From Protest Movement to Armed Resistance: 2013 Iraq Update #24

June 14, 2013

By Stephen Wicken and Jessica Lewis

Anti-government demonstrations have been shrinking in size and receiving decreased media attention in recent weeks as violence has risen in Sunni Arab-majority areas. The developments in tandem suggest that Sunni Arabs are abandoning protests to form tribal militias or join established insurgent groups such as the neo-Baathist Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandia (JRTN). The insurgent groups are likely to absorb other protesters after the elections in Anbar and Ninewa on June 20. Given mounting evidence of Shi‘a militant mobilization in and around Baghdad in recent weeks, the threat of widening sectarian conflict in Iraq continues to grow.

Since December 2012, competitors to represent Iraq's Sunni Arabs have presented the Sunni population with the options of protest, federalism, or insurgency. Protests have diminished in size in recent weeks, however. Regional autonomy and outright rebellion have become the main poles around which protest sentiment has re-organized. The divisions have hardened between the pro-federalism camp, centered on Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi’s Mutahidun (United) political coalition and Sunni clerics such as Jordan-based Abd al-Malik al-Saadi, and the pro-insurgency camp, most strongly concentrated in Fallujah, Mosul, and Tikrit and linked to insurgent groups such as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and JRTN.

The social media outlets that had helped organize and document the anti-government protests in Iraq have changed in character. In recent weeks, widely “liked” Facebook pages that since December 2012 have been devoted to disseminating information on the protests  have been posting fewer and fewer images and videos of protests inside Iraq.[1]Where the pages do reference the ongoing protests, they seldom make reference to the number of attendees, and visual evidence shows that demonstrations are visibly diminished in size. Instead, the more popular pages – particularly that of the Iraqi Revolution – refer to the “heroic” activities of revolutionary “tribal rebels” (thuwar al-‘asha’ir) attacking Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), particularly the federal police. Although these rebels are not designated by group names, it is possible in many cases that they are representatives of the tribal militias formed in response to the Hawija incident in April.

Increasingly, these social media accounts are referring to three key indicators of growing sectarian conflict both in Iraq and beyond. Firstly, a number of spectacular attacks across Iraq in recent weeks point to growing efforts on the part of AQI to push Iraq back into sectarian fighting. Secondly, mounting evidence of the remobilization in Baghdad of Shi‘a militants, particularly Asa‘ib Ahl al-Haq (the League of the Righteous or AAH), both to conduct ethnic cleansing of Sunni-majority areas and to gain ground from the Sadrists, raises the threat of Sunni-Shi‘a violence spreading outwards from the capital. Thirdly, the Assad regime’s offensive against Al-Qusayr in May and early June 2013 demonstrated the heightened involvement of Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi‘a militias in an increasingly sectarian conflict in Syria. This conflict has exacerbated the pull of sectarian identity politics across the region, prompting protests from Ramallah in the West Bank to the Qatari capital of Doha, whence Egyptian-born cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi called for a “Day of Rage and Support” across the region in support of the Syrian rebels. 

Qaradawi’s speech was immediately posted on a number of Iraqi Facebook pages that have served as social media platforms for the protests. Highlighting the link, on May 31, Said al-Lafi, the clerical student who has served as spokesman of the Ramadi-based Anbar Coordination Committee, spoke at a ‘Supporting the Syrian People’ conference in Doha organized by Qaradawi. Wearing a ‘Free Syria’ scarf, Lafi toldthe audience that “our revolution in Iraq is an extension of the one in Syria” in response to an Iranian “conspiracy against our religion.” Lafi called on his “Arab brothers” to be ready to intervene in Iraq, warning that as soon as Syria falls to the Free Syrian Army, “the next step will be Iraq.” 

As the key spokesman identified with the ‘Pride and Dignity Square’ protest just north of the city of Ramadi, Lafi has been a leading protest figure since his emergence in January 2013. He established himself as the voice of the protesters in the demonstrations’ early weeks, issuing the formal list of 13 demands made by protesters in Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah ad-Din in January. Lafi is no stranger to extremist statements, having in the past issuedthreats to Iraqi security forces and warnedthat Sunni Arab Iraqis would attain their rights “whether by peaceful means or not.” This provided the Maliki government with an opportunity to attempt to marginalize an influential figure, issuing a warrant for his arrest on terrorism charges and attempting more than once to arrest Lafi. 

Lafi’s Doha speech, however, which ended with the chant “Sunni blood is one!”, marked a significant escalation in rhetoric from a figure close both to Mutahidun’s political leaders and to the protest’s spiritual leader, Abd al-Malik al-Saadi. (Lafi was the target of an arrest attempt on April 30 while meeting with protest leaders at the home of Mutahidun leader and Anbari Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) chairman Ahmed al-Alwani.) Highlighting this connection to Qatar, Mutahidun spokesman Thafir al-Ani on June 13 announced that a number of members of the Renewal List (Tajdeed) – the splinter from the Iraqi Islamic Party formed by fugitive former Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi – had joined Mutahidun for the upcoming elections in Anbar and Ninewa. Hashemi has appeared repeatedlyon Qatar’s Al-Jazeera in recent months making exaggerated claims about the need for a Sunni region in Iraq in order to avoid a sectarian civil war, and any connection to his list will only solidify the Mutahidun’s sectarian and federalist credentials at voting time. 

In his speech, Lafi made reference to another key development that threatens to detonate Iraq’s sectarian tensions, claiming that “an entire Sunni generation is being demolished in Iraq at the hands of Shi‘a militias.” Mounting evidence points to the remobilization of these militias, AAH in Baghdad, where AAH has been implicated in an attack on senior Sadrist figure Hazem al-Araji. While AAH historically has been active in Baghdad and predominantly Shi‘a southern Iraq, the group established a political office in Tal Afar in Ninewa in September 2012 and has also sent delegations to Mosul.

This remobilization of Shi‘a militias and the growing regional weight of sectarianism has encouraged Mutahidun leaders to represent themselves to voters in Anbar and Ninewa as the protectors of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. At an election rally in northern Mosul on June 9, Thafir al-Ani warned that if the people of Ninewa do not choose a “strong” bloc to govern the province, “Asa‘ib Ahl al-Haq and [Iraqi Hezbollah militia] the Army of the Chosen and [its leader Wathiq al-] Battat will enter the alleys of Mosul and kill those who worship.” It is not enough, claimed Ani, to participate strongly in the elections – voters must choose “owners of brave attitudes and principles.” Following Ani at the podium, Ninewa Governor Atheel al-Nujaifi – brother of bloc leader Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi – sought to bolster the bloc’s Sunni nationalist credentials, paying tribute to the province’s resistance to American occupation as well as to the “bullying” of the central government. The Mutahidun leaders’ use of Shi‘a militant threats and the history of Sunni resistance as campaign topic highlight both the coalition’s efforts to project strength and the increasing utility of using sectarian rhetoric to do so.

Protest leaders and spokesmen have also issued warnings of the threats posed by Shi‘a militias to Sunni Arab communities. On June 13, Abd al-Razzaq al-Shammari, spokesman for the Popular Committees tied to Lafi’s Coordination Committee, announced that the Ramadi protest on Friday, June 14 would take the name “You Are Higher,” explicitly intended to send “a clear message to our brothers and our families in Baghdad, Diyala, and other provinces that they are above the militias.” The organizing committee of the Fallujah protest went a step further, declaring the formation of popular committees to protect residential neighborhoods in the city from armed groups and militias. Ahmed al-Tai, a protest organizer in Fallujah, claimed that security forces would not protect Anbaris from militias paid by “political parties” to assassinate civilians. 

