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Thursday, September 26, 2013

The wal-‘Adiyat Dabha Offensive in Southern Aleppo

by Charlie Caris and Isabel Nassief

A group of rebel brigades, led by Ahrar al-Sham and Liwa al-Tawheed, have launched an offensive called wal-‘Adiyat Dabha against regime-held towns south of Aleppo city. The offensive comes after several rebel gains in Aleppo over the last two months. Of the brigades involved, five are signatories to the recent Islamic alliance announced by the leader of Liwa al-Tawhid on September 24th.


This area of southern Aleppo was the site of a government offensive focused on securing airbases and supply lines while clearing surrounding towns. In late June, however, the regime was quickly forced to abandon its offensive and return troops to Homs, where rebels had been able to take advantage of the regime’s vulnerability. Since then rebels have made significant gains in Aleppo province, taking control of Khan al-Assal, a town on the western outskirts of Aleppo city, in July. On August 5th, rebel forces led by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham captured Menagh airbase, and later that month rebels also took control of the town of Khanassir, which sits on a critical government supply route between Homs and Aleppo city.


The current rebel offensive was announced on September 20th with the stated objective of “seizing control of the major and secondary supply routes” in the countryside south of Aleppo. The operation, entitled wal-‘Adiyat Dabha (a Quranic phrase roughly translated as “The Panting Chargers”) was advertised as a milestone in cooperation between various rebel battalions in and around Aleppo.


As rebel battalions began their assault last week, the operation gained traction on social media, and Youtube videos appeared bearing a distinct logo specifically designed for wal-‘Adiyat Dabha. The following day Ahrar al-Sham, one of the most prominent partners in the operation, circulated a map showing villages south of Aleppo that the rebels wanted to wrest from regime control. The operational plan, as shown on the map, depicts rebel forces advancing from the west, south, and east, near a regime defense factory, and continuing on towards southern Aleppo city and Nayrab military air base. In the six days since the operation began, rebel forces appear to have stayed true to the map, and claim to have liberated at least 25 villages south of Aleppo city. The newly-liberated villages are: Kafr Hout, al-Zara’a, Kafr Kar, Banan al-Has, Sarj Far’a, Balouza, Burj A’zawi, Madrasa village, Im Jaran, Qanatrat, Samaria, Maghriyat al-Shebli, al-Mayan, al-Manatir, Rasm al-Safa, Rasm Humud, Mazra’a Ali Hussein, Diyman, Sada’aya, Rasm al-Shih, Mazra’a al-Ayoub, Rasm al-Hilwa, Tayeba, Rasm ‘Akirish, and al-Safira.






Pro-Assad forces have responded to the rebel offensive by reinforcing regime strongholds near the airport, shelling contested areas such as as-Safira village, and deploying troops from Nayrab airbase to engage rebels directly in the contested villages. New reports show rebel-fired Grad rockets striking Aleppo International Airport on September 25th, and videos indicate that rebel forces continued to shore up liberated villages including the heavily-contested Madajin area, on September 26th.


Of the rebel battalions we have documented taking part in wal-‘Adiyat Dabha, Ahrar al-Sham, Liwa al-Tawhid, Liwa al-Ansar, Kata’ib Nour al-Din al-Zenki, and al-Furqa 19 (aka Liwa Amjad al-Islam) are all signatories to the recent “Islamic alliance.” Other participants include Jabhat al-Na’im al-Islami, Liwa Halab al-Madina al-Islami, Liwa Ahrar Souria, Kata’ib Abu Amara, and al-Furqa 9 Special Forces, although this list may not be exhaustive.


Since the timing and location of this offensive coincide with the newly-announced Islamic alliance and its membership significantly overlaps with the offensive participants, wal-‘Adiyat Dabha might in some respects be viewed as a showcase of the strength of the Islamic alliance signatories. Their capacity to successfully launch operations and gain territory in Aleppo may give the Islamic alliance members additional leverage in talks with General Salim Idris, Chief of Staff of the FSA’s Supreme Military Council (SMC), who has cut his trip to France short in order to meet with alliance members. It might also strengthen the position of alliance members in Aleppo ahead of an impending battle with ISIS, which has taken the border town of Azaz and may be blocking rebel re-supply from that route.


