigade names did not appear on the scanned signature page of the hard copy of the document or in the list that was enumerated in the video announcement, and was subsequently removed from the website text. The two other brigades were Liwa al-Haqq (SIF, Homs area), and Liwa al-Forqaan (Quneitra area). According to a Tawhid brigade spokesman, both brigades were present for the drafting process but were not at the signing ceremony. Although some of the remaining brigades have a presence throughout the country, the strength of the 11 alliance signatories is concentrated largely in Aleppo, and the two additional brigades would have served to bolster their southern credentials.

The fact that this announcement comes amidst a spike in incidents in which the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has clashed with the Free Syrian Army units and, atypically, Syria’s other al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, raises the possibility that this new coalition is also a move against ISIS by its Syrian nationalist rivals.

This move follows a chain of events on the battlefield through which ISIS took the town of Azaz in Northern Aleppo and the nearby Bab al-Hawa border crossing with Turkey, which serves as an important supply route for rebel forces and was previously held by a Free Syrian Army-linked brigade. The maneuver to take the border crossing began with an incident between local ISIS fighters and members of the FSA-linked Asifat al-Shamal brigade on September 18.





The timeline of events is as follows:

September 18, 2013
ISIS raided the al-Ahli hospital in Azaz to arrest a German doctor. When Asifat al-Shamal refused to hand the doctor over to ISIS, clashes broke out between the two groups and ISIS killed two Asifat al-Shamal fighters.
ISIS assassinated Amr Diab Hajulh, a media activist affiliated with Asifat al-Shamal. Asifat al-Shamal and activists in Azaz called for the Tawhid Brigade to intervene and join in the fight against ISIS.

September 19, 2013
Clashes broke out between ISIS and Asifat al-Shamal in Azaz. ISIS also raided the Azaz Media Center, interrupting their news coverage. The Tawhid brigade arrived in Azaz.
Liwa al-Tawhid mediated a ceasefire agreement between ISIS and Asifat al-Shamal and published it. The agreement was signed by Abu Abdelrahman al-Kuweiti (ISIS) and Captain Abu Ghazala Al Rashid (Asifat al-Shamal brigade). The agreement called for the release of prisoners held by ISIS within 24 hours and for the implementation of standard checkpoints monitored by al-Tawhid.

September 22, 2013
The Asifat al-Shamal military administration issued a statement saying the agreement was nullified because ISIS failed to release its prisoners after 48 hours.
ISIS released a statement accusing Asifat al-Shamal of treason citing several examples. Asifat al-Sham then wrote a response defending itself against ISIS’s accusations.

By Monday, September 23, it was clear that ISIS was in full control of Azaz. The internet was abuzz with talk of the impending battle between FSA brigades and ISIS. The battle had even been given a name, نهروان, Nahrawan, after a famous battle of early Islam, in which Ali bin Abi Talib, the fourth caliph, fought and defeated the army of a heretical group of Muslims known as Kharijites, who can be seen as ideological ancestors of al-Qaeda.

Many were expecting Liwa al-Tawhid to release its statement announcing the Battle of Nahrawan on September 24. The coalition formation statement that was published instead could be a preparatory step, a pragmatic consolidation that precedes any sort of direct confrontation with ISIS. The fact that JN has joined a coalition with non al-Qaeda affiliates and that ISIS is not currently a part of this coalition could signal a break between ISIS and JN. It is far too soon to confirm such a break.

The coalition could also represent another major inflection point in the organization of the rebels in Syria. Repudiation of the interim government is a major development and cause for concern, though perhaps unsurprising given its inefficacy. The greater consequence may lie in the implicit departure of this coalition from the leadership of the SMC, the unified military command of the opposition. Erosion of FSA-controlled ground lines of communication across the Turkish border combined with an abandonment by some of its most powerful brigades has the potential to leave the SMC in shambles.

Reactions from many of the relevant players both inside and outside of Syria have yet to surface. One quick response has come from Asifat al-Shamal, the embattled brigade from Azaz. Their quick show of support strengthens the case that this new coalition is a move not only against the ineffective interim leadership, but also against the encroaching forces of ISIS.

We will continue to monitor the situation and post important updates as it develops.

Map: Renewed Sectarian Violence and Displacement in Iraq

Air Strikes, Clashes, and Indirect Fire from September 9, 2013

Clashes, Air Strikes, and Indirect Fire from September 2-6, 2013

The heat maps below show direct clashes between regime troops and rebel forces, regime air strikes, and indirect fire by regime and rebel forces in Syria from September 2-6, 2013. These types of incidents help elucidate areas of physical proximity between rebel and regime forces, and locations that the regime is targeting where rebels are likely present. Indirect fire events are not represented. We will continue to provide updated maps as the situation in Syria develops.

(Data on events compiled from reporting by Shaam News Network)