There is no clear evidence, however, that AAH has mobilized in Mosul or Tal Afar. Managing security in and around the city, a historic base for both AQI and JRTN, has long been a problem for the security forces, however. A number of provincial elections candidates were killed in Ninewa prior to the postponement of elections in March. More recently, three candidates were killed around Mosul in early June. Fadel al-Hadidi, a candidate for the Ninewa-based National Tribal Gathering of the Mother of Two Springs, was shot to death in central Mosul on June 8; Luay Abd al-Wahid Hussein Fathi, of the independent Good and Tender Iraq list, was killed by gunmen east of Mosul on June 12; and Muhannad Ghazi al-Murad of the Iraqi Republican Assembly affiliated with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlak's list, was gunned down after Friday prayers in the Zahra neighborhood on June 14. On June 13, a member of the office of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Daawa Party, Khalil Dhiab Shehab al-Sumaidaie, was killed by gunmen while traveling north of Mosul. The latter attack was praised on social media by an account connected to Sunni cleric Taha al-Dulaimi, an outspoken proponent of Sunni federalism. Atheel al-Nujaifi, meanwhile, survived an assassination attempt on June 13, the thirdin two months, when his motorcade was targeted by a car bomb that killed two civilians nearby. MG Ahmad Hassan al-Jabouri, who transitioned from the role of Ninewa Police Chief to the Border Protection Forces last week, was also woundedin an IED attack on his motorcade south of Mosul on June 11.

The assassinations in Mosul constitute an interesting subset of a larger trend of increasing attacks, including a wave of 10 vehicle-borne explosive (VBIED) attacks that rippled across Iraq on June 10, 2013 in what was likely a coordinated AQI operation. Most were suicide attacks (SVBIEDs), an AQI signature, and the cumulative casualties exceeded 180. The wave consisted of two distinct efforts. 

The first effort centered on Baghdad, exploiting traditional sectarian fault lines in the capital, Taji, and Diyala in order to continue AQI's apparent effort to mobilize Shi'a militias and fuel sectarian war. The highest casualties were inflicted by this effort, in the open markets of Tajiand Jadidat al-Shat and near the police station in Kadhmiyah. The SVBIED attack against the police station in Kadhmiyah occurred just one week after the assassination attempt on Hazem al-Araji, a leading Sadrist. The Araji event pointed to a rise in intra-Shi’a violence as former Mahdi Army elements wrestle to respond to the threat posed by AQI, especially since Baghdad has resurfaced as AQI's main effort, most visibly in the wave of SVBIED attacks on 20 and 27 May. 

The second effort was concentrated in northern Iraq in Kirkukand Ninewaprovinces, and it uniformly targeted headquarters of Iraqi Army and Iraqi Federal Police. Examining the northern wave of SVBIED attacks more closely, they constitute a separate effort to combat Iraqi Security Forces in the provinces. These attacks are likely attributable to AQI since they are contemporary with continued attacks in Baghdad, as well as correlated with historicAQI VBIED attack patterns. They also illuminate additional threat streams that are present in the north. Ansar al-Islam has re-emerged in jihadist virtual forums to claim creditfor SVBIED attacks in Ninewa. Both AQI and Ansar al-Islam share a jihadist vision and communicatewithin the realm of al-Qaeda associates; however, Ansar al-Islam is traditionally considered to envision objectives within the geographic bounds of Iraq, whereas AQI is formally affiliated with al-Qaeda core and its transnational vision. As recently as November 2012, Ansar al-Islam credited AQI's front group in Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) for its role in jointattacks; however, over recent months, the group has begun to complainbitterly of persecution by ISI. A report that ISI leader Ayad al-Ayesh was killedin Mosul at the hands of Ansar al-Islam also suggests in-fighting among jihadist organizations operating in the city.  

It is possible that this infighting among Sunni extremist groups explains other attack patterns visible in Mosul in June 2013. There have been reports of unexplained targeted killings against individual civilians, for example. The majority of recent attacks in Mosul have instead been effective small arms fire attacks against army and federal police forces, executed with a degree of surgical precision indicative of ex-military forces, according to sources on the ground. 

This attack profile points more directly to JRTN, whose members include skilled former military personnel. The group retains a great deal of capacity, including in western Mosul. Its members are well-trained, drawing strongly from the ranks of the Baathist-era military, and continue to conduct organized attacks using automatic weapons and occasionally mortars. JRTN’s lethal activities, like those of Ansar al-Islam, are likely centered on Ninewa and Kirkuk provinces. The group is also careful to target the army and federal police, avoiding attacks on local police drawn from the communities within which it operates. Through its political arm the Free Iraq Uprising, JRTN has long had a strong presence at a number of protest sites, particularly in Fallujah, Mosul, and Tikrit, in addition to its key role at the Hawija site. JRTN has likely increased in membership and influence over the course of the anti-Maliki protest movement. Its rhetoric is revolutionary, callingfor the overthrow of the American-installed constitution and the “Safavid” government it produced. This makes JRTN the likeliest group behind an emerging threat against the ISF in the north. 

The anti-Maliki protest movement has receded since the Hawija incident on 23 April 2013.  The observed recession in protest activity, combined with reflections of emerging Sunni nationalist rhetoric and rising attack trends with and without AQI signatures, raises the concern that insurgent activity is replacing the protest movement as an accepted means of resisting the Maliki government. Small arms fire attacks and IED attacks against ISF targets are also historically attributable to Sunni insurgent or revolutionary groups, many of which are likely associated now with JRTN.  

These attacks raise questions about the future of Sunni Arab disposition within Iraq. Clerical and tribal voices still call for the continuation of protests until protesters’ demands are met, but their influence appears to be waning. That the protests are shrinking in size and receiving diminishing coverage both in news and social media implies a change in strategy for Sunni Arabs seeking to address long-held grievances against the Maliki government.

A high turnout at the upcoming provincial elections may indicate continued interest in the political process, but as Iraq’s recent history has shown, politics and violence are by no means mutually exclusive. AQI opposes all political participation, and is likely behind the attacks on provincial election candidates, especially those who were former members of the anti-AQI Sahwa (Awakening) militias. 

As an explicitly Sunni-oriented but Iraqi nationalist group, JRTN is better placed than AQIto gain widespread Sunni Arab support. Iraq’s Sunni Arabs turned away from AQI in huge numbers in 2007-2008, and the group’s commitment to targeting government forces and Shi‘a civilians in order to provoke renewed sectarian conflict, while apparently successful in encouraging Shi‘a militant remobilization, is not a promising strategy for winning widespread Sunni support. Although JRTN was known to attack Sahwa members while US forces were still in Iraq, AQI has targeted them continually, assassinating scores of popular and influential tribal figures who also played significant political roles.  

Negotiation remains a possible avenue for easing Iraq’s growing crisis, but a slim one. Osama al-Nujaifi has sought to present himself as a mediator between the government and the protests, but has been rebuffed by protest spokesmen outside his own camp and forced to state his support for Abd al-Malik al-Saadi’s ‘goodwill’ initiative, which Saadi has insisted should have no involvement from politicians. Saadi’s negotiation campaign, however, has yet to advance beyond the announcement stage. 

Instead, a preponderance of factors point to Sunni Arab mobilization, some of which has already occurred and more of which is likely in Iraq’s immediate future. AQI continues to conduct massive waves of spectacular attacks on the ISF, is likely behind assassinations of Sunni political figures, and has prompted the remobilization of Shi‘a militias in Baghdad. The fall of Al-Qusayr has prompted a growing use of sectarianism for political ends across the region, and its reflections inside Iraq are already heightening sectarian tensions. A surge in political campaigning as the provincial elections draw closer may focus Sunni Arab attention on the vote in the short term, but is also driving sectarian rhetoric. Rallies and voting centers, meanwhile, will constitute key targets for AQI, while security deployments in Anbar and Ninewa increase the likelihood of confrontation between the ISF and JRTN and between the ISF and tribal militias. While Sunni anti-government protests may be diminishing in size, sectarian tensions and violence trends are by no means following suit.  Instead, levels of violence in predominantly Sunni Arab areas continue to point toward the likely re-emergence of a widespread Sunni Arab insurgency in Iraq.

Stephen Wicken is a research analyst at the Institute for the Study of War and Jessica Lewis is its research director.      