Heavy fighting was ongoing as of the time of writing, and we expect to see additional development as rebel and regime forces continue to maneuver for control of key supply routes throughout Aleppo province. For those who wish to follow reports of this battle on social media sites, “ضبحا العاديات” is the name of the offensive in Arabic. We are also looking for indicators that additional rebel battalions have signed on to the Islamic alliance. A likely candidate for admission is Liwa Ahrar Souria, whose official Facebook page recently removed the FSA symbol from their logo.

Wednesday, September 25, 2013

Syrian National Coalition Reaction to Formation of an Islamic Alliance

by Charlie Caris

Today the Syrian National Coalition posted a statement on their arabic-language website that contains an initial response to the Islamic alliance, which was announced yesterday in Aleppo and includes a number of FSA brigades as well as an al-Qaeda affiliate.

Below are some key takeaways, and a translation of this statement:

Key takeaways:
  • The alliance that was announced is not representative of the Free Syrian Army
  • The future of Syria will be decided at the ballot box by the Syrian people
  • This alliance announcement was poorly timed due to the SNC’s upcoming UN visit, and will cause dangerous schisms in the opposition forces
  • Al-Qaeda has an “un-Syrian” agenda and Jabhat al-Nusra should not have been included in this alliance. The governing body of Syria should maintain dialogue with all of the signatories to the document except for Jabhat al-Nusra
  • The coalition’s interim government is critical for Syria’s future, and the leader of the SNC is connected to the people on the inside of the country
“Statement from Anas al-Abdeh, a member of the Political Committee for the Syrian National Coalition -

The timing of the statement that the Islamic battalions released yesterday was not appropriate at all, and these signs raise a question regarding the soldiers of this statement, especially because it coincides with a visit by the SNC high council to the United Nations with the goal of gaining new friends for the Syrian case. The battalions that agreed to the statement do not represent the most important of the FSA battalions on the ground, as there are large battalions that did not agree to this statement. There must be information for all that the nature of the future state in Syria is the choice of the Syrian people through ballot boxes and elections, and no one has the right to impose his custodianship on the Syrian people and impose a version of the ruling state or the laws that will govern it. And of course, It is possible for holders of grievances to persuade the people at some stage after the revolution, but not right now. Throwing around such topics and the imposition of a particular variety of the nature of governance at the current time causes the splitting between rebels and generates dangerous clashes for the force of the revolution inside and outside Syria. It is necessary for the alliance to be based on dialogue with these battalions - with the exception of Jabhat al-Nusra - and to attempt to understand the points and take them into consideration. It was an error for Jabhat al-Nusra to be added to the statement because any project connected with al-Qaeda -which has an un-Syrian agenda - does not unite us in Syria and is an anti-national project. An interim government is an urgent demand to serve the Syrian people in the warring areas and the person who runs it [the interim government] is a warrior from inside [Syria] and conducts consultations with the battalions and the revolutionary forces to choose the members of the government. And the 13 groups of battalions of Islamic revolutionaries in Aleppo were called on Tuesday evening to unification within a clear Islamic framework stemming from the capability of Islam, and these battalions announced that they do not recognize any opposition "formations" from the outside. And these organizations said, and most prominent among them Jabhat al-Nusra and Liwa al-Tawhid and Liwa al-Islam, in the statement spread over the internet that, "All that proceeds in the way of formations from the outside without returning to the inside, does not represent us and is not recognized by us."

Islamic Alliance Signatories

by Isabel Nassief

The graph below, made with Palantir, represents the eleven rebel brigades that signed the Islamic alliance document released September 24 near Aleppo. It also shows their existing alliances, including all of the major blocs in Syria (the FSA, the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF), and the al-Qaeda affiliates). At this time it remains unclear whether the FSA brigades that signed on to this alliance intend to maintain their FSA ties or break with the coalition completely.


The Islamic Alliance Emerges

by Valerie Szybala


(Note: post updated 9/26/13)

A new coalition has formed among eleven Syrian rebel organizations, according to a statement that Liwa al-Tawhid released late on September 24. Liwa al-Tawhid has hitherto fallen under the umbrella of the Syrian Military Council. The new Islamic alliance – which includes some of the most powerful factions from the FSA, the Syrian Islamic Front, and also Jabhat al-Nusra –aims to fight to establish an Islamic state under Shari’a law in Syria. It also rejects the Syrian National Coalition and the leadership of Ahmad Tohme – recently elected as the head of the Syrian opposition’s interim government – by name. The signatories to the document claim to represent the following organizations:

Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, Liwa al-Tawhid, Suqor al-Sham, Liwa al-Islam, Harakat Fajr al-Sham al-Islamiya, Harakat al-Noor al-Islamiya, Kataib Nour al-Din al-Zinki, Liwa al-Ansar, Tajamu Fastaqm Kamr Umrat & Al-Forqat al-Tisaa Ashr

Initial reports on this event (and some still circulating) indicated that there were 13 brigades who signed on to the document instead of 11. The reason for this discrepancy is that the original text version of the brigade list posted on Liwa al-Tawhid’s website listed two additional brigades, although these brigade names did not appear on the scanned signature page of the hard copy of the document or in the list that was enumerated in the video announcement, and was subsequently removed from the website text. The two other brigades were Liwa al-Haqq (SIF, Homs area), and Liwa al-Forqaan (Quneitra area). According to a Tawhid brigade spokesman, both brigades were present for the drafting process but were not at the signing ceremony. Although some of the remaining brigades have a presence throughout the country, the strength of the 11 alliance signatories is concentrated largely in Aleppo, and the two additional brigades would have served to bolster their southern credentials.

The fact that this announcement comes amidst a spike in incidents in which the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has clashed with the Free Syrian Army units and, atypically, Syria’s other al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, raises the possibility that this new coalition is also a move against ISIS by its Syrian nationalist rivals.

This move follows a chain of events on the battlefield through which ISIS took the town of Azaz in Northern Aleppo and the nearby Bab al-Hawa border crossing with Turkey, which serves as an important supply route for rebel forces and was previously held by a Free Syrian Army-linked brigade. The maneuver to take the border crossing began with an incident between local ISIS fighters and members of the FSA-linked Asifat al-Shamal brigade on September 18.





The timeline of events is as follows:

September 18, 2013
ISIS raided the al-Ahli hospital in Azaz to arrest a German doctor. When Asifat al-Shamal refused to hand the doctor over to ISIS, clashes broke out between the two groups and ISIS killed two Asifat al-Shamal fighters.
ISIS assassinated Amr Diab Hajulh, a media activist affiliated with Asifat al-Shamal. Asifat al-Shamal and activists in Azaz called for the Tawhid Brigade to intervene and join in the fight against ISIS.

September 19, 2013
Clashes broke out between ISIS and Asifat al-Shamal in Azaz. ISIS also raided the Azaz Media Center, interrupting their news coverage. The Tawhid brigade arrived in Azaz.
Liwa al-Tawhid mediated a ceasefire agreement between ISIS and Asifat al-Shamal and published it. The agreement was signed by Abu Abdelrahman al-Kuweiti (ISIS) and Captain Abu Ghazala Al Rashid (Asifat al-Shamal brigade). The agreement called for the release of prisoners held by ISIS within 24 hours and for the implementation of standard checkpoints monitored by al-Tawhid.

September 22, 2013
The Asifat al-Shamal military administration issued a statement saying the agreement was nullified because ISIS failed to release its prisoners after 48 hours.
ISIS released a statement accusing Asifat al-Shamal of treason citing several examples. Asifat al-Sham then wrote a response defending itself against ISIS’s accusations.