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[1] For example, the “Iraqi Revolution” Facebook page, established in February 2011 to cover Iraq in the context of the Arab Awakening, grew steadily in popularity in the early months of the protests, reaching more than 100,000 “likes” by early February. While its popularity has continued to grow, the rate has slowed dramatically in recent weeks. Where the page once featured multiple posts per hour on protests across Sunni Arab-majority Iraq, including photos and videos, it now features primarily images of militants and slogans about revolution.

2013 Iraq Update #23: Sadrists and Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq Fight for Baghdad

By Ahmed Ali

Iraqi Shi‘a militia remobilization crossed a new threshold last week that points towards future escalation. A violent shoot-out between the Sadrists and Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH) in Baghdad’s Kadhmiyah neighborhood resulted in the hospitalization of major Sadrist leader Hazim al-Araji and the death of Thirgham Hussein al-Shahmani, possibly a commander in the Promised Day Brigade (PDB), Moqtada al-Sadr’s military wing. The clashes signal AAH’s mobilization against the Sadrist Trend, which, in turn, faces a decision about whether to mobilize the Promised Day Brigade. AAH’s activities appear to go on without resistance or objection from Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, although it is difficult to prove his complicity.   

On June 2, the office of the leader of the Sadrist trend in Kadhmiyah, Hazim al-Araji, reported that he had survived an assassination attempt in his stronghold. Al-Araji is a prominent Sadrist leader who has been influential in Baghdad and specifically in Kadhmiyah. He is the brother of Sadrist parliamentary leader Baha al-Araji and cousin of General Farouq al-Araji, the director of the Office of Commander in Chief (OCINC), which is under the leadership of Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki. Together, the Araji brothers represent a strong Sadrist contingent in opposition to Maliki. The alleged assassination attempt against Hazim al-Araji occurred as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq removes obstacles to claiming the mantle of Sadrist leadership and overtaking the Mahdi Army.

The facts of this incident have been cloaked in messaging as multiple parties worked to reduce tensions. Isolating ground truth, the facts are as follows:

On June 2, at least 3 members of Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH) openedfire in the Kadhmiyah neighborhood of Baghdad, targeting senior members from their rival group, the Sadrist Trend. The attack took place while Kadhmiyah’s shrine was experiencing one of its busiest gatherings of the year, with hundreds of thousands visiting the area in an annual pilgrimage to commemorate the death of Imam Kadhim, who is buried in the shrine. Among those who were targeted in the attack was Hazim al-Araji. Al-Araji was not killed, but a member of his entourage, Thirgham al-Shahmani, was killed along with a member of AAH, Hosam al-Abudi, when the Sadrists returned fire.

Al-Araji was brieflyhospitalized and released on June 3, although his hospitalization was not directly related to the attack, according to his office. On June 3, the Sadrists organized a massive funeral for al-Shahmani.

As these events developed, the leader of AAH, Qais al-Khazali, announced that he had contacted two major clerics to mediate the rising tensions between his group and the Sadrists. These figures included Ayatollahs Kadhim al-Haeri and Mahmoud al-Shahroudi. Both Haeri and Shahroudi are Iraqi-born but are currently based in Iran. Haeri is close to both the Sadrists and AAH, while Shahroudi is a former leading official within the Iranian government and is leadingthe Iranian government’s effort to spread its influence in Najaf’s clerical establishment. In the meantime, Prime Minister Maliki did not make any statements about this incident, despite the potential escalation of intra-Shi‘a violence. Additionally, the leader of the Sadrist trend, Moqtada al-Sadr, was not in Iraq. On June 4, his office issued a statement that he had visited Haeri in Qom, Iran and is currently believed to be in Beirut. 

In addition to these facts, a number of plausible assumptions may be considered:

First, the Sadrists presided over this religious procession in Kadhmiyah. The Sadrists have historically been able to enjoy primacy in holding processions near shrine under the leadership of al-Araji. The area is a traditional Sadrist stronghold but has been increasingly targetedfor influence by AAH. Second, it is likely that AAH members were on-site and armed, based on how events transpired. It is probable that they knew of Hazim al-Araji’s presence with other prominent members of his entourage when they opened fire. Additionally, indications point to the likelihood that Thirgham al-Shahmani may have been a leader of the Promised Day Brigade (PDB), the militant wing of the Sadrist Trend, which would also have been known by AAH.

Thousands of Shi’a pilgrims cross the Tigris from Adhimiya to Kadhmiyah using al-Aimma Bridge, 2008

There are, however, three key disputed facts. First, it is not certain that the exchange of fire in Kadhmiyah was a targeted killing, nor is it clear whether Araji was the one targeted. Qais al-Khazali represented the event as a clash that escalated, and four days after the incident, al-Araji himself stated that he was not personally targeted. Al-Araji also suggested that Moqtada al-Sadr had prior knowledge of a threat during the processions, suggesting that the attack was planned. Second, on June 4, al-Araji’s office releaseda statement that the six AAH members who were involved in the Kadhmiyah attack had been moved to Iran, while AAH members in Baghdad have been moved to other provinces due to fear of retribution. AAH denied that these moves had been made by the group. Third, it is unknown whether the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) near the site of the clashes were complicit in the attack by not intervening to preventviolence from escalating. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were on-site at the procession, but it appears that they opted not to step in.

In order to get a clearer picture of this incident and to evaluate its consequences, the details as they unfolded in messaging are examined below.          

The details of the Kadhmiyah events

Shortly after the June 2 attack, the office of Hazim al-Araji accused AAH of carrying out an assassination attempt against al-Araji using silenced weapons, a trademark tactic of Iranian-backed Shi‘a militias. Another source close to al-Araji revealed that three gunmen attempted to assassinate him at 10:15 PM Baghdad time while he was inspecting religious processions at Baghdad’s most revered Shi‘a shrine, the Imam Kadhim shrine in Khadhmiyah. Furthermore, the same source stated that al-Araji’s security detailreturned fire and wounded one of the gunmen, but that all of the assailants were able to flee. Early reports also indicated that an al-Araji “senior companion,” Thirgam Abu Ali, also known as Thirgam al-Shahmani, was killed during the exchange of fire.   

Map of Baghdad, Attack on Hazim al-Araji, June 2, 2013

After this incident, an unnamed high-ranking official from the office of Moqtada Al-Sadr (OMS) issued a statement that accused “militias,” a direct reference to AAH, of attempting to assassinate al-Araji. The same statement “advised” Sadrist rank and file not to carry out retaliatory attacks and highlighted that the blood of Iraqis and specifically Sadrists is “forbidden,” including original Sadrist elements such as AAH. This statement underscores OMS’s desire to control the response of Sadrists while their leader is outside the country.

On June 3, Sadr himself issued a statement that directly accused AAH of responsibility. Al-Sadr condemned AAH and announced a 3-day mourning period during which Sadrist offices will be closed. He further addressed AAH by saying that these killings will not satisfy his father, Mohammed Sadeq Al-Sadr, for whose legacy Moqtada al-Sadr and AAH leader Qais al-Khazali compete. He continued, declaring that “killing is not within your authorities or the authorities of your leaderships even though you are with the government,” again directing his statement at AAH. Sadr’s statement points to the relationship between AAH and Maliki’s government, presenting the government as complicit in the attack. The escalation of language and reference to the mantle of his father, of whom Khazali was a student, indicates that Sadr has decided to leverage this attack to restate his authority over AAH.

Continuing their campaign to denounce the government, Sadrists also pointed to the lack of security at the Kadhim shrine. An unnamed source close to al-Araji even stated that the security forces in the area that belong to the second Iraqi Federal Police division “had knowledge of the assassination attempt.” Another source specifically singled out the commander of the second Iraqi Federal Police division, Major General Shakir Al-Asadi, for allowing the assassination attempt to take place.