By Monday, September 23, it was clear that ISIS was in full control of Azaz. The internet was abuzz with talk of the impending battle between FSA brigades and ISIS. The battle had even been given a name, نهروان, Nahrawan, after a famous battle of early Islam, in which Ali bin Abi Talib, the fourth caliph, fought and defeated the army of a heretical group of Muslims known as Kharijites, who can be seen as ideological ancestors of al-Qaeda.

Many were expecting Liwa al-Tawhid to release its statement announcing the Battle of Nahrawan on September 24. The coalition formation statement that was published instead could be a preparatory step, a pragmatic consolidation that precedes any sort of direct confrontation with ISIS. The fact that JN has joined a coalition with non al-Qaeda affiliates and that ISIS is not currently a part of this coalition could signal a break between ISIS and JN. It is far too soon to confirm such a break.

The coalition could also represent another major inflection point in the organization of the rebels in Syria. Repudiation of the interim government is a major development and cause for concern, though perhaps unsurprising given its inefficacy. The greater consequence may lie in the implicit departure of this coalition from the leadership of the SMC, the unified military command of the opposition. Erosion of FSA-controlled ground lines of communication across the Turkish border combined with an abandonment by some of its most powerful brigades has the potential to leave the SMC in shambles.

Reactions from many of the relevant players both inside and outside of Syria have yet to surface. One quick response has come from Asifat al-Shamal, the embattled brigade from Azaz. Their quick show of support strengthens the case that this new coalition is a move not only against the ineffective interim leadership, but also against the encroaching forces of ISIS.

We will continue to monitor the situation and post important updates as it develops.


Wednesday, September 11, 2013

Clashes, Air Strikes, and Indirect Fire from September 2-6, 2013

The heat maps below show direct clashes between regime troops and rebel forces, regime air strikes, and indirect fire by regime and rebel forces in Syria from September 2-6, 2013. These types of incidents help elucidate areas of physical proximity between rebel and regime forces, and locations that the regime is targeting where rebels are likely present. Indirect fire events are not represented. We will continue to provide updated maps as the situation in Syria develops.



(Data on events compiled from reporting by Shaam News Network)

Tuesday, September 10, 2013

Clashes and Air Strikes for September 8th, 2013

The heat map below shows direct clashes between regime troops and rebel forces and regime air strikes in Syria on September 8th, 2013. Here, a lack of air strikes in Dera'a coincides with a significant intensification of air strikes around Homs city. This suggests that the regime was unable to simultaneously increase strikes in Homs and maintain strikes in Dera'a and, therefore, reallocated its forces.

These types of incidents help elucidate areas of physical proximity between rebel and regime forces, and locations that the regime is targeting where rebels are likely present. Indirect fire events are not represented. We will continue to provide updated maps as the situation in Syria develops.


(Data on events compiled from reporting by Shaam News Network)

Monday, September 9, 2013

Clashes and Air Strike on September 7, 2013

The heat maps below show direct clashes between regime troops and rebel forces and regime air strikes in Syria on September 7th, 2013. These types of incidents help elucidate areas of physical proximity between rebel and regime forces, and locations that the regime is targeting where rebels are likely present. Indirect fire events are not represented. We will continue to provide updated maps as the situation in Syria develops.



(Data on events compiled from reporting by Shaam News Network)

Sunday, September 8, 2013

Clashes and Airstrikes on September 4th, 5th, and 6th, 2013

The heat maps below show direct clashes between regime troops and rebel forces and regime air strikes in Syria on September 4th,5th, and 6th, 2013. These types of incidents help elucidate areas of physical proximity between rebel and regime forces, and locations that the regime is targeting where rebels are likely present. Indirect fire events are not represented. We will continue to provide updated maps as the situation in Syria develops.

(Data on events compiled from reporting by Shaam News Network)

Friday, September 6, 2013

A Video Tour of Regime Checkpoints in Hama Province

This video, released today by Ahrar al-Sham, details the locations of checkpoints manned by Assad’s forces in northwestern Hama province. It is stands out from the flood of information coming out of Syria both for its professional quality as well as the detailed information that it provides.



Below we have provided an overview map of the checkpoints along with a loose translation of the video, including time markers to guide you to each location referenced in the video.


Ahrar al-Sham is an Islamist group fighting against the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war. It is the principal unit in the Syrian Islamic Front, and believed to be one of the strongest rebel groups in the conflict. Ahrar al-Sham is not a part of the Free Syrian Army nor is it affiliated with the al-Qaeda-backed groups, but it has been known to cooperate with both in offensives against the regime.

Thursday, September 5, 2013

Clashes and Air Strikes in Syria on Sept 3, 2013


The heat maps below show direct clashes between regime troops and rebel forces and regime air strikes in Syria on September 3, 2013. These types of incidents help elucidate areas of physical proximity between rebel and regime forces, and locations that the regime is targeting where rebels are likely present. Indirect fire events are not represented. We will continue to provide updated maps as the situation in Syria develops.

(Data on events compiled from reporting by Shaam News Network)

Wednesday, September 4, 2013

Clashes and Air Strikes in Syria from September 1 and 2


The heat maps below show direct clashes between regime troops and rebel forces and regime air strikes in Syria on September 1 and 2, 2013. These types of incidents help elucidate areas of physical proximity between rebel and regime forces, and locations that the regime is targeting where rebels are likely present. Indirect fire events are not represented. We will continue to provide updated maps as the situation in Syria develops.

(Data on events compiled from reporting by Shaam News Network and Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)

See AEI's Iran Tracker Where is Quds Force Commander Qassem Suleimani?

Will Fulton writes about possible reasons for a dearth of coverage on one of Iran's most powerful and revered security officials:

"No show: Suleimani's scheduled presence and topic of discussion at this meeting -- Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and Lebanon -- was reported weeks in advance. This was pre-planned and important. For Suleimani not to show at all would mean that his presence was required (in the most literal sense of the term) elsewhere. Could this indicate that the IRGC and other senior regime officials, or Assad, are panicking over the possibility of a U.S. intervention? Or is Suleimani simply attending to his responsibilities at this critical juncture (what IRGC Deputy Commander Hossein Salami called on September 3 "the threshold of a strategic turning point for the region's future")?"

Read the entire post at: http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/fulton-suleimani-speech-sept-04-2013


Tuesday, September 3, 2013

Russian Ships Track US Navy Movements

In response to the chemical weapons attack in Damascus on August 21, 2013, the US Navy repositioneda total of five Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers in the Eastern Mediterranean.  These ships, carrying the long range Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), were located so they would be in position to launch TLAM missiles against Syria, if the order to do so was issued.  The movement to firing position did not take long - two days after the chemical weapon attack, four destroyers were already in place, ready to attack. The US Navy was ready, no more than 48 hours after the attack, to respond with long range, precision fires in support of US strategic interests.

DELAY IN STRIKE YIELDS SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN RUSSIAN SURVEILLANCE

In response to the US Navy movements to conduct a Tomahawk Land Attack (TLAM) cruise missile strike against Assad regime targets in Syria, the Russian Navy deployedseveral ships from its Black Sea Fleet Headquarters of Sevastopol to the Mediterranean.  On September 1, the Russian Navy reconnaissance vessel SSV-201 Priazovye departed Sevastopol for the Mediterranean. This picture of the Priazovye shows that it carries a number of active and passive electrical components that can be used to gather intelligence on US Navy ships operating in the area.

© Ilhan Kermen

Although Russian Navy ships in the Mediterranean have limited ability to interfere with US Navy operations, and don’t appear intent on doing so, they do have the ability - especially with the addition of SSV-201 Priazovye - to track US Navy movements, communications, and activities.  Russian tracking of US Navy ships in the Mediterranean can be accomplished with both active means, including radar, as well as passive means, primarily signals intelligence. 