The leader of AAH, Qais al-Khazali, attempted to contain the fallout of the events on June 4. He issued a statement denying that AAH had attempted to assassinate al-Araji. According to Khazali, what happened was a “quarrel that unfortunately escalated and lead to the death of two people; one from the Sadrist trend and the other from AAH.” This was the first point at which news emerged that AAH lost one of its own members in Kadhmiyah that day. Khazali emphasized that the events were personal between those who were involved and “it [the clashes] is only their opinion.” He praised Moqtada Al-Sadr for “[calling] for not carrying weapons,” and also the role of the Marji‘a [a level of Shi‘a cleric], revealing in later statements the involvement of Haeri and Shahroudi in calming tensions. He finally called on security authorities to open an investigation and publicize the outcome.

Although it is possible to interpret Khazali’s representation of events literally, it is also reasonable to regard this messaging strategy as consistent with a failed assassination attempt on Hazim al-Araji. Khazali’s messaging demonstrates his desire to mitigate perceptions that AAH undertook high-profile targeted killings of popular Sadrist leaders, which may damage future opportunities to assume leadership of Sadrist elements. Connections of the population to leaders such as the Araji brothers are still strong.

After the attack, Al-Araji was hospitalized due to an undisclosed illness. The announcement was made on Al-Araji’s Facebook page, and, according to the statement, “Araji was subject to severe illness on last Monday that necessitated his transport to a hospital for treatment.” A photo was released with the announcement showing al-Araji in a hospital bed, indicating that al-Araji wished to publicize his survival as well as his close proximity to the attack that claimed the life of al-Shahmani. Al-Araji was later released from the Kadhmiyah hospital according to an unnamed source from his office who added that al-Araji was hospitalized “due to exhaustion and not a heart attack or wounds sustained from the failed assassination attempt.” Reportedly, al-Araji was back visiting and inspecting processions the next day. This appearance may have been intended to combat the impression of a leadership vacuum in the Sadrist movement or an assertion of political patronage.

Hazim al-Araji hospitalized in Kadhmiyah on June 3, 2013, image from personal Facebook page

Al-Araji’s office, meanwhile, continued to release information about the events by issuing a statement namingsix AAH members involved in the attack. The statement revealed that they had been transported to Iran to avoid “legal and tribal pursuit,” according to information received from within AAH. The six AAH members were only identified by name without any identification of their roles or positions. They are: Khudhair Khudair, Mohammed Zanbawi, Imad al-Saadi, Adel Debis, Ali Hamid, and Abbas al-Dabash. By announcing that the six have been transported to Iran, the Sadrists are linking AAH to Iran in order to emphasize their own nationalist credentials and tarnish AAH as an Iranian-linked organization. Groups with ties to the Iranian government are not perceived positively among the Iraqi public. Al-Araji’s office also added that AAH has “smuggled [moved] most of its members who are in Baghdad to other provinces due to fear of physical elimination.” A senior AAH member later denied that AAH has moved from Baghdad. Additionally, by publishing the names of the six attackers, Araji’s office signaled that it is familiar with AAH’s leadership and members in Kadhmiyah and that it is monitoring their activities. It also suggests that al-Araji means to designate them as future targets and also to narrow the focus of retribution as a means of controlling violence.

The claim that there were six attackers contradicted earlier reports from al-Araji’s office that there were three AAH gunmen, but it is plausible that an AAH team may have involved additional primary or support personnel. Furthermore, as AAH has been increasing its presence in Kadhmiyah, it is likely that most AAH personnel in the vicinity of the Kadhim shrine procession were armed. It is therefore reasonable to attribute responsibility for the attack to the six named AAH members.

AAH self-defense campaign

AAH’s campaign to deny it attempted to assassinate al-Araji continued throughout the week. On June 4, Khazali released a televised statement in which he reiterated that there was no assassination attempt. On June 5, Ameer al-Taie, a member of AAH’s political bureau, stated that “the incident of the assassination of Sadrist leader Hazim al-Araji is a lie.” Al-Taie laid the blame on al-Araji for promoting the event as an assassination attempt in order to regain his status with Moqtada Al-Sadr. He also added that members of the Sadrist trend attacked the houses of AAH members in Baghdad, depicting the Sadrists as a mutual aggressor. AAH’s rendition of the Kadhmiyah event gained momentum as some Iraqi and Iranian Shi‘a clerical and political leaders took up positions to mediate between AAH and the Sadrists.  

These figures included the previously mentioned clerics Kadhim Al-Haeri and Mahmoud Hashemi al-Shahroudi. Khazali announced that he had contacted both Haeri and Shahroudi and asked them to intervene. Other Iraqi Shi‘a leaders, including the leader of the Badr organization and Minister of Transportation Hadi al-Amri and leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) Ammar al-Hakim played a role in easing tensions. The involvement of these figures underscores the significance of the Kadhmiyah incident as a watershed moment in the AAH-Sadrist rivalry.

Haeri and Shahroudi signal the position of the Iranian government to de-escalate the crisis at this moment. It is probable that Iran will favor AAH over Sadr for control of a Shi‘a movement in Iraq based on its past history with Moqtada al Sadr, who has proved unreliable and spent time under house arrest in Qom. It is also likely that Iranian support to AAH will increase Sadr’s legitimacy in the eyes of many Iraqi Shi‘a who do not look highly upon leadership figures with ties to the Iranian government.

AAH’s version of the Kadhmiyah events and the need to quell the potential mobilization of the Promised Day Brigade required al-Araji to respond. On June 6, Hazim al-Araji himself stated to the media that the “targeting was not on me personally. It was rather targeting the ziyara [pilgrimage] to terrify the visitors of the Imam Kadhim shrine.” Al-Araji offered further details about the events by saying “a group of known militia members gathered by the central procession of the Martyr Sadr office in Kadhmiyah and started to threaten the sons [members] of the trend” and that he asked the commander of the second Iraqi Federal Police division commander, Major General Shakir al-Asadi, to request from the group to “stay away from the [Sadrist] procession.” Al-Araji then added that “Asadi, after talking to them for five minutes went to bring a force to arrest them [AAH].” In saying this, al-Araji downplays the fact that he was likely targeted personally, which would invite Sadrist retaliation for the attack; in doing so, he shifts the action from personal violence to violence against Shi‘a pilgrims in a general move to discredit AAH as a defender of the public.

Al-Araji further added that AAH members attacked them after the departure of police commander al-Asadi, resulting in the death of a leader in the Sadrist trend, Thirgham Hussein Al-Rubaie [Shahmani]. This was the first time Shahmani was acknowledged as a senior figure within the Sadrist trend and not just a member of al-Araji’s entourage. Al-Araji condemned al-Asadi for not being able to prevent the violence, while expressing thanks overall to the government’s security apparatus for protecting pilgrims in Kadhmiyah. His repudiation of al-Asadi indicates an attempt to portray him as complicit with AAH.

Who is Thirgham al-Shahmani?

Initial reports did not provide detailed identification of Thirgham al-Shahmani. He was initially identified as a murafeq, indicating a companion or in this context senior bodyguard. The early statement issued by Sadr’s office only identified him as a member of the Mahdi Army. Araji’s June 6 statement was the first to identify him “as a leader in the Sadrist trend.” Moreover, on June 6, al-Araji posted a photo on his Facebook page that identified Shahmani as the “leader and martyr hero Thirgham Abu Ali.” The name Abu Ali may be al-Shahmani’s nom de guerre, while another name used to describe him publically has been Thirgham al-Rubaie. Another Sadrist-sympathetic Facebook page posted a photo on June 6 of al-Shahmani that titled him as the “martyr of the Holy Kadhmiyah.” The second posting generated a great number of comments and “Likes” that indicate al-Shahmani’s prominence.

A massive funeral was held for al-Shahmani in Kadhmiyah on June 3. These events, coupled with AAH’s announcement that the Sadrists sought retribution for the June 2 incident suggest that Shahmani was a senior leader in the Promised Day Brigade (PDB) and possibly commander of one of its units in Kadhmiyah. This may also explain why Sadr announced a three day mourning period in order to absorb the rage of PDB members who were likely seeking revenge for their martyred commander. The death of al-Shahmani may provide a full explanation as to why high-level figures intervened to prevent further clashes between AAH and the Sadrists.