US NAVY OPERATIONS VULNERABLE TO DETECTION

Even without the presence of Russian Navy ships, US Navy operations are vulnerable to detection.  The SPY-1D radar used onboard the US Navy Arleigh Burke class destroyers operating in the Mediterranean has a peak power output of at least 4 Megawatts. Any ship operating a radar system with a peak power output of 4,000,000 watts is going to be visible to the most rudimentary radar receiver, let alone a dedicated, technically capable reconnaissance ship like Priazovye. 

Although the US Navy can and does use the tactical procedure of Emissions Control (EMCON) to restrict radar and communications energy output as a means of limiting external situation awareness of US Navy ship movements, in a relatively small waterspace like the Mediterranean it is going to be difficult for the US Navy to conceal ship locations, movements, and activities.  This is especially true given that the maximum range of TLAM averages about 1,000 nautical miles, depending on the exact TLAM variant used. In practical terms, this means US Navy ships must be within 1,000 nautical miles of their target when launching TLAM.  This means that Russian ships attempting to surveil US Navy ships can limit their search activities to a Weapons Engagement Zone (WEZ) that corresponds to potential TLAM launch points that are within 1000 nautical miles of potential targets in Syria, roughly the eastern third of the Mediterranean. 

TLAM LAUNCH VULNERABLE TO DETECTION

Even if the US Navy is very aggressive about limiting radar and communications emissions, and is successful in concealing the location of the five Arleigh Burke Class destroyers currently positioned in the Mediterranean prior to launching TLAM, once those cruise missiles leave the Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells, a solid rocket motor booster elevatesthe TLAM to at least several hundred feet in altitude.



This launch and boost phase is observable in two ways.  First, the solid rocket motor puts out a significant amount of thermal energy during the launch and boost phase.  This thermal energy bloom is easily observable from both terrestrial and space based platforms - especially if the sensors have been “cued” where to look for the launch. Second, although the TLAM does have a reduced radar cross section, making it very difficult to see while in flight at low altitude overland, during the boost phase the solid rocket motor booster is still joined to the TLAM missile itself.  The elements joined together are easily observable on radar.

RUSSIAN DETECTION OF TLAM LAUNCH

Regardless of how proficient the US Navy is at concealing current locations of ships, the Russian Navy will almost certainly detect the launch of TLAM.  Assuming that no launch will occur until after the US Congress reconvenes in session on September 9, the Russian Navy will have had almost three weeks, perhaps more, to move ships into position to locate and track US Navy ships prior to launching TLAM.   

THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE AND INITIATIVE

The Prussian military philosopher Carl Von Clausewitz wrote that

“Surprise…. is to be regarded as a substantive principle in itself, on account of its moral effect. When it is successful in a high degree, confusion and broken courage in the enemy's ranks are the consequences; and of the degree to which these multiply a success, there are examples enough, great and small.”

In modern terms, US Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, counsels commanders to seize the initiativein order to

“Shock, demoralize, and disrupt the enemy immediately.... to seize and maintain the initiative, deny the enemy the opportunity to achieve its objectives, and generate in the enemy a sense of inevitable failure and defeat.”

The US has waited so long to respond to the chemical weapons attacks that it has effectively ceded any advantages of surprise and initiative to the Assad regime. The Assad regime knows an attack is coming or is likely to come in the near future.  In addition to the overall forewarning of attack, the Assad regime is likely to get detailed updates from the Russian Navy as soon as the US Navy launches a TLAM attack. 

CONCLUSION

By significantly delaying the potential strike against the Assad regime, not only has the US given Assad considerable time to prepare for the attack in Syria, it has given Russia time to position intelligence assets that can immediately alert the Assad regime of exactly when the TLAM missiles are launched.  Fixed site targets, such as runways or heavy radars, are going to be vulnerable to TLAM strikes regardless of advanced warning.  Mobile targets - such as military and political leadership targets - are going to be far less vulnerable to a cruise missile strike if they have detailed warning of exactly when TLAM launches occur.  A strike against the Assad regime can still serve US strategic interests.   By ceding the elements of surprise and initiative, the US has made the strike much less likely to cause consequential damage to the Assad regime.  