Funeral of Thirgam al-Shahmani in Kadhmiyah on June 3, 2013

Al-Araji’s personal relationship to al-Shahmani also raises questions about his own role in the PDB in Baghdad. It is unknown at this time who commands the Promised Day Brigades, and al-Araji’s role in the 2006-2007 period of the Mahdi Army makes him an ideal candidate. Thus it appears that AAH members knowingly fired upon an entourage that included two key Sadrist leaders, both possibly leaders within the Promised Day Brigades. If true, this may indicate why AAH chose to attack al-Araji among Sadrist leaders.  Also likely related is the degree of patronage Hazem al-Araji has over pilgrims, a lucrative and important status essential to AAH’s claim as the legitimate heir of Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr.

Conclusion

The preponderance of indicators points to the conclusion that AAH did execute a targeted attack upon al-Araji, in close proximity to al-Shahmani and other Sadrists at the Kadhmiyah procession on June 2. The various statements to the contrary can be explained by the need to de-escalate the tension between AAH and the Sadrists created by a failed assassination in close proximity to a Shi‘a religious procession. Khazali needs to recover the incident in order to reset. Sadr made an attempt to frame the incident to denigrate AAH, but on balance, it is risky for Sadr to stand toe-to-toe with AAH militarily. Thus, de-escalation is the only reasonable move for the Sadrists, which would explain al-Araji’s later messaging.

As the competition between Sadr and Khazali continues, Moqtada al-Sadr’s absence from Iraq places him at a disadvantage. Al-Khazali’s forces are more disciplined and his presence in Iraq allows him direct control over them. Additionally, this dynamic provides Khazali with the upper hand in recruiting new members into AAH. Meanwhile, Sadr – who is basedin Beirut – is in a more difficult position in asserting direct control over the Sadrist Trend. It will be a challenge for him going forward to mitigate the risk of escalation or usurpation of his forces by AAH while his senior leaders sustain assassination attempts.

Both AAH and the Sadrists have sought to portray themselves as defenders of the Iraqi Shi‘a in the wake of this incident. This is especially important for the Sadrists in light of AAH’s recent political and militant resurgence in Baghdad. The Sadrists have used this event to demonstrate AAH’s willingness to fire upon Shi‘a pilgrims as well as to accuse Maliki and the ISF of complicity and tolerance of AAH lethal activity. AAH, on the other hand, has mitigated this message by congratulating regional intermediaries for de-escalating the conflict. On the whole, the Sadrists’ institutional position has been threatened. As of June 7, the Sadrists and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) are making a move to form coalitions within the new provincial councils to limit Maliki’s Da‘wa party. It will be important to examine the interplay between their political approach and AAH’s violent approach to sway the Shi‘a population. It will also be important to monitor the mobilization of the PDB in response to this event as an indicator of the degree to which Sadr maintains control of the movement from afar.

This attack comes at a time of heightened Shi‘a militia mobilization outside of the country, particularly in Syria, and now also within Iraq. Evidence of intra-Shi‘a violence in key neighborhoods of Baghdad, such as Kadhmiyah, suggests that Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) is actively projecting influence in Baghdad, recruiting new members, and mobilizing in direct competition with the Sadrists. The attack against al-Araji therefore indicates the emboldened state of AAH, that it would target senior Sadrist leadership in this way. This suggests the complicity of Prime Minister Maliki, whose overt relationship with AAH suggests he should have been the first to intervene to de-escalate intra-Shi‘a violence as a matter of political necessity. Maliki has undertaken a deliberate effort to marginalize Sadr, has generally exacerbated sectarian tensions, and more recently advanced AAH. The inaction of the  ISF at the attack’s location already generates a perception of complicity. So too does the fact that Maliki reportedly removed General Araji from his leadership of OCINC, from which he would have effective oversight of the ISF in Kadhimiya and likely advanced knowledge of threats to his cousin. If Maliki had been complicit in a deliberate assassination attempt against Hazem al-Araji, he would have had to remove Farouq al-Araji.  Maliki has made no public statement on these events. He evidently does not want any tinge of complicity. If he was not complicit in the events, he is certainly not acting to denounce them.  

Ahmed Ali is an Iraq Research Analyst at ISW.                                         

Iraq's sectarian crisis reignites as Shi'a militias execute civilians and remobilize

by Jessica Lewis, Ahmed Ali, and Kimberly Kagan

Escalating violence in Iraq crossed a new and very dangerous threshold this week.  Al Qaeda in Iraq launched a concentrated wave of car-bomb and other attacks specifically against civilian Shi'a targets in and around Baghdad.  Shi'a militias are mobilizing and have begun a round of sectarian killings facilitated by false checkpoints, a technique characteristic of the 2006-2007 period.  Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki has taken a number of steps to demonstrate that he remains in control of the situation.  The expansion of Shi'a militia activity, however, is likely to persuade many Iraqis that he is either not in control or is actively abetting the killings.  The re-mobilization of Shi'a militias in Iraq coincides with the formal announcement by Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah of his organization's active military participation in the Syrian civil war.  Al Qaeda in Iraq's sectarian mass-murder attacks coincide with the announcement by AQI's affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al Nusra, that attacking Hezbollah is that group's primary target henceforth.  The stage appears to be set not merely for the collapse of the Iraqi state into the kind of vicious sectarian killing and sectarian cleansing that nearly destroyed it in 2006 and 2007, but also for the expansion of that sectarian warfare throughout both Mesopotamia and the Levant.

Sectarian violence has escalated sharply in Iraq. On Monday, May 27, al-Qaeda in Iraq conducted a coordinated operation to target Shi‘a neighborhoods in Baghdad with numerous and large vehicle-borne explosive devices (VBIEDs). This operation followed a wave of VBIED attacks on May 20 that targeted the lines of communication into Baghdad and some Shi‘a populations across Iraq. An estimated 212 people have diedin violent attacks in Iraq since May 20, and another 624 have been injured. May’s casualties are thus likely to surpass April’s, which had made that month the most violentin Iraq since 2008. Most of these attacks, especially VBIEDs and suicide attacks, conform to the methods usually attributed to AQI. Additional reports from Baghdad and Diyala also indicate that Shi‘a militant groups, including the Iranian-backed Sadrist splinter group Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, have begun to mobilize in Iraq to establish checkpoints in Baghdad and to conduct extra-judicial killings (EJKs) against Sunnis. Extra-judicial killings reportedlycarried out by militias also occurred in the city of Hilla in central Iraq. AAH, along with Lebanese Hezbollah and Kata’ib Hezbollah, publically acknowledgedits military involvement in Syria in April 2013. Lebanese Hezbollah has mobilized in Syria throughout May. This regional military activation, as well as the elevated threat to the Iraqi Shi‘a population posed by AQI, lends greater credibility to the reports that Iraqi Shi‘a militant groups have mobilized to conduct intimidation and violence against Sunni in the name of defending Shi’a populations.

AQI’s 2013 VBIED Campaign

Violent attacks by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) escalated sharply in April and May. AQI has maneuvered among anti-government protests and Iraqi Security Force deployments to project attacks throughout Iraq, most prominently in Baghdad, Salah ad-Din, and Ninewa Provinces. Vehicle-borne improvised-explosive devices (VBIEDs) are re-emerging as a primary attack type, reverting to a trend first seen as the sectarian civil war expanded in 2006. In particular, the two waves of VBIED attacks on May 20 and May 27 demonstrate a concerted effort by AQI to exacerbate sectarian tensions and escalate violence, to fix Iraqi security forces in certain positions and drive them from others, to gain freedom of movement along lines of communication, and to set conditions for deliberate targeting of neighborhoods that were prime locations for sectarian violence in 2006-7. AQI conducted a campaign in July 2012 (under the banner of the Islamic State of Iraq) that focused on Iraqi government officials, security forces, Sahwa (Awakening) leaders, and Shi‘a civilians in order to limitthe reach and effectiveness of Maliki’s government and to regain lost territory. Since that time, AQI has conducted attacks using IEDs, suicide bombers, armed clashes, assassinations, and coordinated simultaneous explosions.  The recent waves differ both in the number of VBIEDs used simultaneously and in the specific targeting of Shi’a civilians in known sectarian hot-spots.

The concentration of VBIED attacks in late May 2013 demonstrates AQI’s capacity to stage in the locations around the outskirts of Baghdad (the Baghdad belt) from which it had launched attacks in 2006-7, to procure the components necessary to build VBIEDs in large numbers, and to project force into Shi‘a communities and mixed areas within Baghdad. Moreover, the campaign has deliberately escalated violence and selected targets to shape not only the perceptions of Iraqi Sunnis, but also those of Iraqi Shi‘a, who may begin to lose faith in the Maliki government if attacks are allowed to continue. 

GRAPHIC 1 | VBIED ATTACKS IN BAGHDAD, 20 AND 27 MAY 2013

Wave of VBIED attacks: May 20

A wave of 11 VBIED attacks and seven additional explosions struck urban centers across Iraq on Monday, May 20 resulting in at least 60 deaths and 178 injuries. Two other VBIEDs were defused before they could explode on their targets. Six of the VBIEDs detonatedin predominantly Shi‘a neighborhoods along the periphery of Baghdad city. These events, depicted on the map above, accounted for a small percentage of the total casualties on that day, yielding one death and 21 injuries. The low casualties may indicate AQI’s difficulty entering Shi‘a neighborhoods to hit prime targets. In light of the wave of attacks a week later that did hit such targets, however, it is more likely that AQI was using the first series of attacks to establish access routes into Baghdad and test its ability to synchronize operations. The neighborhoods chosen represent the outer rim of Shi‘a communities in Baghdad that are most easily accessible from main supply routes and proximate Sunni neighborhoods. The attacks collectively illustrate a campaign to attack a very selective target set just inside the city rim.

Other VBIEDs on May 20 in the cities of Basra, Mahmoudiyah, Wasit, Hilla, Balad, Samarra, and Baiji, accounted for the majority of the casualties. The most lethal attack occurredin Hilla city, Babel Province, where two car bombs exploded in a market near the Shi’a Wardiya mosque, killing 22 and wounding 77. Targeting of religious sites clearly indicates AQI’s intent to elicit a sectarian response, particularly given the centrality of the Samarra mosque bombing in 2006 to the subsequent mobilization of Shi‘a  militias for sectarian combat. Additionally, the car bomb in Balad on May 20 targeted a bus full of Iranian pilgrimsbound for the Shrine of Imam Mohammed, leaving four dead and 10 wounded. This incident, along with another attack on Iranian pilgrims at the Samarra mosque on May 25, feed into the justifications being proffered by Shi’a fighting groups in support of their activities.  Key figures within Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq have used these attacks recently as rallying cries to defend holy sites. Iran has also responded to previous attacks by launching probes into the deaths of pilgrims in Iraq. Iran’s Director General of the Hajj and Pilgrimage Organization in charge of Holy Sites Masoud Akhavan announcedin December 2012 that Iranian security companies were escorting Iranian pilgrims into Iraq. This practice may also be a vehicle by which Iran could funnel IRGC-QF augmentation into Iraq, for which there is historical precedent.  It also explains AQI’s focused targeting of these pilgrims.

Comparing the VBIED attacks on May 20 to concurrent attacks using improvised explosive devices (IED) and adhesive explosive devices (AED), the VBIEDs were used to target large numbers of civilians, while IEDs and AEDs were often used for targeted killings or attacks against security force patrols or members of the Sahwa (Awakening). The Samarra VBIED on May 20 targeted Sahwa as they gathered to receive their salaries. VBIEDs have also been used in 2013 to target ISF at security checkpoints, but in May 2013 they have largely been used to target Shi‘a civilians.

Wave of VBIED attacks: May 27

Two days after Iraqi security forces moved to conduct operations in western Anbar, AQI launched a second wave of 13 VBIEDS and one additional explosion on May 27 that killed 36 and wounded 147. This time, all 14 attacks occurred in the vicinity of Baghdad, indicating a deliberate shift to focus upon the capital region. Within Baghdad, the map above demonstrates a geographic shift from the periphery to the center, in particular to neighborhoods at the heart of the sectarian strife in 2006-7 such as Saadoun (in Rusafa), Khadimiya, Huriya, Saadriya (in central Karkh), and Shaab (just outside of Sadr City). Attacks in Habbibiyah in Sadr City may also be meant to show the government and Shi‘a militant groups that AQI can attack even into the heart of their territory.

AQI’s ability to plan and execute 13 simultaneous VBIED attacks at strategically selected sites within Baghdad is also noteworthy. VBIEDs are among the most expensive and complex improvised weapons systems, capable of achieving massive effects in isolation, and often historically reserved for that purpose. The use of so many VBIEDs in a single day demonstrates a high degree of technical and organizational skill and suggests the ability to produce VBIEDs in large numbers and rapidly.  It indicates the dramatic extent to which AQI appears to have recovered from the defeats inflicted on it in 2007 and 2008.

AQI attacks did not slow after May 27, moreover. Attacks have continued over the last three days, including six more VBIEDs in the vicinity of Baghdad, and one in particular against a wedding in Jihadon May 30 that claimed 20 casualties. Jihad is another predominantly Shi‘a neighborhood in southwestern Baghdad that was heavily contestedin 2006-7, and sufficiently Shi’ified through migrations and extra-judicial killings that it supported Moqtada al Sadr in the Baghdad Uprising in 2008. This attack occurred one day after a VBIED attackin the market of Jihad, which killed 16 and wounded 45. Cumulatively, these two events claimed the greatest number of casualties over the last ten days.

Shi‘a Militant Response

The recent bombing waves in Baghdad have gripped residents with fear of sectarian war. Their sentiments are reminiscent of the atmosphere that engulfed the city in 2006 as broader conflict loomed.  As a result of the deteriorating security in Baghdad, commercial activity in the city has been declining.   Social media posts and isolated reportshave been circulating since the beginning of the week that Iraqi Shi‘a militias, primarily Asai’b Ahl Al-Haq (AAH), have been patrolling streets of Baghdad, setting up “false checkpoints,” and conducting extra-judicial killings against Sunnis. Residents have beenexpressing fear of extra-judicial killings since early May. The evidence is clear; Shi’a militants have mobilized in Baghdad and are conducting executions of civilians.

GRAPHIC 2 | SHI'A MILITANT ATTACKS IN BAGHDAD, MAY 2013

Several attacks over recent days bore the signature of Shi’a militant groups. On 28 May, the bodiesof two university students were found in northern Baghdad in Agarguf area of the Mansour District with hands bound behind them, shot in the chest and head. They had been thrown from an unmarked vehicle according to witnesses who also noted that false checkpoints had been set up in the same area. Agarguf area was used by Shi’a militant groups to dump hundreds of bodies in 2007. Three people had been kidnappedby armed persons in an unmarked vehicle on the evening of 26 May at al-Mu’atham bus stop in central Baghdad, which is frequently used by students. It is possible that these events, both involving signature tactics of Shi’a militant groups, had the same victims. Additionally, on 26 May, armed persons wearing police uniforms invadeda home in al-Za’franiya in southeast Baghdad, dragging the owner outside and shooting him. The method of attack and geographic location correspond with historical patterns of Shi’a militancy and make attribution to Sunni terrorist groups implausible. Sunni mosques were also attacked in the Baghdad neighborhoods of Mansourand Saydiyahand twice in Diyalaprovince, which clearly points to Shi‘a militancy.

Morality policing executions have also been reported in areas of Baghdad just outside of Sadr City. On 14 May, unidentified armed men attackeda police checkpoint in Zayunah, handcuffing security personnel but leaving them unharmed. Afterwards, the same gunmen traveling in an SUV raided five liquor stores and killed 12 people. A week later, on 22 May, unidentified armed men attacked a brothelin Zayunah and killed five men, five women, the owner, and his wife with silenced weapons and knives. Also on 22 May, unidentified armed men travelling in a car shota liquor shop owner while driving near a market in al-Shaab, in northeast Baghdad. Zayuna and al-Shaab are predominantly Shi’a neighborhoods, and militia activity there most likely indicates the militia’s intent to re-establish control.