Lebanese Rhetoric Surrounding Potential US Strike


Monday, September 2, 2013

Reconfiguration of Regime's Military Assets, Kfar Souseh Neighborhood, Damascus

The map below was posted online by activists in the local revolutionary coordinating committee for the Kfar Souseh neighborhood of Damascus. It purports to show the new locations of regime security forces in that neighborhood through 8/31/2013. The Syrian military forces have been redeploying military assets in the past few weeks in preparation for a possible U.S. strike, moving potential targets out of military complexes and into civilian buildings and covert locations.

Map of regime redeployment in Kfar Souseh, Damascus (see below for translation)


Three jeeps with around 40 shabiha (pro-regime militia) and military personnel have deployed in buildings along this line.
This is a checkpoint with SUV and 24-passenger parked at it, there is also some explosive detection equipment and a Doshka heavy machine gun on a vehicle nearby. They are stopping and inspecting pedestrians and cars.
Around ten military personnel in a garden. Two boxes of weapons entered into the location a few days earlier. Near map marker #120: on the fourth floor of the building there is a military general, some officers, and around 50 soldiers.
Near map marker #217 there are soldiers and officers
There is a checkpoint of two people
Sniper locations
Security forces are present in civilian clothing: around 200 of them at map marker #175, and around 150 of them at map marker #182.
Heavy security deployment at the buildings across from the Council of Ministers. There is a checkpoint with two BTR’s (Russian-made armored personnel carriers).
  
Location of Kfar Souseh



Sunday, September 1, 2013

Fighting Continues Across Syria

Heavy fighting continued throughout Syria yesterday, with Damascus bearing the brunt of it. Many of the locations on the heatmap below indicate regime bombardments and airstrikes, but in Aleppo the rebels took the offensive, with attacks on a military checkpoint near al-Safira and a fuel center.

Kinetic events  in Syria on August 31, 2013
(Map as of 23:22, Sept 1, 2013; data gathered from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights) 

A closer look at Damascus shows a significant amount of fighting in the northern Barzeh neighborhood. The village of Mo’adamiyeh al-Sham, the site of one of the alleged chemical attacks of August 21st, also continues to be the target of regime bombardments.

Kinetic events in Damascus on August 31, 2013
(Map as of 23:22, Sept 1, 2013; data gathered from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights) 



Regime Preparations Continue

We are closely tracking the Assad regime's response to the delay in the anticipated U.S. attack. Here is a snapshot of what we see via social media. Special thanks to Babel Street and its sophisticated, social media analytic software.

The regime circulated a statement that Damascus International Airport would be shut down to civilian air traffic until further notice. The last civilian outbound flight occurred at 6 p.m., and the notice took effect at 9 p.m. local.
  1. Activists indicate that military forces have withdrawn from three bases located at the Damascus International Airport, and there are unconfirmed reports that digging and drilling have commenced in the area.
  2. Multiple opposition activists reported that Republican Guard installations on Mount Qasioun, Assad’s military stronghold in Damascus, were atypically blacked out overnight.
  3. Opposition media centers have indicated that a radar system was removed from the 613 Air Defense Battalion’s command center, located in the countryside to the East of Dera'a.
It seems reasonable to conclude that the Assad Regime is moving equipment, supplies, or personnel under cover of darkness.
     
In addition, reports have surfaced that the armed opposition has attempted to breach Aleppo prison overnight. The operation was still ongoing as of time of blog post (1:01 a.m. EDT, Sept. 1, 2013).

Saturday, August 31, 2013

31 AUG 2013 1445 EDT

Unconfirmed social media reports indicate that there has been an uptick in regime strikes particularly in Damascus following President Obama’s announcement that the U.S. will seek congressional authorization before conducting operations against the Syrian regime.