Additionally, several assassinations this week fit patterns of violence historically characteristic of Shi’a militant groups. On 26 May, the imam of the al-Qadisiyah Mosque was attackedby unidentified armed men with silenced weapons while driving in Diyala Province. The same day, unidentified armed individuals shot a policemanin al-Waziriyah, in the northeast quadrant of Baghdad, again using silenced weapons, and a primary school teacher was killedwith silenced weapons in al-Qahirah, a neighboring area in the northeast of Baghdad. On 27 May, another teacherwas shot with silenced weapons near the militia stronghold of Khalis in Diyala. Additionally, in an assassination that drew more public attention to this rise in targeted killings, Abbas Ja’far, the brother of a famous soccerplayer, was shot on 25 May by two armed men on a motorcycle outside his home in Habibiyah, a neighborhood in eastern Baghdad abutting Sadr City. Two other attacks involved drive-by shootings of civilians in Jisr Diyala in southeast Baghdad, one a civilianas he was leaving his home, and another the owner of a grocerystore. Other variants of these militia signature attacks included the killing of four civilians as they exited a taxi in al-Kadhimiyah, north of Baghdad, and the killing of two owners of a goldsmith shop in al-Mashtal, on the rim of southeast Baghdad. Some of these instances clearly demonstrate sectarian violence because they hit obviously Sunni targets. Others, in predominantly Shi’a areas of Baghdad, instead demonstrate intra-Shi’a violence.

Other attacks likely conducted by Iraqi Shi‘a militias can be detected by method and by target. The most recent target set has included cafés, where larger groups congregate. They include an improvised explosive device (IED) attackon a café in the western Baghdad neighborhood of Ameriya on April 18 that killed 27 people. Another café attack took place in Baghdad in the nearby Jamia neighborhood on May 5 (killing or wounding 15 people) and anotheron May 29 in the Hib Hib area in Diyala province that resulted in 22 people killed and wounded. While these attacks have not been clearly attributed, they differ from attacks customarily attributed to AQI, such as car bombs, suicide bombings, and attacks against Iraqi Shi‘a targets. These attacks all took place in predominantly Iraqi Sunni locales. In four of them, IEDs were used; in the fifth, the attack on the Ihsan mosque in Mansour, was conducted by hand grenades. On May 31, police sources in Babil revealedthat gunmen killed four people in Hilla. The sources describe the gunmen as traveling with impunity and using silenced weapons, killing former members of the Baath party and one shop owner in Hilla—again, hallmarks of Shi’a militia rather than AQI activity. This comes one week after the VBIED attack upon a Shi’a mosque there.

It is conceivable that AQI has conducted these attacks to instigate retaliatory violence. Their divergence from AQI’s attack methods and their locations, however, make it much more likely that they are reprisal attacks by Shi‘a militant groups. The widespread perception among the public that Shi’a militias conducted these attacks is a major driver and amplifier of fear among the population.

IMAGE 1 | MEMBERS OF ASA'IB AHL AL-HAQ IN PARADE ON 4 MAY 2013

AAH has been in the in the spotlight of renewed militant and political activities since April 2013. The group itself confirmed its role and participationin military activities in Syria along with other Shi‘a groups. Moreover, and in a major projection of force and political prominence, AAH organized a massive, campaign-style rally in Baghdad on May 4. The event was held in a government-owned soccer stadium in Baghdad, the Sina’a Club Stadium on the border of Sadr City, and was ostensibly to celebrate the 10^thanniversary of the group. Members of the Iraqi Council of Representatives are reportedto have attended. Photos of the gathering reveal the presence of AAH’s senior leadership, parades, large attendance, tribal figures, and sophisticated organizational capabilities. During the event, AAH’s intentions and capabilities for increased activity were made clear. AAH leader, Qais Al-Khazali, calledon members of “the resistance across the spectrum” to maintain readiness and warned politicians who are connected to “regional agendas” that they will be pursued regardless of whether they are “in fortified areas, secured hotels, or armored vehicles.” The resistance is the title used by AAH to describe itself, as well as the word Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollahi leaders use referring to the “axis of resistance” against Israel and its allies. Al-Khazali also urged anti-government protesters to refrain from sectarian slogans and to reject the killing of ISF members. Those statements cameunder attack by some Iraqi politicians who also condemned the government for allowing the event to happen. AAH ability to hold events in government-owned facilities is attributed to its relations with Maliki. He has welcomed them into the political process and views them as a countervailing force against the Sadrist Trend, led by Muqtada Al-Sadr, from which the group split in 2004. 

IMAGE 2 | LEADERSHIP OF ASA'IB AHL AL-HAQ ON 4 MAY 2013

Spread of “false checkpoints”

Since 2007, Baghdad’s security procedures have incorporated a vast network of street checkpoints manned by Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) members. The purpose of those checkpoints is to look for car bombs and capture wanted individuals. Reports describing “false checkpoints” suggest that some are not manned by ISF members, but instead by personnel in civilian clothes who may or not be security officials. Reportedly, these checkpoints have been inspecting identification cards and inquiring about the sectarian affiliation of passengers. There are also reportsthat the militias have kidnapped and killed people based on their identity and that the targeting has primarily been of Iraqi Sunnis. The areas where those checkpoints are reported to have operated are concentrated in western Baghdad, which has neighborhoods that are mixed between Iraqi Shi‘a and Iraqi Sunnis.

This way of operating closely echoes events in 2006-7, during which Shi’a militia groups established checkpoints in Baghdad at which they stopped cars, checked identification cards, and kidnapped and then executed Sunnis. They manned those checkpoints either in militia garb or dressed as Iraqi Security Forces. In 2006, the ISF was infiltrated by these militias and tolerated such checkpoints within sight of their official locations or operated them.

Further reports surfacedon May 30 detailing that individuals in civilian clothes have been present at multiple official Baghdad checkpoints; the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior described the individuals as “belonging to formation within the Ministry of Interior.” The MoI spokesperson added that the ministry relies on members from intelligence or other departments who are sometimes tasked with verifying identification cards. According to the same report and citing an unnamed senior security source, militias have been active in both the Rusafa and Karkh sections of Baghdad, but the report asserted that talks of false checkpoints are "exaggerated and intended to spread an atmosphere of fear among citizens.” Despite the explanation offered by MoI, the presence of civilian-clothed individuals is bound to stoke the fears of populations that encounter such checkpoints. It may, indeed, feed speculation that the MoI has become re-infiltrated by militias or is itself engaging in sectarian violence.

Allegations of militia reactivation in Baghdad have been emerging since early May. On May 8, just four days after the AAH parade in the soccer stadium, Iraqiyya issued a statement condemning the government for tolerating rhetoric and threats from Iraqi Shi‘a militias, including AAH, Kata’ib Hizballah (KH), and the Mokhtar Army (an Iraqi Hezbollah unit which was formed in February 2013). Iraqiyya positedthat statements from these militias are “directly or indirectly tied to those events that resulted in the death of innocent youth.” Iraqiyya may have been referring to increased attacks on cafes where youth congregate.

On May 21, Muqtada Al-Sadr,issued a statement in which he urged followers to “ostracize extremism and what is issued from some of those who belong to Wahhabism or what is issued by some Shi‘a militias.” With this statement, Sadr attempted to take the middle ground in condemning Sunni extremist groups while also criticizing Shi‘a groups. Sadr’s critique of groups like AAH is natural. They are rivals and they compete over turf in Baghdad and elsewhere in southern Iraq. Their rivalry is two-fold, as the leader of AAH, Qais al-Khazali, views himself as the heir to Sadr’s father Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq Al-Sadr. Muqtada al-Sadr stands to lose if AAH mobilizes while the Sadrist Trend does not. AAH is also the Sadrists’ primary political, military, and increasingly social competitor; this competition is very likely to continue in the future.

The Iraqi government has made a number of announcements to reassure the public and assuage its fears. The cabinet announced on May 28 that it will “pursue all types of militias and firmly strike anybody who violates public order.” Additionally, Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki visited the areas in western Baghdad where most militia activities are reported to have taken place. He inspected checkpoints in Jihad, Amriyya, Mansour, Adel, Huriyya, Kadhimiyah, Taji, and Al-Adhamiyah on May 29. His deputy, Saleh Al-Mutlaq, visited the Saydiyah area on the same day. These are the mixed areas where much of the sectarian violence occurred in 2006-7 and where the public is most concerned about militia activities. The Ministry of Interior (MoI) denied the presence of false checkpoints and urged citizens to contact authorities with information regarding their presence. The Baghdad Operations Center, which absorbed ISF headquarters in Rusafa (East Baghdad) and Karkh (West Baghdad) last week, announced a travel ban for all unregistered vehicles starting at 0600 on Friday, May 31.  Vehicles without license plates have been cited in reports of kidnapping and executions.

Maliki has recently ordereda major shift of key leaders across the security sector, ostensibly in response to heightened security concerns. Those major changes may signal his lack of confidence in their leadership for the security of Baghdad. The leadership changes might also have been a prerequisite for moving trusted leaders into vital positions in the provinces, where Maliki had begun to conduct more aggressive offensive operations after the Hawija incident. Such a hypothesis would seem more plausible if former trusted leaders emerge in new positions, and some of them have. It is also likely that Maliki’s recent restructure of Iraqi Security Force leadership heralds a new security strategy for Baghdad. It is not clear what new strategy he might have intended, but he has at this point either tolerated the mobilization of militias or lost control of their activities in Baghdad.

The possible reactivation of militias poses a serious challenge for him as a security breakdown in Baghdad will be seen as a major setback to ISF and the prime minister. Maliki has hitherto been able to isolate Baghdad from the protesting provinces. The large range of AQI and the reemergence of the militias links the violence in the capital and the provinces in ways he will not likely control. In that light, Maliki’s strategic embrace of AAH in 2012 in order to limit Muqtada al-Sadr’s influence may backfire in 2013. Muqtada may be marginalized, but so too may be Maliki.

And there is evidence that Muqtada is losing control of his militias as well.  In a significant development, a member of the Sadrist trend office in Mahmudiyah organized a parade. The date of the parade is not known but on May 30 Muqtada Al-Sadr warned his followers to refrain from any action “that reignites sectarianism” and declared that organizing parades is his sole responsibility.  He further disowned the actions of the organizer, Karim Al-Araji, and stated that Araji acted independently. The Mahmudiyah event carries a number of implications. It is a mixed area in the Baghdad belt and since 2006 has continued to be on the fault line of sectarian tensions. The parade suggests that, with reports emerging about militia activation, organizers perceived a need to project force to compete with reported activities by AAH. They may have acted independently of Sadr’s control but his statement demonstrates that he is concerned about ceding ground to AAH’s mobilization. For AAH, discontented members of the Sadrist trend would be prime recruitment targets that could significantly enhance the capabilities of the group.     

For its part, AAH has deniedinvolvement in operations in Baghdad. Its spokesperson, Ahmed Al-Kanani, stated with regard to false checkpoints that AAH “in cooperation with the security apparatus investigated the news of a false checkpoint in Al-Liqa Square in Iskan and other areas in Baghdad, but did not find any trace of them.” AAH’s political bureau chief, Adnan Faihan Al-Dulaimi addedon May 30 that the group is not involved in any activities, but warned that the current conditions are similar to the ones that appeared in 2006. Al-Dulaimi emphasized that AAH “is ready for it [mobilization] and we are ready to protect our people.”

Despite the withdrawal of U.S. forces and AAH’s ostensible transition to a socio-religious and political role, AAH has remainedan active militant group that did not disarm. Moreover, as the group has been playing an active role in the Abu Al-Fadhel Al-Abbas Brigade (AFAB) in Syria, with responsibility to protect the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Damascus, AAH has been activated for battle since 2012. This mobilization for Syria reduces the obstacles to taking up arms in Iraq.

AAH has overtly linked the conflict in Syria to the one in Iraq. According to AAH’s political deputy Al-Dulaimi, “The Sayyeda Zeinab shrine has had symbolic importance for Muslims all over the world and the targeting of this shrine by Takfiri extremists will result in a disaster, because an attack on it will be followed by a similar attack on the Imam Askari shrine in Samarra. An attack on the Imam Askari shrine in Samarra will inflame the sectarian crisis in Iraq.” The line of argument serves AAH well by justifying mobilization in both Syria and Iraq.

Dulaimi stated in the same interview that “[AAH] is alongside Iraq’s security forces and emphasizes the existing political process in this country.” With the escalation of attacks by AQI, it is also increasingly likely that AAH and other Iraqi Shi‘a militant groups will perceive the need to defend predominately Iraqi Shi‘a areas throughout Iraq; and in Baghdad especially. Attacks against Iraqi civilians have continued despite the efforts of Iraqi Security Forces to contain them. In 2006, when ISF was unable to contain the civil war in Baghdad and Diyala, Iraqi Shi‘a militant groups mobilized to provide protection. Although the ISF's capabilities have vastly improved since 2006, the continuation of AQI attacks in Baghdad will reduce the confidence of the population and set conditions for the return of Iraqi Shi‘a militias as defenders of the Shi’a.

AAH mobilization in Baghdad comes as other Iranian-backed groups have increased their involvement in the Syrian conflict. Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah made two visits to Tehran in April, the firstto meet with IRGC-Qods Force Commander Qassem Suleimani and the second to meet Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Afterwards, Nasrallah admitted his fighters’ involvement in Syria, announcedthat “Hezbollah could become more deeply involved in the future,” and said that Syria had “real friends” who would aid it. He further stated that there would be “very serious repercussions” if the shrine of Sayyida Zeinab was destroyed or damaged. This announcement was concurrent with Hezbollah’s sending of numerous reinforcements, probably more than two thousand, to assist regime forces in besieging the strategically important town of Qusayr.

In Qusayr, Hezbollah met fierce resistance, with estimatesof over 50 militants killed in action between May 18-21. On May 24, 75 fighters had been reportedkilled to that point in the month. The next day, Nasrallah officially signaledhis “undying loyalty” to the Syrian regime; this shift in rhetoric is notable, from a commitment primarily to defending Lebanese civilians in Syria and religious sites using veiled language to an explicit and overt commitment to defending the Syrian regime.

Compounding Hezbollah’s official commitment to the ongoing Syrian civil war, the group has come into direct conflict with Sunni-oriented extremist elements. Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda affiliated rebel organization, announcedon May 15 that targeting Hezbollah would be their top priority. Jabhat al-Nusra has also clashed with the Abu Fadl al-Abbas (AFAB) brigade, which is a Shi‘a Syrian militant group affiliated AAH. AFAB and AAH, like Hezbollah, are all Iranian-linked militant organizations. This signals a broadening conflict between Sunni and Shi‘a militant groups expanding across the Iraqi and Syrian fronts.

Iraqis, and particularly the people of Baghdad, have proven resilient in the face of violence since 2008, but their reaction to increased attacks and the news of Iraqi Shi‘a militias resurgence indicate genuine concern. The overt mobilization of Iraqi Shi‘a militias has already included: public military parades, increased inflammatory and threatening rhetoric, leaflets and night letters dropped demanding the departure of Iraqi Sunnis, assassination of local Sunni clerics, and possible retaliatory attacks that target Iraqi Sunni areas. If AAH has mobilized, other Iraqi Shi‘a militias like KH and Sadr’s Promised Day Brigade will feel pressured to take part in order to burnish their credentials as protectors of the Iraqi Shi‘a, which could escalate quickly to sectarian war, not only in Iraq, but throughout the region.

 Ahmed Ali is an Iraq Research Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War. Jessica Lewis is the Research Director at the Institute for the Study of War. Dr. Kimberly Kagan is the President at the Institute for the Study of War.